Nietzsche - Beyond Good And Evil Reading Notes

Beyond Good and Evil This book, subtitled "Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future," concluded the series of three books at the middle of Nietzsche's productive thought, spanning the period from 1882 to 1886. Nietzsche had finished Zarathustra, Part IV, in April 1885 and published only 40 copies for distribution. Meanwhile, he began pulling together notes for Beyond Good and Evil. His letters, during this period, disclose a great deal of personal frustration. None of his books had been successful and his publishers were not even distributing them. In an attempt to solidify and justify his thought, Nietzsche was beginning to re-work his older books. Eventually, having re-acquired his rights to publication, he would put out new editions. Beyond Good and Evil itself was finished by April of 1886, with some follow-up work extending throughout the summer. In the summer of 1886, he also began laying out the structure of a large work which he called "The Will to Power: Attempt at a Transvaluation of All Values." He never completed this work but did leave extensive, though somewhat confusing notes. In his "Preface" to Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche begins with the astonishing suggestion, "supposing truth is a woman --- what then?" Given the notoriously poor performance of philosophers at winning women (and Nietzsche should know), is it any wonder that none of them have won truth as such? Indeed, as Nietzsche says, "every kind of dogmatism is left standing dispirited and discouraged." It is appropriate, thus, that Nietzsche's first chapter discusses "the Prejudices of Philosophers." We should begin by returning to aphorism #110 of The Gay Science. Nietzsche makes a radical distinction between truth and knowledge. Knowledge, one must recall, is whatever has evolved through time and whose value can only be supposed as having been life-preserving, species-preserving. It is there, but we can never know why except to acknowledge that it must have had utility through a long time depth. Nietzsche calls these elements of knowledge "errors" precisely because of these obscure origins. On the other hand, in a far shorter period of human history, and therefore really untested, the pursuit of truth has evolved. Just as knowledge represents value given out of our will to power, a truth claim (which is a special value given to an element of knowledge over and against another element of knowledge) is a value given out of our will to power (or our will to truth, as Nietzsche abbreviates it). The will to truth is, in effect, modern man's attempt to work the erroneous elements of human knowledge into a coherent system of some kind. One of the unexpected consequences of the will to truth is that God has become unbelievable. That being said, we see that philosophers are exemplars of the will to truth. They propose systematic points of view that organize and, hence, give value to elements of knowledge. But we need to be very suspicious about philosophers. Are they really "disinterested" or are they, in fact, always driven by their own unconscious "interests"? Reading even the most obscure philosophy, we should always ask, "toward what morality is this reasoning aimed." As Nietzsche says, "every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author." Also (#6), "in the philosopher . . . there is nothing whatever that is impersonal; and above all, his morality bears decided and decisive witness to who he is." Of course, there is some kind of blatant "self-contradiction" going on here because Nietzsche himself is a philosopher! Right? Yes, but he is one of a new bunch. "In all seriousness: I see such new philosophers coming up." Note that the first paragraph of aphorism #2 is a quote. It is, in fact, a model of what the old philosophers say and reason. So Nietzsche's reply to the old philosophers is in his second paragraph. It is this model assumption that has justified all

philosophies that attempt to ground their "truths" in metaphysics. Therefore, if we throw out the assumptions built into this "model," and if we question the very roots of the will to truth and the grounds of any systematization, with our dangerous "maybes," we will come up with a brave new bunch of philosophers. In this whole section, Nietzsche goes a long way in clarifying what The Gay Science was really all about. But what is the answer? Note in aphorism #10 that the answer is not nihilism. Nietzsche's course is clearly somewhere between metaphysically based moralities and nihilistically motivated lack of value commitments. From here to the end of the first chapter, Nietzsche sustains a systematic and coherent attack on the typical prejudices of modern philosophers. Central to this attack is Nietzsche's account of how the human will has been misunderstood and, consequently, misused. This discussion is quite important to an understanding of the very different way in which Nietzsche uses the term 'will' in his expression "the will to power." "Willing seems to me to be above all something complicated, something that is a unit only as a word --- and it is precisely in this one word that the popular prejudice lurks." (#19) Moving on to the second chapter, "The Free Spirit," Nietzsche develops the theme of those up-coming philosophers who seek the overman through self-overcoming. He begins, however, with an amazing declaration regarding the utility of simple errors. While we continually sing praises to the truth, Nietzsche always