Legal Ethics Individual Report Batch 1.docx

Legal Ethics Report Batch 1 Page |1 THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR I. What is integration? Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as a condition precedent to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An integrated Bar must perforce include all of them. Indeed, if anyone were excluded, then to that extent the Bar would be divided instead of integrated. Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by governmental authority of an organization of the legal prof ession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an off icer of the courts. To be effective, the integrated Bar should have the power to exact financial support in reasonable amount from its members. Indeed, refusal to support the integrated Bar or to become a member thereof places a lawyer outside the operation of the system established by the State for the regulation of legal profession, and, logically, he should be barred from the practice of law and his name should be removed from the Roll of Attorneys. Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers and ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the basic principle of maximum Bar autonomy, under the supervision of and subject to regulation by the Supreme Court. II. Objectives Generally speaking, the purposes of an integrated Bar are:

(1) To aid the courts in carrying on and improving the administration of justice; (2) To foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning, competence and public service and high standards of conduct; (3) To safeguard the proper professional interests of its members; (4) To cultivate among them a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood; (5) To provide a forum for the discussion of subjects pertaining to the law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and to publish information relating thereto; (6) To encourage and foster legal education; (7) To carry on a continuing program of legal research in the technical fields of substantive law, practice and procedure, and make reports and recommendations thereon; and (8) In general to do such other acts as may be necessary, proper or convenient to the end that the public responsibility of the Bar may be more effectively discharged. Rep. Act No. 6397, approved and effective September, 17, 1971, postulates the following objectives: (1) To raise the standards of the legal profession; (2) To improve the administration of justice; and (3) To enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. III. Activities. The integration of the Bar will make it possible for the legal profession to:

Legal Ethics Report Batch 1 Page |2 (1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law; (2) Protect lawyers and litigants from the abuses of tyrannical judges; (3) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence; (4) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law and break up any monopoly of local practice maintained through influence or position; (5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges; (6) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers; (7) Provide placement services, establish legal aid offices throughout the country, and set up lawyer reference services so that the poor may not lack competent legal service; (8) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our provinces; (9) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in order to raise the standards of the profession throughout the country; (10) Enforce rigid ethical standards and promulgate minimum fees schedules; '(11) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research; (12) Conduct campaigns to educate the public on their legal rights and obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the true functions of the Filipino lawyer; and (13) Promote greater involvement of the lawyers population in the solution of the problems that affect the nation. IV. Methods of Integration.

In some states, Bar integration has been effected by legislative enactment under the police power; in others, it has been accomplished by rule of court pursuant to the court's inherent power to regulate and control the practice of law; and in a third group of states, it has been by a combination of both, with the legislature passing a short act creating the organization or directing the court to do so, and the court filling in the details of the structure and government by rule of court. In the Philippines, the following are the pertinent legal provisions: A. Constitution. Art. VIII, Sec. 13 of the Philippine Constitution provides, inter alia, that: The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. x x x The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

B. Stationary Enactment. Rep. Act No. 6397, approved and effective September 17, 1971, reads, in its entirety, thus: SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.

Legal Ethics Report Batch 1 Page |3 SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Alaska1955Statute

V. History.

Arizona1933Statute

A. England. The concept of the integrated Bar is derived from England, where for centuries the Bar has been integrated under the authority and government of the Inns of Court. No person may be a member of the Bar without becoming a member of one of the four Inns, namely: Lincoln's Inn, Inner Temple, Middle Temple, and Gray's Inn. Education and discipline of the barrister are entirely in the hands of the Inns subject to review by the Supreme Court.

Arkansas 1939 Court Rule1

B.United States. In 1914 Herbert Harley, the founder of the American Judicature Society, visited the city of Toronto to study the administration of justice there. The Canadians had an integrated Bar, having brought most of their laws and legal institutions over from England. It was in Toronto that Harley had his first glimpse of an integrated Bar in action. Impressed, he returned to the U.S. convinced that Bar integration was what his country needed to bring about judicial reforms, He also saw possibilities in it for the benefit of the lawyers themselves. In his historic address before the Lancaster County Bar Association in Lincoln, Nebraska, on December 28, 1914, he urged the lawyers to integrate in order to help themselves to do better in their profession and to improve the administration of justice and better serve the public. Harley carried on his campaign for Bar integration on the pages of the Journal of the American Judicature Society. In 1918 a Model Bar Act was published in said Journal, and in 1921, after seven years of promotion, the first integrated Bar in the United States was set up in North Dakota. A majority of the States have since then integrated their Bars, as shown thus: BAR INTEGRATION DATA(United States)

California1927Statute Florida1949Court Rule Georgia1964Court Rule Idaho1923Statute Kentucky1934Statute and Court Rule Louisiana1940Statute and Court Rule Michigan1935Statute and Court Rule Mississippi1930Statute Missouri1944Court Rule Nebraska1937Court Rule Nevada1929Statute New Hampshire1969Court Rule New Mexico1925Statute North Carolina1933Statute North Dakota1921Statute Oklahoma1939Court Rule Oregon1935Statute Puerto Rico1932Statute

Jurisdiction Year of Unification Means of Unification Alabama1923Statute

South Carolina1967Court Rule

Legal Ethics Report Batch 1 Page |4 South Dakota1931Statute Texas1939Statute and Court Rule Utah1931Statute Virgin Islands1956Court Rule Virginia1938Statute and Court Rule Washington1933Statute West Virginia1945Statute and Court Rule Wisconsin1956Statute and Court Rule Wyoming1939Statute and Court Rule So satisfactory have been the results of Bar integration in the United States that in none of the above-mentioned States is there any plan to revert to the voluntary Bar system. Moreover, there are strong moves in the other States of the Union toward Bar integration. C.Philippines. The idea of Bar integration is not new in the Philippines. In 1928 Dean George Malcolm of the Unversity of the Philippines suggested it, even as he called attention to the existence of integrated Bars in other countries, including France, Italy, Germany, Spain, England, and the United States. Jose Abad Santos and Claro M. Recto were on the vanguard of the movement for Bar integration. It was Abad Santos who, before World War II, prodded the Philippine Bar Association into drafting a charter for an integrated Bar. In 1934 a bill to integrate the Philippine Bar was filed in the House of Representatives. It did not, however, get beyond that stage. In 1947 representatives of forty-one local Bar associations and prominent lawyers met at a national convention and agreed to petition

the Supreme Court to integrate the Philippine Bar. The petition was filed on January 27, 1948 but the same has remained unresolved. On March 2, 1950, Senator Lorenzo Sumulong and the late Senator Emiliano Tria Tirona filed Senate Bill No. 83 for the creation of a corporation to be known as "The Philippine Integrated Bar." Although backed by the Senate Committee on Justice, the measure remained pending until adjournment of Congress, and was not thereafter revived. On May 7, 1958, former Senator Vicente J. Francisco, speaking for the Lawyer's League of the Philippines at a conference of judges and lawyers, urged integration of the Philippine Bar. On June 23, 1962, representatives of fifty-three Bar associations in the Philippines met in conference at the Far Eastern University and agreed to file in the Supreme Court a petition for Bar integration. For this purpose, a national committee was created composed of Jose W. Diokno as chairman, and, as members, Roman Ozaeta, Jose P. Carag, Eugenio Villanueva, Jr., and Leo A. Panuncialman. Subsequently, or on July 11, 1962, the committee filed the corresponding petition (Adm. Case No. 526) in the Supreme Court. No final action has been taken thereon. In 1970 Senator Jose W. Diokno authored Senate Bill No. 79 seeking to empower the Supreme Court to integrate the Philippine Bar. VI. Recent Developments. On October 5, 1970, the Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, created by resolution a Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction, and directed it to submit its final report to the Court on or before December 31, 1972. Appointed chairman of the Commission was Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, and, as members, Senator Jose J. Roy, retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, Presiding Justice Salvador V. Esguerra of the Court of Appeals, Director Crisolito Pascual of the U.P. Law Center, former Senator Tecla San Andres Ziga, and San Beda Law Dean Feliciano Jover Ledesma, with Atty. Romeo Vicente as recorder-secretary. 'The Court appointed ranking

Legal Ethics Report Batch 1 Page |5 members of the Bench and the Bar as consultants of the Commission. Subsequently, all Bar associations (represented by their respective presidents) were also made consultants. Surveys thereafter conducted by the Commission indicated widespread enthusiastic support for Bar integration. Accordingly, the enactment of a Bar Integration Law was urged by the Commission. The result was the passage by Congress, in a special session in September, 1971, of House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." This measure was signed by the President on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act No. 6397, the full text of which is quoted supra. The legislation started as a bill sponsored by Congressman Ramon D. Bagatsing in the lower chamber of Congress. The House Judiciary Committee voted unanimously to endorse it. Indeed, the measure passed the House in record time. It was then forwarded to the Senate Judiciary Committee headed by Senator Salvador H. Laurel, who enthuslastically hailed the concept of an integrated Bar. It was he who smoothly steered the measure through the complicated process of legislation in the upper chamber. Although unanimously endorsed by the Senate Judiciary Committee, the bill was nevertheless referred for comment to Senator Jose W. Diokno, who introduced three important modifications, First, he saw to it that the bill contained a direct appropriation clause giving the Supreme Court the needed funds. Second, he persuaded the Senate to delimit to two years (from the approval of the law) the period within which the Supreme Court may effect integration of the Bar. Third, he put into final shape the purpose clause of the Bill. Early in December, 1971, the Commission on Bar Integration announced the opening of the Bar Integration Center at 955 Quezon Boulevard Extension, Quezon City (beside Tres Hermanas Restaurant), with Tel. No. 97-55-16. Manned by a select staff of lawyers and technical assistants, and headed by Atty. Cecilio L. Pe (Executive Officer), the

Center immediately proceeded to achieve, as soon as possible, a consensus among lawyers on the issues posed by the matter of Bar integration. It is part of the work of the Center to conduct a nationwide information drive on Bar integration, and to collate and evaluate the reactions of all sectors, especially the lawyer population. Accordingly, almost simultaneously with its opening, the Center immediately issued "An Appeal to All Lawyers," the full text of which is quoted hereunder, to wit: The Bar Integration Center (of the Commission on Bar Integration of the Supreme Court) is earnestly calling upon all lawyers and other interested parties throughout the Philippines to participate actively in the current dialogue and exchange of views on the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar. Whether in active law practice or not—in the government service or in some private calling—all lawyers are hereby requested, in this connection, to visit or otherwise contact the Center. A nationwide poll will soon be taken to ascertain the reactions of all sectors of the community, especially the lawyers, to the idea of Bar integration, or the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines into an Integrated Bar, bona fide membership in which shall be a condition precedent to the practice of law and the retention of one's name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. Presently, the Bar Integration Center is updating a LAW LIST essential to the establishment and maintenance of lines of communication with the members of the Bar. We hereby appeal for the unstinted support and cooperation of each and every lawyer in our country. We ask him to send to the Center, among other pertinent data, (a) his full name, (b) year of admission to the Bar, (c) present occupation, (d) official, business and residence addresses, and (e) telephone number(s), aside from (f) an optional statement, in capsule form, of his initial thinking on the matter of Bar integration.

