People's Liberation Army Navy

People's Liberation Army Navy From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) (Pinyin: Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiě fàngjūn Hǎ ijūn) is the naval branch of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the military of the People's Republic of China. Until the early 1990s, the navy performed a subordinate role to the PLA Land Forces. Since then it has undergone rapid modernisation. The PLAN also includes 35,000 Coastal Defence Force and 56,000 Naval infantry/Marines, plus a 56,000 PLAN Aviation naval air arm operating several hundred land-based aircraft and ship-based helicopters.

Mission of the PLAN Peacetime      

Sea patrols of territorial waters Establish presence in disputed territorial waters and protect current interests Anti-piracy, anti-smuggling, search and rescue Maintain security of territorial waters Active logistical support role of combatants and island garrisons Maintain security of Sea Lines of Communications

Wartime       

Littoral defense of local seas Blockade or protection of vital ship routes and choke points (eg. Taiwan strait) Tactical transport, support, and amphibious operations of ground forces Air defense Anti-submarine operations Engagement of enemy shipping Active logistical support role of combatants and island garrisons

History The PLAN traces its lineage to units of the Republic of China Navy who defected to the PLA towards the end of the Chinese Civil War. In 1949, Mao Zedong asserted that "to oppose imperialist aggression, we must build a powerful navy." The Naval Academy was set up at Dalian in March 1950, mostly with Soviet instructors. The navy was established in September 1950 by consolidating regional naval forces under General Staff Department command in Jiangyan, now in Taizhou, Jiangsu province. It then consisted of a motley collection of ships and boats acquired from the Kuomintang forces. The Naval Air Force was added two years later. By 1954 an estimated 2,500 Soviet naval advisers were in China—possibly one adviser to every thirty Chinese naval personnel—and the Soviet Union began providing modern ships. With Soviet assistance, the navy reorganized in 1954 and 1955 into the North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet, and a corps of admirals and other naval officers was established from the ranks of the ground forces. In ship building the Soviets first assisted the Chinese, then the Chinese copied Soviet designs without assistance, and finally the Chinese produced vessels of their own design. Eventually Soviet assistance progressed to the point that a joint Sino-Soviet Pacific Ocean fleet was under discussion.

1950's and 1960's Through the upheavals of the late 1950s and 1960s the navy remained relatively undisturbed. Under the leadership of Minister of National Defense Lin Biao, large investments were made in naval construction during the frugal years immediately after the Great Leap Forward. During the Cultural Revolution, a number of top naval commissars and commanders were purged, and naval forces were used to suppress a revolt in Wuhan in July 1967, but the service largely avoided the turmoil affecting the country. Although it paid lip service to Mao and assigned political commissars aboard ships, the navy continued to train, build, and maintain the fleets.

PLAN sailors in Qingdao, China

1970's and 1980's In the 1970s, when approximately 20 percent of the defense budget was allocated to naval forces, the navy grew dramatically. The conventional submarine force increased from 35 to 100 boats, the number of missile-carrying ships grew from 20 to 200, and the production of larger surface ships, including support ships for oceangoing operations, increased. The navy also began development of nuclear-powered attack submarines and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.

In the 1980s, under the leadership of Chief Naval Commander Liu Huaqing, the navy developed into a regional naval power. It should be noted that Liu Huaqing was an Army Officer who spent most of his career in administrative positions involving science and technology. It was not until 1988 that the People's Liberation Army Navy was lead by a Naval Officer. Liu was also very close to Deng Xiaopeng his modernization were very much in keeping with Deng's national policies. While under his leadership Naval construction yards produced fewer ships than the 1970s, but a great emphasis was placed on technology and improved quality. Modernization efforts also encompassed higher educational and technical standards for personnel; reformulation of the traditional coastal defense doctrine and force structure in favor of more green-water operations; and training in naval combined-arms operations involving submarine, surface, naval aviation, and coastal defense forces. Examples of the expansion of China's capabilities were the 1980 recovery of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the Western Pacific by a twenty-ship fleet, extended naval operations in the South China Sea in 1984 and 1985, and the visit of two naval ships to three South Asian nations in 1985. In 1982 the navy conducted a successful test of an underwater-launched ballistic missile. The navy also had some success in developing a variety of surface-to-surface and air-to-surface missiles, improving basic capabilities. [1]

Current Status Strategy, Plans, Priorities The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy has become more prominent in recent years owing to a change in Chinese strategic priorities. The new strategic threats include possible conflict with the United States and/or a resurgent Japan in areas such as the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. As part of its overall program of naval modernization, the PLAN has a long-term plan of developing a blue water navy.

