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MARTIN, Miko P.

2015 – 01836

IV – BA Psychology

Kas 112 WFV

_____________________________________________________________________________ The Cory Aquino Leadership: Perspectives from the Social Sciences Summary

Cory as Restorationist (Amado M. Mendoza Jr., Department of Political Science) Professor Amado Mendoza Jr. opens his lecture by comparing Ferdinand Marcos and Cory Aquino, and by tagging Marcos as the true “revolutionary” and Cory as more of a “restorationist”. He argues that before the Marcos administration, Filipino politics was heavily influenced by the property rights, since an increase in property meant an increase in power. At the time, Filipino politics depended on the elite, since they had more than enough power and property to spend. However, when Marcos declared Martial Law, he eradicated the property rights of many of his political rivals and the elite, ensuring that all power belonged to him and his administration. In a way, Marcos did indeed “revolutionize” Filipino politics, not by distributing power amongst the people, but by grabbing all power for himself. This naturally left a large power vacuum (and mess) that President Cory Aquino filled. Professor Mendoza argues that, as “restoratioinist”, the Cory administration returned the Philippines to the pre-Marcos democracy ran by property rights and elitism. Professor Mendoza saw four phases in Cory’s role as a leader and historical icon. This begins with the (1) end-game against the Marcos dictatorship, from August 1983 to EDSA I, then the (2) revolutionary government from February 25, 1986 to the convening of Congress in July 1987, (3) regular government from July 1987 to June 1992, and ends with (4) postpresidency Cory, from July 1992 to her death in August 2009. Though she was constantly mocked by her political enemies as a “plain housewife”, Cory Aquino still managed to garner a large following, a necessity in the end-game against the Marcos dictatorship. Imelda Marcos once called Cory a “plain housewife” who knew nothing of politics. To Imelda, Cory admitted that indeed, she did not know a lot of things, like how to swindle or engage in corruption.

During the revolutionary government period, the Cory administration released political prisoners and engaged in peace talks with communist forces, while keeping their minds open for the continued stay of US Military bases in the Philippines. At this point, pro-Marcos forces have still maintained some of their power, and some Marcos loyalists even attempted to overthrow the Cory administration. However, none of their attempts were as serious as the numerous coup d’état carried out by rightist forces, like the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) led by Juan Ponce Enrile and Gringo Honasan, who believed that they should be leading the government they failed to capture back in February 1986. Politics at the time of revolutionary government can be illustrated as a three-person strategic interaction game between the Left (Jose Ma. Sison), the Center (Cory Aquino), and the Right (Juan Ponce Enrile). In this game, both the Left and the Right require outside support to beat the other, and so they would disrupt each other’s attempts in forming alliances with the Center. This was often done violently, where one side would violently attack the other to alienate the Center from the opponent. When the Cory administration first leaned left, the right was provoked to attack, leading to incidents like the Mendiola Massacre and the deaths of leftist leaders Leandro “Lean” Alejandro and Rolando Olalia. By January 1987, peace talks with communist forces were scrapped, and the Cory administration was forced to lean right to stop further attacks. As charismatic as she was, Cory Aquino was not immune to embarrassment; something that became evident once the administration returned to a regular government. Many tabloids reported Cory hiding under her bed during one of the more serious coup d’état against her government, and she responded poorly by filing charges against one of the journalists who spread the rumor. She was also humiliated when the Senate ignored her request to extend the stay of US Military bases in the Philippines. Cory Aquino ends her term reporting to the nation that she has succeeded in presiding over a troubling transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, something that is still debated on today. Cory Aquino continued as a stateswoman, mainly opposing attempts from future administrations to amend the Constitution. She helped oust Joseph Estrada and called on Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to resign after the “Hello Garci” scandals.