Legal Ethics Report Batch 1 Page |6 On February 4, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration decided to recommend to the Supreme Court the promulgation of a Court order or rule to effect Bar integration pursuant to the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6397, and, in connection therewith, the resolution of the pending petitions of 1948 and 1962. The Commission also achieved a tentative consensus regarding certain basic features of an integrated Philippine Bar. Reporting this trend of thought in his Sunday Times column of February 6, 1972, Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, Chairman of the Commission, wrote as follows: Non-political The integrated Bar will be absolutely and completely nonpolitical. No lawyer occupying an elective position in the government (from the Presidency down to the position of barrio councilor) shall be eligible for any position in the integrated Bar. Any lawyer who, during his incumbency as delegate governor or officer of the integrated Bar, files his certificate of candidacy for any elective government position, will forthwith automatically be considered resigned from his position in the integrated Bar. Political activity of any kind or degree within the integrated Bar itself will be completely proscribed and heavily penalized. Positions honorary All positions in the integrated Bar will be honorary. No delegate of the House of Delegates, no member of the Board of Governors, no officer of the integrated Bar, will be reimbursed for any expense incurred by him in the discharge of his duties. In simple language, any lawyer who accepts and assumes any official position in the integrated Bar will have to spend his own money for his transportation, hotel, food, and all other requirements. The presidency

Any lawyer who is elected president of the integrated Bar cannot serve as such for more than one year; thereafter he shall be forever barred from seeking re-election to the presidency. Rotation of the presidency The Philippines will be divided into seven (7) regional areas: Northern Luzon, Greater Manila Area, Southern Luzon, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern Mindanao, and Western Mindanao. The delegates elected from all the areas will form the House of Delegates which will elect fifteen Governors. Each of the seven areas will be represented by a minimum of one member in the Board of Governors. The Board of Governors will thereafter elect the officers of the integrated Bar. The presidency of the unified Bar shall rotate among the seven regional areas. To illustrate: if for the first year of the existence of the integrated Bar, the president elected comes from the Greater Manila Area, no lawyer from this area can be elected president for the succeeding six years. The president for the second year will have to come from one of the other six areas. And so on. National conventions The rotation principle shall also apply to the annual national conventions of the unified Bar. Each regional area is entitled, within a period of seven consecutive years, to host an annual national convention. Voluntary bar associations All voluntary bar associations now existing or which will be formed in the future may continue to co-exist with the integrated Bar, but there will be only one official national Bar association. Fears allayed Adoption of all of the above basic features will, hopefully, completely free the integrated Bar from the bane of politics, and dissipate all fears that the unified Bar will be dominated by lawyers from the Greater Manila Area, the lawyer population of which is the largest.

Legal Ethics Report Batch 1 Page |7 VIII. Arguments for Unification. A. Improved Discipline. Unification provides a system whereby members will be disciplined only by a body where they hold membership, where they can participate in policy-making, and where administrative expenses are borne by all. Unification is the best way to create machinery to handle the Bar's great disciplinary needs, The collection of dues from all members of the Bar would permit adequate financing of existing grievance committees and investigative staffs. The creation of esprit de corps in the profession, by reason of all lawyers belonging, would prevent many disciplinary problems from arising as all lawyers would be regularly exposed by receipt of Integrated Bar literature to the high standards of the profession. In addition, nonlawyers could be much more easily identified. At the present time there is no accurate list or record of Philippine lawyers. B. Greater Influence. The improving of discipline through unification results in an increase in the Bar's influence to the greater benefit of the public. Improving the quality of the legal profession by disciplinary improvements increases the public prestige of lawyers and ensures a respectful hearing for the Bar's recommendations. C. Greater Democracy. All lawyers practising in the Philippines belong to the Bar. They pay no dues and they have no vote. Their regulation comes by rule of the Supreme Court. To provide a registration system without providing a forum is taxation without representation. To provide a forum is to invite participation. Unification provides this forum, all lawyers have a vote, and the opinion of every lawyers can quickly be canvassed. Experience has shown that

unification results in better participation in the activities of the Integrated Bar. D. Greater Facilities and Services. A motivating factor for unification is the increased budget resulting from the larger number of dues-paying members. The increase in budget makes possible a larger headquarters staff and better financing of Bar programs in the investigation of grievances, prevention of unauthorized practice, public relations, legislative reform, continuing education, and other programs. E. Prevention of Unauthorized Practice, Unification enlarges the machinery to fight the unauthorized practice of law. The Integrated Bar would have sufficient funds to support existing active committees, investigators, prosecutors and a public relations program condemning unauthorized practice. The Integrated Bar would represent all the lawyers and, thus, would be powerful enough to resist legislation and regulation designed to encourage unauthorized practice. This strength would also resist encroachment on the legal profession by those seeking to deny the public independent legal advice.

The Integrated Bar's roster of active members would be a simple device for identifying who is and is not an unauthorized practitioner. Since unification would improve the public image of the legal profession, laymen would be willing to avoid unauthorized practitioners. F. Recruiting of Members is Simplified. All lawyers are required to belong to an Integrated Bar. Consequently, the headquarters staff and members of the Bar can concentrate on duties other than the continuous membership solicitation which absorbs so much of the time and money in the headquarters of voluntary Bar associations.

Legal Ethics Report Batch 1 Page |8 G. Official Status. A unified Bar is part of the government or an arm of the court and, thus, can perf orm more public services than a non-governmental voluntary association. It may be asked to perform investigations, special studies, and other important assignments. H. More Cohesive Profession. Members of a voluntary Bar association often complain they are improving the profession, but only members are paying dues. Unification is a way of sharing costs among all who enjoy the benefits. A unified Bar would have special advantages for younger lawyers. Voluntary Bar associations often are stereotyped as organizations of established practitioners, and young lawyers hesitate to join. Unification would produce automatic membership for all, and the younger lawyer would come into contact with his older colleagues during his important formative stage. I. Registration Unnecessary. The inevitable alternative to unification is a form of registration and licensing either by the court or the state, with the possibility of the moneys going into the public treasury. The day of the voluntary social club idea of a state Bar is gone, and only the unified Bar can effectively function to fulfill the obligations of the profession to its members, to the courts, and to the public. IX. Arguments Against Unification A. Government regulation is undesirable. The most frequent and most effective argument against unification is the philosophical objection to the intrusion of more governmental regulation into the life of the profession without any apparent need, and without any substantial benefit. It is readily admitted that as officers of the judicial system lawyers of necessity are subjected to regu-lation for many reasons, paramount among them the maintenance and elevation

of professional standards and the impartial administration of justice. These objectives, it is argued, are being achieved with the present regulation which includes the disciplinary proceedings employed by voluntary Bar associations. The argument is that a self-imposed discipline is more likely to produce beneficial results and that the legal profession is today the last refuge of independent self-reliant individuals in our society and that the lawyer will serve the cause of the law better as a free agent than as a reluctant member of a coerced democracy of lawyers. Reply: Surveys made by the Commission on Bar Integration indicate that there exists, among the lawyers in the Philippines, a widespread demand for integration. They are obviously dissatisfied with conditions as they are, both within their own ranks and throughout the nation as a whole. The present system of voluntary Bar organization, to put it mildly, leaves much to be desired. Left alone, the bulk of the Philippine lawyer population do not care to affiliate themselves with voluntary Bar associations. Integration is necessary as a means of organizing all attorneys into a cohesive group that will apply itself to the solution of the problems that plague the administration of justice and afflict the Philippines in many other fields. B. Local Bar associations will be weakened. The unified Bar will encroach upon or extinguish local Bar associations by diminishing or usurping their function. A unified Bar would assume exclusive authority over grievances, unauthorized practice, continuing legal education, and other areas, leaving the local Bar association only social or fraternal functions as opposed to substantive professional functions. Reply: Integration will not necessarily weaken local Bar associations. So much depends on the provisions of the corresponding Court Rule. The one drafted by the Commission would allow local Bar associations to coexist with the Integrated Bar. Indeed, it would assign to them a prominent role, as their assistance in the matter of integration would be

Legal Ethics Report Batch 1 Page |9 earnestly solicited. Moreover, it is envisioned that the Integrated Bar would have local Chapters which would conceivably serve local needs in collaboration with voluntary Bar associations.

"Every activity tending to impair the independence and non-political character of the Integrated Bar shall be strictly prohibited and severely penalized."

C. Government by clique is the likely result.

E. Effective lobbying will be prohibited.

Nepotism or paternalism is likely to occur among officers who are concerned primarily with perpetuating themselves and their ideas in office. Undesirable factions will arise and rule for a while, only to be replaced by competing, but equally undesirable factions.

