Parents Are Parties To Juvenile Court Proceedings

1 2 3

Parties without attorney Joe Lunchbucket Joe Lunchbucket Jr Petitioners

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In the Court of Appeals for the State of California

9 10

1st Appellate District

12

Joe lunchbucket Joe lunchbucket jr Petitioner

13

vs.

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) No _______________________ ) ) ) Petition for Writ of ) Habeas Corpus and Petition ) for Writ of Certiorari ) Auxiliary to the Writ of ) Habeas Corpus regarding ) BS County Superior ) Court Case Number JV666 ) )

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BS COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT Respondent

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I.

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1.1

Petitioners Joe Lunchbucket and Joe Lunchbucket jr are

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each in his own right one of the sovereign people constituent of

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People of the State of California, whom does herein petition

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this court:

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a.

to issue an order to the BS County Superior

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Court to certify its record before this court

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for review in proceeding number JV666 and,

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b.

to issue the appropriate writ to the BS County

28 -1Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

1

Superior Court to vacate and set aside it’s

2

judgments in proceeding number JV666 as void

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for want or excess of jurisdiction,

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c.

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to issue injunctive orders for the correction of records.

1.2

Petitioner herein, Joe Lunchbucket is Parent and

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first counsel to Joe lunchbucket jr a minor whom

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was the object of the actions challenged, and

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whom has held sole legal and physical custody

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pursuant to order in BS County Superior Court

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case number 66649 since approximately 1992.

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1.3

Petitioners are restrained of liberty and denied

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Due Process of law by the juvenile court under

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color of law in that Petitioner Joe lunchbucket

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is enjoined of parental right and standing whilst

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Petitioner Joe Lunchbucket jr now eighteen years

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of age whom was a minor at the time of the events

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complained of, has been deprived of Due Process

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of law and has thus suffered gross restraint of

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liberty and continues to unjustly suffer

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defamation of his character and the consequences

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thereof in that: NCIC reports Joe Lunchbucket jr

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as a convicted “drug trafficker” when the actions

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of the court in JV666, if held to be valid

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supports no such claim even.

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II.

27 28 -2Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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Declaration of Facts 2.1

Beginning on November 2nd 2003 and on several

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subsequent dates petitioner received notices of the filing of

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petitions in the BS Superior Court alleging one Joe Lunchbucket

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jr, a minor, to come within the jurisdiction of said court.

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Respondent immediately made requests for discovery and no answer

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to any discovery request was ever received.

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2.2

On December 15, 2004 petitioner received notice of the

filing of a petition in the BS Superior Court alleging one Joe

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Lunchbucket jr to come within the jurisdiction of said court.

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Respondent again made immediate request for discovery and no

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disclosure was ever received.

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2.3

On January 10, 2005 after a perpetual series of abuse

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of parental standing, Petitioner herein filed with the BS

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Superior court a “Special Plea in Bar” with accompanying

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affidavit questioning the courts command in the matter and

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demanding proof of lawful authority and identity to

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constitutional jurisdiction.

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2.4

On March 4, 2005, a date set for further proceedings,

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Petitioner attempted to file amended pleadings and the Juvenile

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court clerk refused to accept the documents stating the parent

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could “present them to the court at the hearing”. Immediately

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thereafter the matter of Tyler M. was called and BS County Court

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Commissioner Michael Williams began by Ruling that there were

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documents in the file that did not belong there, that they were

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being returned to the father and stating the reasons to the

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father as “Your not a party to this action”. In response to the

28 -3Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

1

fathers objection the commissioner ruled “you can file for a

2

writ if you want to”.

3

2.5

Petitioners affidavit accompanying said Plea in Bar

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had made it clear that in each previous appearance petitioner

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had been intimidated by an armed paramilitary individual and was

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thusly forced to sit in the gallery and not allowed before the

7

bar, and that after minor’s counsel stated the parent to be

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present, the court proceeded in the matter as if the parent were

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for all practical purposes absent. The parent was in fact not

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afforded the status of a party and not allowed to participate in

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discovery, examination, inquiry or objection. Petitioners

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affidavit accompanying said Plea in Bar is incorporated herein

13

by reference as if fully restated.

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III.

