Legal Ethics Case Digests.docx

11. In the Matter of JAMES JOSEPH HAMM Petitioners: James Hamm Petition: To review the recommendation provided by Committee on Character and Fitness (the Committee) denying the Petitioner’s application for admission to the State Bar of Arizona (the Bar). FACTS: -

Hamm, the Petitioner, was sentenced to life in prison for one-count of first degree murder to which he pled guilty. Prior to serving his sentence, Hamm had been separated from his wife with whom he had a son and had supported himself by selling and using marijuana, other drugs and drinking alcohol.

-

The crime for which Hamm was sentenced to life imprisonment is for the murder of Morley and Well, who were killed by Hamm along with two accomplices, Garland Wells and Bill Reeser. The three robbed and killed Morley and Well by shooting them with a gun and leaving their bodies lying in the dessert.

-

While in prison, Hamm exhibited good conduct and became a model prisoner which earned him a conditioned parole. Hamm was released after serving nearly seventeen years in prison. From conditioned parole, Hamm absolutely discharged on December 2001.

-

While on parole, Hamm graduated from the Arizona State University College of Law. In July 1999, Hamm passed the Arizona bar examination and, in 2004, filed his Character and Fitness Report with the Committee.

-

In its report, the Committee stated that, in reaching its conclusions, it considered the following: 

Hamm’s unlawful conduct, which included the commission of two violent “execution style” murders and his testimony as to the facts surrounding the murders



Hamm’s omissions on his Application and his testimony in explaining his failure to disclose all required information. Hamm’s neglect of his financial responsibilities and/or violation of a longstanding child support court order and his testimony as to his failure to comply with the court order. Hamm’s mental or emotional instability impairing his ability to perform the functions of an attorney including his testimony as to any diagnosis and treatment.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not Hamm can be admitted to the Bar. HELD: No, the Supreme Court decided that Hamm failed to prove his burden that he is of good moral character on the following grounds: -

-

-

Hamm failed to show rehabilitation from past criminal conduct by not accepting full responsibility for serious criminal misconduct - Staples’ murder although he accepted responsibility for the death of Morley. Hamm was not completely up-front in his testimony to the murder of which he claims that he only intended to rob and not to kill. This is contrary to the facts – he accepted the gun and brings it with him in the car, shot Morley without attempting robbery and shot hit again to ensure he is dead and shot Staples when he attempted to escape. Hamm’s failure to fulfill his long overdue obligation to support his child who he was aware existed. Hamm’s failure to disclose the incident involving him and his wife, Donna, when he submitted his application to the Committee. This incident gave rise to Hamm being questioned by the law enforcers which should have been reflected by Hamm in the application – Question 25. Hamm’s act of quoting lines from Supreme Courts’ decision and use the same in the introduction for his petition.

12. INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE v. NLRC AND NESTOR B. MICOSA G.R. No. 97239. May 12, 1993 FACTS: •

On September 15, 1987, Micosa was accused of the crime of homicide.

• On January 23, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision finding Micosa guilty of homicide, but appreciating, however, in his favor the presence of the mitigating circumstances of (a) incomplete self-defense and (b) voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance. • On February 8, 1990, IRRI’s Director General personally wrote Micosa that his appointment as laborer was confirmed, making him a regular core employee whose appointment was for an indefinite period and who "may not be terminated except for justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Labor Code." • On March 30, 1990, IRRI’s Human Resource Development Head, J.K. Pascual wrote Micosa urging him to resign from employment in view of his conviction in the case for homicide. • On May 7, 1990, Micosa sought the assistance of IRRI’s Grievance Committee who recommended to the Director General, his continued employment. • However, on May 21, 1990, J.K. Pascual issued a notice to Micosa that the latter’s employment was to terminate effective May 25, 1990. •

On May 29, 1990, Micosa filed a case for illegal dismissal.

• On August 21, 1990, Labor Arbiter Numeriano D. Villena rendered judgment finding the termination of Micosa illegal and ordering his reinstatement with full backwages from the date of his dismissal up to actual reinstatement. • On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission was basically in agreement with the findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter. ISSUE: 1. whether a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for dismissal from employment 2. whether a conviction of a crime of homicide involves moral turpitude. HELD: 1. NO. Even under IRRI’s Employment Policy and Regulations, the dismissal of Micosa on the ground of his conviction for homicide cannot be sustained. The miscellaneous provisions of said personnel manual mentions of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude as a ground for dismissal. IRRI simply assumed that conviction of the crime of homicide is conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. We do not subscribe to this view. 2. NO. Moral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing 10 citing In Re Basa 11 and Tak Ng v. Republic 12 as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine. Thus, the precipitate conclusion of IRRI that conviction of the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude is unwarranted considering that the said crime which resulted from an act of incomplete self-defense from an unlawful aggression by the victim has not been so classified as involving moral turpitude. This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular

conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances

13. Soriano v. Dizon A.C. No. 6792. January 25, 2006.

FACTS: While driving on his way home, a taxi driver (herein complainant) overtook the car driven by herein respondent. Incensed, respondent tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn. An altercation resulted therefrom that got to the point that the respondent fired and shot complainant hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the respondent so the latter pushed him out and sped off. ISSUE:

WON respondent’s guilt warrants disbarment.

RULING: Yes. Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.

14. LINSANGAN vs. TOLENTINO AC No. 6672 September 4, 2009 Facts: A complaint for disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services. Complaint alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50, 000.00. Complainant also attached “respondent’s” calling card. Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card. Issue:

Whether or not Tolentino’s actions warrant disbarment.

Held: Yes. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides that lawyer, shall not for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause. This rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty. In the case at bar, complainant presented substantial evidence (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits. Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a more favorable result. Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Any act of solicitations constitutes malpractice

which calls for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statues warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. Thus in this jurisdiction, the Court adheres to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession. Canon 2: A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner compatible with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession. Rule 2.03: A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business

15. EDGAR Y. TEVES vs. COMELEC and HERMINIO G. TEVES G.R. No. 180363, April 28, 2009 Facts: · Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. · Respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. · Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office. · The COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of member of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy. · Upon MR, COMELEC en banc denied the motion saying that since petitioner lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional elections, it thereby rendered the instant MR moot and academic. Issue: Whether petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.

Held: · NO. Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general. · The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law. · Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law.

· In Teves v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991. o The evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question. o Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary. o Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991. · However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case. · The Court clarified that not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not. · Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. · Consequently, considering all circumstances, the Court held that petitioner’s conviction does not involve moral turpitude. · The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. · In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse.

16. HON. REMIGIO E. ZARI, Complainant, vs. DIOSDADO S. FLORES, Respondent A.M. No. (2170-MC) P-1356 November 21, 1979. Facts: Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge of Branch VI City Court of Quezon City, recommended the dismissal from the service of Mr. Diosdado S. Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City Court, on grounds of moral turpitude and persistent attempts to unduly influence the complainant amounting to undue interest in cases pending before Branch VI and gross discourtesy to superior officers as manifested by his uncalled for and unjustified use of strong and contemptuous language in addressing the City Judges.

Issue: Whether or not respondent’s acts constitute grounds for dismissal from the service. Held: In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City Judge Oscar A. Inocentes on June 10, 1969, the respondent stated that I am a person of good moral character and integrity and have no administrative, criminal or police record. This claim is not true because the respondent had been convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, in a sentence dated April 28, 1967. This prevarication in a sworn statement is a ground for serious disciplinary action. That in his accomplished Civil Service Form No. 212 which was subscribed and sworn to, the respondent admits having acted as counsel for three companies; and that the giving of legal advice by notaries and others who are not admitted to the practice of law is dangerous to the welfare of the community, because such persons have not demonstrated their capacity by submitting to examinations lawfully established in the practice of law. The respondent's conviction for libel shows his propensity to speak ill of others as reflected in his letter to Judge Minerva C. Genovea, then Executive Judge of the City Court of Quezon City which contains defamatory and uncalled for language.es virtual law library The handwritten notes of the respondent regarding different cases pending in Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City, presided by the complainant, show that the respondent had exerted undue influence in the disposition of the cases mentioned therein. Respondent, Diosdado S. Flores, is dismissed as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City, with forfeiture of all retirement privileges and with prejudice to reinstatement in the national and local governments, as well as, in any government instrumentality or agency including government owned or controlled corporations. 17. BARRIENTOS VS DAAROL 218 SCRA 30, 401 January 29, 1993 Facts: Victoria Barrientos filed a disbarment case against Transfiguracion (Trans) Daarol on grounds of Gross Immoral conduct. Trans is a 41 year old Manager of a company Zaneco. Known by Victoria's father since the latter was his former teacher and Victoria's mother was his classmate. Victoria is a 20 year old college student. Known by Trans because he frequently visits the house due to his familiar relationship with the family. Trans invited Victoria to be one of the usherettes for Mason Convention on June 28 to 30 in which he asked to request for her parents approval. Thereafter, they go home together every after session. On July 1, they went on a joy ride and strolled on a beach. While on strolling he proposed his love to her; that respondent told her that if she would accept him, he would marry her within six (6) months from her acceptance; Victoria said she will think about it. He constantly visited the house to court and ask for the "yes". That on July 7, 1973, she finally accepted respondent's offer of love and respondent continued his usual visitations almost every night thereafter; they agreed to get married in December. On August 20, they went on a party, before going home he invited her for a joy ride, went on strolling at the beach at the airport where no houses are around. He again profess his love, caressed her, and act removing the undies of Victoria. When the latter asked what he's doing he just professed his love and said it is ok cause he will marry her and December is near. She gave in to his words and had carnal knowledge. Every time they go out together he'll bring her to the said beach at the airport and have sexual intercourse. This happened two to three times a week. On the course of this relationship, Victoria got pregnant and said it to Trans. He said she must abort the fetus. She answered no. They went to her parents and told them to bring her to Manila. They will get married at Manila to prevent scandalous remarks to her.