A quasi-governmental agency such as the unified Bar will be debarred from lobbying for or against legislation, from engaging in public relations, from attempting to influence the general public on matters of importance and from the free exercise of the rights and privileges possessed and enjoyed by a voluntary association.

Reply: Nepotism, paternalism, factionalism, perpetuation in power, and other evils are not inevitable. Rules can be formulated and enforced effectively (especially under the supervision of the Supreme Court) to curb such pernicious practices. For instance, under the Court Rule drafted by the Commission, there is a prohibition against being elected as Delegate or Governor for more than two consecutive terms. Also, it is therein provided that no person who shall have been President of the Integrated Bar shall be eligible for any subsequent election to the Presidency; that the Presidency shall rotate from year to year among all the several regions in such order of rotation as the Board of Governors shall prescribe; and that the annual conventions of the House of Delegates shall be held in all the several Regions in such order of rotation as shall be determined by the Board of Governors. D. Government authority will dominate the Bar. The Integrated Bar will be subject to the capricious conduct of those occupying public office from time to time to which it must be subservient or else risk the loss of their membership and the right of members to practice law. Reply: This criticism betrays a lack of confidence in the Filipino lawyer. It considers him as one who can be easily cowed. Besides, the Court Rule on integration can have provisions designed to safeguard the integrity and independence of the Integrated Bar, the due enforcement of which can be assured by the supervisory authority of the Supreme Court. Thus, pursuant to the Rule drafted by the Commission on Bar Integration,

Reply: On the contrary, as borne by the experience of American states which have unified their Bars, integration brings about such a solid and powerful group of lawyers that the legislature and the government as a whole, no less than the general public, cannot afford to ignore their views or demands or deny them adequate hearing. Indeed, integrated Bars are not only listened to. They are, moreover, consulted by all sectors on vital issues, especially those relating to the law and the administration of justice. F. Excise tax may not be levied by a court. A license fee is an excise tax which may be levied only by a legislature and not by a court or unified Bar association. Reply: If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose, either by itself or through the instrumentality of an Integrated Bar. G. The right to practice is not subject to regulation. The right to practice law is personal freedom and property right, not a privilege to be granted by a court and subject to judicial regulation. Reply: Well-settled is the rule that the practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege clothed with public interest connected with the administration of justice and hence subject to judicial regulation.

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 10 H. A unified Bar is an impersonal Bar. The impersonality resulting from a unified Bar will rob it of the elements of comradeship, esprit de corps and good fellowship.

Reply: Impersonality is not a necessary consequence of integration. Activities may, in fact, be better planned and implemented by a unified Bar for the promotion of camaraderie, esprit de corps and good f ellowship. So ,much depends on the members themselves. I. Politics will intrude. Opponents point to the natural tendency of lawyers to introduce politics into the profession. They fear that some lawyers may use the integrated Bar only for purposes of personal aggrandizement or glory. Reply: An integrated Bar need not be a political weapon. Traditionally, lawyers have always resisted attempts to regiment their political inclinations. It is next to impossible to lead them politically by the nose like docile lambs—it would be more accurate to say that lawyers are political tigers. Besides, provisions should be incorporated in the integration Court Rule that would prevent the unified Bar from becoming a political or personal tool of any man or group of men. Thus, in the draft prepared by the Commission on Bar Integration, there is a perpetual prohibition against the re-election of the President. Then, too, it is provided that: "The Integrated Bar shall be independent and strictly non-political. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Region or Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, or Officer of the Integrated Bar or of any Region of Chapter thereof who files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or who accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position in the Integrated Bar from the moment of such filing or acceptance. Every activity tending to impair the

independence and non-political character of the Integrated Bar shall be strictly prohibited and severely penalized." X. Constitutionality of Bar Integration. In every case where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the Courts have upheld their validity. The decisions support this reasoning: —that Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law;2 —that the practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the Courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the Courts;3 —that as the practice of law is a privilege clothed with public interest, it is just and fair that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities;4 —that these public responsibilities can best be met through collective action; but there can be no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of Court that requires all attorneys to pay annual dues to the integrated Bar.5 1. Freedom of Association To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).6

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 11 Compulsory enrollment in the State Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue, therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of group activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect.7 The Rules and By-laws of the State Bar do not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend its meetings or vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected by the integration of the Bar is the payment of annual dues. He is as free as he was before to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to a position taken by the State Bar.8 The bulk of State Bar activities serve the functions of elevating the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to the people of the State, without any reference to the political process. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interests in raising the quality of professional services, may require that the costs of improving the profession in this fashion should be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program, the lawyers, even though the organization created to attain the objective also engages in some legislative activity.9 Integration does not make any lawyer a member of any group of which he was not already a member. He was already a member of the Bar when he applied for, took and passed the Bar examinations.10 All that integration actually does is to provide an organization for the welldefined but unorganized group of which every lawyer is already a member.11 Assuming Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.12 The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and control.13 Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the state Bar.14

For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax. A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such an exaction.15 The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of the practice of law is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar f ar outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.16 3. Freedom of Speech For the integrated Bar to use a member's dues money to promote measures to which said member is opposed would not nullify his freedom of speech.17 Since it is settled that a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in an integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill some of the very purposes for which it was established.18 The objection would make every governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect.19 The objection would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of government.20

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 12 4. Fair to All Lawyers Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising, because, although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they have hitherto not had and through which, by proper work, they may receive benef its they have not heretofore enjoyed and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past. Since the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of the police power by the Court, since it will apply equally to all who are practising lawyers at the time Bar integration takes effect, young lawyer and old, and since it is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.21 XI. Conclusion. The evils feared to arise under an integrated Bar have failed to materialize in over fifty years of integration in the United States. It is shown that in States where the integrated Bar has been tried, it has revealed none of the abuses lodged against it, but on the other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibility to the public, improved the administration of justice, and is the only means presented whereby every member of the Bar can share in its public and professional responsibility. It is noteworthy that the English Bar was integrated early in its history and has never abandoned integration. Since the integrated Bar movement was initiated in the United States in 1914, a majority of the States have adopted it, and none has returned to the old regime of voluntary organization. States having integrated Bars recommend the system as a vast improvement over the voluntary organization, and proclaim that they would under no circumstances return to the old setup. 22 The Commission on Bar Integration, on the basis of an in-depth study, is fully convinced of the constitutionality of integration. Titans of the Philippine Bar have advocated integration since 1928. If, for any reason, the Integrated Bar will later prove to be undesirable, the Supreme Court

can always order its dissolution. In all other jurisdictions, however, including European and American states, the Integrated Bar has been enthusiastically adjudged as an unqualified success.23

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 13 ANNOTATION THE USE OF ABUSIVE LANGUAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION FROM MEMBERSHIP IN THE BAR By Prof. LOHEL A. MARTIREZ § 1.The Petition; ground, p. 522. § 2.Under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, p. 524. § 3.Additional Notes on Contempt, p. 530. The case presents a rather odd situation where a full-fledged lawyer crossed swords with a would-be lawyer, the former petitioning for the disqualification of the latter from membership in the bar quite unsuccessfully but enough to implant some lasting lessons that there is no place for abusive, vituperative, uncouth and vile languages in the Legal profession, and the Court finding the Respondent guilty of contempt. This is entitled, EMILIA E. ANDRES, Petitioner, versus STANLEY H. CABRERA, Respondent, SBC-585, Promulgated on December 14, 1979. § 1. The Petition; ground The petition to disqualify respondent from admission to the Bar was filed by Atty. Emilia E. Andres, Legal Officer II in the Office of the Ministry of Labor on the ground of “lack of good moral character as shown by his propensity in using vile, uncouth, and incivil language to the extent of being reprehensively malicious and criminally libelous and likewise, for his proclivity in filing baseless, malicious and unfounded criminal cases.” The use of Abusive Language is not a Ground for Disqualification from Membership in the Bar “Vile” means sinful, impure, unclean, wicked or highly objectionable; “uncouth” means awkward, outlandish, rude, unrefined, or boorish.

A few samplings of the words used by Respondent would clearly show the truthfulness of the accusation. Such as: “moronic statements,” “moronic excuse,” “unparalleled stupidity,” “moronically failed” “moronically received” “criminal conspiracy by the idiotic,” “avalance of the sadistic resolution en banc,” “vomiting injustice,” “wanton dishonesty,” etc. And just for the reader, a “Moron” according to Webster, is a “Moderately feeble-minded person” and that “most morons can be happy with tasks too simple and monotonous to satisfy an intelligent person.” To impute upon the lady lawyer such uncalled for conducts smacks at unchivalries of a gentleman respondent; such insulting words and phrases hurt even the Supreme Court. The statements as it were lacked the polish and the superior refinements in speech and manner expected of a future barrister. Whether in or out of court, man should watch out his speech since they are a reflection of one’s inner personality. Even King Solomon prayed that the words of his mouth and the meditations of his heart if ever be acceptable in the sight of God, with more reason for ordinary mortals especially those engaged or about to engage in the Law Profession but to find inspiration with the works of the immortal lawgiver, Moses. A fine speech, respectful decorum, chivalry and magnanimity in purpose toward opposing parties are marks of good breeding that law students and lawyers should stand foursquare. To call somebody’s act or acts “moronic” or “idiotic” especially when that somebody is a lawyer is an insult of the first degree to the one alluded to; likewise an indirect attack upon the integrity of the Supreme Court for having accepted to the Bar people with “moronic” or “idiotic” tendencies. This is most unfair and CONTEMPT was in order. § 2. Under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court Power of the Court.—The power to punish contempt is inherent in all courts, and is essential to their right of self-preservation. (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271) This power applies in administrative

