Notes On Torts And Damages.docx

PART I. TORTS I.

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Quasi-Delict (Articles 2176-2194, NCC) a.1. Nature, Scope and Coverage Article 2176, NCC – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter Elcano vs Hill (gunshot-crime committed by a minor) Held: 1. The concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character, whether voluntary or negligent 2. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the victim does not recover damages on both scores GashemShookat vs CA (breach of promise to marry) Held: 1. A breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 2. Damages pursuant to Article 21 may be awarded not because of promise to marry but because of fraud and deceit behind it. 3. Such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or policy Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc. vs CA (canteen owner; adulterated beverages) Held: 1. Liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations such as act which breaks the contract. Taylor vs Manila Electric Company (loss of an eye and other injuries of a minor who is more mature than the average boy of his age) Held: 1. When the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the

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plaintiff’s own act, which contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover damages for the injury Navida et.al vs Dizon et.al. (inquiries sustained from DBCP-chemical used to kill worms ; workers in banana plantations) Held: 1. Tort is not strictly a criminal act; territoriality does not apply

a.2. Requisites Article 2176, NCC 

Child Learning vs Tagorio (child locked inside the comfort room) Held: 1. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the NCC, plaintiff has to prove the preponderance of evidence: i. the damages suffered by the plaintiff; ii. the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and iii. The connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.

b. Quasi-delict distinguished from: b.1. Culpa Criminal 

Barredo vs Garcia and Almario (head on collision between Malate Taxicab and carretela resulting to the death of Faustino Garcia) Held: 1. Differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquialiana/quasi-delict: a. Penal Code-crimes affect the public interest while quasi-delict are only of private concern b. Penal Code-punishes or corrects the criminal act while quasidelict by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage c. Penal Code-punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them while quasi-delict include all acts in which any kind of fault or negligent intervenes

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The separate civil action lies, the employer being primarily and directly responsible in damages Joseph vs Bautista Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation vs People of the Philippines (truck transporting products of San Miguel Corporation collided with a Nissan Pickup; usually evading damaged road) Held: 1. Liability of employer under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180 of the NCC for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is DIRECT and PRIMARY, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. 2. Enforcement of the judgment under the NCC against the employer does not require the employee to be insolvent since the nature of the liability of the employer with that of that employee, the two being statutorily considered joint tortfeasors is solidary. 3. Under Art. 103 of the RPC, it provides that an employer may be held subsidiarilly and civilly liable for felony committed by his employee in the discharge of his duty. 4. The liability under the RPC attaches when the employee is convicted of a crime done in the performance of his work and is found to be insolvent that renders him unable to properly respond to the civil liability adjudged. Sps. Santos et.al. vs Pizardo et.al. (vehicle collision between Viron Transit Bus and Lite Ace Van) Held: 1. In case of negligence, the offended party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under the RPC and an action for quasi-delict under the Civil Code. 2. An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender: 1. Civil liability ex delicto under Art. 100 of RPC and 2. Independent civil action 3. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Art. 2177 of the

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Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery under the rules Manliclic vs Calaunan (collision between Bus and Owner-Type Jeep; Manliclic was acquitted of the criminal liability) Held: 1. The extinction of civil liability referred to Section 2(b) of Rule 111 refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Art. 100 of the RPC, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasidelict only and not as crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Lumantas, MD vs Calapiz (emergency appendectomy led to damaged urethra) Held: 1. It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. 2. The acquittal of an accused of the crime charge does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability.

b.2. Quasi-delict Contractual 

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distinguished

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Culpa

Torres-Madrid Brokerage vs Feb Mitsui (Properties owned by Sony; hijacked) Held: 1. In culpa contractual, the plaintiff only needs to establish the existence of the contract and the obligor’s failure to perform his obligation. 2. In quasi delict must clearly establish the defendant’s fault or negligence because this is the very basis of the action. Ochoa vs GS Transport Gutierrez vs Gutierrez (vehicular accident; bus and automobile Held: 1. In culpa contractual, The head of a house, the owner of an automobile, who maintains it for the general use of his family, is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children, whom he designates or permits to run it, where the car is occupied and

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being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owner’s family than the child driving it. Philippine School of Business Administration vs CA (stabbing incident to a student done by non-members of the school’s academic community but elements from outside the school) Held: 1. Art. 2180 of the Civil Code provides that the damage should have been caused by pupils or students of the educational institution. 2. A contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school’s liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently on the contract unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Art. 21 of the Civil Code. 3. The rules on quasi delict do not really govern between the PSBA and Bautista because there is a contract between them. However, this does not prevent the court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. Liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort. Air France vs Carrascoso (Civil Engineer having a first class round trip ticket from Manila to Rome but was asked to vacate his seat for a white man who has the better right) Held: 1. Although the relation of the airline and the passenger is contractual both in origin and nature, nevertheless the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort. Regino vs Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (a student who was not allowed to take the final examinations due to non-payment of a ticket for fundraising activity) Held: 1. Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution, however, may be held liable for a tort even if it has existing contract with its students, since the

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act that violated the contract may also be a tort. Manila Railroad Co. vs La CompaniaTransantlantica (damage of bailers owned by petitioner) Held: 1. Quasi-delict is exclusively concerned with cases where the negligence arises in the absence of agreement. Calalas vs CA (passenger of a jeepney seated on a wooden stool as an extension seat bumped by an Isuzu truck) Held: 1. In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action. 2. In breach of contract in culpa contractual, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor failed to comply his obligation. Construction Development Corp vs Estrella (vehicular accident of a bus and tractor truck of the petitioner) Held: 1. Employer is liable for the acts of its employees. An action based on quasidelict may be instituted against the employer for an employee’s act or omission – the liability for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary, but is subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.

