Military Of Libya

1

Qadhafi’s Libya Military Power and Military History

Compilation of related articles from: Country-data 1987, Globalsecurity 2002 and Wikipedia 2009 _______________________________

Parts: I. Libyan Military Power p. 2 (Globalsecurity 2002)

II. Libyan Armed Forces p. 23 (Country-data 1987, Globalsecurity 202, Wikipedia 2009)

III. Intelligence & Internal Security p. 56 (Globalsecurity 202)

IV. Libya’s Wars 1977-1989 p. 62 (Wikipedia 2009)

2

Libya Military Guide From © Globalsecurity

Since 1969, Qadhafi has determined Libya's foreign policy. His principal foreign policy goals have been Arab unity, elimination of Israel, advancement of Islam, support for Palestinians, elimination of outside--particularly Western-influence in the Middle East and Africa, and support for a range of "revolutionary" causes. After the 1969 coup, Qadhafi closed American and British bases on Libyan territory and partially nationalized all foreign oil and commercial interests in Libya. He also played a key role in promoting the use of oil embargoes as a political weapon for challenging the West, hoping that an oil price rise and embargo in 1973 would persuade the West--especially the United States--to end support for Israel. Qadhafi rejected both Soviet communism and Western capitalism and claimed he was charting a middle course. Libya's relationship with the former Soviet Union involved massive Libyan arms purchases from the Soviet bloc and the presence of thousands of east bloc advisers. Libya's use--and heavy loss--of Soviet-supplied weaponry in its war with Chad was a notable breach of an apparent Soviet-Libyan understanding not to use the weapons for activities inconsistent with Soviet objectives. As a result, Soviet-Libyan relations reached a nadir in mid-1987. After the fall of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, Libya concentrated on expanding diplomatic ties with Third World countries and increasing its commercial links with Europe and East Asia. Following the imposition of UN sanctions in 1992, these ties significantly diminished. Following a 1998 Arab League meeting in which fellow Arab states decided not to challenge UN sanctions, Qadhafi announced that he was turning his back on pan-Arab ideas, one of the fundamental tenets of his philosophy. Instead, Libya pursued closer bilateral ties, particularly with North African neighbors Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. It also has sought to develop its relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, leading to Libyan involvement in several internal African disputes in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Central African Republic, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. Libya also has sought to expand its influence in Africa through financial assistance, ranging from aid donations to impoverished neighbors such as Niger to oil subsidies to Zimbabwe. Qadhafi has proposed a borderless "United States of Africa" to transform the continent into a single nation-state ruled by a single government. This plan has been moderately well received, although more powerful would-be participants such as Nigeria and South Africa are skeptical. There have been no credible reports of Libyan involvement in terrorism since 1994, and Libya has taken significant steps to mend its international image. In 1999, the Libyan Government surrendered two Libyans suspected of involvement in the Pan Am 103 bombing, leading to the suspension of UN sanctions. On January 31, 2001, a Scottish court seated in Netherlands found one of the suspects, Abdel Basset al-Megrahi, guilty of murder in connection with the bombing, and acquitted the second suspect, Al-Amin Kalifa Fhima. Megrahi has appealed his conviction; the appeal began on January 23, 2002. Full lifting of UN sanctions is contingent on Libyan compliance with its remaining UNSCR requirements on Pan Am 103, including acceptance of responsibility for the actions of its officials and payment of appropriate compensation. Libya did pay compensation in 1999 for the death of British policewoman Yvonne Fletcher, a move that preceded the reopening of the British Embassy in Tripoli, and paid damages to the families of the victims in the bombing of UTA Flight 772. On November 13, 2001, a German court found four persons, including a former employee of the Libyan Embassy in East Berlin, guilty in connection with the 1986 La Belle disco bombing, in which two U.S. servicemen were killed. The court also established a connection to the Libyan Government. The German Government has demanded that Libya accept responsibility for the La Belle bombing and pay appropriate compensation.

3

4

From © Globalsecurity

5

Libyan Missiles From © Globalsecurity

Libya has land- and sea-launched short range anti-ship cruise missiles that it purchased from Soviet and European sources. Many of the systems are old and likely are suffering from maintenance problems. Libya had a theoretical capability of delivering weapons of mass destruction in the form of Scud and FROG missiles and missiles delivered by medium-range Tu-22 bombers. Libya also has a variety of fighter aircraft, some old bombers, helicopters, artillery, and rockets available as potential means of delivery for NBC weapons. Libya used transport aircraft in its attempt to deliver chemical agents against Chadian troops in 1987. Despite the UN embargo, Libya continued to aggressively seek ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, and technology from a variety of sources in Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Asia. The imposition of UN sanctions impeded Libyan efforts to obtain foreign assistance for its longer-range missile programs. Libya wanted longer-range missiles, even beyond the No Dong class medium-range missile. Tripoli would be likely to continue to try for longer-range systems to increase the number of US and NATO targets it can hold at risk. If a missile were offered with a range sufficient to strike 2,500 kilometers into Europe, Libya would try to obtain it. Libya's paths to obtaining an ICBM over a 15-year period probably would be to purchase a complete missile system or to set up a foreign assistance arrangement wherein the scientists and technicians went to Libya, developed the infrastructure, and developed the missile right there. According to the Rumsfeld Commission report, Col. Gadhafi said of his adversaries in a 1990 speech: "If they know that you have a deterrent force capable of hitting the United States, they would not be able to hit you. If we had possessed a deterrent - missiles that could reach New York - we would have hit it at the same moment [as the 1986 U.S. air strike on Libya]. Consequently, we should build this force so that they and others will no longer think about an attack." Then in late 1995, Col. Gadhafi said "As things stand today, I would attack every place from where aggression against Libya was being planned. I would even be prepared to hit Naples, where there is a NATO base." On 19 December 2003 Libya agreed to destroy all of its chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. The surprise announcement followed nine months of secret talks between Libyan, American, and British officials. Libya agreed to allow for immediate inspections and monitoring, and to eliminate ballistic missiles traveling more than 300 kilometers with a 500 kilogram payload. A team of American and British intelligence officers spent about two weeks Libya in October and again in December 2003. During the visits, the team of US and UK inspectors went to 10 sites related to Libya's nuclear effort, chemical stockpile and missile program [other accounts suggested that the team was taken to dozens of sites]. Inspectors had learned that Libya had a supply of Scud-C ballistic missiles made in North Korea. Libya agreed to eliminate the North Korean Scud-Cs, but not Scud-Bs, which have a 300 km range.

Scud-B / SS-21 Scarab / Frog-7 Libya obtained Scud-B and Frog-7 missiles from the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s. Libya’s inventory of ballistic missiles consists of some 80 Scud B SRBM TELs and 40 FROG-7 artillery rockets TELs. It is believed that Libya possessed at least three times as many missiles as launchers. Libya continued to maintain a SCUD missile force, although that force is aging and suffers from maintenance problems. Some reports indicated that Libya could not successfully operate the Scud B system, and that many of the launchers and missiles had been sold to Iran. The Russian-made SS-21 Scarab SRBM has a 70 km range and 480 kg payload, and the Frog-7 has a range of 40km. On 15 April 1986, Libya fired two or three Scuds at the US Coast Guard navigation station on the Italian island of Lampedusa, in retaliation for the US bombing raid on Tripoli. The missiles landed in the sea short of the island, and cause no damage.

Scud-C Libya is reported to have the North Korean Scud-C Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) variant with a 550 km range and 500 kg payload. The Scud-B has a 300 km range and 985 kg payload. The CIA reported in August 2000 that Libya had continued its efforts to obtain ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise from foreign sources. One example was the attempt in 1999 to ship Scud-related parts as "automotive parts" from a firm in Taiwan which were intercepted in the UK. In January 2000, the 32 crates of missile parts disguised as auto parts were discovered at London's Gatwick Airport on a British Airways flight bound for Tripoli via Malta. Libya is believed to have been the purchaser of the large shipment of missile-related technology aboard the North Korean-flagged freighter Kuwolsan, intercepted by Indian customs officers in June 1999 at the port of Kandla. The ship carried hundreds of missile components, machine tools, and detailed plans for variants of the Scud-B and Scud-C missiles.

Orbital Transport-und-Raketen Aktiengesellschaft (OTRAG) The West German firm Orbital Transport und Raketen Aktiengesellschaft (OTRAG) shifted its development of a commercial space launch rocket from Zaire to Libya in 1979 and apparently had one or two rather unsuccessful tests there in 1981. A test flight was reported from either the Sebha Oasis or the Jarmah Oasis on 01 March 1981, at which

6

time OTRAG announced that many tens of moduls were currently in production in its manufacturing facility near Munich/Germany. OTRAG claimed that it was working on a nonmilitary rocket to enable Third World countries to launch satellites cheaply. OTRAG became inactive in late 1984, and this effort soon collapsed. Although the Germans withdrew formally under pressure from the Bonn government in 1981, the latest test occurred in 1987. This may be explained by other reports that the head of OTRAG, Lutz Kayser, remained in Libya until the mid-1980s. A London report further claimed that, in October 1989, about 100 German engineers were working on a 500-750-km missile system, code-named "Ittisalt," in a desert camp about 100 km from Sebha, the site of the earlier OTRAG work and also the location of an alleged second Libyan chemical weapons complex. The missile work was reported to be in the research and development stage.

Condor 2 / Al Fatah Libyan efforts to develop its own missile have met with only limited success. Its Al Fatah missile program has remained in a preliminary stage. This developmental effort uses a rocket with a fairly small payload. Libya’s lack of progress with its missile program is directly related to its inability to gain adequate foreign assistance for its efforts, again partly due to UN sanctions. The Condor 2 program was initiated by in Argentina in 1982. A two stage, solid-fuelled missile intended to carry a 450 kg payload (possibly a nuclear warhead) at least 900 km, the project attracted co-funding from Egypt in 1984 and Iraq in 1985. In April 1990, under pressure from the United States, the Argentinean government announced that the project had been shelved. Iraq continued its development of the missile, known as the Badr 2000, until 1990. The involvement of Globesat, another West German company, in a separate Libyan missile project was investigated by the Munich public prosecutor in January 1989, but the case was dropped, apparently without an indictment. One report asserted that a West German company called Technical Oil Production (TOP) was set up in 1984 as a front for missile component acquisitions for a missile project code-named al-Fatah ("the conqueror") and that TOP had exported rocket valve controls for that project. The firm was found guilty and fined. A Serbian company known as JPL Systems in July 1996 was reported to have signed a $30 million contract with officials of Libya's Al Fatah missile-development program to provide technical support. Israeli intelligence sources claimed that the al-Fatah is a 1,000-km range system being developed under the management of a number of foreign experts, some of whom have been identified by Israel as having worked on a Libyan missile program in the 1970s. According to the article, in 1990, the liquid-fuel rocket motor of the al-Fatah was in the static test phase of development. In 1993, Libya was reported to have tried to obtain 80 tons of ammonium perchlorate from Russia, via Ukraine, to produce solid propellants. The Ukrainians, under US pressure, impounded the shipment. In 1995, reports appeared suggesting that Iraqi technicians were working in Libya to revive the program or to integrate it with Libya's Al Fattah program. Ater more than 15 years of development, the al-Fatah was still not operational. Chinese technicians have been linked to the Al-Fatah missile program as early as June 1998. It is reported that the state-run China Precision Machinery Import-Export Co. and the Libyan government reached an agreement in March 1999 to help develop Libya's long-range Al-Fatah missile. Chinese technical assistance has reportedly included a hypersonic wind tunnel to be used for modeling and simulation. In 1999 US imagery intelligence satellites photographed Libyan efforts to enlarge a missile test facility as part of the Al-Fatah development program. The indigenous 1,000-km range Al-Fatah missile, which as of early 2000 was claimed to be in the late stages of development, has not been flight tested. In February 2002 London-based A-Sharq Al Awsat reported that Iran and Libya were

7

negotiating a deal for the production of Iranian missiles in Libya. The deal was reported to call for Iran to establish a missile production line of Iran's Fatah solid-fuel missile in Libya. The project would enable Libya to produce missiles with a range of 1,500 kilometers, which can reach Israel and much of Europe.

MB/EE-150 / MB/EE-600 Libya may have attempted to purchase ballistic missiles from Brazil, but MTCR restrictions and US pressure probably closed off that source. In the mid-1980s, the Brazilian Orbitas consortium developed the solid-fuel the MB/EE 150 roadmobile SRBM, with a range of 150 kilometers. A 600 km-range version of the system may also have been under development. In 1988, reports suggested that an MB/EE-type system was tested over a range of 650 km in the Libya desert.

SS-23 Spider / SS-12 Scaleboard In the 1980s, Libya reportedly sought to purchase obsolete 900 km-range SS-12 Scaleboard MRBMs that had been banned under the INF Treaty, as well as SS-23 Spider SRBMs (range 500 km), from the Soviet Union.

M-9 / CSS-2 Reports often cite Libyan interest in acquiring the Chinese M-9 or CSS-2, but to date no transfers of these missiles to Libya have been verified. US intelligence reports in December 1999 indicated that China had agreed to supply Libya with a hypersonic wind tunnel.

No Dong Libya’s strategy has been to acquire or develop long range missiles (greater than 1,000 kilometers), but it has made little progress in recent years. For example, Libya’s efforts to acquire the North Korean No Dong missile have been unsuccessful. Such a missile would allow Libya to threaten Egypt, Israel, NATO countries in southern Europe, and US forces in the Mediterranean region.

8

Libyan Chemical Weapons From © Globalsecurity

Italian leader Benito Mussolini reportedly authorized the use of gas bombs against Libyan rebels in 1929. T One report claims that 24 mustard gas bombs were dropped on a Libyan oasis in 1930. he Libyans were probably the victims of mustard gas attacks. Libya has had limited success with its chemical warfare program. Libya has experienced major setbacks to its chemical warfare program, first as a result of intense public scrutiny focused on its Rabta facility in the late 1980s and more recently on its Tarhuna underground facility. Nevertheless, Libya retains a small inventory of chemical weapons, as well as the a CW agent production capability. American efforts set back Libya's CW programs about ten years by focussing international attention on the Rabta and Tarhunah facilities and by preventing Libya from obtaining needed chemicals, equipment and experts. Libya, after spending a great deal of money, has only a small amount of agent and two facilities it dares not use for their intended purpose. If Qadahafi had been left undisturbed, he could have had thousands of tons of a variety of chemical agents and the ability to produce much more at will. During the 1980s, Libya succeeded in producing up to 100 tons of blister and nerve agent at its Rabta facility, built with foreign assistance. Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has shown that he is willing and capable of using chemical weapons and missiles against his enemies. In 1986 and 1987 the Government of Chad accused Libya of using toxic gas and napalm against central government forces and against rebel forces. Libya may have used mustard gas [possibly Iranian-supplied] delivered in bombs by AN-26 aircraft in final phases of the war against Chad in September 1987. The wind blew the agent back onto the Libyan forces. In the early 1990s, Qadhafi turned to private contractors from Thailand and other countries to construct facilities for storing a variety of chemical weapons, including nerve gases. The government of Thailand moved in 1993 to prevent its citizens from assisting Libya's chemical weapons build-up. The United States welcomed this action by the Thai government. Qadhafi had not given up the goal of establishing his own offensive chemicals weapons capability and Libya continues to pursue an independent production capability for the weapons. Qadhafi did not appear likely to sign or ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, Libya remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals and other key equipment. UN sanctions have severely limited that support. Finally, while Libya’s ability to deliver any of its existing stockpile of chemical agents is not great, the threat to Egypt, US forces in the region, or NATO cannot be dismissed out of hand. Libya saw the United States as its primary

9

external threat, owing especially to US support for United Nations sanctions against Tripoli for its refusal to turn over suspects in the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103. Although Libya’s capabilities to use chemical agents and missiles are limited, Qadhafi could provide these weapons to states or terrorist groups he supports and that support him in return. Qadhafi’s major limiting factor was Libya’s lack of a sufficient technological infrastructure to support domestic development of NBC weapons and missiles. All Libyan programs must rely on significant infusions of foreign equipment, technology, and expertise. Only Libya’s chemical warfare program has made any demonstrable progress developing facilities capable of supporting large-scale indigenous programs. Despite ongoing embargoes and an unsettled domestic situation, Qadhafi supported development of NBC weapons and missile capabilities. His view apparently was that these weapons can advance his international position, can serve as deterrents against the West’s sophisticated weaponry, can be used to intimidate neighboring states, and can serve as cheaper alternatives to more expensive conventional systems. In addition to an inadequate infrastructure, Libya has serious economic problems that threaten the regime and complicate its long-term goal of establishing domestic production capabilities. Libya’s economic problems result from insufficient economic development outside the oil sector, economic and financial mismanagement, the absence of private enterprise, and corruption. Following the suspension of UN sanctions in April 1999, Libya reestablished contacts with illicit foreign sources of expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals in the Middle East, Asia, and Western Europe. Libya publicly indicated its intent to join the CWC. Under the CWC, Libya would be required to declare and destroy all chemical weapons production facilities and stockpiles, make declarations about any dual-use chemical industry, undertake not to research or produce any chemical weapons, and not to export certain chemicals to countries that have not signed the CWC. Libya would also be subject to challenge inspections of any facility, declared or not. On 19 December 2003 Libya agreed to destroy all of its chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. The surprise announcement followed nine months of secret talks between Libyan, American, and British officials. Libya agreed to abide by the Chemical Weapons Convention, and to allow for immediate inspections and monitoring. A team of American and British intelligence officers spent about two weeks Libya in October and again in December 2003. US and UK specialists invited to Libya said they found few surprises in Libya's chemical weapons program. The US and UK learned that Libya had tens of tons of mustard agent produced about a decade earlier, as well as hundreds of 250-pound aircraft bombs capable of dispersing the mustard agent in combat. During the visits, the team of US and UK inspectors went to dozens of sites related to Libya's nuclear effort, chemical stockpile and missile program. Libya revealed the existence of precursor materials used to develop nerve agents. Libya had also conducted experiments on the nerve agents sarin and soman. A small desert ranch near Tripoli, described as a turkey farm, was actually a hiding place for hundreds of chemical bombs. The mustard gas and nerve agents were stored separately. Libyans took American inspectors right to them, but it was not a place the US would have looked. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons supervised the destruction of about 3,000 chemical bombs and warheads, which was completed in March 2004.

10

Libyan Biological Warfare From © Globalsecurity

Libya acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention [BWC] in 1982. But Libya has never filed confidencebuilding data declarations with the United Nations. While Libya is believed to have had a biological warfare program for many years, it remains in the early research and development stages, primarily because Libya lacks an adequate scientific and technical base. The program also suffers from the difficulty Libya has acquiring needed foreign equipment and technical expertise, partly due to current UN sanctions. However, Libya is trying to develop an indigenous capability and may be able to produce laboratory quantities of agent. Given the overall limitations of the program, it is unlikely that Libya will be able to transition from laboratory work to production of militarily useful quantities of biological warfare agent until well after the turn of the century. The US believes that Libya has continued its biological warfare program. Although its program is in the research-and-development stage, Libya may be capable of producing small quantities of biological agent. Libya's BW program has been hindered, in part, by the country's poor scientific and technological base, equipment shortages, and a lack of skilled personnel, as well as by UN sanctions in place from 1992 to 1999. Libya's biological weapons program may be centered in the General Health Laboratories, a medical facility in the Tripoli area. It reportedly was built with Iraqi assistance, and for a time employed former South African scientists. Unconfirmed reports suggested that in 1997 about a dozen Iraqi BW experts arrived in Libya to help develop a BW complex under the guise of a medical facility called General Health Laboratories. The secret program, code named "Ibn Hayan," was said to aim to produce bombs and warheads filled with anthrax and botulinum toxin [in the 9th Century AD Jabir ibn Hayan established chemistry as an experimental science]. A number of organisations, including universities and laboratories attached to the ministries of agriculture and health, were engaged in making ostensibly innocent purchases of dual-use diagnostic and laboratory materials. On 19 December 2003 Libya agreed to destroy all of its chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. The surprise announcement followed nine months of secret talks between Libyan, American, and British officials. Libya agreed to abide by the BIological Weapons Convention, and to allow for immediate inspections and monitoring. A team of American and British intelligence officers spent about two weeks Libya in October and again in December 2003. During the visits, the team of US and UK inspectors went to 10 sites related to Libya's nuclear effort, chemical stockpile and missile program [other accounts suggested that the team was taken to dozens of sites], but apparently no biological weapons facilities were visited. US and UK specialists invited to Libya found no concrete evidence of an existing biological weapons effort. The team was given access to medical or pharmacological scientists and facilities, and Libyans were questioned about equipment and research that could be applied to biological warfare, but the Libyans denied that a BW program had ever existed.

11

Libyan Nuclear Weapons From © Globalsecurity

Tripoli joined the IAEA in 1963. At one time, some observers classified Libya among the most dangerous countries from the standpoint of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. But in recent years, concerns about Libyan nuclear ambitions have faded, though apprehensions about Libyan chemical weapons efforts remain very much alive. Libya is in no position to obtain access to nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future, given the extremely limited domestic technical base of the country. Over the years, Libya’s nuclear program’s progress has suffered from mismanagement, lack of spare parts, and the reluctance of foreign suppliers to provide assistance, particularly since the UN embargo went into effect in 1992. However, Qadhafi had not abandoned his goal of acquiring a nuclear weapon. He continued to try to develop a Libyan nuclear weapons infrastructure. Despite a 25-year effort to acquire or develop a nuclear weapon, Libya’s nuclear program remained in the embryonic stage. Prior to 2003, the U.S. Intelligence Community estimated that Libya would have a deployable weapon by 2007. Subsequent inspections have since refuted that belief. It had succeeded in providing some training to a number of students and technicians and the establishment of a nuclear research center, which includes a small nuclear research reactor under IAEA safeguards. This facility, located at Tajura, southeast of Tripoli, was provided by the former Soviet Union. Since it was unlikely that Tripoli could produce a weapon without significant and sustained foreign technical assistance, Qadhafi reportedly was trying to recruit nuclear scientists to assist in developing nuclear weapons. Qadhafi's stance on nuclear weapons has been contradictory. Unconfirmed but persistent press reports beginning soon after the 1969 revolution indicated that Libya wanted to purchase a nuclear weapon or the components for such a device. According to one report, Qadhafi sent his deputy, Jallud, to Beijing in an unsuccessful attempt to purchase tactical nuclear weapons. Qadhafi has voiced his concern over the Israeli nuclear capability and publicly expressed his desire to obtain nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, in 1975 Libya reaffirmed its commitment to the 1968 Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed originally by the monarchy in 1968. Qadhafi also stated in interviews in 1981 and 1984 that Libya was only interested in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, and he scoffed at the idea of "an Islamic bomb." In 1975, Libya had ratified the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty signed by the Idris regime in 1969. In 1980, an agreement was reached with the International Atomic Energy Agency placing all of Libya's nuclear installations under international inspection. Despite these steps, in the mid- and late 1970s, Qadhafi repeatedly proclaimed his country's determination to acquire nuclear weapons, primarily because he was convinced that his archenemy, Israel, had achieved such a military capability. There is no doubt, however, that Libya has undertaken extensive bilateral negotiations to secure nuclear research facilities and power plants, and many Libyan students in nuclear energy fields have been sent to United States, West European, and East European universities to further their studies. According to the terms of a 1974 nuclear cooperation treaty with Argentina, Libya was provided with equipment and technical training. Argentina agreed to send senior geologists to Libya to advise on uranium prospecting and uranium enrichment. One alleged reason Libya occupied the Aouzou Strip in Chad in 1975 was that the area was thought to be rich in uranium deposits. Once inspections began after Quadafi's December 2003 decision to disarm, it was confirmed that Libya did obtain "yellow cake" from Niger in 1978, as U.S. Intelligence had long believed. Libya and India agreed in July 1978 to cooperate in the peaceful application of nuclear energy, in line with India's "atoms for peace" policy. France agreed in 1976 to build a nuclear research plant in Libya designed to power a water desalination plant. Qadhafi sought help in obtaining nuclear technology from a number of countries, including the People's Republic of China. Among these efforts, the cooperation with Pakistan launched in 1977 seemed for a time to be producing material results. Libya appeared to be providing financial assistance and, later, deliveries of uranium "yellow cake" originating in Niger in the hope of eventually being compensated by weapons from Pakistan. However, in an interview with an Indian newspaper in March 1986, Qadhafi declared that Libya would never help Pakistan acquire an atomic bomb. He said: "We consider nuclear weapons production a great mistake against humanity." Libya's main partner in the nuclear field, however, was the Soviet Union. A small (ten megawatt) Soviet-supplied reactor began operation in Tajura (outside Tripoli) in 1981. Three years later, a research center was opened at the same site staffed by 750 Libyan specialists and technicians aided by Soviet staff. Many students were sent abroad; a group of 200 was studying in the United States until early 1983 when the United States proscribed training Libyans in nuclear science. As noted in press reports, however, in the mid-1990s discussions between Libya and Russia indicated possible renewed Russian support for Libya’s nuclear effort at Tajura, including refurbishment and long-term maintenance. Libya planned to buy a power station from the Soviet Union, but, dissatisfied with the technology involved, negotiated with the Belgian firm of Belgonucleaire to take over the engineering contract and supply much of the needed equipment. After the United States objected, fearing use of the equipment in weapons development, Belgium decided in 1984 to refuse the US$1 billion contract. Shortly thereafter, Moscow's commitment to construct an 880-megawatt power station to be located in the Sirt [Surt] region was reaffirmed. It was to cost over US$4 billion, with repayment to stretch over 15 to 18 years. In early 1986, however, a plan for the construction of nine 440-megawatt nuclear power plants was suspended indefinitely. Libya ordered a pilot scale uranium conversion facility in 1984. A Japanese company supplied Libya with the technology. The sale was apparently arranged directly with the Japanese instead of through middlemen. As of 2002 the assessment of the US Government was that, since the suspension of UN sanctions against Libya in 1999, Libya had been able to increase its access to dual-use nuclear technologies. Although Libya would need significant foreign assistance to acquire a nuclear weapon, Tripoli's nuclear infrastructure enhancement remains of concern. Qaddafi hinted at this in a 25 March 2002 interview with Al-Jazirah when he said, "We demanded the dismantling of the weapons of mass destruction that the Israelis have; we must continue to demand that. Otherwise, the Arabs will have the right to possess that weapon." A USled naval operation in October 2003 interdicted a shipment of uranium-enrichment components bound for Libya. US

12

officials say the seizure may have helped prompt Libya to make its pledge to dismantle weapons of mass destruction. The US-led naval operation resulted in the seizure of thousands of uranium-centrifuge parts, bound for Libya, from a German-registered freighter in the Mediterranean. The vessel was seized based on intelligence information that it was carrying nuclear components, and that the interdiction was a major success for the Bush administration's Proliferation Security Initiative, the PSI. Begun in early 2003, the PSI involves the United States and more than a dozen other countries working together to prevent the illicit shipment by sea, land or air of weapons of mass destruction material that might end up in the hands of terrorist groups or rogue states. The source of the centrifuge parts bound for Libya has not been revealed. On 19 December 2003 Libya agreed to destroy all of its chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. The surprise announcement followed nine months of secret talks between Libyan, American, and British officials. Libya agreed to abide by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and to allow for immediate inspections and monitoring. Shahram Chubin, director of studies at the Geneva Center for Security Policy, believes Gaddafi is paving the way for a secure succession for his son. "I think that Libya -- and in particular its leadership -- are getting ready for succession. They must have recognized that it makes sense to bring Libya back into the fold of the international community, and to do that they'd have to dispense with these [weapons] programs that they've been having for many, many years, which clearly serve no rational purpose. And I think it's a recognition by Gadhafi that he wants to let his son succeed him and to leave Libya in a slightly better position if he gets rid of these useless weapons, which have created unnecessary distrust and suspicion on the part of its neighbors and, of course, the international community as a whole, including Britain and the United States," Chubin said. [ SOURCE ] The October 2003 seizure of the centrifuge parts came little more than two months before the surprise announcement 19 December that Libya, after negotiations with the United States and Britain, had agreed to dismantle its secret nuclear and other weapons-of-mass destruction programs. The interdiction may well have been a factor in Libya's ultimate decision to end its covert weapons efforts. The October interdiction occurred several months after the start of secret talks between the Muammar Gadhafi government and the United States and Britain on the weapons programs. Mr. Ereli said that shortly after the seizure, Libya agreed for the first time to allow experts from the two countries to visit its weapons facilities. Libya initiated the dialog in mid-March 2003 when it requested the UK to broker talks with the US on weapons of mass destruction. A team of American and British intelligence officers spent about two weeks Libya in October and again in December 2003. During the visits, the team of US and UK inspectors went to 10 sites related to Libya's nuclear effort, along with dozens of others related to chemical and missile programs [some reports suggested that ten nuclear related sites were visited, while other accounts suggested that the team was taken to dozens of sites in all]. Libya allowed US inspectors to visited weapons sites where they saw centrifuges for enriching uranium, which was more advanced than Washington thought. A weapons program would need hundreds of centrifuges, called a cascade, to make significant quantities of uranium. The inspection teams saw only a few centrifuges, did not see a cascade, and Libya denied that enriched uranium had been produced. Speaking on background, a British official said Libya was "developing a nuclear fuel cycle intended to support nuclear weapons development... Libya had not acquired a nuclear weapons capability, though it was close to developing one." Also on background, a US intelligence analyst said the nuclear field was one are the Libyans were "substantially further along than had been publicly disclosed." Libya is a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, allowing limited IAEA inspections, but now planned to sign the treaty's Additional Protocol that allows more intrusive and unannounced inspections. Initial meetings between Libyan officials and the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency could be the beginnings of a long and complex process to verify Tripoli's nuclear ambitions. The head of the atomic agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, opened talks on 20 December 2003 with Libya on the process of future inspections of Tripoli's nuclear activities. Similar work was carried out by the UN nuclear watchdog in 1991 after South Africa announced it would voluntarily abandon its nuclear-weapons program. Senior IAEA inspectors visited the country to collect information on nuclear material, lists of imports, laboratory programs and engineering facilities. They also carried out environmental sampling in the Kalahari desert. In the case of South Africa, the IAEA placed nuclear facilities under safeguards with regular inspections and either destroyed weapons-related equipment or converted it to peaceful nuclear usage. The process took years. In January 2004 Saif al-Islam Gadaffi said Libya spent $40 million on nuclear components, including centrifuges, from various black market dealers, including Pakistani scientists. The Pakistani scientists received as much as $100m over several years starting in the late 1990s. Details about Libya's clandestine nuclear program emerged from a month-long investigation by US, UK and UN inspectors who were given access to formerly clandestine nuclear facilities in and around Tripoli. By late January 2004 investigators had learned that Libya had covertly acquired thousands of parts for gas centrifuges as well as machine tools for making additional centrifuges. Libya also had acquired designs for making a nuclear bomb. But key elements of the design were missing, and Libya's scientists lacked the expertise to evaluate the plans or build such a weapon. Libya began purchasing components for a relatively simple gas centrifuge made mostly of aluminum beginning in the late 1990s. After acquiring parts for about 100 machines, Libya instead began to focus on a more sophisticated maraging steel centrifuge design. Libya had arranged to purchase 10,000 of the maraging steel centrifuges, sufficient to produce as many as ten bombs a year. Some of the centrifuge parts came from factories built expressly to manufacture nuclear components for the black market, including one possible manufacturing site in Malaysia. Libya's centrifuges are of the same design as machines used in Pakistan. Libya had purchased a turnkey facility in which foreign suppliers would supply the parts for the gas centrifuges, as well as assemble and test them. Libya was acquiring a large uranium enrichment facility capable of producing enough HEU for several bombs a year. On 27 January 2004 the United States airlifted out of Libya components of the nuclear weapons program that country agreed to give up. The White House hailed Libya for its cooperation and said its good faith in dismantling weapons will be reciprocated. The announcement was made several hours after the U-S transport plane had landed in the central state of Tennessee carrying some 25 metric tons of Libyan weapons program components including centrifuge parts, uranium, and sensitive documentation. The airlift was the most dramatic move since Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi concluded an agreement 19 December 2003 with the United States and Britain, to give up weapons of mass destruction programs in a bid to end two deca

13

Libyan WMD Facilities Facility

IAEA

Lat

Lon

Al Fallah

Site B

° ' "N

° ' "E

Al Hashan

Site A

° ' "N

° ' "E

Al Karamia

Site H

° ' "N

° ' "E

Al Khalla

Site C

° ' "N

° ' "E

El Ezeizia

Site K

° ' "N

° ' "E

Janzour

Site E

° ' "N

° ' "E

° ' "N

° ' "E

° ' "N

° ' "E

° ' "N

° ' "E

Jarmah NBSR Headquarters

Site J

Rabta Salah Eddin

Site D

° ' "N

° ' "E

Sawani

Site G

° ' "N

° ' "E

Sebha [Sabha]

Site F

° ' "N

° ' "E

Tajura NRC

Site L

° ' "N

° ' "E

Tajura Desalination

Site I

° ' "N

° ' "E

Tarhuna

° ' "N

° ' "E

U/I Location

° ' "N

° ' "E

Nuclear

From © Globalsecurity

CW

BW

Missile

14

From © Globalsecurity

15

National Board for Scientific Research The National Authority for Scientific Research is responsible for higher education and research. The National Board for Scientific Research is responsible for recruiting scientific and research expertise and coordinating between various research institutes in Great Jamihiriya. The main objective behind this is to maintain a reasonable level of scientific progress in accordance with a national scientific research policy which enables the carrying out of strategic studies as well as participation in building the infrastructure and upgrading production levels. NBSR has been legally authorized to issue a principle document for scientific and technical policies for Great Jamihiriya and in doing so NBSR has been able to work on new plans and directions that keep it in pace with current technological and technical developments in addition to this NBSR has determined a number of scientific and technical indicators which should be taken into consideration in order to promote scientific research programmes. This has enabled NBSR to propose numerous mechanisms and means by which to fulfill its objectives such as alternative ways for financing scientific research. Moreover, NBSR has determined a number of priorities which reflect the strategies adopted at the national level in the field of scientific research and technical development. Matouk Mohammed Matouk [Matoug or Matug] is the deputy prime minister and the head of the Libyan People's Committee for Scientific Research [Secretary of the National Board of Scientific Research [also known as the National Committee for Scientific Research and the National Academy of Scientific Research or the National Authority for Scientific Research]. In December 2003 Matouk was the interlocutor with the IAEA. From © Globalsecurity

AU Leaders Agree to Disagree on Gaddafi's Union Government Proposal By Peter Heinlein Addis Ababa 04 February 2009 An African Union summit has ended in confusion over the future of Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi's dream of establishing a continental government. Mr. Gaddafi appears determined to push toward creation of a United States of Africa during his year as AU chairman, despite opposition from the continent's most influential powers. Meetings of African leaders usually run two days, but this summit in Addis Ababa dragged into a fourth day with members deadlocked over AU chairman Gaddafi's proposal for a central administration with sweeping powers. Most heads of state had departed by the time a compromise was struck that allowed Mr. Gaddafi to declare victory. "It is a government of the union. It is an authority, a government. There will be secretaries ... coordinators for various policies, like defense and foreign affairs and defense policies and foreign policies that are divergent and we will coordinate everything and our defense policies for Africa," the Libyan president said. Mr. Gaddafi admitted there are deep divisions among member states about his idea, but in a speech to the closing summit session, Mr. Gaddafi outlined a long-term vision of a fully united Africa, under one flag."We need the peoples of Africa, traditional forces of women and youth who can use their energies to push us to reach the final phase, which is the United States of Africa, which will be like the United States of America today," he said.Special meeting planned Mr. Gaddafi says a special meeting of African foreign ministers will be held in three months to discuss getting the union project off the ground. But his high-profile optimism covered over the low-key determination of a majority of African leaders to kill, or at least indefinitely postpone the creation of a continental government. Only a handful of heads of state were in the room to hear the Libyan leader's closing remarks. But most of Africa's big powers, such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa are sticking to the position that it will not be a government with sovereign powers for the foreseeable future. They left it to African Union Commission Chairman Jean Ping to explain to reporters that moving to a union government would be a long-drawn out process. "The initial purpose was to transform into a government of union, then the member states during their discussions think government has a definition which is precise, and we have not yet reached that stage, and we better move from a commission to an authority," Ping said. Long process lies ahead Ping says even the small step of changing the name of the permanent secretariat from a commission to an authority, as agreed at this summit, could take years, because it requires a charter amendment that must be ratified by two-thirds of the member states.This summit has left no doubt that Mr. Gaddafi is determined to set the wheels of a union government in motion during his one-year term as AU Chairman. But African diplomats and observers say the name change agreed to at this summit gives opponents of the plan the time they to delay it indefinitely. From © Globalsecurity

16

Overthrowing Qadhafi From © Globalsecurity

Since he took power in a 1969 military coup, Col. Muammar Abu Minyar al-QADHAFI has espoused his own political system - a combination of socialism and Islam - which he calls the Third International Theory. Viewing himself as a revolutionary leader, he used oil funds during the 1970s and 1980s to promote his ideology outside Libya, even supporting subversives and terrorists abroad to hasten the end of Marxism and capitalism. Libyan military adventures failed, e.g., the prolonged foray of Libyan troops into the Aozou Strip in northern Chad was finally repulsed in 1987. Libyan support for terrorism decreased after UN sanctions were imposed in 1992. Those sanctions were suspended in April 1999. Since 1969, Qadhafi has determined Libya's foreign policy. His principal foreign policy goals have been Arab unity, elimination of Israel, advancement of Islam, support for Palestinians, elimination of outside--particularly Western-influence in the Middle East and Africa, and support for a range of "revolutionary" causes. After the 1969 coup, Qadhafi closed American and British bases on Libyan territory and partially nationalized all foreign oil and commercial interests in Libya. He also played a key role in promoting the use of oil embargoes as a political weapon for challenging the West, hoping that an oil price rise and embargo in 1973 would persuade the West--especially the United States--to end support for Israel. Qadhafi rejected both Soviet communism and Western capitalism and claimed he was charting a middle course. In August 1981, two Libyan jets fired on U.S. aircraft participating in a routine naval exercise over international waters of the Mediterranean claimed by Libya. The US planes returned fire and shot down the attacking Libyan aircraft. On 7 December 1981 President Ronald Reagan claimed that US has evidence that Libyan leader has sent assassination teams to murder top US officials. Immediately after that the Reagan administration called on 1,500 Americans residing in Libya to leave "as soon as possible," citing "the danger, which the Libyan regime poses to American citizens." In December 1981, the State Department invalidated U.S. passports for travel to Libya. In March 1982, the U.S. Government prohibited imports of Libyan crude oil into the United States and expanded the controls on U.S.-origin goods intended for export to Libya. Licenses were required for all transactions, except food and medicine. In March 1984, U.S. export controls were expanded to prohibit future exports to the Ras al-Enf petrochemical complex. In April 1985, all Export-Import Bank financing was prohibited. Libya's relationship with the former Soviet Union involved massive Libyan arms purchases from the Soviet bloc and the presence of thousands of east bloc advisers. Libya's use--and heavy loss-of Soviet-supplied weaponry in its war with Chad was a notable breach of an apparent Soviet-Libyan understanding not to use the weapons for activities inconsistent with Soviet objectives. As a result, Soviet-Libyan relations reached a nadir in mid-1987. After the fall of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, Libya concentrated on expanding diplomatic ties with Third World countries and increasing its commercial links with Europe and East Asia. Following the imposition of UN sanctions in 1992, these ties significantly diminished. Following a 1998 Arab League meeting in which fellow Arab states decided not to challenge UN sanctions, Qadhafi announced that he was turning his back on pan-Arab ideas, one of the fundamental tenets of his philosophy. Instead, Libya pursued closer bilateral ties, particularly with North African neighbors Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. It also has sought to develop its relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, leading to Libyan involvement in several internal African disputes in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Central African Republic, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. Libya also has sought to expand its influence in Africa through financial assistance, ranging from aid donations to impoverished neighbors such as Niger to oil subsidies to Zimbabwe. Qadhafi has proposed a borderless "United States of Africa" to transform the continent into a single nation-state ruled by a single government. This plan has been moderately well received, although more powerful would-be participants such as Nigeria and South Africa are skeptical. In 1988, Libya was found to be in the process of constructing a chemical weapons plant at Rabta, a plant which is now the largest such facility in the Third World. Libya is currently constructing another chemical weapons production facility at Tarhunah. Libya's support for terrorism and its past regional aggressions made this development a matter of major concern to the United States. In cooperation with like-minded countries, the United States has since sought to bring a halt to the foreign technical assistance deemed essential to the completion of this facility. On December 21, 1988, a bomb exploded aboard Pan American flight 103, 31,000 feet above the quiet Scottish village of Lockerbie. Two-hundred seventy men, women, and children, from 30 nations, were murdered. Authorities in the United States and Britain obtained evidence linking Abd al-Basit al-Maqrahi a senior Libyan intelligence officer and Lamin Fhimah, former manager of the Libyan Arab airlines office in Malta, to the suitcase bomb that destroyed Pan Am flight 103. Libyan agents were also sought by the French government in connection with the bombing of UTA flight 772 in 1989 -- a savage act of terrorism that cost the lives of 171 one people. In 1991, two Libyan intelligence agents were indicted by federal prosecutors in the U.S. and Scotland for their involvement in the December 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103. In January 1992, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 731 demanding that Libya surrender the suspects, cooperate with the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 investigations, pay compensation to the victims' families, and cease all support for terrorism. Libya's refusal to comply led to the approval of UNSC Resolution 748 on March 31, 1992, imposing sanctions designed to bring about Libyan compliance. Continued Libyan defiance led to passage of UNSC Resolution 883--a limited assets freeze and an embargo on selected oil equipment--in November 1993. Promulgated in 1996, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) sought to penalize non-U.S. companies which invest more than $40 million in Libya's oil and gas sector in any one year. ILSA was renewed in 2001, and the investment cap lowered to $20 million. There have been no credible reports of Libyan involvement in terrorism since 1994, and Libya has taken significant steps to mend its international image. In 1999, the Libyan Government surrendered two Libyans suspected of involvement in the Pan Am 103 bombing, leading to the suspension of UN sanctions. On January 31, 2001, a Scottish

17

court seated in Netherlands found one of the suspects, Abdel Basset al-Megrahi, guilty of murder in connection with the bombing, and acquitted the second suspect, Al-Amin Kalifa Fhima. Megrahi has appealed his conviction; the appeal began on January 23, 2002. Full lifting of UN sanctions is contingent on Libyan compliance with its remaining UNSCR requirements on Pan Am 103, including acceptance of responsibility for the actions of its officials and payment of appropriate compensation. Libya did pay compensation in 1999 for the death of British policewoman Yvonne Fletcher, a move that preceded the reopening of the British Embassy in Tripoli, and paid damages to the families of the victims in the bombing of UTA Flight 772. On November 13, 2001, a German court found four persons, including a former employee of the Libyan Embassy in East Berlin, guilty in connection with the 1986 La Belle disco bombing, in which two U.S. servicemen were killed. The court also established a connection to the Libyan Government. The German Government has demanded that Libya accept responsibility for the La Belle bombing and pay appropriate compensation. Libya accepted responsibility for the bombing and has agreed to set up a $2.7 billion fund to compensate the families of the bombing's 270 victims, say reports. In June 2002 a group of New York lawyers announced that they had struck a deal with Libya and Libyan strongman Moammar Gaddafi. Under terms of the deal, the United States and United Nations would lift their sanctions against the terrorist state in return for $2.7 billion payable to the families of the 270 innocent victims murdered on Pan Am Flight 103 and the on ground. As recently as January 12, 2003, Libyan leader, Moammar Gaddafi, in an interview with Newsweek-Washington Post reporter, Lally Weymouth, failed to accept responsibility for the attack and had the audacity of calling for the United States to share the burden of compensation. On 18 August 2003 The White House announced that US sanctions against Libya for the 1988 bombing of a Pan Am jetliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, will remain in place because "there are still a number of serious concerns we have with regard to Libya. ... Libya has met the requirements of accepting responsibility for the Pan Am 103 bombing, and that was important that they accept that responsibility," said White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan. "They have sent a letter to the United Nations to that effect." McClellan said that he expects the United Nations to move forward soon on a resolution to end U.N. sanctions against Libya. The United States had already sent a letter saying that it is not opposed to lifting the U.N. sanctions. "United States sanctions will remain in place because we still have a number of serious concerns when it comes to Libya, most notably, their continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and their continued participation in regional conflicts in Africa that have been very destructive and unhelpful," said McClellan. "Libya continues to have a poor human rights record. So there are a number of concerns we still have." In August 2003 London and Washington began to push the Security Council to lift all UN sanctions against Tripoli. As a permanent member with veto power, France agreed in principle to lift the sanctions, but urged a delay so that it could negotiate increased Libyan indemnity payments to its own citizens in connection with the 1989 bombing of a French UTA airliner over Niger. France dropped its opposition to the resolution after Tripoli agreed to increase payments to families of the 170 passengers who died when the French airliner exploded over the Niger desert. Libya remains on the Department of State’s list of statesponsors of terrorism. Continued US concerns include involvement with West African strongmen in Burkina Faso and Liberia to seize diamond fields in Sierra Leone, along with efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and desists in its pursuit to produce and deliver nuclear weapons. US Ambassador James Cunningham told UN delegates that Washington continued to have "serious concerns about other aspects of Libyan behaviour, including its poor human rights record, rejection of democratic norms and standards, its irresponsible behaviour in Africa, its history of involvement in terrorism -and most important - its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery." Many experts consider Gaddafi's political position to be highly stable. Visitors to Libya cannot fail to notice the ubiquitous large portraits of the leader on buildings, in squares etc., both in cities and the rural areas. The reproduction of the human face on posters, graffiti and bill boards is limited to two figures: Colonel Muammar Qaddafi and to a less extent national hero Omar al-Muktar that distinguished himself in his resistance fight against the Italian occupation forces. On 19 December 2003 Libya agreed to destroy all of its chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. The surprise announcement followed nine months of secret talks between Libyan, American, and British officials. Libya agreed to abide by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and to allow for immediate inspections and monitoring. Experts and analysts say a number of factors were behind Libya's decision. Hans Blix, the UN's former chief weapons inspector, speculated that Libyan leader Colonel Moammar Gadhafi might have feared the same fate as deposed Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. "I can only speculate, but I would imagine that Gadhafi could have been scared by what he saw happen in Iraq. While the Americans would have difficulty in doing the same in Iran and in North Korea as they have done in Iraq, Libya would be more exposed, so maybe he will have reasons to be worried," Blix said.

