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LTD Reviewer (Prelims) Doctrines in Cases Justice Agcaoili

it is shown to have been reclassified and alienated by the State to a private person NATURE OF REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS

By: Theresiana Llenos

REGALIAN DOCTRINE

Central Mindanao University v. Republic, GR No. 195026, Feb. 22, 2016  Consequently, the person applying for registration has the burden of proof to overcome the presumption of ownership of lands of the public domain.  To overcome the presumption of State ownership, the applicant must establish through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the government

Republic v. Bantigue, GR No. 162322, March 14, 2012  To overcome the presumption of State ownership, the applicant must establish through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the government.

Republic v. Cortez, GR No. 197472, Sept. 7, 2015  To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the government, such as presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute declaring the land as alienable and disposable must be established.  Hence, a public land remains part of the inalienable public domain unless

Rodriguez v. Lim, 459 SCRA 412; Manlapat v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 125585, June 8, 2005  But the Torrens system does not furnish a shield for fraud, nor permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. JURISDICTION

Republic v. Bantigue, GR No. 162322, March 14, 2012  (b) Over contested lots, the value of which does not exceed P100,000.  “The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral and land registration cases is indeed set forth in the Judiciary Reorganization Act, xxx”  “(T)he MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in two instances: first, where there is no controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the value of which does not exceed P100,000.”

De los Santos v. Angeles, GR No. L19615, Dec. 24, 1964  Since the existence or nonexistence of applicant’s registrable title is decisive of the validity or nullity of the homestead patent, the court’s jurisdiction could not have been divested by the homestead patent's issuance  Proceedings for land registration are in rem, whereas proceedings for acquisition of homestead patent are not. A homestead patent, therefore, does not finally dispose of the public or private character of the land as

far as courts acting proceedings in rem concerned

upon are

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE COURT’S GENERAL JURISDICTION (AS REGULAR RTC) AND LIMITED JURISDICTION (AS REGISTRATION COURT) NOW ELIMINATED

Lozada v. Bracewell, G No. 179155, April 2, 2014; Averia v. Caguioa, GR No. L-65129, Dec. 29, 1986  The court can now hear and decide not only non-controversial cases but even contentious issues which before were beyond its competence.  As stressed in Lozada v. Bracewell, (April 2, 2014):  “With the passage of Sec. 2. PD 1529, the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it as a cadastral court was eliminated. RTCs now have the power to hear and determine all questions, even

contentious and substantial ones, arising from applications for original registration of titles to lands and petitions filed after such registration.”

LAND (LRA)

REGISTRATION

AUTHORITY

OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS

Sec. 52, PD 1529; (Aznar Brothers v. Aying, 458 SCRA 496  Every instrument affecting registered land shall, if registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds, be constructive notice to all persons.

Abrigo v. De Vera, 432 SCRA 544  But this rule does not apply if the property is not registered under the Torrens system.

Guaranteed Homes v. Valdez (577 SCRA 441  Registration in the public registry is notice to the whole world.  Thus, between two buyers of the same land, priority is given to: o the first registrant in good faith; o then, the first possessor in good faith; and o finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title. (Art. 1544, CC) DUTY OF REGISTER OF DEEDS REGISTER MINISTERIAL; CONSULTA

TO

Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 503

Brothers v. Aying, 458 SCRA 496;Guaranteed Homes, Inc. v. Valdez, 577 SCRA 441)

 It is ministerial only in the sense that the LRA acts under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court.

 Registration of instruments affecting registered land must be done in the proper registry to affect the land and bind third persons.

Angeles v. Sec. of Justice, GR No. 142549, March 9, 2010  But the duty ceases to be ministerial where the issuance of decree would result in double titling of lands.

(Aznar

Campugan v. Tolentino, A.C. No. 8261, March 11, 2015; Gabriel v. Register of Deeds, GR No. G.R. No. L-17956, Sept. 30, 1963; Gurbax Singh v. Reyes, 92 Phil. 182; Almirol v. Register of Deeds of Agusan, 22 SCRA 1152  [W]hether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see whether the documents sought to be registered conform with the formal and legal requirements for such documents.

Sec. 117, PD 1529; Soriano v. Fernandez, GR No. 168157, Aug. 19, 2015  Registration must first be allowed and the validity or effect thereof litigated afterwards.  But if the RD is in doubt as to the action taken, or where the interested party does not agree with the action taken by him, the RD shall certify the question to the LRA via consulta for resolution

Dela Peña v. Avila, GR No. 187490, Feb. 8, 2012; De Leon v. De Leon, GR No. 185063, July 23, 2009  Under Art. 160 of the CC, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.  Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership

Dela Peña v. Avila, supra  But where there is no showing as to when the property was acquired, the fact, for instance, that the title

is in the name of “Celia A. Santos, married to Mario Santos” means that the property belongs exclusively to the wife, Celia.  Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.

Guiang v. CA, GR No. 125172, June 26, 1998. Note: SC affirmed decision of CA composed of JJ. Jaguros, Adefuin and Agcaoili  Under the Family Code (Aug. 3, 1988), the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void.  A void contract cannot be ratified.

Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. Dailo, GR No. 153802, March 11, 2005  Without the consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. Valid? No.

Ravina v. Villa Abrille, GR No. 160708, Oct. 16, 2009  However, if the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date of the contract to institute the case.

Balbin v. Register of Deeds, 28 SCRA 12  Where there is a pending case involving the character of the land or validity of the conveyance  In such case, registration may well await the outcome of the case; meantime the rights of the interested parties could be

protected by the filing of a notice of

Republic v. Cortez, GR No. 197472, Sept. 7, 2015

REGISTRATION IN THE PUBLIC REGISTRY IS NOTICE TO THE WHOLE WORLD

 Congress may also classify lands through a legislative act

Ching v. Enrile, GR No. 156076, Sept. 17, 2008; Vilbar v. Opinion, GR No. 176043, Jan. 15, 2014

DENR Sec. . Yap, GR No. 167707, Oct. 8, 2008

lis pendens

 Thus, in case of conflict between a vendee and an attaching creditor, an attaching creditor who registers the order of attachment and the sale of the property to him as the highest bidder acquires a valid title to the property as against a vendee who had previously bought the same property from the same owner but who failed to register his deed of sale. PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

Gozo v. Phil. Union Mission Corp., G No. 195990, Aug. 5, 2015  Accordingly, all public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the alienable public domain.  To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or a statute

Fortuna v. Republic, GR No. 173423, March 5, 2014  The DENR Secretary is likewise empowered by law to approve a land classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable

 Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands.

Saad Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic, GR No. 152570, Sept. 27, 2006, per Tinga, J.  But while the government has the prerogative to classify lands of the public domain, the primary right of a private individual who possessed and cultivated the land in good faith much prior to such classification must be recognized and should not be prejudiced by after-events which could not have been anticipated.

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Marcelo, GR No. L-46048, Nov. 29, 1988, per Regalado, J.  The Government, in the first instance may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made.

Malabanan v. Republic, GR No. 179987, Sept. 3, 2013  Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES

Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 56 SCRA 647  These properties are outside the commerce of men and therefore not subject to private appropriation.

Sec. 88, ibid; CMU v. Republic, supra  Reserved lands are withdrawn from sale or settlement and are inalienable and not subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease or other disposition

Republic, rep. by Mindanao Medical Center v. CA, 73 SCRA 146  until otherwise provided by law or proclamation.

NOVA v, Republic, GR No. 177168, August 3, 2015  In other words, lands of the public domain classified as reservations remain to be property of the public dominion until withdrawn from the public or quasi-public use for which they have been reserved, by act of Congress or by proclamation of the President, or otherwise positively declared to have been converted to patrimonial property

Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 112526, Oct. 12, 2001  Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of man.  The Constitution expressly mandates the conservation and proper utilization of natural resources, which includes the country’s watershed.

Central Mindanao University v. Republic, GR No.195026, Feb. 22, 2016  Land reserved for a school site under Sec. 83, CA No. 141, shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until

again declared alienable proclamation of the President.

by

NOVA v. Republic, GR No. 177168, Aug. 3, 2015  It remains to be property of the public dominion until withdrawn from the public or quasi-public use for which they have been reserved, by act of Congress or by proclamation of the President, or otherwise positively declared to have been converted to patrimonial property.

DENR Sec. v. Yap, GR No. 167707, Oct. 8, 2008  The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.

Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69  Unless and until the land classified as forest is released as A and D, the rules of confirmation of title do not apply

Republic v. CA and Dela Rosa, 160 SCRA 228; La Bugal-B’laan v. Ramos, 445 SCRA 1  Mineral lands and resources are owned by the State and their exploration, development and utilization is subject to the full control and supervision of the State.

Atok Big Wedge v. CA, 193 SCRA 71  Possession of mineral land, no matter how long, does not confer possessory rights.

Republic v. Southside, 502 SCRA 587  Land inside a military (or naval) reservation, like the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, cannot be the

object of registration unless it had been withdrawn from the reservation and declared as A and D land.  It remains part of a military reservation even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as a military camp.  Moreover, the 1987 Constitution forbids private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain, except through lease for a limited period.

Palomo v. Court of Appeals GR No. 95608, Jan. 21, 1997  Land reserved for park purposes is not registrable  Where a certificate of title covers a portion of land within the area reserved for park purposes, the title should be annuled with respect to that portion

Republic v. RREC, 299 SCRA 199  A foreshore land is that “strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide,“ or "that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides.” Foreshore lands are inalienable unless declared to be A and D portions of the public domain

Republic v. CA and Morato, 281 SCRA 639  Land invaded by the sea is foreshore land and becomes part of the public domain. Puno, J., concurring opinion in Republic v.

RREC

 “The CCP is a ‘non-municipal public corporation’ established for the primary purpose of propagating arts and culture in the Philippines. It was created to awaken the

consciousness of the Filipino people to their artistic and cultural heritage, and encourage them to assist in its preservation, promotion, enhancement and development. The CCP Complex was established as a worthy venue for Filipino artists to express their art and for the people to appreciate art and the Filipino culture. But more than its peso and centavo significance, the Decision and Amended Decision, unless reversed, will deal arts and culture a debilitating blow.”