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A PARENT IS A PARTY ENTITLED TO FULL PARTICIPATION IN JUVENILE

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COURT PROCEEDINGS

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CASE LAW: 3.1

In In re Robert W., 68 Cal.App.3d 705, an action under

Welfare and Institutions Code 602, one of the questions raised on appeal was whether a minor's parent had standing to challenge a juvenile court judge or referee under section 170.6, the Court of appeals stated: “In our view, a parent in a juvenile court proceeding is a party to such proceeding with a substantial interest -- the interest of protecting the parent-child relationship and the parent's right to custody. The right of a parent to separate counsel representation, recognized by Welfare and Institutions Code sections 633 and 634, indicates legislative recognition of a parent's interest as a party to the -4Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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juvenile court proceeding. [9] Since a juvenile court's order may take custody of a minor away from a parent, a parent comes within the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 902, which authorizes a "party aggrieved" to take an appeal” The Robert W court then addressed the separate statutory right of parent and child to counsel: “Section 633 provides that at the detention hearing the minor and his parent shall be informed of "the right of such minor and his parent or guardian to be represented at every stage of the proceedings by counsel." (Italics added.) Section 634 provides, in pertinent part, that "[w]hen it appears to the court that the minor or his parent or guardian desires counsel but isunable to afford and cannot for that reason employ counsel, the court may appoint counsel. In a case in which the minor is alleged to be a person described in Section 601 or 602, the court shall appoint counsel for the minor if he appears at the hearing without counsel, whether he is unable to afford counsel or not, unless there is an intelligent waiver of the right of counsel by the minor; ... In any case in which it appears to the court that there is such a conflict of interest between a parent or guardian and child that one attorney could not properly represent both, the court shall appoint counsel, in addition to [68 Cal.App.3d 716] counsel already employed by a parent or guardian or appointed by the court to represent the minor or parent or guardian. ..." (Italics added.) [7] It seems clear that the language of section 633 of the Welfare and Institutions Code -- which is mandatory in nature -- gives a parent of a minor an absolute right to be represented by counsel at every stage of the juvenile court proceedings. Under section 633, the parent's right to counsel is not affected by the fact that the minor is represented by counsel. Each is entitled to be so represented. Section 634 gives the court discretionary authority to appoint counsel for the minor or the parent in case of indigency except that it is mandatory that counsel be appointed for a minor alleged to come within Welfare and Institutions Code

28 -5Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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section 601 or 602. A distinction is thus made in section 634 between a minor and his parent insofar as the right to a court-appointed attorney is concerned. The minor has an absolute right to a court-appointed attorney while a parent does not possess such right.” 3.2

In contrast the Fifth District Court of Appeals in In

re Byron S. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 822 , 223 Cal.Rptr. 319 (also a 602 case), looked at the fathers right of participation from the perspective of the child’s Due Process Rights. In re Dargo (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 205 [183 P.2d 282] held the parents have a right to appeal and raise issues in the interest of the minor as well as themselves. Logic suggests the converse should also be true although neither counsel nor this court, in its independent research, have found any case, which specifically deals with this issue. Further, and it may be a fine distinction, the minor is not here asserting his father's right to an interpreter that he, the father, could understand but rather his, the minor's, right to the full participation and assistance of his father in the juvenile court proceedings. If his father, for lack of an adequate interpreter, could not understand and thus assist his son, then it is the minor who is aggrieved and, in our view, has standing to raise the issue on appeal. The Byron S court concluded by stating “the minor is [176 Cal.App.3d 829] entitled to the full participation and assistance of his father at the adjudication hearing as well as the disposition hearing.” 3.3

“Due process of law requires sufficient notice to the

parents with an opportunity to be heard” In Re Moilanen (1951) 104 Cal. App. 2d 835, 842 also a 602 case, the court held that such notice was jurisdictional. The California Supreme Court cited Moilanen for this proposition with approval in In Re B.G. (1974) 11 C.3d. 679 (subsequently questioned on other grounds) -6Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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3.4

The California Supreme Court has even recognized non-

3

relative caregivers to be defacto parents entitled to standing

4

as parties to juvenile court proceedings. in In re Rachael

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C.(1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1445 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 473 citing its

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holding in In re B. G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679 [114 Cal.Rptr. 444,

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523 P.2d 244]

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The high court said:

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"We conclude that de facto parents, such as the foster parents in this case, should be permitted to appear as parties in juvenile court proceedings. Their standing should not depend upon the filing of a petition for guardianship, although the filing of such a petition may aid in attesting to their interest in the custody of the child; nor should their participation be restricted to the limited role of an amicus curiae; they should be permitted to appear as parties to assert and protect their own interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of the child."