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 14 proceedings as well as in suits at law. (In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801) The reason for this is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724) And if the courts rest on shaky foundations, the entire democratic processes of this land would be adversely affected in unthinkable proportions. The “last bulwark” of our democracy would be in crisis and the people’s faith in the administration of justice would be gravely undermined that could lead to frustrations or even bloodshed. That is why, it is of utmost importance that the Courts must be strengthened at all times, it must be protected from insults and its authority always held supreme. The courts are not swayed by politics, by religion, or any creed except those of highest tenets of JUSTICE to every man, woman and child.

refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribed an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required so to do, are considered as direct contempt. The refusal to take an oath or to testify before an administrative officer legally authorized to take testimony, may be summarily punished as a direct contempt. (People vs. Abaya, 43 Phil. 247)

Civil and Criminal Contempt distinguished.—A distinction is made between a civil and criminal contempt. Civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered by a court to be done for the benefit of a party. (Phil. Ry Co. vs. Judge of First Instance of Iloilo, SC-G.R. No. 44983) A criminal contempt is any conduct directed against the authority or dignity of the court. (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271) Where the punishment imposed, whether against a party to a suit or a stranger, is wholly or primarily to protect or vindicate the dignity and power of the court, either by fine payable to the Government or by imprisonment, or both, it is deemed a judgement in a criminal case. It has been held, however, that the line of demarcation between a criminal and a civil contempt, is, in many instances, very indistinct, for there are contempts in which both elements are present. (17 C.J.S. p. 7)

The use of disrespectful language in courts is a direct contempt. An attorney who charges the court with having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights of the parties, and of untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted his client, commits contempt. An attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his clients, may rightly act with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but he cannot resort to intimidation or in any way proceed without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724). Where a party alleges in his pleading addressed to the court that he considers it highly oppressive for the court to interfere with him in the details of his administration from which it had detached its jurisdiction, and that this is not the first incident in which he was “bullied into submission of his prerogatives” by said court, the language used is clearly insolent, disrespectful, and contemptuous. A mere disclaimer of any intentional disrespect is no ground for exoneration. His intent must be determined by a fair interpretation of the language by him employed. He cannot escape responsibility by claiming that his words did not mean what any reader must have understood them as meaning. (Intestate Estate of Rosario Olba, in re Contempt Proc. vs. Antonio Franco, 37 O.G. p. 2516) (Citations from Moran, Vol. 11, 2nd Ed.)

Classification of Contempt.—Under the present rule, contempt is divided into two kinds: (1) direct contempt, that is, one committed in the presence of, or so near, the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and (2) constructive contempt, or that which is committed out of the presence of the court, as in refusing to obey its order or lawful process. (Narcisa vs. Bowen, 22 Phil. 365) The disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalities toward others, and

Section 1. Direct contempt punished summarily.—A person guilty of misbehavior in the presense of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required so to do, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court or judge and punished by

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 15 fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a superior court, or a judge thereof, or by fine not exceeding ten pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be an interior court. In Calo, Jr. vs. Tapucar, 88 SCRA 78, No. L-47244, January 16, 1979, the Supreme Court held:—The facts are undisputed. It does appear that while petitioner Calo, Jr. could have been provoked by what he considered an unjust and unfair order, there was no justification for him to resort to intemperate and highly derogatory language. Accordingly, it cannot be considered an excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Judge to find him in direct contempt of court. It continued:—1. There is, in the recent case of Yangson vs. Salandanan, (Adm. Case No. 1347, November 12, 1975, 68 SCRA 42) the opinion being penned by Justice Aquino, a reiteration of the authoritative doctrine that “offensive and disrespectful observation (is) an act of direct contempt or contempt in facie curiae” and could, therefore, be summarily punished without hearing. In a 1932 decision, Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86, the opinion coming from Justice Malcolm, this Court held that an urgent motion filed by counsel, where he sought to disqualify a judge to conduct a new trial of a criminal case where he had previously found the accused guilty on the ground that “a completely impartial trial to which her constitutional right entitled her” and to protect her “against the prejudice necessarily formed by the judge who had presided at the original trial (having thus) formed in his mind a firm and irrevocable conviction as to her guilt” could be punished as direct contempt. 2. There is relevance to this excerpt from People vs. Estenzo, (64 SCRA 211) “It cannot be denied either that unless exercised with restraint and judiciousness, this power lends itself to manifestations of whim, caprice, and arbitrariness. There is a compelling and exigent need therefore for judges to take the utmost care lest prejudice, innate or covert hostility to personality of counsel, or previous incidents lead them to characterize conduct susceptible of innocent explanation as slights on the dignity of the court. It is ever timely to remember how easy it is to overstep the

dividing line that should separate the prosecutor from the judge, when both roles are merged in the same person. The infusion of personal element may go unnoticed. Even if such were not the case, objectively viewed, such an impression may be difficult to avoid by laymen. That is a consideration that cannot be overlooked. . . It is important that public confidence in judicial impartiality and fairness be not impaired. * * * * ‘The power to punish for contempt,’ as was pointed out by Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio vs. Lukban, ‘should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.’ Section 3. Indirect contempts to be punished after charge and hearing.— After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt: (a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions; (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgement, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto; (c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this rule; (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; (e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 16 (f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; (g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him. But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the accused party into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings. (Rule 71) Per Moran: Misbehaviour—Misbehavior of an officer of a court constitutes contempt. Misbehavior is an improper or unlawful conduct. It embraces a wilful refusal or negligent failure, without just cause, of an officer of the court to comply with an order of the court (People vs. Covacha, 52 Phil. 704). An officer who is found to be negligent in the performance of his official duties may be rightfully declared guilty of contempt (United States vs. Manalo, 16 Phil. 654). The clerk of court is subject to the control of the court in the matter of appointments of employees in his office, and his refusal to comply with an order of the judge to submit names and recommendations for appointment, is contempt (In re Jones, 9 Phil. 347). A sheriff or his deputy who through neglect fails to serve summons in accordance with an order of the court, is guilty of contempt.

Disobedience.—Disobedience of a lawful order of the court constitutes contempt under subdivision (b) of the above section. It has been held however, that a person cannot be punished for contempt unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is precisely defined (Lee Yick Hon. vs. Collector of Customs, 41 Phil. 548). The writ or order of the court must be lawful in order that resistance thereto may be punished as contempt. Courts have no power to demand compliance with an order issued without authority (United States vs. Gabriel, 31 Phil. 632). In other words, the disobedience of, or resistance to, an order or mandate which is void, because issued by a court without jurisdiction of the subject-matter or of the parties litigant cannot be considered a contempt. (Weigall vs. Shuster, 11 Phil. 340) But if the

order or mandate is valid, it cannot be disobeyed no matter how erroneous it may be. Obstruction of administration of justice.—Any act of a person tending directly or indirectly to prevent, obstruct, degrade, or embarass the administration of justice constitutes contempt. Any publication during the pendency of a suit, reflecting upon the court, the parties, or witnesses, and tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt (In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944). The criticism that the Supreme Court has no “intellectual leadership,” but merely “sentimental leadership,” was held to be contemptuous (See Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, In re contempt proceedings, Quirino, respondent, G.R.L. 278). A criticism should be distinguished from insult. A criticism after a case has been disposed of, can no longer influence the court, and on that ground it does not constitute contempt. On the other hand, an insult hurled to the court, even after a case is decided, can under no circumstance be justified (People vs. Alarcon, G.R. No. 46551).

In Surea vs. Juntereal, 84 SCRA 5, No. L-38695, July 1, 1978, the Supreme Court said:—The Rules of Court cannot be any clearer. The appropriate section is quite explicit: “After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt: * * * (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, * * *” Clearly, the contemptuous conduct imputed to him, disobedience, called for his being given the opportunity to meet such a charge. Failure to accord such hearing amounts to a denial of due process. In cases of indirect contempt, as was pointed out in Gardones vs. Delgado, 58 SCRA 58, the party proceeded against “could not be adjudged guilty without hearing him or without due process of law.” Such a doctrine goes back to Finnick vs. Peterson, 6 Phil. 172, a 1906 decision where this Court considered a failure to comply with a subpoena duces tecum as constituting an

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 17 indirect contempt and therefore one sought to be held liable is entitled to the hearing or trial.

near a court as to interrupt the admission of Justice (Delima vs. Gallardo, 77 SCRA 286).

§ 3. Additional Notes on Contempt

(9) A contempt charge in the Supreme Court raising issues involving questions of fact may be referred to the lower court for rehearing and recommendation (Estrada vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, 6 SCRA 12).

(1) The violation of a right declared in a judgment does not constitute contempt of court in the absence of any express command or prohibition. Thus the mere failure of the petitioner to vacate the lot in question could not be a basis of a contempt proceeding against said petitioner in the absence of an express court order to that effect (Olego vs. Rebueno, 66 SCRA 446). (2) The action of a party of causing repairs to the property involved in the litigation pending appeal does not constitute contempt of court (Lodovica vs. Court of Appeals, 65 SCRA 154). (3) A trial judge may be held in contempt of court for disregarding a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals (Reliance Procoma, Inc. vs. Phil-Asia Tobacco Corporation, 57 SCRA 370). (4) A conviction for contempt is unjustified when the person convicted of contempt acted in good faith (Oliveros vs. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163). (5) The failure to obey a subpoena constitutes an indirect contempt. A trial judge, therefore who immediately orders the arrest of the person disobeying the court’s subpoena without giving him his day in court commits a grave error (Gardones vs. Delgado, 58 SCRA 58). (6) A person may not be held in contempt of court for failure to obey a court order where the terms of the same are ambiguous. (7) A false allegation made by counsel in his pleading constitutes direct contempt (Occena vs. Marquez, 60 SCRA 38). (8) Contempt of Court may be either direct or constructive. It is direct when committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt proceedings before same and constructive or indirect contempt is one committed out or not in the presence of court and justice. It is tantamount to a misbehaviour in the presence of or so

(10) Threats and disrespectful language in a pleading filed in court constitutes direct contempt (Paragas vs. Cruz, 14 SCRA 809). (11) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court or manifest disobedience thereof constitutes contempt of court (Francisco vs. Ramos, 69 SCRA 379). (12) The power to punish persons for contempt is inherent in all courts and essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of their orders and decisions (Montalban vs. Canonoy, 38 SCRA 273). (13) Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey, should said power be exercised (Oliveros vs. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163). (14) Defiance to a restraining order of the Supreme Court constitutes contempt (Kibad vs. Commission of Elections, 25 SCRA 711). (15) The refusal to honor an injunctive order of the Supreme Court constitutes contempt (Ysasi vs. Fernandez, 26 SCRA 393). (16) The requirement that a person charged with contempt be given an opportunity to be heard and be informed of the charges against him are adequately fulfilled by the court either by reading the complaint to respondent or furnishing him with a copy of the contempt charges (Aguador vs. Enerio, 37 SCRA 140).