Chavez v. PEA, 384 SCRA 152  Submerged areas form part of the public domain; only when reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be classified as agricultural lands.  Once reclaimed the government may then officially classify these lands as A and D, and declare these lands no longer needed for public service. Only then can these lands be considered as A and D lands and within the commerce of men.

Republic v. CA and De Rio, 131 SCRA 532  Lakes are neither agricultural nor disposable lands of the public domain; hence, free patents and certificates of title covering portions of the lake are a nullity.  But areas beyond its natural bed, or the ground covered by the waters at their highest ordinary depth during the dry season, may be registered. REGISTRATION UNDER THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (PD 1529)

Malabanan v. CA, GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009, Sept. 3, 2013; Mercado v. Valley Mountain Mines, GR No. 141019, Nov. 23, 2011

 The applicant must be a Filipino citizen.  The land must be an agricultural land, already classified as alienable and disposable (A and D) land at the time of the filing of the application

Republic v. Alba, GR No. 169710, Aug. 19, 2015  Tersely put, under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; the applicant by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereto; and such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

In Republic v. Alconaba (G.R. No. 155012, April 14, 2004)  it was explained that the intent behind the law's use of the terms possession and occupation is to emphasize the need for actual and not just constructive or fictional possession

Campos v. Republic, GR No. 184371, March 5, 2014, stresses:

 “We emphasize that since the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 13 on January 25, 1977, it must be shown that possession and occupation of the land sought to be registered by the applicant himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, which totally conforms to the requirement under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No 1529. A mere showing of possession and occupation for thirty (30) years or more is no longer sufficient.”

Bienvenido v. Gabriel, GR No. 175763, April 11, 2012 Possession  Open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine;  Continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;  Exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and  Notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood

Malabanan v. Republic, supra  Rule on prescription:  Ordinary prescription – 10 years in good faith  Extraordinary prescription – 30 years  But land must be patrimonial property for prescription to apply  These lands are alienable or disposable, and  Are no longer intended for public use or public service.  Only when such lands have become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of the property begin to run. The Court in Republic v. Sese, GR No. 185092, June 4, 2014, explicated:  “The applicant must be able to show that the State, in addition to the said classification, expressly declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by the President that the subject land is no longer retained for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express declaration by the State, the land

remains to be a property of public dominion and, hence, not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of prescription.”

Republic v. Zuburban Realty, GR No. 164408, March 24, 2014  Distinction between Sec. 14(1) and Sec. 14(2):  Under Sec. 14(1), there must be proof showing that the land had already been classified as alienable and disposable at the time the

application is filed.

 Under Sec. 14(2), there must be proof that the land had already been

converted to patrimonial property

(no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth) at the start of

possession.

Cortex v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567  Ownership by right of accretion  Under Art. 457, CC, to the owners of land adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. Justification:  To offset the owner’s loss for possible erosion of his land due to the current of the river;  To compensate him for his burdens arising from the subjection of his land to encumbrances or legal easements; and  Owner is in the best position to cultivate it.

Grande v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 524  The owner must register the accretion under the Torrens system, otherwise the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.

Cureg v. IAC, 177 SCRA 313  The owner must register the accretion under the Torrens system, otherwise the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. (Grande v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 524)  The increment does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. It must be placed under the operation of the Torrens system. In Republic, rep. by the Mindanao Medical Center v. Court of Appeals (GR No. L40912, Sept. 30, 1976), the SC held that Proclamation No. 350 legally effected a land grant for medical purposes to the Mindanao Medical Center validly sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. DEALINGS WITH LAND ORIGINAL REGISTRATION

PENDING

Lopez v. Querubin, GR No. 155405, March 18, 2015  Sec. 22 of PD 1529 allows the disposition of lands subject matter of a registration proceeding and the subsequent registration thereof in the name of the person to whom the land was conveyed.  The buyer of the property may be a total stranger to the case and it is not even required for him to substitute the original applicant in order that the decree of registration may be issued in his name.  The only requirements are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case

REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 48(b), PUBLIC LAND ACT (CA 141)

Rep. v. East Silverlane, GR No. 186961, Feb. 20, 2012; Rep. v. Espinosa, GR No. 171514, July 18, 2012  Developments in the law as to possession  The first PLA, or Act 926, required a possession and occupation for a period of ten (10) years prior to the effectivity of Act No. 2874 on July 26, 1904 or on July 26, 1894.  The 10-years possession was adopted in the PLA until it was amended by RA 1942 on June 22, 1957 which required possession for thirty (30) years.  But with the effectivity of PD 1073 on May 9, 1977, possession and occupation should now commence on June 12, 1945.