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They concluded by saying ...." It is a general rule that an order denying a person the right to participate in a proceeding is an appealable order. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 50, pp. 74-75.) It would follow that an order denying a person the right to participate in a juvenile proceeding as a de facto parent would be appealable under Welfare and Institutions Code [235 Cal.App.3d 1455] section 395. Second, the decision in In re B. G. was specifically concerned with the de facto parents' status as parties to the appeal. (Supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 692.) The court concluded that de facto parents should be allowed to participate as parties in the proceedings, including the appeal. To the extent that rule 1435(b) would preclude de facto parents from participating in an appeal it is more restrictive than the decision in In re B. G. and section 395 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and

28 -7Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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is therefore to that extent void. We are satisfied that appellants have properly sought appellate review. We intimate no opinion whether de facto parents should be accorded all of the rights of a parent or guardian, such as the right to appointed counsel and free transcripts. and again in In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 775; 859 P.2d 1290 Hence, we concluded, de facto parents should be permitted "to appear as [full] parties," not mere amici curiae, in a juvenile dependency proceeding. [6 Cal.4th 76] Their standing, we stressed, does not depend upon pending guardianship applications. Rather, we held, the fact of de facto parenthood alone should entitle them to intervene and protect their "own interest" in the child's care and custody. (In re B. G., supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 693.)

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It is obvious from these authorities that a natural parent is a

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party to a juvenile court action involving their progeny.

IV.

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STATUTORY AUTHORITY:

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4.1

Under Welfare and Institutions Code Sections 679, 633

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and Cal Rules of Court 1472(a) Parents have the right to be

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present and represented by counsel. The question here is what

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right of the parent does counsel re-present? Is it not the right

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to participate and to be heard?

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4.2 Under

Welfare

and

Institutions

Code

Section

664

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parents

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subpoena

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purpose? Certainly if parents are entitled to subpoena witnesses

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to examine for the establishment of evidence in the fact-finding

are

acknowledged

witnesses,

if

as

not

having to

substantive

examine

them

28 -8Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

then

rights for

to what

1

phase then it follows that they have the right to cross-examine

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adverse witnesses as well. In fact parental presence is so vital

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to the validity of the proceedings that if the hearing moves

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forward in their absence, they are entitled to a rehearing.

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4.3

Even

“De

Facto”

parents

may

be

able

to

acquire

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parental substantive rights including participating as parties,

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and offer evidence. Cal Rules of court 1410, 1472(e). Welfare

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and Institutions Code 676, 679, (658, 656(e).

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V. PARTY AND PARTIES DEFINED 5.1 John Bouvier Revised Sixth Edition, 1856 PARTY, practice, contracts. When applied to practice, by party is understood either the plaintiff or defendant. In contracts, a party is one or more persons who engage to perform or receive the performance of some agreement. Vide Parties to contracts; Parties to 'actions; Parties to a suit in equity. PARTIES, contracts. Those persons who engage themselves to do, or not to do the matters and things contained in an agreement. 2. All persons generally can be parties to contracts, unless they labor under some disability. 3. Consent being essential to all valid contracts, it follows that persons who want, first, understanding; or secondly, freedom to exercise their will, cannot be parties to contracts. Thirdly, persons who in consequence of their situation are incapable to enter into some particular contract. These will be separately considered. PARTIES TO ACTIONS. Those persons who institute actions for the recovery of their rights, and those persons against whom they are instituted, are the parties to the actions; the former are called plaintiffs, and the latter, defendants. The term parties is understood to include all persons who are directly interested in the subject-matter in issue, -9Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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who have right to make defence, control the proceeding, or appeal from the judgment. Persons not having these rights are regarded as strangers to the cause. 20 How. St. Tr. 538, n.; Greenl. Ev. Sec. 523 2. It is of the utmost importance in bringing actions to have proper parties, for however just and meritorious the claim may be, if a mistake has been made in making wrong persons, either plaintiffs or defendants, or including too many or too few persons as parties, the plaintiff may in general be defeated. 3. Actions are naturally divided into those which arise upon contracts, and those which do not, but accrue to the plaintiff in consequence of some wrong or injury committed by the defendant.