18

U. S. Actions From © Globalsecurity

1981 Gulf of Sidra In 1973, Libya claimed the Gulf of Sidra to be within Libyan territorial waters by drawing a straight line between a point near Benghazi and the western headland of the gulf at Misratah This claim was not generally accepted, although only the United States presented a direct challenge by declaring that its ships would continue to regard all areas beyond a distance of 12 nautical miles from the coast as international waters. In response the President authorized Naval exercises in the Gulf of Sidra to conduct Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations. On several occasions, Libyan fighter planes harassed United States planes from carriers maneuvering in the area. When the United States Sixth Fleet began exercises in August 1981, Libyan fighter planes were assembled from elsewhere in the country to fly patrols near the American ships. On August 19, two Su-22 fighter-bombers were intercepted by two F-14 Tomcat fighters from the aircraft carrier Nimitz. While trying to escort the Libyans out of the exercise area, one of the American planes was the target of an air-to-air Atoll missile but was able to evade it. Both Libyan planes were then shot down with Sidewinder missiles launched by the Tomcats. The two Libyan pilots managed to eject and were rescued from the sea. The ease with which the American planes disposed of their attackers demonstrated that the earlier generation Su-22 and its Atoll missile could not prevail against more sophisticated United States equipment.

1983 Early Call Libya's relations with Sudan became strained after Qadhafi condemned Sudanese support for President Anwar al Sadat of Egypt and for the Camp David accords of September 1978. Libya was particularly annoyed by the steadily improving relations between Sudan and Egypt during the closing years of the Numayri regime, which culminated eventually in an Egyptian-Sudanese integration charter that provided Egypt with an air base in Sudan that could serve as a counterweight to Libyan regional power. Egyptian President Mubarak asked the United States to send Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft (AWACS) to monitor Libya's flights and activity toward Sudan in February 1983. Washington charged Qadhafi with planning a coup in Sudan, and the US Ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick stated: "The US has a strong strategic interest in assuring that Qadhafi is not able to upset governments or to intervene militarily in other countries, as is currently happening in Chad." USCENTCOM deployed a small force of E-3s and the carrier USS Nimitz to Egypt to forestall a Libyan attack on Sudan. By 20 Feb 1983 the crisis had passed. After an incident in which a Libyan plane allegedly bombed Khartum, Sudan on 18 March 1983, Sudan and Egypt appealed for assistance. The United States responded on very short-notice, and the 964th Airborne Warning And Control Squadron deployed four AWACS to Egypt for a Joint Chiefs of Staff directed operation called Early Call to monitor Libyan flights toward Sudan. Crews were divided with two going to Sudan for operation Arid Farmer and the other two remaining to take part in the August 1983 Bright Star, a Central Air Force deployment to Egypt which was more than a training exercise.

1983 Arid Farmer Chad Crisis In early 1979, Chad became an open arena of unrestrained factional politics. From 1979 to 1982, Chad experienced unprecedented change and spiraling violence. Southerners lost control of what remained of the Chadian government, while civil conflicts became significantly more internationalized. Opportunistic power seekers sought to gather followers (often using sectarian appeals) and to win support from Chad's African neighbors. By December 1980 Libyan forces had firm control of the capital and most other urban centers outside the south. Throughout 1981 most of the members of the OAU, along with France and the United States, encouraged Libyan troops to withdraw from Chad, and by mid-November 1981 the Libyan forces had complied. Until the early 1980s, United States aid to Chad had been restricted to shipments of food and development assistance. The United States had declined to become involved on behalf of any of the Chadian factions and had no desire to supplant France, which had shouldered the principal Western responsibility in Chad. The United States viewed Libyan expansionism as the cause of the Chadian crisis of 1983 and sought to check Libyan involvement. Accordingly, in April 1983 Washington negotiated an agreement to provide training in the United States for Chadian personnel in a number of military specialties. In July of the same year, the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed, which provided for sending military equipment to Chad. Regrouped as the National Liberation Army (Armée Nationale de Libération--ANL), rebel were trained and equipped by the Libyans. Returning to the offensive, they were able to take Faya Largeau in June 1983, following a devastating Libyan air bombardment. As the rebels advanced, aided by the poorly concealed participation of Libya, the central government made insistent appeals for international help. Rejecting direct intervention, France was prepared to go no further than airlifting arms and fuel. Zaire flew in a detachment of paratroopers, eventually furnishing about 2,000 men. Deployed chiefly around N'Djamena, they freed Chadian troops to fight the rebels. In August 1983, Washington authorized US$25 million emergency aid package

19

to help the Habré government, including the delivery of Redeye antiaircraft missiles and missile launchers. Three United States specialists visited Chad briefly to train Chadians in the use of the equipment. As a further symbol of American concern, on 08 August 1983 two Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, with support crews and 8 F-15 fighter escorts, were sent to Sudan for possible deployment in conjunction with French combat aircraft. The 964th Airborne Warning And Control Squadron deployed to Khartoum, Sudan, in support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed operation called Arid Farmer. The unit provided around-the-clock air surveillance of the volatile border region between Libya and Sudan. The AWACS aircraft, however, were not deployed and were withdrawn after about two weeks. Also during August 1983 aircraft from CVN-69 Eisenhower operated in the Gulf of Sidra. CV-43 Coral Sea's departure from the Mediterranean was delayed for a day because of uncertainty over the situation Protracted bilateral and multilateral negotiations eventually were successful in producing agreement on a simultaneous withdrawal of French and Libyan forces. Within the stipulated period of two months, on November 10, 1984, the French withdrawal was completed. But evidence provided by United States satellite photographs made it apparent that Qadhafi had violated his commitment by not removing his troops from Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture. Although French president François Mitterrand confronted Qadhafi over his actions at a hastily arranged conference, he failed to obtain the Libyan leader's compliance. As the conflict drew in other players, particularly France, Chad was in effect a partitioned country. With French help, the N'Djamena government of Hissein Habré controlled the southern part of Chad. The area north of the sixteenth parallel, however, was controlled by Libyan-backed Goukouni Oueddei, a member of the Tebu Muslim tribe in northern Chad. According to the terms of a September 1984 treaty, France withdrew its forces from Chad. Libya, however, decided to keep its troops there, and skirmishes and fighting continued intermittently. The fighting was suspended on September 11, 1987, when Libya and Chad accepted a cease-fire proposed by the OAU. In United States fiscal years (FY) 1984 through 1987, United States military aid to Chad totaled about US$70 million; an additional US$9 million was proposed for FY 1988. Expenditures for training were about US$200,000 annually. Most of the assistance consisted of transport aircraft and aircraft maintenance, small arms, ammunition, trucks, jeeps, antiaircraft and antitank weapons, uniforms, first aid kits, and food rations. The United States also cooperated with France in the air delivery of items deemed critical. For example, in January 1986 the United States Air Force ferried a Hawk missile battery from France to N'Djamena.

1984 Operation INTENSE LOOK Military and political crises in one region can bring economic uncertainty and panic in another. For example, during the 1984 “Mines of August” crisis in the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez, the presence of naval mines and damage to some 20 commercial vessels caused maritime insurance rates to rise and jeopardized the safe movement of world shipping through this critical waterway. Operation Intense Look was launched in response to the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez mine crisis, when naval mines were discovered in these vital shipping lanes. Libya's mining of the Red Sea in 1984 focused attention on the need to protect shipping lanes leading to the Suez Canal and the need for more advanced mine countermeasure vessels. USS SHREVEPORT (LPD 12) deployed to the Mediterranean Sea in July 1984. While in Rota, Spain, SHREVEPORT received mission tasking to off-load her embarked Marines and embark Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron Fourteen (HM-14). Crossing the Mediterranean Sea, and transiting the Suez Canal in record time, SHREVEPORT participated in Operation INTENSE LOOK, conducting mine clearance operations in the Red Sea. For her actions in support of this critical operation, SHREVEPORT was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation. The quick response of U.S. Navy and multinational mine countermeasures (MCM) forces helped calm fears and safeguard international maritime commerce. The AN/AQS-14 Minehunting Sonar, used primarily to detect bottom mines, was first delivered to the Fleet helicopters in 1984, just in time for use in Operation Intense Look.

1986 Operation Attain Document Tensions between the two countries mounted after the hijacking of a TWA airliner at Beirut in July 1985 and bombing attacks at American airline counters at Rome and Vienna in December of that year. Qadhafi was implicated in these actions through his patronage of the alleged perpetrator, the Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal. The Libyans also began installing batteries of SA-5 missiles acquired from the Soviet Union in late 1985, along with associated radar, to augment their air defense capabilities. United States naval vessels continued to challenge Qadhafi's claim to the Gulf of Sidra, periodically crossing the line of Libyan territorial claim, which he came to refer to as the "line of death" Following the terrorist attacks on 27 December 1985 in the Rome and Vienna airports, a series of Freedom of Navigation operations in the Gulf of Sidra (Operations in the Vicinity of Libya, OVL) were approved. Code-named `Attain Document,' the first two (26-30 January and 12-15 February) occurred without incident. Three carrier task forces of the Sixth Fleet with 225 aircraft assembled off the Libyan coast for maneuvers in March 1986. During `Attain Document III (23-29 March 1986), two SA-5 missiles were shot at U.S. aircraft by a SAM Site on 24 March. Over the next 16 hours, two Libyan patrol boats were sunk by USN aircraft. Shortly before 8:00 a.m. (EST) on March 24, two SA - 5 surface-to-air missiles were fired at U.S. aircraft flying over the high seas in the Gulf of Sidra from a Libyan missile installation in the vicinity of Sirte on the northern Libyan coast. During the course of the next few hours, several surface-to-air missiles were fired at U.S. aircraft operating over the high seas. A total of six SA-5s were launched from the new missile base at Surt against American aircraft. None was hit, however, because the SA-5, with a range of 240 kilometers, could threaten high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft over the Gulf of Sidra but was relatively ineffective against high-performance jet fighters. Subsequently, the missile site was put out of action by carrier-based A-6 Intruders firing High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs), that homed in on the Libyans' radar guidance signals. At approximately 3:00 p.m. (EST) these missile

20

installations again activated their target-acquisition radars with the evident objective of firing upon U.S. aircraft. Two HARM air-to-surface missiles were thereupon fired by a US Navy A-7 aircraft, apparently resulting in the destruction of the radars controlling the missile battery. After a short outage, the radar returned to active status and still posed a threat to U.S. forces. At 6:47 p.m., A-7 aircraft again fired two HARM missiles at the SA-5 radar at Sirte. After another short outage, the radar returned to active status. A second strike followed the next day to knock out a replacement radar unit. Although Soviet technicians were believed to be present to oversee the installation and operation of the SA-5 batteries, none was reported injured in the exchanges. A total of five attacks was carried out on Libyan ships. The most serious loss for the Libyans was one of the eight Soviet-supplied Nanuchka-class missile corvettes in an attack by two A-6s shortly after midnight on March 26. The Libyan missile patrol boat equipped with surface-to-surface missiles came within missile range of US ships on the high seas well away from the Libyan coast. The U.S. commander determined, in light of the Libyan attacks on U.S. aircraft, that this vessel was hostile and therefore ordered U.S. aircraft to engage it. At approximately 2:00 p.m. (EST), U.S. Navy A-6 aircraft fired two Harpoon missiles, which struck and heavily damaged the Libyan vessel. At approximately 4:30 p.m. (EST), a second Libyan patrol boat approached U.S. forces, and was driven off by U.S. Navy aircraft. Shortly after 6:00 p.m. (EST), a third Libyan patrol craft approached the USS YORKTOWN at a high rate of speed; the YORKTOWN fired two Harpoon missiles, which hit the Libyan craft. At the same time, a Frenchbuilt Combattante-class missile attack craft was destroyed when it approached United States Navy ships protecting the aircraft carriers. Shortly after 12:20 a.m. (EST) on March 25, U.S. Navy A-6 aircraft armed with Harpoon missiles attacked another Libyan craft, apparently resulting in the sinking of that vessel. All U.S. aircraft returned safely to their carriers, and no casualties or damage were suffered by U.S. forces. The extent of Libyan casualties is not known.

1986 Operation El Dorado Canyon On April 5, 1986, a bomb exploded in a discotheque in Berlin frequented by United States service personnel. Of the 200 injured, 63 were American soldiers; one soldier and one civilian were killed. On the late evening of 15 April and early morning of 16 April 1986, under the code name El Dorado Canyon, the United States launched a series of military air strikes against ground targets inside Libya. The timing of the attack was such that while some of the strike aircraft were still in the air, President Reagan was able to address the US public and much of the world. He emphasized that this action was a matter of US self defense against Libya’s state-sponsored terrorism. In part, he stated, "Self defense is not only our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose behind the mission...a mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter." The use of force was specifically prompted by what the President claimed was "irrefutable proof" that Libya had directed the terrorist bombing of a West Berlin discotheque nine days earlier which had killed one American and injured 200 others. The impetus for the President’s decision to authorize the raid was the American intelligence interception of a message from Gadaffi ordering an attack on Americans "to cause maximum and indiscriminate casualties." Another communications source, an intercepted Libyan message outlined the attack being planned in West Berlin. The raid was designed to hit directly at the heart of Gaddafi’s ability to export terrorism with the belief that such a preemptive strike would provide him "incentives and reasons to alter his criminal behavior." The final targets of the raid were selected at the National Security Council level "within the circle of the President’s advisors." Ultimately, five targets were endorsed by the JCS and Secretary of Defense and approved by President Reagan:








Aziziyah [Tarabulas] Barracks in Tripoli, which was described as the command and control headquarters for Libyan terrorism. Jamahiriyah Guard Barracks / Benghazi Military Barracks in Benghazi, which were described as another terrorist command post. Like Aziziyah Barracks, it was a billeting area for Gadhafi’s elite Jamahiriyah Guard. It also contained a warehouse for storage of MiG components. Murrat Side Bilal base, which administration officials said was used to train terrorists in underwater sabotage. This combat swimmer and naval commando school, in the Tripoli area, was where PLO and other terrorist organization frogmen were trained. military facilities at Tripoli’s main airport. IL-76 Candid transports used to support Gadhafi’s export of terrorism were the primary targets. Benina Military Airfield southeast of Benghazi. Although not directly related to terrorism, Benina Military Airfield was selected for attack to ensure that its MiG fighters would not intercept or pursue US strike forces. All except one of these targets were chosen because of their direct connection to terrorist activity. The single exception was the Benina military airfield which based Libyan fighter aircraft. This target was hit to preempt Libyan interceptors from taking off and attacking the incoming US bombers. It should also be noted that the French Embassy in Tripoli and several of the neighboring residential buildings also were bombed inadvertently during the raid; they were not targeted. Mission planners decided, as part of the effort to attain tactical surprise, to hit all five targets simultaneously. This decision had crucial impact on nearly every aspect of the operation since it meant that the available US Navy resources could not perform the mission unilaterally. The only two types of aircraft in the US inventory capable of conducting a precision night attack were the Navy’s A-6s and the Air Force’s F-111s. The Navy had two aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean at the time planning for the raid: The America and The Coral Sea. Each had ten A-6 aircraft, but these were not the total of 32 aircraft estimated as required to successfully hit all five targets with one raid. The closest F-111s were based in the United Kingdom (UK); and use of these UK based aircraft dramatically affected the scope and complexity of the operation. Planning was even further compounded when the French refused to grant authority to overfly France. This refusal increased the distance of the flight route from Great Britain to Tripoli by about 1300 nautical

21

miles each way, added 6-7 hours of flight time for the pilots and crews, and forced a tremendous amount of additional refueling support from tanker aircraft. Concurrent with target selection, the nature and size of the strike force were considered. Concern for collateral casualties and risk to US personnel, a certain desired weight of attack, coupled with availability of assets, quickly narrowed the field to a strike by tactical aircraftT . Mission forces are seldom selected on the basis of a single factor, such as accuracy, but on myriad political and military considerations. Tactical air offered the ability to place the greatest weight of ordnance on the targets in the least amount of time while minimizing collateral damage and providing the greatest opportunity for survival of the entire force. The size of the strike force’s final configuration was immense and complex. Approximately 100 aircraft were launched in direct support of the raid:

Air Force 28 KC-10 and KC-135 tankers 5 EF-111 Raven ECM (Electronic Countermeasure) aircraft 24 FB-111 Strike aircraft (six of these were airborne spares, and returned to base after the initial refueling)

Navy 14 A-6E strike aircraft 12 A-7E and F/A-18 Electronic warfare and jamming aircraft which undertook air defense suppression for the mission Several F-14 Tomcats which took up the long range Combat Air Patrol (CAP) responsibilities 4 E-2C Hawkeye airborne command and control and warning aircraft In addition to the above, several helicopters were deployed for possible search and rescue operations, and "50-80 more aircraft were airborne in the vicinity of the carriers some 150-200 miles off shore." In fact, the total size of the force was criticized as excessive from various sources. All combined, the whole operation involved (to some degree) "more aircraft and combat ships than Britain employed during its entire campaign in the Falklands." The 66th Electronic Combat Wing detached the 42nd ECS to the 20th TFW to take part in Eldorado Canyon the raid on Libya. On 14 April 1986, 5 EF111As and 20 F-111Es took off from RAF Upper Heyford as part of the attack force. They were used as an airborne reserve for the F-111Fs of the 48th TFW, RAF Lakenheath. Three EF-111s (two were spares and turned back) formed up with the 48th's F-111Fs and provided electronic defense during the attack on Tripoli. USAFE initiated the Project Power Hunter intelligence network in December 1987. The wing first tested the Durandal runway-buster bombs during Exercise Red Flag, in January and February 1988. During the evening of 14 April, 28 Eighth Air Force KC-135s and KC10s left the Royal Air Force (RAF) bases at Fairford and Mildenhall, England, to meet up with 24 F-111s from RAF Lakenheath. For this mission to Libya, the Eighth Air Force's tankers refueled the strike force four times under conditions of radio silence. On their return, the F-111s needed two more refuelings to get back to England. The mission took 14 hours to cover 5,500 miles nautical miles because France and Spain would not allow the formation to fly over their territory. Eighth Air Force's refueling support made the longest mission ever accomplished by tactical aircraft a success. The first aircraft to launch were the 28 tankers from Britain followed closely by the F/EF-111s. Four refuelings and several hours later, these planes rounded the tip of Tunisia and were integrated into the Navy’s airborne armada by an Air Force officer aboard a KC-10 tanker which had been modified to function also as an airborne command coordination center. Although joint in nature, the actual execution of the strike was operationally and geographically divided between the Navy and Air Force. Navy A-6s were assigned the target in the Benghazi area, and the Air Force F-111s hit the other three targets in the vicinity of Tripoli. This division of responsibility was done largely to simplify and deconflict command and control of the operational aspects of the raid. The modified KC-10 tanker was given charge of the Air Force resources while the carrier America controlled the Navy aircraft. The airborne E-2C Hawkeyes provided early warning, air control vectors, and operations. The actual combat commenced at 0200 (local Libyan time), lasted less than 12 minutes, and dropped 60 tons of munitions. Resistance outside the immediate area of attack was nonexistent, and Libyan air defense aircraft never launched. One FB-111 strike aircraft was lost during the strike. The entire armada remained in the vicinity for over an hour trying to account for all aircraft.

Benina airfield BDA, April 1986

Benina airfield BDA, April 1986

Although retaliation for the Berlin bombing had been anticipated, Libyan air defenses seemed almost wholly unprepared for the attack. In fact, it was reported that antiaircraft fire had not begun until after the American planes had passed over their targets at Tripoli. Libya's formidable air-defense system (manned by 3,000 Soviet air-defense technicians) was completely overwhelmed by precise Navy suppression strikes. It was reported that some Libyan soldiers abandoned their

22

posts in fright and confusion and officers were slow to give orders. Also, Libyans fighters failed to get airborne to challenge the attacking bombers.

Saif Qadhafi The Gaddafi International Foundation for Charity Associations, is headed by Engineer Saif al Islam Muammar al Gaddafi, the elder son of Colonel Gaddafi. The charity has played a significant and beneficial role overseas and has conducted negotiations and ransom payments for the release of numerous western hostages in Africa and in South East Asia, notably in the Philippines and Algeria. But GIFCA has not specified how many deaths there have been in Libyan prisons nor what has been done to ensure that such does not occur again. GIFCA is the agency that has funded the US$ millions compensation money for the families of the Lockerbie and UTA bombing victims, money which, it was claimed, did not originate from the coffers of the Libyan public or government. For several years there has been speculation that Gaddafi might be preparing his eldest son, Seif al-Islam, to succeed him as "Guide of the Revolution." The rumours grew after reports Gaddafi had charged his son with some diplomatic missions to Arab countries on his behalf. Seif al-Islam (Sword of Islam), born in 1971, graduated in 1993 from Tripoli's al-Fateh University where he studied urban engineering. He is officially head of the National Consultancy in charge of drawing out plans for state projects. He also chairs the National Anti-drug Association of Libya. On 19 December 2003 Libya agreed to destroy all of its chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. The surprise announcement followed nine months of secret talks between Libyan, American, and British officials. Libya agreed to allow for immediate inspections and monitoring, and to eliminate ballistic missiles traveling more than 300 kilometers with a 500 kilogram payload. Shahram Chubin, director of studies at the Geneva Center for Security Policy, believes Gaddafi is paving the way for a secure succession for his son. "I think that Libya -- and in particular its leadership -- are getting ready for succession. They must have recognized that it makes sense to bring Libya back into the fold of the international community, and to do that they'd have to dispense with these [weapons] programs that they've been having for many, many years, which clearly serve no rational purpose. And I think it's a recognition by Gadhafi that he wants to let his son succeed him and to leave Libya in a slightly better position if he gets rid of these useless weapons, which have created unnecessary distrust and suspicion on the part of its neighbors and, of course, the international community as a whole, including Britain and the United States," Chubin said. [ SOURCE ] From © Globalsecurity

U*DP Lybia The United Nations (UN) has enjoyed a long and fruitful relationship with Libya. In 1950 the UN began setting up the mechanisms for an independent government in the country and when Libya first declared its independence in December 1951, it became the first nation to achieve sovereignty through the United Nations. A UN mission has been present in the country ever since. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was first established in Libya in 1972. The UNDP is the UN’s global development network. It is on the ground in 166 countries, working with them on their own solutions to global and national development challenges. As they develop local capacity, they draw on the people of UNDP and their wide range of partners. The terms for UNDP and the Libyan Government’s enduring partnership were initially established through a Standard Framework Agreement, signed in 1972, covering agriculture, industry, transport, manpower training and planning. Since then, UNDP Libya has worked relentlessly to support the country’s social and economic development. Even during the difficult period of international sanctions in the 1980’s and 1990’s, UNDP Libya retained an active presence in the country. It collaborated with the government in its Great Man Made River Project, a highly successful programme to eradicate screw-worm from the country’s animal resources, and a host of other development projects. The current climate of economic, political and social revitalisation in Libya has provided UNDP Libya with an excellent opportunity to enhance its commitment to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the Jamahiriya. As part of the largest development agency in the world, UNDP Libya endeavours to bring its global experience to the doorstep of Libyan policy makers at all levels. UNDP Libya focuses on the following five practice areas: Democratic Governance Poverty Reduction Environment and Energy Crisis Prevention and Recovery HIV/AIDS In all of UNDP Libya’s activities it encourages the protection of human rights and the empowerment of women. In recent years, UNDP Libya has received international acclaim for its role in restoring the city of Ghadames, a UNESCO world heritage sight. It has worked to upgrade the Orthopaedic Workshop and Rehabilitation Centre for the Disabled in Benghazi, a facility now compatible with international standards. In co-operation with WMO, it has ensured that Libya’s Meteorological Centre now delivers one of the highest levels of service in the region. Its longstanding partnership with the local National Education Authority and UNESCO has seen the establishment of numerous secondary schools and Higher Institutes of Vocational Training, specialised in subjects as diverse as economics, engineering, marine technology and clothes design. Nevertheless, UNDP remains dedicated to extending its network of partnerships and furthering its efforts to chart a specifically Libyan path to future development that other countries in the region, and indeed across the globe, can follow. From © Globalsecurity

23

II. ARMED FORCES Defense Ministry (from Globalsecurity) p. 25 Origins of the Modern Libyan Armed Forces (from country-data) p. 26 The military leadership (from country-data) p. 27 International military concerns and objectives 1987 (from country-data) p. 28 Manpower 1987 (from country-data) p. 30 Defense costs 1987 (from country-data) p. 32 Foreign military assistance 1987 (from country-data) p. 33 Arms production and military cooperation 1987 (from country-data) p. 34 International terrorism and support for insurgencies (from country-data) p. 35 Army (country-data 1987, globalsecurity 2002, Wikipedia 2009) p. 36 *avy (country-data 1987, globalsecurity 2002, Wikipedia 2009) p.41 Air Force (country-data 1987, globalsecurity 2002, Wikipedia 2009) p. 43

24

Defence Ministry From © Globalsecurity

The annual session of the People's General Congress [Libya's parliament] at Sirta between July 1-4, 1995, voted to maintain Col. Abubaker Jaber Younes in his post as defence minister and armed forces commander-in-chief. The confirmation seemed purely formal, because the Defence Ministry ceased to exist in 1991. By 2000 the General People's Congress, the highest legislative and executive body in Libya, approved a sweeping overhaul of the government, replacing the prime minister and foreign minister and scrapping 12 ministries. The five ministries remaining at central level - foreign affairs, African Unity, finance, information, justice and public order-- might also be abolished at a later date. Before the coup that brought Colonel Muammar al Qadhafi to power in 1969, Libyan national security clearly meant protection of the reign of King Idris and of the national development goals his regime had adopted. Insurance against potential external threats was sought through various compacts with Western powers-- principally the Libyan-United Kingdom Treaty of Friendship of 1953, which granted the British continued use of their World War II Al Adem (Al Adam) Air Base near Tobruk (Tubruq). A similar treaty in 1954 perpetuated use of Wheelus Air Base, near Tripoli, by the United States Air Force. Meanwhile, the monarchy devoted its own resources to the business of warding off domestic threats-largely arising from its faction-ridden army. After Idris was deposed, Qadhafi insisted on the early termination of the treaties that gave Britain and the United States permission to maintain forces on Libyan soil. The country's energies were turned to the cause of pan-Arabism and to supporting fellow Arab countries in their conflict with Israel. The armed forces were doubled in size but, until 1973, the expansion was grounded on a reasonable balance that took into account the country's available resources and the fact that its neighbors were neither aggressive nor naturally hostile. Qadhafi became frustrated over Egypt's failure to consult with Libya in prosecuting the 1973 war against Israel and the fading of his pan-Arabist ambitions in the failure of the unions concluded with Egypt and Syria and later Tunisia. New revenues derived from the escalating price of oil were now available, and the Soviet Union was prepared to supply arms that Western powers had vetoed. For Moscow, the appeal was, first, the commercial one of a cash customer and, second, the potential of Libya as a new client state in the Mediterranean area, following the Soviet 1972 expulsion from Egypt. Only gradually did the extent of Qadhafi's arms appetite become apparent. To Libya's existing fleet of Mirage aircraft from France, large numbers of Soviet fighters were added, including the up-to- date MiG-25. Although Libya had only 7 percent of the population of France, Libya's inventory of over 500 combat aircraft was roughly equivalent to that of France. A force of 3,000 tanks was purchased, although only one-third could be deployed with active units. Its hitherto inconsequential navy was outfitted with submarines and high-speed missile boats. Because voluntary enlistments were wholly inadequate to man the new equipment, conscription was introduced in 1978. Because the inflated arsenal could not be justified by any perceived threat to the nation's borders, there was initial speculation that Libya was becoming a Soviet surrogate in Africa, stockpiling modern weapons for future adventures on that continent. This notion, however, was contradicted by Libya's evident determination to employ its newly purchased arms as it saw fit. Its alignment with Moscow, although based on parallel interests, was a limited one that did not extend to Soviet bases on Libyan soil. In the decade between 1973 and 1983, arms acquisitions amounted to US$28 billion, of which US$20 billion worth had originated with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. But the quantity and sophistication of the new weaponry outstripped the ability of the limited skilled personnel to employ it. In spite of a multitude of foreign technical advisers and trainers, a shortage of qualified personnel needed to operate and maintain the military hardware persisted. Moreover, the wide range of models and countries of manufacture has created logistics and maintenance problems. The Libyan armed forces have not, in fact, thus far played a significant role in Qadhafi's declared objective of the destruction of Israel by united Arab might because Libya's direct involvement in the Arab-Israeli wars has been negligible. Nonetheless, Qadhafi often has been a divisive element in the Middle East. Libya's acknowledged sponsorship of terrorism for the purpose of "liquidating" exiled opponents of the regime and of punishing moderate Arabs and others regarded as opposing the primary purpose of defeating Israel has brought it into conflict with the West and particularly the United States. Hostile encounters with United States military, especially the American retaliatory bombing attack of 1986, demonstrated serious weaknesses in Libya's threat perception and defense posture. The incidents, however, caused many African and Middle Eastern countries briefly to band together in public support of Libya and in condemnation of the United States. In little more than a decade, Qadhafi effected a transformation of Libya into a militarized nation. The armed forces were rapidly expanded, acquiring greatly enhanced firepower and mobility. The able-bodied civilian population was formed in

25

well-equipped militia units. Libya's new military establishment and arsenal have enabled Qadhafi to project his radical vision and ambitions beyond the country's borders. In spite of frequently irrational and inconsistent behavior, he has advanced Libya to the forefront of politics in North Africa and thrown its weight against peaceful settlement in the Middle East. As affirmed by Qadhafi's public statements, his primary purpose in the Libyan arms buildup is destruction of Israel. The armed forces, however, have not been shaped to confront Israel directly nor has Qadhafi been eager to commit Libya to battle with Israel in alliance with other Arab powers. To a limited extent, he has used his arms inventory as a stockpile, supplying weapons selectively to those countries and groups most opposed to Israel's existence. His rhetoric has been devoted to appeals to develop a combined Arab and Islamic force strong enough to wage a successful "holy war" against Israel. In 1987 most observers doubted that either the Libyans or the Soviets viewed the stored Soviet equipment as an arms depot prepositioned for eventual use by Soviet forces in action in North Africa. The matériel has been purchased outright by Libya at a considerable sacrifice to the country's economy. In spite of large numbers of Soviet advisers and support personnel, the unused equipment reportedly has not been maintained in an adequate state of readiness to be employed at short notice. Anticipated use by the Soviet forces presupposes close cooperation and approval by Qadhafi of Soviet operations in North Africa, but other evidence suggested that he was far from willing to agree to a more active Soviet role in the area. The traditional mission of Libyan armed forces has been to protect Libya's territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Normally, the limited capability of neighboring states to threaten Libya's borders would not justify a primed and powerful defense arm. Qadhafi, however, has inflamed relations with all of his neighbors on one or more occasions. In the late 1980s, the military remained ready for possible open conflict with Egypt, whose moderate policy toward Israel Qadhafi viewed as a provocation. Libya's buildup of naval and air strength helped to protect the country's exposed Mediterranean coastline against attack and gave Qadhafi a tangible means for enforcing Libya's claim to the Gulf of Sidra and its natural resources as Libyan territorial waters. Moreover, submarines and fast-attack craft with missiles gave Libya a potential striking power that even major naval forces in the Mediterranean were forced to heed. Libya's arms buildup and demonstrated mobility provided the indispensable underpinning to Qadhafi's efforts to play a leading role in African politics by extending his influence, particularly to the Sahelian nations to the south. Libyan involvement has taken the form of subversion, military assistance, and direct military intervention aimed at winning other countries to support Qadhafi's radical policies or supplanting existing governments with others more amenable to him. Libya's efforts to dominate the Sahel presented a more imminent threat because of the military weakness, poverty, and unstable government in the area. In addition, territorial claims have been advanced against Chad, Niger, and Algeria.

Military of Libya From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Founded

1951

Headquarters

Tripoli

Chief of staff

Colonel Abu-Bakr Yunis Jaber

Conscription

18 months

Active personnel Reserve personnel Deployed personnel Foreign suppliers

76,000 (Ranked 53) 45,000 200

Central African Republic Russia

China

The Military of Libya consists of the Libyan Army, Libyan Air Force and Libyan Navy the with other services which include the People's Militia, also the total number of Libyan personnel is estimated at 119,000. Colonel Abu-Bakr Yunis Jaber is the chief of the staff of the military.

26

ORIGI*S OF THE MODER* LIBYA* ARMED FORCES From www.country-data.com The roots of the contemporary Libyan army can be traced to the Libyan Arab Force (popularly known as the Sanusi Army) of World War II. Shortly after Italy entered the war, a number of Libyan leaders living in exile in Egypt called on their compatriots to organize themselves into military units and join the British in the war against the Axis powers. Five battalions, which were initially designed for guerrilla warfare in the Jabal al Akhdar region of Cyrenaica, were established under British command. Because the high mobility of the desert campaigns required a considerable degree of technical and mechanical expertise, the Libyan forces were used primarily as auxiliaries, guarding military installations and prisoners. One battalion, however, participated in the fighting at Tobruk. After Britain succeeded in occupying the Libyan territories, the need for the British-trained and -equipped Sanusi troops appeared to be over. The Sanusi Army was reluctant to disband, however, and the majority of its members arranged to be transferred to the local police force in Cyrenaica under the British military administration. When Libya gained its independence in 1951, veterans of the original Sanusi Army formed the nucleus of the Royal Libyan Army. Until the discovery and exploitation of oil, beginning in the late 1950s, Libya was one of the poorest countries in the world. Limited available natural resources and a small population provided little basis for viable defensive strength, and the new state was militarily insignificant during its early years. King Idris deliberately divided the security forces into a regular army and a variety of armed police forces. The primary mission of the armed police was to counterbalance dissidents within the faction-torn armed forces and thus preclude a coup against the monarchy. With substantial British assistance, the army was slowly enlarged, and by September 1969 its strength was estimated at roughly 6,500--about half the size of the armed police. The police forces, composed mainly of conservative tribal elements that the king considered more reliable than the regular army, were extremely diverse. They ranged from several lightly armed territorial forces to the mobile National Security Force, which was equipped with helicopters and armored cars. Units of the prestigious Cyrenaican Defense Force, assisted and advised by British military specialists, were garrisoned at several places in Cyrenaica. The small naval and air components were not developed until later. The air force was formed in August 1963, and the navy was established in November 1962. Consisting initially of only a few aircraft and two pilots, by 1967 the air force had increased to about 250 American-trained personnel and a few jet trainers and piston-engine transports. After the June 1967 War, demand for more sophisticated aircraft resulted in the purchase of ten American F-5 fighter-bombers in 1968 and 1969. Throughout this early period, the British were influential in the development of the Libyan navy, which, however, grew extremely slowly and even by the time of Qadhafi's coup in 1969 consisted of just over 200 men. Partly because of the limited resources in trained personnel locally and partly because the monarchy was suspicious of the professional military, the idea of purchasing a sophisticated air defense missile system and training a few specialists in its operation gained popularity among the king's nonmilitary advisers. In 1968 the government entered into a contract with Britain for the installation of an air defense system to be delivered over five years at a cost of almost US$300 million. Under the contract, the British agreed to supply a complex antiaircraft missile system and radar detection and control equipment and to train Libyans to operate them. The high priority assigned to this project and the unprecedented expense involved were reflected in an accompanying decision to postpone the introduction of the monarchy's second five-year development plan until April 1969. Idris, however was unwilling to disrupt the balance between the army and the police by providing the military element with tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers, recognizing that such equipment could be employed against his regime as easily as against a hostile external force. Ironically, when Qadhafi and his Free Officers Movement mounted their overthrow of the monarchy, the ostensibly reliable police did not interfere. Assuming power after the 1969 coup, the new Qadhafi regime integrated major elements of the police into the army. Although he cancelled the British air defense project, Qadhafi began to build up the country's military strength through large equipment purchases from foreign suppliers. In 1970 the government contracted to buy 110 Mirage jet fighters from France. Thereafter, the air force grew rapidly and became an important component of the armed forces. Similar purchases provided tanks and artillery for the army and vessels for the navy. Within a year after the coup, the size of the military establishment was estimated at about 22,000 men--over three times the figure immediately before the coup. Although this increase followed a major recruitment effort, it was primarily the result of the merger of the regular army with most of the former National Security Force and the Cyrenaican Defense Force, which between them had comprised about 14,000 troops. In 1971 the government announced the creation of the Popular Resistance Force, a militia that was under the operational control of the chief of staff of the Libyan armed forces. Initially, the primary mission of the force was to guard government buildings, oil installations, and other important facilities in the event of war or internal disorders. Less than a year after the 1969 coup, Qadhafi and his fellow Free Officers assumed control of British and United States bases in Libya and began to sever military supply links with those countries. France, politically less objectionable to Qadhafi, became the leading source of arms but, in 1974, Libya reached agreement with the Soviet Union for the purchase of equipment on a scale well in excess of France's production capacity, even if France had not been deterred by Qadhafi's increasingly radical and irrational behavior. Tremendous quantities of modern Soviet armaments were delivered beginning in 1975, and the flow was continuing in 1987. In spite of the fact that thousands of advisers from the Soviet Union and other communist countries helped with manning, maintenance, and training in the use of the new equipment, the sheer quantity overwhelmed the ability of the Libyan armed forces to introduce it into operational units. Prodigious importation of new weapons systems was accompanied by a rapid buildup of manpower. When voluntary enlistments proved inadequate, the government invoked a conscription law calling for three to four years service for all males between the ages of seventeen and thirty-five. Consequently, the armed forces more than doubled in strength between 1974, when the first arms agreement with the Soviet Union was concluded, and 1986, when the total manpower of the three services was estimated at over 90,000. In addition to creating the most highly mechanized army among the Arab nations, by the late 1980s Qadhafi had procured a fleet of submarines, corvettes, and missile boats that constituted a significant new naval force in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union had also supplied Libya with modern fighter aircraft, a bomber and transport force, and a sophisticated air defense system.

27

THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP From www.country-data.com The group of junior officers who seized power in 1969 wanted to introduce a radical form of Arab and Islamic socialism. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) of Qadhafi and eleven other officers assumed formal responsibility for drawing up general policies. The initial civilian cabinet was frustrated by the RCC's insistence on reviewing all of its decisions. After its resignation, a new cabinet in January 1970 had Qadhafi as prime minister, Major Abdul Salam Jallud as deputy prime minister, and other RCC members in key ministerial positions. Although the RCC always spoke with one voice and Qadhafi and his associates generally succeeded in instilling a spirit of unity and discipline among the military, there was internal dissent. Differences came into the open in 1975 because of disagreement over the priority being given to armament purchases over domestic social needs in the use of oil revenues. As a result, the minister of planning was dismissed, and others left their posts. By late 1975, only five of the original twelve members were still serving on the RCC. Officially phased out in 1977, the RCC was succeeded by the General Secretariat of the General People's Congress (GPC). At first this new policy-setting body was little more than the RCC under a new name. In the reorganization of 1979, however, when Qadhafi relinquished his position as secretary general, Jallud was replaced by a civilian as deputy secretary general and the other three military members of the General Secretariat were likewise replaced by civilians. They continued to serve as senior policy advisers to Qadhafi, although their public role was curtailed. In 1987, the most senior positions of the military hierarchy were held by members of the original RCC. Qadhafi retained the title of supreme commander of the armed forces. General Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir was commander in chief of the armed forces. Major Khuwayldi al Hamidi was chief of the general staff and headed the People's Militia or People's Army (formerly the Popular Resistance Force.) Colonel (formerly General) Mustafa al Kharrubi was inspector general of the armed forces and commandant of the navy and air force. Major Jallud held no military position, but he headed the revolutionary committees and was acknowledged to be Qadhafi's second in command. In the course of the post-coup reorganization of the military into a single unified command, the RCC retired or fired--for political reasons-the entire leadership of generals and colonels along with a number of officers of lesser rank identified with the Idris regime. Qadhafi and the other RCC members maintained that the former military leaders had been involved extensively in various forms of corruption, particularly in arms-procurement contracts. In addition, the former high command had been largely in agreement with the monarchy's position on such issues as the continued presence of British and United States military bases on Libyan territory and the country's rather limited involvement in the ArabIsraeli disputes. The former military leadership was also believed to have tolerated and in many instances to have profited personally from a recruitment and promotion system that awarded high posts to individual tribal leaders and members of influential families. Senior officers were chosen not on the basis of military qualities or experience, but rather because of personal loyalty or political favors provided to King Idris or in recognition of their political and religious conservatism. These factors, which had brought the senior officers their initial commissions and subsequent promotions, caused much of the low morale among junior officers and contributed to the eventual overthrow of the monarchy. Unlike the former military leaders, many of whom were from the middle and upper classes, and by virtue of their social status could just as easily have chosen higher education or the bureaucracy as routes to advancement, most of the RCC officers were from the lower strata of society. For them, the most logical source of upward mobility under the monarchy had been the military. Of the original RCC members, most of whom were in their mid-twenties at the time of the 1969 uprising, approximately half were from tribal or peasant backgrounds. They reflected the country's three traditional geographic divisions, with roughly one-third coming from each of the major regions-Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan. In political outlook, the military leadership that rose to power after 1969 has been described as both soldier-revolutionary and ardent pan-Arabist. In published interviews, the senior officers, particularly Qadhafi, recalled that their identification with the goal of regional Arab unity and the adoption of a more militant posture toward Israel dated from their secondary school years, when their hero was Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser. The new military leaders frequently emphasized their passionate commitment to the moral tenets of Islam and to their own concept of Islamic socialism. Qadhafi and the other senior military figures became the dominant influence group in the country, representing both the modernizing and the traditional aspects of national life. On the one hand, they have been committed to modernization, reflected in their acquiring technical military equipment and sophisticated weaponry and training personnel to operate and maintain it. Commitment to modernization also was demonstrated by their continuing emphasis on improving the literacy rate and on the development of technical skills and training. On the other hand, many of the top officers, including Qadhafi, have remained proud of their desert backgrounds, their religious convictions, their social relationships, and their traditional belief in the overall primacy of Arab and Islamic attitudes and values. One important exception to emphasis on traditional values has been Qadhafi's desire for a role for women in the armed forces, a proposal that was rejected by the normally obedient GPC. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1986-87, London, 1987, 102-04.