When they went to Manila. He claimed: He said he's married. He can no longer marry her. He's a muslim. He had estranged wife. He said she consented to have sexual intercourse with him because of her love to him and he did not resort to force, trickery, deceit or cajolery; and that the present case was filed against him by complainant because of his failure to give the money to support complainant while in Cebu waiting for the delivery of the child and, also to meet complainant's medical expenses when she went to Zamboanga City for medical check-up. Issue: WON he is qualified for Disbarment due to gross immoral conduct and deceitful act Ruling: YES, LACK GOOD MORAL CHARACTER --- A CONTINUING REQUIREMENT TO BE ABLE TO PRACTICE LAW The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by respondent only after the complainant became pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented himself as being eligible to re-marry for having been estranged from his wife for 16 years and dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that he would work for the annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception after all as it turned out that respondent never bothered to annul said marriage. Respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual desires at the expense of the gullible complainant. He is perverted. He says that: "I see nothing wrong with this relationship despite my being married." Worse, he even suggested abortion. Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a Moslem convert and as such, could enter into multiple marriages and has inquired into the possibility of marrying complainant. As records indicate, however, his claim of having embraced the Islam religion is not supported by any evidence save that of his self-serving testimony. By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires, respondent Daarol has amply demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct is in order.

18. Julieta B. Narag vs. Atty. Dominador M. Narag 291 SCRA 451 Facts: Atty. Dominador Narag was alleged to have abandoned his family for his paramour who was once his student in tertiary level. The administrative complaint of disbarment was filed by her wife, Mrs. Julieta Narag. Respondent filed motion to dismiss because allegedly the complainant fabricated the story as well as the love letters while under extreme emotional confusion arising from jealousy. The case took an unexpected turn when another complaint was filed, the wife as again the complainant but now together with their seven children as cosignatories. After several hearings, the facts became clear, that the respondent indeed abandoned his family as against morals, based on testimonial evidences. In addition, the assailed relationship bore two children. Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality and for having violated and the Code of Ethics for Lawyers culpable for disbarment. Held: YES. Respondent disbarred. The complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent breached the high and exacting moral standards set for the members of the law profession. Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law. (Canons 1&7, Rule 7.03, Code of Ethics for Lawyers) It is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members. Hence when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. Grossly immoral means it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under

such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. As a lawyer, one must not only refrain from adulterous relationships but must not behave in a way that scandalizes the public by creating a belief that he is flouting those moral standards. Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

19. ROYONG VS. OBLENA AC No. 376 April 30, 1963 FACTS: • Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the bar and bench, with rape. The Solicitor General immediately conducted an investigation and found out that there was no rape, the carnal knowledge between complainant and respondent seems to be consensual sex. • In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other misconduct. The Solicitor General made another complaint charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year old Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to practice law, praying that this Court render judgment ordering the permanent removal of the respondent as lawyer and judge. ISSUE: Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the adulterous cohabitation of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment. HELD: Ariston Oblena was disbarred. RATIO: The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as ground for disbarment. Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law. As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known.

Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him sqemed to have acuuiesced to his utatus, did noq render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.

20. Ui vs. Bonifacio Adm. Case No. 3319, June 8, 2000 Facts: Complainant Lesli Ui found out that her husband Carlos Ui was carrying out an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot two children. Hence, a complaint for disbarment was filed by complainant against respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant’s husband. It is respondent’s contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that after June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui’s true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her. Issue: Whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Held: The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, was dismissed. All the facts taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly immoral,” that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

Lawyer's Oath I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.