demands that we really don't know whether the truth is that valuable. And, in fact, when we really honestly examine our situation, isn't it always the case that our lives run far more simply and more smoothly banking on error and ignorance. "Here and there we understand it and laugh at the way in which precisely science at its best seeks most to keep us in this simplified, thoroughly artificial, suitably constructed and suitably falsified world." [If one doubts Nietzsche on this, one should study thermodynamics which is purely a fantastic invention built upon the non-existent "ideal gas."] But how does the free spirited philosopher emerge? "The long and serious study of the average man, and consequently much disguise, self-overcoming, familiarity, and bad contact --- this constitutes a necessary part of the life-history of every philosopher, perhaps the most disagreeable, odious, and disappointing part." Also, note that, "independence is for the very few; it is a privilege of the strong. And whoever attempts it even with the best right but without inner constraint proves that he is probably not only strong, but also daring to the point of recklessness." Aphorism #32 begins a series of powerful statements that are crucial to understanding Nietzsche's project. While in primitive time the value of an act was identical with its practical effect, we have passed through an admirable period of development in which the value of an act has been identified with its origin, called an "intention." Nietzsche actually sees this is a great step forward and, in fact, a necessary prelude to self-overcoming. But now we must understand that the final phase of development lies in precisely understanding the conscious intention as only skin deep. "Indeed, we believe that the intention is merely a sign and symptom that still requires interpretation --- moreover, a sign that means too much and therefore, taken by itself alone, almost nothing." "Nietzsche continues, "the overcoming of morality, in a certain sense even the selfovercoming of morality --- let this be the name for that long secret work which has been saved up for the finest and most honest. . . the whole morality of selfdenial must be questioned mercilessly and taken to court --- no less than the aesthetics of "contemplation devoid of all interest" which is used today as a seductive guise for the emasculation of art, to give it a good conscience."

The remaining aphorisms constitute a powerful set of "directives" in the sense that they offer a sustained statement of how the free spirit must emerge and survive. "Whatever philosophical standpoint one may adopt today, from every point of view the erroneousness of the world in which we think we live is the surest and firmest fact that we can lay eyes on." Aphorisms #32 to #36 give us an especially vivid demonstration of Nietzsche's understanding of human psychology and how it is that the will to power stands centrally in this perspective. Also note aphorisms #42 and #43. "A new species of philosophers is coming up . . ." And they should be called 'Versucher'" (translated as "attempters" but ambiguously also meaning "tempters"). "Are these coming philosophers new friends of 'truth'?" Yes, as The Gay Science preliminarily suggests, Nietzsche's program is a part of the overall untested program of the will to truth, but they will not be dogmatists! "One must shed the bad taste of wanting to agree with many." "What Is Religious" is one of the more amazing chapters of this book. Before embarking, read Kaufmann's note regarding the title. It is not entirely clear what the English title ought to be, and either "the being of religion" or "the essence of religion" might also do. The early aphorisms of this chapter are exactly what we expect of Nietzsche and they "anticipate" the sustained arguments of his Genealogy of Morals. Nietzsche's critique of Christianity is unrelenting and vitriolic. Yet aphorism #49 betrays Nietzsche's actual direction. "What is amazing about the religiosity of the ancient Greeks is the enormous abundance of gratitude it exudes: it is a very noble type of man that confronts nature and life in this way. Later, when the rabble gained the upper hand in Greece, fear became rampant in religion, too --- and the ground was prepared for Christianity." The religious as such can be a powerful instrument in human and cultural development if it is in noble hands and devoted to positive life-affirming ends. This idea is amplified and completed in the concluding aphorisms (#61 and #62). "The philosopher as we understand him . . . will make use of religions for his project of cultivation and education, just as he will make use of whatever political and economic states are at hand." There are genuine virtues to religion when in the right hands and directed toward to right purposes. The problem, of course, is that Christianity precisely lost its "right purposes" and focused, instead, on those who suffer and brought everything downward in pitying. "In a total accounting," Nietzsche says, "the sovereign religions we have had so far are among the chief causes that have kept the type "man" on a lower rung --- they have preserved too much of what ought to perish." The outcome, far from a "cultivated" type of human, is "a smaller, almost ridiculous type, a herd animal, something eager to please, sickly, and mediocre . . . the European of today." Not only is the "religious" itself not unfit for Nietzsche's plan, but he outlines the general form of his "religious life" in #295, at