28

I*TER*ATIO*AL MILITARY CO*CER*S A*D OBJECTIVES From www.country-data.com

Libyan Security Concerns In little more than a decade, Qadhafi effected a transformation of Libya into a militarized nation. The armed forces were rapidly expanded, acquiring greatly enhanced firepower and mobility. The able-bodied civilian population was formed in well-equipped militia units. Libya's new military establishment and arsenal have enabled Qadhafi to project his radical vision and ambitions beyond the country's borders. In spite of frequently irrational and inconsistent behavior, he has advanced Libya to the forefront of politics in North Africa and thrown its weight against peaceful settlement in the Middle East. As affirmed by Qadhafi's public statements, his primary purpose in the Libyan arms buildup is destruction of Israel. The armed forces, however, have not been shaped to confront Israel directly nor has Qadhafi been eager to commit Libya to battle with Israel in alliance with other Arab powers. To a limited extent, he has used his arms inventory as a stockpile, supplying weapons selectively to those countries and groups most opposed to Israel's existence. His rhetoric has been devoted to appeals to develop a combined Arab and Islamic force strong enough to wage a successful "holy war" against Israel. In 1987 most observers doubted that either the Libyans or the Soviets viewed the stored Soviet equipment as an arms depot prepositioned for eventual use by Soviet forces in action in North Africa. The matériel has been purchased outright by Libya at a considerable sacrifice to the country's economy. In spite of large numbers of Soviet advisers and support personnel, the unused equipment reportedly has not been maintained in an adequate state of readiness to be employed at short notice. Anticipated use by the Soviet forces presupposes close cooperation and approval by Qadhafi of Soviet operations in North Africa, but other evidence suggested that he was far from willing to agree to a more active Soviet role in the area. The traditional mission of Libyan armed forces has been to protect Libya's territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Normally, the limited capability of neighboring states to threaten Libya's borders would not justify a primed and powerful defense arm (see fig. 12). Qadhafi, however, has inflamed relations with all of his neighbors on one or more occasions. In the late 1980s, the military remained ready for possible open conflict with Egypt, whose moderate policy toward Israel Qadhafi viewed as a provocation. Libya's buildup of naval and air strength helped to protect the country's exposed Mediterranean coastline against attack and gave Qadhafi a tangible means for enforcing Libya's claim to the Gulf of Sidra and its natural resources as Libyan territorial waters. Moreover, submarines and fast-attack craft with missiles gave Libya a potential striking power that even major naval forces in the Mediterranean were forced to heed. Libya's arms buildup and demonstrated mobility provided the indispensable underpinning to Qadhafi's efforts to play a leading role in African politics by extending his influence, particularly to the Sahelian nations to the south. Libyan involvement has taken the form of subversion, military assistance, and direct military intervention aimed at winning other countries to support Qadhafi's radical policies or supplanting existing governments with others more amenable to him. Libya's efforts to dominate the Sahel presented a more imminent threat because of the military weakness, poverty, and unstable government in the area. In addition, territorial claims have been advanced against Chad, Niger, and Algeria.

Performance in Combat Although never tested in large-scale actions, the Libyan armed forces have been involved in low-level hostilities on a number of occasions. A sharp series of border clashes occurred with Egypt in 1977, and Libyan forces were flown into Uganda in 1978 in an unsuccessful effort to defend the regime of Idi Amin Dada against invading Tanzanian forces. In addition, the Libyans have conducted a series of campaigns in northern Chad since 1980. In brief engagements in 1981 and 1986, they proved to be outmatched against United States air power. The cause of the hostilities between Egypt and Libya was never clearly established, although the attacks were probably initiated by Egypt as punishment for Libyan interference and a warning against the Soviet-backed arms buildup. After border violations alleged by both sides, fighting escalated on July 19, 1977, with an artillery duel, and, two days later, a drive along the coast by Egyptian armor and infantry during which the Libyan army was engaged. Egypt claimed successful surprise air strikes against the Libyan air base at Al Adem (Gamal Abdul Nasser Air Base) just south of Tobruk, destroying aircraft on the ground; surface-to-air missile batteries and radar stations were also knocked out. When the Egyptians withdrew on July 24, most foreign analysts agreed that the Egyptian units had prevailed, although Libyan forces reacted better than had been expected. The Qadhafi regime nevertheless hailed the encounter as a victory, citing the clash as justification for further purchases of modern armaments. In the case of Uganda, Qadhafi had befriended the despotic ruler Idi Amin as a fellow Muslim and potential ally of the Arab cause in Africa. Libya had intervened on Amin's behalf during his first confrontation with neighboring Tanzania in 1972 by airlifting a contingent of four hundred troops into the country. During the invasion of Uganda by Tanzanian troops and Ugandan exiles in 1978, a new Libyan force estimated at 2,000 to 2,500 was sent, assisting in the defense of Entebbe and the capital of Kampala by covering road junctions with armored equipment. Inexperienced, undisciplined, and in unfamiliar forested terrain, the Libyan troops were quickly routed in attacks by foot soldiers. As many as 600 Libyans were estimated to have been killed during the Ugandan operation, and the defeated remainder were hurriedly withdrawn. The troops reputedly were led to believe they were being airlifted into Uganda for training exercises with Ugandan units. They were totally unprepared for actual combat and, having little motivation to fight, often tried to flee.

Invasion of Chad Libya's involvement in Chad dates to the early 1970s, when Qadhafi began supporting the antigovernment rebels of the Front for the National Liberation of Chad (FROLINAT). Libyan intervention has resulted in de facto control over the northern part of the country and three phases of open hostilities--in 1980-81, 1983, and late 1986--when incursions were launched to the south of Chad. During

29

the first two phases, the Libyan units acquitted themselves more professionally than in their previous encounters with Egypt and in Uganda. In mounting the 1980 incursion, they successfully traversed hundreds of miles of desert tracks with armored vehicles and carried out air operations under harsh climatic conditions. They also gained valuable experience in logistics and maintenance of modern military forces over lengthy supply lines. Libya's 1980 intervention in Chad was on behalf of President Goukouni Oueddei against the French-backed forces of Hissein Habré, who at the time also enjoyed Libyan support. Qadhafi's actions were portrayed as support for the Chadian northern groups of Islamic, and to some extent Arab, culture, but his objective was the creation of a Libyan sphere of influence in Chad. Even before 1980, Libyan forces had moved freely in northern areas of the country, operating from the 100-kilometer-wide Aouzou strip (see Glossary), which Libya had occupied by 1973 (see fig. 13). In June 1980, an offensive by Habre's forces resulted in the capture of Faya Largeau, the key center of northern Chad. Beginning in October of that year, Libyan troops airlifted to the Aouzou strip operated in conjunction with Goukouni's forces to drive Habré back. Faya Largeau was then used as an assembly point for tanks, artillery, and armored vehicles that moved south against the capital of N'Djamena. An attack spearheaded by Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks, and reportedly coordinated by advisers from the Soviet Union and The German Democratic Republic, brought the fall of the capital in midDecember . The Libyan force, numbering between 7,000 and 9,000 men of regular units and the paramilitary Islamic Pan-African Legion, 60 tanks, and other armored vehicles, had been ferried across 1,100 kilometers of desert from Libya's southern border, partly by airlift and tank transporters and partly under their own power. The border itself was 1,000 to 1,100 kilometers from Libya's main bases on the Mediterranean coast. Under increasingly insistent pressure from other African countries and from political factions in Chad, the Libyans withdrew in November 1981. Upon their return to Libya, Qadhafi announced that his troops had killed over 3,000 of the "enemy" while losing 300 themselves; other estimates of Libyan casualties were considerable higher. Without military support from Libya, Goukouni's forces were unable to stop the advance of Habré's Armed Forces of the North (FAN), which overran the capital in June 1982. The second Libyan intervention in favor of Goukouni occurred between June and August 1983, with the distinction that Goukouni was now the head of a rebel faction against the legally constituted government of Habré. To make the 1983 phase of the Chadian war appear purely indigenous, the Libyans recruited, trained, and armed Chadian dissidents under Goukouni's nominal command. Supplemented by heavy artillery, the insurgents began well but were soundly defeated in July by Chadian government forces, bolstered by French and United States military supplies and a token force of Zairian troops. Qadhafi called for a Libyan intervention in force. A sustained air bombardment was launched against Faya Largeau after its recapture by Habré on July 30, using Su-22 fighters and Mirage F-1s from the Aouzou air base, along with Tu-22 bombers from Sabha. Within ten days, a large ground force had been assembled east and west of Faya Largeau by first ferrying men, armor, and artillery by air to Sabha, Al Kufrah, and the Aouzou airfield, and then by shorter range transport planes to the area of conflict. The fresh Libyan forces attacked the Faya Largeau oasis on August 10, driving the Chadian government units out. The subsequent intervention of 3,000 French troops ended the Libyan successes and led to a de facto division of the country, with Libya maintaining control of all the territory north of the sixteenth parallel. Under an agreement for mutual withdrawal from Chad, French troops withdrew by early November 1984, but the Libyans secretly dispersed and hid their units. In December 1986, an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 Chadian government troops were moved into the Tibesti Massif region of northwestern Chad to support Goukouni's forces, most of whom who had rebelled against the Libyans after Goukouni grew disillusioned with his Libyan backers in late 1986. Combined Goukouni and Habré forces then reportedly routed a 1,000-man Libyan garrison at Fada, claiming to have captured or destroyed a large number of tanks. In March 1987, the main Libyan air base of Wadi Doum was captured by Chadian forces. Although strongly defended by mine fields, 5,000 troops, tanks, armored vehicles, and aircraft, the Libyans Base was overcome by a smaller Chadian attacking force equipped with trucks mounted with machine guns and antitank weapons. Two days later, the Libyans evacuated their main base of Faya Largeau, 150 kilometers farther south, which was in danger of being encircled. Observers estimated that in the Chadian victories in the first 3 months of 1987 more than 3,000 Libyan soldiers had been killed or captured or had deserted. Large numbers of tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters were captured or destroyed. In some cases, Libya sent its own aircraft to bomb abandoned Libyan equipment to deny its use to the Chadians. It was reported that in many cases Libyan soldiers had been killed while fleeing to avoid battle. At Wadi Doum, panicked Libyans had suffered high casualties running through their own mine fields. These military actions left Habre in virtual control of Chad and in a position to threaten the expulsion of Libya from the Aouzou Strip. The full effect of these stunning defeats had yet to be assessed as of May 1987. It was clear, however, that they had affected the perception of Libya as a significant regional military power. They also cast renewed doubt on the competence and determination of Libyan fighting men, especially in engagements beyond the country's borders to which they evidently felt no personal commitment.

Encounters with the United States In 1973 Qadhafi claimed the Gulf of Sidra to be within Libyan territorial waters by drawing a straight line between a point near Benghazi and the western headland of the gulf at Misratah (see fig. 14). His claim was not generally accepted, although only the United States presented a direct challenge by declaring that its ships would continue to regard all areas beyond a distance of 12 nautical miles from the coast as international waters. On several occasions, Libyan fighter planes harassed United States planes from carriers maneuvering in the area. When the United States Sixth Fleet began exercises in August 1981, Libyan fighter planes were assembled from elsewhere in the country to fly patrols near the American ships. On August 19, two Su-22 fighter-bombers were intercepted by two F-14 Tomcat fighters from the aircraft carrier imitz. While trying to escort the Libyans out of the exercise area, one of the American planes was the target of an air-to-air Atoll missile but was able to evade it. Both Libyan planes were then shot down with Sidewinder missiles launched by the Tomcats. The two Libyan pilots managed to eject and were rescued from the sea. The ease with which the American planes disposed of their attackers demonstrated that the earlier generation Su-22 and its Atoll missile could not prevail against more sophisticated United States equipment. Tensions between the two countries mounted after the hijacking of a TWA airliner at Beirut in July 1985 and bombing attacks at American airline counters at Rome and Vienna in December of that year. Qadhafi was implicated in these actions through his patronage of the alleged perpetrator, the Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal (see International Terrorism and Support for Insurgent Groups , this ch.). The Libyans also began installing batteries of SA-5 missiles acquired from the Soviet Union in late 1985, along with associated radar, to augment their air defense

30

capabilities. United States naval vessels continued to challenge Qadhafi's claim to the Gulf of Sidra, periodically crossing the line of Libyan territorial claim, which he came to refer to as the "line of death" (see fig. 14). Three carrier task forces of the Sixth Fleet with 225 aircraft assembled off the Libyan coast for maneuvers in March 1986. On March 24, six SA-5s were launched from the new missile base at Surt against American aircraft. None was hit, however, because the SA-5, with a range of 240 kilometers, could threaten high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft over the Gulf of Sidra but was relatively ineffective against high-performance jet fighters. Subsequently, the missile site was put out of action by carrier-based A-6 Intruders firing High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs), that homed in on the Libyans' radar guidance signals. A second strike followed the next day to knock out a replacement radar unit. Although Soviet technicians were believed to be present to oversee the installation and operation of the SA-5 batteries, none was reported injured in the exchanges. At the same time, a French-built Combattante-class missile attack craft was destroyed when it approached United States Navy ships protecting the aircraft carriers. The Libyan vessel was hit by two Harpoon missiles launched from an A-7 Corsair aircraft. The most serious loss for the Libyans was one of the eight Sovietsupplied Nanuchkaclass missile corvettes in an attack by two A-6s shortly after midnight on March 26. A total of five attacks was carried out on Libyan ships. Ten days later, on April 5, 1986, a bomb exploded in a discotheque in Berlin frequented by United States service personnel. Of the 200 injured, 63 were American soldiers; one soldier and one civilian were killed. Messages intercepted by the United States, including one from the Libyan mission in East Berlin, furnished what the United States government described as evidence of Libyan involvement in the bombing, which was probably carried out by the Abu Nidal organization. On April 15, the United States retaliated by attacking military installations in Benghazi and Tripoli. Eighteen FB-111 bombers, supported by four EF-111 electronic countermeasures aircraft, left England, refueling several times enroute, and struck the Tripoli airport, a frogman training center at the naval academy, and the nearby al Aziziyah barracks, where Qadhafi often resided. The aircraft carriers Coral Sea and America launched twenty-four A-6 and F/A-18 Hornet strike aircraft against radar and antiaircraft sites at Benghazi before hitting the Benina military airfield and the Jamahiriya barracks. A number of casualties also occurred in residential areas of Benghazi and several Western embassies were damaged. Several transport aircraft and some Soviet-built MiG-23 fighters and helicopters were destroyed on the ground at the two airfields. The only loss among the American attackers was one FB111 that failed to return to its base in England. Although retaliation for the Berlin bombing had been anticipated, Libyan air defenses seemed almost wholly unprepared for the attack. In fact, it was reported that antiaircraft fire had not begun until after the American planes had passed over their targets at Tripoli. It was reported that some Libyan soldiers abandoned their posts in fright and confusion and officers were slow to give orders. Also, Libyans fighters failed to get airborne to challenge the attacking bombers.

MA*POWER Conscription and the People's Militia The concept of universal military service is embodied in Statute 3 for 1984, approved by the GPC in March 1984. This law declared that all Libyans coming of age, whether male or female, were to receive regular military training, as long as they were physically able. Military studies were to be among the basic subjects of the educational curriculum at all stages above the elementary level. Military studies and training in regular military establishments of "specialized cadres in warfare" were to be restricted for the present to males. The statute provided for Libya to be divided into defense regions, the responsibility for defending each region being that of its inhabitants. Defense regions were to regard themselves as strategic reserves for each other. The new law did not supersede the provisions of the Compulsory Military Service Statute of 1978, which made all males between the ages of seventeen and thirty-five subject to a draft commitment of three years of active service in the army or four years in the navy or air force. Students could defer service until completion of their studies. The actual application of conscription laws in 1987 was not entirely clear. In one case, a young man called up for two years' service was required to serve six years. In 1986, of 936,000 men in the 15 to 59 age category, about 550,000 were fit for military service. About 39,000 Libyans reach military age each year; many, however, lack the basic education needed to absorb training in the use and servicing of modern weaponry. The implementing regulations for the 1984 statute stipulated that all secondary schools and equivalent institutions were to be assigned to various military units (see Education , ch. 2). Each student was to devote two days each month to training with the nearest military element having a specialization approximating that of the unit to which the student had been assigned. One month each year was to be spent with the student's original military unit. Members of all government and business enterprises as well as artisans, professionals, and farmers, were also to train for two days a month and one month a year. At some factories, the military commitment was more onerous. When the work day finished at 2:00 P. M., employees were obliged to spend three to four hours with their military units five days each week. Such periods of intensive training continued for six months or more at intervals of every few years. To a considerable extent, the new law merely reinforced a program in existence for some years to mobilize the entire population of physically fit students and working people into local militia units centered on schools, communities, and workplaces. The number of individuals organized into paramilitary units has been estimated at 45,000 but may have increased with the application of the new law. In 1987 the People's Militia was headed by Major Khuwayldi al Hamidi, one of the original members of the RCC. The militia units reportedly were generously equipped with arms, transport, and uniforms. In November 1985, it was announced that the first contingent of "armed people" trained as paratroopers had made a demonstration drop. In early 1986, Western reporters were shown military training at a high school in Tripoli at which a minimum of two out of thirty-six class hours a week were devoted to military studies. In addition, one of three summer months was spent at a military camp. Graduates either entered the army directly or went on to college. Those entering college had to continue reserve training at their former high schools. The weekly lessons included hand-grenade throwing, signals and codes, and machinegun maintenance. High schools concentrated on designated specialties, which in the case of the institution visited was the operation of the Soviet truckmounted Katyusha rocket launcher. The mission of the People's Militia was territorial defense, and it was to function under the leadership of local military commanders. Qadhafi contended that it was the People's Militia that met the Egyptian incursions during the border clash of 1977, although the Egyptians insisted that their successful raids had been contested by regular army units. The militia forces are not known to have faced any other test that would permit an appraisal of their performance in home

31

defense or as auxiliaries to the regular army. There was some evidence that local commanders had not responded energetically to their responsibility for training and supervising militia units.

Women in the Armed Forces Qadhafi has persistently sought to usher in a policy of direct participation by women in national defense. His efforts, which have been resisted by conservative elements of Libyan society and apparently by most young women as well, derived from his argument that women of the Arab world live in a subjugated state and must be liberated from oppression and feudalism. Qadhafi viewed practices governing a woman's role in society and her legal rights as disrespectful, reactionary, and contrary to the Quran. Speaking at a rally in Tripoli in 1978, Qadhafi said that the goal of a totally armed people would be fully realized "when all Libyans--men and women--have been trained in an organized, modern fashion." Addressing in the same speech the political and religious problems that a full-fledged military role for women presented in Islamic Libya, Qadhafi declared that this "is not against religion, not against marriage, not against ethics." Shortly thereafter, it was announced that women were to be conscripted along with men, but this plan apparently was not fully implemented. A women's army college opened in Tripoli in 1979, training volunteers aged thirteen to seventeen in basic military subjects and the use of various weapons. A total of 7,000 students had passed through the academy by 1983. Some female pilots and naval recruits had reportedly also been enlisted. Nevertheless, the notion of women as soldiers remained unpopular. Some observers believed that many of the students had been coerced into entering the academy. The institution was closed in November 1983, reportedly after students ripped down fences to escape and return to their homes. Nonetheless, the new legislation introduced in February 1984 covering universal military service specifically included women. When the GPC took the almost unprecedented step of rejecting the proposal, Qadhafi saw this as evidence of lingering reactionary attitudes in a society that had not whole heartedly accepted the revolution. "Spontaneous demonstrations" of young women demanding the right to engage in military service were organized. In a speech on March 12, 1984, Qadhafi announced that popular demand made it necessary to introduce compulsory military service for all in spite of the CPC's action. After the Libyan retreat from Chad in March 1987, there were indications that women had served there in administrative positions. The women's military academy was not reopened, however, and no immediate steps were taken to institute full-time military service for women. Training was apparently to remain an adjunct to high school and university studies. Even so, there was evidence that the program was not being resolutely enforced. As late as April 1986, the Libyan press mentioned complaints over the delays and haphazard nature of the training programs at the Zlitan Women Teachers' Institute, apparently owing to the indifference of local military authorities. From © Globalsecurity from Countryguide

Other Paramilitary Forces (1987) In about 1980, Qadhafi introduced the Islamic Pan-African Legion, a body of mercenaries recruited primarily among dissidents from Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Mali, and Chad. West African states with Muslim populations have also been the source of some personnel. Believed to consist of about 7,000 individuals, the force has received training from experienced Palestinian and Syrian instructors. Some of those recruited to the legion were said to have been forcibly impressed from among nationals of neighboring countries who migrated to Libya in search of work. According to The Military Balance published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the force was organized into one armored, one infantry, and one paratroop/commando brigade. It has been supplied with T-54 and T55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and EE-9 armored cars. The Islamic Pan-African Legion was reported to have been committed during the fighting in Chad in 1980 and was praised by Qadhafi for its success there. However, it was believed that many of the troops who fled the Chadian attacks of March 1987 were members of the Islamic Pan-African Legion. In an effort to realize Qadhafi's vision of a united Arab military force, plans for the creation of an Arab legion have been announced from time to time. The goal, according to the Libyan press, would be to assemble an army of 1 million men and women fighters to prepare for the great Arab battle--"the battle of liberating Palestine, of toppling the reactionary regimes, of annihilating the borders, gates, and barriers between the countries of the Arab homeland, and of creating the single Arab Jamahiriya from the ocean to the gulf." In March 1985, it was announced that the National Command of the Revolutionary Forces Command in the Arab Nation had been formed with Qadhafi at its head. A number of smaller radical Arab groups from Lebanon, Tunisia, Sudan, Iraq, the Persian Gulf states, and Jordan were represented at the inaugural meeting. Syrian Baath Party and radical Palestinian factions were also present. Each of these movements was expected to earmark 10 percent of its forces for service under the new command. As of April 1987, there was no information confirming the existence of such a militia.

Rank insignia When the army and navy were formed, the uniforms adopted by each service reflected British military and naval tradition. Modifications have occurred over the intervening years, however, and in early 1987 Libyan uniforms were similar to those worn by military personnel of a number of Middle Eastern Arab countries. The standard field uniform for Libyan paratroopers (Army commandos) is a two-piece camouflage uniform made of waterrepellent cotton. The shirt is similar in design to the United States Army fatigue shirt. The shirt and trousers are camouflaged in blue-green, light green, and dark brown. The standard headgear for paratroopers is a sky-blue beret. The uniforms of the air force, however, continued to resemble in both style and color the uniforms of the United States Air Force, which served as a model when the Libyan air arm was established. Originally the rank structure of all three services was similar to that of the British armed forces, but some modifications were introduced in light of the small size of the Libyan military establishment. In early 1979, the system prescribed by law still included nine officer grades and five enlisted ranks; there were no warrant officer equivalents (see figs. 15 and 16). Although three general officer grades continued to be authorized, they have not been used since the 1969 coup. Promoted to the grade of colonel (aqid) after assuming power, Qadhafi has maintained a

32

ceiling on the grade level of his officers corps in keeping with his desire to avoid the ostentatious public image the generals of the monarchy had conveyed. In January 1976, the Arab Socialist Union's National Congress attempted to promote Qadhafi to major general. The Libyan leader stated that he would accept the honor as an expression of gratitude from his compatriots but would retain the title of colonel because it had become an accepted and traditional part of his name.

DEFE*SE COSTS (1987) The pattern of defense spending has been difficult to appraise with any exactitude since the mid-1970s, when government restrictions on the publication of military information were imposed. Detailed budgets, once available, have not been disclosed since the mid1970s. Total amounts allocated to defense in the national budget were available, but apportionments to individual service components or specific programs were impossible to ascertain. Moreover, the figures published for the defense budget clearly fell far short of actual expenditures. In all likelihood, many military outlays were hidden under other budget items or obscured by manipulation of prices or exchange rates. The value of imported military equipment alone has generally been far in excess of the allocations to defense as recorded in the budget. The massive purchases from the Soviet Union, estimated at over US$1 billion annually since the mid-1970s, do not appear in the budget either as payments or amortization of military credit. Increased spending for military improvements and other defense needs was made possible by the vast revenues from petroleum-- particularly after the government nationalized the industry. Even during the monarchy, a doubling of military expenditures between 1964 and 1968 demonstrated that this new source of revenue permitted an upgrading of the military that was previously unattainable. Nonetheless, defense expenditures under the monarchy continued to be relatively modest. As one specialist wrote just before the 1969 coup, "thus far Libya has avoided succumbing to the lure of the arms race or procurement of nonessential prestige military forces." Within a few years after the assumption of power by the Qadhafi regime, defense spending accelerated dramatically. It continued to rise nearly every year, although at a somewhat reduced rate after 1978. Arms imports ordinarily formed more than half of total defense expenditures. However, some slackening in the value of imported equipment has occurred since 1982. This is attributed in part to the saturation of the Libyan defense forces and in part to financial strains on the government arising from the sharp decline in oil prices. The limited official data published by Libya offer a completely different picture from the estimates compiled by non-Libyan sources. In the administrative budget for 1984, the amount shown for the armed forces is LD340 million (for value of the Libyan dinar, see Glossary), which constituted 23.6 percent of the budget. This represented a substantial increase over the LD300 million shown for 1983, composing 19.7 percent of the administrative budget. Defense expenditures were omitted from the budget published for 1985, and no explanation was supplied of the component items in the ostensible disbursements for defense in 1983 or 1984. According to estimates compiled by ACDA, Libyan military expenditures rose eightfold between 1973 and 1979, when a peak of US$3 billion annually was reached. Spending then remained fairly level until a new upswing in spending began by 1983. By 1984, annual outlays on defense were estimated at US$5.1 billion. The 1979 figure represented 12.4 percent of gross national product (GNP), whereas the 1984 figure represented 17.8 percent of GNP and an exceptionally high 40 percent of total government expenditures. On the basis of the ACDA estimate, military spending would have amounted to US$1360 per capita in 1984. This compared to a figure of US$34 per capita for Africa as a whole and was about twice the level of average per capita spending on defense of the average members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Only Israel, Saudi Arabia, and several smaller states of the Arabian Peninsula had military outlays on a scale comparable to those of Libya.

FOREIG* MILITARY ASSISTA*CE (1987) The Quest for *ew Sources of Arms: 1970-87 After the young officers led by Qadhafi deposed the Idris regime, it was almost inevitable that their government would look for new sources of military equipment. One of the many causes of the coup was the monarchy's unwillingness to involve Libya militarily in the Arab-Israeli conflict. To have continued to rely solely on Britain and the United States for arms would have invited domestic and Arab criticism inasmuch as both countries were regarded as hostile to the interests of the Arab world because of their support for Israel. The Libyans therefore cancelled the treaty with Britain and, in March 1970, the British evacuated their bases near Tobruk and Benghazi. United States operational and maintenance support of the Libyan air force ended the following June when American personnel evacuated Wheelus Air Base. Overall American military assistance between 1958 and 1970 had amounted to US$17.4 million in grant aid and US$43.4 million in sales. In 1970 the Libyan government announced that it had contracted for the purchase of French weapons systems, notably Mirage fighters, valued at US$400 million. Using facilities that were formerly part of Wheelus Air Base, French instructors engaged in the training of Libyan pilots and ground crews to operate and maintain the Mirages. The choice of France as an alternative arms supplier was a logical one for Libya. Not only was France increasingly dependent upon Libyan oil supplies, but its policy toward the Arab-Israeli dispute was acceptable to Qadhafi. Failing in its efforts to acquire medium tanks from either France or Britain, Qadhafi turned to the Soviet Union. Moscow had quickly recognized the new Libyan regime and responded with equal speed to the request for weapons. In July 1970, the first Soviet military vehicles, including 30 medium tanks and 100 armored personnel carriers, arrived in Libya. Apart from France, however, during the early 1970s neighboring Egypt had the greatest influence on Qadhafi's drive to upgrade his defense forces. Egypt had supported the coup by positioning Egyptian units at strategic points throughout Libya to help prevent any attempt by royalist forces to stage a countercoup. By 1972 an estimated 2,000 Egyptian soldiers were serving in the country as instructors. Training was also provided for both officers and enlisted personnel at installations in Egypt. After the military academy at Benghazi closed, a number of Libyans were trained at the Egyptian military academy. The October 1973 War, which drew sharp criticism from Qadhafi over the Egyptian military effort and the willingness of President Anwar Sadat to accept a disengagement agreement with Israel, produced a rift between the two North African neighbors. Egypt withdrew from Libya all Egyptian pilots and two vessels it had lent the Libyan navy. Cooperation in air defense was also

33

terminated as Egypt withdrew surface-to-air missiles it had provided earlier and halted work on the air defenses it had been developing to protect Tripoli, Benghazi, and Tobruk. Libya then turned to Pakistan for help. A small Pakistani advisory contingent that had been giving training on helicopters and transport aircraft was expanded to about 600--including 40 pilots. Small numbers of Italian, French, and Yugoslav instructors were also introduced for training.

Military Cooperation with the Soviet Union Because of Libya's forcing the evacuation from Libya of British and United States military personnel in 1970, the Libyans were rebuffed in a renewed effort to obtain military equipment from the West, except for limited British help with the developing navy. Therefore, Libya turned elsewhere for aid. In December 1974, Libya disclosed a large-scale arms purchase agreement with the Soviet Union, involving Tu-22 bombers, MiG-23 fighters, helicopters, T-62 tanks, and antitank and antiaircraft missiles. A second agreement in May 1975 heralded an even greater flow of Soviet arms and military advisers to Libya throughout the 1970s. Included in the agreement were submarines, of which a total of six were eventually transferred. Subsequent agreements followed in 1977, 1978, and 1980. The value of these transactions was estimated at over US$20 billion between 1973 and 1985. The new round of arms purchases in 1978, precipitated by the clashes with Egypt in the preceding year, included the MiG-25 Foxbat in its fighter, reconnaissance, and training configurations. This sale to Libya was the first recorded time the Soviet Union furnished the MiG-25 to any country not participating the Warsaw Pact. Deliveries of sophisticated military hardware were accompanied by Soviet and East European technicians estimated by the United States Department of State to have numbered 2,600 in 1984. In late 1985, these technicians were augmented by a considerable number of specialists to install and help operate the new SA-5 missiles. Approximately 7,600 Libyan military personnel had received training in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe by 1984. Deliveries of modern Soviet armaments continued during the early 1980s, although they tapered off markedly between 1983 (US$2.9 billion) and 1985 (US$1.3 billion), according to estimates compiled by ACDA. Libya was the first non-Warsaw Pact recipient of Haze antisubmarine helicopters. Natya-class minesweepers and Nanuchka-class fast-missile corvettes helped expand the navy. The three batteries of SA-5 missile launchers, including early warning and surveillance radar, delivered toward the close of 1985 failed in their purpose of deterring maneuvers by United States naval elements in the Gulf of Sidra. Nonetheless, when Jallud visited Moscow several months later, it was officially announced that the Soviets had agreed to a new request for aid. Included were an improved version of the SA-5, new monitoring and early warning radar, antijamming devices, M-24 helicopters, and additional gunboats and fighter planes. By early 1987, major arms shipments reportedly had been cut off, either because of Qadhafi's failure to make promised oil deliveries or because of Soviet disillusionment over Libyan performance against United States planes and the abandonment of vast amounts of modern equipment in Chad. The massive Libyan purchases brought the Soviet Union economic gains and enabled the Soviets to extend their strategic influence farther into the Mediterranean while appearing to reward the antiimperialist and Arab unity stance of the Libyan regime. Nevertheless, Qadhafi's increasingly undependable behavior, his estrangement from other Arab and African nations, and his setbacks in employing modern Soviet weaponry apparently made the Soviets skeptical of Qadhafi and reluctant to be closely identified with him. Although in 1984 the two countries issued a joint declaration in principle to enter into a treaty of friendship and cooperation and confirmed their intention in 1986, such an agreement, which would obligate the Soviet Union to come to Qadhafi's aid if attacked, had not been concluded by early 1987. As of early 1987, Qadhafi had refrained from granting the Soviets permanent shore facilities or air bases on Libyan territory; Soviet combatant ships had paid frequent port calls, and antisubmarine planes of the Soviet naval aviation branch had occasionally been rotated to Libyan airfields.

Western restrictions on arms transactions Libya's radicalism, its reckless ventures beyond its borders, and its links to terrorists caused among Western countries a growing reluctance to supply Libya with lethal equipment, a reluctance amounting to formal or de facto embargoes by most Western arms manufacturers. A policy of refusing to ship arms to Libya was reaffirmed in the Tokyo Declaration on International Terrorism in May 1986, signed by the governments of Canada, West Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Britain, and the United States. Libya has nonetheless continued to look to non-Soviet suppliers, turning to such peripheral sources as Yugoslavia, Greece, and Brazil. United States restrictions on military sales date from the mid1970s when the delivery of eight C-130 Lockheed cargo planes ordered in 1972 was blocked out of fear that they would be used for military ventures in Uganda. In 1978 spare parts were banned for the C-130s Libya already had on hand, and an export license was refused for two Boeing 727s. Qadhafi angrily rejected accusations against Libya of supporting international terrorism, describing the American attitude as "both puerile and unworthy of a great power." He denied that Libya financed terrorism and asserted that the aircraft carriers of the United States Sixth Fleet were engaged in "terrorism" by their very presence in the Mediterranean. Having initially rejected a permit for the export of 400 trucks manufactured by the Oshkosh Company, the United States government relented after receiving written guarantees that the trucks would be used solely for agricultural purposes. However, upon their delivery in 1979, the trucks were converted to military transporters by Canadian mechanics using Austrian equipment. After Libya cancelled the treaties with Britain and the United States, France became its main alternative arms supplier. Support for the Mirage fighters by Dassault, a French manufacturer, consisted of both pilot and ground crew training in Libya and France and periodic major overhauls of planes at the Dassault plant. However, the strained relations between the two countries over Chad brought an end to this support. Reportedly, France held discussions concerning the more advanced Mirage 2000 in return for Libyan compliance with its 1983 withdrawal agreement from Chad, but Libya's continued involvement there ruled out any sale. The only major French arms transfer was the US$600 million sale of ten Combattante fastattack craft with missiles the last of which was delivered in 1984 under a contract negotiated six years earlier. Libya was involved in a series of significant transactions with Italy in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1978 the Italian aircraft company Siai-Marchetti secured a contract to supply SF-260 light aircraft intended for training and reconnaissance. The G-222 military transport plane assembled by Aeritalia was also supplied to the Libyans. The Italian firm of Oto Melara received orders for a large number of

34

Palmaria 155-mm self-propelled howitzers. Over a three-year period, a complete renovation of a British-built frigate was carried out in a Genoa shipyard. Four corvettes of the Wadi/Assad type were contracted for in 1974, but the last of these vessels was not delivered until 1982. Both the frigate and the corvettes were fitted with Otomat missiles. An arms-supply relationship with Brazil began in 1977 with a Libyan order for several hundred armored cars at a cost of over US$100 million. A contract in 1981 for US$250 million covered purchases of additional armored cars, rockets, bombs, and missile launchers. Negotiations were interrupted after Brazil's 1983 seizure of four transiting Libyan aircraft loaded with weapons for Nicaragua. Resumption of negotiations in 1986 was expected to lead to Brazilian sale of EMB-312 Tucano trainer aircraft, EMB-121 Xingu transports, and additional Cascavel and Urutu armored vehicles. In late 1985, Libya signed an agreement with Greece covering the sale of US$500 million in equipment, including the Artemis-30 antiaircraft gun and the Steyr armored personnel carrier, manufactured in Greece under license from Austria. Yugoslavia was reported to be supplying a number of Galeb jet trainer aircraft in addition to those already in service, as well as Koncar-class missile boats to be armed with Soviet-designed Styx missiles.

The search for nuclear technology In 1975 Libya had ratified the United Nations (UN) Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty signed by the Idris regime in 1969. In 1980 an agreement was reached with the International Atomic Energy Agency placing all of Libya's nuclear installations under international inspection. Despite these steps, in the mid- and late 1970s, Qadhafi repeatedly proclaimed his country's determination to acquire nuclear weapons, primarily because he was convinced that his archenemy, Israel, had achieved such a military capability. Qadhafi sought help in obtaining nuclear technology from a number of countries, including the People's Republic of China. Among these efforts, the cooperation with Pakistan launched in 1977 seemed for a time to be producing material results. Libya appeared to be providing financial assistance and, later, deliveries of uranium "yellow cake" originating in Niger in the hope of eventually being compensated by weapons from Pakistan. However, in an interview with an Indian newspaper in March 1986, Qadhafi declared that Libya would never help Pakistan acquire an atomic bomb. He said: "We consider nuclear weapons production a great mistake against humanity." A 10-megawatt nuclear research reactor supplied by the Soviet Union in 1979 was installed at a research center at Tajura near Tripoli staffed by 750 Libyan specialists and technicians. Many students were sent abroad; a group of 200 was studying in the United States until early 1983 when the United States proscribed training Libyans in nuclear science. Libya planned to buy a power station from the Soviet Union, but, dissatisfied with the technology involved, negotiated with the Belgian firm of Belgonucleaire to take over the engineering contract and supply much of the needed equipment. After the United States objected, fearing use of the equipment in weapons development, Belgium decided in 1984 to refuse the US$1 billion contract. Shortly thereafter, Moscow's commitment to construct an 880-megawatt power station to be located in the Surt region was reaffirmed. It was to cost over US$4 billion, with repayment to stretch over 15 to 18 years. Libya had a theoretical capability of delivering nuclear weapons in the form of Scud and FROG missiles and missiles delivered by medium-range Tu-22 bombers. Suspicions that Libya was seeking to acquire a medium-range missile capability were aroused in 1980 when it was revealed that the West German firm, Orbital Transport-undRaketen Aktiengesellschaft (OTRAG), had built a rocket-testing base in the Libyan desert. OTRAG, which had earlier been forced to give up a testing site in Zaire, claimed that it was working on a nonmilitary rocket to enable Third World countries to launch satellites cheaply.

ARMS PRODUCTIO* A*D MILITARY COOPERATIO* (1987) During the 1970s some efforts were launched toward greater self-reliance in military materiél, but little has resulted from these initiatives. Although Libya has supplied weapons and equipment to other governments in direct pursuit of its foreign policy, these weapons have been from Soviet-supplied stocks in the vast Libyan inventory. In 1978 Yugoslavia agreed to build a large plant in Libya to manufacture ammunition and spare parts for Soviet weapons. In early 1987, the extent to which this commitment was implemented was unknown, but even repair and maintenance workshops have remained wholly inadequate to service the Sovietsupplied equipment and must be operated largely by foreign technicians. A plan to assemble in Libya some of the SF-260 training planes acquired from Italy did not materialize. Consequently, Libya's manufacturing capacity remains limited to the production of basic quartermaster items, uniforms, and some small arms and ammunition. In addition to supplying arms to dissident and rebel forces in several countries of Africa and other parts of the world, Libya assisted friendly regimes with surplus equipment, but generally not on a consistent or long-term basis. In the two years after the Tripartite Agreement was signed with Ethiopia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) in August 1981, Libyan aid to Ethiopia in the form of weapons and financial backing amounted to half of all Libya's international aid. Libya and Syria have somewhat parallel aims in the Middle East, and Libya has financed much of Syria's arms acquired directly from the Soviet Union. Among African nations, Benin and Ghana have been recipients of weapons and matériel, in part in recognition for voting with Libya in international forums and in part because Libya has been permitted to use them as transit and recruitment points for its activities in other countries of Africa. In late 1984, a five-year cooperation agreement was entered into with Malta under which Libya was to provide a military training team and helicopters and would consign some of its naval units for maintenance in Maltese shipyards. A military agreement was also concluded with Sudan in 1985 after the government of Jaafar al Numayri was overthrown by a group less hostile to Libya. Libya pledged to supply a quantity of trucks, trailers, and spares for Soviet equipment already in the Sudanese inventory. In return, the Libyans reportedly were permitted to set up a base in the western region of Darfur where several hundred Libyan troops joined with Chadian insurgents fighting to topple the Chadian government. Although Sudan later claimed that it was severing these new ties with Libya, as of late 1986 Libya reportedly had not fully evacuated Sudanese territory. In spite of Libya's and Iran's differing goals and mutual suspicions, Libya supported the Iranian Revolution and, unlike other Arab regimes (apart from Syria), backed Iran in its war against Iraq. Qadhafi has provided the Tehran government with T-55 tanks, antitank and antiaircraft artillery, ammunition, and Scud missiles.

35

I*TER*ATIO*AL TERRORISM A*D SUPPORT FOR I*SURGE*T GROUPS (1987) Since Qadhafi's rise to power, Libya has chronically employed terrorism and revolutionary groups as primary instruments for fulfilling its international ambitions. The main targets of terrorist activity have been Libyan dissidents living abroad and prominent political figures of moderate Arab and African countries. Qadhafi has openly declared that "the revolution has destroyed those who oppose it inside the country and now it must pursue the rest abroad." A concerted drive to assassinate anti-Qadhafi exiles resulted in the murder of eleven Libyan dissidents in 1980 and 1981. A further five attacks were sponsored by Libya in 1985. Plots were allegedly uncovered against President Habre of Chad in 1984 and President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre in 1985. Earlier, there was evidence that Libyan agents had targeted Arab moderates, including Presidents Anwar Sadat and Husni Mubarak of Egypt, Jaafar al Numayri of Sudan, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, King Hussein of Jordan, and King Hassan II of Morocco. Qadhafi has endeavored to undermine moderate Arab governments judged not to be militant enough in their attitude toward Israel or to be too closely tied to the West. Sudan under Numayei was a priority target because it cooperated with the West and with Egypt. Arms and funds were funneled to Sudanese rebels based in Ethiopia in their guerrilla warfare against the central government. In early 1983, Libya was accused of having masterminded a coup attempt that miscarried badly. The coup plan called for Libyan planes to bomb public buildings in the capital of Khartoum while dissidents took over the center of the city. When the plan became known and Egyptian and United States aircraft were deployed at Numayri's request, Qadhafi called a halt to the operation. However, in 1984, a plane believed to be Libyan attempted to destroy a radio station at Umm Durman, Sudan, that was broadcasting condemnations of Qadhafi's policies. Since late 1980, Qadhafi has aided the Somali National Salvation Front, an insurgent group operating out of Ethiopia. He has kindled unrest in North Africa in the case of Algeria by providing money and a base to dissidents, such as former president Ahmed Ben Bella, and in Tunisia by recruiting dissidents from the large numbers of Tunisian workers in Libya to conduct raids and sabotage. In addition to repeated interventions in Chad in his efforts to impose a leadership that would be amenable to Libyan influence, Qadhafi has been accused of providing arms and training to Tuareg tribesmen at a camp at Sabha. His goal has been to stir up the Tuareg into demanding a union carved out of existing Sahelian states, a union that would be under Libyan influence. Libya has contributed to Niger's fears by its annexation of a strip of territory on Niger's northern border and its backing of a coup attempt against the president of Niger in 1976. Relations with other African countries--including Senegal, Gambia, Togo, Burkina Faso, and Zaire--have been embittered by Qadhafi's plotting and support for radical dissidents. Beginning in the 1980s, Qadhafi extended his activities into Latin America and Asia. Arms and money allegedly have been made available to insurgents in Guatemala and El Salvador, as well as to the M-19 terrorist group in Colombia. In South Asia, Libya has been involved with opponents of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi governments and in Southeast Asia has provided help to Muslim minorities, notably the Moro separatists on Mindanao in the Philippines. In the Middle East, Qadhafi has been motivated by the aim of destroying Israel and of punishing those Arab elements willing to compromise in the interest of regional peace. The smaller, more radical factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) have received training and arms from Libya as well as financing for their activities. According to the State Department, Libya's contribution in 1981 alone amounted to nearly US$100 million. In 1985 attention was focused on Qadhafi's links with the Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal Organization, more formally known as the Fatah Revolutionary Council, and with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. The Abu Nidal Organization was believed responsible for the shooting of the Israeli ambassador in London, the hijacking of an Egyptian airliner, and attacks on the El Al and Trans World Airlines ticket counters at the Rome and Vienna airports. The State Department charged that millions of dollars in Libyan funds had gone to the Abu Nidal Organization, that its top figures were resident in Libya, and that Libya had provided training and travel documents to its teams mounting terrorist attacks. Although other Middle Eastern states such as Syria and Iran remained involved in terrorism, the State Department maintained that Libya had become the most active, especially against American and European travelers. The affinity of Qadhafi for the Abu Nidal Organization and other radical Palestinian factions is explained by the bitter enmity they share for the main Arafat wing of the PLO, and for their rejection of any form of negotiations with Israel. Terrorist attacks of the kind they have successfully launched serve Qadhafi's purpose by further elevating tensions in the Middle East and blighting the prospects of peace initiatives.