Cory as President (Randolf S. David, Department of Sociology) Professor Randy David pointed out four issues that defined the ideological character of the Cory administration: (1) foreign debt, (2) agrarian reform, (3) crony properties, and (4) human rights. On the matter of foreign debt, the Cory administration decided to honor all the debts that were left behind by the Marcos regime. Many found it unnecessary, since Cory’s reputation would have definitely given her more leverage in negotiating better credit deals. However, the Cory administration was worried that a more radical approach would have unexpected consequences, so they decided not to risk it. While Cory took a noble approach to foreign debt, she was far less noble when it came to agrarian reform. It seemed that agrarian reform was among the last of her priorities, assigning the post of agrarian minister last. She left agrarian reform in the hands of the new Congress, which was dominated by people related to landowners and even landowners themselves. As expected, the Cory administration pass an agrarian reform law that made it impossible to break up large landholdings. To address the crony properties take from the national treasury, the Cory administration created the Presidential Commission on Good Government to bring back all properties that were suspected to have been stolen. Most of these properties were businesses, so courts convened for every case to verify ownership. The government would seize the suspected properties first, then use them as state assets while waiting for the findings of the courts. However, most of these properties, these businesses, were kept as state assets for too long that they froze and completely collapsed. The Cory administration also created another commission: the Presidential Commission on Human Rights, to document and act upon the complaints of the victims from Martial Law. Unfortunately, this was heavily opposed by the military, who felt that the Commission was carrying out a demoralizing witch-hunt against soldiers who were “just following orders”. The administration faced a dilemma, since they could not delve deeper into the human rights violation cases without implicating Fidel V. Ramos and Juan Ponce Enrile, two heroes of the EDSA Revolution who were then holding positions in government. Thus, the Cory administration decided not to pursue the cases, or at least implicate any higher officials.

Cory as Ina ng Bayan (Filomeno V. Aguilar Jr., Department of History) and as Woman (Michael L. Tan, Department of Anthropology) Professor Filomeno Aguilar Jr. explores the iconography of Cory Aquino, who has affectionately been called Ina ng Bayan, and even Inang Bayan, upon her death. He argued that Filipinos imagined the Filipino nation as a family, especially as a siblingship. This sentiment made the Tita Cory image so popular, where the siblings of the nation are headed by a Tita from an older sibling set. Professor Aguilar described Cory Aquino as a “woman of prowess”, the pre-colonial concept of a woman with ties with spirits who ensure success and prosperity. Cory Aquino mirrored the woman with prowess through her devotion to the Catholic Church, a devotion that made her even more popular amongst the masses. Her struggle against Marcos in the 1986 snap elections echoed David and Goliath, and Cory was already being hailed as a saint by then. By the time the Catholic Church gave her their support, her run for presidency was anything but tragic. Admittedly, her popularity waned during her presidency, what with the numerous coup attempts and lack of agrarian reform. However, she maintained the image of the good mother, whose supernatural abilities did not diminish while retaining her grace. So, in her death, Cory Aquino was elevated from Tita Cory to Ina ng Bayan, as respect for her almost saintly image, and to whom the Filipino people placed all their frustrations and hopes on. On the other hand, Professor Michael Tan compared Tita Cory with the other two female leader archetypes in the country: Imelda Marcos and Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo. Imelda Marcos is known as Madam, due to her strong personality and presence, so much so that even activists feel dazzled when they are around her, at least according to Professor Tan’s activist friends. There was a time when Imelda Marcos tried to fashion herself in a “mother” image, but her aristocratic and intimidating presence will always make her Madam in the eyes of most Filipinos. And then there is Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, or Ate Glo. She too tried to change her image, from

Ate to Tita. However, her unyielding and strong, if not moral, republic projected on her the image of a stern Ate. Gloria did not garner the same amount of respect or concern that Cory did. There were no novenas on the news of Gloria’s illness, only rumors of breast implants. In a matricentric country like the Philippines, it was only natural that the motherly-yet-distant Cory Aquino would garner the same respect and reverence as a Tita would.