the book's end, where he identifies it with "no less a one than the god Dionysus, that great ambiguous one and tempter god." After his "Epigrams and Interludes," Nietzsche begins his main task, a critique of morality. The historical efforts have all been aimed at providing a rational foundation of morality and not at offering a critique of morality itself. We naturally assume that moral prescriptions exist; the only issue, therefore, is how we are informed about them and why we must feel obligated to adhere to them. "Every morality," says Nietzsche, "is . . . a bit of tyranny against 'nature'; also against 'reason'." Having said this much, Nietzsche begins the real natural history of morals at #194 where he notes that we not only live under different "tablets of goods" but that we also differ "in what [we] take for really having and possessing something good." Morality evolves out of the self-protective urges of the herd. Fear is "the mother of morals." "Everything that elevates an individual above the herd and

intimidates the neighbor is henceforth called evil." The "good" is appropriated from its former, nobler origins and identified, instead, with community or herd. The pathology of all this can be seen in the Judeo-Christian religions and, then, in the movement toward democracies. Nietzsche's comments regarding democracy (end of #202) are especially interesting. While we like to think of ourselves creating and maintaining "free societies," Nietzsche proposes that, "in fact they are at one with the lot in their thorough and instinctive hostility to every other form of society except that of the autonomous herd." [Is this why virtually all fascist states arise out of democracies?] How "free" are democracies? Nietzsche claims, "they are at one in their tough resistance to every special claim, every special right and privilege (which means in the last analysis, every right . . .)." Freedom as truly "individuation" is really not a value in Christianity or democracy. We are much more secure if everyone conforms to our own self-imposed limits. Indeed, we are more secure if we imagine (with some degree of bad conscience) that these limits are ancient and traditional rather than selfimposed. Then, we don't have to blame ourselves for our timidity and we can feel virtuous in freely criticizing others. The material presented in "We Scholars" is essential to the overall project. After all, where Nietzsche makes reference to "new philosophers upcoming" and similar expressions, aren't we led to believe that the overman lies in some familiar academic direction. The chapter, then, is a disappointing summary of the ills of contemporary scholarship, and no one --- philosopher or scientist --- gets off without rejection. It is a chance to look around and at ourselves, today, and to take in what we are all about. What really do scientists and philosophers aim at today? How is our "embrace of truth" motivated? Nietzsche suggests there is bad conscience here as well as in morality. In the end, however, the chapter delivers few answers to many questions. In the end, philosophy cannot be taught but has to arise out of blood and experience. At best it is "cultivated" but by what. The leading message seems to be an attack against "objectivity" and "skepticism." Both of these create separation and remoteness. Nietzsche desires engagement and a self-confident "subject." The problem is not in being "interested;" the problem lies in denying our "interests" and acting disinterested with bad conscience. We need commitment, not timidity. Moving along to his chapter, "Our Virtues," Nietzsche has further opportunities to suggest what it is that characterizes his philosophers of the future. Will even they have their "virtues," and what will these be? All of this is, of course, preceded by a fairly typical tirade on the shallowness of all virtues, as exhibited past and present. Whenever goodness is connected with a human characteristic or capacity, mustn't we explore it critically and especially examine it for all kinds of "bad faith." On the positive side, Nietzsche continues his consistent suggestion that "our virtues" must include risk taking, hardness, and a tolerance for pain. We must be severe even when that may result in pain to others. These are discussions that understandably create suspicion that Nietzsche really did believe in cruel conquests and a thirst for command over others. In the end, though, in #230 Nietzsche drives home the central thesis which really recovers the momentum of The Gay Science. "This will to mere appearance, to simplification, to masks . . . is countered by that sublime inclination of the seeker after knowledge who insists on profundity, multiplicity, and thoroughness, with a will which is a kind of cruelty of the intellectual conscience and taste." He continues, "indeed, it would sound nicer if we were said, whispered, reputed to be distinguished not by cruelty but by 'extravagant honesty,' we free, very free spirits." [bold-face emphasis mine] "Why did we choose this insane task? Or, putting it differently: 'why have knowledge at all?'" Here, then, is Nietzsche's