Fortuna v. v. Republic, GR No. 173423, March 5, 2014  Vested rights acquired under Sec. 48(b) of the PLA (as amended by RA 1942) must be respected.  Thus, an applicant who, prior to the effectivity of PD 1973 on May 9, 1977 (not Jan. 25, 1977), has been in OCENPO, for at least 30 years, or at least since May 8, 1947, as required under RA 1942, may apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under  The Court however clarified in La Tondena, Inc. v. Republic that only applications for registration filed prior to 1977 may invoke RA No. 1942. (GR No. 194617, Aug. 5, 2015) WHO MAY REQUIREMENT

APPLY:

CITIZENSHIP

Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., GR No. 156364, Sept. 3, 2007; Krivenko v. RD, 79 Phil. 461  Aliens are disqualified from acquiring public and private lands.

Republic v. CA and Lapiña, 235 SCRA 567  The capacity to own land is determined at the time of its acquisition and not registration.  Example: Pedro, a Filipino, bought land with an area of 5 has. from Jose who at the time of the sale had already complied with the requirements for registration. Pedro later became a naturalized Canadian citizen.  Pedro’s subsequent acquisition of Canadian citizenship will not impair his vested right to the land which he could have validly registered when he was yet a Filipino citizen. He is also qualified under the terms of Sec. 8, Art. XII, Constitution.

Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court and ACME, 146 SCRA 509  But the rule does not apply where at the time the corporation acquired the land, the same was already private land as when it was possessed by its predecessor in the manner and for such length of time as to entitle the latter to registration.  If the predecessors-in-interest of the corporation have been in possession of the land in question since June 12, 1945, or earlier, then it may rightfully apply for confirmation of title to the land. That vested right has to be respected. CITIZENSHIP RETENTION AND ACQUISITION ACT (RA NO. 9225)

RE-

David v. Agbay, GR No. 199113, March 18, 2015  No. The law distinguishes between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of RA 9225 in 2003. For those who were naturalized in a foreign country before 2003, they shall be deemed

to have “re-acquired” their Philippine citizenship (which was deemed lost pursuant to CA 63). But for those who became foreign citizens after RA 9225 took effect, they shall “retain” Philippine citizenship if they took the oath of allegiance under the new law. Here, Pedro filed his MSA on April 12, 2007, or before he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship.

Phil. Banking Corp. v. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52; Borromeo v. Descallar, 580 SCA 175; United Church v. Sebastian, 159 SCRA 446  Q. Can a Filipino vendor recover land sold to an alien?  A. Yes. When an agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited and the prohibition is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may recover the land, the public policy being to preserve and maintain the land in the hands of Filipino citizens. Note: In Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun, 93 Phil. 827, the Filipino vendor was in pari delicto with the alien vendee, hence, recovery was not allowed. Other illustrative cases on acquisition by aliens  Where the land was now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino, there is no more public policy to be served by allowing recovery. (Barsobia v. Cuenco , 199 Phil. 26),  Where land is sold to a Chinese who later sold it to a Filipino, the sale can no longer be impugned. (Herrera v. Guan, 1 SCRA 406).  Chuck, an American, and Cory, a Filipino, acquired land which was registered in the latter’s name. Cory sold the land to Mario without Chuck’s consent. Valid? Yes. Chuck never acquired any right to the land, he being an alien. (Cheesman v. IAC, 193 SCRA 93)

Ting Ho. v. Teng Gui, GR No. 130115, July 16, 2008  Ting Ho, a Chinese citizen, acquired a parcel of land, with the improvements thereon. Upon his death, his heirs claimed the properties as part of the estate of their deceased father. The Court, however, excluded the land and improvements from the estate of Ting Ho, being an alien, because he never became the owner thereof.

Frenzel v. Catito, 453 Phil. 885  Petitioner, an Australian, was married to Teresita Santos; while respondent, a Filipina, was married to Klaus Muller. Petitioner and respondent met and cohabited in a common-law relationship, during which petitioner acquired real properties; but since he was an alien, respondent's name appeared as the vendee in the deeds of sale. When their relationship turned sour, petitioner filed an action for the recovery of the real properties from respondent.  The Court denied his petition because he was an alien, adding that being a party to an illegal contract, he could not come to court and ask to have his illegal objective carried out.

Muller v. Muller, G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006  Elena, a Filipino, and Helmut, a German, were married in Germany. During their marriage, Helmut purchased a parcel of land in Antipolo City which was registered in Elena’s name. They eventually separated, prompting Helmut to file a petition for separation of property. Specifically, Helmut prayed for reimbursement of the money he paid for the acquisition of the property.

 The Court ruled that Helmut being an alien, he was prohibited from owning land in the Philippines.

Matthews v. Taylor, GR No. 164584, June22, 2009  In 1988, Benjamin married Joselyn, 17-year-old Filipina. During their marriage, Joselyn bought a lot for P129,000. The sale was financed by Benjamin. Meantime, Jocelyn leased the property to Matthew without Benjamin’s consent; hence, the latter filed suit to annul the lease contract. Is a lease agreement of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife (Jocelyn) without the consent of her British husband (Benjamin) valid?  The Court held that Benjamin, being an alien, has no right to nullify the agreement. No implied trust was created in his favor; nor can reimbursement for his expenses be allowed. May the RD validly refuse to register a deed of donation of a residential land executed by a Filipino in favor of an unregistered organization, the “Ung Sui Si Temple,” operating through three trustees all of Chinese nationality?  Yes. The SC, in Register of Deeds v. Ung Sui Si temple, GR No. L-6776, May 21, 1995, held that Sec. 5, Title XIII of the 1935 Constitution (now Sec. 8, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution) that, “save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain,” the Constitution makes no exception to religious groups.

EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP

Republic v. Bantigue, GR No. 162322, March 14, 2012; Republic v. Dela Paz, GR No. 171631, Nov. 5, 2010; Republic v. T.A.N, 555 SCRA 477  The application for original registration must be accompanied by:  (1) CENRO or PENRO Certification that land is A and D; and  (2) Copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian thereof. Note: In Gaerlan v. Republic, GR No. 192717, March 12, 2014, the Court held that the CENRO/PENRO certification is not sufficient evidence of the facts stated therein). In Republic v. Aboitiz, GR No. 174626, Oct. 23, 2013, the Court emphasized:  “Strangely, the Court cannot find any evidence to show the subject land's alienable and disposable character, except for a CENRO certification submitted by Aboitiz. x x x In Republic v. Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation, the Court declared that the CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring the alienability and disposability of public lands. Thus, the CENRO Certification should be accompanied by an official publication of the DENR Secretary's issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.”

Director of Lands v. CA and Iglesia ni Cristo, 158 SCRA 586  There is now no need to present the tracing cloth plan of the land. A certified blue print or white print

copy of the plan suffices registration purposes.

for

Rep. v. CA and Santos, GR No. 116111, Jan. 21, 1969, 301 SCRA 366  What defines a piece of titled property is not the numerical data indicated as the area of the land, but the boundaries or "metes and bounds" of the property specified in its technical description as enclosing it and showing its limits.

Balantakbo v. CA, GR No. 108515, Oct. 16, 1995  What defines a piece of land is not the area, calculated with more or less certainty mentioned in the description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits.

Republic v. CA and Chavez, 167 SCRA 150  Overt acts of possession may consist in:  Introducing valuable improvements on the land like fruit-bearing trees;  Fencing the area  Constructing a residential house thereon; and  Declaring the land for taxation purposes.  In a practical and scientific way of planting, a one-hectare land can be planted to 144 coconut trees.  It takes only 10 years for mango trees , and 5 years  for coconuts trees, to begin bearing fruit.

Eduarte v. CA, 253 SCRA 391  Mere possession will not defeat the title of a holder of registered land.

Llanes v. Republic, 572 SCA 258  Tax declarations and tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership but they are a good

indicia of possession in the concept

of owner.  A tax declaration merely prove payment of taxes

Republic v. Alconaba, 427 SCRA 611  But when coupled with actual possession, payment of taxes is evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription. Spanish titles no longer efficacious as proof of ownership  Pursuant to PD No. 892, dated Feb. 16, 1976, Spanish titles may no longer be used as evidence of land ownership  The proliferation of dubious Spanish titles have raised conflicting claims of ownership and tended to destabilize the Torrens system of registration.  Case study: Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 733. JUDGMENT

The judgment confirms the title of the applicant or the oppositor. Partial judgment is proper where a subdivision plan is submitted. (Sec. 28)

 Judgment becomes final after 15 days from receipt of notice of the judgment.  Court retains jurisdiction until after the entry of the final decree of registration. (Gomez v CA, 168 SCRA 503)  Principle of res judicata is applicable to registration proceedings. (Aring v. Original, a6 SCRA 1021)

A judgment in rem is binding upon the whole world, such as a judgment in a land registration case or probate of a will; and a judgment in personam is binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest but not upon strangers.

 A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam.  An action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it only binds the parties impleaded although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.(Muñoz v. Yabut, GR No. 142676, June 6, 2011)

Motion for execution of judgment not required

 Upon finality of judgment in land registration cases, the winning

party does not file a motion for execution as in ordinary civil

actions. Instead, he files a petition with the land registration court for the issuance of an order directing the Land Registration Authority to issue a decree of registration, a copy of which is then sent to the Register of Deeds for inscription in the registration book, and issuance of the original certificate of title.  The LRA merely issues an order for the issuance of a decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title in the name of such applicant. (Top Management Programs Corp. v. Fajardo, GR No.150462, June 15, 2011)

Execution pending appeal not required

 Execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration proceeding and the certificate of title thereby issued is null and void.  A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act which requires that a decree shall be issued only after the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory, and it is on the basis of said decree that the Register of Deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate

of title. (Top Management Fajardo, supra)

v.

No period within which decree may be issued  The fact that no decree has as yet been issued cannot divest the applicant of his title to and ownership of the land in question.