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5.2

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Party, n. A person concerned or having or taking part in any affair, matter, transaction or proceeding, considered individually. See Parties. “party” is a technical word, and has a precise meaning in legal parlance. By it is understood he or they by or against whom a suit is brought, whether in law or equity; the party plaintiff or defendant, whether composed of one or more individuals, and whether natural or legal persons, (they are parties on the writ, and parties on the record;)and all others who may be affected by the suit, indirectly or consequently, are persons interested, but not parties. Merchants’ Bank v. Cook, 4 Pick. 405. “party” is not restricted to strict meaning of plaintiff or defendant in a lawsuit, being defined as one concerned in or privy to a matter as in the relation of accessory or confidant, and again a partial person, one who takes sides. State v. Orr, 53 Idaho 452, 24 P.2d 679.

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Blacks Law Dictionary Deluxe Fourth 1951

Party, Adj. Relating or belonging to, or composed of, two or more parts or portions, or two or more persons or classes of persons. PARTIES. The persons who take part in the performance of any act or who are directly interested in any affair, contract, or conveyance, or who are actively concerned in the prosecution and defense of

28 -10Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

1

any legal proceeding. U.S. to Use of Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Henderlong, C.C.Ind., 102 F2; Robbins v. Chicago, 4 Wall. 672, 18 L.Ed. 42; Green v. Bogue, 12 S.Ct. 975, 158 U.S. 478 39 L.Ed. 1061; Hughes v. Jones, 116 N.Y.67, 22 N. E. 446, 5 L.R.A 637,…

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5.3

(1895) said: “'Parties, in the larger legal sense, are all persons having a right to control the proceedings to make defense, to adduce and cross-examine witnesses, and to appeal from the decision, if an appeal lies.' 1 Greenl. Ev. 535.”

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The United States in GREEN v. BOGUE, 158 U.S. 478

5.4

It would necessarily follow that if a parent has an

absolute right to be re-presented by counsel at his own expense that the parent also has the right to present themselves in their own person in the absence of either their desire for or, their ability to afford, an attorney or other suitable counsel. It is only limited liability entities, which need to be represented as their fictional nature prevents them from presenting them selves. Petitioner has neither granted the right nor the authority to any other to re-present him but has in fact sought to present himself on his own behalf and has been unlawfully enjoined from exercising his right to do so. 5.5

A court, for whatever reason, not wanting to recognize the standing of an indigent parent to present themselves in

24

their own person on the one hand and finding it equally

25

within their discretion not to appoint counsel for the

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indigent on the other, effectively disallows due process in

27

every way.

28 -11Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

1

5.6

In any event the court has a duty to answer regarding its

2

claim of authority to prevent a parent from direct

3

participation in proceedings involving the parents minor

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child or to enjoin the parent of his rights as a parent via

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proceedings in which his rights are decided but in which he

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is not allowed to participate. Surely this cannot be.

7

VI.

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PARENTAL RIGHTS and RESPONSIBILITIES

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6.1

Parenting rights are God given and are inherent in the

10

original covenant between man and his creator. The First, Fifth,

11

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution

12

protect these rights from the intrusions of government.

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In Troxel v. Granville, 99-138 [U.S. 06/05/2000 U.S. Supreme Court, November 1999], the Supreme Court ruled, [49] The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." We have long recognized that the Amendment's Due Process Clause, like its Fifth Amendment counterpart, "guarantees more than fair process." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 719 (1997). The Clause also includes a substantive component that "provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests." Id., at 720; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 301-302(1993). 50] The liberty interest at issue in this case -- the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children -- is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court. More than 75 years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399, 401 (1923), we held that the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to "establish a home and bring up

28 -12Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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children" and "to control the education of their own." Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925), we again held that the "liberty of parents and guardians" includes the right "to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control." We explained in Pierce that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." Id., at 535. We returned to the subject in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944), and again confirmed that there is a constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Id., at 166. …..There is a presumption that fit parents act in their children's best interests, Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 602; there is normally no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question fit parents' ability to make the best decisions regarding their children, see, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 304. …..This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition"); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246, 255 (1978) ("We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected"); Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 602 (1979) ("Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that course"); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 753 (1982) (discussing "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child"); Glucksberg, supra, at 720 ("In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the `liberty' specially protected by the Due Process -13Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

1 2 3 4 5 6

Clause includes the righ[t] ... to direct the education and upbringing of one's children" (citing Meyer and Pierce). In light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and… 6.2

It is clear from the above authorities that a parent

7

is not only a party to actions involving their children but that

8

they have both the right and the responsibility to subject all

9

adverse claims against their child to a rigorous scrutiny.