36

The Army 1987 In 1987 the army--by far the largest and most developed branch of the military forces--was still organized tactically in battalion formations. These included twenty tank battalions, thirty mechanized infantry battalions, ten artillery battalions, and two special forces groups comprising ten paratroop battalions. Air defense was organized into two antiaircraft battalions and six surface-to-air missile battalions. Two surface-to-surface missile brigades were equipped with free rocket over ground (FROG) and Scud missiles acquired from the Soviet Union. Although the pattern of equipment purchases and the creation of divisional headquarters units suggested that a transition to a more integrated structure of mobile armored and mechanized infantry was contemplated, by early 1987 the shift to such an organizational form had not yet occurred. During specific deployments, as in Chad, units were brought together on an ad hoc basis. If the tank and mechanized battalions were to be consolidated into a more unified command structure, this would most likely be designed for planning territorial defense rather than for desert combat operations; the system existing in 1987 of independent battalions afforded more flexibility for desert combat. In early 1987, the Libyan army was well outfitted with modern armaments, including rocket systems, armored vehicles for its infantry and artillery, engineering equipment, up-to-date Soviet infantry weapons, sophisticated fire-control systems, flame throwers and chemical munitions, and antitank guided missiles. Libya's more than 3,000 tanks gave it the tenth largest tank force in the world. Its range of tracked and wheeled armor, tank transporters, and air transport ensured it the necessary mobility to bring its forces to bear rapidly against any threat to its territorial integrity and enabled it to intervene in ventures far beyond its borders (see table 10, Appendix). The army was nevertheless confronted by grave deficiencies. The high technological level of its equipment demanded a corresponding level of technical competence in operation and maintenance that the army lacked. Maintenance and repair problems were exacerbated by the diversity of arms sources--British, American, French, Soviet, Italian, and Brazilian. The numerous foreign advisers and technicians were insufficient to overcome low standards of support and logistics. To judge from the ability the Libyans demonstrated in Chad to sustain modern combat operations over extended supply lines, some progress was being made in correcting these problems. The pattern of troop concentrations could not be determined precisely from published sources. Some troops were at the operational sites, including Tripoli, Misratah, Az Zawiyah, Surt, Benghazi, Darnah, and Tobruk, that were established at strategic points along the Mediterranean coast during World War II (see fig. 14). Others were at inland sites at desert oases, such as Sabha, and farther south, at Al Kufrah, which became the main base for operations in Chad. Areas adjacent to the Egyptian border, particularly along lines of movement, were also well defended. Many army units were scattered throughout populated areas, owing in part to their responsibility for training People's Militia units. Few details were available on army training. The military academy at Benghazi, established before independence with British assistance, offered its cadets courses in higher education and military subjects to prepare them for active duty as junior officers. Qadhafi and other members of the RCC attended the institution, but it was closed after the coup. Later a military academy opened at Tripoli. In 1985 a military engineering college (at an unspecified location) to provide training in all technical military specialities was proposed. The college was to have a four-year program leading to a bachelor's degree. At about the same time, the establishment of a reserves college with a one-year program leading to the rank of second lieutenant in the reserves was announced. Admission would be contingent on the attainment of a university degree or its equivalent and a demonstration of "adherence to the great Fatah revolution." Because Libya is not known to have an active reserve program, it remained unclear how the graduates of this institution would be used.

37

Table 10. Major Army Equipment, 1986 Type

Estimated number in Inventory Country of Origin

Tanks T-54 (100mm gun)

n.a.

Soviet Union

T-55 (100mm gun)

2,200

-do-

T-62 (115mm gun)

n.a.

-do-

T-72 (120mm gun)

160

-do-

BRDM-2 reconnaissance

250

-do-

BMP personnel carrier

800

-do-

BTR-50/-60 personnel carrier

700

-do-

OT-62/-64 personnel carrier

400

Brazil

EE-9 reconnaissance

n.a.

-do-

EE-11 personnel carrier

100

-do-

D-74 122mm field gun

60

Soviet Union

M-46 130mm field gun

360

-do-

M-101 105mm howitzer

60

United States

M-1938, D-30 122mm howitzer

330

Soviet Union

M-1974 122mm howitzer, self-propelled

120

-do-

M-1973 152mm howitzer, self-propelled

48

-do-

Palmaris 155mm howitzer, self-propelled

200

Italy

450

various

BM-21/RM-70 122mm

n.a.

n.a.

M-51 130mm

600

Soviet Union

FROG-7

48

-do-

Scud-B

70

-do-

n.a.

Britain

3,000

France

n.a.

Soviet Union

SA-7

n.a.

-do-

Crotale

n.a.

France

Armored Vehicles

Howitzers and Guns

Mortars 81mm, 120mm, 160mm, 240mm Multiple Rocket Launchers

Surface-to-Surface Missiles

Antitank Guided Missiles Vigilant Milan AT-3 Sagger Surface-to-Air Missiles

n.a.--not available. Source: Based on information from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1986-1987, London, 1986, 103.

38

Army (2002) From © Globalsecurity

By 2002 the Libyan Army numbered some 45,000 men, including 25,000 draftees. Recent years saw the Army undermined by the embargo, which deprived it of new weapons, and even more by the rise to power of the 40,000-strong Revolutionary Guard. The Army had been further weakened by having been disorganized into the "People's Guard." The Libyan Army is organized into seven military districts and five Presidential Guards have been created - a product of the 1994 - 1995 restructuring process. Its strength is 45 000 personnel of which 40 000 are conscripts. It also possesses some 40 000 reserves organized into a People’s Militia. The structure of the Army is as follows:








21 X Infantry Btns 10 X Armoured Btns 22 X Artillery Btns 15 X Special Forces 8 X Air Defence Btns The Army is charged with border protection and acting as a rapid deployment force depending on operational circumstances. Doctrine is a mixture of Egyptian doctrine which was adopted after the 1969 coup and socialist principles derived from the concepts of a People’s Army. In 1987 the army--by far the largest and most developed branch of the military forces--was still organized tactically in battalion formations. These included twenty tank battalions, thirty mechanized infantry battalions, ten artillery battalions, and two special forces groups comprising ten paratroop battalions. Air defense was organized into two antiaircraft battalions and six surface-to-air missile battalions. Two surface-to-surface missile brigades were equipped with free rocket over ground (FROG) and Scud missiles acquired from the Soviet Union. Although the pattern of equipment purchases and the creation of divisional headquarters units suggested that a transition to a more integrated structure of mobile armored and mechanized infantry was contemplated, by early 1987 the shift to such an organizational form had not yet occurred. During specific deployments, as in Chad, units were brought together on an ad hoc basis. If the tank and mechanized battalions were to be consolidated into a more unified command structure, this would most likely be designed for planning territorial defense rather than for desert combat operations; the system existing in 1987 of independent battalions afforded more flexibility for desert combat. In early 1987, the Libyan army was well outfitted with modern armaments, including rocket systems, armored vehicles for its infantry and artillery, engineering equipment, up-to-date Soviet infantry weapons, sophisticated fire-control systems, flame throwers and chemical munitions, and antitank guided missiles. Libya's more than 3,000 tanks gave it the tenth largest tank force in the world. Its range of tracked and wheeled armor, tank transporters, and air transport ensured it the necessary mobility to bring its forces to bear rapidly against any threat to its territorial integrity and enabled it to intervene in ventures far beyond its borders. The army was nevertheless confronted by grave deficiencies. The high technological level of its equipment demanded a corresponding level of technical competence in operation and maintenance that the army lacked. Maintenance and repair problems were exacerbated by the diversity of arms sources--British, American, French, Soviet, Italian, and Brazilian. The numerous foreign advisers and technicians were insufficient to overcome low standards of support and logistics. To judge from the ability the Libyans demonstrated in Chad to sustain modern combat operations over extended supply lines, some progress was being made in correcting these problems. The pattern of troop concentrations could not be determined precisely from published sources. Some troops were at the operational sites, including Tripoli, Misratah, Az Zawiyah, Surt, Benghazi, Darnah, and Tobruk, that were established at strategic points along the Mediterranean coast during World War II. Others were at inland sites at desert oases, such as Sabha, and farther south, at Al Kufrah, which became the main base for operations in Chad. Areas adjacent to the Egyptian border, particularly along lines of movement, were also well defended. Many army units were scattered throughout populated areas, owing in part to their responsibility for training People's Militia units. Few details were available on army training. The military academy at Benghazi, established before independence with British assistance, offered its cadets courses in higher education and military subjects to prepare them for active duty as junior officers. Qadhafi and other members of the RCC attended the institution, but it was closed after the coup. Later a military academy opened at Tripoli. In 1985 a military engineering college (at an unspecified location) to provide training in all technical military specialities was proposed. The college was to have a four-year program leading to a bachelor's degree. At about the same time, the establishment of a reserves college with a one-year program leading to the rank of second lieutenant in the reserves was announced. Admission would be contingent on the attainment of a university degree or its equivalent and a demonstration of "adherence to the great Fatah revolution." Because Libya is not known to have an active reserve program, it remained unclear how the graduates of this institution would be used.

39

Libyan Army From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Size

50,000 regular soldiers, 43,000 militia

The current strength of the Libyan Ground Forces is 50,000 with an additional 43,000 troops as part of the Libyan Peoples Militia Paramilitary Group. The Libyan Army is organized into 10 Tank Battalions, 10 Mechanized Infantry Battalions, 18 Infantry Battalions, 6 Commando Battalions, 22 Artillery Battalions, 4 SSM Brigade and 7 Air Defense Artillery Battalions.[1] Though the Libyan army has a large amount of fighting equipment at its disposal, the vast majority was bought from the Soviet Union in the 70s and 80s and is largely obsolete. A high percentage remains in storage and a large amount of equipment has also been sold to various African countries. No major purchases of equipment have been made in recent years largely due to the decline of the economy and military sanctions experienced throughout the nineties. This and various other internal factors has seriously decayed the strength of the whole of the Libyan Military over the years and it has lagged behind its major neighbors in terms of its military capabilities and real war fighting capability. It is expected however, with the resurgence of the Libyan Economy and the recent lifting of sanctions that Libya will seek to rectify this and start to replace its ageing equipment and gain some ground it has lost over the years. From the late seventies to the mid to late eighties the army was involved in 4 major incursions into Chadian Territory. The Libyan Army suffered great losses in these conflicts especially that of the Toyota War of 1987 largely due to poor tactics and western aid to Chad. All of these incursions were eventually repulsed and Libya no longer occupies Chad. This conflict was known as the Chadian-Libyan conflict. Current Libyan Army Equipment [2] • Tanks • 200 T-72, (115 in store), • 100 T-62, (70 in store), • 500 T-55, (1000+ in store), • Tracked Vehicles • 1000 BMP-1 • 30 M-113 • 200 BTR-50 • Wheeled Vehicles • 70 EE-9 Cascavel • 100 EE-11 • 50 BRDM-2 • 500 BTR-60 • 67 OT-64 • SP Artillery • 80 DANA • 210 Palmaria • 130 2S1 • 60 2S3 Akatsiya • Multiple Rocket Launchers • 600 BM-21 , RM-70, • 300 Type-63 • Towed Artillery • 330 M-46 • 190 D-30 • 60 D-74 • Surface to Surface Missiles • 45 FROG-7 • 80 SCUD-B , ( 417 missiles) • Anti Tank • 400 MILAN • 620+ AT-3, AT-4, AT-5 • Air Defence • 48 SA-5 Gammon , Launchers • 400 SA-7 Grail • 20 SA-8b Gecko • 55 SA-9 , SA-13

40

24 Crotale 20 Tor-M1, to be ordered soon 4 S-300PMU-2, systems , to be ordered soon Bofors 40mm gun Anti Aircraft Artillery 90 57mm S-60 250 23mm ZSU-23-4 100 23mm ZU-23-2 ? 30mm M53/59 Praga Small arms AK-47 References and See Also 1. ^ Middle East Military Balance, (2005), "Libyan Military", Libya, Accessed April 24 2007 2. ^ Middle East Military Balance, (2005), "Libyan Military", Libya, Accessed April 24 2007 Air Defence • S-200 • Strela 2 • 9K33 Osa • 9K35 Strela-10 • Crotale • Tor-M1 20 - (under negotiations) • S-300PMU 4 - systems will be ordered Bases • El Adem • Ajdabiya • Aouzou • El Bayda • Benghazi • Ghat • Misratah

• • • • • • • • • • •

two Libyan EE-9 Cascavel on parade

41

The *avy (1986) From country-data The navy has always been the stepchild of the Libyan armed forces, although its Soviet-supplied submarines and fast-attack craft with missiles have endowed it with the potential for inflicting damage on other naval powers in the Mediterranean. The enormous firepower available to small vessels armed with missiles and sophisticated electronic guidance systems has enabled Qadhafi to assemble a modern flotilla at relatively low cost and with few personnel. The navy consisted of no more than 200 officers and men when the first warship was delivered to the Idris regime in 1966. Under Qadhafi, naval personnel had increased to 6,500 by 1986 and was expected to rise still further to meet the staffing needs of additional ships on order. Traditionally, the navy's primary mission has been to defend the coast and to assist the other services in maintaining internal security and public order. After the previously separate customs and harbor police were joined with the navy in a single command under the Ministry of Defense in 1970, the mission was extended to include responsibilities for curbing smuggling and for enforcing customs laws. The rapid naval buildup that occurred during the 1970s was intended to enforce Qadhafi's claim of sovereignty over the Gulf of Sidra with its sponging and fishing grounds as well as potential unexploited mineral wealth. The navy could also deter landings or raids aimed against the country's oil fields and vulnerable oil transport network. The purpose of acquiring amphibious ships for landing infantry and tanks was less obvious. One explanation might be to present a threat to Egyptian forces near the border with Libya. The Egyptians' sole land supply route is the coastal road from Alexandria. The navy has always been dependent on foreign sources for equipment, spare parts, and training. In 1972 a British naval advisory mission that had assisted in the development of the Libyan navy since its founding was terminated. Training was shifted to Greece and to Egypt and later to the Soviet Union. The initial ship orders, placed with British yards, were for patrol boats and corvettes. The largest surface ship in the Libyan navy, a frigate of about 1,500 tons with a crew of 130, was ordered just before the 1969 coup and delivered in 1973. Later, high-speed patrol boats and corvettes equipped with surface-to-surface missiles were purchased from France, Italy, and the Soviet Union. Between 1976 and 1983, six Soviet Foxtrot-class submarines were delivered. Each required a crew of seventy-five; in addition, twelve Soviet advisers were reportedly assigned to each vessel. (For an inventory of ships of the Libyan fleet, see; table 11, Appendix). Little information was available on the navy's organizational structure, but Tripoli was known to be the site of the naval command headquarters and of the principal naval base. Other bases were located in the ports of Benghazi, Darnah, Tobruk, and Marsa al Burayqah. A repair base was located at Al Khums east of Tripoli, and a submarine base was under construction at Ras al Hilal. As of early 1987, the Libyan navy had faced no hostile actions except for the encounter with the American fleet in March 1986 in which one missile boat and a corvette were destroyed and others possibly damaged. Earlier, it was reported that the small Libyan vessels were experiencing difficulty in obeying Qadhafi's order to remain at sea to avoid the risk of being bombed in port by American planes. The fleet reported breakdowns of engines and electronic failures as well as shortages of food and fuel. By early 1987 it was considered probable that the Libyan navy was overextended, having carried out a rapid buildup without sufficient trained personnel. More than one-third of the entire naval complement of 6,500 would be required to supply a single crew for each of the ships in commission in 1986. In addition, personnel would have to be found to staff a number of other vessels on order. Aggravating the problem of reaching a satisfactory level of operation, training, and maintenance was the need to become familiar with a variety of modern weapons systems from numerous supplier countries, among them Britain, France, Italy, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union.

Table 11. Major *avy Equipment, 1986 Type

Number in Inventory

Country of Orogin

Frigates Vosper with Otomat and Aspide missiles

1

Britain

Koni-class with SS-N-2C missiles

1

Soviet Union

Foxtrot class

6

-do-

Mala class submersible

2

Yugoslavia

Wadi/Assad class with Otomat missiles

4

Italy

Nanuchka II with SS-N-2C missiles

3

Soviet Union

La Combattante II with Otomat missiles

9

France

Osa II with Styx missiles

12

Soviet Union

Susah class

3

Britain

8

-do-

Submarines

Corvettes

Fast-Attack Craft

Coastal Patrol Boats Gharyan and Benina classes

42

Landing Ships PS-700

2

France

Polnochniy

3

Poland

7

Soviet Union

Minesweepers Natya

Source: Based on information from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1986-1987, London, 1986, 103.

Navy (2002) From © Globalsecurity

The navy has always been the stepchild of the Libyan armed forces, although its Soviet-supplied submarines and fastattack craft with missiles have endowed it with the potential for inflicting damage on other naval powers in the Mediterranean. The enormous firepower available to small vessels armed with missiles and sophisticated electronic guidance systems has enabled Qadhafi to assemble a modern flotilla at relatively low cost and with few personnel. The navy consisted of no more than 200 officers and men when the first warship was delivered to the Idris regime in 1966. Under Qadhafi, naval personnel had increased to 6,500 by 1986 and was expected to rise still further to meet the staffing needs of additional ships on order. Traditionally, the navy's primary mission has been to defend the coast and to assist the other services in maintaining internal security and public order. After the previously separate customs and harbor police were joined with the navy in a single command under the Ministry of Defense in 1970, the mission was extended to include responsibilities for curbing smuggling and for enforcing customs laws. The rapid naval buildup that occurred during the 1970s was intended to enforce Qadhafi's claim of sovereignty over the Gulf of Sidra with its sponging and fishing grounds as well as potential unexploited mineral wealth. The navy could also deter landings or raids aimed against the country's oil fields and vulnerable oil transport network. The purpose of acquiring amphibious ships for landing infantry and tanks was less obvious. One explanation might be to present a threat to Egyptian forces near the border with Libya. The Egyptians' sole land supply route is the coastal road from Alexandria. The navy has always been dependent on foreign sources for equipment, spare parts, and training. In 1972 a British naval advisory mission that had assisted in the development of the Libyan navy since its founding was terminated. Training was shifted to Greece and to Egypt and later to the Soviet Union. The initial ship orders, placed with British yards, were for patrol boats and corvettes. The largest surface ship in the Libyan navy, a frigate of about 1,500 tons with a crew of 130, was ordered just before the 1969 coup and delivered in 1973. Later, high-speed patrol boats and corvettes equipped with surface-to-surface missiles were purchased from France, Italy, and the Soviet Union. Between 1976 and 1983, six Soviet Foxtrot-class submarines were delivered. Each required a crew of seventy-five; in addition, twelve Soviet advisers were reportedly assigned to each vessel. Little information was available on the navy's organizational structure, but Tripoli was known to be the site of the naval command headquarters and of the principal naval base. Other bases were located in the ports of Benghazi, Darnah, Tobruk, and Marsa al Burayqah. A repair base was located at Al Khums east of Tripoli, and a submarine base was under construction at Ras al Hilal. As of early 1987, the Libyan navy had faced no hostile actions except for the encounter with the American fleet in March 1986 in which one missile boat and a corvette were destroyed and others possibly damaged. Earlier, it was reported that the small Libyan vessels were experiencing difficulty in obeying Qadhafi's order to remain at sea to avoid the risk of being bombed in port by American planes. The fleet reported breakdowns of engines and electronic failures as well as shortages of food and fuel. By early 1987 it was considered probable that the Libyan navy was overextended, having carried out a rapid buildup without sufficient trained personnel. More than onethird of the entire naval complement of 6,500 would be required to supply a single crew for each of the ships in commission in 1986. In addition, personnel would have to be found to staff a number of other vessels on order. Aggravating the problem of reaching a satisfactory level of operation, training, and maintenance was the need to become familiar with a variety of modern weapons systems from numerous supplier countries, among them Britain, France, Italy, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union.

43

The Air Force (1987) From country-data Last of the military services to be established, the air force has been obliged to struggle to develop trained air and ground crews to match the rapid acquisition of modern planes and weaponry (see table 12, Appendix). As a result, in spite of the significant inventory of combat aircraft, amounting to more than 500 as of early 1987, Libyan air units have been committed only reluctantly and have not acquitted themselves impressively in air-to-air engagements. However, the considerable air transport fleet, has apparently been employed capably in Chad and elsewhere. Although the air force has been extensively used in support of Libyan ground units in the fighting in Chad, it does not seem to have played a decisive role. At the time of the overthrow of the monarchy in 1969, the roster of personnel was only about 400 officers and enlisted men. A recruitment drive undertaken in 1970 eventually brought a tenfold increase in the force by 1978. As of 1986, its strength was estimated at 10,000. The country's burgeoning inventory of air force weapons accounted for a considerable share of Libya's procurement efforts. The hundreds of aircraft acquired since 1969 included American helicopters and transports (although deliveries of United States planes were blocked in 1975), later-model French closeair-support fighters, and up-to-date fighter interceptors from the Soviet Union. Of the combat aircraft, the United States Department of State estimated in 1983 that 50 percent remained in storage, including most of the MiG fighters and Tu-22 bombers. According to another report, the Mirage aircraft were so neglected that only half were in flying condition, the others being cannibalized for spare parts. Pilots from Syria and other countries reportedly helped fly the Libyan planes, and instructors, technical personnel, and maintenance teams included Soviets, Pakistanis, and Yugoslavs. With Soviet assistance, the air force was organized into one medium bomber squadron, three fighter interceptor squadrons, five forward ground attack squadrons, one counterinsurgency squadron, nine helicopter squadrons, and three air defense brigades deploying SA-2, SA-3, and Crotale missiles. (The three SA-5 launch sites were operated by army units.) The air force's primary installation was the huge Uqba ben Nafi Air Base (the former Wheelus Air Base) near Tripoli. It had excellent operational features and contained the service's headquarters and a large share of its major training facilities. Both MiG fighters and Tu-22 bombers were located there. A large air base at a site near Benghazi shared with the civil airport also had some MiG squadrons. Most of the Mirages were located at Gamal Abdul Nasser Air Base. Two airfields not far from the Egyptian border, at Al Kufrah Oasis and at Jabal al Uwaynat in the far south, were among the Libyan installations attacked by Egyptian air crews during the 1977 border clash. The Soviets have constructed another base in central Libya at the new army headquarters site of Al Jufrah near Hun with a runway of over 4,000 meters. An air force academy established at Az Zawiyah near Misratah in 1975 was reportedly staffed mainly by Yugoslavs. Institutions referred to as "secondary colleges," possibly technical training schools, were opened at Sabha and at Uqba ben Nafi Air Base in 1978. Basic pilot training was conducted on Italianmanufactured SF-260 planes before the students moved on to the Soko G-2AE Galebs (Yugoslav) and the Aero L-39 Albatros (Czechoslovak) at Az Zawiyah. Additional training took place outside Libya. Several hundred Libyan students were reportedly undergoing instruction with the Dassault firm in France in 1983 as part of the Mirage contract. This was at a time of confrontation between French and Libyan forces in Chad. Information on training programs conducted by the Soviet Union was scanty but in light of the sophisticated weapons in the air force inventory, it could be assumed that much time and effort were invested in producing even a limited number of combat-ready crews, backed up by ground support personnel. Soviet specialists reportedly accompanied the Libyans during the 1980 incursion into Chad and possibly were directly involved in missions of the Tu-22 bombers. The performance of the Libyan air force in emergency conditions cannot have been reassuring to Qadhafi. Libyan pilots have reportedly experienced difficulty in finding and identifying aircraft they have been ordered to intercept. They have been reluctant to fly at night for fear of being unable to locate their bases. To some extent, these problems may reflect outdated navigation and radar aids in their combat aircraft, which are mostly older, stripped-down versions of Soviet designs. The two Su22 fighters were handicapped in their engagement with carrier-based American F-14s in 1981 because the equipment, instruments, and airto -air missiles were outmoded in comparison with those of their adversaries. In spite of Qadhafi's express warning that his air force would repel the United States fleet in the Gulf of Sidra in 1986, his planes did not seriously challenge the American naval units. In addition, Libyan planes did not take off to meet the American fighter-bombers that attacked targets at Benghazi and Tripoli in April 1986; consequently many planes were destroyed or damaged on the ground. In Chad it was reported that many Libyan bombing raids were carried out at excessively high altitudes when met with antiaircraft fire.

44

Table 12. Major Air Force Equipment, 1986 From country-data Type

*umber in Inventory Country of Origin

Bombers Tu-22 Blinder

7

Soviet Union

32

France

MiG-23 Flogger

135

Soviet Union

MiG-25 Foxbat

55

-do-

Mirage 5

63

France

Mirage F-1

14

-do-

MiG-23 Flogger

54

Soviet Union

Su-20/-22 Fitter

50

-do-

30

Yugoslavia

An-26 Curl

20

Soviet Union

I1-76 Candid

15

-do-

C-130H Hercules

7

United States

Boeing 707

2

-do-

C-140 Jetstar

2

-do-

17

Italy

Mi-24 Hind

30

Soviet Union

Mi-14 Haze

30

-do-

Interceptors Mirage F-1

Ground Attack

Counterinsurgency J-1 Jastreb Transport

G-222 Helicopters

SA-321 Super Frelon

8

France

CH-47C Chinook

19

United States

Mi-8 Hip

12

Soviet Union

AB-212

2

Italy

10

France

9

Italy

MiG-25 Foxbat

5

Soviet Union

MiG-23 Flogger

14

-do-

G-2 Galeb

61

Yugoslavia

L-39 Albatros

100

Czechoslovakia

SF-260

120

Italy

12

France

SA-316B Alouette III AB-47 Trainers

CM-170 Magister

Source: Based on information from International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1986-1987, London, 1986, 103104.

45

Air Force (2002) From © Globalsecurity

Last of the military services to be established, the air force has been obliged to struggle to develop trained air and ground crews to match the rapid acquisition of modern planes and weaponry. As a result, in spite of the significant inventory of combat aircraft, amounting to more than 500 as of early 1987, Libyan air units have been committed only reluctantly and have not acquitted themselves impressively in air-to-air engagements. However, the considerable air transport fleet, has apparently been employed capably in Chad and elsewhere. Although the air force has been extensively used in support of Libyan ground units in the fighting in Chad, it does not seem to have played a decisive role. The Air Force is organized into an Air Defence Command which is subdivided into squadrons and regiments which attention paid to close air support and ground attack. Eight close battlefield support squadrons and nine air defence squadrons exist. The size of the Air Force is 22 000 persons including 15 000 conscripts. It has 426 combat aircraft and 52 armed helicopters with many more in store. At the time of the overthrow of the monarchy in 1969, the roster of personnel was only about 400 officers and enlisted men. A recruitment drive undertaken in 1970 eventually brought a tenfold increase in the force by 1978. As of 1986, its strength was estimated at 10,000. The country's burgeoning inventory of air force weapons accounted for a considerable share of Libya's procurement efforts. The hundreds of aircraft acquired since 1969 included American helicopters and transports (although deliveries of United States planes were blocked in 1975), later-model French close-air-support fighters, and up-to-date fighter interceptors from the Soviet Union. Of the combat aircraft, the United States Department of State estimated in 1983 that 50 percent remained in storage, including most of the MiG fighters and Tu-22 bombers. According to another report, the Mirage aircraft were so neglected that only half were in flying condition, the others being cannibalized for spare parts. Pilots from Syria and other countries reportedly helped fly the Libyan planes, and instructors, technical personnel, and maintenance teams included Soviets, Pakistanis, and Yugoslavs. With Soviet assistance, the air force was organized into one medium bomber squadron, three fighter interceptor squadrons, five forward ground attack squadrons, one counterinsurgency squadron, nine helicopter squadrons, and three air defense brigades deploying SA-2, SA-3, and Crotale missiles. (The three SA-5 launch sites were operated by army units.) The air force's primary installation was the huge Uqba ben Nafi Air Base (the former Wheelus Air Base) near Tripoli. It had excellent operational features and contained the service's headquarters and a large share of its major training facilities. Both MiG fighters and Tu-22 bombers were located there. A large air base at a site near Benghazi shared with the civil airport also had some MiG squadrons. Most of the Mirages were located at Gamal Abdul Nasser Air Base. Two airfields not far from the Egyptian border, at Al Kufrah Oasis and at Jabal al Uwaynat in the far south, were among the Libyan installations attacked by Egyptian air crews during the 1977 border clash. The Soviets have constructed another base in central Libya at the new army headquarters site of Al Jufrah near Hun with a runway of over 4,000 meters. An air force academy established at Az Zawiyah near Misratah in 1975 was reportedly staffed mainly by Yugoslavs. Institutions referred to as "secondary colleges," possibly technical training schools, were opened at Sabha and at Uqba ben Nafi Air Base in 1978. Basic pilot training was conducted on Italian-manufactured SF260 planes before the students moved on to the Soko G-2AE Galebs (Yugoslav) and the Aero L-39 Albatros (Czechoslovak) at Az Zawiyah. Additional training took place outside Libya. Several hundred Libyan students were reportedly undergoing instruction with the Dassault firm in France in 1983 as part of the Mirage contract. This was at a time of confrontation between French and Libyan forces in Chad. Information on training programs conducted by the Soviet Union was scanty but in light of the sophisticated weapons in the air force inventory, it could be assumed that much time and effort were invested in producing even a limited number of combat-ready crews, backed up by ground support personnel. Soviet specialists reportedly accompanied the Libyans during the 1980 incursion into Chad and possibly were directly involved in missions of the Tu-22 bombers. Much of Libyan air doctrine appears now to be of an ad hoc nature and contracted personnel from Yugoslavia. South Africa, Russia, North Korea and Pakistan provide piloting, maintenance and technical services. The performance of the Libyan air force in emergency conditions cannot have been reassuring to Qadhafi. Libyan pilots have reportedly experienced difficulty in finding and identifying aircraft they have been ordered to intercept. They have been reluctant to fly at night for fear of being unable to locate their bases. To some extent, these problems may reflect outdated navigation and radar aids in their combat aircraft, which are mostly older, stripped-down versions of Soviet designs. The two Su22 fighters were handicapped in their engagement with carrierbased American F-14s in 1981 because the equipment, instruments, and airto -air missiles were outmoded in comparison with those of their adversaries. In spite of Qadhafi's express warning that his air force would repel the United States fleet in the Gulf of Sidra in 1986, his planes did not seriously challenge the American naval units. In addition, Libyan planes did not take off to meet the American fighter-bombers that attacked targets at Benghazi and Tripoli in April 1986; consequently many planes were destroyed or damaged on the ground. In Chad it was reported that many Libyan bombing raids were carried out at excessively high altitudes when met with antiaircraft fire.

46

From © Globalsecurity

Air Order of Battle AIR DEFE*CE COMMA*D SQUADRO*

AIRCRAFT

BASE

TRIPOLI SECTOR 1203rd

MiG-23/UB

Umm Aitiqah

2nd

Mirage F.1ED/BD

Okbs ben Nafi

1st

MiG-23MF/MS/UB

Misurata

1025th

MiG-25

Al Jufra-Hun

1055th

MiG-25

Ghurdabiya-Sirte

1st

MiG-25

Al Jufra-Hun

1st

MiG-25

Sabha

HUN SECTOR

BENGASI SECTOR 1040th

MiG-23

Benina

1st

MiG-23

Benina

1060th

MiG-23/UB

Gamal Abdel Nasser

2nd

MiG-23/UB

Al Bumbah

TOBRUK SECTOR

AIR FORCE SQUADRO*

AIRCRAFT

BASE

1032nd Fight./Bomb.

Su-22M-2

Okba ben Nafi

1024th Bomb.

Su-24MK

Ghurdabiya-Sirte

1st Bomb.

Tu-22B

Al Jufra-Hun

1st Fight./Bomb.

Mirage F.1AD/BD

Okba ben Nafi

1st Fight./Bomb.

Su-22M-2

Ghurbabiya-Sirte-

1st Fight./Bomb.

Su-22M-2

Ghadames

1st Fight./Bomb.

MiG-23BN/UB

Al Bumbah

2nd Fight./Bomb.

MiG-21

Gamal Abdel-Nasser

2nd Fight./Bomb.

MiG-23BN/UB

Labraq

1st Arm. Helos.

Mi-24

Okba ben Nafi

1st Arm. Helos.

Mi-24

Misurata

1st Border Patrol

Mi-24

Gammal Adbel Nasser

1st Coast Patrol

Mi-24

Ghudardabiya

47

Air Force Size From © Globalsecurity

PERSONNEL: Aproximately 22,000 air force members EQUIPMENT: Approximately 420 combat aircraft (more than half of the aircraft are non-operational), 52 armed helicopters (many in storage) and 90 transport aircraft (some in storage). Most of the equipment is of Soviet origin and some from the USA and France. Serviceability of aircraft and equipment has been drastically affected by the UN embargo ordered in April 1992. AIRCRAFT INVENTORY: Bombers : 6 TU-22A/U Blinder. Fighter/Ground Attack : 50 Mig-21MF Fishbed, 75 MiG-23B/ML Flogger, 60 Mig-25 Foxbat, 15 Mirage F1-ED, 6 Mirage F1-BD, 40 MIG 23BN Flogger, 15 Mig 23-U Flogger, 30 Mirage 5D/DE, 14 Mirage 5DD, 14 Mirage F1-AD, 45 SU-20/22 Fitter. Counterinsurgency: 24 Jastreb J-1E. Reconnaissance: 5 Mirage 5DR, 7 Mig 25-R Foxbat. Strike and multi-role aircraft : 12 SU-24MK Fencer, 40 SU-22M-3 Fitter, 10 MIG-25R/U Foxbat, 2 TU-22U Blinder. Tankers: 2 KC-130H Hercules Transport: 1 Boeing 707-320, 6 Boeing CH-47, 1 C-140 Jetstar, 15 An-26 Curl, 5 C-130H Hercules, 2 L-100-20 Hercules, 3 L 100-30 Hercules, 16 G-222, 18 I1-76M Candid, 15 L-410UVP Turbolet. Helicopters: 12 Mi-35V Hind, 35 Mi-24 Hind, 50 Mi-14 Haze, 7 Mi-8C Hip, 30 Mi-2 Hoplite, 18 CH-47C Chinook, 10 SA 316B Alouette III, 5 AB 206A JetRanger, 2 AB-212 Bell, 11 SA-321 Super Frelon Training and Liaison: 150 L-39ZO Albatross, 80 G-2AE Galeb, 20 SF-260WL Marchetti, 12 CM-170 Magister, 1 TU-22 Blinder, 20 Mi-2 hel MISSILES: Air Defense missiles: S-75 Dvina (SA-2), S-125 Neva (SA-3) SAMs and Antey S-200 (SA-5) Air-to-air missiles: AA-2 (Atoll), AA-6 (Acrid), AA-7 (Apex), AA-8 (Aphid), AA-11 (Archer), R-530, R-550 Magique, Super 530D/F. Air-to-ground missiles: AS-9 (Kyle), AS-10 (Karen), AS-14 (Kedge), AT-2 (Swatter), AT-6 (Spiral)

48

Airfields Civil aviation in Libya was the responsibility of the Secretariat of Communications, which operated all airports, and the Civil Aviation Institute, which trained all personnel. The three internation airports in 1985 were located at Tripoli (Al Aziziyah), Benghazi (Benina), and Sabha. Smaller airfields were located at Marsa al Burayqah, Tobruk Ghat, Ghadamis, Al Kufrah, and several other locations. Most civil air personnel went abroad for training. Britain suspended its air traffic control training program for Libyans in 1985, but Pakistan subsequently agreed to train about seventy-eight Libyan air traffic controllers.

*ame

ICAO

Type

Latitude

Longitude

Runway ft.

Elevation ft.

Military Airfields AL BUMBAH NORTH

HL

C

32.4529

23.1186

11,155

33

AL JUFRA [Al Jufra-Hun]

HL

C

29.1981

16.0010

13,729

846

BENINA [Benghazi]

HLLB

B

32.0968

20.2695

11,732

433

EL BEIDA [LABRAQ]

HLLQ

B

32.7886

21.9644

11,824

2,157

GAMAL ABD EL NASSER

HL

C

31.8613

23.9070

9,895

519

GHADAMES EAST

HLTD

A

30.1517

9.7153

11,811

1,122

GHAT

HLGT

A

25.1456

10.1426

11,811

2,296

MARTUBAH

HL

C

32.5423

22.7454

11,781

1,235

MISURATA

HL

C

32.3248

15.0607

11,140

60

MITIGA [UMM AITIQAH]

HLLM

A

32.8941

13.2760

11,076

36

OKBA IBN NAFA

HL

C

32.4734

11.8979

10,500

253

SEBHA

HLLS

A

26.9935

14.4514

11,778

1,427

SIRTE [Ghurdabiya-Sirte]

HLGD

C

31.0633

16.5950

11,807

267

TRIPOLI INTL [Tripolis-Tarrabalus AB]

HLLT

B

32.6635

13.1590

11,815

263

Other Airfields AGEDABIA [AJDABIYAH ]

HLAG

D

30.7651

20.1914

3,360

50

AL BOOSTER

HL

D

29.8743

23.3472

11,503

175

AL HAMADA CON 66 EAST

HL

D

29.5294

12.9442

7,773

2,090

AL KHADIM

HL

D

31.9985

21.1918

11,838

800

AL KHUWAYMAT

HL

D

27.2573

21.6181

11,811

500

AL MARJ

HL

D

32.5253

20.8751

4,275

950

AL WIGH

HL

D

24.1859

14.5328

11,975

1,558

AMAL V12 [AMAL 3]

HLAM

D

29.4795

21.1224

5,700

145

BEDA M3

HL

D

28.5033

19.0028

7,495

499

BENI WALID

HL

D

31.7392

13.9540

5,905

985

BIR UMRAN

HL

D

26.3324

13.4221

4,920

1,400

BRACH

HL

B

27.6534

14.2718

11,806

1,056

BU ATTIFEL

HLFL

D

28.7954

22.0809

7,051

161

DAHRA

HLRA

D

29.4700

17.9312

6,882

1,050

49

HABIT AWLAD MUHAMMAD

HL

D

30.7014

12.4845

7,758

2,000

HON

HLON

D

29.1101

15.9656

5,905

919

KUFRA

HLKF

B

24.1787

23.3140

12,007

1,367

MARSA BREGA [MARSA AL BURAYQAH]

HLMB

D

30.3781

19.5764

7,218

50

MATAN AS SARRA

HL

D

21.6875

21.8310

11,013

1,722

MATRATIN

HL

D

30.6430

18.3208

6,967

100

NAFURAH 1

HL

D

29.2129

21.5920

9,832

122

NANUR

HL

D

31.7056

14.9111

12,773

185

OXY A 103 [AKLASH WADI]

HL

D

29.0062

20.7861

5,940

318

QARYAT AL KARMAL

HL

D

31.9757

20.0269

3,280

85

RAS LANUF OIL

HLNF

D

30.5000

18.5272

5,903

42

SARIR

HL

D

27.6624

22.5086

7,220

400

SARIR NW

HL

D

27.9757

22.3574

7,218

330

SIDI SALIH

HL

D

32.4950

13.2889

3,235

490

TAMINHINT

HL

B

27.2401

14.6563

11,130

1,325

UBARI

HL

D

26.5675

12.8231

9,349

1,387

WADDAN

HL

D

29.1392

16.1603

6,514

910

WADI BUZANAD SW

HL

D

28.9619

17.5881

6,160

489

WAREHOUSE 59A

HL

D

28.3224

19.9300

6,918

488

WAREHOUSE 59E

HLGL

D

28.6353

21.4386

6,539

325

WAW AL KABIR

HL

D

25.3568

16.8100

12,480

1,465

ZELLA 74

HLZA

D

28.5901

17.2942

7,092

1,085

ZELTEN SW NEW

HL

D

28.5871

19.3034

5,162

550

ZUETINA [AZ ZUWAYTINAH]

HL

D

30.8702

20.0755

5,725

16

ZWARA

HL

D

32.9523

12.0155

5,913

15

Cities of 100,000 and more inhabitants City name

City Proper Year

Total

Al Khums

1990

200,000

BENGHAZI [Dual capital]

1990

800,000

Misurata

1990

360,000

Sebha

1990

150,000

TRIPOLI [Dual capital]

1990

1,500,000

Zuwarah

1990

280,000

From © Globalsecurity

50

Libyan Air Force ‫ة‬DDDDDDD‫ة الليبي‬DDDDDDD‫وات الجوي‬DDDDDDD‫الق‬

Al Quwwat al-Jawwiya al-Libiyya

Roundel since 1969. Former Royndel From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Active HQ Engagements

1978 Okba Ben Nafi, Tripoli Chadian-Libyan conflict 1978-1987 Gulf of Sidra incidents 1981,1989

Attack

Su-22, J-21, Mi-14, Mi-24, Bell 206,

Bomber

Su-24

Fighter

MiG-21, MiG-23, Mirage F1

Trainer

SF-260, L-39, G-2, Yak-130

Transport

An-26, Falcon 20, Falcon 50, Gulfstream II, Il-76, L-410, C-130, Il-78 Midas, Bell 212, CH-47, Mi-8

The Libyan Air Force (Arabic: ‫ القوات الجوية الليبية‬- Al Quwwat al-Jawwiya al-Libiyya) is the air force of Libya, with an air force personnel estimated at 22,000. After U.S. forces had left Libya in 1970, Wheelus Air Base, a previous U.S. facility about seven miles from Tripoli, became a Libyan Air Force installation and was renamed Okba Ben Nafi Air Base. OBN AB housed the LPAF's headquarters and a large share of its major training facilities. LPAF Soviet-made MiG-17/19/25 fighters and Tu-22 bombers were based at Okba Ben Nafi Air Base. Of the combat aircraft, the United States Department of State estimated in 1983 that 50 percent remained in storage, including most of the MiG fighters and Tu-22 bombers. History Cold War During the Cold War, aircraft and personnel of the Soviet Air Force took residence at Okba Ben Nafi Air Base. With Soviet assistance, the Libyan Air Force was organized into one medium bomber squadron, three fighter interceptor squadrons, five forward ground attack squadrons, one counterinsurgency squadron, nine helicopter squadrons, and three air defense brigades deploying SA-2, SA-3, and Crotale missiles.[1] Post–Cold War With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the elimination of military aid by the new Russian republic, Soviet/Russian support was drastically curtailed. The last major delivery of Soviet aircraft was 15 Su-24 Fencers in March/April 1989. Much of Libyan air doctrine appears now to be of an ad hoc nature and contracted personnel from Yugoslavia, South Africa, Russia, North Korea and Pakistan provide piloting, maintenance and technical services. UN sanctions were lifted in early 1999 and Libya has talked to Russia about upgrades for its MiG-21s and MiG-25s while also expressing an interest in MiG-29s, MiG-31s and long-range SAMs. However, many of the transport and combat aircraft are in storage. Combat History LAF has lost a total of four aircraft to United States Navy F-14 Tomcats in two incidents, in 1981 and 1989. Aircraft Inventory

51

Libyan Air Force Mi-8 Libyan Air Force L-39 Libyan Tu-22 flying in the early 1980s. • Combat Aircraft - most aircraft are grounded and considered withdrawn from service o 12 Dassault Mirage F1BD/ED[2] - all grounded but to be refurbished and return to service o 25 Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21bis o 125 Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-23BN/MS/ML/UM o 40 Sukhoi Su-22M3/UM-3K o 5 Sukhoi Su-24MK- one lost in fire o 13 Soko J-21 Jastreb • Trainers o 110 Aero L-39ZO Albatros o 20 Aermacchi SF-260WL - 12 of them will refubished o 116 Soko G-2 Galeb o 6 Yakovlev Yak-130[2] - on order • Transport Aircraft o 10 Antonov An-26 - plans to procure new transport planes to replace them o 3 Dassault Falcon 20 o 1 Dassault Falcon 50 o 3 Gulfstream II o 15 Ilyushin Il-76 o 15 Let L-410 Turbolet o 10 Lockheed C-130H Hercules • Refuellers o 4 Ilyushin Il-78 • Attack Helicopters o 8 Aerospatiale Gazelle o 4 Bell 206 JetRanger o 12 Mil Mi-14 o 43 Mil Mi-24 - 13 of them modernised in South Africa • Transport Helicopters o 2 Bell 212 Twin Huey o 8 Boeing CH-47 Chinook - another 12 sold to U.A.E o 25 Mil Mi-8 including Mi-17 o ? Mil Mi-17 • Air Defence o 90 Lavochkin SA-2 o 10 Isayev SA-3 o 48 SA-6 • Future Aircraft o 14 Dassault Rafale - MoU signed December 9, 2007 runs until July 1, 2008[3] o 12 Eurocopter EC 665 Tiger - MoU signed December 9, 2007 runs until July 1, 2008 o 20 Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-29SMT - under study o 12 Sukhoi Su-30MK - under study o 15 Eurocopter EC 725 o 10 Eurocopter AS 350 Ecureuil • Retired Aircraft o Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-25 o Dassault Mirage V[4] o Boeing 707 o Tupolev Tu-22 o Aeritalia G222 o Aerospatiale Super Frelon References 1. ^ Library of Congress Country Study Libya, Chapter 5:National Security, 1987 2. ^ a b Libyan military aviation OrBat 3. ^ (French) Armes: Exclusivite France-Lybie prolongee 4. ^ Libyan Mirages in Use for Pakistan AF Spares, Air Forces Monthly, June 2008 issue, p. 32 External links • Libyan Air Force - Globalsecurity.org • Libyan Air Forces - Historical Listings - worldairforces.com • Libyan Detachment in Malta - aeroflight.co.uk • Photos of Libyan military aircraft - airliners.net • (French) http://www.avions-militaires.net/dossiers/armee-air/lby.php