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 18 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW PRACTICE IN MORE THAN ONE JURISDICTION By SEVERIANO S. TABIOS*

country could offer. It is for this reason that practice of law in more than one jurisdiction has become a necessity.

§ I.Introduction, p. 352

The practice of law in any jurisdiction is a privilege granted only to those who have qualified for the standard of admission in the State. As the power to admit is a judicial function that involves the exercise of discretion after a thorough evaluation of applicant’s qualification, a license to practice becomes a guarantee by the State to its constituents that the licensee is fit and proper to assume the responsibilities of a lawyer, to enjoy and keep their confidence and to aid and assist them in their causes and in the management of their legal businesses and affairs.2

§ II.Requirements of Admission to the Practice of Law, p. 354 A.Requirements in the Philippines, p. 354 1.Admission Upon Examination, p. 354 2.Admission Without Examination, p. 355 B. Requirements of Admission in a Foreign Jurisdiction, p. 356 1. General Requirements for Admission in New York State, p. 356 2. Admission Upon Examination, p. 357 3. Admission Without Examination, p. 361 § III.Practice of Law in Association with Foreign Lawyers, p. 362 § IV.Conclusion, p. 363 § I. Introduction It has been observed that because of accelerated growth in foreign investments generating international movements of goods across national boundaries and the transnational transfers of technologies, multinational companies have grown in numbers by necessity to oversee the investments in the host country. While these multinational companies generally employ local manpower, they normally maintain, however, a small core of selected specialists to handle sensitive matters that only head office people could be entrusted with. As a very different type of lawyering is called for in a relationship as complex and fluid as that between the multinational, the host and the home governments,1 it is normally expected that a multinational should be consulting its own head office lawyers on legal problems encountered in the host country, although it already retains the services of the best legal minds the host

Under the Philippine Legal System, the practice of law entails the exercise of a public function for the administration of justice.3 For this reason, the practice of law should be limited to citizens and excluded from foreigners.4 In this regard, the filing of a brief by a Japanese lawyer as an appendix to a brief presented by a Filipino attorney on record was considered as an unauthorized practice of law by one not admitted to the bar.5 Furthermore, the use of a stationery of a foreign law firm not authorized to practice law in this country by a Filipino member of the firm was considered unethical, because the use of the stationery was viewed as a representation that being associated with the firm respondents could “render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment.”6 § II. Requirements of Admission to the Practice of Law A. Requirements in the Philippines 1. Admission Upon Examination According to the Revised Rules of Court, any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 19 and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.7 Additionally, it is also required as a condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of a lawyer’s name in the Roll of Attorneys with the Supreme Court that the lawyer pay his annual dues with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.8 For the purposes of admission to the practice of law, the candidate must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines, and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.9 Additionally, a candidate shall undergo a bar examinations on required subjects. The subjects include Civil Law, Labor and Social Legislation, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law (including the general principles of Penal Science and Criminology), Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporation and Public Offleers), International Law (Public and Private), Taxation, Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure and Evidence), Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (in pleadings and conveyancing).10 In this regard, no applicant shall be admitted to the bar examination unless he has satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law school or university recognized by the government, to wit: Civil Law, Commercial Law, Remedial Law, Criminal Law, Public and Private Inter-, national Law, Political Law, Labor and Social Legislations, Medical Jurisprudence, Taxation and Legal Ethics.11 It is significant to note that strict compliance with the requirements is needed, For this purpose, the passing of the bar examination is only a partial compliance and would not guarantee admission unless the other requirements are strictly complied with. Thus, an applicant who swore that previous to his study of law he had completed the required pre-legal education as prescribed by the Department of Education, when in fact he never graduated from high school and that while he was taking his first year law, he was at the same time taking his preparatory course, may be ousted because his admission to the bar which was obtained under false pretenses has to be revoked. According to the Supreme Court, the fact

that he hurdled the bar examinations is immaterial because passing such examination is not the only qualification required to become an attorney, considering that taking the prescribed course of study in the regular manner is equally essential.12 2. Admission Without Examination Under the Revised Rules of Court, the Supreme Court may in its discretion admit to the bar without examination those applicants, who, being Filipino citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court for the United States or in any circuit court of appeals or district court therein, or in the highest court of any State or territory of the United States, and who can show by satisfactory certificates that they have practiced at least five years in any of said courts, that such practice began before July 4, 1946 and that they have never been suspended or disbarred.13 Moreover, lawyers who are citizens of the United States who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed member of the Philippine bar, in actual practice in the courts of the Philippines and in good and regular standing as such, may, upon satisfactory proof of these facts, be allowed by the Supreme Court to continue such practice after taking the prescribed oath.14 It is significant to note that the above-mentioned requirements for admission without examination appears to be intended as a transition to accommodate lawyers who had been in actual practice before July 4, 1946 who wanted to practice law in the Philippines. But, as the provisions of the Revised Rules of Court require, these lawyers should be Filipino citizens who had practiced law for at least five years before the cut-off date in the United States or American lawyers who were duly licensed member of the Philippine bar before July 4, 1946. Necessarily, those lawyers who started their law practice after July 4, 1946 would never qualify for admission without examination, because even if they are Filipino citizens who had been admitted to practice law in the United States they would lack the requirement of having practiced law for at least five years before July 4, 1946 B. Requirements for Admission in a Foreign Jurisdiction

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 20 1. General Requirements for Admission in New York State In other foreign jurisdictions such as in the State of New York, citizenship is not a requirement for admission to the practice of law in the State. Even foreigners who are not residents of the State of New York are eligible for admission provided they qualify and satisfy the specific requirements for admission. In this regard, Title 22 of the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of New York (cited as 22 NYCRR) provides that a person shall be admitted to practice law in the courts of the State of New York only by an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court upon compliance with the rules.15 According to the Rules of the Court: of Appeals for the Admission of Attorneys and Counselors at Law, a candidate for admission may seek admission upon examination or admission without examination depending on the qualification and eligibility of the candidate. Each of these type of admissions are governed by separate rules and regulations requiring strict adherence thereto. However, the Court of Appeals, upon application, may in its discretion vary the application of or waive any provision of the Rules of Admission where strict compliance will cause undue hardship to the applicant; but such application shall be in the form of a verified petition setting forth the applicant’s name, age and residence address, the facts relied upon and a prayer for relief.16 2. Admission Upon Examination An applicant for admission upon examination shall furnish the New York State Board of Law Examiners with satisfactory proof that applicant is over 21 years of age, specifying the date and place of his birth, and that applicant has complied with the educational requirements for admission.17 For this purpose, the applicant may qualify to take the New York State bar examination by submitting to the New York State Board of Law Examiners satisfactory proof that applicant commenced the study of law after applicant’s 18th birthday and that applicant attended and was graduated with a first degree in law from a law school or law schools which at all times during the period of applicant’s attendance was or

were approved. In this regard, an approved law school is one whose program and course of study meet the requirements of the rules for admission as shown by the law school’s bulletin or catalogue or which is approved by the American Bar Association or which is a member of the Association of American Law Schools, or which is registered and approved by the New York State Education Department. An approved law school shall require for its first degree in law the successful completion of either a full-time or a part-time program which consists of a minimum of 80 semester hours of credit, or the equivalent, in professional law subjects; and at least 1,200 classroom periods of 50 minutes each, including examinations.18 As an alternative to law school studies, an applicant may study law in a law office and qualify to take the New York State bar examination. For this purpose, the applicant shall submit to the New York State Board of Law Examiners satisfactory proof that applicant commenced the study of law after its 18th birthday, that applicant successfully completed at least one academic year as a matriculated student in a full-time program or the equivalent in a part-time program at an approved law school and at the conclusion thereof was eligible to continue in that school’s degree program, and that applicant thereafter studied law in a law office or offices located within New York State under the supervision of one or more attorneys admitted to practice law in New York State, for such a period of time as, together with the credit allowed pursuant to the rules for attendance in an approved law school, shall aggregate four years. In this regard, an applicant studying law in a law office or offices within New York State must be actually and continuously employed during the required period as a regular law clerk and student in a law office, under the direction and subject to the supervision of one or more attorneys admitted to practice law in New York State, and must be actually engaged in the practical work of such law office during normal business hours. In addition, the applicant must receive instruction from the attorney or attorneys of the law office in those subjects which are customarily taught in approved law schools.19

