Pale Case Digests 7.docx

PALE Case Digests Canon 20 The Reparations Commissions v. Visayan Packing Corporation and Fieldmen’s Insuranc Co Stipulation of attorney’s fee in the contract: How to determine its validity FACTS: Plaintiff Reparations Commission (Repacom, for short) is a government entity created by virtue of Republic Act No. 1789, with offices at the 5th Floor, Development Bank of the Philippines Building No. 2, Port Area, Manila while the defendants, Visayan Packing Corporation (Vispac, for short) and the Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. (FICI, for short) are corporations duly organized and registered under the laws of the Philippines, with offices in Bacolod City, Philippines and Singson Bldg., Plaza Moraga, Manila, respectively. On May 19, 1960, plaintiff Repacom adopted Resolution No. 262 awarding to the defendant Vispac by way of a contract of conditional purchase and sale subsequently executed on November 15, 1960 the following reparations goods with a total F.O.B. value of P1,242,424.67: one (1) Cannery Plant; three (3) Fishing Boats including all its corresponding accessories and appurtenances. These reparations goods were delivered to the defendant Vispac, on May 30, 1960 Defendant-appellant FICI is impleaded as bondsman for the principal defendant Vispac, under Surety Bond No. 4122 issued by the former on May 30, 1960, to guarantee "faithful observance and compliance by the principal of all its obligations" recited in the Contract of Conditional Purchase and Sale of Reparations Goods (Exhibit "A") and in the annexed Schedule of Payments On September 27, 1962, Repacom filed a complaint for specific performance with the court a quo against Vispac seeking collection of the amount of P124,242.47 allegedly due on May 30, 1962 as payment of the 1st installment of the reparations goods and impleaded the FICI as defendant. In its answer dated November 8, 1962, Vispac claimed that the Schedule of Payments (Exhibit "A") is vague and ambiguous with respect to the date when the first installment falls due and that by reason thereof, the ambiguity should be construed against Repacom, the party which drafted the contract. Thus, while Repacom maintains that the 1st installment is due on May 30, 1962, Vispac, on the other hand, argues that it is due on May 30, 1963. On the basis of the said Stipulations of Facts and the pleadings submitted by the parties, the court a quo rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment ordering the defendant to pay, jointly and severally, to the plaintiff the sum of P124,242.47 with interest at the legal rate from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid. The plaintiffs prayer

for attorney's fees is denied, inasmuch as there is no showing that the defendants were motivated with bad faith in failing to pay plaintiffs claim. With respect to the cross-claim of defendant Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc., the Court hereby orders defendant Visayan Packing Corporation to pay defendant Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc., such amount which the latter may pay to the plaintiff by reason of this judgment, with interest at 12% per annum until fully paid, and attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the amount paid by Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc., to the plaintiff. With costs against the defendants. ISSUE: Whether trial court erred in ordering VISPAC to pay FICI of attorney’s fee equivalent only to 10% despite the 20% rate stipulated in the indemnity agreement RULING: YES, trial court erred in their decision Anent the contention of FICI that the trial court erred in ordering Vispac to pay to FICI attorney's fees equivalent to only 10% of the amount due despite the fact that Vispac bound itself to pay to FICI attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the total amount due but in no case less than P200.00 as per their Indemnity Agreement (Exhibit "1-FICI"), it has been held that a stipulation regarding the payment of attorney's fees is neither illegal nor immoral and is enforceable as the law between the parties (Santiago v. Dimayuga, 3 SCRA 919 [1961]), as long as such stipulation does not contravene law, good morals, good customs, public order or public policy (Polytrade Corp. v. Blanco, 30 SCRA 187 [1969]; Social Security Commission v. Almeda, 168 SCRA 474 [1988]). Considering, therefore, that the 20% attorney's fees provided under the parties' Indemnity Agreement (Exhibit "1-FICI") is not contrary to the existing jurisprudence on the matter and is not considered excessive nor unconscionable, the same should be awarded to FICI. Country Bankers Insurance Co. v. Lianga Bay Basis of awarding attorney’s fee as damages FACTS: It appears that sometime in 1989, the petitioner and the respondent entered into a contract of fire insurance. Under Fire Insurance Policy No. F-1397, the petitioner insured the respondent’s stocks-in-trade against fire loss, damage or liability during the period starting from June 20, 1989 at 4:00 p.m. to June 20, 1990 at 4:00 p.m., for the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00). On July 1, 1989, at or about 12:40 a.m., the respondent’s building located at Barangay Diatagon, Lianga, Surigao del Sur was gutted by fire and reduced to ashes, resulting in the total loss of the respondent’s stocks-in-trade, pieces of furnitures and fixtures, equipments and records. Due to the loss, the respondent filed an insurance claim with the petitioner under its Fire Insurance Policy No. F-1397