II. ACT OR OMISSION  Gaid vs People (reckless imprudence resulting to homicide; student) Held: 1. Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. 2. The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and (2) that the damage impending to be

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caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest. 3. The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? Dyteban vs Jose Ching(three-vehicle accident: Joana Paula Bus, Nissan Pick Up and Prime Mover wrongfully parked at the National Highway) Held: 1. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.17 2. The test by which to determine the existence or negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant indoing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. 3. The test of negligence is objective. We measure the act or omission of the tortfeasor with that of an ordinary reasonable person in the same situation. Daywalt vs Corporacion de PP AgustinosRecoletos (sale of land which is 452 has. but turned out to be 1,248 has.) Held: 1. Whatever may be the character of the liability, if any, which a stranger to a contract may incur by advising or assisting one of the parties to evade performance, he cannot become more extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance of the contract than the party in whose behalf he intermeddles. 2.

The damages ordinarily recoverable against a vendorfor failure to deliver land which he has contracted to

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deliver is the value of the use and occupation of the land for the time during which it is wrongfully withheld. 

Picart vs Smith (automobile and a frightened pony on a bridge) Held:

1. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precaution against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is the constitutive f act in negligence. 2. Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. 3. The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge, Seeing an automobile ahead he improperly pulled his horse over to the railing on the right. The driver of the automobile, however, guided his car toward the plaintiff without diminution of speed until he was only a few feet away. He then turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened, jumped around and was killed by the passing car. Held: That although the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in being on the wrong side of the bridge, the defendant was nevertheless civilly liable for the legal damages resulting from the collision, as he had a fair opportunity to avoid the accident after he realized the situation created by the negligence of the plaintiff and failed to avail himself of that opportunity; while the plaintiff could by

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no means then place himself in a position of greater safety.  

R Transport vs Yu (hit and run by a bus; different registered owner and actual owner) Held: 1. Verily, foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. It is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. 2. Once negligence on the part of the employee is established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer was remiss in the selection and/or supervision of the negligent employee. To avoid liability for the quasi-delict committed by its employee, it is incumbent upon the employer to rebut this presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. 3. The liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of its subordinate is direct and primary, subject only to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. 4. The Supreme Court (SC) has consistently been of the view that it is for the better protection of the public for both the owner of record and the actual operator to be adjudged jointly and severally liable with the driver 5. The principle of holding the registered owner liable for damages notwithstanding that ownership of the offending vehicle has already been transferred to another is designed to protect the public and not as a shield on the part of unscrupulous transferees of the vehicle to take refuge in, in order

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to free itself from liability arising from its own negligent act.” Umali vs Bacani (Alcala Electric Plant; 3 year old boy who was electrocuted) Held: 1. An electric plant company which fails to use ordinary foresight in taking necessary precaution to eliminate tall banana plants which when blown by a moderate wind could trigger danger, vis-a-vis, its electric lines; which after a storm and foresecable damage to its lines that could endanger life and limb did not cut off electric power from its plant; and which, after being made aware, thru one of its employees, that a live wire had been cut by the action of the storm, did not take precaution to prevent anybody from approaching the live wire, is negligent and liable for damages for death of 3½ year old boy who went to the place where live wire is located and got into contact with it. 2. Where negligence of electric utility plant was proximate cause of death of child, parental negligence in allowing the child to go to place where fallen live wire was located is merely contributory. 3. Negligence of employee is presumed to be negligence of his employer who may escape liability only by proof that it exercised diligence of good father of family to prevent damage not only in selection of employees but in adequately supervising their work. Civil Aeronautics Administration vs CA (Ernest E. Simke-an honorary consul general waiting for his future son-in-law and slipped over an elevation at MIAA) Held: 1. Failure of the CAA to have the dangerous elevation repaired in order to eliminate existing hazards constitutes such negligence as to warrant a finding of liability based on quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code. 2. Applying the test formulated in Picart vs. Smith (37 PHIL 809) private respondent is not guilty of contributory negligence because he could not have reasonably foreseen the

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harm that would befall him considering the circumstances. Even if the private respondent had been looking where he was going, the step in question could not easily be noticed because of its construction. Rakes vs AG & P (a laborer of the defendant transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor that accidentally slid in rails, caught the plaintiff and broke his leg and was amputated up to the knee) Held: 1. In order to enforce the liability of an employer for injuries to his employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action be first prosecuted against the employer or his representative primarily chargeable with the accident. No criminal proceeding having been taken, the civil action may proceed to judgment. 2.

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The negligence of the injured person contributing to his injury but not being one of the determining causes of the principal accident, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but only in reduction of his damages. Each party is chargeable with damages in proportion to his fault.

Associated Bank vs Tan (depositor of Associated Bank that deposited a postdated check in his account and issued several cheques to his creditors but eventually dishonored due to nonsufficiency of funds) Held: 1. The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family where the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors is concerned; The standard applies, regardless of whether the account consists of only a few hundred pesos or of millions. Pacis vs Morales (17-yo died due to shooting incident happened inside a gun store in Baguio City) Held:

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A higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances.Such person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care. 2. A gun store owner is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. SD Martinez vs Buskirk (carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it. Held: 1. A coachman or driver, who had driven the horses composing his team for a considerable time, during which the animals had shown no disposition to become unruly, left his team as usual and was assisting in unloading the wagon when the horses bolted and running into the plaintiffs' carriage caused personal injuries to the plaintiff and damage to the vehicle. It was further shown that, to leave teams under like circumstances and to assist in unloading the wagon, is the custom of drivers in the city and that the custom is sanctioned by employers. 2. That acts, the performance of which has not proven destructive or injurious and which have been generally acquiesced in by society for so long a time as to have ripened into a custom, cannot be held to be unreasonable or imprudent and that, under the circumstances, the driver was not guilty of negligence in so

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leaving his team while assisting in unloading his wagon. Ylarde et. Al. vs Aquino et.al. (digging incident done by male students of an elementary school) Held: 1. It is only the teachers and not the principal or head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. In a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held liable. Under Section 2180 of the Civil Code, the teacher-in-charge of school children should be held liable for negligence in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. 2. A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils should make sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company. 3. Excavation should not be placed in the category of school gardening, planting trees, and the like as these undertakings do not expose the children to any risk that can result in death or physical injuries. 4. In determining whether or not reckless imprudence exists, the degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience. Phil Hawk Corp vs Vivian Tan Lee (vehicular accident resulting the death of the respondent’s husband and physical injuries to her – motorcycle, passenger jeep and a bus) Held: 1. Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence—to be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks.