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 21 An applicant who studied law in a foreign country may qualify to take the New York State bar examination by submitting to the New York State Board of Law Examiners satisfactory proof of successful completion of a period of law study in the foreign country whose jurisprudence is based upon principles of English Common law which is substantially equivalent to that required for admission to the New York State bar examination or that applicant has successfully completed a full time or part-time program consisting of a minimum of 24 semester hours of credit, or the equivalent, in professional law subjects in an approved law school in the United States or that applicant meets the educational requirements for admission to an approved law school in the United States for an LL.M or S.J.D. degree in law. Applicant must also show that the legal education he completed in the foreign country fulfills the educational requirements for admission to the practice of law in that country.20 Applicants for admission upon examination are required to pass the New York State Bar examination, consisting of problems in both adjective and substantive law, being conducted twice each year by the New York State Board of Law Examiners21 and the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination being administered by the National Conference of Bar Examiners.22 The Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination may be taken within a period of no more than two years prior or subsequent to passing the New York State bar examination. After applicant passed both examinations, the New York State Board of Law Examiners shall certify the results to the Appellate Division of the appropriate Judicial Department of the New York State Supreme Court.23 Every applicant for admission must file with a committee on character and fitness appointed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court affidavits of reputable persons that applicant possesses the good moral character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor at law. The number of such affidavits and the qualifications of persons acceptable as affiants shall be determined by the Appellate Division to which the applicant has been certified.24 With respect to an applicant who does not reside and is not employed full-time in the State of New York, it is required as a condition of admission that said applicant

execute and file with the Appellate Division of the department in which applicant is being admitted a duly acknowledged instrument in writing setting forth the applicant’s residence or mailing address and designating the clerk of such Appellate Division as the applicant’s agent upon whom process may be served, with like effect as if served personally upon the applicant, in any action or proceeding thereafter brought against the applicant and arising out of or based upon any legal services rendered or offered to be rendered by the applicant within the State.25 Applications for admission are processed in any one of the four departments of the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court. For residents of New York State or applicants whose full-time employments are located within New York State, applications are processed in any of the following departments having jurisdiction over the area, namely: First Judicial Department at New York, New York; Second Judicial Department at Brooklyn, New York; Third Judicial Department at Albany, New York and Fourth Judicial Department at Rochester, New York. However, applications of candidates who are not residents nor employed in New York, inciudmg foreign applicants, are processed only in the Third Judicial Department at Justice Building, Empire State Plaza, Albany, New York. Appropriately, upon certification by the New York State Board of Law Examiners that an applicant has passed the required examinations, the appellate division of the Supreme Court in the department to which such applicant shall have been certified, if it shall be satisfied that the applicant possesses the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor at law, shall admit him to practice as such attorney and counselor at law in all the courts of New York State, provided that applicant has in all respects complied with the rules of the court of appeals and the rules of the appellate divisions relating to the admission of attorneys.26 3. Admission Without Examination Under the Rules for Admission of Attorneys in the State of New York, practitioners in other jurisdictions with practice experience of at least five

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 22 years may in the discretion of the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court be admitted to practice without examination upon compliance with other requirements. For this purpose the rules require that applicant should be over 26 years old, has had the substantial equivalent of the legal education required for admission to the bar examinations and while admitted to practice law in a jurisdiction whose jurisprudence is based upon the principles of the English Common Law has actually practiced for a period of at least five years.27 The first step that an applicant will have to do is to apply for a certificate of equivalent legal education from the State Board of Law Examiners by attaching to his application a summary of his legal experience, a transcript of his law school record and a certified check for $100.00 as processing fee. As soon as the New York State Board of Law Examiners has issued a certificate of equivalent legal education, the appropriate depart ment of the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court will send a form entitled Applicant’s Affidavit as to Legal Practice which applicant shall accomplish and return to the New York State Supreme Court. If the New York State Supreme Court finds applicant qualified, two sets of forms will be forwarded with instruction for applicant to accomplish one set immediately and forward that set to the National Conference of Bar Examiners at Chicago, Illinois. As soon as notified by the National Conference of Bar Examiners that it has already rendered its report, applicant will subsequently submit the second set to the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court. If applicant is found qualified, an interview will be scheduled with a member of the Committee on Character and Fitness who will certify to the New York State Supreme Court his observations on applicant. An oath taking will subsequently take place if applicant is admitted to the practice of law. § III. Practice of Law in Association with Foreign Lawyers With the expansion of foreign trade and the attendant complexities of foreign investment laws and regulations, the need for lawyers to be knowledgeable with laws and regulations in other jurisdictions where transnational clients conduct business has been felt. For this purpose, practitioners in one jurisdiction often maintain correspondent relationship

with others in another jurisdiction. In some instances, partnership among lawyers admitted to practice in different jurisdictions have been formed. In the Philippines, where foreigners are not allowed to practice law, partnership by Filipino lawyers with foreign lawyers may not be possible for the practice of law in the Philippines. As declared by the Supreme Court in the recent case of Dacanay vs. Baker and McKenzie, et. al.,28 the use of a stationery of a foreign law firm not authorized to practice law in the Philippines by a Filipino member of the firm is unethical Additionally, the Supreme Court has ruled that the practice of law is limited to Filipino citizens.29

On the other hand, in the State of New York, big law firms maintain the services of lawyers admitted to practice in different jurisdictions. While the Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility adopted by the New York State Bar Association considers it improper for a lawyer to engage in practice where he is not permitted by law or by court order to do so,30 however, it allows the formation of a partnership between or among lawyers licensed in different jurisdictions, provided all enumerations of the members and associates of the firm on its letterhead and in other permissible listings make clear the jurisdictional limitations on those members and associates of the firm not licensed to practice in all listed jurisdictions.31 Moreover, the same firm name may be used in each jurisdiction.32 It may be interesting to note that, under its ethical considerations, the New York Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility recommends that the legal profession, in furtherance of the public interest, should discourage regulation that unreasonably imposes territorial limitations upon the right of a lawyer to handle the legal affairs of his client or upon the opportunity of a client to obtain the services of a lawyer of his choice in all matters including the presentation of a contested matter in a tribunal before which the lawyer is not permanently admitted to practice. This is because the demands of business and the mobility of our society

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 23 pose distinct problems in the regulation of the practice of law by the states.33 § IV. Conclusion Regulation of the practice of law is accomplished principally by the State. Authority to engage in the practice of law is a privilege conferred by the highest tribunal of the State only to those who are qualified and morally fit to assume the responsibilities of an attorney and counselor at law. For this reason, it is improper for a lawyer to engage in practice where he is not permitted by law or by court order to do so. Correspondingly, a lawyer who needs to protect the rights of his clients doing business in another jurisdiction should seek admission to the practice of law in that jurisdiction, if that is possible, or arrange a relationship with a lawyer in that jurisdiction on an “Of Counsel” basis. ——o0o—— Fundamentals of Law Practice in More Than One Jurisdiction, 136 SCRA 352, May 10, 1985

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 24 ANNOTATION LAWYERS ARE NO ANGELS By Prof. LOHEL A. MARTIREZ § 1. Attorney at-law; authority; principal duties, p. 744. § 2. Grounds for disbarment or suspension, p. 746. § 3. Adultery, Concubinage, Abduction, and few unprofessional acts, p. 747. A. Adultery, p. 747.

Court and their speech or conducts are tied up to the highest standards of excellence being officers of the courts and professors of the laws in the administration of justice. Lawyers are mortals with clay feet and also need understanding and cooperation from clients. Lawyers are standard bearers of truth and honesty and are shining pillars of the people’s faith in our democratic institutions that our forefathers have fought and died for. They are a blessing to our growing society and in every turn of events and in every breath we take, lawyers and their glorious handiworks form part and parcel of national, or even international relations in this world of multiple interests.

§ 4. Lawyer’s chance to defend from accusations, p. 748.

The case under annotation entitled, CESARIO ADARNE vs. ATTY. DAMIAN V. ALDABA, is one such case where the lawyer, after acting with creditable showing for and in behalf of the complainant, even if shortlived, thought that nothing more had to be done since he was not the attorney of record, became the innocent target of an irate litigant, Adarne.

§ 5. Reinstatement; Substitution, p. 750.

The triple accusations may be summed up as follows:

————

(a) Gross negligence and misconduct;

Filing an administrative case against a lawyer is quite simple. Probing the same to the satisfaction of the court is another, and is often difficult. If the cause of action calls for disbarment, the complainant must clearly establish that the respondent is guilty of the charge.

(b) Failure to give entire devotion, warm zeal and utmost learning; and,

“Malpractice” is a serious offense; and “Disbarment”, a real shocker! A lawyer disbarred is an embittered soul and the stigma of defeat and shame that follow can break the heart of the colossus. The proceedings are in itself very trying, since upon its resolution in favor of the respondent can he be assured of complete atonement of his reputation cast over by clouds of suspicions during the pendency of the case.

lightly by a lawyer in good standing.

Lawyers are no angels such that they can be expected to know what is within the mental faculties of the client. Neither are they endowed with supernatural powers that they can exactly anticipate the rulings of the courts. Yet, their acts are guided by the rules laid down by the Supreme

Here is a sampling of the complainant’s wild imaginings in the prayer:—

B. Concubinage, p. 747. C. Forcible Abduction, p. 747, D. Consented Abduction, p. 747.

(c) Failure to protect client’s interests from adverse decision. These are grave and serious charges that cannot be taken

Viewed from the standpoint of the complainant, Atty. Aldaba, the herein respondent, is irresponsible, and, perhaps, a no-good lawyer. And not only that, the complaint was loaded with threats, thereby insulting the integrity of the great mass of the Filipino people.

“. . . sapagkat kung hindi po susugpu-in ang masasamang gawa naito ng mga ibang abogado na nabibili,—lala’la’ ang sakit naito sa profession ng

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 25 mga abogado, at lilikha ng maraming api, lalaganap ang kriminalidad ng walang tigil, at walang katahimikan ang ating Demukrasya at kung magkakagayon ang mga mamamayan ay—sapilitan sakumunista sasamba.” (italics supplied)

413, 19 Sup. Ct. 743, 43 L. Ed. 1028). As a matter of fact, the presumption is that an attorney has authority to appear; if the person he appears for does not disclaim his authority, he is bound. (Bacon vs. Mitchell, 14 N.D. 454, 106 N. W. 129, 4 L.R.A. [N.S.] 244).

Talking about Communism in an administrative case like this, is offbound. Communism has nothing to do with the case in issue. The false prophecy of Filipinos worshipping or embracing communism as a way of life, is at best a daylight fantasy. The Complainant, perhaps, out of desperation for a lost cause, tried to inject politics into his charges but thrown out by the Court as out of question and contrary to the facts of the case.