life-question. Has he found an answer? In #231, he exclaims, "Learning changes us; it does what all nourishment does which does not merely 'preserve'." But there is a kind of "spiritual fate" at the bottom of this will. "A thinker cannot relearn but only finish learning." At this point, the chapter takes a bizarre turn. Nietzsche decides to address "a few truths about 'woman as such'" and, from #232 to the end at #239, he takes on the "defeminization" of woman. All of this has, of course, become tastelessly offensive in our own time. How is all of this relevant to "our virtues"? I suspect, in fact, that it is relevant. Tasteless and offensive as this discussion is, shouldn't it call our own attention to the virtue of an "extravagant honesty"? Perhaps all honest inquiries press toward tastelessness and offensiveness because they press past the socially accepted norms of the age and demand more, even when it begins to tighten and hurt. Perhaps, in fact, the collective energy of distaste is a pretty accurate sign to the effect that there is a need for genuine honesty. This is not to say that Nietzsche was correct in his judgments about woman but it is, I think, an interesting glimpse at what the problems of honesty may be. Perhaps these eight aphorisms are not such a bizarre turn at all. "Peoples and Fatherlands" I leave for cultural historians. The volume concludes with "What is Noble." It is in this final chapter that Nietzsche makes clear how he sees the idea of "evil" arising and how, therefore, we can (and must) step through and beyond the dichotomy of good and evil. All of this is preliminary to his Genealogy of Morals. His leading assumption is that all human advancement has occurred because of the nobility of individual humans. Nietzsche calls these the "aristocracy" but it is a term we have to watch carefully. It is a class of nobility and not a class of decadence and privilege. The noble person Nietzsche has in mind is self-aware and self-confident, perhaps to an extreme. On the basis of this assumption, Nietzsche posits the evolution of two great moral systems --- "master morality" and "slave morality." Master morality is constructed on the basis of nobility and hangs on the general idea that what the noble person does is "good." There is little or no need for a dichotomous term, "bad," because it just blankets the rest of what gets done. We simply have the ascent of excellence and whatever gets in the way is brushed aside or crushed. To excel is important enough to human advance, the will to life, that the rest is irrelevant or suppressed. Put crudely, slavery may be essential. As with Nietzsche's discussion regarding "woman," we are likely to take offense to these ideas because we imagine ourselves to live under democratic principles/ideals of equality and we paid dearly in the middle-19th Century to separate ourselves literally from slavery. But this is an important occasion in which to take Nietzsche's teachings quite forthrightly and demand the highest truths regarding what we actually are as a people. American political idealism is probably full of bad conscience! It is in slave morality, that the dichotomy of good and evil arises and this is because the slave mentality, out of fear and resistance, needs to make the noble human "evil." The leading theme of slave morality is to defend against and destroy, if possible, the nobleman, with all his attitudes and exploitations. It is also, therefore, the theme of leveling and conformity to a non-threatening herd-like existence. In Nietzsche's eyes (see #262), the evolution from master morality to slave morality is virtually an expected part of human natural history. There simply comes a time when the age of nobility has generated an abundant and secure society in which the evolution of new egalitarian ideals can occur. The great acquired power of the aristocracy has given rise to a general empowerment of the people and mediocrity can come to be idealized. But once the mass man has been empowered, what then?

[Compare this to Jose Ortega y Gasset's theme in his Revolt of the Masses. These are questions we should be asking in relation to American politics today, I suspect. One might want to take seriously Nietzsche's suggestion (#242) that "the democratization of Europe is at the same time an involuntary arrangement for the cultivation of tyrants." The tendency toward fascism in Europe was already apparent in Nietzsche's time and did nothing but live up to Nietzsche's insights in the next century. Why does fascism so successfully evolve out of democratic republics? Because it is an easy step from the idealization of mediocrity to the placement of all power in the image of the truly mediocre politician. Slave morality becomes state morality.] It is really this society of decadence in which Nietzsche locates himself and, for that matter, us. The master morality and its age of self-confident conquerors is gone and not likely to return; the cultural environment is that of slave morality and the politics of common tyrants. Nihilism is a natural result of this decadence. The question, then, is what can be noble in this society. How can a sub-culture of self-overcoming free spirits emerge? And who will be their gods? Nietzsche is far from a nihilist, obviously. His free spirits will not be commanders of people, like the nobility of the past, but rather people who possess extravagant honesty about all things and the personal courage to step away from the herd in at least their person acts. (See his #273) [Was #275 written with Clinton in mind?] What are the virtues of the noble individual? Nietzsche suggests (in #284) "courage, insight, sympathy, and solitude." [See Kaufmann's footnote #32.] But we should especially view #287. Nietzsche is rarely so forthcoming with deliberate formulae! "The noble soul has reverence for itself." The god of this noble self (#295) is, of course and at long last, Dionysus.