52

Mitiga International Airport From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Elevation AMSL

32°30′38.71″N 13°16′33.6″E32.5107528°N 13.276°ECoordinates: 13°16′33.6″E32.5107528°N 13.276°E

Coordinates

Direction

36 ft / 11 m

Length

32°30′38.71″N

Surface

ft

m

03/21

6,000

1,829

Asphalt

11/29

11,076

3,376

Asphalt

Mitiga International Airport (IATA: MJI, ICAO: HLLM) is an airport in Libya, located about seven statute miles (11 km) east of Tripoli. The civilian airport was established in 1995. Domestic flights to Benghazi and Musrata are flown, as well as international service to Istanbul, Turkey and Aleppo, Syria. Prior to June 1970, the United States Air Force (USAF) used the facility, then known as Wheelus Air Base. Subsequently the facility was known as Okba Ben *afi Air Base, a Libyan People's Air Force (LPAF) installation. During the Cold War, aircraft and personnel of the Soviet Air Force took residence at Okba Ben Nafi Air Base. The base housed the LPAF's headquarters and a large share of its major training facilities. LPAF Soviet-made MiG-17/19/25 fighters and Tu22 bombers were based at Okba Ben Nafi Air Base. The Mig-25s were the first sold to an air force other than that of the Soviet Union itself. In 1986, the base was a primary target of Operation Eldorado Canyon (see below), a United States retalliatory strike against Libya for Libyan missile attacks on U.S. aircraft over the Mediterranean Sea and Libyan involvement in alleged terrorist attacks on U.S. servicemen in Europe. Origins Wheelus Air Base was originally built by the Italian Air Force in 1923 and known as Mellaha Air Base. Mellaha was used by the German Luftwaffe during the Battle of North Africa, with the Germans using it for short range recon units, as well as coastal and naval recon units. Special weather recon units also existed at Mehalla. The main Luftwaffe unit was the 2nd staffel of the Aufklärungsgruppe (H) 14 or 2.(H)/14. The squadron was equipped with twelve single-engined Henschel Hs 126, an aircraft with 2man crews, which could cover approx 710 km, with a maximum speed of 360 km/h. Three liaison aircraft in the form of Fieseler Fi 156 Storch and a Junkers Ju 52 for transport of men and materiel. It was captured by the British 8th Army in January 1943. World War II The US Army Air Force began using Mellaha as a base in January 1943. It was used by the 376th Bombardment Group (Heavy) of the 12th Air Force for B-24 bomb missions into Italy and southern Germany. On 15 April 1945 Mellaha AAF was taken over by USAAF’s Air Training Command. It was renamed Wheelus Army Air Field (AAF) on 17 May 1945 in honor of USAAF Lt Richard Wheelus who had died earlier that year in a plane crash in Iran. Wheelus AAF was inactivated on 15 May 1947, then reactivated as Wheelus Air Base ( Wheelus AB) on 1 June 1948 and transferred to the USAF Military Air Transport Service (MATS). It's host unit under MATS was the 1603d Air Transport Wing. With the crowning of His Majesty King of Libya Mohammed Idris Al-Sanusi I in 1951, United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE)-based fighter-bomber units also began using Wheelus AB and its nearby El Watia Gunnery Range for gunnery and bombing training. A further agreement between the United States and Libya, signed in 1954, granted the U.S. the use of Wheelus and its gunnery range until December 1971. "Lady Be Good" On 9 November 1958, British geologists flying over the Libyan Desert spotted an aircraft resting on the sand dunes approximately 400 statute miles (640 km) south of Benghazi, Libya. A ground party reached the site in March 1959 and discovered the plane to be the Lady Be Good, a B-24D Liberator of the USAAF's 376th Bomb Group (AAF Serial No. 41-24301). The USAAF bomber had disappeared after a 4 April 1943 high-altitude bombing attack by 25 Liberators from an AAF base at Sulûq (near Benghazi) against the harbor facilities at Naples, Italy. All planes but one returned to Allied territory that night--the one missing was the Lady Be Good. Evidence at the site indicated that the Lady Be Good crew had become lost in the dark on the return from Naples and mistook the nighttime desert for the Mediterranean Sea. The aircrew had overflown Sulûq southward into the desert. With the B-24's fuel supply depleted, the nine men aboard had bailed out and disappeared while attempting to walk northward to civilization. Intensive searches were made for clues as to the fate of the crew to no avail. In 1960, the remains of eight airmen were found, one near the plane and the other seven far to the north. The body of the ninth crewman was never found. Five had trekked 78 miles (125 km) before perishing, and one had gone an amazing 109 miles (175 km). In addition, they had lived eight days rather than only the two expected of men in the desert with little or no water. Numerous parts from the Lady Be Good were returned to the U.S. for technical study. Also, some of the parts were installed in other planes, aircraft which then experienced unexpected difficulties. A C-54 in which several autosync

53

transmitters were installed had propeller trouble and made a safe landing only by throwing cargo overboard. A C-47 in which a radio receiver was installed ditched in the Mediterranean, and a U.S. Army U-6 "Otter" airplane in which a Lady Be Good seat armrest was installed crashed in the Gulf of Sidra with 10 men aboard. No trace of the U-6's passengers and crew was ever found of any of them; one of the few pieces washed ashore was the armrest of the Lady Be Good. In 1960, members of the 7272nd ABW donated funds for the design and manufacture of a memorial window to the Lady Be Good and its crew in the Wheelus AB base chapel. Cold War use By USAF Wheelus was first used by the USAAF as a bomber base in 1943. It was renamed Wheelus Air Base in 1945, and remained in use by the United States until 1970. With its 4,600 Americans, the U.S. Ambassador to Libya once called it "a Little America...on the sparkling shores of the Mediterranean," although temperatures at the base frequently reached 110 to 120 degrees Fahrenheit (43 to 50 degrees Celsius). Military Air Transport Service Use The Military Air Transport Service (MATS) activated the 1603rd Air Transport Wing at Wheelus on 1 June 1948. The 1603rd flew C-47 and C-54s to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Cyprus, and operated the base transport control center until 1952. The 58th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (58 ARRS) operated out of Wheelus until 1970 when they were relocated to the 67th ARRSQ in the UK. The 58 ARRS flew three HH-3E Jolly Green Giant helicopters, and three HC-130 refueling tankers. MATS aircraft and personnel from Wheelus participated in Operation Hajji Baba in 1952. Also in 1952 the MATS 580th Air Resupply and Communications Wing was reassigned to Wheelus from Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho. The Wing (later Group) supported special operations in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Southwest Asia until being inactivated in 1956. MATS withdrew and relocated to Rhein Main AB, Germany in January 1953. However, MATS and later Military Airlift Command (MAC) aircraft were frequent visitors at Wheelus and maintained a small detachment there until the base's closure in 1970. Strategic Air Command use As the Cold War overtook post-WW II international politics, on 16 November 1950 USAF's Strategic Air Command (SAC) began deploying B-50s, B-36s, B-47s and support aircraft (KB-29, KB-50, and KC-97 tankers) from US air bases to Wheelus. The base became one of several SAC forward operating locations (FOLs) in North Africa, becoming a vital link in SAC war plans for use as a bomber, tanker refueling and recon-fighter base. Wheelus hosted SAC bomber deployments in 45-day rotational deployments, using Wheelus as a staging area for planned strikes against the Soviet Union. SAC's use of Wheelus continued until 1970, when as part of the USAF withdrawal from the base, its rotational deployments ended. USAFE use Wheelus AB was reassigned from MATS to United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) on 16 October 1951, under USAFE's 7272nd Air Base Wing. The 7272nd was later designated a Fighter Training Wing and became the host unit at Wheelus AB until the base closure on 11 June 1970. 431st Fighter-Interceptor Squadron The 431st Fighter-Interceptor Squadron was activated when the 172nd Fighter Squadron of the Michigan Air National Guard was ordered to active duty in June 1953. The squadron was reassigned from Selfridge AFB and deployed to Wheelus, where it was equipped with twenty-five F-86Fs, two T-33s, and one C-47. The squadron insignia adorned each side of the center fuselage, just over the wing. The tail markings consisted of a red-and-white comet design on the vertical tail. A white lightning flash decorated the red portion of the comet's tail. In January 1955 the F-86D began to replace the F-86Fs, which were sent to NATO air forces. The squadron's tail markings changed with the F-86Ds having two or three horzontal red chevrons starting at the base of the rudder, with the chevron point touching the vertical fin's leading edge and angling towards the upper trailing edge of the rudder. Inside the rearmost chevron was a solid blue triangle. In September 1958, the 431st FIS moved to Zaragoza Air Base, Spain, and was transferred from USAFE to SAC's 16th Air Force. On 1 August 1956, the Headquarters of 17th Air Force moved to Wheelus Air Base, Libya from Rabat, Morocco, where it remained until relocating to Ramstein AB, Germany on 15 November 1959. Detachment 1, 20th Fighter-Bomber Wing The 20th Fighter Bomber Wing, based at RAF Wethersfield UK, established an operational detachment at Wheelus AB, in February 1958. This detachment managed the USAFE Weapons Training Center for month-long squadron rotations by the Europe-based USAFE tactical fighter wings. This facility allowed USAFE units from Germany, such as the 36th and 49th TFWs in joint operations with their F-84 "Thunderjet" and the 50th TFW with F-100 Super Sabres trained at Wheelus. In addition, the United Kingdom based 20th and 48th TFWs with F-100Ds, and the 81st TFW trained in air-to-air and air-to-ground gunnery and delivery of conventional ordnance and nuclear "shapes" at the weapons range about 10 nautical miles further east of the air base. As the F-4 Phantom II replaced most USAFE fighters in the 1960s, Phantom detachment operations became the predominant activity at Wheelus. USAFE's use of Wheelus continued until 1970, when as part of the USAF withdraw from the base, desert weapons range training ended. USAF withdrawal Oil was discovered in Libya in 1959, and what had been one of the world's poorest countries became extremely wealthy. The United States enjoyed a generally warm relationship with Libya and pursued policies centered on interests in operations at Wheelus Air Base and the considerable U.S. oil interests. In September 1969 Libya's king was overthrown by Muammar al-Gaddafi who ousted the Americans and British. Gaddafi demanded that Wheelus, which he saw as a vestige of European colonialism, be closed and its facilities turned over to the Libyan people. While the U.S. wished to retain Wheelus Air Base, the strategic value of the facility had declined with the development of nuclear missiles that had effectively replaced many bomber bases. Indeed, Wheelus had primarily served as a tactical fighter training facility in the 1960s. The Wheelus base agreement had just two more years to run, and in December 1969, the U.S. agreed to vacate the facility by June 1970. Libyan/Soviet Use

54

After the USAF left, Wheelus became a Libyan People's Air Force installation and was renamed Okba Ben *afi Air Base. OBN AB housed the LPAF's headquarters and a large share of its major training facilities. LPAF Soviet-made MiG-17/19/25 fighters and Tu22 bombers were based at Okba Ben Nafi Air Base. Of the combat aircraft, the United States Department of State estimated in 1983 that 50 percent remained in storage, including most of the MiG fighters and Tu-22 bombers. In addition, aircraft and personnel of the Soviet Air Force took residence at Okba Ben Nafi Air Base. With Soviet assistance, the Libyan Air Force was organized into one medium bomber squadron, three fighter interceptor squadrons, five forward ground attack squadrons, one counterinsurgency squadron, nine helicopter squadrons, and three air defense brigades deploying SA-2, SA-3, and Crotale missiles Operation El Dorado Canyon At 0200 hours on 16 April 1986 Okba Ben Nafi AB, various Libyan government buildings, and three of 30 Libyan terrorist[citation needed] training camps were bombed by F-111Fs from USAFE's 48th Tactical Fighter Wing (48 TFW), flying non-stop from RAF Lakenheath, UK, to Libya in "Operation El Dorado Canyon". The mission was in retaliation for Libyan missile attacks on U.S. aircraft over the Mediterranean Sea and Libyan involvement in alleged terrorist attacks on U.S. servicemen in Europe. Operation El Dorado Canyon included eighteen 48 TFW F-111F "Aardvark" fighter-bombers (Pave Tack-equipped), five EF-111A "Sparkvarks" from the 66th Electronic Combat Wing/42nd Electronic Combat Squadron at RAF Upper Heyford, UK, and carrier-based U.S. Navy F-14 Tomcats and A-6E Intruders. The 66 ECW Sparkvarks formed up with the attack force to provide electronic defense during the attack. One 48 TFW F-111F (AF Serial No. 70-2389, callsign "Karma 52") was lost outbound from the attack to (presumably) a SAM or AAA hit. The pilot, Major Fernando Ribas-Dominici and the WSO, Capt Paul Lorence, were lost. The 14-hour 5,800-mile (9,300 km) round trip to Libya required numerous in-air refuelings (over seven million pounds of fuel), because countries closer to Libya—Spain, Italy, France, and Greece—had refused American planes permission to fly over or from bases in their countries. Ironically, the 48 TFW had practiced for years at Wheelus with F-100s and later at Zaragoza AB Spain with F-4D Phantoms and the F-111s for just such a mission. Post–Cold War With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the elimination of military aid by the new Russian republic, Okba Ben Nafi AB drastically curtailed its military mission. The last major delivery of Soviet aircraft was 15 Su-24 Fencers in March/April 1989. Much of Libyan air doctrine appears now to be of an ad hoc nature and contracted personnel from Yugoslavia, South Africa, Russia, North Korea and Pakistan provide piloting, maintenance and technical services. UN sanctions were lifted in early 1999 and Libya has talked to Russia about upgrades for its MiG-21s and MiG-25s while also expressing an interest in MiG-29s, MiG-31s and long-range SAMs. However, many of the transport and combat aircraft are in storage. External links

• • • • • • • • •

Air Mobility Command Successor of the Military Air Transport Service Strategic Air Command US Air Forces in Europe 20th FDW/TFW F-100 photos Lady Be Good Official Website USAF Museum Lady Be Good Factsheet USAF Museum Lady Be Good Stained Glass Window From Wheelus AB Chapel Wheelus High School Ex Student Association Operation El Dorado Canyon

55

North American F-86F-20-NH Sabre AF Serial No. 51-13168 of the 431st FIS. North American F-86D-50-NA Sabre AF Serial No. 52-10054 of the 431st FIS.

North American F-100D-65-NA Super Sabre AF Serial No. 56-2967 of the 20th FBW at Wheelus AB.

56

III. Intelligence and Internal Security From © Globalsecurity

To ensure both the country's and Gaddafi's security, Libya has a highly active intelligence service that operates both in and outside the country. Libya's intelligence service comprises several (as many as seven) individually independent agencies, which also monitor each other. It is claimed that many Libyans constantly feel that they may be under surveillance, which causes a certain amount of fear and caution. The intelligence services' procedures are not known, but probably take a wide variety of forms, e.g. physical surveillance, compulsory reporting for the various officials, monitoring through communication technology, mass media monitoring etc. It is well known that civil servants are constantly shifted within the administrations and executive departments where they work, to prevent strong, opposing alliances from forming that could threaten the regime. According to experts, this reshuffling of staff strongly contributes to bureaucracy and administrative inefficiency. By the late 1980s, many segments of Libyan society deeply resented the authoritarian nature of the Libyan government under Qadhafi. The extent of silent opposition could not be assessed with certainty but has been estimated at more than 50 percent by outside observers. Dissent was hard to measure because all news media were strictly controlled to serve as instruments of the state, and no forms of association were permitted without the endorsement of the regime. Citizens were fearful of voicing discontent or uttering critical opinions that might be reported by a widespread informer network. Punishment for open dissent was arbitrary and could be extraordinarily severe. Internal security mechanisms reaching into every corner of Libyan society, and fears of harsh retribution have successfully prevented antipathy to Qadhafi's actions from reaching a stage of public demonstrations or open questioning. As many as 50,000 Libyans--mostly from the more prosperous classes--have taken up residence abroad, but the opposition groups that have sprung up among the exiles have not presented a convincing threat to the regime. Numerous attempts have been launched to overturn Qadhafi's rule. In most instances, these attempts have originated among military officers who have access to weapons and the necessary communications and organizational networks. In no case, however, did they appear to come near to achieving their goal. The effectiveness of the internal security apparatus and the infiltration of officers loyal to Qadhafi have frustrated most plots before they could develop sufficiently to have a chance of success. Among the reported coup attempts, possibly the most widespread was uncovered among disaffected officers of the RCC in 1975. A large number of personnel were tried in secret by a military court, with many sentenced to death and hundreds condemned to long prison terms. An undisclosed number of officers and civilians were arrested in an abortive coup in January 1983; five officers were executed, including the deputy commander of the People's Militia. A coup attempt, reportedly involving bloody fighting in front of the fortified barracks where Qadhafi resides in a Tripoli suburb, occurred in May 1984. According to the United States Department of State, over 5,000 were arrested, many tortured, and perhaps more than 100 executed. A leading opposition group, the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, took credit for this failed operation, although Qadhafi blamed the Muslim Brotherhood. Another reported plot in March 1985 was said to have been foiled when it was infiltrated by persons loyal to Qadhafi. Some sixty military officers, disgruntled over the country's economic mismanagement and extravagance, were said to have been arrested. A further instance of disaffection occurred in November 1985. Colonel Hassan Ishkal, a senior officer and military governor of Surt, was reportedly summarily executed after being summoned to Qadhafi's headquarters. It was believed that he had broken with Qadhafi over the interference of revolutionary guards in the military and over Qadhafi's adventurist foreign policies. Because of these coup attempts, protective security surrounding Qadhafi was carried to unusual lengths. His travel plans were concealed and changed abruptly, his patterns of residence were disguised, and he moved about in a heavily armored convoy. His personal bodyguard was composed of a Presidential Guard, drawn from his own tribal group. Moreover, there were reports that Qadhafi constantly moved senior military officers from one command to another so that no officer could develop a unified command capable of threatening the regime. The major instrument used by Qadhafi to detect and avert coup attempts was an extensive internal security apparatus. By the late 1980s, details of the salient features of the security organization were still generally lacking. The system installed in the early 1970s with Egyptian help was modeled on its Egyptian counterpart and was once described as "composed of several overlapping but autonomously directed intelligence machines." As it further evolved, internal security functioned on several levels, beginning with Qadhafi's personal bodyguard unit (reportedly given technical assistance by East German advisers). The secret service and, at a lower level, the police were constantly on the alert for suspicious conduct, as were the revolutionary committees and the Basic People's Congresses. The committees constituted an effective informer network and may also act independently of other security agencies when authorized and encouraged by Qadhafi. This multilayered complex assured tight control over the activity of individuals in virtually every community. Libya has increased its monitoring of Libyan dissidents and oppositionists abroad. This is largely a reaction to an aborted coup in 1993 which Qadhafi believed was orchestrated by oppositionists abroad. On 21 December 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 was downed over Lockerbee, Scotland by a terrorist bomb. 270 people were killed aboard the Boeing 747. Libya was accused of responsibility for the bombing, which killed 259 people onboard and 11 on the ground. Two Libyan operatives, Abdel Basset al-Megrahi and A-Amin Khalifa Fahimah, were indicted in 1991 and thought to be in hiding in Libya. They were sent to the Netherlands for trial in 1999 and implicated Mohammed Abu Talb, a Palestinian terrorist jailed in Sweden. In 2000 Ahmad Behbahani told a 60 Minutes journalist from a refugee camp in Turkey that he proposed the Pan Am operation and coordinated the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. He also claimed that Iran was behind the 1994 bombing in Argentina that killed 86 people. Behbahani was later called a fraud by the CIA and

57

FBI. In 2001 a Scottish court convicted Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, a Libyan intelligence officer, of murder in the 1998 bombing of Pan am Flight 103. A 2nd Libyan, Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, was acquitted. The conviction was upheld in 2002. In 2003 Libya set up a $2.7 billion fund for families of 270 people killed. On 19 September 1989 a French DC-10, UTA Flight 772, was bombed over the Sahara desert of Niger and all 170 [171] passengers died. French authorities placed the blame on Libya’s Abdallah Senoussi, brother-in-law of Moammar Khadafy and chief of foreign operations for the Libyan secret service. The six Libyan suspects were named by a French judge in 1998 and tried in absentia in 1999. The attack was in retaliation for French intervention on behalf of Chad in a war with Libya since the mid 1980s In August 1993 Qadhafi began a shake up of his security and intelligence services. On one hand, this move confirmed the fall of the regime's number two man, Commandant Abdessalam Jallud and his tribe, the Migariha, whose influence was dominant up until now in the security services. On the other hand, it confirmed the preeminence of the Kaddadifa clan, of which the chief of state is a member. In February 1996 a plan to kill Moammar Khadafy failed and several bystanders were killed. In 1998 David Shayler, a former member of the British intelligence services, disclosed the plot in France while fighting extradition to Britain. The British foreign secretary denied the attack. Shayler returned to London in 2000 to face charges. Evidence strongly suggests a restructuring of the intelligence services' methods by 2002. They now seem to be less generalised, instead focusing more directly on clearly defined opposition groups and individuals. This change may be a result of the regime wishing to project a more open and less repressive image, or possibly feeling less under threat at present.

Maktab Maaloumat al-Kaed Guide's Intelligence Bureau Muammar al-Gadhafi holds the title of Guide of the Revolution. The Guide's Intelligence Bureau is a major coordinating body. It is located in the Bab al-Aziza barracks in the center of Tripoli. Qadhafi began a reorganization of Libya's security and intelligence services in early August 1993. The diversity of different services was maintained, but the Guide's Intelligence Bureau (Maktab Maaloumat al-Kaed) wan reinforced and becomes a major coordinating body. Located in the Bab al-Aziza barracks in the center of Tripoli, as of late 1993 the Bureau was headed by Ahmed Ramadan al-Asabia, a Kaddadifa member and intelligence specialist very close to Colonel Kadhafi. One of his principal advisors, Mohamed Amsied al-Majub al-Kaddafi, was general coordinator of the Revolutionary Committees, replacing Abdessalam Jallud who had withdrawn to his native town of Sebha. Al-Asabia exercised direct control over the four security and intelligence agencies.

Haiat amn al Jamahiriya Jamahiriya Security Organization (JSO) [aka External Security Organization (ESO)] [aka Libyan Intelligence Service (LIS)] The Libyan External Security Organization, a/k/a Jamahiriya Security Organization (hereinafter "JSO") is an intelligence and operational entity which operates separately from, but is an agency, instrumentality and/or organ of the Libyan government. This service is divided into two branches: Internal Security, and Foreign Security. This organization has several branches, amongst which: Foreign Liaison Office, which has overall responsibility for most overseas intelligence operations and a sub-directorate provides direct contact with international terrorist groups.





Foreign Security Special Operations, External Security (including External Operations and Fundamentalist Movements) The Libyan External Security Organization (ESO) is the principal intelligence institution in Libya which has been responsible for supporting terrorist organizations and for perpetrating state sponsored acts of terrorism. As of 1993 the Jamahiriya's Security Organization (Haiat amn al Jamahiriya) was led by Lieutenant Colonel Abdallah Senussi, brother in law of Colonel Kadhafi. Although he is director of the most important intelligence service, Senussi was the only senior intelligence official who is not a member of the Kaddadifa clan. His loyalty to his brother in law made him a Migariha dissident. This service is divided into two branches: Internal Security, directed in 1993 by Omar Gueider (of the Orphelis clan) and Foreign Security, whose boss in 1993 was the publicity-seeking Colonel Yussef Dibri, who is also director the Libyan radio. A native of the Kufra oasis on the Egypt- Sudan border, married to a Lebanese and resident of Suite 501 at Hotel El Kebir in Tripoli, Dibri had only limited power and was especially active when contacts with foreigners are involved. Other high officials of Foreign Security nonetheless played important roles. For example, in 1993 the operations bureau of Foreign Security was under Captain Abdusalam Mohamed Zadma of the Ouled Souleymane clan, traditional allies of the Kaddadifa. Formerly responsible for opposition members abroad, he was in charge of the fundamentalist file. Foreign Security special operations were under Nasser Ali Achur who had been given

58

the IRA file. In this capacity he is participated in the negotiations between Tripoli and MI5 concerning Irish revolutionaries. As of late 1995 Musa Kusa was the head of the Libyan External Security Organization (ESO), and was also the head of Al Mathaba. In October 2001 the chairman of the Libyan intelligence, Mousa Kousa, met in London high ranking British and American intelligence and discussed during his meetings with them his country's cooperation with the west concerning the file of terrorism. In November 2001 Abdallah Senussi, the deputy head of Libyan intelligence who was implicated in the bombing of a French airliner in 1989, was put under house arrest. Abdallah Senussi, who is Libyan leader Moamer Kadhafi's brother-in-law, was put under house arrest along with several other Libyan intelligence officials. Senussi had been a Kadhafi confidant for 20 years. Senussi, along with five Libyan agents and diplomats, was condemned in absentia to life in prison by a Paris court in March 1999 for his involvement in the bombing of a French UTA airliner over Nigeria in 1989, killing 170 people.

Istikhbarat Askaria Military Intelligence The High Command of the Armed Forces (Al Kiada al Ulia Kuwait Mussallah) was the new title adopted in 1993 for former Military Intelligence (Istikhbarat Askaria). It remained under the orders of Colonel Mustapha Kharrubi, inspector general of the armed forces and one of the five historical leaders of the Libyan revolution. In 1995 Col. Jumaa bin Niran, former head of the security battalions in Tripoli, became chief of military intelligence in succession to Humaidi. He was assisted by Col. Musbah al Amrussi and LTC Abdullah Mahmud Hijazi.

Kataeb al Amn Security Battalions The Kataeb al Amn [Security Battalions], including the Green Brigades, is responsible for the regime's security in the major cities. Under the command of Colonel Massud Abdul Hafiz al-Kaddafi, they are responsible for the regime's security in the major cities. They field highly modern equipment. The Tobruk unit is commanded by a cousin of the Guide, Ahmed Kadhaf Ed-Dam, a key person in Libyan-Egyptian relations. The new unit created in Tarhuna is directed by Colonel Said Uaidate al-Kaddafi who commanded the Republican Guard missile-launching unit from 1985 until early 1993. In 1995, Col. Khalifa Ahneiche, who also commands the garrison at Sirta, of which he is a native, was maintained as chief of the battalions. But he now combined this function with that of boss of the armaments board. That body had previously answered to the military intelligence service headed by Ahneiche's chief rival, Col. Khuaildi Humaidi. In his new job Ahneiche exercised control over all foreign arms procurements.

Al Haras Assauri Revolutionary Guard The Revolutionary Guard (Al Haras Assauri) is a new command created to control the Revolutionary Committees whose numerous misdeeds have been widely criticized by the Libyan people. The revolutionary committees introduced into workplaces and communities were not at first extended to the military. When they were later imposed, there were complaints that they were controlled by officers with insufficient revolutionary zeal. After the early 1980s, a paramilitary wing of the Revolutionary Committees, the Revolutionary Guards, became entrenched within the armed forces. They served as a parallel channel of control, a means of ideological indoctrination in the barracks, and an apparatus for monitoring suspicious behavior. The Revolutionary Guards reportedly held the keys to ammunition stockpiles at the main military bases, doling it out in small quantities as needed by the regular forces. The influence of the Revolutionary Guards increased after a coup attempt in May 1985. The Guards, assisted by the Revolutionary Committees, set up roadblocks and arrested thousands of individuals suspected of being implicated. In the late 1980s, the Revolutionary Guards were believed to be no more that 1,000 to 2,000 strong, but they were outfitted with light tanks, armored cars and personnel carriers, multiple rocket launchers, and SA-8 antiaircraft missiles. Most had been recruited from Qadhafi's own tribal group in the Surt region. Recent years saw the Army undermined by the embargo, which deprived it of new weapons, and even more by the rise to power of the 40,000-strong Revolutionary Guard. The Republican Guard is responsible for the security of Colonel Kadhafi and his family. Like King Idris's praetorian Cyrenaican Defense Force, Qadhafi's Republican Guard recruits almost exclusively from tribes whose loyalty he cultivates through economic largess. The Guard works as a shock troop to confront threats from any quarter—especially the regular armed forces— and works double duty as a bodyguard.

59

Al Mathaba Anti-Imperialism Center (AIC) Al Mathaba (meaning center) is the Libyan center for anti-imperialist propaganda which has funded third world guerilla groups. The Anti-Imperialism Center (AIC) - also known as Mathaba - is used by the Libyan Government to support terrorist networks and thus plays an important role in Qadhafi's terrorism strategy. Established in 1982 to support "liberation and revolutionary groups”, the AIC has sponsored a number of stridently anti-Western conferences in Tripoli. At the same time, the AIC's mission is to identify and recruit revolutionaries for ideological and military training in Libya. During their training at AIC camps, individuals are selected for advanced training, including in weapons and explosives, and indoctrination. With representatives in many Libyan embassies worldwide, the AIC runs its own independent clandestine operations and disburses payments to terrorist, insurgent, and subversive groups. As of 1992 the AIC was headed by Musa Kusa, a Qadhafi confidant who was also Libya's Deputy Foreign Minister. As of late 1995 Musa Kusa was the head of the Libyan External Security Organization (ESO), and was also the head of Al Mathaba. Al Mathaba is more a concept than an organisation. Its origins are Libyan and its objective anti-imperialist. Libya’s international activity is considerable. Some see it everywhere, behind every armed, or even radical, group. It was in 1982 that Libya took the initiative of organising an international organisation essentially based on the third world: Al Mathaba. By calling the 3rd Al Mathaba Congress in August 2000, to mark the 30th anniversary of its revolution, with the participation of many representatives, particularly from Africa and Latin America, Libya no doubt hoped to affirm for itself an active international role, far beyond its small size. Judging by the level of participation, its plan was particularly well received, reflecting the high degree of sympathy Libya enjoys in the anti-imperialist world — the result of the continuity of its efforts over a period of time. Once an organization that backed morally, financially and physically the liberation movements seeking to overthrow oppressive regimes—ofttimes through armed struggle—Col. Gadhafi said that "after restructuring, (Mathaba) must confront the concept of globalization." Many heads of state were present: Sam Nujoma (Namibia), Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe), Yoweri Kaguta Musaveni (Uganda), Blaise Campraore (Burkina Faso), Alpha Oumar Konare (Mali), Yahya Jammeh (Gambia), Idris Deby (Chad), Abdou Diouf (Senegal), and the President of Guinea Bissao. Progressive political forces, communists and revolutionaries were there as well: the Cuban CP, Shaffik Handal (FMLN, San Salvador), the Guatamalan URNG, Tomas Borge and Daniel Ortega of the FSLN (Nicaragua), Raul Reyes (FARC, Columbia), a personal representative of Hugo Chavez (Venezuela), Lula, of the Brazilian Labour Party, Gladys Marin, General Secretary of the Chilian CP, Marina Arismendi, General Secretary of the Uruguayan CP. From Europe there was a very varied Italian delegation, with the Refoundation Communist Party in particular, and a Spanish delegation from the United Left (José Cabo) and from OSPAAAL.

Ministry of Interior Throughout its prerevolutionary history, the mission and operating concepts underlying the Libyan police system were the same as those in many other Muslim societies. The traditional concept of police or shurtah was a broad one. Because the shurtah were used from time to time by the government in power to undertake new conquests, security force commanders often had full-sized armies at their disposal. Domestically, however, the shurtah were primarily responsible for suppressing dissidence and insurrections as well as performing other internal security duties. The latter duties typically embraced the kinds of administrative and judicial functions often required of urban and rural police, such as the prevention of crime, investigation and arrest of criminals, and maintenance of public order. Some of these concepts have survived in present-day Libya; others have been altered in response to the changing needs of the society. Shortly after the 1969 coup, military officers were temporarily integrated into key police positions to guard against a countercoup. A complete reorganization of the police followed over the next three years. An early step in the process of stripping the police of paramilitary status was the consolidation of the regional police forces into a unified organization under the Ministry of Interior. In 1971 new separate agencies to handle civil defense and fire protection were provided for by law. Ministerial decrees established other units, such as the Central Traffic Department, the Central Department for Criminal Investigation, the Arab International Criminal Police Bureau, the Ports Security Department, the Identity Investigation, and the Police Training Department. A special police law promulgated by the RCC in January 1972 spelled out the new functions of the police force, which was formally redesignated the Police at the Service of the People and the Revolution. The police were specifically charged with responsibility for "the administration of prisons, civil defense activities, passport and nationality affairs, identity card affairs, and other functions set forth by laws and bills." Individual police units were under the jurisdiction of regional security directorates throughout the country, with primary responsibility for enforcing the laws and administering the police falling under the minister of interior and his deputy. A special police affairs council--composed of the deputy minister as chairman, the directors of the central police department, the regional chiefs, and a legal adviser--was empowered to coordinate activities of various police branches and to issue decrees on police matters. Police ranks followed closely those of the armed forces. An officer candidate had to be a Libyan citizen at least twenty years of age, of good conduct and behavior, in good physical condition, and not married to a foreigner. He also had to be a graduate of the police academy. Police work was considered a prestigious occupation, and its attractive working conditions and benefits reportedly produced well-qualified applicants who underwent stiff competition for vacancies. However, standards may have deteriorated as more lucrative opportunities in the oil industry and in government became available for those with sufficient education. In a counterpart to the media attacks on the professional military in 1983, the official Libyan press targeted the police as lacking revolutionary zeal. The press demanded greater direct responsibility for the masses in protecting the people's security. Articles was recalled that the

60

police were descended from the mobile forces of the Idris regime, headed by "fascist, bourgeois officers" who had suppressed all manifestations of discontent with the royalist system. Police officials were accused of engaging in licentious behavior, of drinking liquor, and of carrying on illegal businesses. They were charged with being "feudalistic" in their behavior, of being ill-educated because many lacked a high- school diploma, and often unfit for duty because of advancing age. Declaring that "security is the responsibility of the people as a whole in the same way as the defense of the homeland is," Qadhafi announced in 1985 that the police would henceforward be known as the People's Security Force. Whether this name change accomplished much seemed doubtful; the official press complained that all that had happened was that signs over the police stations now read "People's Security Station."

Support to Proxies Some 30 insurgent and terrorist groups worldwide have received Libyan training, weapons, money and other forms of support. Since Qadhafi's rise to power, Libya has chronically employed terrorism and revolutionary groups as primary instruments for fulfilling its international ambitions. The main targets of terrorist activity have been Libyan dissidents living abroad and prominent political figures of moderate Arab and African countries. Qadhafi has openly declared that "the revolution has destroyed those who oppose it inside the country and now it must pursue the rest abroad." A concerted drive to assassinate anti-Qadhafi exiles resulted in the murder of eleven Libyan dissidents in 1980 and 1981. A further five attacks were sponsored by Libya in 1985. Plots were allegedly uncovered against President Habre of Chad in 1984 and President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre in 1985. Earlier, there was evidence that Libyan agents had targeted Arab moderates, including Presidents Anwar Sadat and Husni Mubarak of Egypt, Jaafar al Numayri of Sudan, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, King Hussein of Jordan, and King Hassan II of Morocco. Qadhafi has endeavored to undermine moderate Arab governments judged not to be militant enough in their attitude toward Israel or to be too closely tied to the West. Sudan under Numayei was a priority target because it cooperated with the West and with Egypt. Arms and funds were funneled to Sudanese rebels based in Ethiopia in their guerrilla warfare against the central government. In early 1983, Libya was accused of having masterminded a coup attempt that miscarried badly. The coup plan called for Libyan planes to bomb public buildings in the capital of Khartoum while dissidents took over the center of the city. When the plan became known and Egyptian and United States aircraft were deployed at Numayri's request, Qadhafi called a halt to the operation. However, in 1984, a plane believed to be Libyan attempted to destroy a radio station at Umm Durman, Sudan, that was broadcasting condemnations of Qadhafi's policies. Since late 1980, Qadhafi has aided the Somali National Salvation Front, an insurgent group operating out of Ethiopia. He has kindled unrest in North Africa in the case of Algeria by providing money and a base to dissidents, such as former president Ahmed Ben Bella, and in Tunisia by recruiting dissidents from the large numbers of Tunisian workers in Libya to conduct raids and sabotage. In addition to repeated interventions in Chad in his efforts to impose a leadership that would be amenable to Libyan influence, Qadhafi has been accused of providing arms and training to Tuareg tribesmen at a camp at Sabha. His goal has been to stir up the Tuareg into demanding a union carved out of existing Sahelian states, a union that would be under Libyan influence. Libya has contributed to Niger's fears by its annexation of a strip of territory on Niger's northern border and its backing of a coup attempt against the president of Niger in 1976. Relations with other African countries--including Senegal, Gambia, Togo, Burkina Faso, and Zaire--have been embittered by Qadhafi's plotting and support for radical dissidents. Beginning in the 1980s, Qadhafi extended his activities into Latin America and Asia. Arms and money allegedly have been made available to insurgents in Guatemala and El Salvador, as well as to the M-19 terrorist group in Colombia. In South Asia, Libya has been involved with opponents of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi governments and in Southeast Asia has provided help to Muslim minorities, notably the Moro separatists on Mindanao in the Philippines. In addition to using oil as leverage in his foreign policy, Qadhafi's principal tactics have been destabilization of weaker governments and terrorism. Libya continues to harbor and finance groups all over the world that share Qadhafi's revolutionary and antiWestern views, including the Japanese Red Army and such radical Muslim groups as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Council. Its support for terrorist activity against U.S. citizens and interests resulted in U.S. air strikes against Libya in April 1986; the precipitating event for this U.S. action was the bombing of a Berlin discotheque which killed an American serviceman and for which evidence of Libyan complicity had been discovered. In October 1987, a Libyan arms shipment was intercepted on its way to the Irish Republican Army. In 1988, operatives of the Abu Nidal Organization, which is headquartered in Libya, launched a grenade attack on a Khartoum hotel and sprayed a Greek passenger ferry with machine-gun fire. Later that year, two Libyan intelligence agents planted an explosive device in Malta on the flight connecting with Pan Am flight 103 in Germany which later exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 259 passengers and crew and 11 people on the ground. In September 1989, Libya masterminded the bombing of UTA flight 772 over Niger, killing all 171 persons aboard. Libyan terrorism also has targeted anti-Qadhafi dissidents overseas. Qadhafi's public calls for the deaths of Libyan opponents abroad during the latter half of 1993 raised strong suspicions of his regime's involvement in the disappearance of prominent Libyan dissident Mansour Kikhya from Cairo in December 1993. While supporting terrorist groups, Qadhafi also has attempted to undermine other Arab and African states by supporting coups, funding and training opposition political parties and guerrilla groups, and plotting assassinations of rival leaders. He also has sought involvement in Asia and Latin America through support for various subversive groups. Use of such methods has strained Libyan relations with many nations. Qadhafi's foreign interventions included a bid to prop up former Ugandan dictator Idi Amin in 1979; incursions and intermittent war with Chad throughout the 1980s; continued claims on territory in Chad, Niger, and Algeria; and alleged support of Islamic fundamentalist groups in Sudan, Algeria, and Egypt. Libya withdrew its forces from the disputed Aouzou Strip in mid-1994, after the International Court of Justice ruled Libya's presence an illegal occupation of Chadian territory. In the Middle East, Qadhafi has been motivated by the aim of destroying Israel and of punishing those Arab elements willing to compromise in the interest of regional peace. The smaller, more radical factions

61

of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) have received training and arms from Libya as well as financing for their activities. According to the State Department, Libya's contribution in 1981 alone amounted to nearly US$100 million. In 1985 attention was focused on Qadhafi's links with the Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal Organization, more formally known as the Fatah Revolutionary Council, and with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. The Abu Nidal Organization was believed responsible for the shooting of the Israeli ambassador in London, the hijacking of an Egyptian airliner, and attacks on the El Al and Trans World Airlines ticket counters at the Rome and Vienna airports. The State Department charged that millions of dollars in Libyan funds had gone to the Abu Nidal Organization, that its top figures were resident in Libya, and that Libya had provided training and travel documents to its teams mounting terrorist attacks. Although other Middle Eastern states such as Syria and Iran remained involved in terrorism, the State Department maintained that Libya had become the most active, especially against American and European travelers. The affinity of Qadhafi for the Abu Nidal Organization and other radical Palestinian factions is explained by the bitter enmity they share for the main Arafat wing of the PLO, and for their rejection of any form of negotiations with Israel. Terrorist attacks of the kind they have successfully launched serve Qadhafi's purpose by further elevating tensions in the Middle East and blighting the prospects of peace initiatives.

Libyan Training Camps Libya has trained Palestinian and other terrorists in-country since the early 1970s. In addition to the principal facilities in and around Tripoli, over the past two decades the Libyans have operated smaller training camps dispersed throughout their country. On some occasions, terrorists are trained at Libyan military bases. For example, in 1988 members of the radical Palestinian group, the Popular Struggle Front, trained at an Air Force base in the Aouzou region. Members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command also are known to have trained in Libyan military camps. Non-Palestinian groups that have received training in Libya in recent years include the Ecuadorian Alfaro Vive, Carajo organization, Colombia's M-19, the Haitian Liberation Organization, the Chilean Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, and the Japanese Red Army. Trainees from Asia, Latin America, and Africa often go to Libya legally, usually pretending to be students. Sometimes, Third World nationals travel to Libya for what they believe to be legitimate schooling, such as technical or religious training. When they arrive, however, they find themselves met at the airport by soldiers, placed on a truck, and transported to a terrorist/dissident training camp. Those students hostile to Libyan overtures are summarily deported and branded as unworthy students. Extremists travel to Libya using other methods as well. For example, radicals from Mauritius traveled to Tripoli in 1987, ostensibly to attend a youth conference. Instead, they went to a terrorist training camp.







Seven April Training Camp. Located about 9 kilometers from Tripoli, the facility provides training in terrorism and subversion to Africans and Latin Americans, as well as to Libyan military personnel. Sidi: Bilal Port Facility. Terrorists who carried out the May 1990 seaborne attack against Israel were trained here. Bin Ghashir. Just south of Tripoli, it has been used to train dissidents from Africa, Asia, and Latin America in terorist/guerrilla tactics. Ras al Hilal. Palestinian terrorist groups have trained at this facility.