Additional Research

The August 1987 Coup D’état The most serious attempt at taking over the government was began on August 29, 1987, and was carried out by Reform the Armed Forces Movement led by then-Colonel Gringo Honasan. The plan was to occupy the Malacañang Palace, key military installations and numerous media stations in Metro Manila. By occupying Malacañang and military installations like Camp Aguinaldo, the RAM would have taken the symbols of civil government and military authority. By occupying radio and television stations, the RAM would have had a platform to spread their propaganda. By holding these locations for an extended period of time, the plotters expected military units as well as hordes of civilians to defect to their side. Though unspecified, it was possible that RAM began recruiting men for the coup since July 22, 1987. Nueva Ecija officials reported that massive recruitment of police and military men took place in their area, under the pretense of creating an anti-insurgency force. Other officers gathered under the banner of RAM in secret, believing that the then-current government were too left-leaning, and that RAM, the force that first attempted a coup d’état against Marcos on February 1986, would save the country from communists. The RAM attempted to occupy Malacañang, Camp Aguinaldo, PTV-4 or Camelot Hotel, Broadcast City, Villamor Airbase, RECOM 3-Camp Olivas, RECOM 7-Cebu, and Legaspi Airport. These sites saw major conflict between rebel and government forces, with rebel forces managing to occupy all the sites except for Malacañang. Honasan himself led the attack on Malacañang, but withdrew and assisted the attack on Camp Aguinaldo instead once he realized he wouldn’t be able to penetrate the palace. On the way to Camp Aguinaldo, his forces would actually shoot at jeering civilian onlookers, killing 11 civilians and wounding 54. They also fired on the convoy of Noynoy Aquino as he was on his way to his home at Arlegui near Malacañang. Noynoy was wounded in the attack, and his bodyguard as well as two other people were killed. The attacks lasted for two days and a half: 53 people died and almost 200 people were seriously injured. Many of these casualties and wounded were civilians where shot at by rebel troops, the first time coup d’état participants ever shot at unarmed civilians. What was a loss for the rebels turned into victory soon after, as numerous institutions feared another coup d’état, and began acquiescing to the demands of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and RAM.

Hacienda Luisita The Cojuangco family first got Hacienda Luisita on 1957, when Jose Cojuangco Sr. acquired Central Azucarera de Tarlac, which included Hacienda Luisita. Cojuangco obtained it through a loan from the Government Service Insurance System and from the Manufacturer’s Trust of New York. The loans were secured on the condition that the estate must eventually be distributed to the farmers under President Ramon Magsaysay’s Social Justice Program. Eventually, the properties were transferred to Cojuangco’s Tarlac Development Corp. Come May 1980, the Marcos administration files a civil case before the Manila Regional Trial Court to compel the distribution of land to farm workers. It wasn’t until Dec 1985 when the Manila RTC finally orders the transfer of Hacienda Luisita to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to be distributed. However, the Cojuangco family brought the case to the Court of Appeals, and so the case was delayed again. As president, Cory Aquino created the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program on July 1987, which was not as comprehensive as expected. On March 1988, the Solicitor General filed the motion to dismiss the civil case against the Cojuangcos. He cited CARP, and the court granted the motion. As the CARP law was enacted, Stock Distribution Option scheme was offered as an alternative to land distribution, which allowed landlords to distribute stock to farmers instead of land. In essence, the SDO provided landlords with an excuse to avoid equitable land distribution. To acquire the SDO deal, TADECO creates Hacienda Luisita Inc., and in a referendum, 92.6% of farmers voted “yes” to SDO. Farmers recalled this “referendum” as terrifying, as Cojuangco-Aquino advisers goaded farmers to choosing between stocks or land - “prinsipyo o

