Motion For Cog Ownership

IN THE 7TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF MISSOURI rOTTNTY OF CLAY CTAY -- DIVISION 2 Bounty Qp^ COUNTY OF DIVISION 2

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William Duff, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER WHXIAM FRAZIER, (SERIAL 3092) AND OFFICER ALAN ROTH (SERIAL # 4090) Defendants.

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) CASE NO. 07CY-CV06125 ) ) ACTION ) FOR TRESPASS, AND ) TRESPASS ON THE CASE ) ) ) VERIFIED )

PLIANTIFF INVITES THE COURT TO TAKE COGNIZANCE September 12, 2007

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To wit;

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The Subject matter being adjudicated in this case is specific to plaintiffs individually held Right of

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Liberty and Right to own property. Recently, defendants have injected, by way of their motions to

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dismiss, an additional right of action as subject matter here to be adjudicated; Plaintiffs Right to

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contract. All of which, plaintiff declares are Rights of Action belonging to Plaintiff. The controversy

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arises from Defendants and their agent's insistence upon regulating these rights of action;

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1. The attempted regulation upon plaintiff1 s right of action arises from Plaintiff s presence on the public right of way with his property (auto) without; a. State permission in the form of State Driver license; i. Defendants make the statutory claim plaintiff "must" have a State issued Driver license, however, Defendant fails to provide this court with competent evidence that said State Statutory Claim is superior to Plaintiff's Right of action to be on the public right of way with his property where no claim of injury attends. ii. Conversely, plaintiff offers City of Chicago v. Collins et al., Supreme Court of I Illinois. 175 111. 445, 51 N.E. 907 (Oct. 24, 1898). b. State permission in the form of State issued license tags;

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The license in the latter-named case is designed to operate upon those who hold themselves out as common carriers, and a license may be exacted from such as a proper exercise of police power; but no reason exists why it should be applied to the owners of private vehicles, used for their individual use exclusively, in their own business, or for their own pleasure, as a means of locomotion. Farwell v. City of Chicago, 71 III. 269; Joyce v. City of East St. Louis, 77 111. 156; Chy of Collinsville v. Cole, 78 111. 114; Chy of St. Louis v. Grone, 46 Mo. 575; Livingston v. City of Paducah, 80 Ky. 657; City of Covington v. Woods (Ky.) 33 S.W. 84 A license, therefore, implying a privilege, cannot possibly exist with reference to something which is a right, free and open to all, as is the right of the citizen to ride and drive over the streets of the city without charge and without toll, provided he does so in a reasonable manner.

William duff

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i. (see la(i)) c. State mandated commercial contract for automobile insurance; i. All insurance companies will not sell automobile insurance to anyone who does not consent to and use the State Driver License. As such, having automobile insurance, while generally being a good idea which plaintiff would have were it possible. However, being impossibility, the law could not expect it. And now

d. An automobile (they call a "motor vehicle") that Attorney Generals office now claims; is purchased fraudulently Even though Plaintiff lias entered into evidence in this case a copy of the bill of sale ceding "all Right, Title and interest of every kind" in that automobile to Plaintiff. And to which Plaintiff now adds, a copy of the certified check used to purchase said property (see exhibit Z attached hereto), complete with sellers name and assignment, as further evidence of said ownership. From this analysis of the issues, it is becoming apparent there is possibility of a fraud being perpetrated

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somewhere in this controversy. But is it the Plaintiff that is perpetuating it? Or is it the people in State

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offices, whom the Attorney General is really acting to protect, who have devised or are perpetuating a

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scheme designed and implemented into Missouri Statutes that serves to severely diminish the peoples

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Right to Liberty and to own and use Property, which the State could not ordinarily restrain, all the

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while generating fines and fees for State Revenue out of what would otherwise be the practice of

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people enjoying the fruits of their Liberty and property, free from restraint by the State? It should

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2 come as no surprise, given the path plaintiffs proof is taking us; Plaintiff sees fraud in the latter and

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none in the former.

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In their official capacities, defendants can act only in accordance with powers granted by the people

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against plaintiff upon subject matter that comprehends an injury plaintiff has done or by some form of

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contract plaintiff has consented to. Plaintiffs papers filed in this case state expressly he does not

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consent to any such contract, and certainly not an adhesion contract as defendants are intimating exists.

SUMMARY

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Statutes are claims of authority that represent rebuttable presumption of law. Plaintiff has more than

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rebutted the statutory presumption being subordinate to plaintiffs Right of Action. Defendants do not

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assert that plaintiff has injured anyone. As such, only one possibility remains that would lend any

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credibility at all to defendants claims, to wit; The state of Missouri possesses an ownership interest in we don't know for sure because it is not clearly stated in statute or in practice and it is not stated clearly in any contract william duff

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the 1996 Buick sufficient to decide its use and disposal. If this were the fact, and what defendants are

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hiding behind in their assertion of statute, even if it were true, that fact would provide no authority for

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defendants to put their hands on plaintiff or bind and imprison him. They have NO authority to do so

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unless an intentional injury is comprehended, (see 4th amendment)

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Lets assume for a moment that it is so. The man that sold the 1996 Buick to plaintiff believed he

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owned all right, title and interest of every kind in the auto. How do we know? He stated it on the bill

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of sale (see exhibit B). That would suggest the State has NO interest sufficient to support the statute

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defendants claim applies here. What could make the statute apply to all motor vehicles without the

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owners of the property knowing it?