From © Globalsecurity

62

IV. Libya’s Wars From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Libyan-Sudanese Conflict (1967-99) Libyan-Egyptian War (21-24 July 1977) Chadian-Libyan conflict (1978-1987) Clashes between Libya and the US (1981-89) •

Libyan Wars, 1980-1989 Part 4 by Tom Cooper

63

Libyan–Sudanese conflict From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Conflict between Libya and Sudan has occurred intermittently since relations between the two countries began to deteriorate in 1972. Between 1967 and 1971 Libyan-Sudanese relations had been based on a positive foreign policy relationship with both nations favoring solidarity with other Arab countries.[1][2] However, during the early 1970s President Gaafar Nimeiry of Sudan began to pursue a foreign policy strategy which aligned Sudan with Western powers. Sudan’s western focused policy conflicted with Libyan interests. This new Sudanese national interest would weaken relations between Sudan and Libya throughout the 1970s.[1] Under Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi Libya continued to pursue foreign policy directed along ideological and pragmatic there is no such thing as libya solidarity.[2] This resulted in several instances of conflict between the two nations between 1972 and 1976. In 1976 Sudan charged that Libya was involved in a terrorist plot against its government. This led to a severance of relations between the nations. In the late 1970s and 1980s Sudanese and Libyan foreign policy clashed over several regional conflicts. These included the Chadian-Libyan conflict , the Libya-Egypt conflict and Libyan support for Ugandan dictator Idi Amin.[3] In these cases Libya’s conflict with Sudan resulted from Gaddafi’s regional goals of pan-Arabism and was heavily influenced by relations with Egypt.[4] The Chad-Libyan conflict in particular influenced the foreign policy of several African countries towards Libya. Pro-Libyan supporters were set against an anti-Libyan side which included Sudan and Egypt.[5] Some sub-Saharan countries such as Sudan and Zaire supported the anti-Libyan forces in Chad out of fear of a Libyan expansion.[6] In 1986 Libya assisted the Mahdi government under Omar al-Bashir to assume power in Sudan, resuming relations between the two nations.[7] After this point both nations employed markedly different foreign policy strategies. Sudan adopted a non-aligned course, trying to obtain western aid while building better relationships with Arab states. This included cooperative ties with Libya.[8]. Libya began to pursue stronger regional connections, with Gaddafi attempting to increase his influence in the African continent . This changed the nature of relations between the two nations.[2]

Events On May 1969, Gaafar an-Nimeiry managed a successful coup d’etat in Sudan. Later that same year, Muammar al-Gaddafi rose to power through a coup d’etat in Libya. He initially tried to strengthen the traditional ties with Sudan and Egypt, so much so that he proposed a federation with the individual states during his first two years in power. His policy and ideology were influenced by Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, especially his anti-Soviet, anti-Western and Arab nationalist sentiments. Their relationship was very influential until Nasser died in September 1970. In the early 1970s Sudan’s internal divisions especially in the southern region, Darfur, began to play a larger role in Sudanese foreign policy. Consequently Sudanese relations with Libya became heavily dictated by the war in southern Sudan. In August 1971, Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi helped reverse a communist coup against Sudanese President Nimeiry by diverting a British airliner carrying one of the coup’s leaders and handing him over to Nimeiry to be hanged.[9] Libya turned over two of the top communist plotters to the Sudanese authorities, who executed them shortly afterward. However, a year later Sudan accused Libya of involvement in three successive coup attempts and severed diplomatic relations.[10] “One of the main features of Libya’s policy towards Africa has been its sheer volatility. In Sudan, Libya initially supported President Jaafar Nimeiry against unsuccessful leftist coup attempted in 1971; however, in 1976 the Gaddafi regime backed a coup attempt against Nimeiry that left the Sudanese leader shaken and in-secure.”.[6] Subsequent to Libya’s shaky alliance with the Nimeiry regime and Gaddafi’s attempt to replace it in 1976, Sudan sought out Egyptian protection to Libya’s discomfort.[4] Relations between Libya and Sudan were in many respects a consequence of relations with Egypt.[4] In particular, the Libya-Egypt conflict in 1977 made relations between Sudan and Libya more tense. Sudan backed Egypt in this conflict and opposed Libyan military action. During the fall of 1977, Nimeiry and Sudanese opposition leaders began attempts at reconciliation.[10] Subsequently, starting in February 1978, Libya and Sudan agreed to resume relations. However, relations soon become strained after Gaddafi condemned Sudanese support for President Sadat of Egypt who signed the September 1978 Camp David Accords.[10] This difference of political and ideological position toward the situation in Israel, gave Gaddafi the encouragement to support plots against the Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat and Nimeiry.[11] Between 1978 and 1980 Gaddafi’s Islamic Legion of Arab and African “volunteers,” trained in Libyan guerrilla camps. They supported the factional fighting in Chad and assassinated political leaders in Chad who contested Libya’s interference.[9] Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, Qaddafi employed assassins to eradicate his enemies in Sudan, Niger, Senegal and Gambia. It is also alleged that his assassins unsuccessfully attempted to kill Hermann Eilts, former U.S. ambassador to Egypt.[9] Libya’s foreign policy in the area became apparent when in 1979, Libyan forces unsuccessfully invaded Chad, marking the beginning of the Chadian-Libyan conflict.[12] The Chadian affair crystallized African attitudes toward Libya. Sudan’s pro-Chadian stance during the conflict, would mark a significant point in the relations between Sudan and Libya.[5] Gaddafi, who has determined Libya’s foreign policy since 1969, has consistently been a proponent of Arab unity, the advancement of Islam, the Palestinian cause and anti-Western sentiments. He has also supported the elimination of Israel.[2] Hence, Gaddafi’s antagonism towards Egypt was a response to Egypt’s pro-Israeli stance. As an additional foreign policy point, Libyan actions in the region often signified strong expansionist aims. This provides the context for understanding how, in January 1981 Radio Tripoli announced the intended merger of Libya and Chad, after Gaddafi said that Chad was part of Libya’s “vital living space.” This announcement alarmed neighboring African states including Sudan. They had already suffered from Gaddafi’s participation in trying to disrupt the governments of Sudan, Egypt and Tunisia through coups and assassinations after failed attempts at unification.[9] By the end of January 1981, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) formally condemned Libya’s intentions for unification with Chad and asked Gaddafi to remove his troops from Chad immediately. Gaddafi’s resentment of western influence in the region becomes apparent when in 1981 Chester Crocker, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs announced that the US was willing to funnel military aid to any of Gaddafi’s neighbors who saw the problem as they saw it.[11] This provided Sudan another avenue to obtain US foreign aid. Suffice to say, Sudan received $250

64

million in economic and military aid in 1982, and more than $200 million in 1983 from the United States.[11] In 1983, six years after and Nimeiry and Sudanese opposition leaders began attempts at reconciliation, opposition from the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement and its military wing, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army emerged against Nimeiry’s northern focused policies. During this time, Libya’s cooperative foreign policy towards Sudan had changed drastically since the early 1970s. While opposition to Nimeiry was mounting, Gaddafi provided financial and material support to these opposition groups and other anti-Nimeiry rebel groups and organizations, including Anyanya II and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).[6] While Gaddafi’s foreign policy has been imbued with controversy and surprises, (a prime example relates to why Gaddafi, an Arab nationalist supported Ethiopia, a primarily Christian African country, against Sudan (under Nimeiry), an Arab country with a Muslim majority)[5] Libya’s support of anti-Nimeiry groups is understandable within the context of Libya’s anti-western foreign policy and Nimeiry’s support for the Camp David Accords. Nimeiry prevailed against the 1983 Libyan backed opposition but relations between the two countries continued to suffer when in March 1984, Nimeiry claimed that a Libyan Air Force Plane, a Soviet-built Tupolev TU-22 bomber, based at an airfield in the Al Kufra oasis in south-east Libya, had killed five people in an air raid on Omdurman.[11] In reaction to the numerous coups in the region, in 1985, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) was formed when all unions and political parties except the NIF signed the “Charter of the National Alliance” and the “Charter to Protect Democracy” in order to incite civil disobedience against future coups.[13] Following this, on 6 April 1985, a group of military officers, led by Lieutenant General Abdel Rahman Swar al-Dahab, overthrew Nimeiry. Following Nimeiry’s fall in 1985, Gaddafi immediately abandoned military support for the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and provided his full support to Nimeiri’s former Muslim opponents in the North, namely Sadiq al-Mahdi’s Umma Party.[6] On April 9, 1985 Lieutenant General Dhahab ordered the formation of a fifteen-man Transitional Military Council (TMC) to rule Sudan. The TMC suspended the constitution; dissolved the SSU, the secret police, and the parliament and region assemblies dismissed regional governors and their minister; and released hundreds of political detainees from Kober Prison. In July 1985, Libyan-Sudanese relations once again fluctuated, this time becoming stronger after a military protocol was signed between the two countries. Despite Gaddafi’s strong support for the Sudanese opposition leader Sadiq al Mahdi,[10] in December 1985, many Libyans labeled as “Islamic extremists,” were gathered and exiled from Sudan. In February 1986 the International Monetary Fund declared Sudan bankrupt, after the Dhahab government refused to accept IMF economic austerity measures. Later that year Sadiq al Mahdi was declared the Prime Minister of Sudan. In a change of tone towards Libya, Mahdi unsuccessfully attempted to mediate the Libyan-Chadian conflict.[10] The Mahdi government also permitted Libya to station some of its military forces in Darfur. From this position the troops assisted Chadian rebels in carrying out raids against government forces in Chad. However, in response to pressures from Egypt and the United States shortly thereafter, the Sudanese government requested a withdrawal of Libyan forces. On June 30 1989, Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Omar al-Bashir overthrew Mahdi and created the Revolutionary Command Council for Nation Salvation to govern Sudan. Early in 1990 Sudan and Libya discussed the idea of unification between the two nations. In July of that year the first meeting of the Libyan-Sudanese Joint General People’s Committee was held, and the Councils of Ministers of the two countries met in a combined session. The chief result of this meeting was greater economic cooperation, not the previously discussed political unification. Libya and Sudan signed a trade and development agreement that had Libyan investment in agricultural projects in exchange for guaranteed access for the Sudanese agricultural products.[14] In October 1993, the Revolutionary Command Council which was created a few years earlier was dissolved. The leader of the coup d’etat, Lieutenant General Bashir, became a civilian president, and all the vital offices of government were now held by members of the NIF political party or their sympathizers.[13] “The pro-Libyan attitude of black African states has prompted Gaddafi to adopt a new foreign policy towards the continent.[6] “In general, the future of Libya’s relations with the countries of the region is likely to be influenced by Gaddafi’s rapprochement with the Arab countries and with the West.”[6] Libyan and Sudanese ties were further cemented when in February 1999 an economic cooperation agreement was signed between the two countries and four other Sahel states.[14] As alluded to earlier, Libya’s relations with Sudan were in many respects a consequence of relations with Egypt.[4] “Particularly important is the rapprochement with Egypt. The two countries have agreed to integrate their economies and, more interestingly, to co-ordinate their African policies, especially in relations to Sudan. In August 1999, at a summit conference held in Cairo, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Gaddafi agreed to mediate an end to Sudan’s civil war. The regimes of both Libya and Egypt have confronted and/or continue to confront armed Islamic opposition and consequently both share an interest in Sudan, a country that has been accused of harboring radical Islamic groups. Above all, however, the Egyptian-Libyan initiative seems to reflect a joint fear on the part of the two countries that Washington supports the succession of southern Sudan and the break-up of an Arab country.”[6] References ^ a b Sudan (01/08) ^ a b c d Libya (10/07) ^ [1] ^ a b c d George Joffe, “Libya’s Saharan Destiny,” The Journal of North African Studies, 10, no. 3–4 (2005) ^ a b c Hussein Solomon and Gerrie Swart, “Libya’s Foreign Policy In Flux,” African Affairs, 104, no. 416, (2005) ^ a b c d e f g Asteris Huliaras ,“Qadhafi's comeback: Libya and sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s”, African Affairs 100, (2001) 7. ^ Mary-Jane Deeb, Libya’s Foreign Policy in North Africa, Westview Press: United States 8. ^ Background Notes Archive - Africa 9. ^ a b c d John K. Cooley. “The Libyan Menace,” Foreign Policy, No. 42. (Spring, 1981 10. ^ a b c d e Libya - Government 11. ^ a b c d Oye Ogunbadejo. “Qaddafi and Africa’s International Relations,” The Journal Of Modern African Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Mar., 1986) 12. ^ Libya Chad Invasion 1979 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

65

13. ^ a b Robert O. Collins. “Africans, Arabs, and Islamists: From the Conference Tables to the Battlefields in Sudan,” African Studies Review, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Sep., 1999) 14. ^ a b http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/IB93109_20030806.pdf

66

Libyan–Egyptian War July 21-24 1977 From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Libyan-Egyptian War was a short border war between Libya and Egypt in July 1977. Tension between the two countries had increased during April and May 1977 as demonstrators attacked the embassies of both countries. In June 1977, Qaddafi ordered the 225,000 Egyptians working and living in Libya to leave the country by July 1 or face arrest. On July 21, 1977 gun battles between troops on the border began, followed by land and air attacks on both sides. A ceasefire was agreed to on July 24, having being organised by Algeria's president. Timeline A "march on Cairo" was organized with thousands of Libyan protestors marching towards the Egyptian border in June 1977. The Libyans wanted to demonstrate against Egypt's closer ties with Israel. On July 20, 1977 Libyan artillery units fired at the Egyptians in Sallum, after the protest march was stopped by Egyptian soldiers. On July 21, 1977 Egyptian armored units and motorized infantry supported by artillery drove into the border area and answered the Libyan artillery fire. Approximately two divisions of the 1st Egyptian army, which were usually stationed around Cairo, were ordered to the Libyan border. The Egyptian Air Force attacked Libyan army bases on the border with Su-20 and MiG-21 combat aircraft. Two radar facilities and an air defense rocket position hidden in an oasis, as well as a rocket position near the Mediterranean coast close to Bardiyah, were destroyed. The Egyptians also bombed an airbase near Benghazi, much further west than the border. The land campaign went into full effect later that day, as parts of the 3rd Egyptian armored division pushed toward the Libyan city Musaid behind the common border. International press scrambled to cover the growing conflict. The ew York Times quoted an Egyptian military spokesman claiming that a Libyan "armored and aerial attack" had failed "with the loss of 40 tanks and 2 planes."[1] On July 22, 1977 the Egyptian Air Force in a second wave with Su-20 and MiG-21 combat aircraft attacked the Libyan Air Force bases south of Tobruk. Libyan airplanes on the ground were said to have been destroyed according to Egyptian sources. Libyan aircraft from all over the nation scrambled to defend. An Egyptian Mig-21 was shot down by a Libyan SA-7 Grail. The Egyptian sorties pressed on, however, attacking a key Libyan airfield in the oasis of Kufra using fighter planes. Some Egyptian paratroopers were said to have dropped behind the Libyan lines. Capitalizing on the opening of the second front, Egyptian helicopters surprised the Libyan air defense, using electronic counter measures (ECM). The Washington Post reported Egyptian President Sadat as calling these attacks "a lesson (to Qaddafi) he will never forget."[2] On July 23, 1977 the Egyptian Air Force launched a third wave of attacks on Libyan air installations, targeting for the second straight day the massive air force base south of Tobruk. Again Libyan planes scrambled in defense, this time arriving in the air in full force to intercept. The ensuing dogfight was fierce, with a Libyan Mirage 5DE blasting an Egyptian MiG-21 Fishbed. Many planes broke through the Libyan defense however, and the Air Force base was heavily damaged. Libyan combat aircraft counter-attacked, hitting the Egyptian base Marsa Matruh and other targets near the border. On July 24, 1977, the Libyans boldly tested the Egyptian air defense net, sending its planes in deeper than ever before. Three Libyan Mirages and a MiG-21 Fishbed were shot by Egyptian interceptors and air defense positions, according to Egyptian data. In addition, an alleged terrorist base in Libya approximately 35 km from the border was destroyed by Egyptian forces. After the cease-fire, there were some more skirmishes between Libyan and Egyptian fighters, in one of them, two LARAF MiG-23MS engaged two EAF upgraded MiG-21MF to carry western weaponry. The Libyan pilots did the mistake of trying to manoeuvre with more nimble Egyptian fighters, and one MiG23MS was shot down by Maj. Sal Mohammad, while the other used the speed advantage to escape. [3] Armistice and aftermath A mediation by Algeria as well as the Palestinian leader of the PLO Yassir Arafat, has finally led to a cease fire. The Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat gave his force instruction to stop all attacks on 24 July 1977 and agree upon an armistice. The fighting stopped on 25 July 1977. Even after the fighting ended, the rift between Arab states remained, however. Many conservative Arab countries had sympathy for Egypt and Anwar as-Sadat, while the so-called social revolutionary-progressive Arab states endorsed the Libyan attitude under Muammar Gaddafi. The West looked on with disdain. An editorial in the ew York Times summed up an American perspective of the war by quoting a Palestinian, "If the Arabs haven't got Israel to fight, they will be fighting each other."[4] In August 1977 an exchange of the prisoners of war between Libya and Egypt was agreed upon and led to a relaxation between the two states. External links

•

Egyptian-Libyan War 1977

References 1. 2. 3.

^ ew York Times, 22 July 1977, p. 1 ^ Washington Post, 23 July 1977, p. A1 ^ Libya & Egypt, 1971-1979

67

4.

^ Marvine Howe, "The Arabs Can't Seem to Stop Fighting," ew York Times, 24 July 1977, p. E2

68

Chadian–Libyan conflict

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Date Result

1978–1987 Chadian victory

Muammar al-Gaddafi

Hissène Habré

7,500+ casualties 1,000+ 800+ Armored vehicles 28+ Aircraft

captured

1,000+

Chad received aid from France and Zaire, while Libya was backed by the GUNT

The Chadian-Libyan conflict was a state of sporadic warfare events in Chad between 1978 and 1987, between Libyan and Chadian forces. Libya had been involved in Chad's internal affairs prior to 1978 and before even Muammar al-Gaddafi's rise to power in Libya in 1969, beginning with the extension of the Chadian Civil War to northern Chad in 1968.[1] The conflict was marked by a series of four separate Libyan interventions in Chad, taking place in 1978, 1979, 1980–1981 and 1983–1987. In all of these occasions Gaddafi had the support of a number of factions participating in the civil war, while Libya's opponents found the support of the French government, that intervened militarily to save the Chadian government in 1978, 1983 and 1986. The military pattern of the war delineated itself already in 1978, with the Libyans providing armour, artillery and air support and their Chadian allies the infantry, that assumed the bulk of the scouting and fighting.[2] This pattern was radically to change in 1986, towards the end of the war, when all Chadian forces united in opposing the Libyan occupation of northern Chad with a degree of unity that had never been seen before in Chad.[3] This deprived the Libyan forces of their habitual infantry, exactly when they found themselves confronting a mobile army, well provided now with anti-tank and anti-air missiles, thus cancelling the Libyan superiority in fire-power. What followed was the Toyota War, in which the Libyan forces were routed and expelled from Chad, putting an end to the conflict. Regarding the reasons behind Gaddafi's involvement with Chad, the initial reason stood in his ambition to annex the Aouzou Strip, the northernmost part of Chad that he claimed as part of Libya on the grounds of an unratified treaty of the colonial period.[1] In 1972 his goals became, in the evaluation of the historian Mario Azevedo: The creation of a client state in Libya's "underbelly", an Islamic republic modelled after his jamahiriya, that would maintain close ties with Libya, and secure his control over the Aouzou Strip; expulsion of the French from the region, and use of Chad as a base to expand his influence in Central Africa.[4]

Occupation of the Aouzou Strip Libyan involvement with Chad can be said to have started in 1968, during the Chadian Civil War, when the insurgent Muslim National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT) extended its guerilla war against the Christian President François Tombalbaye to the northerly Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture (BET).[5] Libya's king Idris I felt compelled to support the FROLINAT because of long-standing strong links between the two sides of the Chadian-Libyan border. To preserve relations with Chad's former colonial master and current protector, France, Idris limited himself to granting the rebels sanctuary in Libyan territory and to providing only non-lethal supplies.[1] All this changed with the Libyan coup d'état of September 1, 1969 that deposed Idris and brought Muammar alGaddafi to power. Gaddafi claimed the Aouzou Strip in northern Chad, referring to an unratified treaty signed in 1935 by Italy and France, (then the colonial powers of Libya and Chad, respectively).[1] Such claims had been previously made when in 1954 Idris had tried to occupy Aouzou, but his troops were repelled by the French Colonial Forces.[6]

69

The Aouzou Strip, highlighted in blue. A map of Chad including the 15th parallel (the Red Line) where the French separated government and rebel forces Though initially wary of the FROLINAT, Gaddafi had come to see by 1970 the organization as useful to his needs and with the support of Soviet bloc nations, particularly East Germany, trained and armed the insurgents, and provided them with weapons and funding.[7][1] On August 27, 1971 Gaddafi was bold enough to engineer a coup attempt against Tombalbaye, that only narrowly failed; this may have been triggered by Libya's anxiety following an attempt made on July 24 to further Christian-Muslim reconciliation with the grant of half the Chadian cabinet's posts to Muslim politicians. Such an opening, though turned down by the FROLINAT, was seen by Gaddafi as a menace to his influence in Chad.[8] On the same day of the failed coup, Tombalbaye cut all diplomatic relations with Libya, and invited all Libyan opposition groups to base themselves in Chad, and started laying claims to Fezzan on the grounds of "historical rights". Gaddafi's answer was to officially recognize on September 17 the FROLINAT as the sole legitimate government of Chad, while in October the Chadian Foreign Minister Baba Hassan denounced at the United Nations Libya's "expansionist ideas".[9] Through French pressure on Libya, and with Hamani Diori the President of Niger playing the role of mediator, the two countries resumed diplomatic relations on April 17, 1972. Shortly after, Tombalbaye broke diplomatic relations with Israel and is said to have secretly accepted on November 28 to cede the Aouzou Strip to Libya; in exchange Gaddafi pledged 40 million pounds to the Chadian President[10] and the two countries signed in December a Treaty of Friendship. Gaddafi withdrew official support to the FROLINAT and forced its leader Abba Siddick to move his headquarters from Tripoli to Algiers.[11][8] Good relations were confirmed in the following years, with Gaddafi visiting the Chadian capital N'Djamena in March 1974,[12] and in the same month a joint bank was created to provide Chad with investment funds.[9] Six months after the signature of the 1972 treaty, Libyan troops moved into the Strip and established just north of Aouzou an airbase protected by surface-to-air missiles. A civil administration was set up, attached to Kufra, and Libyan citizenship was extended to the few thousand inhabitants of the area. From that moment, Libyan maps represented the area as part of Libya.[11] The exact terms by which Libya gained Aouzou remain partly obscure, and are debated. The existence of a secret agreement between Tombalbaye and Gaddafi was revealed only in 1988, when the Libyan President exhibited an alleged copy of a letter in which Tombalbaye recognizes Libyan claims. Against this, scholars like Bernard Lanne have argued that there never was any sort of formal agreement, and that simply Tombalbaye had found expedient for himself not to make mention of the occupation of a part of his country. Also, Libya was unable to exhibit the original copy of the agreement when the case of the Aouzou Strip was brought in 1993 before the International Court of Justice.[13][11]

Expansion of the insurgency The rapproachment was not to last long, as on April 13, 1975 a coup d'état removed Tombalbaye and replaced him with General Felix Malloum. As opposition to Tombalbaye's policy of appeasement towards Libya was among the reasons behind the coup, Gaddafi felt the coup as a menace to his influence in Chad and resumed supplying the FROLINAT.[1] In April 1976, there was a Gaddafi-backed attempted assassination of Malloum,[8] and in the same year Libyan troops started making forays into central Chad in company of FROLINAT forces.[2] Libyan activism began generating concerns in the strongest faction into which the FROLINAT had split, the Command Council of the Armed Forces of the North (CCFAN). On the issue of the interested nature of Libyan support the insurgents split in October 1976, with a minority leaving the militia and forming the Armed Forces of the North (FAN), lead by the anti-Libyan Hissène Habré, while the majority, willing to accept an alliance with Gaddafi, was commanded by Goukouni Oueddei. The latter group was to shortly after rename itself People's Armed Forces (FAP).[14] In those years, Gaddafi's support had been mostly

70

moral, with only a limited supply of weapons. All this started changing in February 1977, when the Libyans provided Goukouni's men with hundreds of AK-47 assault rifles, dozens of bazookas, 81 and 82mm mortars and recoilless cannons. Armed with these weapons, the FAP attacked in June the Chadian Armed Forces' (FAT) strongholds of Bardaï and Zouar in Tibesti and of Ounianga Kebir in Borkou. Goukouni assumed with this attack full control of the Tibesti, because Bardaï, besieged since June 22, surrendered on July 4, while Zouar was evacuated. The FAT lost 300 men, and piles of military supplies fell into the hands of the rebels.[15][16] Ounianga was attacked on June 20, but was saved for the time being by the French military advisors present there.[17] This year, as it had become evident that the Aouzou Strip was being used by Libya as a base for deeper involvement in Chad, Malloum decided to bring the issue of the Strip's occupation before the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity.[18] Malloum also decided he needed new allies; because of this, he negotiated a formal alliance with Habré, the Khartoum Accord, in September. This accord was kept secret until January 22, when a Fundamental Charter was signed, following which a National Union Government was formed on August 29, 1978 with Habré as Prime Minister.[19][20] The Malloum-Habré accord was actively promoted by Sudan and Saudi Arabia, both of which feared a radical Chad controlled by Gaddafi and saw in Habré, with his good Muslim and anticolonialialist credentials, the only chance to thwart Gaddafi's plans.[21]

Libyan escalation The Malloum-Habré accord was perceived by Gaddafi as a serious threat to his influence in Chad, and promptly answered by bringing Libyan involvement to levels never reached before. For the first time with the active participation of Libyan ground units,[2] Goukouni's FAP unleashed on January 29, 1978 the so-called Ibrahim Abatcha offensive against the last outposts held by the government in northern Chad, namely Faya-Largeau, Fada and Ounianga Kebir. The attacks were completely successful, and Goukouni and the Libyans assumed complete control of the BET Prefecture.[22][23] The decisive confrontation between the LibyanFAP forces and the Chadian regular forces took place at Faya-Largeau, the capital of the BET. The city, defended by 5,000 Chadian soldiers, fell on February 18 after sharp fighting to 2,500 rebels, supported by possibly as many as 4,000 Libyan troops. The Libyans do not seem to have directly participated in the fighting; in a pattern that was to repeat itself in the future, the Libyans provided armor, artillery and air support.[2] The rebels also were much better armed than before, displaying Strela 2 surface-to-air missiles.[24] Goukouni had made about 2,500 prisoners with these successes and those in 1977; as a result, the Chadian Armed Forces had lost at least 20% of its manpower,[23] and in particular the Nomad and National Guard (GNN) was decimated by the fall of Fada and Faya.[25] Goukouni used these victories to strengthen his position in the FROLINAT: during a Libyan-sponsored congress held in March in Faya, the insurgency's main factions reunited themselves and nominated Goukouni new secretary-general of the FROLINAT.[26] Malloum's reaction to the Goukouni-Gaddafi offensive was to sever diplomatic relations with Libya on February 6 and bring before the United Nations Security Council the issue of Libyan involvement in the fighting, as well as raising again the question of Libya's occupation of the Aouzou Strip; but on February 19, after the fall of Faya, Malloum was forced to accept a ceasefire and withdraw the protest. The ceasefire was reached also because Libya had halted the advance of Goukouni, because of pressure from France, then an important weapon supplier of the Arab country.[22] Malloum and Gaddafi restored diplomatic relations on February 24 at Sebha in Libya, where an international peace conference was held which included as mediators Niger's President Seyni Kountché and Sudan's Vice-President. Under severe pressure from France, Sudan and Zaire,[27] Malloum was forced to sign on March 27 the Benghazi Accord, which recognized the FROLINAT and agreed on a new ceasefire. Among the chief conditions of the agreement was creation of a joint Libya-Niger military committee, that was tasked with implementing the agreement; through this committee, Chad legitimized Libyan intervention in its territory. The accord also contained another condition dear to Libya, as it asked for the termination of all French military presence in Chad.[22] The stillborn accord was for Gaddafi nothing more than a strategy to strengthen his protégé Goukouni; it also weakened considerably Malloum's prestige among southern Chadians, who saw his concessions as a proof of his weak leadership.[27] On April 15, only a few days after signing the ceasefire, Goukouni left Faya leaving there a Libyan garrison of 800 men. Relying on Libyan armor and airpower, Goukouni's forces conquered small FAT garrison and pointed towards the capital N'Djamena.[27][2] Against these stood freshly arrived French forces. Already in 1977, after Goukouni's first offensives, Malloum had asked for a French military return in Chad, but President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was at first reluctant to commit himself before the carrying out of the legislative elections, held in March 1978; also, France was afraid of damaging its profitable commercial and diplomatic relations with Libya. At the end, the rapid deterioration of the situation in Chad resolved the President on February 20, 1978 to start Opération Tacaud, that by April brought in Chad 2,500 troops to secure the capital from the rebels.[28] The decisive battle took place at Ati, a town 270 miles northeast of N'Djamena. The town's garrison of 1,500 soldiers was attacked on May 19 by the FROLINAT insurgents, equipped with artillery and modern weapons. The garrison was relieved by the arrival supported by armor of a Chadian task force and, more importantly, of the Foreign Legion and the 3rd Regiment of Marine Infantry; in a two-days battle, the FROLINAT was repelled with heavy losses, a victory that was confirmed in June by another engagement at Djedaa, after which the FROLINAT admitted defeat and fled north, after having lost 2,000 men and left the "ultramodern equipment" they carried on the ground. Of key importance in these battles was the complete air superiority the French could count on, as the Libyan Air Force pilots refused to fight the French.[27][29][30]

Libyan difficulties Only a few months after the failed offensive against the capital, major dissensions in the FROLINAT shattered all vestiges of unity and badly weakened Libyan power in Chad. On the night of August 27 Ahmat Acyl, leader of the Volcan Army, attacked FayaLargeau with the support of Libyan troops in what was apparently an attempt by Gaddafi to remove Goukouni from the leadership of the FROLINAT, replacing him with Acyl. The attempt backfired, as Goukouni reacted by expelling all Libyan military advisors present in Chad, and started searching for a compromise with France.[31][32] The reasons for the clash between Gaddafi and Goukouni were both ethnic and political. The FROLINAT was divided between Arabs, like Acyl, and Toubous, like Goukouni and Habré. These ethnic divisions also reflected a different attitude towards Gaddafi and his Green Book. In particular, Goukouni and his men

71

had shown themselves reluctant to follow Gaddafi's solicitations to make The Green Book the official policy of the FROLINAT, and had first tried to take time, leaving the question to the complete reunification of the movement. When the unification was accomplished, and Gaddafi pressed again for the adoption of The Green Book, the dissensions in the Revolution's Council became manifest, with many proclaiming their loyalty to the movement's original platform approved in 1966 when Ibrahim Abatcha was made first secretary-general, while others, among whom Acyl, fully embraced the Colonel's ideas.[33] In N'Djamena, the contemporary presence of two armies, the FAN of the Prime Minister Habré and the FAT of the President Malloum, prepared the stage for the battle of N'Djamena, which was to bring about the collapse of the State and the ascent to power of the Northern elite. A minor incident escalated on February 12, 1979 into heavy fighting between Habré and Malloum's forces, and the battle intensified on February 19 when Goukouni's men entered in the capital to fight alongside Habré against the FAT. It is estimated that by March 16, when the first international peace conference took place, 2,000–5,000 people were killed and 60,000–70,000 forced to flee the capital, and the greatly diminished Chadian army left the capital in the rebels' hand and reorganized itself in the south under the leadership of Wadel Abdelkader Kamougué. During the battle, the French garrison stood passively by, even helping Habré in certain circumstances, as when they demanded the Chad Air Force to stop its bombings.[34] An international peace conference was held in Kano in Nigeria, to which Chad's bordering states participated with Malloum for the Chadian army, Habré for the FAN and Goukouni for the FAP. The Kano Accord was signed on March 16 by all those present, and Malloum resigned, replaced by a Council of State under the chairmanship of Goukouni.[35] This was a result of Nigerian and French pressures on Goukouni and Habré to share power;[36] the French in particular saw this as part of their strategy to cut all ties between Goukouni and Gaddafi.[37] A few weeks later, the same factions formed the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT), kept together to a considerable extent by the common desire to see Libya out of Chad.[38] Despite signing the Kano Accord,[39] Libya was incensed that the GUNT did not include any of the leaders of the Volcan Army and had not recognized Libyan claims on the Aouzou Strip. Already since 13 April there had been some minor Libyan military activity in northern Chad, and support was provided to the secessionist movement in the south, but a major response came only after June 25, when the ultimatum for the formation of a new, more inclusive, coalition government posed by Chad's bordering states to the GUNT expired. On June 26, 2,500 Libyan troops invaded Chad directed to Faya-Largeau. The Chadian government appealed for French help. The Libyan forces were first stymied by Goukouni's militiamen, and then forced to retreat by French reconnaissance planes and bombers. In the same month, the factions excluded by the GUNT founded a countergovernment, the Front for Joint Provisional Action (FACP), in northern Chad with Libyan military support.[40][38][36] The fighting with Libya, the imposition by Nigeria of an economic boycott and international pressure brought to a new international peace conference in Lagos in August, to which all eleven factions present in Chad participated. A new accord was signed on August 21, under which a new GUNT was to be formed, open to all factions. The French troops were to leave Chad, and be replaced by a multinational African peace force.[41] The new GUNT took office in November, with Goukouni President, Kamougué Vice-President, Habré Defence Minister[42] and Acyl Foreign Minister.[43] Despite the presence of Habré, the new composition of the GUNT had enough pro-Libyans to satisfy Gaddafi.[44]

Libyan intervention It became clear from the start that Habré isolated himself from the other members of the GUNT, which he treated with disdain. Habré's hostility for Libya's influence in Chad united itself with his ambition and ruthlessness: observers concluded that the warlord would never be content with anything short of the highest office. In such a context it was thought that sooner or later an armed confrontation between Habré and the pro-Libyan factions would take place, and more importantly, between Habré and Goukouni.[42] As expected, clashes in the capital between Habré's FAN and pro-Libyan groups became progressively more serious; in the end, on March 22, 1980 a minor incident, like in 1979 with the first, triggered the second battle of N'Djamena. In ten days, the clashes between the FAN and Goukouni's FAP, who both had 1,000–1,500 troops in the city, had caused thousands of casualties and the flight of about half the capital's population. The few remaining French troops, who left on May 4, proclaimed themselves neutral, as did the Zairian peace force.[45][46] While the FAN was supplied economically and militarily by Sudan and Egypt, Goukouni received shortly after the beginning of the battle the armed support of Kamougué's FAT and Acyl's CDR, and was provided with Libyan artillery. On June 6, the FAN assumed control of the city of Faya; this alarmed Goukouni, and he signed, on June 15, a Treaty of Friendship with Libya. The treaty gave Libya a free hand in Chad, legitimising its presence in that country: this was especially evident in the first article of the treaty, where it was written that the two countries were committed to mutual defence, and a threat against one constituted a threat against the other.[46][47] Beginning in October, Libyan troops airlifted to the Aouzou Strip operated in conjunction with Goukouni's forces to reoccupy Faya. The city was then used as an assembly point for tanks, artillery and armored vehicles that moved south against the capital of N'Djamena.[48] An attack started on December 6, spearheaded by Soviet T-54 and T55 tanks and reportedly coordinated by advisors from the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, brought the fall of the capital on December 16. The Libyan force, numbering between 7,000 and 9,000 men of regular units and the paramilitary PanAfrican Islamic Legion, 60 tanks, and other armored vehicles, had been ferried across 1,100 kilometers of desert from Libya's southern border, partly by airlift and tank transporters and partly under their own power. The border itself was 1,000 to 1,100 kilometers from Libya's main bases on the Mediterranean coast.[48] The Libyan intervention demonstrated an impressive logistical ability, and provided Gaddafi with his first military victory and a substantial political achievement.[49] While forced into exile and with his forces confined to the frontier zones of Darfur, Habré remained defiant: on December 31 he announced in Dakar he would resume fighting as a guerilla against the GUNT.[49][46]

Libyan withdrawal On January 6, 1981, a joint comuniqué was issued in Tripoli by Gaddafi and Goukouni that Libya and Chad had decided "to work to achieve full unity between the two countries". The merger plan caused strong adverse reaction in Africa, and was immediately condemned by France, that on January 11 offered to strengthen French garrisons in friendly African states and on January 15 placed

72

the French Mediterranean fleet on alert. Libya answered by threatening to impose an oil embargo, while France threatened to react if Libya attacked another bordering country. The accord was also opposed by all GUNT ministers present with Goukouni at Tripoli, with the exception of Acyl.[43][50] Most observers believe that the reasons behind Goukouni's accepting the accord may be found in a mix of threats, intense pressure and the financial help promised by Gaddafi. Also, just before his visit to the Libyan capital, Goukouni had sent two of his commanders to Libya for consultations; at Tripoli, Goukouni learned from Gaddafi that they had been assassinated by "Libyan dissidents", and that if he didn't want to risk losing Libyan favour and lose power, he should accept the merger plan.[51] The importance of the opposition they met caused Gaddafi and Goukouni to downplay the importance of the communiqué, speaking of a "union" of peoples, and not of states, and as a "first step" towards closer collaboration. But the damage had been done, and the joint communiqué badly weakened Goukouni's prestige as a nationalist and a statesman.[43] Increasing international pressure against Libyan presence in Chad were at first met by Goukouni's statement that the Libyans were present in Chad because requested by the government, and that international mediators should simply accept the decision of Chad's legitimate government. In a meeting held in May Goukouni had become more accommodating, declaring that while the Libyan forces withdrawal was not a priority, he would accept the decisions of the OAU. Goukouni could hardly at the time renounce Libyan military support, necessary for dealing with Habré's FAN, which was supported by Egypt and Sudan and funded through Egypt by the United States Central Intelligence Agency.[52] In the meantime, relations between Goukouni and Gaddafi started deteriorating. Libyan troops were stationed in various points of northern and central Chad, in numbers that had reached by January–February about 14,000 troops. The Libyan forces in the country created considerable annoyance in the GUNT, by supporting Acyl's faction in its disputes with the other militias, including the clashes held in late April with Goukouni's FAP. There were also attempts to Libyanize the local population, that made many conclude that "unification" for Libya meant Arabization and the imposition of Libyan political culture, in particular of The Green Book.[53][54][55] Amid fighting in October between Gaddafi's Islamic Legionnaires and Goukouni's troops, and rumors that Acyl was planning a coup d'état to assume the leadership of the GUNT, Goukouni demanded on October 29 the complete and unequivocal withdrawal of Libyan forces from Chadian territory, which, beginning with the capital, was to be completed by December 31. The Libyans were to be replaced by an Organization for African Unity (OAU) Inter-African Force (IAF). Gaddafi complied, and by November 16 all Libyan forces had left Chad, redeploying in the Aouzou Strip.[55][54] Libya's prompt retreat took many observers by surprise. Reasons were to be found in Gaddafi's desire to host the OAU's annual conference in 1982 and assume the presidency of the OAU for that year. Another point could be found in Libya's difficult situation in Chad where, without some popular and international acceptance for Libyan presence, it would have been difficult to take the concrete risk of causing a war with Egypt and Sudan, with US support. This does not mean that Gaddafi had renounced the goals he had set for Chad, but that he now had to search for somebody else as Chad's leader, as Goukouni had proved himself unreliable.[55][56]

Habré takes *'Djamena The first IAF component to arrive in Chad were the Zairian paratroopers; they were followed by Nigerian and Senegalese forces, bringing the IAF to 3,275 men. Before the peace-keeping force was fully deployed, Habré had already taken advantage of Libya's withdrawal, and made massive inroads in eastern Chad, including the important city of Abéché, that fell on November 19.[57] Next to fall was in early January Oum Hadjer, at only 100 miles from Ati, the last relevant town before the capital. The GUNT was saved for the moment by the IAF, the only credible military force confronting Habré, that prevented the FAN from taking Ati.[58] In the light of Habré's offensive, the OAU requested the GUNT to open reconciliation talks with Habré, a demand that was angrily refused by Goukouni;[59] later he was to say: "The OAU has deceived us. Our security was fully ensured by Libyan troops. The OAU put pressure on us to expel the Libyans. Now that they have gone, the organization has abandoned us while imposing on us a negotiated settlement with Hissein Habre"[60] In May, the FAN started a final offensive, passing unhindered by the peacekeepers in Ati and Mongo.[60] Goukouni, increasingly angered with the IAF's refusal to fight Habré, made an attempt to restore his relations with Libya, and reached Tripoli on May 23, but Gaddafi, burned by his experience the previous year, proclaimed his state neutrality in the civil war.[61] The GUNT forces attempted to make a last stand at Massaguet, 50 miles north of capital on the Abéché-N'Djamena road, but were defeated by the FAN on June 5 after a hard battle. Two days later Habré entered unopposed in N'Djamena, making him the de facto source of national government in Chad, while Goukouni fled the country seeking sanctuary in Cameroon.[62][63] Immediately after occupying the capital, Habré proceeded to consolidate his power by occupying the rest of the country. In barely six weeks, he conquered southern Chad, destroying the FAT, Kamougué's militia, whose hopes for Libyan help failed to materialize. Also the rest of the country was submitted, with the exception of the Tibesti.[64]

GU*T offensive Since Gaddafi had kept himself mostly aloof in the months prior to the fall of N'Djamena, Habré hoped at first to reach an understanding with Libya, possibly through an accord with its proxy in Chad, the leader of the Revolutionary Democratic Council (CDR) Ahmat Acyl, who appeared receptive to dialogue. But Acyl died on July 19, replaced by Acheikh ibn Oumar, and the CDR was antagonized by Habré's eagerness to unify the country, making him overrun the CDR's domains.[65] Therefore, it was with Libyan support that Goukouni reassembled the GUNT, creating in October a National Peace Government with its seat in the Tibesti town of Bardaï and claiming itself the legitimate government by the terms of the Lagos Accord. For the impending fight Goukouni could count on 3,000–4,000 men taken from several militias, later merged in an Armée ationale de Libération (ANL) under the command of a Southerner, Negue Djogo.[66][67] Before Gaddafi could throw his full weight behind Goukouni, Habré attacked the GUNT in the Tibesti, but was repelled both in December 1982 and in January 1983. The following months saw the clashes intensify in the North, while talks, with even an exchange in March of visits between Tripoli and N'Djamena, broke down. Therefore, on March 17 Habré brought the Chad-Libya quarrel before the United Nations, asking for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to consider Libya's "aggression and occupation" of Chadian territory.[66][68] Gaddafi was ready now for an offensive. The decisive offensive began in June, when a 3,000 strong GUNT force invested Faya-Largeau, the main government stronghold in the North, that fell on

73

June 25, and then rapidly proceeded towards Koro Toro, Oum Chalouba and Abéché, assuming control of the main routes towards N'Djamena. Libya, while helping with recruiting and training and providing the GUNT with heavy artillery, only committed a few thousand regular troops to the offensive, and most of these were artillery and logistic units. This may have been due to Gaddafi's desire that the conflict should be read as a Chadian internal affair.[48][66][62] The international community reacted adversely to the Libyan-backed offensive, in particular France and the United States. On the same day as the fall of Faya, the French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson warned Libya that France would "not remain indifferent" to a new Libyan involvement in Chad, and on July 11 the French government accused again Libya of direct military support to the rebels. French arms shipments were resumed on June 27, and on July 3 a first contingent of 250 Zairians arrived to strengthen Habré; the United States announced in July military and food aid for 10 million dollars. Gaddafi suffered also a diplomatic setback from the OAU, that at the meeting held in June officially recognized Habré's government and asked for all foreign troops to leave Chad.[69][66][68] Supplied by Americans, Zairians and the French, Habré rapidly reorganized his forces (now called Chadian National Armed Forces or FANT) and marched north to confront the GUNT and the Libyans, that he met south of Abéché. Habré proved again his ability, crushing Goukouni's forces, and started a vast counteroffensive that enabled him to retake in rapid succession Abéché, Biltine, Fada and, on July 30, Faya-Largeau, threatening to attack the Tibesti and the Aouzou Strip.[66]

Opération Manta Main article: Opération Manta Feeling that a complete destruction of the GUNT would be an intolerable blow for his prestige, and fearing that Habré would provide support for all opposition to Gaddafi, the Colonel called for a Libyan intervention in force, as his Chadian allies could not secure a definitive victory without Libyan armor and airpower.[70] Since the day after the fall of the town, Faya-Largeau was subjected to a sustained air bombardment, using Su-22 and Mirage F-1s from the Aouzou air base, along with Tu22 bombers from Sebha. Within ten days, a large ground force had been assembled east and west of Faya-Largeau by first ferrying men, armor, and artillery by air to Sabha, Al Kufrah, and the Aouzou airfield, and then by shorter range transport planes to the area of conflict. The fresh Libyan forces amounted to 11,000 mostly regular troops, and eighty combat aircraft participated to the offensive; nowithstanding this, the Libyans maintained their traditional role of providing fire support, and occasional tank charges, for the assaults of the GUNT, that could count on 3,000–4,000 men on this occasion.[48][71] The GUNT-Libyan alliance invested on August 10 the Faya-Largeau oasis, where Habré had entrenched himself with about 5,000 troops. Battered by multiple rocket launcher (MRL), artillery and tank fire and continuous airstrikes, the FANT's defensive line disintegrated when the GUNT launched the final assault, leaving 700 FANT troops on the ground. Habré escaped with the remnants of his army to the capital, without being pursued by the Libyans.[71] This was to prove a tactical blunder, as the new Libyan intervention had alarmed France, that, also due to American and African pressures, announced on August 6 the return of French troops in Chad as part of Opération Manta, meant to stop the GUNT-Libyan advance and more generally weaken Gaddafi's influence in the internal affairs of Chad. Three days later several hundred French troops were dispatched to N'Djamena from the Central African Republic, that were later brought to 2,700, with several squadron of Jaguar fighter-bombers. This made it the largest expeditionary force ever assembled by the French in Africa, except for the Algerian War of Independence.[71][72][73][74] The French government then defined a limit (the so-called Red Line), along the 15th parallel, extending from Mao to Abéché, and warned that they would not tolerate any incursion south of this line by Libyan or GUNT forces. Both the Libyans and the French remained on their side of the line, with France showing itself unwilling to help Habré retake the north, while the Libyans avoided starting a conflict with France by attacking the line. This led to a de facto division of the country, with Libya maintaining control of all the territory north of the Red Line.[72][48] A lull ensued, during which in November talks sponsored by the OAU failed to conciliate the opposing Chadian factions; no more successful was Ethiopia's leader Mengistu's attempt at the beginning of 1984. Mengistu's failure was followed on January 24 by a GUNT attack, supported by heavy Libyan armor, on the FANT outpost of Ziguey, a move mainly meant to persuade France and the African states to reopen negotiations. France reacted to this breach of the Red Line by launching the first significant air counter-attack, bringing into Chad new troops and unilaterally rising the defensive line to the 16th parallel.[75][76][77]