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Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumptionthat the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection or supervision of its employees. 3. The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable to respondent, since it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having failed to sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on the road. Indeed, petitioner’s tests were concentrated on the ability to drive and physical fitness to do so. It also did not know that Avila had been previously involved in sideswiping incidents. Regala vs Carin (story of two adjacent neighbors where one decided to renovate his house and asked permission from the other that he will bore a hole through a perimeter wall) Held: 1. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. 2. While the Court harbors no doubt that the incidents which gave rise to this dispute have brought anxiety and anguish to respondent, it is unconvinced that the damage inflicted upon respondent’s property was malicious or willful, an element crucial to merit an award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code. Francisco vs Chemical Bulk Carriers (story of a blind owner of a gasoline station) Held: 1. Standard of conduct is the level of expected conduct that is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of the person, time and place.25 The

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most common standard of conduct is that of a good father of a family or that of a reasonably prudent person.26 To determine the diligence which must be required of all persons, we use as basis the abstract average standard corresponding to a normal orderly person.27 However, one who is physically disabled is required to use the same degree of care that a reasonably careful person who has the same physical disability would use.28 Physical handicaps and infirmities, such as blindness or deafness, are treated as part of the circumstances under which a reasonable person must act. Thus, the standard of conduct for a blind person becomes that of a reasonable person who is blind. We note that Francisco, despite being blind, had been managing and operating the Caltex station for 15 years and this was not a hindrance for him to transact business until this time. In this instance, however, we rule that Francisco failed to exercise the standard of conduct expected of a reasonable person who is blind. First, Francisco merely relied on the identification card of Bacsa to determine if he was authorized by CBCI. Francisco did not do any other background check on the identity and authority of Bacsa. Second, Francisco already expressed his misgivings about the diesel fuel, fearing that they might be stolen property,29 yet he did not verify with CBCI the authority of Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel. Third, Francisco relied on the receipts issued by Bacsa which were typewritten on a half sheet of plain bond paper.30 If Francisco exercised reasonable diligence, he should have asked for an official receipt issued by CBCI. Fourth, the delivery to Francisco, as indicated in Petron’s invoice, does not show that CBCI authorized Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel to Francisco. Clearly, Francisco failed to exercise the standard of conduct expected of a reasonable person who is blind.

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Hazing as Negligence-Villareal vs People (Hazing at Ateneo de Manila School of Law) Held: 1. Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it.241 In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor.242In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill.243 Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible.244 2. The test245 for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.246 3. As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved.247 If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid damage or injury.248 In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required.249 It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, “from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort.”250 The duty of the person to employ more or less

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degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.251 III. Damage to Another IV. CAUSAL RELATION BETWEEN ACT OR OMISSION AND DAMAGE  Tison et.al. vs Sps Pamasin (vehicular accident between the tractor trailer and a jitney, the driver’s license of the tractor driver is prohibited as to restriction imposed by the LTO) Held: 1. A causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. 2. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.28 3. Controlling is our ruling in Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals29 where we reiterated that negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages  Ocean Builders vs Sps Cubacub (an employee with chicken pox; immediate cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest and the antecedent cause as pneumonia) Held: 1. To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts, three elements must be present, viz.: (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate causation.—At the onset, the Court notes that the present case is one for damages based on torts, the employer-employee relationship being merely incidental. To successfullyprosecute an action anchored on torts, three elements must be present, viz.: (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate causation. 2. Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence,

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unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. 

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a. DOCTRINE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE Fernando vs CA (story of emptying a septic tank in Agdao Public Market in Davao City) Held: 1. To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation betweenthe omission and the damage. He must prove under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that the defendant’s negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. 2. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. Dyteban vs Ching ((three-vehicle accident: Joana Paula Bus, Nissan Pick Up and Prime Mover wrongfully parked at the National Highway) Held: 1. Proximate cause is that cause acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have

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reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It is based upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Plaintiff must, however, establish a sufficient link between the act or omission and the damage or injury. That link must not be remote or farfetched; otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage or injury must be a natural and probable result of the act or omission. Bataclan vs Medina (burst tires of the bus; overturned bus and eventually got burned when people came closer holding torches) Held: 1. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. 2. When a vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passenger, but most probably by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it wasvery dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available, they

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had to use a torch the most handy and available; and what was more natural, than that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them, That the proximate cause of the death of B was the overturning of the vehicle thru the negligence of defendant and his agent. 3. The burning of the bus wherein some of the passengers were trapped can also be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through the driver and conductor who were on the road walking back and forth. They should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and detected even from a distance. That the failure of the driver and the conductor to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus, constitutes negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier under the provisions of the Civil Code. Manila Electric Corp. vs Rermoquillo (repair of a media agua said to be in a leaking condition; cause of death electrocution) Held: 1. To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the latter's length of 6 feet. 2. Where it is shown that the death of the deceased was primarily caused by his own negligence, the company could not be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence. To hold the latter liable in damages for the

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death of the deceased, such supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and principal cause of the accident. But in the case at bar, the act of the deceased in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet with his hands was the proximate and principal cause of the electrocution, therefore his heirs cannot recover. 3. A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury, a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such act or condition is the proximate cause. Taylor vs Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. (loss of an eye and other injuries of a minor who is more mature than the average boy of his age) Held: 1. Under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiff's action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting a match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore, is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. Sanitary Steam Laundry vs CA (This case involves a collision between a Mercedes

Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms

Benz panel truck of petitioner Sanitary Steam Laundry and a Cimarron which caused the death of three persons and the injuries of several others; collision between a truck and a privately-owned Cimarron van caused the death of three of the van’s passengers. The petitioner therein, the owner of the truck, argued that the driver of the Cimarron was committing multiple violations of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code40 at the time of the accident. Among these violations: the Cimarron was overloaded at the time of the accident; the front seat of the van was occupied by four adults, including the driver; and the van had only one functioning headlight) Held: 1. The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioner’s driver. As the trial court noted, the swerving of petitioner’s panel truck to the opposite lane could mean not only that petitioner’s driver was running the vehicle at a very high speed but that he was tailgating the passenger jeepney ahead of it as well. 2. It has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Petitioner says that “driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during nighttime certainly increases the risk of accident,” that because the Cimarron had only one headlight, there was “decreased visibility,” and that the fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded “decreased [its] maneuverability.” However, mere

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allegations such as these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the contributing cause of the injury. Mercury Drug vs Baking (story of Diamicron and Diamicron –sleeping tablet; resulted to vehicular accident) Held: 1. The vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioner’s employee been careful in reading Dr. Sy’s prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision. 2. It is thus clear that the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him, after such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.6 Here, petitioner’s failure to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee will make it solidarily liable for damages caused by the latter. BPI vs Suarez (lawyer who issued BPI checks that were dishonored; DAIFDAUD) Held: 1. The erroneous marking of DAIF, which BPI belatedly rectified, was not the proximate cause of Suarez’s claimed injury, the Court reminds BPI that its business is affected with public interest. 2. In the present case, Suarez failed to establish that his claimed injury was proximately caused by the erroneous marking of DAIF on the checks. 3. There is nothing in Suarez’s testimony which convincingly shows

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1.

that the erroneous marking of DAIF on the checks proximately caused his alleged psychological or social injuries. Suarez merely testified that he suffered humiliation and that the prospective consolidation of the titles to the Tagaytay properties did not materialize due to the dishonor of his checks,24 not due to the erroneous marking of DAIF on his checks. Hence, Suarez had only himself to blame for his hurt feelings and the unsuccessful transaction with his client as these were directly caused by the justified dishonor of the checks. In short, Suarez cannot recover compensatory damages for his own negligence.25 Ramos vs COL Reality (vehicular collision; Toyota and Ford Expidition; ongoing construction in the area) Held: Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in this case, viz.: Article 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter’s negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superior’s action against the third person, assuming of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made. Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilino’s act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered by respondent from the accident.

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Vallacar Transit vs Catubig (vehicle collision due to overtaking of a motorcycle to a slow moving truck but traversed by a bus on its opposite direction) Held: 1. RTC concisely articulated and aptly concluded that Catubig’s overtaking of a slow-moving truck ahead of him, while approaching a curve on the highway, was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision which led to his own death. 2. The presumption that employers are negligent under Article 2180 of the Civil Code flows from the negligence of their employees.32 Having adjudged that the immediate and proximate cause of the collision resulting in Catubig’s death was his own negligence, and there was no fault or negligence on Cabanilla’s part, then such presumption of fault or negligence on the part of petitioner, as Cabanilla’s employer, does not even arise. Thus, it is not even necessary to delve into the defense of petitioner that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Cabanilla as its employee driver. b.

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DOCTRINE OF IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE Tison vs Pomasin (vehicular accident between the tractor trailer and a jitney, the driver’s license of the tractor driver is prohibited as to restriction imposed by the LTO) Held: Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,27 we held that a causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto.Negligence, consisting in whole or

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in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.28 Likewise controlling is our ruling in Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals29 where we reiterated that negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages.In the instant case, no causal connection was established between the tractor-trailer driver’s restrictions on his license to the vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently explain that the Land Transportation Office merely erred in not including restriction code 8 in his license. Caedo vs Yu Khe Thai (vehicle collision between Mercury car owned by the petitioner and a Cadillac and a carretela) Held: 1. There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The next question is whether or not Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily liable with the driver. The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which reads:"ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months." 2. If the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. 3. The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not res-pondeat superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by

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him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage. 4. The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire other persons to drive for them precisely because they are not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different situations that are continually encountered on the road. What would be a negligent omission under the aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an old and infirm person who is not similarly equipped. 5. The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his negligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed. Kapalaran Bus Line vs Coronado (bus and a jeepney) Held: 1. Immediately before the collision, the bus driver was actually violating the following traffic rules and

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regulations, among others, in the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No. 4136, as amended: x xx Thus, a legal presumption arose that the bus driver was negligent, a presumption Kapalaran was unable to overthrow. 2. The liability of an employer under Art. 2180 is direct and immediate and not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the negligence of the latter. 3. In requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and in creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers Mendoza vs Soriano (Soriano hit by a Tamaraw FX-failed to maintain safe speed and the driver did not aid the victim) Held: 1. The circumstances that the victim was thrown five meters away after he was hit and that the vehicle stopped only some 25 meters from the point of impact support the conclusion that the vehicle was overspeeding—under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a motor vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating traffic regulations. 2. The records show that Macasasa violated two traffic rules under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. First, he failed to maintain a safe speed to avoid endangering lives. Both the trial and the appellate courts found Macasasa overspeeding. The records show also that Soriano was thrown five meters away after he was hit. Moreover, the vehicle stopped only some 25 meters from the point of impact. Both circumstances support the conclusion that the FX vehicle driven by Macasasa was overspeeding. Second, Macasasa, the vehicle driver, did not aid Soriano, the accident victim, in violation of Section 55, Article V of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. While Macasasa at first agreed to bring Soriano to the hospital, he fled the scene in a hurry. Contrary to