The petitioner, however, denied the insurance claim on the ground that, based on the submitted documents, the building was set on fire by two (2) NPA rebels who wanted to obtain canned goods, rice and medicines as provisions for their comrades in the forest, and that such loss was an excepted risk under paragraph No. 6 of the policy conditions of Fire Insurance Policy No. F-1397 RTC ruled in favour of Lianga Bay and awarded among other things attorney’s fee and cost of litigation, as affirmed by CA. ISSUE: Whether the awarding of cost of litigation and attorney’s fee is reasonable RULING: NO, it is baseless With respect to the award of litigation expenses and attorney’s fees, Article 2208 of the New Civil Code17 enumerates the instances where such may be awarded and, in all cases, it must be reasonable, just and equitable if the same were to be granted. Attorney’s fees as part of damages are not meant to enrich the winning party at the expense of the losing litigant. They are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.18 The award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the general rule. As such, it is necessary for the court to make findings of facts and law that would bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of such award. We find none in this case to warrant the award by the trial court of litigation expenses and attorney’s fees in the amounts of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) and Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00), respectively, and therefore, the same must also be deleted. Article 2208 provides: In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded; (2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest; (3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff; (4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff; (5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim; (6) In actions for legal support; (7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers; (8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws; (9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded; (11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. Pineda v. Atty. De Jesus Claim for additional attorney’s fee FACTS: On April 6, 1993, Aurora Pineda filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against petitioner Vinson Pineda in the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151, docketed as JDRC Case No. 2568. Petitioner was represented by respondents Attys. Clodualdo de Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio and Emmanuel Mariano. During the pendency of the case, Aurora proposed a settlement to petitioner regarding her visitation rights over their minor child and the separation of their properties. The proposal was accepted by petitioner and both parties subsequently filed a motion for approval of their agreement. This was approved by the trial court. On November 25, 1998, the marriage between petitioner and Aurora Pineda was declared null and void. Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels were well-compensated.3 They, including their relatives and friends, even availed of free products and treatments from petitioner’s dermatology clinic. This notwithstanding, they billed petitioner additional legal fees amounting to P16.5 million4 which the latter, however, refused to pay. Instead, petitioner issued them several checks totaling P1.12 million5 as "full payment for settlement." Unsatisfied, they filed a motion to the court praying for additional attorney’s fee for 50 million pesos. On April 14, 2000, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay P5 million to Atty. de Jesus, P2 million to Atty. Ambrosio and P2 million to Atty. Mariano. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced the amount as follows: P1 million to Atty. de Jesus, P500,000 to Atty. Ambrosio and P500,000 to Atty. Mariano. The motion for reconsideration was denied. ISSUE: Whether the prayer for additional attorney’s fee is tenable RULING: NO, it is not tenable Professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was governed by the principle of quantum meruit which means "as much as the lawyer deserves."10 The recovery of attorney’s fees on this basis is permitted, as in this case, where there is no express agreement for the payment of attorney’s fees. Basically, it is a legal mechanism which prevents an unscrupulous client from running

away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it. In the same vein, it avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the lawyer himself. Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid controversies with clients concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees should be avoided and should be filed only when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it.11 In the case at bar, respondents’ motion for payment of their lawyers’ fees was not meant to collect what was justly due them; the fact was, they had already been adequately paid. Demanding P50 million on top of the generous sums and perks already given to them was an act of unconscionable greed which is shocking to this Court. As lawyers, respondents should be reminded that they are members of an honorable profession, the primary vision of which is justice. It is respondents’ despicable behavior which gives lawyering a bad name in the minds of some people. The vernacular has a word for it: nagsasamantala. The practice of law is a decent profession and not a money-making trade. Compensation should be but a mere incident.12 Respondents’ claim for additional legal fees was not justified. They could not charge petitioner a fee based on percentage, absent an express agreement to that effect. The payments to them in cash, checks, free products and services from petitioner’s business — all of which were not denied by respondents — more than sufficed for the work they did. The "full payment for settlement"13 should have discharged petitioner’s obligation to them. Canon 21 Uy Chico v. The Union Life Assurance Society Limited Waiver of the privilege between an attorney and his client; attorney merely an agent of communication FACTS: The plaintiff and his brother took over the business and continued it under the same name, "Uy Layco." Sometime before the date of the fire, the plaintiff purchased his brother's interest in the business and continued to carry on the business under the father's name. At the time of the fire "Uy Layco" was heavily indebted and subsequent thereto the creditors of the estate of the plaintiff's father. During the course of these proceedings, the plaintiff's attorney surrendered the policies of insurance to the administrator of the estate, who compromised with the insurance company for onehalf their face value, or P6,000. This money was paid into court and is now being held by the sheriff. The plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining that the policies and goods insured belonged to him and not to the estate of his deceased father and alleges that he is not bound by the compromise effected by the administrator of his father's estate.