French withdrawal To put an end to the deadlock, Gaddafi proposed on April 30 a mutual withdrawal of both the French and Libyan forces in Chad. The French President François Mitterrand showed himself receptive to the offer, and on September 17 the two leaders publicly announced that the mutual withdrawal would start on September 25, and be completed by November 10.[75] The accord was at first hailed by the media as a proof attesting Mitterrand's diplomatic skills and a decisive progress towards the solution of the Chadian crisis;[78] it also answered Mitterrand's intent of following regards Libya and Chad a foreign policy independent from both the United States and the Chadian government.[72] While France respected the deadline, the Libyans limited themselves to retiring some forces, while maintaining at least 3,000 men stationed in Northern Chad. When this became evident, it resulted in a source of considerable embarrassment for the French and the occasion of recriminations between the French and Chadian governments.[79] According to Nolutshungu, the 1984 bilateral Franco-Libyan agreement may have provided Gaddafi with an excellent opportunity to find an exit from the Chadian quagmire, while bolstering his international prestige and posing him in a condition to force Habré into accepting a peace accord which would have included Libya's proxies. Instead, Gaddafi misread France's withdrawal as a willingness to accept Libya's military presence in Chad and the de facto annexation of the whole BET Prefecture by Libya, an action that was certain to meet the opposition of all Chadian factions and of the OAU and the UN. Gaddafi's blunder would eventually bring about his defeat, with the rebellion against him of the GUNT and a new French expedition in 1986.[80]

Opération Épervier

74

Main article: Opération Epervier During the period between 1984 and 1986, in which no major clash took place, Habré greatly strengthened his position thanks to staunch US support and Libya's failure to respect the Franco-Libyan 1984 agreement. Decisive was also the increasing factional bickering that started plaguing the GUNT since 1984, centered around the fight between Goukouni and Acheikh ibn Oumar over the leadership of the organization.[81] In this period, Gaddafi expanded his control over northern Chad, building new roads and erecting a major new airbase, Ouadi Doum, meant to better support air and ground operations beyond the Aouzou Strip, and brought in considerable reinforcements in 1985, rising their forces in the country to 7,000 troops, 300 tanks and 60 combat aircraft.[82] While this build-up took place, significant elements of the GUNT passed over to the Habré government, as part of the latter's policy of accommodation.[83] These desertions alarmed Gaddafi, as the GUNT provided a cover of legitimacy to Libya's presence in Chad. To put a halt to these and reunite the GUNT, a major offensive was launched on the Red Line, whose ultimate goal was N'Djamena itsef. The attack, started on February 10, involved 5,000 Libyan and 5,000 GUNT troops, and concentrated on the FANT outposts of Kouba Olanga, Kalait and Oum Chalouba. The campaign ended in disaster for Gaddafi, when a FANT counteroffensive on February 13 using the new equipment obtained from the French forced the attackers to withdraw and reorganize.[77][83][84] Most important was French reaction to the attack. Gaddafi had possibly believed that, due to the upcoming French legislative elections, Mitterrand would have been reluctant to start a new risky and costly expedition to save Habré; this evaluation proved wrong, as what the French President could not politically risk was to show weakness towards Libyan aggression. As a result, on February 14 Opération Epervier was started, bringing 1,200 French troops and several squadrons of Jaguars in Chad. Two days later, to send a clear message to Gaddafi, the French Air Force bombed Libya's Ouadi Doum airbase, which caused in retaliation the following day the Libyan bombing of the N'Djamena Airport.[85][86][84]

Tibesti War The defeats suffered in February and March accelerated the disintegration of the GUNT. When in March at a new round of OAUsponsored talks held in the People's Republic of Congo Goukouni failed to appear, many suspected the hand of Libya, causing the defection from the GUNT of its Vice-president Kamougué, followed by the First Army and the FROLINAT Originel. In August, it was the CDR's turn to leave the coalition, seizing the town of Fada. When in October Goukouni's FAP attempted to retake Fada, the Libyan garrison attacked Goukouni's troops, giving way to a pitched battle that effectively ended the GUNT. In the same month, Goukouni was arrested by the Libyans, while his troops rebelled against Gaddafi, dislodging the Libyans from all their positions in the Tibesti, and on October 24 went over to Habré.[87] To reestablish their supply lines and retake the towns of Bardaï, Zouar and Wour, the Libyans sent in Tibesti a task-force of 2,000 troops with T-62 tanks and heavy support by the Libyan Air Force. The offensive started successfully, expelling the GUNT from its key strongholds, also through the use of napalm and, allegedly, poison gas. This attack ultimately backfired, causing the prompt reaction of Habré, who sent 2,000 FANT soldiers to link with the GUNT forces. Also Mitterrand reacted forcefully, ordering a mission which parachuted fuel, food, ammunition and anti-tank missiles to the rebels, and also infiltrated military personnel. Through this action, the French made clear that they did not felt any more committed to keep south of the Red Line, and were ready to act whenever they found it necessary.[88][89] While militarily Habré was only partly successful in his attempt to evict the Libyans from the Tibesti (the Libyans would fully leave the region in March, when a series of defeats in the north-east had made the area untenable), the campaign was a great strategic breakthrough for the FANT, as it transformed a civil war into a national war against a foreign invader, stimulating a sense of national unity that had never been seen before in Chad.[90]

Toyota War Main article: Toyota War At the opening of 1987, the last year of the war, the Libyan expeditionary force was still impressive, counting on 8,000 troops and 300 tanks; but it had lost the key support of its Chadian allies, who had generally provided reconnaissance and acted as assault infantry. Without them the Libyan garrisons resembled isolated and vulnerable islands in the Chadian desert. On the other side, the FANT was greatly strengthened, now having 10,000 highly motivated troops, provided with fast-moving and sand-adapted Toyota trucks equipped with MILAN anti-tank guided missiles, that gave the name of "Toyota War" to the last phase of the Chadian-Libyan conflict.[91][92][93] Habré started, on January 2, 1987, his reconquest of northern Chad with a successful attack of the well-defended Libyan communications base of Fada. Against the Libyan army the Chadian commander Hassan Djamous conducted a series of swift pincer movements, enveloping the Libyan positions and crushing them with sudden attacks from all sides. This strategy was repeated by Djamous in March in the battles of B'ir Kora and Ouadi Doum, inflicting crushing losses and forcing Gaddafi to evacuate northern Chad.[94] This in turn endangered Libyan control over the Aouzou Strip, and Aouzou fell in August to the FANT, only to be repelled by an overwhelming Libyan counter-offensive and the French refusal to provide air cover to the Chadians. Habré readily replied to this setback with the first Chadian incursion in Libyan territory of the Chadian-Libyan conflict, mounting on September 5 a surprise and fully successful raid against the key Libyan air base at Maaten alSarra. This attack was part of a plan to remove the threat of Libyan airpower before a renewed offensive on Aouzou.[95] The projected attack on Aouzou never took place, as the dimensions of the victory obtained at Maaten made France fear that the attack on the Libyan Base was only the first stage of a general offensive into Libya proper, a possibility that France was not willing to tolerate. As for Gaddafi, being subjected to internal and international pressures, he showed himself more conciliatory, which brought as a result to an OAU-brokered ceasefire on September 11.[96][97]

Aftermath While there were many violations of the ceasefire, the incidents were relatively minor. The two governments immediately started complex diplomatic manoeuvres to bring on their side world opinion in the case, widely expected, that the conflict was resumed; but

75

the two parts were also careful to leave the door open for a peaceful solution. The latter course was promoted by France and most African states, while the Reagan Administration saw in a resumption of the conflict the best chance to unseat Gaddafi.[98] Steadily, relations among the two countries improved, with Gaddafi giving signs that he wanted to normalize relations with the Chadian government, to the point of recognizing that the war had been an error. In May 1988 the Libyan leader declared he would recognize Habré as the legitimate president of Chad "as a gift to Africa"; this led on October 3 to the resumption of full diplomatic relations between the two countries. The following year, on August 31, 1989, Chadian and Libyan representatives met in Algiers to negotiate the Framework Agreement on the Peaceful Settlement of the Territorial Dispute, by which Gaddafi agreed to discuss with Habré the Aouzou Strip and to bring the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for a binding ruling if bilateral talks failed. Therefore, after a year of inconclusive talks, the sides submitted in September 1990 the dispute to the ICJ.[99][100][101] Chadian-Libyan relations were further ameliorated when Libyan-supported Idriss Déby unseated Habré on December 2. Gaddafi was the first head of state to recognize the new regime, and he also signed treaties of friendship and cooperation on various levels; but regarding the Aouzou Strip Déby followed his predecessor, declaring that if necessary he would fight to keep the strip out of Libya's hands.[102][103] The Aouzou dispute was concluded for good on February 3, 1994, when the judges of the ICJ by a majority of 16 to 1 decided that the Aouzou Strip belonged to Chad. The court's judgement was implemented without delay, the two parties signing as early as April 4 an agreement concerning the practical modalities for the implementation of the judgement. Monitored by international observers, the withdrawal of Libyan troops from the Strip began on April 15 and was completed by May 10. The formal and final transfer of the Strip from Libya to Chad took place on May 30, when the sides signed a joint declaration stating that the Libyan withdrawal had been effected.[101][104] References • Azevedo, Mario J. (1998). Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad. Routledge. ISBN 90-5699-582-0. • Brandily, Monique (December 1984). "Le Tchad face nord 1978-1979" (PDF). Politique Africaine (16): 45–65. http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/016045.pdf. • Brecher, Michael & Wilkenfeld, Jonathan (1997). A Study in Crisis. University of Michigan Press. ISBN 0-4721-0806-9. • Buijtenhuijs, Robert (December 1984). "Le FROLINAT à l'épreuve du pouvoir: L'échec d'une révolution Africaine" (PDF). Politique Africaine (16): 15–29. http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/016015.pdf. • Buijtenhuijs, Robert (March 1981). "Guerre de guérilla et révolution en Afrique noire : les leçons du Tchad" (PDF). Politique Africaine (1): 23–33. http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/001023.pdf. • Brian Ferguson, R. (2002). State, Identity and Violence:Political Disintegration in the Post-Cold War World. Routledge. ISBN 0-4152-7412-5. • Clayton, Anthony (1998). Frontiersmen: Warfare in Africa Since 1950. Routledge. ISBN 1-8572-8525-5. • de Lespinois, Jérôme (June 2005). "L'emploi de la force aérienne au Tchad (1967–1987)" (PDF). Penser les Ailes françaises (6): 65–74. http://www.cesa.air.defense.gouv.fr/DPESA/PLAF/PLAF_N_6.pdf. • Gérard, Alain (December 1984). "Nimeiry face aux crises tchadiennes" (PDF). Politique Africaine (16): 118–124. http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/016118.pdf. • Macedo, Stephen (2003). Universal Jurisdiction: ational Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes Under International Law. University of Pennsylvania Press. ISBN 0-8122-3736-6. • Mays, Terry M. (2002). Africa's First Peacekeeping operation: The OAU in Chad. Greenwood. ISBN 978-0-275-97606-4. • Metz, Helen Chapin (2004). Libya. US GPO. ISBN 1-4191-3012-9. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/lytoc.html. • Mouric, N. (December 1984). "La politique tchadienne de la France sous Valéry Giscard d'Estaing" (PDF). Politique Africaine (16): 86–101. http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/016086.pdf. • Nolutshungu, Sam C. (1995). Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad. University of Virginia Press. ISBN 0-8139-1628-3. • Pollack, Kenneth M. (2002). Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991. University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 08032-3733-2. • Simons, Geoff (2004). Libya and the West: From Independence to Lockerbie. I.B. Tauris. ISBN 1-8606-4988-2. • Simpson, Howard R. (1999). The Paratroopers of the French Foreign Legion: From Vietnam to Bosnia. Brassey's. ISBN 1-5748-8226-0. • Wright, John L. (1989). Libya, Chad and the Central Sahara. C. Hurst. ISBN 1-85065-050-0. • Libya-Sudan-Chad Triangle: Dilemma for United States Policy. US GPO. 1981. *otes 1. ^ a b c d e f K. Pollack, Arabs at War, p. 375 2. ^ a b c d e K. Pollack, p. 376 3. ^ S. Nolutshungu, Limits of Anarchy, p. 230 4. ^ M. Azevedo, Roots of Violence, p. 151 5. ^ A. Clayton, Frontiersmen, p. 98 6. ^ M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis, p. 84 7. ^ R. Brian Ferguson, The State, Identity and Violence, p. 267 8. ^ a b c M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 85 9. ^ a b G. Simons, Libya and the West, p. 56 10. ^ S. Nolutshungu, p. 327 11. ^ a b c J. Wright, Libya, Chad and the Central Sahara, p. 130 12. ^ M. Azevedo, p. 145

76

13. ^ . "Public sitting held on Monday 14 June 1993 in the case concerning Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamayiriya/Chad)" (PDF). International Court of Justice. 14. ^ R. Buijtenhuijs, "Le FROLINAT à l'épreuve du pouvoir", p. 19 15. ^ R. Buijtenhuijs, pp. 16–17 16. ^ . "Public sitting held on Friday 2 July 1993 in the case concerning Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamayiriya/Chad)" (PDF). International Court of Justice. 17. ^ A. Clayton, p. 99 18. ^ J. Wright, pp. 130–131 19. ^ S. Macedo, Universal Jurisdiction, pp. 132–133 20. ^ R. Buijtenhuijs, Guerre de guérilla et révolution en Afrique noire, p. 27 21. ^ A. Gérard, imeiry face aux crises tchadiennes, p. 119 22. ^ a b c M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 86 23. ^ a b R. Buijtenhuijs, Guerre de guérilla et révolution en Afrique noire, p. 26 24. ^ R. Buijtenhuijs, "Le FROLINAT à l'épreuve du pouvoir", p. 18 25. ^ Libya-Sudan-Chad Triangle, p. 32 26. ^ R. Buijtenhuijs, "Le FROLINAT à l'épreuve du pouvoir", p. 21 27. ^ a b c d M. Azevedo, p. 146 28. ^ J. de Léspinôis, "L'emploi de la force aeriénne au Tchad", pp. 70–71 29. ^ M. Pollack, pp. 376–377 30. ^ H. Simpson, The Paratroopers of the French Foreign Legion, p. 55 31. ^ M. Brandily, "Le Tchad face nord", p. 59 32. ^ N. Mouric, "La politique tchadienne de la France", p. 99 33. ^ M. Brandily, pp. 58–61 34. ^ M. Azevedo, pp. 104–105, 119, 135 35. ^ Ibid., p. 106 36. ^ a b M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 88 37. ^ N. Mouric, p. 100 38. ^ a b K. Pollack, p. 377 39. ^ T. Mays, Africa's First Peacekeeping operation, p. 43 40. ^ T. Mays, p. 39 41. ^ T. Mays, pp. 45–46 42. ^ a b S. Nolutshungu, p. 133 43. ^ a b c M. Azevedo, p. 147 44. ^ J. Wright, p. 131 45. ^ S. Nolutshungu, p. 135 46. ^ a b c M. Azevedo, p. 108 47. ^ M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 89 48. ^ a b c d e H. Metz, Libya, p. 261 49. ^ a b J. Wright, p. 132 50. ^ M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, pp. 89–90 51. ^ M. Azevedo, pp. 147–148 52. ^ S. Nolutshungu, p. 156 53. ^ S. Nolutshungu, p. 153 54. ^ a b M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 90 55. ^ a b c M. Azevedo, p. 148 56. ^ S. Nolutshungu, pp. 154–155 57. ^ S. Nolutshungu, p. 164 58. ^ T. Mays, pp. 134–135 59. ^ S. Nolutshungu, p. 165 60. ^ a b T. Mays, p. 139 61. ^ S. Nolutshungu, p. 168 62. ^ a b K. Pollack, p. 382 63. ^ T. Mays, p. 99 64. ^ S.Nolutshungu, p. 186 65. ^ Ibid. p. 185 66. ^ a b c d e S. Nolutshungu, p. 188 67. ^ M. Azevedo, p. 110, 139 68. ^ a b M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 91 69. ^ M. Azevedo, p. 159 70. ^ K. Pollack, pp. 382–383 71. ^ a b c K. Pollack, p. 383 72. ^ a b c S. Nolutshungu, p. 189 73. ^ M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, pp. 91–92 74. ^ M. Azevedo, p. 139 75. ^ a b M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 92 76. ^ S. Nolutshungu, p. 191 77. ^ a b M. Azevedo, p. 110

77

78. ^ M. Azevedo, pp. 139–140 79. ^ M. Azevedo, p. 140 80. ^ S. Nolutshungu, pp. 202–203 81. ^ Ibid., pp. 191–192, 210 82. ^ K. Pollack, pp. 384–385 83. ^ a b S. Nolutshungu, p. 212 84. ^ a b K. Pollack, p. 389 85. ^ M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 93 86. ^ S. Nolutshungu, pp. 212–213 87. ^ S. Nolutshungu, pp. 213–214 88. ^ S. Nolutshungu, pp. 214–216 89. ^ K. Pollack, p. 390 90. ^ S. Nolutshungu, pp. 215–216, 245 91. ^ M. Azevedo, pp. 149–150 92. ^ K. Pollack, p. 391, 398 93. ^ S. Nolutshungu, pp. 218–219 94. ^ K. Pollack, pp. 391–394 95. ^ K. Pollack, pp. 395–396 96. ^ S. Nolutshungu, pp. 222–223 97. ^ K. Pollack, p. 397 98. ^ S. Nolutshungu, pp. 223–224 99. ^ G. Simons, p. 58, 60 100. ^ S. Nolutshungu, p. 227 101. ^ a b M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 95 102. ^ "Chad The Devil Behind the Scenes", http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,971950,00.html?iid=chix-sphere 103. ^ M. Azevedo, p. 150 104. ^ G. Simons, p. 78 External links • Qaddafi Plays Quietly, But He's Still in the Game," The ew York Times, March 17, 1991.

Time,

1990-12-17,

Operation Manta (1983-84) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Operation Manta is the code name for the French military intervention in Chad between 1983 and 1984, during the Chadian-Libyan conflict. The operation was prompted by the invasion of Chad by a joint force of Libyan units and Chadian Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) rebels in June 1983. While France was at first reluctant to participate, the Libyan air-bombing of the strategic oasis of Faya-Largeau starting on July 31 led to the assembling in Chad of 3,500 French troops, the biggest French intervention since the end of the colonial era. The French troops, instead of attempting to expel the Libyan forces from Chad, drew a "line in the sand".[1] They concentrated their forces on the 15th parallel, the so-called "Red Line," (later moved up to the 16th parallel) to block the Libyan and GUNT advance towards the N'Djamena, thus saving the Chadian President Hissène Habré. The Libyan and rebel forces also avoided attacking across the Red Line and provoking the French. The resulting impasse led to the de facto partition of Chad, with the Libyans and the GUNT in the north and Habré and the French in central and southern Chad. To end this stalemate, French President François Mitterrand and Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi negotiated a mutual withdrawal of their countries' troops from Chad in September 1984. The accord was respected by the French, thus signing the end of Operation Manta, but not by the Libyans, whose forces remained in Chad until 1987 (they did, however, continue to respect the Red Line). The violation of the 15th parallel caused a renewed French intervention in Chad under Operation Epervier and the expulsion of Libyan forces from all Chad except for the Aouzou Strip the following year. Background Chad had been involved in a civil war since 1965, which reached its most dramatic phase in 1979 when a fragile alliance between the President Félix Malloum and the Prime Minister Hissène Habré collapsed, unleashing factional politics. International mediators midwifed the formation of a Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT), comprising all armed factions, but civil war reignited in 1980 when Habré, now Defence Minister, rebelled against the GUNT's Chairman, Goukouni Oueddei. Habré succeeded in taking N'Djamena, the Chadian capital, on August 7, 1982.[2] Refusing to acknowledge Habré as the new Chadian President, Goukouni refounded the GUNT as an anti-Habré coalition of armed groups in October in the town of Bardaï .[3] While Gaddafi had kept himself mostly aloof in the months prior to the fall of N'Djamena,[4] he decided to reinvolve himself in the Chadian conflict after Goukouni's fall. He recognized Goukouni as the legitimate ruler of Chad and decided to arm and train his forces.[5] Crisis

78

Gaddafi, judging the time to be ripe for a decisive offensive, ordered a massive joint GUNT-Libyan attack against Faya-Largeau, the main government stronghold in northern Chad, during June 1983. The fall of the city on June 24 generated a crisis in Franco-Libyan relations, with the French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson announcing that day that France "would not remain indifferent" to Libya's intervention in Chad.[6] The 3,000 man-strong GUNT force continued its advance towards Koro Toro, Oum Chalouba and Abéché, the main city in eastern Chad, which fell on July 8. These victories gave Goukouni and Gaddafi control of the main routes from the north to N'Djamena[3][7], and also severing Habré's supply line to Sudan.[2] As the rebels advanced, with poorly-concealed assistance from Libya, Habré appealed for international help. Rejecting direct intervention and downplaying the Libyan role, France was prepared to go no further than airlifting arms and fuel, with the first French arms shipments arriving on June 27. On July 3, Zaire flew in a detachment of 250 paratroopers, eventually raised to about 2,000 men. Deployed chiefly around N'Djamena, the Zaireans freed Chadian troops to fight the rebels. The United States further announced that 25 million US dollars in military and food aid would be provided. Thus assisted, and taking advantage of the GUNT's overextended supply line, Habré took personal command of the Chadian National Armed Forces (FANT) and drove Goukouni's army out of Abéché four days after the city's fall. FANT recaptured Faya-Largeau on July 30 and went on to retake other points in the north.[2][3] French intervention Faced with the collapse of the GUNT-Libyan offensive, Gaddafi increased his force commitment forces in Chad. Libyan MiGs bombed Faya-Largeau on the day after it was recaptured by FANT, in the first undisguised Libyan intervention in the crisis.[6] A force of 11,000 Libyan troops, complete with armour and artillery, was airlifted into the Aouzou Strip, to support the GUNT forces, along with eighty combat aircraft, a considerable portion of the Libyan Air Force. Habré entrenched himself in Faya-Largeau with 5,000 troops, but he could not match the massive Libyan firepower, losing a third of his army and being forced out of Faya and retreating 200 miles south.[8] Habré issued a fresh plea for French military assistance on August 6.[9] French President François Mitterrand, under pressure from the US and Francophone African states, announced on August 9 his determination to contain Gaddafi. A ground force was rapidly dispatched from the bordering Central African Republic, beginning Operation Manta.[10][11] The first French contingents were deployed north of N'Djamena at points on the two possible routes of advance on the capital. Fighter aircraft and antitank helicopters were dispatched to Chad to discourage an attack on N'Djamena. As the buildup proceeded, forward positions were established roughly along the 15th parallel from Mao in the west to Abéché in the east (the so-called "Red Line"), which the French tried to maintain as the line separating the combatants. This force eventually rose to become the largest expeditionary force ever assembled by France in Africa since the Algerian War, reaching 3,500 troops and several squadrons of Jaguar fighter-bombers.[10][11][2] Stalemate Although France said it would not tolerate Libya's military presence at Faya-Largeau on August 25,[12] Mitterrand was unwilling to openly confront Libya and return northern Chad to Habré. This inaction gave the impression that the French were willing to concede control of Northern Chad to Gaddafi. The Libyans, too, avoided crossing the Red Line, thereby avoiding engagement with the French troops.[11] While the division of the country left Habré unsatisfied with Gaddafi's influence in Chadian affairs, the Chadian President benefited greatly from the French intervention. He was also able to restore his old ties with the French military, and create new ones with the French Socialists. On the other side of the Red Line, the stalemate was a far greater problem for the GUNT, bogged down in the arid north but far away from Tripoli, where the main decision-making took place. It was only a question of time before rifts would start emerging between the Libyan military and the GUNT forces, due to Libya's inability to balance the demands from these two groups.[13] France and Libya pursued bilateral negotiations independently from the Chadian factions which they sponsored, as well as the militantly anti-Libyan Reagan Administration in the United States, which favoured negotiations between Goukouni and Habré. For a time, France seemed interested in the Libyan suggestion of replacing Habré and Goukouni with a "third man." However, these negotiation attempts repeated the failure of the peace talks which had been promoted by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in November 1983.[11][12] Renewed fighting The OAU-supported mediation attempt made by Ethiopia's leader Mengistu Haile Mariam at the beginning of 1984 was not any more successful than previous attempts. On January 24, GUNT troops backed by heavily-armed Libyan counterparts, overran the Red Line and attacked the FANT outpost of Ziguey, northern Kanem,[14][15] 200 km south of the Red Line in order to secure French and African support for new negotiations. Thirty FANT soldiers were killed and twelve taken prisoner, while in Zine, close to Mao, two Belgian doctors of Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) were taken hostage.[16] This attack forced the French to counter-attack, although not in the manner desired by Habré. He felt the French ought to retaliate by striking the GUNT at FayaLargeau, which would have served as a declaration of war on Libya and escalated the conflict, something Mitterrand wanted to avoid at all costs. Instead, on January 25, French Defence Minister Charles Hernu ordered two Jaguar fighter-bombers to interdict the attackers and pursue them during their retreat. While the advance was blocked, a Jaguar was shot down and its pilot killed, leading to the January 27 decision to move the Red Line from the 15th to the 16th parallel, running from Koro Toro to Oum Chalouba. The French also moved a squadron of four Jaguars from Libreville, Gabon to N'Djamena.[11][17][18] French withdrawal

79

On April 30, Gaddafi proposed a mutual withdrawal of both French and Libyan forces from Chad in order to end the stalemate. The offer was accepted by Mitterrand, and four months later, Mitterrand and Gaddafi met on September 17, announcing that the troop withdrawal would start on September 25, and be completed by November 10.[12] The Libyan offer arrived when the French were becoming bogged down in an intervention that promised no rapid solution. Also, the cost of the mission, which had reached a 150 million CFA Francs per day, and the loss of a dozen troops following a number of incidents, turned the majority of French public opinion in favour of the departure of French forces from Chad.[19] The agreement was initially hailed in France as a great success that attested to Mitterrand's diplomatic skills. The French troops retired before the expiry of the agreed withdrawal dateleaving behind only a 100-strong technical mission and a considerable amount of material for the FANT. To Mitterrand's embarrassment, France discovered on December 5 that Gaddafi, while pulling out some forces, had kept at least 3,000 troops camouflaged in the north.[12][20][21] Reactions to the withdrawal The French withdrawal badly strained Franco-Chadian relations, as Habré felt both insulted and abandoned by the French government. Rumors of "secret clauses" in the Franco-Libyan accord spread from N'Djamena throughout Africa. These rumors obligated the French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas to formally deny the existence of such clauses in the Franco-African summit held in Bujumbura in December. Mitterrand resisted pressure from African governments to return to Chad, with the Foreign Relations Secretary of Mitterrand's Socialist Party Jacques Hustinger proclaiming that "France can't be forever the gendarme of Francophone Africa".[22] After the return of the French troops in their country, Mitterrand found himself accused both at home and abroad of having been naive in trusting the word "of a man who has never maintained it". Gaddafi emerged with a major diplomatic victory that enhanced his status as a Third World leader who had duped the French government.[23] Aftermath The year following the French withdrawal was one of the quietest since the ascent to power of Habré, with both forces carefully remaining on their side of the Red Line, even if the GUNT had initially expressed the desire to march on N'Djamena and unseat Habré. Habré instead used the truce to strengthen his position through a series of peace accords with minor rebel groups. These weakened the GUNT, which was increasingly divided by internal dissension and progressively estranged from the Libyans, who were pursuing a strategy of annexation towards northern Chad.[24][25] At the beginning of 1986, the GUNT was increasingly isolated internationally and disintegrating internally. In reaction to this decline of his client, which legitimized the Libyan presence in Chad, Gaddafi encouraged the rebels to attack the FANT oputpost of Kouba Olanga across the Red Line on February 18, with the support of Libyan armour. This brought the French return to Chad in Operation Epervier, restoring the Red Line. A few months later and to the surprise of no one, the GUNT rebelled against its former Libyan patrons, opening the way for the Toyota War in 1987 which expelled the Libyans from all Chad except the Aouzou Strip. The Aouzou Strip was finally restored to Chad in 1994.[26] References

• • • • • • •

Azevedo, Mario J. (1998). Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad. Routledge. ISBN 90-5699-582-0. Brecher, Michael & Wilkenfeld, Jonathan (1997). A Study in Crisis. University of Michigan Press. ISBN 0-4721-0806-9. Collelo, Thomas (1990). Chad. US GPO. ISBN 0-1602-4770-5. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/tdtoc.html. Jessup, John E. (1998). An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 1945-1996. Greenwood Press. ISBN 0-3132-8112-2. Ngansop, Guy Jeremie (1986). Tchad: Vingt d'ans de crise. L'Harmattan. ISBN 2-85802-687-4. (French) Nolutshungu, Sam C. (1995). Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad. University of Virginia Press. ISBN 0-8139-1628-3. Pollack, Kenneth M. (2002). Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991. University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 08032-3733-2.

*otes ^ Smith, William E. (1983-08-29), "France http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,949768,00.html 2. ^ a b c d T. Collelo, Chad 3. ^ a b c S.Nolutshungu, Limits of Anarchy, p. 188 4. ^ S. Nolutshungu, p. 185 5. ^ K. Pollack, Arabs at War, p. 382 6. ^ a b M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, A Study in Crisis, p. 91 7. ^ M. Azevedo, Roots of Violence, p. 110 8. ^ K. Pollack, p. 183 9. ^ J. Jessup, An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict, p. 116 10. ^ a b M. Azevedo, p. 139 11. ^ a b c d e S. Nolutshungu, p. 189 12. ^ a b c d M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 92 1.

Draws

the

Line",

Time,

80

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

^ S. Nolutshungu, pp. 189–190 ^ M. Azevedo, p. 110, 139 ^ S. Nolutshungu, p. 189, 191 ^ G. Ngansop, Tchad, p. 150 ^ M. Azevedo, p. 110 ^ G. Ngansop, pp. 150–151 ^ G. Ngansop, pp. 154–155 ^ S. Nolutshungu, p. 190 ^ M. Azevedo, pp. 139–140 ^ G. Ngansop, p. 158 ^ M. Azevedo, p. 140 ^ G. Ngansop, pp. 159–160 ^ S. Nolutshungu, pp. 191–193 ^ S. Nolutshungu, pp. 212–228

Operation Epervier (1986-87) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Operation Epervier (English: Operation Sparrowhawk) is the codename for the current French military presence in Chad[1]. Operation Epervier started in the night of February 13 to 14 1986, under the Defence agreement between France and Chad, and was prepared during a meeting in N'Djamena between the Chadian President Hissène Habré and the French Defence Minister Paul Quilès. Its goal was to contain Libyan invasion, that had brought to the loss of all Chadian territory north of the 16th parallel and was now threatening the capital, following a new offensive started on February 10 by Qaddafi in the erroneous belief that there would be no French reaction. The French Air Force was the first to strike: on February 16 an air raid on Ouadi Doum badly damaged the Ouadi Doum airbase, a strategic air base in Chad from which Libyan planes could attack N'Djamena and hamper the deployment of the troops. Following this event on February 18, 200 French Commandos took possession of Camp Dubut, near N'Djamena, which had already been France's headquarters during Opération Manta (1983–1984). The Commandos secured the camp for the mission's air force, that arrived the night of the 18th and was composed of six Mirage F1 and four Jaguar fighter-bombers and a battery of low altitude (anti aircraft) Crotale missiles. To defend the capital and the camp against high altitude air attacks a battery of French Army Air Defense MIM-23 Hawk missiles arrived on March 3, and shortly afterwards a radar was stationed at Moussoro, defended by 150 French troops. This brought the total number of troops in the country to 900. For many months the troops remained largely inactive, and the air force limited itself to reconnaissance missions for the Chadian army, remaining careful not to cross the 16th parallel. But when in October the leader of the GUNT Goukouni Oueddei rebelled against his former protector Qaddafi, and vicious fighting erupted in the Tibesti between his People's Armed Forces militia (1500-2000 men) and the Libyan army, who had 8000 men in Chad, the situation changed. Overwhelmed by superior forces, Goukouni's forces were in great difficulty; this led France to plan a mission to help the Tibesti rebels. In the night between September 16 and 17, two Transall transport aircraft parachuted 6000 litres of gasoline, munitions, provisions and anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles into the Tibesti. It was also reported by Le Monde that a small number of French soldiers had secretly entered the Tibesti to support Goukouni's men. On January 2 Habré's troops invaded the capital of the Ennedi, Fada; the battle was a triumph for the Chadians, while 781 Libyans remained on the ground. A decisive role was played by French supplies, especially the anti-tank MILAN missiles. Qaddafi answered by violating the red line of the 16th parallel; Libyan planes bombed Arada, 110km south of the line, and Oum-Chalouba, close to a new French base established at Kalaït, exactly on the 16th parallel, manned by 250 troops. France's reaction was to bomb again on January 7 the airbase of Ouadi Doum: the fourteen aircraft employed in the operation destroyed the Libyan radar station, but limited themselves to this. In what appears to have been an escalation, Libyan forces raided the French-Chadian base of Kalaïton January 11; it was the first direct attack on the French contingent, which suffered no losses. Additionally, Qaddafi prepared a vast offensive: he added 4000-6000 troops to the 8000 men stationed in the Bourkou-Ennedi-Tibesti. In the meantime, the French also strengthened their forces; in February Operation Epervier reached 2200 men and established two new bases at Biltine and Abéché (Camp Moll), in eastern Chad. Knowing now that his back was fully covered by the French, Habré concentrated most of his forces near Fada; and when on March 18 the Libyan offensive was at last started the result was a disaster for Qaddafi. 1200 Libyans were killed and 500 taken prisoner, and Faya-Largeau, the main Libyan stronghold in Chad, was taken without fighting on March 27. In this recapture of Northern Chad, France did not officially take part in the fighting; but it is believed that a special unit of the DGSE participated in the taking of Ouadi Doum. But it was only in May, when the French Defence Minister Alain Giraud visited the town of Faya-Largeau, that the respect of the 16th parallel by the French troops was declared no longer applicable. Libyan expulsion from Chad did not end the Chadian-Libyan conflict: the dispute over who was the rightful possessor of the Aouzou strip remained open, and when Habré occupied Aouzou on August 8, the French contingent was once again involved. This happened on August 25, when Qaddafi bombed Faya-Largeau, where a French parachute regiment was stationed, but without causing any real damage. And when Habré started yet another new offensive, in retaliation a Tupolev Tu-22 was sent on September 7 to bomb the capital, but the aircraft was destroyed by the Army MIM-23 Hawk battery, proving the efficiency of the French defences of N'Djamena. A simultaneous Libyan attack on Abéché was more successful - if not very effective - owing to the inadequacy of the French Air Force SAM Crotale battery recently deployed. France decided not to react to these attacks, to prevent an escalation. On September 11 Chadians and Libyans accept a ceasefire mediated by the OAU, which put an end to the war. While long negotiations between the two parties started, the French continued to fortify their positions in Chad, for example by completing an air strip at Abéché in September. The French started assuming humanitarian tasks, such as mine-clearing in northern Chad; it was during one of these missions that Operation Sparrowhawk reported on January 14, 1988 its first loss. The Chadian-Libyan conflict came to an end in October 1988, when Chad resumed formal diplomatic relations with Libya, in accordance

81

with recommendations made by the OAU. As a result, the French contingent started diminishing, also for economic reasons: in 1987 alone, Operation Epervier had cost France 1,700,000 French francs. In 1989 the number of men employed in Chad had fallen to 1,000, and many minor bases had been dismantled. A new president in Chad Habré was an indirect victim of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The diminished importance of Africa for French policy also brought France to become more critical of Habré's unimpressive human rights record. Habré moved to free himself from French tutelage by searching for the USA's friendship and help also considerably cooled down the relationship between Paris and N'Djamena, to the point that the French decided to remain neutral in the conflict that started in April 1989 between the President and his former general Idriss Déby. On his part, Déby promised not to attack the French base at Abéché, and in his march to the capital was followed by an officer of the DGSE, Paul Fontbonne. Déby occupied the Chadian capital on December 3, 1990, with the French maintaining themselves neutral. The increasing pillaging in the city did cause the troops to react: they secured the city's key-points (the airport, the embassy, the power station) and evacuated its 1250 western civilans. With Déby in power, while Franco-Chadian relations remained good, those with Libya bettered considerably. Among the conditions asked by Qaddafi to Déby for his friendship was the deportation in Libya of the Haftar force, composed of former Libyan troops that had deserted; to save them they were secretly brought in Nigeria in a joint operation that involved both the CIA and components of Operation Sparrowhawk. Notwithstandind this, Chadian-Libyan relations remained good, and the last issues among the two countries were resolved in 1994 by the International Court of Justice of The Hague, that gave the Aouzou Strip to Chad. The operation's key roles have been the logistic support to the French cooperation in their restructuration and reduction of the Chadian army, that was reduced from 40,000 to 25,000 men, and their role in making possible the presidential election of 1996. Actions like the former helped the French authorities in justifying their presence in the country: when Amnesty International questioned them in April 1996 on this presence, the official answer was that Operation Sparrowhawk was being used to assist the democratic process in Chad, and also as an internal and external deterrent.[1] In theory Operation Epervier, that had been created to contain Libyan expansionism, should have come to an end with the settlement of all issues among the two countries; but Chad became to be seen now as the "French aircraft carrier of the desert", of key strategic importance as one of the five countries (the others were Djibouti, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Gabon) with a continuing French military presence in August 2002. In that period Operation Epervier could count on 951 men, disposed in the bases of Hadji Kossei near N'Djamena and that of Croci next to Abéché. The new Sudanese menace The menace represented by Sudan and its proxies had already brought the French forces to increase their units to 1,200 troops based near N'Djamena to protect the Chadian President Idriss Déby's administration in the event of a large scale attack by the United Front for Democratic Change rebels or an invasion by their chief tactical and financial supporters, the Sudanese military. French involvement, which increased by 300 troops in April of 2006, further complicates the Chadian-Sudanese conflict. The force can also count at the moment on six Mirage F1, three tactical transport planes, two Breguet reconnaissance planes and three Puma helicopters.[2] Prior to, but especially after the Battle of N'Djamena, French airplanes have participated in reconnaissance missions to determine the scope of Sudanese involvement.[3]. The French forces also played a small but important part in the battle of N'Djamena, where they provided logistical support to the government but without taking sides in the fighting; they also provided the Chadian army with intelligence on the enemy's movemements, and fired warning shots near the rebel column.[4] President Déby has responded to increasing instability by threatening to expel the 200,000 Sudanese Fur refugees "if after June" the international community has not acted so he "can't guarantee the security of [his] citizens and the refugees."[5] *otes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

^ "France's Ties With African Leaders Fading". ABC News. 22 April 2006. http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=1872116&CMP=OTC-RSSFeeds0312. ^ "The French army helped the Chadian government". Le Figaro. 19 April 2006. ^ "AU investigates if Sudan backing rebels in Chad". CNN. 21 April 2006. http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/04/21/chad.au.reut/index.html?section=cnn_latest. ^ "Rebels Are Repelled in Capital of Chad". New York Times. 13 April 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/13/world/africa/13cndchad.html?ex=1302580800&en=650482951134c124&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss. ^ "After Battle in Capital, Chad Threatens to Expel Sudanese". New York Times. 15 April 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/15/world/africa/15chad.html?ex=1145764800&en=a453127bb71afcb0&ei=5087%0A.