There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may issue a decree. The

reason is that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be enforced against the adverse party. (Del Rosario v. Limcaoco, GR No. 177392, Nov. 26, 2012)  From another perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. (Republic v. Nillas, GR No. 159595, Jan. 23, 2007)

Kinds of judgment

 A judgment in rem is binding upon the whole world, such as a judgment in a land registration case or probate of a will; (2) a judgment in personam is binding upon the parties and their successors-ininterest but not upon strangers, and (3) a judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam; it is binding only against the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action.  An action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or reconveyance, is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. (Muñoz v. Yabut, GR No. 142676, June 6, 2011)

DECREE OF REGISTRATION The decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject to exceptions or liens as may be provided by law. (Sec. 31, PD No. 1529)  It shall be conclusive against all persons, including the government and its branches. (Ibid.)  Land becomes registered land only upon the transcription of the decree in the book of the Register of Deeds, and not on the date of the issuance of the decree. (Manotok v. CLT Realty, GR No. 123346, March 31, 2009)  Title is deemed issued upon transcription of the decree. (Manotok Realty v. CLT, 540 SCRA 304)  A registration court has no jurisdiction to decree again land already decreed in a prior case. (Laburada v. LRA, 287 SCRA 333)  An application for registration of a titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title. (SM Prime Holdings v. Madayag, 578 SCRA 552) Maysilo Estate Case – “Land of Caveat Emptor”  Issue: When is a certificate of title deemed registered – the date of the issuance of the decree of registration (April 19, 1917), or the date the decree was transcribed in the Office of the RD (May 3, 1917)?  Held: The original certificate of title is issued on the date the decree of registration is transcribed since what stands as the certificate is the transcript of the decree of registration made by the RD in the registry. (Manotok v. CLT Realty, 540 SCRA 304) CERTIFICATE OF TITLE A certificate of title may be an original certificate of title, which constitutes a true copy of the decree of registration, or a

transfer certificate of title, issued subsequent to original registration.  The title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title one year after the issuance of the decree of registration by the LRA. (Del Prado v. Caballero, GR No. 148225, March 3, 2010; Panganiban v. Dayrit, 464 SCRA 370)  A person dealing with registered land need not go beyond, but only has to rely on, the title of his predecessor. (Guaranteed Homes v. Valdez, 577 SCRA 441)  A certificate of title issued pursuant to adminis- trative proceedings is as indefeasible as any title issued through judicial proceedings provided the land is a disposable public land, and becomes incontrovertible one year after the issuance of the patent. (Republic v. Carle, 105 Phil. 1227)  A certificate of title based on an emancipation patent under PD No. 27 also enjoys the same protection as a certificate issued judicially or administratively. (Lonoy v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, GR No. 175049, Nov. 27, 2008) REGISTERED LAND PRESCRIPTION

NOT

SUBJECT

TO

“No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.” (Sec. 47, PD 1529)  Titile to land once registered, is imprescriptible. It may not be lost by adverse, open and notorious possession.  The right to recover possession of registered property is equally imprescriptible since possession is a mere consequence of ownership. (Repulic v. Mendoza, GR No. 185091, Aug. 8, 2010)

But a registered owner may be barred from recovering possession by virtue of laches.  In Panganiban v. Gamponia (100 Phil. 277), petitioners, for 45 years, did nothing to assert their right of ownership and were barred from recovering possession of the property.  In Agne v. Director of Lands (181 SCRA 7090), the registered owner’s right to recover possession was lost by inaction for almost 30 years.  In Golloy v. CA (173 SCRA 26), while the lot was registered in the name of respondent, petitioners acquired title thereto by possession for 50 years. REGISTERED LAND NOT SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK A certificate of title cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding filed with the RTC (Sec. 48, PD 1529; Manotok v. Barque, 582 SCRA 583)  Direct attack: when the object of the action is to annul or set aside the judgment, or enjoin its enforcement.  Collateral attack: in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereto.  A direct attack on title is proper in a counterclaim (Leyson v. Bontuyan, 452 SCRA 94). Collateral attack, illustrative cases  Director of Lands v. Gan Tan (89 Phil. 184) - where the decision of the lower court denying reconstitution because petitioner is allegedly an alien was reversed, the Supreme Court holding that the issue is a collateral attack on the title and should be raised only a direct action.  Oño v. Lim (614 SCRA 514) – where it was held that there is no collateral attack when respondent asserted that the title in the name of petitioner’s predecessor had

become inoperative due to the prior conveyance of the land in favor of respondent’s mother. ADVERSE CLAIM Thus, an adverse claim based on prescription and adverse possession cannot be registered because, under Sec. 47, no title to registered land shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. (Estella v. Register of Deeds, 106 Phil. 911)  A sale of land may not be annotated as an adverse claim because the law prescribes the remedy of registration of the sale and the issuance to the vendee of a transfer certificate of title. (RD v. Nicandro, 111 Phil. 989; Sec. 57, PD 1529)  But hereditary rights of a person fraudulently registered in her sister’s name is registrable as adverse claim. (Gabriel v. Register of Deeds, 9 SCRA 136) An adverse claim is effective for 30 days; but it is not ipso facto cancelled after said period - a separate petition is necessary. (Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 102377, July 5, 1996)  The RD cannot unilaterally cancel the adverse claim. There must be a hearing for the purpose. (DiazDuarte v. Ong, 298 SCRA 388)  The adverse claim may be cancelled if it is frivolous or vexatious, in which case damages may be adjudged against the adverse claimant. NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS

Lis pendens is proper in the following cases:  Action to recover possession of property;  Action to quiet title thereto;  Action to remove clouds thereon;  Action for partition; and  Any other proceedings in court directly affecting the title to the land

or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon. The notice need not be annotated on the owner’s duplicate certificate of title because the notice is an involuntary transaction. Entry in the day book is sufficient. (Yu v. CA, 251 SCRA 509) Cancellation of lis pendens  Before final judgment, the notice may be cancelled upon order of the court if the notice (a) is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party or (b) if it is not necessary for the protection of the party who caused its registration. The cancellation is a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. (Casim v. RD, GR No. 168655, July 2, 2010)  The notice may also be cancelled by the RD upon verified petition of the party who caused the annotation thereof. (Sec. 77) Cancellation of lis pendens, grounds  The power to cancel a notice of lis pendens is exercised only under exceptional circumstances, such as: where such circumstances are imputable to the party who caused the annotation; where the litigation was unduly prolonged to the prejudice of the other party because of several continuances procured by petitioner; where the case which is the basis for the lis pendens notation was dismissed for non prosequitur on the part of the plaintiff; or where judgment was rendered against the party who caused such a notation. (Casim v. RD, supra) REVIEW OF DECREE In Eland Philippines v. Garcia, GR No. 173289, Feb. 17, 2010, the Court, citing Agcaoili, “Property Registration Decree and Related Laws”, held that:

 courts may reopen the proceedings where a petition for review is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree of registration, based on actual or extrinsic fraud. Requisites: (a) petitioner must have an interest in land; (b) petition is based on actual or extrinsic fraud; (c) petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree of registration; and (d) property has not yet passed to innocent purchaser for value. (Walstrom v. Mapa, 314 Phil. 527)  Extrinsic fraud is the fraudulent act of the successful party committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party which prevented the latter from fairly presenting his case.  Intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case. (Palanca v. American Food Manufacturing, 24 SCRA 819)  The fraud must have prevented a party from having his day in court. ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE Reconveyance  It is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful landowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another, to compel the registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him.  The action respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful owner or a

person who has a better right. (Alde v. Bernal, GR No. 169336, March 18, 2010; Ybañez v. IAC, 194 SCRA 793; Gonzales v. IAC, 157SCRA 587) An action for reconveyance is an ordinary action involving “title” to land, and should be filed in the courts where the land or portion thereof is situated. (Sec. 1, Rule 4; Latorre v. Latorre, GR No. 183026, March 20, 2010; Republic v. Mangatora, GR No. 170375, July 7, 2010)  In civil actions involving title to or interest in property, jurisdiction rests with the RTC where the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000 (or, P50,000 in Metro Manila).  The action is in personam and is binding only on persons impleaded. (Ching v. CA, 181 SCRA 9) Requisites  Action is brought by the party in interest after one year from issuance of decree;  Registration was procured through actual fraud;  Property has not yet passed to innocent purchaser for value.  But a party may file an action for reconveyance of the property of which he has been illegally deprived even before the issuance of the decree. (Mun. of Hagonoy v. Secretary, 73 SCRA 507)  Meantime, a notice of lis pendens may be annotated on the certificate of title immediately upon the institution of the action in court. (Muñoz v. Yabut, GR No. 142676, June 6, 2011). o Art. 434 of the CC provides that to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove, first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto.

 Pacete v. Asotigue, GR No. 188575, Dec. 10, 2012 o Facts: When Pacete procured OCT No. V-16654 in 1961, the disputed lot was already in possession of Asotigue, whose predecessor-in-interest, Sumagad, had been occupying it since 1958. o Issue: Is reconveyance in favor of Asotigue proper? o Held: Yes. The registration of Asotigue's lot in favor of Pacete, who neither possessed nor occupied it, is wrongful. Since Pacete had not yet transferred the lot to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for reconveyance is proper. Reconveyance is available not only to the legal owner of a property but also to the person with a better right thereto. Quieting of title  An action for reconveyance has sometimes been treated as an action to quiet title. Requisites: • Plaintiff has a legal or equitable title or interest in the property • The deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity. (Philville Development and Housing Corporation v. Bonifacio, GR No. 167391, June 8, 2011)

Prescription of action for reconveyance – Action based on fraud – 4

years

– – –

Action based on implied trust – 10 years Action based on void contract – imprescriptible Action to quiet title where plaintiff is in possession –

imprescriptible

But laches may bar recovery. (Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277) REVERSION  Reversion is an action filed by the government, through the Office of the Solicitor General, to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of the public domain. (Yujuico v. Republic, GR No. 168661, Oct. 26, 2007, citing Agcaoili, “Property Registration Decree”)  Ground: in all cases where lands of the public domain are held in violation of the Constitution.  All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. (Sec. 101, PLA)  But unless and until the land is reverted to the State by virtue of a judgment of a court of law in a direct proceeding for reversion, the Torrens certificate of title thereto remains valid and binding against the whole world. (Tolentino v. Laurel, GR No. 181368, Feb.22, 2012) The RTC may properly take cognizance of reversion suits which do not call for an annulment of judgment of the RTC acting as a land registration court.

 Actions for cancellation of title and reversion belong to the class of cases that "involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,” and where the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00, fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC. (Rep. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, GR No. 192975, Nov. 12, 2012; Santos v. CA, GR No. 61218, Sept. 23, 1992, 214 SCRA 162) Reversion suits were originally filed with the RTC to annul titles or patents administratively issued by the LMB.  But with the effectivity of BP Blg. 129 which gave the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), now Court of Appeals, jurisdiction over actions for annulment judgments of RTCs, the Rules of Court promulgated on July 1, 1997 incorporated Rule 47 on annulment of judgments or final orders of the RTCs. (Yujuico v. Republic, 537 SCRA 513) State not bound by prescription or estoppel  Under Sec. 91 of the PLA (CA No. 141), the LMB Director has continuing authority to conduct investigation to determine whether or not public land has been fraudulently awarded or titled to the end that the corresponding certificate of title be cancelled and the land reverted to the mass public domain. (Piñero v. Director of Lands, 57 SCRA 386)  The indefeasibility of a title is not a bar to an investigation by the State as to how such title has been acquired. (Cavile v. Litania-Hong, 581 SCRA 408) But while the general rule is that the State is immune from estoppel, this concept is understood to refer to acts and mistakes of its officials especially those which are irregular.  In Rep. v. CA and Santos, GR No. 116111, Jan. 21, 1999), for nearly twenty years (starting from the

issuance of St. Jude's titles in 1966 up to the filing of the complaint in 1985), the government failed to correct and recover the alleged increase in the land area of St. Jude’s property. It was held that the government’s prolonged inaction strongly militates against its cause, as it is tantamount to laches. CANCELLATION OF TITLE Cancellation of title is an action initiated by a private party usually in a case where two titles are issued for the same lot.  Where two titles are issued for the same lot, the earlier in date prevails. (Pajomayo v. Manipon, 39 SCRA 676)  Land does not revert to the State but is declared as lawfully belonging to the party whose title is superior over the other.  But the State is vested with personality to file the action to protect public interest and safeguard the Assurance Fund.

DARAB, are not covered by petitions for annulment. RECOVERY FROM ASSURANCE FUND Illustrative cases • National Treasurer v. Perez (131 SCRA 264) – where respondent could not be awarded damages since the donation to him was not executed with the formalities of a will and therefore could not have transferred to him ownership of the property. Treasurer of the Philippines v. CA (153 SCRA 3590) – where respondents acquired no land or any interest in the land as a result of the invalid sale to them by the impostor Lawaan Lopez who had no title or interest to transfer •



Actions for cancellation of title, reconveyance and reversion belong to the class of cases that "involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein."  Where the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00 (BPBlg. 129, Sec. 19 [2]), the actin falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC. (Rep. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, GR No. 192975, Nov. 12, 2012; Santos v. CA, 214 SCRA 162) ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT This is an extraordinary remedy filed with the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.  Judgments or orders of quasijudicial bodies, e.g., NLRC or

Illustrative cases • La Urbana v. Bernardo (62 Phil. 790) – where, having knowledge of the pending litigation and notice of lis pendens affecting the land, it nevertheless proceeded to take the risk of purchasing property in litigation. • Fraginal v. Parañal (516 SCA 530) – where property sold to petitioner was a prime land which has been the subject of successive transfers with “unusual haste” which should have triggered petitioner’s curiosity.

A FORGED DEED IS A NULLITY, BUT IT MAY BECOME THE ROOT OF A VALID TITLE 

Forged deed is a nullity  Generally, a forged deed is a nullity and conveys no title, even if accompanied by the owner’s duplicate certificate of title. (Joaquin v. Madrid, 106 Phil. 1060)









The registered owner does not lose his title, and neither does the assignee or mortgagee acquire any right to the property. (Bernales v. Sambaan, 610 SCRA 90) The innocent purchaser for value protected by law is one who purchases a titled land by a virtue of a deed executed by the registered owner himself, not by a forged deed.

But a forged deed may become the root of a valid title • A forged deed may become the root of a valid title in a bona fide purchaser if the certificate has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name of the forger or the name indicated by the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser for value. (Solivel v. Francisco, 170 SCRA 218) • For then the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate. (Guaranteed Homes v. Valdez, 577 SCRA 441) Muñoz v. Yabut, GR No. 142676, June 6, 2011: • “A void title may become the root of a valid title if the derivative title was obtained in good faith and for value. Following the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title, every person dealing with registered lands may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and he is not required to go beyond the certificate and inquire into the circumstances

culminating in the vendor's acquisition of the property. The rights of innocent third persons who relied on the correctness of the certificate of title and acquired rights over the property covered thereby cannot be disregarded and the courts cannot order the cancellation of such certificate for that would impair or erode public confidence in the Torrens system of land registration.” (See also: Republic v. Agunoy, 492 Phil. 118 [2005], citing cases) •

Remedy of party defrauded – action for damages • The right or lien of an innocent mortgagee for value upon the land mortgage must be respected and protected, even if the mortgagor obtained his title through fraud. • The remedy of the persons prejudiced is to bring an action for damages against those who caused the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an action against the Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for the recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund. (PNB v. CA and Chuy Kim Kit, 187 SCRA 735)

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