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petitioner’s claim, there is no showing of any factual basis that Macasasa fled for fear of the people’s wrath. What remains undisputed is that he did not report the accident to a police officer, nor did he summon a doctor. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a motor vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating traffic regulations. While respondents could recover damages from Macasasa in a criminal case and petitioner could become subsidiarily liable, still petitioner, as owner and employer, is directly and separately civilly liable for her failure to exercise due diligence in supervising Macasasa. We must emphasize that this damage suit is for the quasidelict of petitioner, as owner and employer, and not for the delict of Macasasa, as driver and employee. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The liability arises due to the presumed negligence of the employers in supervising their employees unless they prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. We agree that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Soriano was guilty of contributory negligence for not using the pedestrian overpass while crossing Commonwealth Avenue. We even note that the respondents now admit this point, and concede that the appellate court had properly reduced by 20% the amount of damages it awarded. Hence, we affirm the reduction of the amount earlier awarded, based on Article 2179 of the Civil Code which reads: When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover

Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms

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damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. Anonuevo vs CA (an injured cyclist of damages from the driver of the car which had struck him) Held: 1. The fact that there has long existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed on motorized vehicles, arising from the special nature of a motor vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the qualification under Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize such higher standard. Simply put, the standards applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal footing with other types of vehicles. 2. If the very injury has happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed the proximate cause of the injury. 3. To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. Filipinas Synthetic Fiber vs Delos Santos (Galant Sigma burst into flames and burned to death beyond recognition all four occupants of the car from a collision with a shuttle bus) Held: 1. Under the New Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Apparently, in the present case, Mejia’s violation of the traffic rules does not erase the presumption that he was the one negligent at the time of the collision. 2. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is

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direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. c. RES IPSA LOQUITOR Maao Central & Co. vs CA (an employee riding on a company’s cargo train and derailed causing injury and subsequently death of the victim) Held: 1. At any rate, the absence of the fish plates—whatever the cause or reason—is by itself—alone proof of the negligence of the petitioner. Res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine was described recently in Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, thus: Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. 2. Contributory negligence has been defined as “the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.” It has been held that “to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body.” There is no showing that the caboose where Famoso was riding was a dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending danger. FF Cruz & Co vs CA (manufacturing company adjacent to the defendants residence; burned) Held: 1. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, whose application to the instant case petitioner objects to, may be stated as follows: Where the thing which

Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms

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caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. 2. The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine, considering that in the normal course of operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips, sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be found thereon. It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of petitioner or its employees was not merely presumed. The Court of Appeals found that petitioner failed to construct a firewall between its shop and the residence of private respondents as required by a city ordinance; that the fire could have been caused by a heated motor or a lit cigarette; that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the shop; and that workers sometimes smoked inside the shop. 3. Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, petitioner’s failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances would suffice to Support a finding of negligence. 4. In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty of negligence since it had failed to construct a firewall between its property and private respondents’ residence which sufficiently complies with the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence US vs Crame (motorcycle and one George Coombs-private army) Held: 1.

Where, in a criminal prosecution against the driver of an automobile for running down and injuring a

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pedestrian crossing a street, it appeared that at the time the injury was produced, the injured person was where he had a right to be, that the automobile was being driven on the wrong side of the street, and no warning was given of its approach, it was properly held that there was a presumption of negligence on the part of the driver and that the burden of proof was on him to establish that the accident occurred through other causes than his negligence. The beggar has the same right to the use of the streets of a city as has the man with his automobile. Each is bound to the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety, and the prevention of injury to others, in the use thereof.

Africa vs Caltex (fire broke out at Caltex Service Station and burnt several neighboring houses) Held: 1. Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. 2. The gasoline-station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The person who knew or could have known how the fire started were the appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care. Layugan vs IAC (security guard and a part-time helper-bumped by an Isuzu truck while his parked truck is on the road) Held:

Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do; "(T)he failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur: This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened provided character accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management and control of alleged wrongdoer.

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Under doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" the happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under exclusive control and management of defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used. 7. The doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstance involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available; The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is particular to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. 8. The presumption of negligence on the part of the master or employer is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and consequently, may be rebutted; It may be overcome by proof that the employer exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection or supervision of his employees. Perla Compania de Seguros Inc vs Sps Sarangaya (fire accident in a building from the engine of the car) Held: 1. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie case. The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking. The doctrine is based on the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in general terms. In such

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instance, the plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to establish negligence. 2. The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act, use reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person in the same situation would have employed? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. 3. To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the following requisites must concur: a. the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; b. the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and c. the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.17 Carmen, Jr. vs Bacoy (stolen jeep for a joyride; bumped a motorcycle that caused the death of Sps Del Carmen) Held: 1. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, “[w]here the thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence—in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant—that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care.” Res ipsa loquitur is “merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a specific proof of negligence.” It “recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof,

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thus, it allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff to present along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part.” The doctrine is based partly on “the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege negligence in general terms.” 2. The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence are as follows: 1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; 2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and 3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. 3. The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. Solidum vs People (an anesthesiologist who is part of the team of anesthesiologists during the surgical pull through operation conducted on a threeyear old patient born with an imperforate anus) Held: 1. Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” The doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that “where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the

Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms

2.

3.

absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.” It is simply “a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.” In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. Dr. Solidum’s conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his failure to monitor and properly regulate the level of anesthetic agent administered on Gerald by overdosing at 100% halothane.