The defendant insurance company sought to show that the plaintiff had agreed to compromise settlement of the policies, and for that purpose introduced evidence showing that the plaintiff's attorney had surrendered the policies to the administrator with the understanding that such a compromise was to be effected. The plaintiff was asked, while on the witness stand, if he had any objection to his attorney's testifying concerning the surrender of the policies, to which he replied in the negative. The attorney was then called for that purpose. Counsel, on this appeal, base their argument of the proposition that a waiver of the client's privilege may be withdrawn at any time before acted upon ISSUE: Whether there was a waiver of privilege RULING: YES, there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner Our practice Act provides: "A lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the confidence and preserve the secrets of his client. He shall not be permitted in any court, without the consent of his client, given in open court, to testify to any facts imparted to him by his client in professional consultation, or for the purpose of obtaining advice upon legal matters." It will be noted that the evidence in question concerned the dealings of the plaintiff's attorney with a third person. Of the very essence of the veil of secrecy which surrounds communications made between attorney and client, is that such communications are not intended for the information of third persons or to be acted upon by them, put of the purpose of advising the client as to his rights. It is evident that a communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions be delivering the communication to the third person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a privileged communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such a communication, after reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a communication between the client and a third person, and that the attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary or agent. It is manifest that the objection to the testimony of the plaintiff's attorney as to his authority to compromise was properly overruled. The testimony was to the effect that when the attorney delivered the policies to the administrator, he understood that there was a compromise to be effected, and that when he informed the plaintiff of the surrender of the policies for that purpose the plaintiff made no objection whatever. The evidence is sufficient to show that the plaintiff acquiesced in the compromise settlement of the policies. Having agreed to the compromise, he cannot now disavow it and maintain an action for the recovery of their face value. People v. Sy Juco Retaining the confidence inviolate even if subject to compulsion by law via search warrant

FACTS: Upon petition of the agent and representatives of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, named Narciso Mendiola, who alleged that, according to information given him by a person whom he considered reliable, certain fraudulent bookletters and papers or records were being kept in the building marked No. 482 on Juan Luna Street, Binondo, Manila, occupied by Santiago Sy Juco, a warrant to search the building in question was issued against said person on March 7, 1933, by the Court of First Instance of Manila, through Judge Mariano A. Albert. After making the required search the officers concerned seized, among things, an art metal filing cabinet claimed by Attorney Teopisto B. Remo to be his and to contain some letters, documents and papers belonging to his clients. Inasmuch as said officers later refused to return the filing cabinet in question to him, he filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying that the Collector of Internal Revenue and his agents be prohibited from opening said art metal filing cabinet and that the sheriff of the City of Manila likewise be ordered to take charge of said property in the meantime, on the ground that the warrant by virtue of which the search was made is null and void, being illegal and against the Constitution. After due hearing, the Court of First Instance through Judge Delfin Jaranilla, decided to overrule both petitions, declaring that the art metal filing cabinet and the books and papers claimed by the Salakan Lumber Co., Inc., would be returned to Attorney Teopisto B. Remo and to the company, respectively, as soon as it be proven, by means of an examination thereof to be made in the presence of the interested parties, that they contain nothing showing that they have been used to commit fraud against the Government. ISSUE: Whether Atty. Remo can prevent the court in divulging the contents of the metal cabinet RULING: YES, he can prevent the court as it would violate the confidence reposed to him by his clients It is clear that the court could not and can not order the opening of the art metal filing cabinet in question because, it having been proven that it belongs to the appellant attorney and that in it he keeps the records and documents of his clients, to do so would be in violation of his right as such attorney, since it would be tantamount to compelling him to disclose or divulge facts or things belonging to his clients, which should be kept secret, unless she is authorized by them to make such disclosure, it being a duty imposed by law upon an attorney to strictly preserve the secrets or communications made to him. Such an act would constitute a qualified violation of section 383, No. 4, and of section 31 of Act No. 190, which read as follows: An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment; nor can an attorney's secretary stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of client and his employer, concerning any fact, the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. (Sec. 383, No. 4, Act No. 190.)

A lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the confidence and preserve the secrets of his client. He shall not be permitted in any court without the consent of his client, given in open court, to testify to any facts imparted to him by his client in professional consultation, or for the purpose of obtaining advice upon legal matters. (Sec. 31, Act No. 190.) For all the foregoing reasons, and finding that the errors assigned by the appellant are very well founded, the appealed judgment is reversed, and it is ordered that the art metal filing cabinet, together with the key thereof seized by the internal revenue agent by virtue of the judicial warrant in question, which is hereby declared null and void, be immediately returned unopened to the appellant Canon 22 Mercado v. Ubay Presumption that a lawyer has an authority to bind the client FACTS: On May 18, 1966, petitioners filed an action for partition with the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch I, docketed as Civil Case No. TM-223, against Antonio, Ely and respondents Lucina and Trinidad, all surnamed Samonte and who are brothers and sisters. On June 27, 1966, the defendants were served with a copy of the complaint and summons thru their co-defendant Antonio Samonte who acknowledged receipt thereof. On July 11, 1966, all the defendants in the above-numbered case, thru counsel, Atty. Danilo Pine, filed their answer to the complaint. Later, on January 4,1967, the said defendants, thru the same counsel, filed their amended answer. On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Cavite (now RTC) rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and against all the defendants in the civil case, including private respondents. Since no appeal was made by any of the defendants from the decision of the trial court, the same became final and executory and the court issued the corresponding writ of execution. However, before the writ could be carried out by the provincial sheriff, all the defendants, thru the same counsel, Atty. Danilo Pine, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the writ of execution issued by the trial court in Cavite in Case No. TM223. On July 9, 1971, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On May 27, 1972, respondent Lucina Samonte and Trinidad Samonte brought an action before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC) docketed as Case No. C-2442, for the annulment of the final judgment rendered by the trial court in Cavite in Case No. TM-223, alleging the following matters: that they did not authorize anyone including Atty. Danilo Pine to file an answer in their behalf as defendants in Case No. TM 223, and that the filing of the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the writ of execution in the same case was without their knowledge and participation.

ISSUE: Whether they can annul the judgment solely on the fact that they did not authorized Atty. Pine RULING: NO, they cannot use such defense Apart from the presumption that the sheriff had regularly performed his functions, records amply show that all the defendants, including private respondents had filed their answer in Case No. TM223 thru counsel, Atty. Danilo Pine. And when final judgment had been rendered by the CFI of Cavite against respondents and a writ of execution issued by the trial court, the private respondents, thru the same counsel, Atty. Pine even instituted a petition for certiorari and mandamus to enjoin the execution of the judgment of the Cavite court. Respondents now allege that they have not authorized Atty. Danilo Pine to appear in their behalf as defendants in Case No. TM-223 or to file the petition for certiorari with the appellate court. Such allegation is devoid of merit. An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client (Sec. 21, Rule 138, Rules of Court). The fact that private respondents had not personally appeared in the hearings of Case TM-223 in the trial court is immaterial. The filing of the answer by and appearance of Atty. Danilo Pine in their behalf are sufficient to give private respondents standing in court. It is hard to believe that a counsel who has no personal interest in the case would fight for and defend a case with persistence and vigor if he had not been authorized or employed by the party concerned. It is obvious that since the appellate court had decided adversely against private respondents in their petition for certiorari, the latter filed the annulment suit for a second chance at preventing petitioners from enforcing the decision rendered by the Cavite court in favor of the latter. Land Bank v. Pamintuan Dev. Presumption of authority: Mere appearance of another counsel not tantamount to withdrawal of the first counsel FACTS: The antecedent facts show that in DARAB Case No. 1204-0545-2003 for "Preliminary Determination of Just Compensation," DARAB rendered a Decision3 dated April 27, 2004, fixing the just compensation of respondent Pamintuan Development Company’s 274.9037 hectare lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4972 and located at San Vicente, Makilala, Cotabato, at P58,237,301.68. The dispositive portion thereof, reads: WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the just compensation of TCT No. T-4972 registered in the name of Pamintuan Development Company (PAMDEVCO) containing an area of 274.9037 hectares located at San Vicente, Makilala, Cotabato is preliminary determined at FIFTY EIGHT MILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED ONE AND 68/100 (P58,237,301.68) PESOS. On June 4, 2004, Attys. Engilberto F. Montarde and Felix F. Mesa, filed a Notice of Entry of Appearance5 in behalf of petitioner. Within the period to appeal, or on June 15, 2004, said counsels