10

6.3

In discussing the distinction in the nature of family

11

versus juvenile courts the California Supreme Court makes it

12

imminently clear that juvenile courts pit the state via its

13

agencies against the parent and child as separate litigants.

14

In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 866; 913

15

P.2d 1075 the court stated very clearly

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The two courts have separate purposes. The family court is established to provide parents a forum in which to resolve, inter alia, private issues relating to the custody of and visitation with children. In that setting, parents are presumed to be fit and capable of raising their children. (Fam. Code, § 3061.) The juvenile court, by contrast, provides the state a forum to "restrict parental behavior regarding children, ... and ... to remove children from the custody of their parents or guardians." (Edwards, supra, 27 Santa Clara L.Rev. at p. 206, fns. omitted.) 6.4

It would appear from this analysis that 602

proceedings provide the “state” an environment in which to challenge the parents capacity or capability of raising their own children. Clearly the only “parties” by this analysis are the “state” (by and through its agents) and the “parent”. -14Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

1 2

6.5

As per the holding in Ryder v. United States 115 S.Ct.

3

2031, 132 L.Ed.2d 136, 515 U.S. 177 an individual is duty bound

4

to initiate a direct challenge to the claimed authority of

5

anyone representing him or herself as a government officer or

6

agent prior to the finality of any proceeding in order to avoid

7

implications of de facto officer doctrine. When challenged those

8

posing as government officers and agents are required to

9

affirmatively prove whatever authority they claim. In the

10

absence of proof, they may be held personally accountable for

11

loss, injury and damages.

12

6.6

“Public officers are merely the agents of the public,

13

whose powers and authority are defined and limited by law. Any

14

act without the scope of the authority so defined does not bind

15

the principal and all persons dealing with such agents are

16

charged with knowledge of the extent of their authority”

17

Continental Casualty Co. V. United States 113 F.2d 284 (5th

18

Cir.1940)

19

6.7

When the juvenile courts authority to proceed is

20

challenged, its duty to declare its jurisdiction and lawful

21

authority to proceed is not discretionary. "Once jurisdiction is

22

challenged it must be proven." Hagins vs. Levine 415 US 533 note

23

3 (1974).

24

VII.

25 26 27 28 -15Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

1

MEMORANDUM ON THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF PARENTAL

2

RESPONSIBILITY

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7.1

My Rights are my property and where the rights and

obligations of parental responsibility are concerned, there can be no tolerance whatever for any unjustified assault from any quarter. The ages old institution of family is so basic to the very foundation of civilization so as to be sacred. It stands as the cornerstone of the very survival of the human species. This fact is so plain and so self-evident as to defy rational debate. 7.2

Let it be stated here in the most unambiguous terms.

Where the safety, security and well being of the minor child is concerned, no body corporate, whether it be called a government, or any of its agencies, nor even the so called State nor any of its equally fictitious self appointed representatives, has any lawful power to invade the sanctuary of the family and impose, threaten to impose or otherwise bring to bear any force of any kind whatever that would compromise the natural and lawfully protected God given inalienable rights long recognized as being not only fundamental to a civilized society, but indeed, is essential to the very existence of the society itself. 7.3

The government of this country was created, brought

into being, and given power to serve the interests not of corporate enterprise, nor for collectivist aspirations, but for the purpose of expressing the interests of the individual. Where government, as agency of the state, or its representatives fails to preserve the interests of the individual, they act to support the enemies of the people. Where government officials tolerate

28 -16Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

1

or condone the institutionalized assault on the family, they are

2

themselves the enemy.

3

7.4

As sire and therefore lord of the family dominion, a

4

father has a natural, moral and lawful obligation to defend the

5

minor child within his household against wolves be they clad in

6

sheep’s clothing or any other costume. For a father to abrogate

7

this responsibility is nothing short of abandonment. The social

8

consequences of such failure are paramount to the collapse of

9

civilization itself. It therefore becomes not only an obligation

10

to the family that the father place himself in the face of the

11

assault, but also an obligation to his countrymen.