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An action upon medical negligence — whether criminal, civil or administrative — calls for the plaintiff to prove by competent evidence each of the following four elements, namely: (a) the duty owed by the physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient relationship, to act in accordance with the specific norms or standards established by his profession; (b) the breach of the duty by the physician’s failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard of care; (3) the causation, i.e., there must be a reasonably close and causal connection between the negligent act or omission and the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered by the patient. In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect the patient against unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as standards of care, set the duty of the physician to act in respect of the patient. Unfortunately, no clear definition of the duty of a particular physician in a particular case exists. Because most medical malpractice cases are highly technical, witnesses with special medical qualifications must provide guidance by giving the knowledge necessary to render a fair and just verdict. As a result, the standard of medical care of a prudent physician must be determined from expert testimony in most cases; and in the case of a specialist (like an anesthesiologist), the standard of care by which the specialist is judged is the care and skill commonly possessed and exercised by similar specialists under similar circumstances. The specialty standard of care may be higher than that required of the general practitioner. The standard of care is an objective standard by which the conduct of a physician sued for negligence or malpractice may be measured, and it does not depend, therefore, on any individual physician’s own knowledge either. In attempting to fix a standard by which a court may

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8.

determine whether the physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is required. The judge, as the trier of fact, ultimately determines the standard of care, after listening to the testimony of all medical experts. In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. It is puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation “engaged in any kind of industry.” The term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry. However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and humanitarian work. Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his

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duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent. Rosit vs Davao Doctors Hospital (a patient who figured an accident had fractured jaw; the doctor used bigger screws instead of the small ones) Held: 1. GR: To establish medical negligence, the Supreme Court (SC) has held that an expert testimony is generally required to define the standard of behavior by which the court may determine whether the physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient. 2. We have further held that resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as an exception to the requirement of an expert testimony in medical negligence cases may be availed of if the following essential requisites are satisfied: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.

D. BURDEN OF PROOF  Alano vs Magud-Lagmao (story of an 18yo found at Cubao Overpass, brought to the hospital, pronounced brain dead and vital organs were extracted and given to various recipients) Held: 1. It is respondent’s failure to adduce adequate evidence that doomed this case. As stated in Otero v. Tan, 678 SCRA 583 (2012), “[i]n civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. The parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the

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

defense offered by their opponent.” Here, there is to proof that, indeed, the period of around 24 hours from the time notices were disseminated, cannot be considered as reasonable under the circumstances. They failed to present any expert witness to prove that given the medical technology and knowledge at that time in the 1980’s, the doctors could or should have waited longer before harvesting the internal organs for transplantation. BJDC Construction vs Lanuzo (This case involves a claim for damages arising from the death of a motorcycle rider in a nighttime accident due to the supposed negligence of a construction company then undertaking re-blocking work on a national highway.) Held: 1. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. It is basic that whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it because a mere allegation is not evidence. Generally, the party who denies has no burden to prove. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court, but it may rest on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the essential allegations but raises affirmative defense or defenses, which if proved, will exculpate him from liability. 2. Negligence, the Court said in Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 (1988), is “the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do, or as Judge Cooley defines it, ‘(t)he failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person,

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that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.’” In order that a party may be held liable for damages for any injury brought about by the negligence of another, the claimant must prove that the negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury. Proximate cause is defined as “that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.” V.  



DEFENSES a. COMPLETE DEFENSE a.1. Plaintiff’s Own Negligence Paulan vs Sarabia Fe Cayao-Lasam vs Ramolete (defendant underwent “raspa” Held: 1. Contributory negligence is the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured, which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury. Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident. Where the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiff’s own act, which contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover damages for the injury. Again, based on the evidence presented in the present case under review, in which no negligence can be attributed to the petitioner, the immediate cause of the accident resulting in Editha’s injury was her own omission when she did not return for a follow-up check up, in defiance of petitioner’s orders. The immediate cause of Editha’s injury was her own act; thus, she cannot recover damages from the injury. BJDC Construction vs Lanuzo (This case involves a claim for damages arising from

Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms

the death of a motorcycle rider in a nighttime accident due to the supposed negligence of a construction company then undertaking re-blocking work on a national highway.) Held: 1. Based on the evidence adduced by the Lanuzo heirs, negligence cannot be fairly ascribed to the company considering that it has shown its installation of the necessary warning signs and lights in the project site. In that context, the fatal accident was not caused by any instrumentality within the exclusive control of the company. In contrast, Balbino had the exclusive control of how he operated and managed his motorcycle. The records disclose that he himself did not take the necessary precautions. As Zamora declared, Balbino overtook another motorcycle rider at a fast speed, and in the process could not avoid hitting a barricade at the site, causing him to be thrown off his motorcycle onto the newly cemented road. SPO1 Corporal’s investigation report corroborated Zamora’s declaration. This causation of the fatal injury went uncontroverted by the Lanuzo heirs. 2. Moreover, by the time of the accident, the project, which had commenced in September 1997, had been going on for more than a month and was already in the completion stage. Balbino, who had passed there on a daily basis in going to and from his residence and the school where he then worked as the principal, was thus very familiar with the risks at the project site. Nor could the Lanuzo heirs justly posit that the illumination was not adequate, for it cannot be denied that Balbino’s motorcycle was equipped with headlights that would have enabled him at dusk or night time to see the condition of the road ahead. That the accident still occurred surely indicated that he himself did not exercise the degree of care expected of him as a prudent motorist. EXCEPTION TO COMPLETE DEFENSE:

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Taylor vs Manila Electric (loss of an eye and other injuries of a minor who is more mature than the average boy of his age) Held: 1. The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, "must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises cannot be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child from entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are accustomed to roam about or to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and Where the Child does enter under such conditions the owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty, a negligent omission, for which he may and should be held responsible, if the child is actuallyinjured, without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be to expose all the children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or occupants of land upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to enter. Hidalgo Ent. Vs Balandan (ice plant factory; tanks were not provided with any kind of fence; 8-yo boy; bath in one of the tanks, sank to the bottom and died) Held:

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1.

2.

3.