kaldero”. If one ever did choose land, TADECO management would remove the person from work evict them from their residence. 14 years later, on Oct. 2003, supervisors petition the Department of Agrarian Reform to revoke SDO, claiming that HLI has not given them their dividends and shares from the conversion of their lands. 5,000 farmers file a supplemental petition to revoke SDO, claiming that the deal was unconstitutional. Farmers began to protest, and the protests very quickly escalated. Tragedy struck on November 16, 2004, as armed forces began to violently disperse the protests. 700 policemen, 17 truckloads of soldiers, 2 tanks with heavy weapons, 1 pay

loader, and 4 firetrucks with water cannons were set upon the farmers, resulting in the killing of 7 farmers and 121 injured, and event which is now known as the Hacienda Luisita Massacre. DAR creates Task Force Luisita, to investigate the Hacienda Luisita Massacre and to sit down and discuss with SDO farm workers. AFP deployed soldiers to facilitate “peace and order” as the DAR investigates. Because farmworkers were still on strike at the time, protesters and AFP frequently engaged in verbal, sometimes physical, confrontation. Eventually, DAR cancels SDO and orders the distribution of the estate. However, HLI repeatedly delays attempts to distribute Hacienda Luisita, through appeals and motions for reconsideration. It remains unresolved to this day.

Analysis This forum was created as a reaction to Cory’s death, and perhaps as respect to her memory, reflected her in a more positive light. There were talks of her iconography and descriptions that elevate her to almost divine status. Would it have been right to think of her as a saint? Maybe not. Perhaps she was virtuous, but she wasn’t a saint. The many coup d’état weakened her in the eyes of the public, and Hacienda Luisita remained as a blight to her reputation. This was a truth that the speakers were not afraid of sharing, but even they relent to Cory’s significance and reputation. She was hailed as a saint, and to the eyes of many, she acted accordingly. As title suggested, the forum gave an interpretation of Cory’s leadership through the various social sciences. Prof. Mendoza provided a timeline of Cory’s political history and the political mechanisms that were present during her time in the presidency. Prof. David discussed the issues that the Cory administration faced and how each decision faced Philippine society. Prof. Aguilar drew comparisons with historical figures, even biblical, to show how Cory’s iconography changed, while Prof. Tan juxtaposed her against Filipino leaders and what they meant to Filipino family culture. This multi-disciplinary approach to assessing the Cory administration showed how Cory Aquino touched almost every aspect of society. Unfortunately, many of the lectures suffered from overlaps with each other, often times repeating what one lecturer has just said. If not for the different approaches between History and Anthropology,

Prof. Aguilar’s and Prof. Tan’s lectures on Tita Cory would have been far more similar to or even indistinguishable from each other.

Personal Reaction I did enjoy reading the paper, although I would have preferred actually attending the forum back in 2009. I personally don’t know a lot about the Cory administration, so to have been able to join a discussion on that time period, using multiple disciplines to create a more holistic view of the Cory administration, is something I would have loved to do. I wish I read this paper sooner, and though I know it wouldn’t have exactly fit into the forum, I wish the Department of Psychology was somehow involved as well. As much as I appreciated the lecture, I still felt more anger and disappointment than appreciation. I’m angry that men would continue to destabilize an already fragile country just after it has gone through hell, and that these men get away with attacking the state due to their status and position in government. I’m disappointed that agrarian reform was, again, held back by landlords with agendas, and that a supposedly virtuous president like Cory Aquino would enable the atrocities and injustices in Hacienda Luisita.

Bibliography The Cory Aquino Leadership: Perspectives from the Social Sciences. (2009). Kasarinlan, 24 (12). Retrieved October 15, 2018. Hacienda Luisita Timeline. (2012, April 25). Retrieved October 16, 2018, from https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/182081/hacienda-luisita-timeline

The Final Report of the Fact-Finding Commission: Pursuant to R.A. No. 6832. (1990). Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines: Bookmark. Unyon ng mga Manggagawa sa Agrikultura (UMA) For Land and Justice: The Continuing

Agrarian Struggle in Hacienda Luisita. Report of the 2013 Hacienda Luisita National FactFinding Mission. (2013) Luisita Watch. UMA Pilipinas.

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