12

7.5

Certainly, every father must so act, in part at least,

13

because he believes that other fathers will and must do

14

likewise, and that therefore the future of his progeny is

15

secured by the righteous example of responsible parenting. In

16

this way, we as a people are able to pass on our learning, our

17

humble wisdom, our meager accomplishments and our hopes for a

18

more moral society to our children and their children's

19

children. Nothing less than this is acceptable to any man who

20

has in his heart the genuine desire to better himself, and to

21

thereby make a meaningful contribution to his progeny, not less

22

his people.

23

7.6

As father and therefore first counsel to my child,

24

there can be no proceedings, representation, counsel, advice,

25

coercive deal making, nor any other transactions with my

26

dependant children without both my consent and my direct

27

involvement.

28 -17Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

1

7.7

Any actions concerning the minor child shall be

2

proposed or effected through his parents' sovereign capacity to

3

know and understand and therefore to exercise the law. Failure

4

of those agencies charged with the preservation of public

5

justice to fulfill their obligation to answer where authority is

6

clearly questioned renders all subsequent proceeding in the

7

matter nugatory.

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7.8

The respondent to this petition has continuously

refused or otherwise failed to answer petitioner’s inquiries. 7.9

The question of legitimacy raises the question of

11

accountability. Where an act is done in secrecy, there will be

12

found the fruits of a poisonous tree. Where persons who claim

13

authority refuse to reveal their principal, or the basis in law

14

for their actions, there can be no grant of legitimacy, and

15

according to law and reason, no accountability. Where there is

16

no accountability, there is fertile soil for nurturing the

17

fruits of the poisonous tree. Where there is no accountability,

18

there can be no legitimacy, and therefore in accord with law and

19

reason, no basis whatever for lawful action. No lawful court,

20

without the pretense of legitimacy, could possibly entertain

21

such actions where they have been properly challenged.

22

7.10 That which does not appear is presumed not to exist.

23

The primary question of legitimacy is paramount. Acts on the

24

part of persons who claim to be party to the alleged action have

25

yet to identify their lawful authority, nor any other evidence

26

that could establish a basis for legal standing that would

27 28 -18Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

1

empower them to participate in any proceedings regarding the

2

instant matter.

3

7.11 The alleged claimants before said court have yet to

4

reveal a principal party of interest with standing, have yet to

5

state a rational claim, nor even to substantiate said supposed

6

claim in any way that could empower said court to so constitute

7

itself as to hear the issues as a lawful venue.

8

7.12 The foregoing points to the elements essential to

9

satisfy the most fundamental requirements of subject matter and

10

personum jurisdiction. The defects so far identified are fatal.

11

No amount of presumption nor resort to fictions of law can cure

12

them.

13

7.13 Where jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven.

14

Our law rests for its very existence on the foundation of facts.

15

Mere fictions are incapable of providing the required evidence

16

that alone has the capacity of establishing substance and

17

justification for any action to be entertained by any court that

18

could in any way whatsoever put in harms way the natural rights

19

of the individual.

20

7.14 Where the claim to authority is used to justify

21

aggression, usurpation, or plunder an individual is within their

22

lawful power to demand substantial evidence of that supposed

23

authority, and to institute and implement all means available to

24

realize effective defense against such assaults. Indeed, in

25

times such as these, when assumed authority supported by the

26

threat of arms is common the world over, it becomes the duty of

27 28 -19Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

1

every man to question the legitimacy and lawful basis of any

2

presentment of proclaimed authority.

3

7.15 Clearly, the a priori grant of legitimacy to any

4

posture of authority has become an irresponsible and dangerous

5

act. The assumption that anyone with the mere appearance of

6

power thus has legitimacy is not only irrational, in such times

7

as these when the daily news informs us regularly and often of

8

the corruption, greed and avarice that pervades the institutions

9

of government and the corporate enterprises they serve from the

10

national down to the local level, it becomes an act of criminal

11

complicity to give aid and comfort to those who would undermine,

12

sabotage or otherwise corrupt our law. This has been justly

13

called treason.

14

VIII.

15

These considerations bring forward the following determinations:

16

8.1

Resort is here made to quotes from accomplished

17

jurists and delivered opinions and decisions of authentic Courts

18

of Law only where they coincide with well settled principles of

19

law and reason, and where they can be reconciled with the

20

conscience of a dutiful father seeking to exercise his moral and

21

lawful obligations.