Organization The PLAN is organized into several departments for effective command and control.

Equipment

Luhai-class destroyer Shenzhen (167) entering harbor

Song-class SSK

The PLAN initially utilized Soviet-based hardware as the backbone of their forces, with increasing domestic production over time. In the last several years, the PRC has made progress in modernising its fleet with the purchase of Sovremenny class destroyers and Kilo class submarines, as well as producing sophisticated domestic designs such as the Lanzhou class destroyers and the Yuan class submarines. The Sovremenny class destroyers were equipped with the SS-N-22 anti-ship missile.

China's submarine fleet has also made advances. The Song and Yuan-class subs are quieter than their predecessors and the Kilo-class subs are equipped with two next-generation weapons: the Klub anti-ship cruise missile and the VA-111 Shkval torpedo. Many Chinese submarines, including the Kilo, are also thought to have air-independent propulsion, which would allow them to remain submerged for longer periods of time than they could previously maintain. Chinese naval production has improved, in part due to Russian assistance. Its latest destroyers use more local hardware of an improved quality, such as better fire-control systems and stealth technology in their hull designs to reduce their radar profile, and C4I systems. However, despite these advances, China's newer vessels are still outnumbered by older ones that it has to keep in service out of necessity. Thus the PLAN still greatly lags behind other navies in the region such as the United States Navy, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Republic of Korea Navy in terms of overall unit quality.

The future fleet

PLAN Sovremenny-class destroyer Taizhou

The PLAN's ambitions include operating out to the first and second island chains, as far as the South Pacific near Australia and spanning to the Aleutian islands, and operations extending to the Straits of Malacca near the Indian Ocean. The future PLAN fleet will be composed of a balance of assets aimed at maximising the PLAN's fighting effectiveness. On the high end, there would be high technology destroyers equipped with long range air defense missiles (052B/052C, 051C); destroyers armed with sophisticated anti-ship weaponry (Sovremenny class); advanced nuclear powered attack and ballistic missile submarines (Type 093, Type 094); advanced conventional attack submarines (Kilo and Yuan); aircraft carriers and large amphibious warfare vessels capable mobilizing troops at long distances. On the medium and low end, there would be more economical yet multi-role capable frigates and destroyers (upgraded Luda, Luhu, Jiangwei II, 054A); fast littoral missile attack craft (Houjian, Houxin, 220X); various landing ships and light craft; conventionally powered coastal patrol submarines (Song). The future fleet will have the obsolete combat ships (based on 1960s designs) phased out in the coming decades as more modern designs enter full production. It may take until 2025 until the bulk of these older ships are retired. Until then, they will serve principally on the low end, as multi-role

patrol/escort platforms. Their use could be further enhanced in the future by being used as fast transports or fire support platforms. 2001-2006 so far have demonstrated a rapid building and acquisition program. There were more than a dozen new classes of ships built in these last five years, totalling some sixty brand new ships (including landing ships and auxiliaries). Simultaneously, dozens of other ships have been either phased out of service or refitted with new equipment. There has been speculation about PLAN building or acquiring an aircraft carrier [1], but the idea appears to have a lower priority than other efforts. Most naval analysts believe that, without significant overall naval modernization, a PLAN aircraft carrier at present would be militarily useless and would take resources away from other parts of the military. This assessment appears to be shared by the Chinese military and political leadership. China currently has the Admiral Kuznetsov class aircraft carrier Varyag in Dalian. China could finish this carrier and make it operational, or simply use it for takeoff and landing training. Though the PLAN has made significant strides in anti-ship and anti-aircraft weaponry, its fundamental weakness is in ASW capabilities. Despite the utilization of helicopters, torpedoes and depth charges, the PLAN lacks advanced sonar systems that are necessary to hunt down modern submarines. Electronic Warfare is another weakness of the PLAN. All but the newest ships and weapons are susceptible to jamming and other electronic countermeasures. The command/control systems remain at the fleet level, with only some form of integration in the latest combatants. Training is another teething factor. With the large influx of PLAN warships, new crews will have to be trained intensively. Especially after the 361 submarine accident, there has been some doubt about PLAN personnel capabilities in effective damage control, safety and fire fighting. These areas of weakness can only be addressed in the coming decades, as the PLAN may choose to modernize one area at a time, due to budgetary issues.