also filed a Notice of Appeal6 via registered mail. The Certification7 attached to the Notice of Appeal was signed by Loreto B. Corotan, Head of petitioner’s Agrarian Operations Center. Respondent filed an Opposition contending that the notice of appeal and notice of entry of appearance should be denied due course because Attys. Montarde and Mesa failed to show that their appearance was authorized by petitioner. Said new counsels, on the other hand, asserted that they were duly authorized, attaching to their Comment the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Gilda E. Pico, Executive Vice President of petitioner, authorizing Loreto B. Corotan to represent,8 and designating9 Attys. Montarde and Mesa as counsels for LANDBANK. On August 2, 2004, DARAB issued an order holding that Attys. Montarde and Mesa are without authority to represent petitioner because the latter failed to effect a valid substitution of their former counsel of record. It added that the April 27, 2004 decision had become final and executory because the notice of appeal filed by its purported new counsels is a mere scrap of paper which did not toll the running of the reglementary period to appeal. The DARAB, however, denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, a petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner with the Court of Appeals, but the latter dismissed the petition. It sustained the DARAB’s finding that Attys. Montarde and Mesa were not clothed with authority to file the notice of appeal. ISSUE: Whether DARAB gravely abused their discretion when it ruled that the appearance was improper, eventually affecting the remedy of appeal RULING: YES, DARAB gravely abused their discretion The presumption in favor of the counsel’s authority to appear in behalf of a client is a strong one.13 A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his client’s name.14 However, the court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other party require a lawyer to adduce authorization from the client. In the case at bar, the filing of a notice of entry of appearance by Attys. Montarde and Mesa, gave rise to the presumption that they have the authority to file the notice of appeal in behalf of petitioner. When their authority was challenged, they presented the SPA executed by Gilda E. Pico, Executive Vice President of LANDBANK authorizing them to represent petitioner; and the two memoranda of Atty. Danilo B. Beramo, Department Manager and Head, CARP Legal Services Department, requesting Atty. Montarde to file a notice of appeal. These documents are sufficient proof of their authority to represent petitioner’s cause. The doubt entertained by the DARAB as to when the SPA and memoranda were executed is of no consequence in view of petitioner’s vigorous assertion that it authorized said lawyers to file a notice of appeal. Indeed, even an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by the client either expressly15 or impliedly.16 Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyer’s first appearance and validates the action taken by him.

The case of Ong Ching v. Ramolete,20 is on all fours with the instant controversy. The trial court therein held that the period to appeal had already lapsed rendering the assailed decision final and executory because petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, though presented within the reglementary period, is without legal effect having been filed by a lawyer other than petitioner’s counsel of record. It disregarded petitioner’s written authorization belatedly filed by said new lawyer as the same was not appended to the motion for reconsideration previously filed. In debunking the ruling of the trial court, we stressed that the new counsel who filed the motion for reconsideration in behalf of the client is presumed to be authorized even if he filed no formal notice of entry of appearance. Hence, said motion effectively tolled the running of the period to appeal. As explained by the Court: The present case, however, does not involve a substitution of attorneys, but merely the employment by petitioner of an additional counsel. True it is, as claimed by respondents, that the motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Hermosisima gives no indication that he was presenting his motion in collaboration with Atty. Vasquez; but neither would it indicate that by his filing of the pleading in the case, Atty. Hermosisima was replacing Atty. Vasquez as counsel for petitioner. In law it is assumed prima facie that every attorney who appears in court does so with sufficient authority. The fact that a second attorney enters an appearance on behalf of a litigant does not authorize a presumption that the authority of the first attorney has been withdrawn. There is no question that a party may have two or more lawyers working in collaboration as his counsel in a given litigation. Thus in the case at bar the certificate dated May 16, 1972, executed by Atty. Vasquez, is to the effect that he, with the consent and authority of petitioner (who signified his conformity in writing) was authorizing Atty. Hermosisima to collaborate with him in the case due to his ill health. It is evident therefore that the DARAB gravely abused its discretion in denying due course to the notice of appeal seasonably filed by Attys. Montarde and Mesa, the duly authorized counsel of petitioner. In the same vein, the affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the assailed order of the DARAB is a clear disregard of the oft repeated principle that courts should not resort to a rigid application of the rules where the end result would frustrate the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the controversy.