How about this scenario;

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When an auto is manufactured, its Statement of origin (MSO) is evidence of all right title and

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interest in that property (fact). The State comes along and forces the manufacturer, over which the

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state wields undue power and influence4, and/or its dealers to turn over the MSO to the state upon

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sale to one of the people (fact). Then the state transfigures and transforms the auto into a "Motor

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Vehicle" upon which the State issues the buyer a "Certificate of Title"(fact). All of this is done

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without a clear disclosure to the buyer. All the buyer sees is the certificate of title. The seller

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assures the buyer they are the proud new "Owner" of the car. The buyer provides the full

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consideration to the dealer for the property (car)(fact) but the State took ownership of the buyer's

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property and issued the buyer a certificate of title as recognition for the buyers right to possess and

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use it. What just happened there? Before we discuss that lets look at a legal definition; •

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FRAUD, TO DEFRAUD, torts: Unlawfully, designedly, and knowingly, to appropriate the property of another, without a criminal intent. FRAUD, contracts, torts: Any trick or artifice employed by one person to induce another to fall into an error, or to detain him in it, sv that he may make an agreement contrary to his interest. The fraud may consist either, first, in the misrepresentation, or, secondly, in the concealment of a material fact. Fraud, force and vexation, are odious in law. Booth, Real Actions, 250. Fraud gives no action, however, without damage; 3 T. R. 56; and in matters of contract it is merely a defence; it cannot in any case constitute a new contract. 7 Vez. 211; 2 Miles' Rep. 229. It is essentially ad hominem. 4 T. R. 337-8.

if you ask 100 people if they own their car, 99.99% will say they do. The Manufacturer is a State created Corporation and therefore subject to State Regulation, (fact) William duff

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o Fraud avoids a contract, ab initio, both at law and in equity, whether the object be to deceive the public, or third persons, or one party endeavor thereby to cheat the other. 1 Fonb. Tr. Equity, 3d ed. 66, note; 6th ed. 122, and notes; Newl. Cont. 352; 1 Bl. R. 465; Dougl. Rep. 450; 3 Burr. Rep. 1909; 3 V. & B. Rep. 42; 3 Chit. Com. Law, 155, 806, 698; 1 Sch. & Lef. 209; Verpl. Contracts, passim; Domat, Lois Civ. p. 1, 1.4,t.6 5 s.8, n. 2. Undisclosed to the buyer and by force upon the seller, a third party (The State) stepped into the

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contractual proceedings between the buyer and seller and took the value of the property without

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providing any consideration thereto and without the express knowing and voluntary consent of the

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buyer. The buyer, happy with "their" new property pays for it in lull and then,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, The State,

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with its new prize bounty enacts statutes, to:

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Why? Because the state claims an ownership interest in the property. It doesn't openly

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claim this. The State does it by subterfuge through its "use statutes'0. As here in this case

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when defendants claim that it is against the statute to buy or sell a "motor vehicle" without

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assigning the title (certificate of title), what they are saying is, we own it, and it can only be

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bought or sold according to our rules.

• Force the buyer, in excess of the full price of the property, to pay a sales tax, annual property tax etc.; • Force the buyer, in excess of their belief in their foil ownership of the property, to follow every "good idea" State statute enacted for the use and disposal of that property, wherever it is.

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The scenario I just provided is not an analogy, it is a reality, it is unassailable in fact and in law. It is

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fact, this is what is being done and that fact clearly identifies the fraud that is apparent in this case.

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Plaintiffs dealings with the previous owner do not comprehend fraud by either party thereto.

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Plaintiffs choice not to be party to the fraudulent actions of the corporate State of Missouri is a choice

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Plaintiff, in his sovereign dominion over his own private domain, does as of Right to Liberty and

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Property, that being superior to the State Interests being adjudicated here, be they just or be they

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fraudulent.

Plaintiff has no duty to perpetuate fraud. Neither do the office holders herein consumed.

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Plaintiff, recognizing the fraud by State agents, purchased the 1996 Buick, took the fraudulent

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certificate of title and extinguished it as the property entered plaintiffs domain. Plaintiff correctly 5

In Missouri, many such statutes are located in RSMo chapter 300.

William duff

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owns all right title and interest of every kind in said property and defendants, by force of arms, in an

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armed criminal action did trespass upon plaintiffs domain, and steal plaintiffs Liberty and property in

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his Body, his Right of Action, and in his 1996 Buick and personal property therein. Defendants

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excuse: Criminal enforcement upon a civil matter arising out of a fraudulent act of the State of

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Missouri.

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Even the Missouri Supreme Court declares all of the acts, complained of by defendants, as being

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"CIVIL" in nature (that can only mean contractually) and the only reason offenders are tried under

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criminal rules is that the prosecution has a higher burden of proof attendant to the fines imposed.

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There is, and there can be, no authority that would support defendants trespasses upon plaintiff and

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plaintiff is due the remedy sought here.

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This court, and the magistrate designated generally to hold it, are now fully informed of the fraud

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suborned by defendants and their attorneys and the injuries that is causing plaintiff. Both the court and

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the magistrate have a duty to seek a remedy against these state actions, just as plaintiff is doing in this

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action. To ignore the duty is to vacate the office of trust.

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WHEEFORE, this plaintiff, demands this court issue the orders previously entered in this case, with

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preceape to the clerk for writ of execution thereof, on the seal of the 7th Judicial Circuit Court of

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Missouri, and without further delay and for all other considerations and support due this plaintiff.

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>ate

wffih Plaintiff

Cc: William Duff to: [email protected], William Frazier and Alan Roth to: 1001 NW Barry Rd. Place Kansas City, Missouri C/O KCMO Police Department - North Division EMILY A. DODGE Assistant Attorney General at; [email protected] and emi ly. dodge(o).ago. mo. aov

william duff

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