As mentioned earlier, the first duty of a lawyer is the administration of justice, and his duty to his client is subordinate to that. So that, as far as his relations with his client are concerned, he is duty bound to—be true to the court and to his client; to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; to keep this client informed as to the state of his business; to keep his secrets confided to him as such. However, an attorney is not an insurer of the result in a case in which he is employed, and only ordinary care and diligence can be required of him. (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary)

§ 1. Attorney-at-law; authority; principal duties. What is an Attorney-at-law? An attorney-at-law, is an officer in a court of justice who is employed by a party in a cause to manage the same for him. (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary) And the courts have ruled several times over, that a lawyer is above all an officer of the court. To become an officer of a court of justice is no easy task. In other words, he (the lawyer) is a defender of the oppressed, his talents in law constitute active forces aimed at the administration of justice regardless of political, social, economic, or religious stations in life of parties litigants. A lawyer, although employed by a party in a cause to manage the same for him, is not a part of the cause. He voluntarily dissociates himself from the facts of the case and keeps himself beyond the influences of the litigants simply because his primary purpose is to stand by the truth. Managing the cause of a party litigant does not imply resort to foul tactics or outright falsehoods to mislead the court and the public. His business is to carry on the practical and formal parts of the suit, (1 Kent 307) to the best of his ability, to help clarify matters, and proclaim what is right. But first of all, there should be an authority. And the authority of an attorney commences with his retainer. After he has been retained in a case, he has certain implied powers therein. (Stone vs. Bank, 174 U.S.

Membership in the bar is an exacting responsibility. It is, to quote from Justice Cardoso, “a privilege burdened with conditions.” (Cited in Albano vs. Coloma, Adm, Case No. 528, October 11, 1967, 21 SCRA 411) It imposes, at the very least, the obligation of attending with due zeal and diligence to a client’s cause. (Maria Luz Atienza vs. Vicente Evangelista, Adm. Case No. 1517, November 29, 1977 (Second Division), 80 SCRA 338). Perhaps, it is worthy to note that, an attorney at law is not expected to know all the law; he is not liable to disbarment for an honest mistake or error. (In re Filart, 40 Phil. 205). Based on the foregoing, it can be safely advanced, that, a lawyer must do his best to help in the administration of justice. As was pointed out in the past, the legal profession is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money-making trade. (Jayme vs. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422) An Attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill, having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do. Prone to err like any other human being, he is not answerable for every error or mistake, and will be protected as long as he acts honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge. Atty. Aldaba, did a “creditable showing” at a “special appearance” even as he exercised a “reasonable degree of care and skill” in temporarily handling the case for the herein complainant. In fact, the

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 26 respondent deserves praises as one lawyer true to his profession as the records of the case reveal. § 2. Grounds for disbarment or suspension A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience take any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitute malpractice. (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved, and as an officer of the court, that he has performed his duty in accordance with his oath. (In re De Guzman, 55 SCRA 139) The rule of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply to the grounds for disbarment enumerated in Section 27. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865) The statutory enumeration is not to be taken as a limitation of the general power of the courts in this respect. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as a lawyer for grounds other than those enumerated by these rules, (as stated above) the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; and it may be exercised without any special statutory authority; and in all proper cases, unless positively prohibited by statute. Accordingly, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as lawyer for grounds other than those enumerated by this provision. (Moran, p. 237, citing Balinon vs. De Leon, et al., 50 O.G. 583 and In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567)

On several occasions, the Supreme Court have ruled on very critical points where a lawyer deserved condemnation for acts unworthy of the legal profession. The Court ruled thus: The crime of abduction is a violation of the criminal law that cannot be lightly passed over, and the inherent nature of the act is such that it is against good morals and the accepted rules of right conduct. (In re Basa, 41 Phil. 274) The crime of concubinage likewise involves moral turpitude. (In re Isada, 60 Phil. 915) § 3. Adultery, Concubinage, Abduction, and few unprofessional acts A. Adultery Adultery is committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married even if the marriage be subsequently declared void. (Art. 333, R.P.C.) B. Concubinage Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, . . . . (Art. 334, R.P.C.) C. Forcible Abduction The abduction of any woman against her will and with lewd designs shall be punished by reclusion temporal. The same penalty shall be imposed in every case, if the female abducted be under twelve years of age. (Art. 342, R.P.C.) D. Consented Abduction The abduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen years of age, carried out with lewd designs, shall be punished by the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. (Art. 343, R.P.C.)

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 27 “Moral Turpitude” as used in Sec. 27 of Rule 138, includes any act done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. (In re Basa, 41 Ohil. 275) A client whose rights have been prejudiced by the failure or by the delay of an attorney in preparing or filing pleadings necessary in the proper conduct of a cause, and in taking such steps as may be required in the progress of the case, and who has suffered damages as the result of his attorney’s negligence or misconduct, may recover and is entitled to damages. (Moran, citing In re Filart, 40 Phil. 205) Where an attorney, in deliberately and maliciously withholding from the court certain facts of which he had full knowedge in an attempt to unjustly and unlawfully deprive others of their legitimate rights, has acted with betrayal to the court of which he is an officer and sought thereby to prevent the administration of justice, and gross violation of his oath of office. (Moran, citing De los Santos vs. Sagalongos, 69 Phil. 406) It is highly unprofessional for an attorney who has appeared for the defense in a criminal case to act later for the prosecution, or vice versa. The reason for this prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of confidence and trust in the very highest degree. (U.S. vs. Laranja, 21 Phil. 500) § 4. Lawyer’s chance to defend from accusations. But, following the principles of fair-play, any respondent-lawyer, is given a fair chance to defend himself from accusations. Not all accusations are true. So it is likewise mandated that, no attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte. (Section 30 Rule 138, R.P.C.)

The notice to an attorney to appear and show cause why he should not be punished for contempt, can not be considered as a notice to show cause why he should not be suspended from practice. A lawyer has the right, after due notice, to be heard and defend himself in suspension proceedings. (In Re Jesus Cuenco, 41 Phil. 32) Disbarment proceedings against a lawyer duly notified but failed to appear may be held ex parte. (In re Adriatico, 17 Phil. 173) In disbarment proceedings, defendant should be allowed a reasonable time to make his defense. In ordinary trials the inability to procure witnesses after the exercise of due diligence, is ground for postponement, and such cases are no greater importance than a disbarment proceeding to an attorney. (In re MacDougall, 3 Phil. 70) A citizen has sufficient interest to institute a proceeding and bring the unprofessional conduct of an attrorney to the attention of the proper authorities. (Hernandez vs. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775) Carelessness and neglect of professional duty, and fraud and misconduct towards his clients, are grounds for suspension of a member of the bar. (In re Carmen, 41 Phil. 43) An attorney who, in proceedings to remove him as notary public, produces in his own defense a false affidavit of a third person, is guilty of malpractice. (In re De lara, 27 Phil. 176) It is unprofessional and worthy of the highest form or rebuke for a lawyer to attribute to a judge a statement which he did not make in his decision. (Ferrer vs. De Inchausti, 38 Phil. 905) Where an attorney illegally appropriated the sum of P2,000 because although the act was done not in his capacity as attorney, the same is a violation of the lawyer’s oath not to commit any act of falsehood and further shows his lack of good moral character. (Villegas vs. De Mesa, 70 Phil. 97) The disbarment of an attorney is not intended as a punishment but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. (Guzman vs. Tadeo, 68 Phil. 554)

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 28 Stated in a varying phraseology, disbarment leads us to two leading objectives, namely: (1) to compel the attorney to deal fairly and honestly with his client; and (2) to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsiblities belonging to the office of an attorney. (Moran, citing Strong vs. Munday, 52 N.J. Eq. 833, 1 A. 611 and 6 C.J., p. 581) § 5. Reinstatement; Substitution. The Supreme Court may reinstate an attorney at law who has been disbarred for reasons and upon assurances satisfactory to the court. (In re Adriatico, 17 Phil. 324) Time and again, it has been finely held, that, a member of the bar cannot be subjected to the peril of disbarment simply because of decision adverse to his client. The serious consequence of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence showing the basis thereof. The Court is in agreement. It would be to place an intolerable burden on a member of the bar if just because a client failed to obtain what is sought by her after due exertion of the required effort on his part, he would be held accountable. Success in a litigation is certainly not the test of whether or not a lawyer had lived up to his duties to a client. It is enough that with the thorough preparation of the case handled by him, he had taken all the steps to prosecute his suit. If thereafter the result would be the frustration of his client’s hopes, that is a cause for disappointment, no doubt for him no less than for his client, but not for disciplinary action. He is more to be sympathized with than condemned—on the assumption of course that he did what was expected of him. (Atienza vs. Evangelista, 80 SCRA 338) In every case of disbarment the burden of proof lies with the complainant to show that the respondent is guilty of the acts charged. “Burden of Proof” means the general duty of a party to ultimately establish the issues or the truth of his claim by the amount of evidence required by law. (Elliot on Evidence) This, the complainant Cesario Adarne failed to do in the instant case. He entangled himself in a mass

of confusions by changing lawyers oftener without first observing the formalities required. It has been settled that no substitution of attorneys will be allowed unless there are filed: (1) a written application for such substitution; (2) the written consent of the client; (3) the written consent of the attorney substituted; and (4) in case such written consent can not be secured, there must be filed with the application, proof of service of notice of such motion upon the attorney to be substituted, in the manner prescribed by the rules. Unless the foregoing formalities are complied with, substitutions will not be permitted and the attorney who appeared last in the case before such application will be regarded as the attorney of record and will be held responsible for the proper conduct of the case. (U.S. vs. Borromeo, 20 Phil. 189; Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil. 540) As a timely reminder from the Highest Tribunal, it said: It is well settled that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent attorney must be established by convincing proof. In the instant case, there is no sufficient proof to warrant the disbarment of the respondent attorney. Neither is there culpable malpractice to justify his suspension. In the future, lawyers will likewise be placed in the same predicament as Atty. Aldaba, or, even worse than that as a result of distorted frames of thought of unsuccessful litigants. Lawyers being made scapegoats of their own unrighteousness, but, the Supreme Court will always be there with watchful eyes—ever ready to render justice unto those who rightfully deserve it.

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 29 ANNOTATION THE ATTORNEY IN COURT PRACTICE By RODOLFO POMPEYO J. CABRILLAS § 1.Introduction, p. 197. § 2.The Attorney’s Mission, p. 199. § 3.The Attorney’s Proper Habits, p. 199. A.Punctuality and Expedition, p. 200. B.Systematic, p. 200. C.Cheerfulness, p. 200. D.Honesty, p. 201. E.Simple, Clear, Direct and Dignified Language, p. 201. § 4.The Attorney’s Duties to the Courts, p. 202. A.Respectful Attitude Towards the Court, p. 202. B.Obedience to the Lawful Orders of the Court, p. 203. C.Loyalty to the Courts, p. 203. D.Fairness, Truth and Candor, p. 204. § 5.Conclusion, p. 205. § 1. Introduction Statistics lend wind to the observation that most of the leading members of a community are lawyers. That the lawyer represents the most superior product of civilization, a master of logic, truth and wisdom is not by any means a flattery. However, this conception was a fiction of sorts during the riotous pre-Martial law days. Then, lawyers were “liars”, “boleros” or “opportunistas”. Faith in equality and justice had so weaned, that it nearly earned itself a peso denomination, were it not for the last

bastion of the RULE OF LAW, the Supreme Court Under the new dispensation, lawyers have become highly regarded by the public, not only because they are now considered additionally honest -but also because of the realization that abuse and all its evil cousins cannot now thrive. This is not to say, however, that the Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have been adamant. For it is a fact, especially among lawyers that the Supreme Court had continuously adopted stringent measures to discipline its members, under its power and prerogative “to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, x x x.”1 The framers of the Constitution, most of them lawyers, realizing that the practice of lawyers would involve to no mean degree the frequent contact with the public, resolved that since “practice” caters to the public interest, a body in the stature of the Highest Tribunal of the land had to supervise with sanctions this legal practice. And so it was thus decreed. The practice of law treats of four relations: the lawyer and the public; the lawyer and the courts; the lawyer with his client; and, the lawyer with his brothers in the profession. By necessity, a lawyer in practice relates himself with either or all of the four at any one time. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill.2 From this definition it could be gleaned that practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It may include the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions or special proceedings,3 the drawing of deeds and other instruments of conveyances,4 incorporation service,5 foreclosure of mortgage service,6 insolvency proceedings,7 proceedings in attachment,8 matters of estates and guardianships,9 advertising oneself as a lawyer and participates in trial10 or giving advice for compensation.11 It is the purpose of this paper to the subject matter relevant to the annotated case to treat only on the relation of the lawyer to the courts. § 2. The Attorney’s Mission All facets of the lawyer’s career are aimed at the administration of justice. Indispensably, lawyers constitute the only other partners of courts. While the latter are the ultimate dispensers of justice, these are

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 30 impotent sans the practitioners’ aid without going at war with the requisites of due process. The lawyer’s mission, therefore, is not stifled by the objective of asserting and defending merely a cause or a right. Aiding succor to the client is incidental and must yield to the requirements of justice. It is in this fashion that it has been observed that one of the primary duties of lawyers is to help the courts in the solution of the multifarious legal questions that arise from diverse human affairs.12 By necessity, he is therefore an officer of the Court13 and as such is subject to its control and supervision.14 § 3. The Attorney’s Proper Habits Regulation of legal practice may arise from jurisprudence, the Rules of Court, and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Some qualities which lawyers must endeavor to maintain in their relations with the public, their clients and other lawyers apply in equal tension to their attachment to the courts. A. Punctuality and Expedition It is the duty of the lawyer not only to his client but also to the courts and to the public to be punctual in attendance, and to be concise and direct in the trial and disposition of cases.15 Punctuality or its lack could spell the difference between contempt and default, on one hand and legal success on the other. Frequent tardiness could lead to loss of clients’ confidence and court embarrassment. Case backlog will be minimized if punctuality and expedition were not disregarded. Postponements could be avoided by timely preparations and religious observance of a clean schedule. Part of delays suffered by litigants is caused by counsel.16 It has been said that procrastination is our occupational disease, and we sometimes forget that courts operate for the dispatch of the public business and not for the convenience, whim and caprice of judges and lawyers.17 B. Systematic

A well prepared case, coordinated handling of cases, a properly scheduled time allocation and ultimate success in practice depends immeasurably to a systematic approach to a case.18 There is no substitute for a systematic procedure in pursuance of the requirements of punctuality and expedition.19 C. Cheerfulness A lawyer should be cheerful, but not boisterous. He should inspire confidence, be careful in all things he does, analytical and thorough.20 D. Honesty A lawyer will find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty as an honest man.21 A well-deserved reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust and public duty is the best advertisement a lawyer can have.22 E. Simple, Clear, Direct, Dignified Language The language of a lawyer oral or written must be simple, clear and direct to the point. This will give strength to his argument. Trifles or pomposity has no place in a court of justice because a case will be decided on its merits according to law and not on f flowery eloquence.23 It must not be excessive. Instead of strengthening arguments, excessive language weakens the persuasive force of legal reasoning and disturbs the orderly and proper administration of justice.24 Moreover, the language of a lawyer especially in the trial of a cause must scrupulously avoid personalities between counsel. It is indecent to allude to the personal history or the personal peculiarities and idiosyncracies of counsel or the other side. Personal colloquies between counsel which cause delay and promote unseemly wranglings should also be carefully avoided.25 Lastly, a lawyer’s language must be dignified. Shouting in court, unnecessary gesture, and unwarranted display of passion should be avoided.26 Casting insult on a defendant in a criminal case because of

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 31 his lowly station in life even if to show that he deserves a greater penalty had been held to be a disgrace to the bar and an offense to the Court.27

cannot decide upon it as whatever appraisal he has on a questioned order would be a matter of opinion.

§ 4. Attorney’s Duties to the Courts

Thus, it has been observed37 that the lawyer may consider himself more learned than the judge and may not agree with his rulings or orders which he regards as incorrect; yet he should receive these orders and rulings with proper decorum and self-restraint. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed because it is within his office to decide, and the bar should be submitting to them with respect.

The public duties of the attorney takes precedence over his private duties; his first duty is to the courts. Thus, where duties to the court conflict with duties to a client, the latter must yield to the former.28 A. Respectful Attitude Towards the Court Expectedly, the foremost duty of a lawyer is to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.29 It has been held that as an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, to which he owes fidelity.30 Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institution; which without such respect would be resting on a very shaky foundation.31 By the use of disrespectful and offensive language a lawyer was cited for contempt32 because such contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence was a defiance of the court.33 What is disrespect to the court however, unless patently a breach of the ordinary and the common must depend on the circumstances obtaining in a particular case. Thus, in one case, it was ruled that lawyers should be allowed a great latitude of pertinent comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold and for the felicity of their clients they may be pardoned some infelicities of language.34 Due regard is to be taken however of the fact that as observed by the Supreme Court,35 “(t)he language which does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.” B. Obedience to Lawful Orders of Court Obedience to the lawful orders of the Court is heat to the fire. Otherwise, there is no point in going to court. However, erroneous these orders might be, compliance must be followed meekly. If the order be not lawful, initial compliance is expected as the remedy is elsewhere.36 Afterall, there is need for another tribunal to rule on its legality. Counsel

C. Loyalty to the Courts Judges not being wholly free to defend themselves, are peculiarly entitled to receive the support of the Bar against unjust criticism and clamor.38 Whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint of a judicial officer, it is the right and duty of the lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities.39 Clear is the mandate of the canons on the desired attitude of loyalty of lawyers to the courts and his demeanor and remedy in instances where the end of fairness, and equity had been frustrated. Very much related to the requirements of respect to the courts, the duty of loyalty includes the duty to act with care and circumspection to avoid undue embarrassment to the court or unnecessary interference with its proceedings,40 and the duty to assist in the administration of justice.41 D. Fairness, Truth and Candor Under the Canons,42 candor and fairness are basic characteristics of the conduct of lawyers with respect to the Courts and other lawyers. Details have not been omitted in the Canons. Thus, it declares that “(i)t is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote the contents of a paper; the testimony of a witness, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the language of a decision43 or a textbook; or with knowledge of its invalidity, to cite as authority a decision that has been overruled, or a statute that has been repealed; or in argument to assert as a fact that which has not been proved, or x x x to mislead his

L e g a l E t h i c s R e p o r t B a t c h 1 P a g e | 32 opponent by concealing or withholding positions in his argument upon which his side intends to rely.” Also, it is the duty of lawyers to avoid the concealment of the truth especially from the Court, despite the demands of clients,44 because no client, however powerful, and no cause, however important, is entitled to receive from the lawyer any service involving dishonesty to the courts.45 § 5. Conclusion Tomes have been written of lawyers, their conduct and relations. Much more had been said. These cannot be said of the other callings, for the legal profession by necessity invades the province of the others. This is not to say that the legal profession is the most superior because there is no need to mention the obvious. Thus scrutinized, the lawyer must always strive to pursue the very elusive desirable standards of conduct of the profession. Justice Frankfurter had been cited46 to have said that, “(t)he legal profession beyond any other calling is the one that is concerned with those establishments, those processes, those criteria, those appeals to reason and right, which have had a dominant share in begetting a civilized society.” Stronger is this observation applicable in the relation of lawyers to the courts, of which he is an officer.47 Envisioned as a machinery of justice, counsel and court are indispensable parts complementing each other. Impairment of either breaks the machine; the wheels become erratic; realignment is required. Justice is frustrated. The law is breached. Chaos reigns.