Doctrine of attractive nuisance - One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this' attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children. DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE TO SWIMMING POOL OR WATER TANK.—The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.

a.2. ASSUMPTION OF RISK 



Afiliada vs Hisole and Hisole (gored by a carabao and later died) Held: 1. LIABILITY OF OWNER OF ANIMAL FOR DAMAGE CAUSED TO ITS CARETAKER.—Under article 1905 of the Civil Code, the owner of an animal is not liable for injury caused by it to its caretaker. 2. In the present case, the animal was in the custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. Ilocos Norte vs CA (electrocuted; storm)

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Held: 1. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim’s death. It was through the intervention of petitioner’s negligence that death took place. x x x Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general public” . . . considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be” (Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim’s death was solely due to a fortuitous event. “When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission” Calalas vs CA ((passenger of a jeepney seated on a wooden stool as an extension seat bumped by an Isuzu truck) Held: 1. We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner’s contention that Sunga’s taking an “extension seat” amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner’s contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the

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following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor’s will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.  Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs Reyes (Amay Bisaya – being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited) Held: 1. Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a “gate-crasher.” The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury”) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame. 2. Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee. a.3. DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE; DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING NEGLIGENCE;

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DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERED HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE 



PERIL;

Picart vs Smith (Smith (automobile and a frightened pony on a bridge) Held: 1, Understanding of the "last clear chance" rule of the law of negligence as particularly applied to automobile accidents. This rule cannot be invoked where the negligence of the plaintiff is concurrent with that of the defendant. Again, if a traveller when he reaches the point of collision is in a situation to extricate himself and avoid injury, his negligence at that point will prevent a recovery. But Justice Street finds as a fact that the negligent act of the defendant succeeded that of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval of time, and that at that moment the plaintiff had no opportunity to avoid the accident. Consequently, the "last clear chance" rule is applicable. In other words, when a traveller has reached a point where he cannot extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert the injury, his negligence in reaching that position becomes the condition and not the proximate cause of the injury and will not preclude a recovery. Allied Bank vs BPI (post-dated check in the amount of P1M) Held: 1. The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence. The doctrine necessarily assumes negligence on the part of the defendant and contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and does not apply except upon that assumption. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending

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2.



harm by the exercise of due diligence. Moreover, in situations where the doctrine has been applied, it was defendant’s failure to exercise such ordinary care, having the last clear chance to avoid loss or injury, which was the proximate cause of the occurrence of such loss or injury. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.” Admittedly, petitioner’s acceptance of the subject check for deposit despite the one year postdate written on its face was a clear violation of established banking regulations and practices. In such instances, payment should be refused by the drawee bank and returned through the PCHC within the 24-hour reglementary period. As aptly observed by the CA, petitioner’s failure to comply with this basic policy regarding post-dated checks was “a telling sign of its lack of due diligence in handling checks coursed through it.”

Pantranco vs Baesa (passenger jeepney collided with Pantranco; picnic to celebrate the wedding anniversary –MAY FOREVER Te! –bleh) Held: 1. The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918); Glan People’s Lumber and Hardware, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. de Calibo, et al., G.R. No. 70493, May 18, 1989]. The subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the immediate or

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2.

3.

proximate cause of the accident which intervenes between the accident and the more remote negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, supra]. Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages. Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the doctrine of “last clear chance” finds no application in this case. For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could not have known the existence of the peril. In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction. The speed at which the approaching bus was running prevented David Ico from swerving the jeepney to the right shoulder of the road in time to avoid the collision. Thus, even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it. This Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine “can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is

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or should have been discovered” [Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, supra]. 

People’s Lumber vs IAC (truck and jeepney – Calibo (jeepney’s driver)-from a drinking spree) Held: 1. The evidence not only acquits Zacarias of any negligence in the matter; there are also quite a few significant indicators that it was rather Engineer Calibo’s negligence that was the proximate cause of the accident. Zacarias had told Patrolman Dimaano at the scene of the collision and later confirmed in his written statement at the police headquarters that the jeep had been “zigzagging,” which is to say that it was travelling or being driven erratically at the time. The other investigator, Patrolman Jose Esparcia, also testified that eyewitnesses to the accident had remarked on the jeep’s “zigzagging.” There is moreover more than a suggestion that Calibo had been drinking shortly before the accident. The decision of the Trial Court adverts to further testimony of Esparcia to the effect that three of Calibo’s companions at the beach party he was driving home from when the collision occurred, who, having left ahead of him went to the scene when they heard about the accident, had said that there had been a drinking spree at the party and, referring to Calibo, had remarked: “Sabi na huag nang mag drive . . . pumipilit,” (loosely translated, “He was advised not to drive, but he insisted.”) 2. Even, however, ignoring these telltale indicia of negligence on the part of Calibo, and assuming some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias in failing to keep within his designated lane, incorrectly demarcated as it was, the physical facts, either expressly found by the Intermediate Appellate Court or which may be deemed conceded for lack of any dispute, would still absolve the latter of any actionable

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responsibility for the accident under the rule of the last clear chance. 3. Both Drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view of each other’s vehicle from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. Both vehicles were travelling at a speed of approximately thirty kilometers per hour. The private respondents have admitted that the truck was already at a full stop when the jeep plowed into it. And they have not seen fit to deny or impugn petitioners’ imputation that they also admitted the truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away. From this facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at that distance of thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to expect, as the Appellate Court would have it, the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path. De Roy vs CA (The firewall of a burnedout building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter) Held: 1. This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court’s decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that “the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.”

Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms

2. Nor was there error in rejecting



petitioners argument that private respondents had the “last clear chance” to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop and, therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of “last clear chance,” which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case. PLDT vs CA (jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT) Held: 1. The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known to, hence appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of petitioner. 2. The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. It is basic that private respondents

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cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence. Ong vs MCWD Echevara vs Ramos (vehicular accident) Held: 1. The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, but the defendant—who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so—is made liable for all the consequences of the accident, notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff. However, the doctrine does not apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered. 2. In this case, both Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent man would have taken to prevent the vehicular accident. Since the gross negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence of Benigno Valdez were the proximate cause of the vehicular accident, respondents cannot recover damages pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code. Philippine National Railways vs Vizcara (jeep and the train) Held:

Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms

1.

2.

Both courts ruled that the petitioners fell short of the diligence expected of it, taking into consideration the nature of its business, to forestall any untoward incident. In particular, the petitioners failed to install safety railroad bars to prevent motorists from crossing the tracks in order to give way to an approaching train. Aside from the absence of a crossing bar, the “Stop, Look and Listen” signage installed in the area was poorly maintained, hence, inadequate to alert the public of the impending danger. A reliable signaling device in good condition, not just a dilapidated “Stop, Look and Listen” signage, is needed to give notice to the public. It is the responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep the signal devices in working order. Failure to do so would be an indication of negligence. Having established the fact of negligence on the part of the petitioners, they were rightfully held liable for damages. The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. To reiterate, the proximate cause of the collision was the petitioners’ negligence in ensuring that motorists and pedestrians alike may safely cross the railroad track. The unsuspecting driver and passengers of the jeepney did not have any participation in the occurrence of the unfortunate incident which befell them. Likewise,

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they did not exhibit any overt act manifesting disregard for their own safety. Thus, absent preceding negligence on the part of the respondents, the doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied. a.4 EMERGENCY RULE  Valenzuela vs CA (lancer parked and bumped by Li) Held: 1. One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Li’s disingenuous and patently selfserving asseverations. The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan throroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were alert—as every driver should be—to those conditions. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Physiological “fight or flight” mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc. Li’s failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a “very fast” speed as testified by Rodriguez; and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol. Either factor working independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela’s car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply his brakes. 2. Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening

Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms



or dangerous situations and does not require the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions. Under the “emergency rule” adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. 3. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists. Orix Metro Leasing vs Mangalinao (A multiple-vehicle collision in North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) resulting in the death of all the passengers in one vehicle, including the parents and a sibling of the surviving orphaned minor heirs, compelled the latter to file an action for damages against the registered owners and drivers of the two 10-wheeler trucks that collided with their parents’ Nissan Pathfinder (Pathfinder) Held: 1. The ‘Emergency Rule’ invoked by petitioners will not apply. Such principle states: [O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if

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he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. Considering the wet and slippery condition of the road that night, Antonio should have been prudent to reduce his speed and increase his distance from the Pathfinder. Had he done so, it would be improbable for him to have hit the vehicle in front of him or if he really could not avoid hitting it, prevent such extensive wreck to the vehicle in front. With the glaring evidence, he obviously failed to exercise proper care in his driving. a.5 PRESCRIPTION  Capuno vs Pepsi (vehicular accident) Held: 1. An action for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years. 2. AN action based on a quasi-delict is governed by Article 1150 of the Civil Code as to the question of when the prescriptive period of four years shall begin to run, that is, “from the day (the action) may be brought,” which means from the day the quasidelict occurred or was committed 3. The institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict. b. INCOMPLETE PARTIAL DEFENSE b.1. DOCTRINE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE  NTC vs De Jesus  Rakes vs Atlantic Gulf ((a laborer of the defendant transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor that accidentally slid in rails, caught the plaintiff and broke his leg and was amputated up to the knee) Held: 1.

The negligence of the injured person contributing to his injury but not being one of the determining causes of the principal accident, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but only in reduction of his damages. Each

Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms

party is chargeable with damages in proportion to his fault. 





Taylor vs Manila Electric Railroad ((loss of an eye and other injuries of a minor who is more mature than the average boy of his age) Held: 1. When the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiff's own act, which contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover damages for the injury. Banal & Enverso vs Tacloban Electric House & House Plant (accident after a procession; daughter died) Held: 1. Although the trial judge made the findings of fact herein before outlined, he nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrines announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Paciftc Co. ([1907], 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages. Jarco Marketing Corp. vs CA (the daughter of the defendant was pinned by the bulk of the store’s gift-wrapping counter/structure) Held:

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Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. In his book, former Judge Cezar S. Sangco stated: In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Napocor vs Casionan (pocket miner) Held: 1. Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. On the other hand, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. There is contributory negligence when the party’s act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of

Notes/Torts and Damages/Midterms

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the person injured which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury. The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. If indeed there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim, then it is proper to reduce the award for damages. This is in consonance with the Civil Code provision that liability will be mitigated in consideration of the contributory negligence of the injured party. Article 2179 of the Civil Code is explicit on this score: When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. 2. ; It was held that to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body. 3. In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the community. There were no warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives should they accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area. Cadiente vs Macas (15yo HS student standing on the shoulder of the road was bumped by Ford Fiera) Held: 1. The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a

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plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full, but must proportionately bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant is thus held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. In this case, records show that when the accident happened, the victim was standing on the shoulder, which was the uncemented portion of the highway. As noted by the trial court, the shoulder was intended for pedestrian use alone. Only stationary vehicles, such as those loading or unloading passengers may use the shoulder. Running vehicles are not supposed to pass through the said uncemented portion of the highway. However, the Ford Fiera in this case, without so much as slowing down, took off from the cemented part of the highway, inexplicably swerved to the shoulder, and recklessly bumped and ran over an innocent victim. The victim was just where he should be when the unfortunate event transpired. Cimafranca, on the other hand, had no rightful business driving as recklessly as she did. The respondent cannot be expected to have foreseen that the Ford Fiera, erstwhile speeding along the cemented part of the highway would suddenly swerve to the shoulder, then bump and run him over. Thus, we are unable to accept the petitioner’s contention that the respondent was negligent.

Sugaree 

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