External links

• • •

French Ministry of Defence, Elements francais au Tchad / French Forces Chad, accessed September 2008 Opération Epervier (in French) Relief in N'Djamena

82

Toyota War From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Toyota War is the name commonly given to the last phase of the Chadian-Libyan conflict, which took place in 1987 in Northern Chad and on the Libyan-Chadian border. It takes its name from the Toyota pickup trucks used as technicals to provide mobility for the Chadian troops as they fought against the Libyans.[6] The 1987 war resulted in a heavy defeat for Libya, which, according to American sources, lost one tenth of its army, with 7,500 troops killed and 1.5 billion dollars worth of military equipment destroyed or captured.[7] The war began with the Libyan occupation of northern Chad in 1983, when Libya's leader Gaddafi, refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the Chadian President Hissène Habré, militarily supported the attempt by the opposition Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) to overthrow Habré. The plan was foiled by the intervention of France that, first with Operation Manta and later with Operation Epervier, limited Libyan expansion to north of the 16th parallel, in the most desertic and sparsely inhabited part of Chad.[8] In 1986 the GUNT rebelled against Gaddafi, stripping Libya of its main cover of legitimacy for its military presence in Chad. Seeing an occasion to unify Chad behind him, Habré ordered his forces to pass the 16th parallel so as to link with the GUNT rebels (who were fighting the Libyans in Tibesti) in December.[9] A few weeks later a bigger force struck at Fada, destroying the local Libyan garrison. In three months, combining the methods of guerilla and conventional warfare in a common strategy,[10] Habré was able to retake almost all northern Chad, and in the following months, inflicted new heavy defeats on the Libyans, until a ceasefire putting an end to the conflict was signed in September. The ceasefire left open the issue of the disputed Aouzou Strip, which was eventually assigned to Chad by the International Court of Justice in 1994. Background Since 1983 Chad was de facto partitioned, with the northern half controlled by the rebel Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) headed by Goukouni Oueddei and supported on the ground by Libyan forces, while the south was held by the Westernbacked Chadian government guided by Hissène Habré.[11] This partition on 16th Parallel (the so-called Red Line) into Libyan and French zones of influence was informally recognised by France in 1984, following an accord between France and Libya to retire from the country the respective forces present in Chad.[12] The accord was not respected by Libya, which maintained at least 3,000 men stationed in northern Chad.[13] During the period between 1984 and 1986, in which no major clash took place, Habré greatly strengthened his position thanks to western support and Libya's failure to respect the Franco-Libyan 1984 agreement. Decisive was also the increasing factional bickering that started plaguing the GUNT since 1984, centered around the fight between Goukouni and Acheikh ibn Oumar over the leadership of the organization.[14] Taking advantage of the GUNT's difficulties, Habré struck a series of accords with smaller rebel factions, which left the GUNT at the beginning of 1986 with only three of the eleven factions that had originally signed the Lagos Accord in 1979. The remaining factions were Goukouni's People's Armed Forces (FAP), Acheikh's armed branch of the Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR) and that part of the Chadian Armed Forces (FAT) which had maintained its loyalty to Wadel Abdelkader Kamougué.[15] Forces on the ground At the opening of 1987, the last year of the war, the Libyan expeditionary force was still impressive, comprising 8,000 troops, 300 tanks, many multiple rocket launchers (rocket artillery) and regular artillery pieces, Mi-24 helicopters and sixty combat aircraft. These forces did not have a unified command, but were divided into an Operational Group South, active in the Tibesti with 2,500 men, and an Operational Group East, centered in Faya-Largeau.[16] Apparently formidable, the Libyan military dispositive in Chad was marred by serious flaws. The Libyans were prepared for a war in which they would provide ground and air support to their Chadian allies, act as assault infantry, and provide reconnaissance. However, by 1987, Gaddafi had lost his allies, exposing Libya's inadequate knowledge of the area. Libyan garrisons came to resemble isolated and vulnerable islands in the Chadian Sahara. Also important was the low morale among the troops, who were fighting in a foreign country, and the structural disorganization of the Libyan army, which was in part induced by Gaddafi's fear of a military coup against him. This fear led him to avoid the professionalization of the armed forces.[17][18] The Libyans had also to deal with the greatly strengthened Chadian National Armed Forces (FANT), which was composed of 10,000 highly motivated troops, led by experienced and able commanders, such as Idriss Déby, Hassan Djamous and President Hissène Habré himself. And while FANT previously had no airpower, limited mobility and few antitank and antiaircraft weapons, by 1987 it could count on the French Air Force to ground the Libyan aircraft, and, more importantly, to provide 400 highly mobile Toyota pickups equipped with MILAN anti-tank guided missiles. It is these trucks that gave the name "Toyota War" to this last phase of the Chadian-Libyan conflict.[19][20] Libyan expulsion Habré selected as the first target for his reconquest of northern Chad the well-fortified Libyan communications base of Fada. It was defended by 2,000 Libyans and the bulk of the Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR) militia (Gaddafi's closest Chadian allies), well-provided with armour and artillery. Hassan Djamous, the thirty-year-old FANT commander-in-chief, pitched about 4,000–5,000 troops against Fada's Libyan garrison.[16] Taking advantage of his army's superior knowledge of the terrain, which apparently included unknown access points to the base, Djamous avoided a frontal assault and used his forces' high mobility, to surround the Libyan positions and then unleashed his troops, destroying the defending garrison. In the battle, 784 Libyans were killed and 100 tanks destroyed, while only 50 FANT soldiers died.[21][22] The unexpected defeat stunned Gaddafi, who then reacted on January 4 by recalling to service all of the army reservists. In an act of defiance towards France, he also ordered the bombing of Arada, well south

83

of the 16th parallel. France retaliated with a new airstrike on Ouadi Doum and destroyed their radar system, effectively blinding the Libyan Air Force in Chad for several months.[23] Gaddafi attempted to contain the FANT threat by rushing several new battalions into Chad (especially to Faya-Largeau and Ouadi Doum), including units of the elite Revolutionary Guard. This brought the amount of Libyan forces in the country to a total of 11,000 by March.[24] In March 1987, the main Libyan air base of Ouadi Doum was captured by Chadian forces. Although strongly defended by minefields, 5,000 troops, tanks, armored vehicles, and aircraft, the Libyans' base fell to a smaller Chadian attacking force led by Djamous equipped with trucks mounted with machine guns and antitank weapons. Observers estimated that, in the Chadian victories in the first three months of 1987, more than 3,000 Libyan soldiers had been killed, captured, or deserted. Large numbers of tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters were captured or destroyed. In some cases, Libya sent its own aircraft to bomb abandoned Libyan equipment to deny its use to the Chadians. It was reported that, in many cases, Libyan soldiers had been killed while fleeing to avoid battle. At Ouadi Doum, panicked Libyans had suffered high casualties running through their own minefields.[25] The fall of Ouadi Doum was a severe setback for Libya. Deserted by most of their Chadian allies, Libyan forces found themselves isolated in foreign territory, and the loss of the main Libyan air base in Chad prevented Libya from providing close air cover to its troops. In general, the offensive against FANT had exposed the vulnerability of Libya's heavy armor to a more mobile enemy. On Gaddafi's orders, a general withdrawal was undertaken from Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti Prefecture, beginning with Faya-Largeau. The town had served as the main Libyan base during the preceding four years, but was in danger of being encircled. Its garrison of 3,000 troops, together with the survivors of Ouadi Doum, retired toward the Libyan base at Maatan-as-Sarra, north of the Chadian border.[26] In an attempt to reduce the damage inflicted to his international standing, Gaddafi announced that Libya had won the confrontation, and was now leaving Chad so that the opposition could play its part in fighting Habré.[27] These military actions left Habré in control of Chad and in a position to threaten the expulsion of Libya from the Aouzou Strip, affected the international perception of Libya as a significant regional military power, and cast renewed doubt on the competence and determination of Libyan soldiers, especially in engagements beyond the country's borders to which they evidently felt no personal commitment.[25] The Toyota War attracted considerable interest in the United States, where the possibility of using Habré to overthrow Gaddafi was given serious consideration.[28] As part of the Reagan Administration's support for his government, Habré, during a visit to Washington, received a pledge of $32 million United States dollars worth of aid, including Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.[7] Renewed Chadian offensive In August 1987, the encouraged Chadians carried their offensive into the disputed Aouzou Strip, occupying the town of Aouzou following another battle in which the Libyans suffered severe losses in troops and abandoned equipment. In retaliation, Libya intensified its air bombardments of towns in the north, usually from altitudes beyond the range of FANT's shoulder-fired missiles. Appeals by Habré for French air missions to defend the area against the bombing were rejected, as Aouzou had been retaken against the wishes of French President François Mitterrand. Instead, Mitterrand called for international mediation to settle competing claims to the disputed territory.[26][29] After a succession of counterattacks, toward the end of August the Libyans finally drove the 400 Chadian troops out of the town. This victory — the first by Libyan ground forces since the start of the Toyota War — was apparently achieved through close-range air strikes, which were followed by ground troops advancing cross-country in jeeps, Toyota all-terrain trucks, and light armored vehicles. For the Libyans, who had previously relied on ponderous tracked armour, the assault represented a conversion to the desert warfare tactics developed by FANT.[26] To highlight the victory, Gaddafi flew foreign journalists to the region, so the news of his victory could reach the headlines.[7] Habré quickly reacted to this setback and to the continued bombing of FANT concentrations in northern Chad. On September 5, 1987 he mounted a surprise raid against the key Libyan air base at Maaten al-Sarra. Reportedly, 1,000 Libyans were killed, 300 were captured, and hundreds of others were forced to flee into the surrounding desert. Chad claimed that its troops destroyed about 32 aircraft - including MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighters, Su-22 fighter-bombers, and Mi-24 helicopters - before the FANT column withdrew to Chadian soil.[26] The attack had been opposed by France, who refused to provide FANT with intelligence and logistical support, causing FANT to suffer considerable losses. The French Defence Minister André Giraud let it be known that "France was not implicated in any way" in the attack and "had not been informed of it". The American reaction was markedly different, as it had previously supported the attempted reconquest of the Aouzou Strip; it now welcomed the Chadian raid.[30] Ceasefire Because of domestic opposition, internal demoralization, and international hostility, Gaddafi assumed a more conciliatory attitude following his defeat. On the other side, Habré also found himself vulnerable, as the French feared that the attack on Maatan as-Sarrah was only the first stage of a general offensive into Libya proper, a possibility that France was not disposed to tolerate. As a result, Mitterrand forced Habré to accept the mediation efforts of the Organization of African Unity's Zambian Chairman, Kenneth Kaunda, which resulted in a ceasefire on September 11.[30][5][31] It was assumed that war would, sooner of later, resume, but in the end the ceasefire violations were relatively minor.[32] Gaddafi announced in May 1988 that he would recognize Habré as President of Chad "as a gift to Africa", even if Libya refused to leave the disputed Aouzou Strip.[7] On October 3 the two countries resumed diplomatic relations, and another important step was made when the two countries agreed in September 1990 to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice.[33] On February 3, 1994 the court ruled in favour of Chad, thus definitively solving the Aouzou controversy by assigning the territory to the southern country.[31] References

• •

Azevedo, Mario J. (1998). Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad. Routledge. ISBN 90-5699-582-0. Brecher, Michael & Wilkenfeld, Jonathan (1997). A Study in Crisis. University of Michigan Press. ISBN 0-4721-0806-9.

84

• • • • • • •

Clayton, Anthony (1998). Frontiersmen: Warfare in Africa Since 1950. Routledge. ISBN 1-8572-8525-5. Collelo, Thomas (1990). Chad. US GPO. ISBN 0-1602-4770-5. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/tdtoc.html. Metz, Helen Chapin (2004). Libya. US GPO. ISBN 1-4191-3012-9. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/lytoc.html. Ngansop, Guy Jeremie (1986). Tchad, vingt d'ans de crise. L'Harmattan. ISBN 2-85802-687-4. (French) Nolutshungu, Sam C. (1995). Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad. University of Virginia Press. ISBN 0-8139-1628-3. Pollack, Kenneth M. (2002). Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991. University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 08032-3733-2. Simons, Geoff (2004). Libya and the West: From Independence to Lockerbie. I.B. Tauris. ISBN 1-8606-4988-2.

*otes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

^ H. Metz, Libya, p. 254 ^ The Americana Annual, 1988, 180 ^ M. Azevedo, Roots of Violence, p. 119 ^ The Economic Cost of Soviet Military Manpower Requirements, 143 ^ a b c K. Pollack, Arabs at War, p. 397 ^ A. Clayton, Frontiersmen, p. 161 ^ a b c d G. Simons, Libya and the West, p. 58 ^ K. Pollack, pp. 382–385 ^ S. Nolutshungu, Limits of Anarchy, p. 212 ^ M. Azevedo, p. 124 ^ K. Pollack, Arabs at War, p. 383 ^ M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis, p. 92 ^ M. Azevedo, p. 140 ^ S. Nolutshungu, pp. 191–192, 210 ^ G. Ngansop, Tchad, vingt ans de crise, p. 160 ^ a b K. Pollack, p. 391 ^ K. Pollack, p. 386, 398 ^ S. Nolutshungu, pp. 218–219 ^ M. Azevedo, pp. 149–150 ^ K. Pollack, p. 391, 398 ^ K. Pollack, pp. 391–392 ^ S. Nolutshungu, p. 216 ^ M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, A Study in Crisis, p. 94 ^ K. Pollack, p. 392 ^ a b H. Metz, p. 262 ^ a b c d T. Collelo, Chad ^ M. Azevedo, p. 150 ^ S. Nolutshungu, p. 221 ^ S. Nolutshungu, p. 222 ^ a b S. Nolutshungu, pp. 222–223 ^ a b M. Brecher & J. Wilkenfeld, p. 95 ^ S. Nolutshungu, p. 223 ^ G. Simons, p. 60

85

Clashes between Libya and the United States Gulf of Sidra incident (19.8.1981)

Computer recreation of Fast Eagle 107's AIM-9 Sidewinder about to hit a Libyan Su-22 Kleeman and Venlet's F-14 Tomcat from the incident

is on display at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The first Gulf of Sidra incident, August 19, 1981, was an incident in which two Libyan Sukhoi Su-22 Fitter attack aircraft were shot down by two US F-14 Tomcats off of the Libyan coast. Background In the 1970s, Libya had claimed a 12 mile extension zone of its territorial waters in the Gulf of Sidra, which had prompted US Naval Forces to conduct Freedom of Navigation operations in the area, the so called "line of death". These operations further increased when Ronald Reagan came to office; in August 1981 he authorized a large naval force, led by USS Forrestal and imitz, to deploy off the Libyan coast. The Libyan Air Force responded by deploying a high number of interceptors and fighterbombers, and early on the morning of August 18 when the US exercise began, at least three MiG-25 'Foxbats' approached the US Carrier groups but were escorted away by F-4 Phantom IIs from Forrestal and F-14s from VF-41 and VF-84 from imitz. The Libyans tried to establish the exact location of the US Naval Force. 35 pairs of MiG-23 'Floggers', MiG-25s, Sukhoi Su-20 'Fitter-Cs', Su-22M 'Fitter-Js' and Mirage F.1s flew into the area, and were soon intercepted by seven pairs of F-14s and F-4s. The situation was tense, but neither side fired any weapons, even in at least two cases when MiG-25s tried to breach through the American fighters by flying high and fast. Incident On the morning of the 19th, two VF-41 Black Aces F-14As, Fast Eagle 102 (CDR Henry Kleeman/LT David Venlet) and Fast Eagle 107 (LT Lawrence Muczynski/LTJG James Anderson), were flying combat air patrol to cover aircraft engaged in a missile exercise. An E-2B Hawkeye from VAW-124 gained radar contact with two Sukhoi Su-22 'Fitters' which had left Okba Ben Nafi Air Base near Tripoli. The two F-14s from VF-41 Black Aces were ordered to intercept the two Libyan aircraft. Only few seconds before the crossing, at an estimated distance of 300 m one of the two Libyans fired an AA-2 "Atoll" at one of the F-14s, which missed. Then the two Sukhois flew right past the Americans and tried to escape. The Tomcats evaded and were cleared to return fire by their "rules of engagement" (ROE), which mandated self defense on the initiation of hostile action. The F-14s turned hard port and came behind the Libyan jets. The American pilots fired AIM-9L Sidewinders, the first kill is credited to “Fast Eagle 102”, and the second Libyan was downed by “Fast Eagle 107”. Both Libyan pilots ejected. The official United States Navy report states that both Libyan pilots ejected and were safely recovered, but listening to the official audio recording of the incident taken from USS Biddle one of the F-14 pilots states that he saw a Libyan pilot eject but his parachute failed to open.[1] Less than an hour later, while the Libyans were conducting a Search and Rescue operation of their downed pilots, two fully armed MiG-25s entered the airspace over the Gulf and headed towards the US carriers at Mach 1.5 and conducted a mock attack in the direction of USS Nimitz. Two VF-41 Tomcats and one VF-84 Tomcat headed towards the Libyans, who then turned around. The Tomcats turned home but had to turn around again when the Libyans headed towards the US carriers once more. After being tracked by the F-14's radars, once again the MiGs finally headed home. One more Libyan formation ventured out into the Gulf towards the US forces later that day.[2] The international tensions and dogfighting incidents seen in the movies Top Gun and Iron Eagle were drawn in part from this incident.[citation needed] *otes 1. ^ "USS Biddle Ship's History 1967–1993 (Audio recording from the dogfight and a short text transcript)". United States Navy. 1981-08-18. http://www.ussbiddle.org/history/fitter_engagement_audio.html. 2. ^ Libyan Wars, 1980-1989, Part 2 By Tom Cooper. External links Description of the incident Air Aces record US Department of State Country Study of Libya, reporting that both Libyan pilots survived. Reagan and Gadhafi - Robert M Kimmitt's commentary on the 1981 "Line of Death" incident Naval Aviation 1911-1986. A pictorial study pp.91

86

Action in the Gulf of Sidra (March 1986) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Date Location Result United States

March, 1986 Libya Tactical U.S. Victory Libya

30 warships 225 aircraft

2 missile corvettes 3 patrol boats

None

1 corvette sunk 1 patrol boat sunk 1 corvette damaged 1 patrol boat damaged , probable destruction or damage to SAM sites, unknown number of human casualties

In the spring of 1986, the US Navy deployed aircraft carrier groups into the Mediterranean Sea, specifically the disputed Gulf of Sidra. Libya claimed that the entire Gulf is their territory, 32 degrees, 30 minutes north with an exclusive 62 nautical miles (115 km) fishing zone[1], Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi asserted this in 1973 and dubbed it The Line of Death. The United States claimed its rights to conduct naval operations on international waters, a standard of 12-mile (19 km) territorial limit from a country's shore. The 1986 naval operations, prior to Operation El Dorado Canyon, resulted in several armed clashes between the United States and Libya. Identifications of the name of the operation vary. This source[2] claims it as Operation Attain Document, while this source[3] claims it was dubbed Operation Prairie Fire. Background Tensions between the US and Libya heightened after the hijacking of the TWA Flight 847 in 1985, and the Rome and Vienna airport attacks that same year. The US claimed that the Libyan leader was involved in these actions through his support of the alleged perpetrator, Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal. At the same time Libya began the installation of SA-5 surface-to-air-missile batteries that they had received from the Soviet Union in late 1985, along with radars, to beef up their air defence. As the US Navy had done for several years, they continued to challenge Libya’s claim to the Gulf of Sidra by crossing the so called “Line of Death”. Following the terrorist attacks of December 1985 in Rome and Vienna, the US Navy began several Freedom of Navigation operations in the area around Libya in an operation named “Attain Document”, which the first two parts of the operation were held between January 26 and January 30, and February 12 and February 15. These two occurred without incident. The third part of the operation were held between March 23 and March 29 when three carrier task forces, USS America, USS Coral Sea and USS Saratoga from the Sixth Fleet with 225 aircraft and some 30 warships began operations. Apparently an operation had been planned in the Pentagon sometime in the autumn of 1985. The plan was simple; operations already underway would likely cause some kind of Libyan reaction, which could be declared as “provocations” which would give the US Navy a reason to strike back. Although the operations prior to the end of March 1986 went without incidents, the US Navy had made 130 intercepts of Libyan fighters in the airspace above the Gulf of Sidra, although neither side could be provoked to open fire. Muammar al-Gaddafi had threatened to shoot down or destroy US aircraft or ships moving into the “Line of Death”, but during the 32 days prior to hostilities nothing happened, although both sides had aircraft close to each other. Even some Soviet Tu-16’s appeared several times to take a look at the US Navy but was escorted away. Hostilities On March 24, two MiG-25s took off from Benina air base with an order to intercept and shoot down some of the US fighters[4], but before they could get close enough a US E-2C detected the Libyans and soon two F-14s from VF-33 intercepted the two Libyans at 20,000 feet (6,100 m). This had been routine for the past weeks, but that was soon about to change as the Libyans started aggressive manoeuvring head on in an effort to get into firing positions on the two F-14s, this was a clear sign of hostile intentions. The F-14 wing leader reported “excessive hostile actions and intentions” and the air warfare commander back on USS America gave the pilots “warning yellow, weapons hold” which meant the F-14s could open fire if deemed necessary. An intense dogfight ensued, without any missiles fired. The F-14s dropped to 5,000 feet (1,500 m) where they had a distinct advantage of the MiG-25s, and positioned themselves between the sun and the Libyans and the F-14s ended at the high six o’clock behind the hostile MiGs and locked them up with their radars and acquired AIM-9 Sidewinder tones. The Libyans soon had enough and returned to base. But one of the MiGs turned around against the F-14s and the wing leader acquired the MiG and requested permission to open fire, but before permission was granted, the MiG-25 turned away and headed south. At the same time, F-14s from VF-102 were patrolling some 40 kilometres away from the Libyan coast (still international waters) and were fired upon by two SA-5s. The SA-5 being a big weapon was not

87

especially dangerous for fast moving aircraft such as the F-14s and dropped harmlessly into the waters. Two additional SA-5s were launched but were jammed by an EA-6B. Several Libyan patrol boats headed out towards the US battle groups and the Americans responded by sending up aircraft to counter the patrol boats. USS Saratoga launched A-7s armed with AGM-88 missiles from VA-83 and A-6s armed with AGM-84 missiles and Mk-20 Rockeye II cluster bombs from VA-85 and EA-6Bs from VAQ-132, USS America had A-6Es from VA-34 and the USS Coral Sea had A-6Es from VA-55 in the air, these were supported by several E-2Cs, F-14s, F/A-18s and KA-6Ds. The first air strikes occurred around 19:26 when two A-6Es from VA-55 found a French built Combatante-II patrol boat, the ship was first disabled by an AGM-84 and then destroyed by another Intruder with Rockeye cluster bombs. 40 minutes later, F-14s, F/A-18s, A-7Es and EA-6Bs headed towards the SA-5 site near Surt at low level and suddenly climbed which caused the Libyans to activate their radars and launch missiles at the incoming strikers; this prompted the A-7Es to launch several AGM-88 missiles, the strike formation then descended to 30 meters above sea level and turned back. It’s unknown if any of the missiles struck their intended targets, but A-6Es from VA-86 and VA-55 turned to engage several Libyan missile boats. At around 21:55, two A-6Es from VA-55 attacked a Nanuchka-class corvette which were heading towards the USS Yorktown, which prompted the Yorktown to open fire with an AGM-84 which struck the Libyan boat and subsequently started a fire; the corvette survived the attack and was towed back to Benghazi. The USS Yorktown launched two Harpoon missiles which damaged a second Combatante-II boat. Around midnight the Libyans launched several SA-2s and SA-5s, this time at A-6Es and A-7Es which responded by heading towards the coast. A-7Es from VA-83 launched several AGM-88s disabling several Libyan radars, and three more SA-5s form Syrte were launched with a single SA-2 near Benghazi. At 07.30 on another Libyan corvette was intercepted by A6Es from VA-55 and disabled by Rockeye munitions and later sunk by an AGM-84 missile launched from an A-6E from VA-85 with no Libyan surface-to-air missiles launched. The operation was terminated after this strike with no losses to the American side, and an unknown number of human losses to the Libyan side. *otes 1. 2. 3. 4.

^ Maritime Claims ^ Operation Attain Document ^ Libyan Wars, 1980-1989 Part 4 by Tom Cooper ^ According to a post from author Tom Cooper

External links

• •

Operation Attain Document Libyan Wars, 1980-1989 Part 4 by Tom Cooper

A VMFA-314 F/A-18A lands on USS Coral Sea (CV-43). An F-14 from VF-74 lands on USS Saratoga.

88

An A-7 aboard USS America during flight operations against Libya in 1986. Libyan corvette burns after attempting to engage US forces.

Bombing of Libya Operation El Dorado Canyon (15 April 1986) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The United States bombing of Libya (code-named Operation El Dorado Canyon) comprised the joint United States Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps air-strikes against Libya on April 15, 1986.

Origins After years of occasional skirmishes with Libya over Libyan territorial claims to the Gulf of Sidra, and years of vulnerability to Libyan-supported terrorism, especially the Abu Nidal group behind the Rome and Vienna airport attacks of December 27, 1985, the United States contemplated a military attack to send a message about support for international terrorism. In March 1986, the United States, asserting the 12-nautical-mile (22 km; 14 mi) limit to territorial waters recognized by the international community, sent a carrier task force to the region. Libya responded with aggressive counter-maneuvers on March 24 that led to the destruction of Libyan radar systems and missile attack boats. Less than two weeks later on April 5, a bomb exploded in a West Berlin disco, La Belle, killing two American servicemen and a Turkish woman and wounding 200 others. The United States claimed to have obtained cable transcripts from Libyan agents in East Germany involved in the attack. After several days of diplomatic talks with European and Arab partners, President of the United States Ronald Reagan ordered the strike on Libya on April 14. Eighteen F-111F strike aircraft of the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing, flying from RAF Lakenheath supported by four EF-111A Ravens of the 20th Tactical Fighter Wing, from RAF Upper Heyford in England, in conjunction with twenty-seven A-6, A-7, and F/A-18 attack aircraft from the aircraft carriers USS America and USS Coral Sea on station in the Gulf of Sidra struck five targets at 02:00 on April 15, in the stated objective that their destruction would send a message and reduce Libya's ability to support and train terrorists. Commander TJ Coughlin and his strike group of A6 Intruders caused considerable damage to the Libyan Navy by sinking 2 Combattante Guided Missile Cruisers. Cdr. Coughlin is credited with the sinking of both of these ships. The United States was denied overflight rights by France, Spain and Italy as well as the use of European continental bases, forcing the Air Force portion of the operation to be flown around France and through the Straits of Gibraltar, adding 1,300 miles (2,100 km) each way and requiring multiple aerial refuelings. Although unauthorised the inbound jets passed through Maltese airspace. The attack lasted about ten minutes. Several targets were hit and destroyed, but some civilian and diplomatic sites in Tripoli were struck as well, notably the French embassy [2], when a number of bombs missed their intended targets. When asked to comment about the near miss of the French Embassy, President Reagan reportedly quipped, "Well, the boys were tired!"

U.S. forces and targets[2] Planned

Target

Actual

Aircraft

Bombing

Aircraft

Azizyah barracks

9× F-111F

36× GBU-10 2,000 lb LGB

3× bombed 1× 4× aborts, 1× lost

Murat Sidi Bilal camp

3× F-111F

12× GBU-10 2,000 lb LGB

Tripoli airfield

6× F-111F

Jamahiriyah barracks

(Benghazi) 7× A-6E

Hit

Miss

missed 13

3

all bombed

12

-

72× Mk 82 500 lb RDB

5× bombed 1× abort

60

-

84× Mk 82 500 lb RDB

6× bombed 1× abort on deck

70

2

Benina airfield

8× A-6E

72× Mk 20 500 lb CBU 6× bombed 2× aborts 24× Mk 82 500 lb RDB

60× Mk 20 12× Mk 82

Air defense Tripoli networks

6× A-7E

8× Shrike 16× HARM

all aircraft fired

8× Shrike HARM

6× F/A-18

4× Shrike 20× HARM

all aircraft fired

4× 20× HARM

45 aircraft

300 bombs 48 missiles

35 bombed 1 missed 1 lost 8 227 hits 5 misses aborts 48 homing missiles

Benghazi Totals

Libyan air defenses The Libyan air defense network was extensive including: • 4 Long range SA-5 Vega anti-aircraft missile units with 24 launchers.

16× Shrike

89

• 86 SA-2 Volchov and SA-3 eva anti-aircraft missile units with 276 launchers. Covering Tripoli alone were: • 7 SA-2 Volchov anti-aircraft missile units with 6 missiles launchers per unit giving 42 launchers. • 12 SA-3 eva anti-aircraft missile units with 4 missiles launchers per unit giving 48 launchers. • 3 SA-6 Kub anti-aircraft missile units with 48 launchers. • 1 SA-8 Osa-AK anti-aircraft regiment with 16 launch vehicles. • 2 Crotale II anti-aircraft units 60 launch pads

Casualties Libyan It was claimed that the air strike killed at least 40 people in Libya. Forewarned by a telephone call from Malta's Prime Minister, Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici, that unauthorized aircraft were flying over Maltese airspace heading south towards Tripoli, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and his family rushed out of their residence in the Bab al Aziziya compound moments before the bombs dropped. Gaddafi escaped injury but his 15-month-old adopted daughter Hanna was killed, and two of his sons were injured.[3] In July 2008, Gaddafi's son Saif al Islam announced that an agreement was being negotiated with the United States whereby Libya would make any future compensation payments to American victims of terror attacks conditional upon the settlement of claims by victims of the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986.[4] On August 14, 2008 the resultant U.S.-Libya Comprehensive Claims Settlement Agreement was signed in Tripoli by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, David Welch, and by Libya's Secretary for American Affairs, Ahmad Fituri.[5] In October 2008 Libya paid $1.5 billion into a fund which will be used to compensate relatives of the • Lockerbie bombing victims with the remaining 20%; • American victims of the 1986 Berlin discotheque bombing; • American victims of the 1989 UTA Flight 772 bombing; and, • Libyan victims of the 1986 US bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi. As a result, President Bush has signed an executive order restoring the Libyan government's immunity from terror-related lawsuits and dismissing all of the pending compensation cases in the US, the White House said. [6] American Two USAF captains — Fernando L. Ribas-Dominicci and Paul F. Lorence — were killed when their F-111 was shot down over the Gulf of Sidra. On December 25, 1988, Gaddafi offered to release the body of Lorence to his family through Pope John Paul II. This turned out to be Ribas-Dominicci's body, which was returned in 1989. Lorence's remains are believed to still be in Libyan hands. In 2001, Theodore D. Karantsalis, a reference librarian at Miami-Dade College, enlisted the aid of Congressman Wally Herger's office to urge Libya to return Lorence's remains on behalf of his family and friends. Karantsalis also created a website and invited visitors to sign a petition to Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart seeking the return of Capt. Lorence's remains. On January 27, 2005, Karantsalis filed a federal lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) against the Department of Defense and the Department of the Air Force seeking "to know where Captain Paul Lorence's remains are located." Karantsalis had hoped to locate the remains before the 20th anniversary of Lorence's death.[7] Retaliation Libya responded by firing two Scud missiles at U.S. Coast Guard stations on the Italian island of Lampedusa which exploded far short of their targets. In Beirut, Lebanon, two British hostages held by the Abu Nidal Organization, Leigh Douglas, Philip Padfield, along with an American named Peter Kilburn were shot dead in revenge. In addition, journalist John McCarthy was kidnapped and tourist Paul Appleby was murdered in Jerusalem. Another British hostage named Alec Collett was also killed in retaliation for the bombing of Libya. Collett was shown being hanged in a video tape. His body has never been found. Gaddafi quashed an internal revolt, the organization of which he blamed on the United States. Although Gaddafi appeared to have left the public sphere for a while in 1986/87, it later emerged that he had significantly increased Libyan arms shipments to terrorist groups in this period – especially to the Provisional IRA. The Libyan government was alleged to have retaliated by ordering the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Pakistan on September 5, 1986. The allegation did not come to light until it was reported by The Sunday Times in March 2004-days after British prime minister, Tony Blair, paid the first official visit to Tripoli by a Western leader in a generation.[8] Then came the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 on December 21, 1988, which exploded in mid-air over the town of Lockerbie in Scotland. Iran was initially thought to have been responsible for the bombing, but two Libyans were charged in 1991, one of whom was convicted for the crime on January 31, 2001. The Libyan Government formally accepted responsibility for the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing on May 29, 2002, and offered $2.7 billion to compensate the families of the 270 victims.[9]

Aftermath International response The attack was widely condemned in strong terms. By a vote of 79 in favor to 28 against with 33 abstentions, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 41/38 which "condemns the military attack perpetrated against the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on 15 April 1986, which constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law."[10] The Government of Libya said that the United States had fallen prey to the arrogance and madness of power and wanted to become the world's policeman. It charged that any party that did not agree to become an American vassal was an outlaw, a terrorist, and a devil. A meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement said that it condemned the dastardly, blatant and

90

unprovoked act of aggression. The League of Arab States expressed that it was outraged at the United States aggression and that it reinforced an element of anarchy in international relations. The Assembly of Heads of State of the African Union in its declaration said that the deliberate attempt to kill Libyans violated the principles of international law. The Government of Iran asserted that the attack constituted a policy of aggression, gunboat diplomacy, an act of war, and called for an extensive political and economic boycott of the United States. Others saw the United States motive as an attempt to eliminate Libya's revolution.[11] The Government of China felt that the U.S. attack violated norms of international relations and had aggravated tension in the region. The Government of the USSR believed that there was a clear link between the attack and U.S. policy aimed at subjecting countries to its diktat, at stirring up existing hotbeds of tension and creating new ones, and at destabilizing the international situation. Some observers held the opinion that Article 51 of the UN Charter set limitations on the use of force in exercising the legitimate right of self-defense in the absence of an act of aggression, and affirmed that there was no such act by Libya. It was charged that the United States did not bother to exhaust the Charter provisions for settling disputes under Article 33. Others asserted that Libya was innocent in the bombing of the West Berlin discotheque. [12] The U.S. received support from the United Kingdom, Australia, Israel, and a few others. Its doctrine of declaring a war on what it called "terrorist havens" was not repeated until 1998, when President Bill Clinton ordered strikes on six terrorist camps in Afghanistan. Margaret Thatcher's approval of the use of Royal Air Force bases led to substantial criticism, including an unprecedented story in The Sunday Times suggesting the Queen was upset by an "uncaring" Prime Minister. Gaddafi himself responded by saying "Thatcher is a murderer...Thatcher is a prostitute. She sold herself to Reagan".[13] The overall European reaction to the United States’ bombing of Libya was extremely negative. Nearly every European government opposed the American attack. Public opinion in almost every state was overwhelmingly against the action. While the United Kingdom permitted the United States to use its bases to launch the attack, both France and Spain denied fly-over rights, giving rise to much anti-French sentiment in the United States. The West German government, although officially opposed to the attack, was somewhat ambivalent and understanding in post-attack statements by Helmut Kohl. Interestingly, only in France, which had history of conflict with Libya over Chad, was public opinion supportive of the U.S. action, with initially about 60% approving. Although the Soviet Union was ostensibly in cooperation with Libya, it had, by the time of the Libya bombing, made its increasing ambivalence toward Libya apparent in public communications. Gaddafi had a history of verbally attacking the policy agendas and ideology of the Soviet Union, and he often engaged in various international interventions and meddlings that conflicted with Soviet goals in a variety of spheres. During a period where the Soviet Union was apparently attempting to lead a subtle diplomatic effort that could impact its global status, close association with the whims of Gaddafi became a liability. In the entire crisis, the Soviet Union explicitly announced that it would not provide additional help to Libya beyond resupplying basic armaments and munitions. It made no attempt to militarily intimidate the United States, despite the ongoing American operations in the Gulf of Sidra and its previous knowledge that the United States might launch an attack. However, the Soviet Union also did not completely ignore the propaganda gift and it issued a standard denunciation of this 'wild' and 'barbaric' act by the United States. After the raid, Moscow did cancel a planned visit to the United States by foreign affairs minister Eduard Shevardnadze. At the same time, it clearly signaled that it did not want this action to affect negotiations about the upcoming summer summit between the United States and the Soviet Union and its plans for new arms control agreements. United *ations response to anniversary Every year, between at least 1994 and 2006, the United Nations General Assembly scheduled a declaration from the Organization of African Unity about the incident,[14] but systematically deferred the discussion year after year until formally putting it aside (along with several other issues which had been similarly rescheduled for years) in 2005.[15] 1st anniversary On the first anniversary of the bombing, April 1987, European and North American peace and solidarity activists gathered to commemorate the anniversary. After a few days of social and cultural networking with local Libyans, including a tour of Gaddafi's bombed house, the group gathered with other Libyans for a commemoration event.[16] 20th anniversary Early on April 15, 2006 – to mark the 20th anniversary of the bombing raid – a concert involving U.S. singer Lionel Richie and Spanish tenor José Carreras was held in front of Gaddafi's bombed house in Tripoli. Diplomats, businessmen and politicians were among the audience of what Libya dubbed the "concert for peace". The BBC reported Lionel Richie as telling the audience: Hanna [Gaddafi's adopted daughter] will be honored tonight because of the fact that you've attached peace to her name.— [17]

Revelation of warning In October 2008, Libyan Foreign Minister Abdel Rahman Shalgham revealed that Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi had warned Gaddafi two days before the attack that an American raid was coming. Italy had refused American use of its airspace for the strike. Giulio Andreotti, Italy's foreign minister at the time, and Margherita Boniver, foreign affairs chief of Craxi's Socialist Party, both confirmed Shalgham's statement.[18] Dr. Stoney Merriman, retired chief of public affairs at the Pentagon during Operation El Dorado Canyon, alleged that immediately prior to the U.S. bombing of Libya, U.S. special forces rescued Quadaffi at his home, "to prevent an international incident if visiting dignitaries had been killed". Dr. Merriman was editor of the newspaper in Carthage, Tennessee, Albert Gore Jr's hometown, at the time of his revelation. "You wouldn't believe what really goes on at the Pentagon," Merriman advised. Dr. Merriman died shortly thereafter, of a sudden brain tumor.[3]

Reparations On May 28, 2008, the United States began negotiations with Libya on a comprehensive claims settlement agreement to resolve outstanding claims of American and Libyan nationals against each country in their respective courts. On August 4, 2008, president

91

George W. Bush signed into law the Libyan Claims Resolution Act[4], which had unanimously passed Congress on July 31. The Act provides for the restoration of Libya’s sovereign, diplomatic, and official immunities before U.S. courts if the Secretary of State certifies that the United States Government has received sufficient funds to resolve outstanding terrorism-related death and physical injury claims against Libya. On August 14, 2008, the United States and Libya signed a comprehensive claims settlement agreement.[19] Full diplomatic relations were restored between the two nations. References 1. ^ Pollack, Kenneth M. Arabs At War, Military Effectiveness 1948-1991 University of Nebraska Press, 2002 2. ^ Bernard Weinraub. "U.S. Jets Hit 'Terrorist Centers' in Libya; Reagan Warns of New Attacks If Needed". Y Times. 3. ^ "Hello Eddie, how is Mintoff?", Malta Today on Sunday (2008-08-03). Retrieved on 7 August 2008. 4. ^ "Libya, Italy to sign compensation deal: Gaddafi son", Yahoo! News (2008-07-24). Retrieved on 7 August 2008. 5. ^ "Libya, US Sign Compensation Agreement", The Tripoli Post (2008-08-17). Retrieved on 17 August 2008. 6. ^ "Libya compensates terror victims". BBC News. Retrieved on 2008-11-01. 7. ^ "2006 - One Pilot Still In Enemy Hands", Contra Costa Times (2006-03-11). Retrieved on 7 August 2008. 8. ^ "Revealed: Gaddafi's air massacre plot". 9. ^ "Security Council lifts sanctions imposed on Libya after terrorist bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 and UTA Flight 772". 10. ^ A/RES/41/38. Declaration of the assembly of heads of state and government of the organization of African Unity on the aerial and naval military attack against the Socialist Pe... 11. ^ UN Chronicle, August 1986 12. ^ United Nations Yearbook, 1986, Volume 40, Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York 13. ^ Moloney, Ed (2002). A Secret History of the IRA. Penguin Books. pp. 14–15. ISBN 0-141-01041-X. 14. ^ "General Assembly Session 49 meeting 93" (20 December 1994). 15. ^ "General Assembly Session 59 meeting 117" (12 September 2005). 16. ^ US-Libya Relations / Bombing Anniversary Vanderbilt. 17. ^ Libya concert marks US bomb raids, BBC News. 18. ^ Italy Warned Libya of Bombing, Saved Qaddafi's Life (Update3)Bloomberg.com - Retrieved 4-November-2008 19. ^ U.S. Department of State, Significant Events in U.S.-Libyan Relations, Sept 2, 2008[1] See also • 1986 Berlin discotheque bombing • Crypto AG • Gulf of Sidra incident (1981), U.S.-Libyan air engagement over territorial claim, two Libyan jets shot down • Action in the Gulf of Sidra (1986) Naval battle between libyian and US forces before the April bombing campaign • Gulf of Sidra incident (1989), U.S.-Libyan air engagement over territorial claim, two Libyan jets shot down • Pan Am Flight 73 • Pan Am Flight 103 • Operation Attain Document related to operations by U.S. Naval Forces in 1986. • Second Battle of Sirte, World War II naval battle between Regia Marina and Royal Navy. • UTA Flight 772 • List of military strikes against presumed terrorist targets Further reading • Stanik, Joseph T. El Dorado Canyon: Reagan's Undeclared War With Qaddafi. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2003. ISBN 1-55750-983-2 • Venkus, Robert E. Raid On Qaddafi. New York, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. ISBN 0-312-07073-X External links • Margaret Thatcher's statement on US bombing of Libya • Operation El Dorado Canyon at globalsecurity.org • Operation El Dorado Canyon from Air Force Association magazine • Petition for the return of the remains of Paul Lorence • Excerpt from Victor Ostrovsky's The Other Side of Deception HarperCollins 1994 • The Libyan Strike: How The Americans Did It (Operation El Dorado Canyon) at Air Power Australia (c) July 1986 • Revealed: Gadaffi's air massacre plot The Times March 28, 2004

92

Ground crew prepares a 48th Tactical Fighter Wing F-111F aircraft for an air strike on Libya. President Reagan consults bipartisan Congress members the day before the strike.

93

Gulf of Sidra incident (4.1.1989)

The lead F-14 has just destroyed the last remaining MiG-23.A 48th Tactical Fighter Wing F-111F aircraft takes off to participate in an air strike on Libya. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The second Gulf of Sidra incident, January 4, 1989, occurred when two US F-14 Tomcats shot down two Libyan MiG-23 Flogger Es that appeared to be attempting to engage them, as had happened previously in the first Gulf of Sidra incident (1981). In 1973 Libya claimed much of the Gulf of Sidra as its territorial waters and subsequently declared a "line of death", the crossing of which would invite a military response. Tensions between Libya and the U.S. were high after the U.S. accused Libya of building a chemical weapons plant near Rabta, causing the U.S. to deploy USS John F. Kennedy near its coast. A second carrier group, based around Theodore Roosevelt, was also being prepared to sail into the Gulf of Sidra.

Engagement On the morning of January 4, 1989, the Kennedy battle group was operating some 130 km north of Libya, with a group of A-6 Intruders on exercise south of Crete, escorted by two pairs of F-14As from VF-14 and VF-32, and as well as an E-2C from VAW126. Later that morning the southernmost Combat Air Patrol station was taken by two F-14s from VF-32, AC207 (CDR Joseph Bernard Connelly/CDR Leo F. Enwright 159610 AC207) and AC202 (LT Hermon C. Cook III/LCDR Steven Patrick Collins 159437 AC202). The officers had been specially briefed for this mission due to the high tensions regarding the Carrier Group's presence; the pilots were advised to expect some kind of hostilities. At 11:50 hrs, after some time on patrol, the E-2 informed the F-14 crews that four Libyan MiG-23s had taken off from Al Bumbaw airfield, near Tobruk. The F-14s turned towards the first two MiG-23s some 50 km ahead of the rear pair and acquired them with radars. At the time the Floggers were 72 nautical miles (133 km) away at 10,000 ft (3,000 m) and heading directly towards the Tomcats and carrier. The F-14s turned away from the head-on approach to indicate that they didn't want to engage. The Floggers changed course to intercept at a closing speed of about 870 knots (1,000 mph, 1600 km/h). The F-14s descended to 3,000 ft (910 m) to give them a clear radar picture of the Floggers against the sky and leave the Floggers with sea clutter to contend with. Four more times did the F-14s repeat this maneuver, still tracking the Libyans. At 11:59 the Radar Intercept Officer (RIO) of the lead Tomcat ordered the arming of the AIM-9 Sidewinder and AIM-7 Sparrow missiles it was carrying. The E-2C had given the F-14 crews authority to fire if threatened; the F-14 crews did not have to wait until after the Libyans opened fire. At almost 12:01 the lead Tomcat RIO said that "Bogeys have jinked back at me again for the fifth time. They're on my nose now, inside of 20 miles", followed shortly by "Master arm on" as he ordered arming of the weapons. At a range of 14 nmi (26 km) the RIO of the lead F-14A fired the first AIM-7M Sparrow; he surprised his pilot, who did not expect to see a missile accelerate away from his Tomcat. The RIO reported "Fox 1. Fox 1." The Sparrow failed to track because of a wrong switch-setting. At 10 nmi (19 km), he launched a second Sparrow missile, but it also failed to track its target. The Floggers accelerated and continued to approach. At 6 nmi (11 km) range the Tomcats split and the Floggers followed the wingman while the lead Tomcat circled to get a tail angle on them. The wingman engaged with a Sparrow and downed one of the Libyan aircraft. One of the US pilots broadcast "Good kill! Good kill!" The lead Tomcat closed on the final Flogger from the rear quadrant and at 1.5 nmi (2.8 km) the pilot fired a Sidewinder, which hit its target. One crewman broadcast "Good kill!" and "Let's get out of here." The Libyan pilots were seen to successfully eject and parachute into the sea, but the Libyan Air Force was unable to recover them. The Tomcats then proceeded north to return to the carrier.

Aftermath No one is sure to why the two MiGs operated in this manner and provoked an engagement, and the Libyans did not launch a successful rescue operation to recover the pilots. The following day, the Libyans accused the US of attacking two unarmed

94

reconnaissance planes, but the footage, also called the gun-camera videos, showed that the Libyans had been armed with AA-7 Apex missiles. Depending on the model, this can be either a semi-active radar-homing missile or an infrared-homing (heat-seeking) missile. The attacks had repercussions on the NATO base at Lampedusa, and the U.S. Naval Air Station at Sigonella. Gaddafi reportedly threatened reprisal against the commanders of those bases. Identifications of the Tomcats vary. The narrative above used the details from Air Aces[1]. Another source[2] identifies the wingman as AC202 rather than AC204. Both agree on AC207 as the lead.

F-14 Tomcat BU*O 159610 At the request of the National Air and Space Museum, the Navy provided BUNO 159610 to its Udvar-Hazy location near Dulles International Airport[3]. Although Tomcat BUNO 159610 downed the Libyan MiG-23 as a VF-32 F-14A model Tomcat, it returned from that deployment and was entered into the F-14D remanufacture program and served later in a precision strike role as a VF-31 F14D(R). On September 30, 2006, it was formally unveiled to the public with now retired CAPTs Connelly and Enwright on the podium as honored guests. As of March 2008, BuNo 159437 is still resting at the Aircraft Maintenance and Restoration Group (AMARG) facility just outside Davis-Monthan AFB. The aircraft is in poor condition (lacking a windscreen and a few other panels), but has been set aside for a future museum placement that has as yet been undetermined. As of March, it was the only F-14 Tomcat being set aside, the rest being slated for destruction. References 1. ^ Sidra 1989, Air Aces. 2. ^ Top Edge. 3. ^ "Tomcat Sunset Saturday: Celebrate the Retirement of the F-14 Tomcat". http://www.nasm.si.edu/events/eventDetail.cfm?eventID=548. External links • Brief description of the incident • January 16, 1989 Time Europe story, with details of the radio broadcasts and times. • Air aces record • VF-32 photo gallery • Audio recording of the engagement • Libyan Wars, 1980–89, Part 6 — Chemical Reaction, Tom Cooper. • Actual combat footage from of one of the F-14s