Modernization Of China

MODERNISATION OF THE PLA

RESTRUCTURING OF THE PLA  The PLA restructuring was an obvious fall out of the changing doctrinal evolution. The two elements which guided the restructuring process where new military thinking and investing in the advanced hardware. The understanding also dawned that it was not sufficient to invest only in the land forces. The Navy and the Air Force was an essential asset to take China into the twenty first century as a military superpower. Thus began the downsizing of the army and modernization of the PLA in totality. It would be pertinent, when discussing the modernization of PLA, to include the three armed forces, the aero space advancement, the Information warfare and nuclear aspect. The restructuring was carried out under the following principles :-

RESTRUCTURING OF THE PLA 

The restructuring should help make the army capable of offensive attack in depth.  The restructuring must be guided by the theory of combined operations.  It must place due emphasis on electronic warfare at the tactical level.  It should prepare the combined units for both a high-tech conventional war and a tactical nuclear war.8

THE BEGINNING  The restructuring process of the PLA began in 1975 when Mao Zedong entrusted Deng Xiaoping with the every day affairs of the CMC. The CMC implanted a three year plan to reduce the force from 6.1 million to 4.5 million. The army was reduced by 32 percent, the strategic missile force by 27.2 percent and the staff itself by 32.2 percent.9 The second stage of reduction was delayed by the Tiananmen incident, which began in 1992. In this stage nearly 30 percent reduction took place. In 1998 third major effort was taken to trim the PLA by nearly 50,000 officers. The purpose of these cutting were saving money and enhancing social stability.  Army modernization has the least priority amongst the three services. The aim being, to reduce numbers and increase the technological enrichment of the Army. The manpower reduction will restructure the force into:-

 A small number of hi-tech forces for flexible use in regional contingencies.  A large number of forces equipped with low-to-medium technology weapons for internal security.  A nuclear force to maintain a viable deterrent against other nuclear powers.10

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After the Sino Russian Bilateral Force Reduction Agreement in 1998, the deployment of the army has focused on the Southeast area of the mainland. The force level at present is 24 Group Armies (GA), divided into six Military Regions (MR),11 viz. Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Chengdu and Lanzhou regions. The focus in the modernization process had been to modernize and train selected formations, known as the ‘Fist Units’ or ‘Rapid Reaction Formations/Units’. The rationale of forming these RRF/RRUs is drawn from the fact that the emphasis in the new modernization programme is on ‘Quality Building’. These units are being trained on the following aspects : Surprise attacks on enemy command and control centres.  Disrupt enemy supply lines and distribution system.  Interrupt enemy lines of communication.  Perturb enemy lines of communication.  Conduct armed reconnaissance behind enemy lines.  Cooperate with tactical and operational air assault in the course of Group Armies’ main engagement.

 Deploy forward observation teams to guide long range artillery strikes and air support.  Organise and coordinate guerilla activities with the militia.

 According to an OC 1993 Jane’s Defence Weekly report, China’s first step towards this was the converting the 15 Airborne Army’s three brigades into divisions to augment their rapid response capability. The brigade sized forces were considered too small for combat missions hence the upsizing to division sized forces. The Chinese RRF is composed of airborne units and light infantry units. It is equipped with light weapons and depends entirely upon air transportation. The RRF is expected to react rapidly to border disputes, minority rebellions and political violence.

MODERNISATION OF INFANTRY WEAPONS  China has concentrated on indigenizing weapon manufacture. The China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) and China Precision Machinery Export & Import Corporation (CPMEIC) with 157 factories in China manufacture most of the infantry weapons as also aspire to be a major exporter of weapons. The focus of modernization was on improving battlefield survivability, enhanced firepower, targeting systems, cross wind sensors and third generation night sights, The earlier Soviet weapons were phased out. The 5.56 automatic rife M16A1 and the Schmel personal fuel-air-explosive (FAE) projectors were built. The flame throwers gave a very potent rocket grenade against emplacement.

MODERNIZATION OF ARMOUR  China produces various tanks like T-54, T-59, T-69, T-79, T-80, T-85 and T-90. Since 1997, China has been pursuing improvement in the fire control systems in the BMP-3. NORINCO has developed the Type 90 II tanks with reactive armour. The latest tank models also have greater speed, endurance, improved accuracy and night vision capabilities. The APC type 90 and WZ 551 have improved armour plating, higher power to weight ratio and longer ranges. China has also purchased the Russian BMD-3 airborne infantry fighting vehicle.

MODERNISATION OF ARTILLERY  NORINCO developed a “ Super Range Rocket” which can fire 406 rockets with a range of 360 km in addition to howitzers of 122mm, 130 mm, 152 mm, 155 mm, and 203 mm calibers. The CPMEIC has developed multi-barrel rocket launchers like A 100 (300 mm) which can fire 10 different rockets at ranges of 50-100 km in 60 seconds. The latest acquisitions are the Smerch Multiple-Launch Rocket System and Kitolov laser guided artillery round. It has also purchased the Tor-MI (SA-15) SAM system to enhance its air defence capability.

THE PLA NAVY (PLAN)  In the 1990’s Admiral Liu Huaqing outlined his expansive maritime vision, including advocacy of access to the Indian Ocean, and especially propagating his thesis of China building a sea faring blue water Navy. An aircraft carrier force was described by Liu as extremely necessary to guard China’s sea lanes as it emerged as a major trading country and this had to come to symbolize China’s ‘blue water’ ambitions13. This resulted in a protracted and inward-looking landwarfare-centreed strategy based on mobilization of society to a new thinking and strategy of forward deployment, employing smaller forces which were to be trained to operate in areas remote from the Chinese mainland.

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Under this expansive vision of Admiral Liu, China’s navy was expected to develop a green-water first-island-chain operational reach by 2000, blue-water second-island-chain by 2020, and develop a world-class fleet by 2049, the twenty first century maritime vision was underlined by Admiral Shi Yunsheng, by highlighting that, in the new era, China’s naval priorities will be to develop : An offshore defence strategy.  A strong navy with science and technology.  More advanced weapons systems.  Well trained and more qualified personnel.

 The PLAN Naval AF, 7000 marines and 40,000 conscripts. PLAN has to protect 18000 km of coastline, 32 ports, sea lanes of communication (SLOC), maritime interest, and project power in pursuance of National interest of China. PLAN is controlled through Naval HQ, which is subordinate to the CMC through the General Staff Department. Many naval elements appear to be under dual subordination, necessitating inter-services co-ordination. The PLA is organized into three fleets (North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet and South Sea Fleet), Marines and the PLANAF. The headquarters of the fleets exercises operational control in their respective areas, overall afloat forces, naval air units, and the shore elements of coastal defence including base, shipyard and training facilities.

UPGRADATION OF EQUIPMENT  Submarines China has acquired four kilo class conventional submarines from Russia, including two of the most advanced version of the kilo class project 636, which have advanced stealth features, advanced technology in torpedoes, sonar quieting counter measures, and hull construction.  Combat Ships  Acquisition of 2 x Russian Sovremenny class destroyers fitted with SSN 22 (Sunburn) SSMs, which will be PLAN’s largest ships. These would enhance China’s long range offensive and sea denial capability.  4 x Jiang Wei frigates have replaced Jianghu class frigates. Two more frigates are under induction.  New Houjien and Houxian missile patrol crafts and Dayun class resupply vessels have joined the fleet.

 Designed to specialize in antisurface warfare in close cooperation with submarines, Sovermenny/kilo team operating in conjunction with Air Force fighters and AWACS would significantly increase PLAN’s ability to blockade any littoral island state.

 Naval Cruise Missiles. Alongwith the Sovermeny class destroyers, PLAN has acquired about 30-50 missiles of SSN-22 (Sunburn) SSMs. The 162-mile version has the capability to manoeuvre, which would make it difficult for the point defence phalanx gun system to intercept. It is also capable of low level, high speed evasive maneuvers.  Marines. The Marines have the capability of amphibious combat and high mobility. Establishment of the Chinese Marine Corps signaled the PLA’s quest for a power projection capability. The Corps was at its peak in 1998 with strength of 56,000 before it was mysteriously and drastically reduced. The Marine Corps has routinely participated in combined training on islands in the Western Pacific and South China Sea. One refueling on reserves the Marine’ strength will increase to 8 divisions (including 24 infantry, 8 tank and 8 artillery regiments). Two tank regiments and Army divisions have also been assigned the amphibious role.

 Naval Doctrine. The PLAN doctrine flows out of the ‘National Doctrine of Active Defence’. It provides for ‘Defence Close to the Ocean’ replacing the earlier doctrine of ‘Defence Close to the Coast’. It necessitates improved firepower in an offshore conflict, maintenance of effective control over SLOC, and the conduct of warfare in waters adjacent to Chinese territory.

PRESENT AND FUTURE PLANS  The PLA Navy is the third largest in the world and the largest maritime force in Asia with a total of 2,68,000 personnel, 1350 surface combatants, more than 100 submarine and about 500 aircraft which constitute this navy. However, the fleet is unbalanced. Its major vessels (S/M’s and major combatants) make up only 10% of the total. The remainder consists of Patrol Craft, Mine-warfare vessels and amphibious ships.  China is divided into seven Military Area Commands (MAC). The geographic extant of each of these zones is such that each covers a single particular (perceived) threat area. Similarly the PLA-N fleet disposition is organised such that each is responsible for a particular geographic threat area.

MODERNISATION OF SUBMARINE FORCES  Conventional Submarines. The modernisation of the PLA-N’s conventional submarine force includes:  Series production of the indigenously developed Type 039 Song class submarines, capable of launching C-801/C-802 series of anti-ship missiles (ASMs).  Acquisition of a further two Russian-built Project 636 Kilo class submarines to complement the current four Kilo class boats in service.  Nuclear Attack Submarines. In 1997 the United States Department of Defence reported that a new SSN, known as the Type 093, was reported under construction. It was reported that the first of class would be in service by 2005, and a second vessel by 2007. The Type 093 is expected to be an improved version of the current Han class and be capable of firing ASMs.

 Surface Combatants. The PLA Navy is following a two-track approach in order to modernise its operational capabilities. This twotrack approach comprises:  Training. The PLA-N has increased emphasis its training programmes, especially joint warfare programmes, so as to maximise the effectiveness of its existing equipment. It has also begun to operate farther away from home waters and has embarked on goodwill cruises to the United States, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Thailand and Pakistan.  Acquisition and Construction of New Platforms. No matter how much training is conducted, the PLA-N will be limited if it does not update its current force of surface combatants. The purchase of an additional four Sovremenny class destroyers from Russia will go someway towards achieving a balanced fleet, however these purchases must be complemented by further development of the Luhu and Luhai classes if she is to achieve a creditable deterrence against the United States, Taiwan or Japan..

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE  Ships. While scaling down its older classes of amphibious vessels, China commissioned nine Yuting class tank-landing ships in the 1990s. These 4,800 ton (full load) ships have the capacity to carry 250 troops, 10 tanks and each carry four Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel. The rationale behind the continuing modernisation of China’s amphibious forces is that China must maintain a creditable force with which she could invade Taiwan, should Taiwan ever declared her independence.  Manpower. PLA manpower available for amphibious operations has been enhanced since the mid-1990s. Apart from the 5,000-strong No.1 Marine Brigade (based in Yulin), the PLA has three divisions trained in amphibious operations, thus making a total of 30,000 troops available for amphibious operations. With a lift capacity of under 10,000 troops, it would be expected that China’s merchant fleet would be available to augment the PLA-N. Such a force would require considerable escort, a task currently beyond the capability of the PLA-N.

THE PLA AIR FORCE (PLAAF)

MODERNISATION OF EQUIPMENT OF PLAAF  China’s acquisition of Russian combat aircraft’s and Israeli combat air technology is pushing China’s Air Force (PLAAF) closer to the goal of all weather, power projection Air Force. China has emerged out as third largest aircraft produced in the world producing six types of aircraft.

MODERN FIGHTERS AND ATTACK AIR CRAFTS  In 1996 China purchased 22 additional SU 27s from Russian ie. in addition to the 24 purchased earlier in 1991.  Deal contracted with Russia to co-produce SU 27s. This will enhance PLAFF combat capabilities sharply. Approx 150 SU-27s are to be produced in Shenyang at the rate of 10-15 ac per year.  SU 27s have been fitted with two Sarbtisya ECM pods that can automatically detect and jam hostile radar signals. The electronic sub systems are being improved.  China is pursuing a major domestic fighter development programme, the most ambitions being the J-10 multi role fighter. Flight tests had begun in Mar 1998. Approx 300 such aircraft’s will be built eventually. Deal contracted with Russia to co-produce SU 27s. This will enhance PLAFF combat capabilities sharply. Approx 150 SU-27s are to be produced in Shenyang at the rate of 10-15 ac per year.

MODERN FIGHTERS AND ATTACK AIR CRAFTS  China is discarding J-5, J-6, IL-28 and other older aircraft to induct J-7, J-8, A-5, H-6, (TU-16) aircraft’s. China is undertaking indigenous development of super-7, FC-1, FC-1 (CCA), F-8, XJ stealth fighter, B-7 FGA, and SU-27 aircraft’s.  China is pursuing a major domestic fighter development programme, the most ambitions being the J-10 multi role fighter. Flight tests had begun in Mar 1998. Approx 300 such aircraft’s will be built eventually. Deal contracted with Russia to co-produce SU 27s. This will enhance PLAFF combat capabilities sharply. Approx 150 SU-27s are to be produced in Shenyang at the rate of 10-15 ac per year.  China is discarding J-5, J-6, IL-28 and other older aircraft to induct J-7, J-8, A-5, H-6, (TU-16) aircraft’s. China is undertaking indigenous development of super-7, FC-1, FC-1 (CCA), F-8, XJ stealth fighter, B-7 FGA, and SU-27 aircraft’s.

ADVANCED MISSILES AND MUNITIONS  Along with SU 27s, China has also acquired the Vympel (AA-11) R-73 air to air missile. This confers a 120 degree field of view, helmet mounted sight, and a range of 18.6 miles.  Development of helmet mounted sight to guide PL-9 air to air missile has been completed. This would be fitted on J-7, and subsequently on other fighters.

 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). China has procured six to eight Search Water airborne early warning radar systems for fitting it on its J-8 transport aircraft, which at higher altitudes would give the radar a range of 200 miles. Two Y-8s (AN-12) have been modified for Airborne Early Warning. PLAAF is also planning to modify four IL-76s in Israel, which would be fitted with Phalcon Radome System.  Air to Air Refueling. Initially China had modified H-6 bombers to enable refueling of J-8 II fighters, thereby extending their range from 430 miles to 630 miles. In 1998 China has procured 4 x IL 76 refueling tankers which can refuel the SU 30s and extend their radius from 932 miles to 1615 miles. At a 600 miles radius IL 76 can carry enough fuel to refuel at least 6 x SU 27s or SU 30s. This capability will give additional operating range to her fighter and bomber aricraft’s, which will be able to threaten land targets upto Ambala and Patna, our island territory and SLOC, as well as pose nuclear threats to mainland of India using strategic bombers.  Transport Fleet. In 1996 China purchased additional 12 x IL 76 to boost up its existing strength of 10 x IL 76 and 10 x TU 154 Transport ac. The fleet is considered insufficient to move a large army formation and its equipment.

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Helicopters.  25 x Z-8 (Super Feion) and Z-9 (Daulphin) are being produced indigenously.  24 x MI 17 acquired from Russian.  24 x S-70 C (Sikorsky) Black Hawak helicopters have been acquired.  Air Defence. PLA has procured 144 missiles with launchers of SA-10 Grumble (S-300P), and raised one AD Brigade

NEW EQUIPMENT IN THE PIPELINE.  100 x SU27 fighter aircraft in knocked down condition, and 150 x SU 27 to be manufactured under license.  Agreement for purchase of 50 x SU-30 fighter aircraft signed in Apr 97.  D-4 RPV, B2 Radio controlled target Drones. Z-5 Multipurpose RPVs and turbojet powered unmanned aircraft Changkong IC (CKIC).  Phazotron Radars-200. China claims to have developed OTH-B radar and acquired AN/ UPD-4 Ground mapping radar.  Argus -2000 radar is to be fitted on IL-76 by UK to convert it as AWACS.  Air to air refueling aircraft technology/kits-unspecified quantity.  3 x IL-76 were modified in 1995. Now 5 x Y -8 ac have been modified for the same.  J-10 AND Super-7 (FC-1 being developed indigenously by Chengdu Aircraft Industry. Production of F-10, a multi role aircraft, is likely to commence by 2003

AIR CRAFT CARRIER PLANS  The exact progress of China’s aircraft carrier progress is unknown. Reports over the last ten years that China intends to build an aircraft carrier have proved unfounded. And while some commentators argue that the construction of the 9,700-ton multi-role ship Shichang is an indicator of future plans for an aircraft carrier, its limited aviation facilities belie this rumour. Nevertheless, if China wishes to achieve her goals of a blue-water navy with global reach, an aircraft carrier must form part of the equation. Noting China’s small step-by-step progress in warship production thus far, it would be unlikely that China would jump straight to the big time and construct a 50,000 to 60,000 ton ship. It is more likely that a smaller design would be chosen, and the fact that the president of the Spanish shipbuilder Bazan (builders of Thai Navy’s carrier) was unsuccessful in his ‘sales pitch’ to PLA-N officials would to indicate that China does not, in the near term, wish to acquire an aircraft carrier.

CHINAS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

DELIVERY SYSTEMS  China is the only developing nation to have developed the complete triad of Nuclear Weapons delivery stems. She has of late began concentrating her effort on developing a survivable submarine based strike capability, however she has been troubled by extremely slow progress in the development of her indigenous nuclear submarine.17

STRATEGIC FORCES  The Chinese strategic forces comprise the following : ICBMs. The Chinese have a maximum of thirty ICBMs which are silo-based. Under development is a mobile MIRV vehicle launched ICBM. Besides this they have approximately a hundred IRBMs and MRBMs.  Strategic Bombers. The Chinese have 120 H-6s and some TU-4 bombers. These are old slow-flying and vulnerable air craft of Soviet origin. However if at least one of these aircraft will be able to survive the enemy air defence cover, the aim would have been achieved. The newly procured Su-27 provides a more potent threat with their 2000 km reach.  Submarines. The Chinese have one nuclear powered ‘Xia” class submarine which carries 12 SLBMs of 2000 kms range. A program to develop a better variant is on.

TACTICAL FORCES  The Chinese have developed small tactical warheads which can be fitted to aircraft bombs, to artillery shells or small SSMs. The exact number of tactical nuclear warheads is not known.

CLASSIFICATION OF MISSILES  China classifies her missiles as per a system different from that followed by the rest of the world. This has enabled her to twist the provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime to her advantage18. The Chinese system is as under: Short range. Range less than 1000 kms.  Medium range. Range from 1000 to 3000 kms.  Long Range. From 3000 to 8000 kms.  Intercontinental. Exceeding 8000 kms.

STRATEGIC MISSILES  The Chinese have developed and deployed four classes ob ballistic missiles and are currently developing the fifth type. These have been given the generic name of Dong Feng (meaning East Wind) by the Chinese and CSS (meaning Chinese Surface to Surface) by the West.

SSMs  China has also developed a number of tactical ballistic missiles. While these have the capability of delivering a nuclear warhead and while China has developed very low yield nuclear warheads, there are no reports of the two being integrated. This missiles series is referred to in the West as the “M” series. The operational versions are known as M7, M9, M11 and M12. Their details are as under : M7. Also called CSS-8, it delivers 190 kg warhead for 150 kms. It has been supplied to Iran.  M9. This missile is similar to the Soviet SS-23, delivers a single warhead of approx 500 kg over a range of 600 kms and is carried on it’s own Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL). It has been supplied to Syria.  M11. The M11 is an M9 variant having a range of 290 to 300 kms. This missile is analogous to our Prithvi but carries an 800 kg warhead. It has been supplied to Pakistan.

SSMs  M12. This missile is a solid propellant missile similar to the M11 but has a range of 120 kms only. This may be an improvement of the M7 class.  M18. Nothing is known of this missile except that it is under development.

THE CHINESE MISSILE PROGRAMME  The Chinese began work on delivery systems along with the development of Nuclear Weapons systems. In the fifties and early sixties the US and later the USSR could target any point the Chinese mainland whereas the Chinese did not even have a nuclear Weapon. The Chinese decided to develop the complete triad of delivery systemsnamely, the ICBM, the SLBM and the aircraft. Accordingly the CMC established the Fifth Academy to conduct research and development in rocketry sciences. By 1960 the Chinese had developed a short range ballistic missile and by 1964 they had the Nuclear Weapon.

MODERNISATION PROGRAMME FOR MISSILES  Second Artillery Corps. A sustained modernization programme for the PLA strategic forces continues, with a view to improve their accuracy and survivability. New Cruise, ballistic and anti missile systems are being developed.  Ballistic Missile. China is presently modernizing its ICBM force estimated to consist of 4 to 18,8000 km range DF-5 liquid fuel ICBMs. DF-41 with a range of 12000 km and 800 kg payload is likely to replace DF-5. DF-31 with an 8000 km range and 700 kg payload is also expected to be operational soon. Both of these missiles are likely to incorporate multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology. Amongst the tactical ballistic missiles systems DF 25 with a range of 1700 km is being improved to 2000 km with a payload of 2000kgs. Other tactical missiles include DF-15/M-9 with 600km range and DF-11/M-11.  Cruise Missiles. The second Artillery Corps and PLA are not yet armed with strategic cruise missiles. However land attack cruise missile for theatre and strategic missions have high priority for development.  China is know to be trying out combined GPS/Inertial, and Tercom guidance system for cruise missiles.

 Anti Missile, Anti Satellite & Space Warfare. China has produced HQ-9 surface-to air missile. This missile would be useful against cruise missiles and may at least have a potential for limited antitactical ballistic missile (ATBM) capability. China has shown interest in the improved S-300 PMU2 Favosit, which features a longer-range missile. Longer range phased array radar, improved ECCM, and the ability to hit both cruise and ballistic missiles is being developed. China has also invested heavily in anti satellite and space warfare programmes.  The Ballistic Missile –Theater Ballistic Missile Defence Imbroglio. There is a far cruder, but very specific, way in which China is attempting to ensure its relevance in regional security. The PLA excels in very few warfare areas, but one of them is its arsenal of shortand medium-range ballistic missiles-primarily (but not necessarily) tipped with conventional warheads.  China has offered almost every conceivable argument against the development and deployment of theater ballistic missile defence (TBMD).

KOREA: SEEING DOUBLE AND ENJOYING THE VIEW  Chinese leaders are cautious about the process of change on the Korean Peninsula and the implications of that impending change for China. Despite outward composure, Beijing is increasingly concerned by the developments in North Korea, a concern undoubtedly intensified by the history of disruptions to China’s security and stability that have originated in Korea. Chinese leaders are troubled that Pyongyang remains deaf to its suggestions for reform and more rational conductadvice given with Asian gentility in the hope that it can be accepted more readily than if delivered with Western bluntness.  Delicately Balanced Dual Relations. Beijing has been particularly attentive to, and ingenious in, its relationships with its two near neighbors, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK).  Nuclear Weapons in Korea – and the Japan Link. Chinese officials say that China wants a stable, nonnuclear Korean Peninsula. Beijing has expressed a preference for a Korean Peninsula nuclear-free zone. It wants a peninsula void of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means to deliver them.

KOREA: SEEING DOUBLE AND ENJOYING THE VIEW  Learning to Like Multilateralism. In April 1996, Seoul and Washington proposed talks to include North Korea, South Korea, China, and the United States. Beijing was initially quite reticent about these Four-Party Talks, as they came to be known. Eventually, Chinese leaders urged a reluctant Pyongyang to accept the proposal and agreed to participate themselves.  Prognosis. China expects to enter the next century with a divided Korea composed of a crippled North and an economically recovering South. It expects that the Chinese economy will continue to benefit from trade and investment from South Korea.  Taiwan Complications Intrude Again. As in so many other aspects of China’s regional security situation in the coming years, the issue of Taiwan is inescapable. If the Taiwan issue remains unresolved, and especially if it remains volatile.

PLA CAPABILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY : HOW DOES CHINA ASSESS ITS FUTURE SECURITY NEEDS ?  With the Asian financial crisis and the floods in China. It hardly seems urgent to address the future war fighting capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). But China’s military planners are patient, long-term strategic thinkers, so despite the current problems, I will still provide some comments on the topic. This chapter is divided into six sections. Its purpose is to present a “net assessment” of how China may see its future military capabilities.  Section One continues a discussion, begun in the introductions, about errors to be avoided in estimating future Chinese military capabilities. Section Two describes the way that the open sources of information available in China assess the future security environment, including the likelihood of war and the future trends in military capabilities of the major powers. Section Three narrows the focus of this chapter to China’s quantitative estimates of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) for 2010 and 2020, based on books by the Academy of Military Science and the Academy of Social Science, including a discussion of why some Chinese analysts claim these national power “scores” can predict the outcome of future warfare. Section Four identifies debates among the Chinese military about long-term modernization goals. Section Five lists China’s military investment allocation priorities and attempts to link some of these investment decisions to the defence debate, suggesting that the shape of the PLA by 2020 can be affected a great deal by the debate among the three schools. Section Six describes how Chinese military authors assess future American military capabilities to defend South Korea and Taiwan and to pursue a potential Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Easily offended or highly nationalistic American readers should skip this section.

PLA CAPABILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY : HOW DOES CHINA ASSESS ITS FUTURE SECURITY NEEDS ?  What are some of the key issues in understanding what China’s military capabilities may be in the first 2 decades of the 21st century? In spite of the hazards of straight-line projections of China’s current forces to 2010 or 2020, many still use this estimative methods to arrive at a picture of future capabilities. This chapter argues that it is also important to know in detail the objectives that China’s leaders seek to pursue through military modernization. Happily, Western analysts of the Chinese military may have a better chance to get right the issue of China’s modernization goals than whether China’s military technology programs will succeed. After all, China leaders continue to proclaim the validity of Sun Tzu and to repeat Deng Xiaoping’s guidance tao guang yang hui (conceal our capabilities and bide our time). China is unlikely to raise its level of transparency by inviting the U.S. defence attaché to visit the research and development (R&D) programs in fields such as counter-stealth radar, laser weapons, electro dynamic railguns, anti-satellite interceptors, precision guided missiles, and many other weapons designed to focus on U.S. vulnerabilities. I believe that its is relatively easy to determine that China lacks items on the Military Critical Technologies List, but by paying attention to Chinese open sources, especially books and professional journals that deal with long-term future modernization goals, we can make some sound judgments about China’s Military future.

CHOOSING AMONG ESTIMATIVE METHODS FOR CHINA’S FUTURE CAPABILITY  This chapter concludes that China’s future military capabilities will be based on factors that are impossible to estimate beyond 2010. Some of these factors cannot even be estimated accurately today. They include quantitative estimates of the fundamentals of military power such as the future size of China’s defence budget, its future industrial base, its access to advanced military technology, and “non-equipment” factors such as the quality of its future officer corps. Of course, it is possible to estimate that a certain specific Chinese force structure may come into existence by 2010 by using straight-line projection. Even though this is and error-prone estimative method, it is quick and simple and perhaps can fool the gullible who have no idea how their own nation makes defence modernization decisions. For example, an intelligence analyst could simply use the current numbers of Chinese ships, tanks, aircraft, and other key indicators, then multiply these units by China’s growth rate (say, 8 percent a year), perhaps adding a few new weapons systems known to be in development and retiring a few judged to be obsolete by 2010. Indeed, some in the U.S. intelligence community used such an approach on the Soviet Union for many years, even when it produced incorrect results. The erroneous assumption is that China is on “autopilot” in pursuing its military modernization. A more likely assumption is that China’s leaders will debate and adjust their military programs (perhaps many times) between now and 2020. If so, then we must try to understand these debates and these adjustments rather than straight –lining, or making up long lists of obstacles that the Chinese can “never” overcome.

CHOOSING AMONG ESTIMATIVE METHODS FOR CHINA’S FUTURE CAPABILITY  In a book published in 1998, a much better and more realistic approach than straight-lining has been suggested by John Culver who wisely points out that “most prudent analysts of the Chinese military rule out very few scenarios.”2 Culver’s recommended approach proceeds from two important facts. First, he states that, . . . a survey of analytical documents prepared by the U.S. intelligence community over the past decade reveals a tendency towards “optimistic” assessments of developmental weapons programs or changes in the force structure of the Chinese military.

CHOOSING AMONG ESTIMATIVE METHODS FOR CHINA’S FUTURE CAPABILITY  In other words, American analysts have tended to overestimate China’s capability to improve its forces and should be cautious not to repeat this mistake. This chapter argues that one factor in China’s slow modernization has been a debate among the military leaders about their goals, a debate that includes at least three “schools” of thought, three sets of scenarios for future warfare China may face, and three corresponding preferences for defence allocations. Unfortunately, in spite of the evidence of these Chinese “schools,” some specialists continue to impute “ unified rational actor” decision-making to China as if Graham Allison, the Kennedy School of Government, and the seminal book, Essence of Decision, never existed. I also agree completely with John Culver’s second point, namely that, . . . in the course of examining the spectrum of development possibilities of the Chinese military in the next 10 to 20 years, two possibilities at the extreme end of the spectrum stand out: China could continue to make halting progress. . . or, China could break completely with the past and exhibit unprecedented abilities to integrate a new level of technology into its military. Either of these development trends is possible ( as are any number of alternatives failing between these points on the development spectrum. . .

CHOOSING AMONG ESTIMATIVE METHODS FOR CHINA’S FUTURE CAPABILITY  Culver’s prudent view of the range of choice that China faces suggests a potential policy challenge. The United States and other major powers (especially Japan and Russia) will have influence ( if they wish to apply it ) to shape China’s future military capability. Along with Henry Kissinger, Culver and I and many others are impressed by the wide range of future Chinese military capabilities that may hypothetically develop in the next 10 to 20 years. Kissinger recently pointed that American options will not be lost by failing to confront China soon: Undoubtedly, if China continues to grow at the rate of the past 20 years, it will become perhaps the most powerful country in Asia. Its impact on its neighbors would magnify. But do we really want a showdown now . . .? (W)ere Beijing, at whatever juncture, to pursue hegemonistic policies it would have to contend around its borders with many states of considerable strength. A wise America could forge a determined resistance among them.

TWO COMMON ERRORS IN ESTIMATIVE METHODS  Unfortunately, Culver’s views are not universally held, inside or outside the U.S. Government. Many analysts of Chinese capabilities are overly ( perhaps obsessively) concerned with identifying the obstacles that China faces in developing its future military capabilities to the exclusion of finding factors that will help China’s military modernization. It sometimes seems to me that some analysts of the Chinese military try to outdo each other to see who can imagine the most potent obstacles that China cannot possibly overcome for “decades.” Strangely, perhaps for half-conscious ideological reasons, these same analysts shy away from considering even the most obvious benefits and advantages that China may enjoy as a technological latecomer. They seem to ignore that Japan, in the economic field in the 1950s and 1960s, benefited from catching up from behind. Excessively dwelling on the obstacles that China faces and ignoring China’s advantages as a technological later comer is a serious error. Analysts who doubt that obstacles can be overcome should read General Mi Zhenyu’s book, National Defence Development Strategy, which lists the latecomers’ advantages and urges China to exploit them. It seems to me rather strange for some analysts to display an almost cocky certainty that they can identify so well the obstacles to China’s modernization and can identify so few advantages, especially in light of China’s well-known secrecy about military affairs. As Ambassador James Lilley told the Senate Intelligence Committee on September 18, 1997: The other thing that clouds the issue is the Chinese superb practice of deception-when capable, feign incapacity. This is the way they operate. They’ll throw up smoke screens. They’ll take your to backward factories. They’ll lead you down the garden path, and you’ll always get some gullible person coming back saying their military is backward. For example they’ll use obsolete tanks. That’s because that’s what the Chinese wanted them to see.

TWO COMMON ERRORS IN ESTIMATIVE METHODS  Analysts of the Chinese military who make long lists of obstacles are bad enough, but I fear more those analysts who neglect or even completely ignore the intentions and policy preferences of the Chinese military leadership. To estimate China’s future military capabilities, it seems to me that a basis starting point should be to understand what China’s leaders think they ought to try to develop. There is an especially perverse version of this error. It is committed by analysts who apparently assume the Chinese leadership to be robots in lockstep, incapable of disagreeing with each other about what goals for military modernization should be pursued. In one of the most useful analytical findings in many years, Dennis Blasko pointed out in 1996 that there seemed to be no Chinese Doctrine of Local War, in spite of the fact that quite a few Western analysts had been proclaiming a “new” doctrine of Local War for a decade. A similar major contribution was made by Ellis Joffe in The Chinese Army After Mao, when he shrewdly warned analysts of the Chinese military that there had been no formal termination or epitaph for Chairman Mao’s doctrine of People’s War, but that it had evolved in a very Chinese manner into something quite different.

TWO COMMON ERRORS IN ESTIMATIVE METHODS  What is the solution to the shortcomings of estimative methods? Are straight-line projections the only solution? Should we keep piling up examples of obstacles? Can we ever learn what doctrine and goals are guiding China’s military modernization? Despite China’s veil of secrecy, two modest steps may be worth consideration: greater example of open sources and greater comparison of China with other cases, including historical cases.

SECTION ONE: U.S. DEFENCE DEPARTMENT NET ASSESSMENT  What is strategic or net assessment? Does China do it differently than the United States? Net assessment is sometimes confused with intelligence analysis of foreign forces and international trends. The difference is that net or strategic assessment is an analysis of the interaction of two or more national security establishments both in peacetime and in war, usually ourselves and a potential enemy. It is the interaction of the two belligerents that is the central concept, not an assessment of one side alone.  A number of lessons form U.S. experience may help understand how China performs strategic assessment. They practice of strategic assessment in the U.S. Department of Defence in the past 25 years has been dived into the following six categories of studies and analyses:  efforts to measure and forecast trends in various military balance such as the maritime balance, the Northeast Asian balance, the power-projection balance, etc.;

SECTION ONE: U.S. DEFENCE DEPARTMENT NET ASSESSMENT  Assessments focused on weapons and force comparisons with efforts to produce judgments about military effectiveness ;  Historical evaluations of lessons of the past;  Analyses of the role of perceptions of foreign decision-makers and even the process by which foreign institutions make strategic assessments;  The search for quantitative analytical tools; and  Identifying competitive advantages and distinctive competencies of each side’s military force posture, highlighting important trends that may change a long-term balance, identifying future opportunities and risks in the military competition, and appraising the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. Forces in light of long-term shifts in the security environment. This sixth form of study is the ‘net assessment’ approach.

SOURCES OF ERRORS IN STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT  In historical analysis, it is possible to examine what the senior leaders on each side did to “assess” the outcome and nature of the coming wars in the time prior to their outbreak. In fact, a widely praised explanation for the causes of war is precisely that the strategic assessments of opposing sides where in conflict prior to the initiation of combat- one side seldom starts a war believing in advance it will lose. Thus, we may presume there are almost always miscalculations in strategic assessments according to the nature of the national leadership that made the assessment . China may make its own miscalculations, and we should be alert to this possibility.  An insightful set of seven historical examples of strategic assessment in 1938-1940, which was produced for the Office of Net Assessment of the Office of the Secretary of Defence, has identified a number of serious assessment errors in Britain, Nazi Germany, Italy, France, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan. A number of lessons drawn from these examples are relevant to any effort to understand how the Chinese leadership conducts strategic assessment of its future security environment.

SOURCES OF ERRORS IN STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT  First, it is a mistake to examine static, side-by-side, force-onforce comparisons of numbers of weapons and military units without trying to analyze the way these weapons and units would actually interact in future combat. The static use of counting numbers and units was at fault in the French military assessment of potential German attack in 1939. The military balance, measured in quantitative terms between the German forces opposite France and the French forces involved in that theater, was almost equal, even slightly favoring France. The armored fire power of France and its allies exceeded that of the Germans by one-third. Force-on-force comparisons used by the French before the war did not reveal that (1) that Germans would achieve a fourto-one advantage by massing forces in the sector in which they achieved a break through, (2) the Germans could make rapid, deep penetrations to destroy rear areas in France, and (3) the German air force would completed neutralize French air power and achieve absolute air superiority. Only a strategic assessment focusing on the qualities of the interaction of the two belligerents would give any indication of the outcome of the war.

SOURCES OF ERRORS IN STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT  Second, the failure to define correctly who will be a friend and who a foe in wartime is critical to the outcome. Therefore, the question of international alignments or alliances cannot be ignored. Professor Paul Kennedy points out that Britain’s pre-war planning completely failed to identify the role the Soviet Union could play as a second front in the war against Hitler. The French error was similar : French security thinkers failed to consider the scenario that Germany might first conquer France’s East European allies, eliminating France’s alliance, before attacking France directly.

SOURCES OF ERRORS IN STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT  Third, it is a mistake to deduce from an opponent’s peacetime training exercises, published military doctrines, and peacetime military deployments what may be the way forces actually conduct themselves in a protracted war that goes beyond the original plan of war because the longer a war, the more time for factors involving the entire national society and economy to be brought into play and the less important the initial deployments, doctrines, and plans. Professor Stephen Rosen of Harvard University had found that, between August 1939 and June 1940, the U.U. Navy senior leadership’s strategic assessments of the adequacy of U.S. Military capabilities paid little attention to how a future war might unfold. It mainly satisfied U.S. Navy peacetime criteria, using simple comparisons of the number of U.S. Navy and Imperial Japanese Navy ships”. . . (with) no sense of the possible wartime interaction between the two fleets let alone between the two nations.”

SOURCES OF ERRORS IN STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT  Fourth, it is mistake to mirror image the assumptions of other nations. As Andrew Marshall wrote in 1982 about assessing the former Soviet Union. A major component of any assessment of the adequacy of the strategic balance should be our best approximation of a sovietstyle assessment of the strategic balance. But this must not be the standard U.S. calculations done with slightly different assumptions . . . rather it should be, to the extent possible, an assessment structured as the Soviets would structure it, using those scenarios they see as most likely and their criteria and ways of measuring outcomes. . . the Soviet calculations are likely to make different assumptions about scenarios and objectives, focus attention upon different variables, include both long-range and theater forces (conventional as well as nuclear), and may at the technical assessment level, perform different calculations, use different measures of effectiveness, and perhaps use different assessments may substantially differ from American assessments.

SOURCES OF ERRORS IN STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

 A fifth mistake is geographic scope or “big picture” problems. U.S. errors in the period between the two world wars were “big picture” problems. Although the United States eventually developed fire alternative scenarios (RAINBOW I to V ), it initially mistakenly believed it had only one potential enemy in the Pacific (Japan) and therefore assumed that, because of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1904, the United States might be forced to fight England in the Atlantic. Then with the rise of Hitler, 15 years of American assessments had to be discarded when the strategic focus shifted to winning first in Europe, while staying on the defensive in the Pacific.  A sixth mistake may be to neglect open sources. The most relevant comparison for better understanding China from among these pre-World War II case studies may be the study of the secretive Soviet Union of 1940. As Professor Earl Ziemke describes Soviet secrecy in 1940: The Soviet net assessment process cannot be directly observed. Like a dark object in outer space, its probable nature can be discerned only from interactions with visible surrounding. Fortunately, its rigidly secret environment has been somewhat subject to countervailing conditions . . . . Tukhachevsky and his associates conducted relatively open discussion in print.

SOURCES OF ERRORS IN STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

 Ziemke’s description of the Soviet assessment process resembles in a few ways the Chinese process, including the “ open discussion in print” of some assessment issues. It is apparent from Ziemke’s account of the way in which Soviet strategic assessment was performed in the 1930s that a number of similarities, at least in institutional roles and the vocabulary of Marxism-Leninism, can also be seen in contemporary China. The leader of the Soviet Communist Party publicly presented a global strategic assessment to periodic Communist Party Congresses. The authors of the military portions of the assessment came from two institutions which have counterparts in Beijing today and were prominent in Moscow in the 1930sl the General Staff Academy and the National War College. Another similarity was that the Soviet Communist Party leader chaired a defence council or main military committee and, in these capacities, attended peacetime military exercises and was involved in deciding the details of military strategy, weapons acquisition, and war planning. As the leader of a party based on “scientific socialism,” the leader was expected to pronounce openly the Party’s official assessment of the future. Sensitive details obviously had to remain secret, but open sources could provide at least an outline of the assessment.