22

8.2

Reference to published authorities is utilized here

23

not to substantiate but to corroborate the findings and

24

determinations rendered by one's sovereign capacity and duty to

25

scrutinize and to test the veracity of any and all propositions

26

offered, or agreements proposed that would have a meaningful

27

impact on the lawful duties and obligations, or the capacity to

28 -20Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

1

exercise such lawful duties and obligations, either as father,

2

sovereign, citizen, person or individual man.

3

8.3

The right to counsel is not to be construed as any

4

obligation to be attorned or to accept an attorney, or other

5

officer of the court as counsel, nor as any obligation to

6

surrender or otherwise forfeit one's right to maintain and to

7

effect a responsible defense by the imposition of a limited

8

liability entity as one's supposed representative nor as any

9

compromise of one's capacity to present oneself in ones own

10

person. It is only fictions of law, which need to be re-

11

presented since their fictitious nature forecloses any

12

possibility of their presenting themselves in their own person.

13

8.4

There is no evidence on the record of any principal

14

party of interest who has been identified, or even claimed to

15

exist.

16

8.5

There is no evidence on the record that any pretended

17

representative or agent of a supposed principal party of

18

interest has any authority to act on behalf, or to do any act in

19

the interests of an unidentified principal party of interest.

20

8.6

There is not a single piece of evidence on the record

21

that could support a claim of authenticity for any of the

22

persons who have inserted themselves into the theatre of

23

proceedings thus far before the juvenile court.

24

8.7

The only party appearing thus far with any capacity to

25

lawfully exercise any legitimate authority in the instant matter

26

has been the father and petitioner herein.

27 28 -21Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

1

8.8

The only party willing to openly enter themselves on

2

the record, without limited liability protections of any kind,

3

has been the father and petitioner herein.

4

8.9

That limited liability is equal to limited

5

credibility, and that therefore the only party evidenced by

6

facts on the record as having credibility is the father and

7

petitioner herein.

8 9 10 11

8.10 There appears no evidence on the record of any open, written or other authentic and voluntary contractual obligation upon which a claim in the instant matter could lie. 8.11 There appears no evidence on the record that any of

12

the identified nor unidentified parties of interest have any

13

standing to bring the alleged action.

14

8.12 There appears no evidence on the record of any

15

coherent, rational, open, authentic, verified, substantiated, or

16

otherwise lawful foundation upon which any claim could lie

17

8.13 The only evidence on the record thus far declaring the

18

law of the case is that of the father and petitioner herein, who

19

declares sovereignty in original jurisdiction.

20

IX.

21

Conclusion

22

9.1

It is an outrage and an affront to the dignity of

23

law to suggest that the state, as plaintiff

24

through their county courts, county agencies,

25

district attorney’s, appointed officers of court

26

and probation department agents which act as the

27

states instrumentalities, could conduct a

28 -22Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

1

legitimate proceeding against the rights of a

2

parent as if the parent were not a party to that

3

action but only there as a specter for the states

4

purpose of stating that he was present for the

5

compiling of that record while excluding the

6

parent from partaking of the compiling of that

7

record even to the extent of the clerk refusing

8

to accept his legitimate pleadings!

9

9.2

Petitioner herein moves this court for injunctive

10

order compelling: BS County Superior Court to

11

Vacate and set aside its’ judgments in the above

12

named cause and to purge the void judgment data

13

from their records rendering the matter void ab

14

initio and to remove all taint and disabilities

15

resulting there from.

16

9.3

Petitioner herein further moves this court for

17

injunctive order compelling BS County superior

18

Court, its’ agents and assigns, and all police,

19

public and private agencies to whom such void

20

determinations have been reported to purge the

21

above data from their records.

22 23 24

I Joe Lunchbucket affirm, pursuant to the laws of the

25

republic state of this state, that the foregoing is true and

26

accurate.

27

Respectfully submitted,

28 -23Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

1 2

__________________________________________6/26/2009

3

Joe Lunchbucket Petitioner Sui Juris

4 5 6

I Joe Lunchbucket jr. affirm, pursuant to the laws of the

7

republic state of this state, that the foregoing is true and

8

accurate.

9

Respectfully submitted,

10 11

__________________________________________6/26/2009

12

Joe Lunchbucket Jr Petitioner Sui Juris

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

-24Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus