Legal-ethics-canons-7-9-readings.docx

Legal Ethics (Canons 7-9)  

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. L-30135. February 21, 1980.] BRAULIO STO. DOMINGO, GAUDENCIO MAPILE, PEDRO G. TUASON, PONCIANO RIVERA, SIMON B. REYES, JR.,petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES and EDUARDO SAN PASCUAL, respondents. Eugenio Maclang for petitioner Sto. Domingo. Quirino T. Carag & Parmencio B. Patacsil for respondent S. B. Retes. Norberto J. Quisuimbing for private respondent.

DECISION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p: During periods pertinent to this case, petitioner Braulio Sto. Domingo was the Municipal Mayor of San Juan, Rizal. Petitioners Gaudencio Mapile, Pedro G. Tuason and Ponciano Rivera were the members of the Local Board of Investigators of the municipality, a Board created under section 15 of the Police Act of 1966. Petitioner Simeon B. REYES, Jr. was a police Captain of the San Juan Police Department, while respondent Eduardo SAN PASCUAL was the Chief of Police. The antecedental facts disclose that petitioner REYES was the Chief of the Service Bureau of the San Juan Police Department. For alleged repeated disobedience of REYES, respondent SAN PASCUAL, as Chief of Police, obtained authority from petitioner Mayor Sto. Domingo to reassign REYES to the administrative division. The Mayor later reassigned the latter to his office. Thereafter, upon learning that REYES still had a key to the door of the office where the police records were located, SAN PASCUAL issued a memorandum order for REYES to return the key. REYES allegedly refused to acknowledge receipt of the order and to return the key. When asked to explain, REYES stated that he did not have a key belonging to the police department. SAN PASCUAL found the explanation unsatisfactory, believing that even if the key had been ordered by REYES at his personal expense, it should have been surrendered. SAN PASCUAL then suspended REYES for ten days for refusal to acknowledge the memorandum order, and ten days for refusal to return the key, in the exercise of his disciplinary jurisdiction pursuant to section 15 of Republic Act No. 4864. 1 REYES thereafter filed a sworn complaint with the Police Commission (POLCOM) on September 13, 1968 2 and a sworn statement on October 3, 1968 3 charging SAN PASCUAL with Oppression and Grave Misconduct. On October 12, 1968, the POLCOM referred the complaint to the Board of Investigators of San Juan for appropriate action at the same time advising SAN PASCUAL of the referral. 4 On October 21, 1968, the Board

recommended to the Mayor the suspension of SAN PASCUAL 5 in view of the gravity of the charges and considering that the complainant (REYES) was under the supervision of SAN PASCUAL. However, on October 22, 1968, the Chairman of the Board recalled said recommendation in order to give SAN PASCUAL a chance to answer charge. 6 San Pascual has alleged that the Mayor did not withdraw the order suspending him. cdrep On October 24, 1968, SAN PASCUAL filed a Complaint with Preliminary Injunction before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch IV (Civil Case No. Q-12528), presided by respondent Judge de los Angeles against Mayor Sto. Domingo, the members of the Board of Investigators of San Juan, the Chairman and Commissioner of the POLCOM, and REYES. SAN PASCUAL alleged that the complaint filed against him before the POLCOM was capricious and without factual and legal basis and prayed for damages as well as for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the oppressive exercise of authority by defendants therein and to restrain them from proceeding with the administrative investigation, and or preventively suspending SAN PASCUAL. Additionally, SAN PASCUAL raised the question of legality and constitutionality of the procedure laid down in Republic Act No. 4864 7 and the creation of the Police Commission thereunder, which he claimed was in conflict with the Decentralization Law, or Republic Act No. 5185, and contended that the latter law should prevail. On November 8, 1968, respondent Judge granted the Writ prayed for. "enjoining the respondents (petitioners herein) and the office of which they act, the Police Commission and Local Board of Investigators of San Juan, Rizal, and any and all of the defendants in proceeding or taking any action on the aforesaid complaint or issuing an order based on the said complaint or any provisions of the Police Act of 1966 like that of suspending the plaintiff from his position as police chief of San Juan, Rizal, upon filing of a bond in the sum of P1,000.00" A Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners (defendants below) was denied in the Order of December 24, 1968. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed on February 1, 1969 by petitioners-officials, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and praying that he be prohibited from further hearing the case below. On February 7, 1969, this Court restrained respondent Judge "from enforcing and carrying out the Order of November 8, 1968 and from further hearing Civil Case No. Q-12528". 8 The effect of this Restraining Order was the suspension of SAN PASCUAL. 9 A Motion to Lift Restraining Order filed by him and opposed by petitioners, was apparently left unresolved by us. Respondent Judge predicated his injunctive Order on the theory that "if the Board of Investigators will be allowed to proceed with the investigation and the injunction will not be issued, most probably the plaintiff Eduardo San Pascual may be investigated by an illegal board or under an illegal procedure which is basic constitutional right of the accused." And that "if the Police Act of 1966 would be declared unconstitutional in some aspects the investigation which if proceeded to would amount to nothing but would only place the said plaintiff Eduardo San Pascual in a humiliating and embarrasing situation." 10 Petitioners contend, on the other hand, that Police Chief SAN PASCUAL has not shown a clear legal right which should be enforced by injunctive relief; that injunction does not lie to prevent embarrassment and humiliation to an individual; that the issuance of the Writ of Injunction was

prejudicial to public interest considering the nature of the administrative proceedings against SAN PASCUAL and the fact that a public office is not "property" but is a public trust; that the mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid will not entitle a party to have its enforcement enjoined; that the due process clause does not apply in cases of preventive suspension; that the constitutionality of the Police Act of 1966 must be presumed and that it is not in conflict with Republic Act No. 5185 or the Decentralization Law. We find merit in this Petition filed by the Municipal Mayor, the members of the Board of Investigators of San Juan, Rizal, and REYES. The Police Act of 1966 11 was enacted "to achieve and attain a higher degree of efficiency in the organization, and operation of local police agencies with the end in view that peace and order may be maintained more effectively and the laws enforced with more impartiality." A declared objective of that Act is "to place the local police service on a professional level." 12 To carry out the purposes of the Act, a Police Commission was therein created under the Office of the President composed of a Chairman and two other members. 13 Sec. 14 of the Act provides for the removal and suspension of members of the police force or agency, thus: LLphil "Members of the local police agency shall not be suspended or removed except upon written complaint filed under oath with the Board of Investigators herein provided for misconduct or incompetency, dishonesty, disloyalty to the Government, serious irregularities in the performance of their duties, and violation of law." The proviso on the Board of Investigators is contained in section 15, and reads: SEC. 15. Board of Investigators. — In every local police agency there shall be a Board of Investigators. Charges against any member of the city and/or municipal police agency shall be investigated by a Board of Investigators of three members, composed of the city or municipal treasurer, as chairman, a representative of the Provincial Commander, and a councilor, elected by a majority of the city or municipal council concerned, as members. Copy of the charges shall be furnished the respondent by the chairman of the Board of Investigators within five day from the date of filing of said charges, and the respondent shall answer within five days from receipt thereof. The Board of Investigators shall conduct its investigation in public within five days from receipt of respondent's answer to the charges or from the expiration of respondent's period to answer, whichever is earlier and unless for good cause shown, the investigation shall be finished within thirty days thereafter, and the Board shall submit the records of the investigation, its findings and recommendations to the Police Commission within thirty days after the termination of the investigation. The decision of the Police Commission shall be final and must be rendered within seventy-five days from the time of receipt of the findings of the Board. Disciplinary jurisdiction of offenses involving suspension of not more than ten days or forefeiture of not more than fifteen days' pay is vested in the chief of the police agency concerned whose decision shall be final."

The preventive suspension of any member of the police force charged administratively is likewise provided for. "SEC. 16. Suspension of Members of the Police Force of Agency. — When an administrative charge is filed under oath against any member of the local police agency, the city mayor or municipal mayor, as the case may be, may suspend the respondent: Provided, That the charge involves disloyalty to the government, dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, serious irregularities, or serious neglect of duty, if there are strong reasons to believe that the respondent is probably guilty thereof which would warrant his suspension or removal from the service. The preventive suspension shall not be more than sixty days, after which the respondent shall be reinstated to the service without prejudice to the continuation of the case until its final disposition: Provided, however, That if the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence, or petition of the respondent, the period of the delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. The respondent shall be entitled to his salary for the period of suspension upon exoneration." Applied to the case at bar, we find that the procedure prescribed by the Police Act had been complied with. On September 13, 1968, REYES had filed a written complaint (mere "statements" according to SAN PASCUAL) under oath with the POLCOM against Police Chief SAN PASCUAL, for Oppression and Grave Misconduct. This was followed by his Sworn Statement on October 3, 1968 where he was asked by the Investigation Division of the POLCOM to elaborate on the charges he had filed against SAN PASCUAL. POLCOM indorsed the REYES complaint to the Board of Investigators of San Juan, Rizal, on October 12, 1968. An order of suspension was then recommended by the Board to be issued by the Mayor, although that recommendation was recalled by the Board Chairman on October 22, 1968 to enable SAN PASCUAL to answer the complaint. 14 And even if, as alleged, petitioner Mayor had refused to lift his suspension order despite the recall of the recommendation made by the Board of Investigators, he would have been well within his authority to maintain the suspension under section 16 of the Police Act (quoted verbatim above), the Police Chief having been charged with Oppression and Grave Misconduct, offenses specifically included in the said section, and the Mayor presumably having had strong reasons to believe that SAN PASCUAL was probably guilty thereof. Upon these facts, we find inexistent any oppressive exercise of authority by petitioners-officials, which could constitute the basis for the injunctive relief that was granted by respondent Judge. Contrary to the criterion that he followed, the mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined. 15 In providing as it does for preventive suspension of a policeman charged administratively, the Police Act does not thereby, as contended by SAN PASCUAL violate the due process clause. Thus, in Nera vs. Garcia, et al., 16 this Court held: LibLex "Preventive suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. It is not a punishment. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed from office. This is the penalty. For this reason, there is nothing improper in suspending an officer before

the charges against him are heard and before he is given an opportunity to prove his innocence." The Constitution itself allows suspension for cause as provided by law and the law provides that an employee may be suspended pending an investigation, or by way of penalty. 17 Preventive suspension, however, cannot be indefinite, otherwise, it would be equivalent to penalty without finding of guilt. 18 In the case of members of the police force, preventive suspension for not more than sixty days is specifically provided for by section 16 of the Police Act. As early as Cornejo vs. Gabriel, et al., 41 Phil. 188, 195 (1920), this Court, in the words of Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm, had also ruled: "The suspension of an officer pending his trial for misconduct, so as to tie his hands for the time being, seems to be universally accepted as fair, and often necessary. . . . Notice and hearing are not prerequisites to suspension unless required by statute and therefore suspension without such notice does not deprive the officer of property without due process of law. Nor is a suspension wanting in due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the laws because the evidence against the officer is not produced and he is not given an opportunity to confront his accusers and cross-examine the witness." 19 xxx xxx xxx "The holding of the court here was that it is within the power of the legislature to authorize the temporary suspension of a public officer during the pendency of valid proceedings to remove such officer and as an incident to such proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that the constitution has given power to remove such officer only for cause and after a hearing. Notice and hearing are not prerequisites to the suspension of a public officer under a statute which does not provide for such notice and hearing." 20 The reason given is that a public office is not "property" within the meaning of the due process clause. "Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office as 'property.' It is, however, well settled in the United States, that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency. In the case of Taylor vs. Beckman (1899), 178 U.S., 548), Mr. Chief Justice Fuller said that: 'Decisions are numerous to the effect that public offices are mere agencies or trusts, and not property as such.' The basic idea of government in the Philippine Islands, as in the United States, is that of a popular representative government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractural right to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people whom he represents." 21 Of more recent vintage is the ruling of this Court in Manuel vs. Villena 22 as follows: ". . . Section 1838 of the Revised Administrative Code does not require that the investigation be in the nature of a court trial. In deciding administrative questions, administrative bodies or officials generally enjoy wide discretion. Technical rules of procedure are

not strictly enforced, and due process of law in the strict judicial sense is not indispensable. It is sufficient that the substantive due process requirement of fairness and reasonableness be observed. ". . . Absence of previous notice is not of itself a substantial defect; what the law abhors is the lack of opportunity to be heard." Respondent SAN PASCUAL seeks shelter in the case of Libarnes vs. Executive Secretary, 23 which held that 'the Chief of Police of Zamboanga City is a member of our civil service system. 24 Hence, he cannot be "removed or suspended except for cause, as provided by law and after due process." 25 While the principle is valid, that case, however, is not in point because it involved the termination of services of said Chief of Police by the designation of another in his place and constituted an illegal removal. The instant case, on the other hand, refers to an administrative complaint under oath, duly instituted, where the Police Chief was preventively suspended considering the gravity of the charges against him. Moreover, the constitutional provision on removal or suspension except for cause as provided by law gives in to the fundamental postulate that a public office is a public trust. 26 Similarly, while we uphold the ruling in the case of Abaya vs. Villegas 27 that "a civil service employee should be heard before he is condemned", the facts of that case do not support SAN PASCUAL's posture either because that case involved the cancellation of an employee's civil service eligibility where there was no investigation before he was eased out of the service, which is completely different from the factual situation at bar. SAN PASCUAL will have full opportunity to be heard at the administrative investigation to be conducted by the Board of Investigators (if this has not been conducted as yet) and it is only after the latter shall have submitted its findings and recommendations to the POLCOM that this body will render its decision. llcd We come now to the specific consideration of the issue of alleged conflict between the Police Act of 1966 28 and the Decentralization Act of 1967. 29 The Decentralization Act was enacted to grant further autonomous powers to local governments. Section 4 thereof specifically provided, inter alia: xxx xxx xxx "The suspension, removal, transfer and other personnel action on the heads of offices and their other employees in provinces, cities and municipalities shall be subject to the provisions of civil service law, rules and regulations." xxx xxx xxx SAN PASCUAL then pinpoints section 32 of the Civil Service Act of 1952 30 providing that "no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law and after due process." We perceive no inconsistency nor irreconcilability between the two Acts. The provisions of the Police Act of 1966 prescribing a specific procedure for the removal and suspension of members of the local police forces, creating local Boards of Investigators whose findings and recommendations are to be forwarded to the Police Commission, and providing that the decision of said Commission shall be final, 31 have not been repealed nor modified by the Decentralization Act of 1967. The presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of a statute and not against it. 32 Repeals by implication are not favored and when there are two acts on the same subject, effect should be given to both if possible. 33

Another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation gives way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally must be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable. 34 Further, it has been held: "A special and local statute, providing for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or later is manifest, although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." 35 The Police Act of 1966 providing for the procedure of removal and suspension of policeman is the earlier special law. The Decentralization Act of 1967 is the later general law that provides for the procedure and suspension of all civil service employees in the Government. Consequently, the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special (the Police Act) is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general the (the Decentralization Act), one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. 36 In fact, this Court has already explicitly ruled: "The special laws covering specific situations of policemen and employees of the City of Manila, Republic Acts 557 and 409, subsist side-by-side with Republic Act 2260, and are not impliedly repealed by the latter which is a general law." 37 Republic Act No. 657 was the prior enactment to the Police Act of 1966 and was repealed by the latter. The ruling in the aforecited case, therefore, should apply with as much force and vigor to the present suit. It should likewise be observed that the system for the suspension or removal of policeman has invariably been provided for in special provisions or special laws, namely, section 2272, Revised Administrative Code, followed by RA No. 557, and now the Police Act of 1966. They have always been separate and apart from the procedure for civil service personnel, in general, provided for in section 684, etc. of the Revised Administrative Code, and the Civil Service Act of 1959. The two modes of suspension or removal have always been preserved. As then Secretary of Justice Claudio Teehankee, now Associate Justice of this Court, had occasion to opine in his Memorandum for the President, dated December 22, 1967, and with which we fully agree: "In the final analysis, the Decentralization Act does not vest any specific power in the Commissioner of Civil Service in addition to what has been granted by the Civil Service Law. For it is essentially a mere restatement of the rule that the suspension or removal of civil service employees in general 'shall be subject to the provisions of civil service law, rules and regulations.' Under that law, by the terms of Section 16 (i), the power of the Civil Service Commission 'to have final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers and employees in the competitive or classified service . . .' is qualified by the phrase 'except as otherwise provided by law.' As regards members of local police forces, there is such a statute, the Police Act of 1966 which confers such disciplinary power in the Police Commission. WHEREFORE, the Orders dated November 8, 1968 and December 24, 1968, respectively, issued by respondent Judge are nullified and set aside and

the Restraining Order heretofore issued converted into a permanent Writ of Injunction. LibLex SO ORDERED. Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ. concur. Teehankee (Chairman), took no part.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 00 . January 9, 1973.] IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES. SYLLABUS 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; POWERS OF THE SUPREME COURT; COURT OF THE VIEW THAT IT MAY INTEGRATE THE PHILIPPINE BAR IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS POWER UNDER ARTICLE VIII, SEC. 13 OF THE CONSTITUTION TO PROMULGATE RULES CONCERNING THE ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW. — The Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that " the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNIFICATION OF THE BAR, CONSTITUTIONAL; BASIS. — Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional — hinges on the effects of Bar integration of the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTEGRATION OF THE BAR PERFECTLY CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGALLY UNOBJECTIONABLE. — The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippines Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," and, within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM p: On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" — on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule." The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. 4 Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction. In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows: "SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. "SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court. "SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval." The Report of the Commission abounds with arguments on the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time. The following are the pertinent issues: (1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar? (2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional? (3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time? A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus: "Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official national unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the

practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. "The term 'Bar' refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers. "Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Governmental authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court. "Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court. "The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are: "(1) Assist in the administration of justice; "(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning, professional competence, public service and conduct; "(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members; "(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood; "(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information relating thereto; "(6) Encourage and foster legal education; "(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and make reports and recommendations thereon; and "(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively. "Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession to: "(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law; "(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuses of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers; "(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers; "(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence; "(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers; "(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice maintained through influence or position; "(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers; "(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent service; "(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our provinces;

"(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country; "(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules; "(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research; "(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and "(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation." Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional — hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him. The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 44 to 49 of its Report: "Constitutionality of Bar Integration "Judicial Pronouncements. "In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality. "The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning: " — Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law. " — The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court. " — Because the practice of law is a privilege clothed with public interest, it is fair and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities. " — These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there can be no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar. "1. Freedom of Association. "To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate). "Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national

organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. "Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. "Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue, therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of group activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect. "The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the education and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. "Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar. "2. Regulatory Fee. "For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court levies a tax. "A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction. "The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of annual dues. "3. Freedom of Speech. "A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar. "For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech. "Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established. "The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a 'free speech' issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government. "4. Fair to All Lawyers. "Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practicing because although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work,

they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair." To resolve the third and final issue — whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time — requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration. In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar. Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs. It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice. How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the Commission on Bar Integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-committal. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar associations and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposition thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) voted against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time. The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," and, within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively. ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.

EN BANC [Bar Matter No. 491. October 6, 1989.] IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES. SYLLABUS 1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES; NON-POLITICAL IN CHARACTER; OFFICERS, DELEGATES AND GOVERNORS CHOSEN ON THE BASIS OF PROFESSIONAL MERIT AND ABILITY TO SERVE. — A basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and. governors would be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to serve. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATION OF IBP BY-LAWS. — It is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws. The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt — the better for them to corral and entertain the delegates billeted therein; the procurement of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; all these practices made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole election process. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATION OF THE ETHICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION. — The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from "activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be minions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance. The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem. 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ANNULMENT OF IBP ELECTION. — The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the nonpolitical character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS: The IBP elections held on June 3, 1989 should be as they are hereby annulled. 5. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES; IBP BY-LAWS PROVIDING DIRECT ELECTION BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF NATIONAL OFFICERS, REPEALED. — The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates (approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1980 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national officers: (a) the officers of the House of Delegates; (b) the IBP president; and (c) the executive vice-president, are repealed. 6. ID.; FORMER SYSTEM OF HAVING THE IBP PRESIDENT AND EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT ELECTED BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, RESTORED. — The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the

governors of the nine [9] IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive VicePresident to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored. 7. ID.; RIGHT OF AUTOMATIC SUCCESSION BY THE EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT TO THE PRESIDENCY UPON EXPIRATION OF THEIR TWO-YEAR TERM, RESTORED. — At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew. 8. ID.; SPECIAL ELECTIONS FOR THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS IN THE NINE (9) IBP REGIONS WITHIN THREE (3) MONTHS AFTER THE PROMULGATION OF THE RESOLUTION IN THE CASE AT BAR; ORDERED. — Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3) months after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president. In these special elections, the candidates in the election of the national officers held on June 3, 1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any position.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM p: In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC), the following were elected by the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and proclaimed as officers: NAME POSITION Atty. Violeta Drilon President Atty. Bella Tiro Executive Vice-President Atty. Salvador Lao Chairman, House of Delegates Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo Secretary, House of Delegates Atty. Teodoro Quicoy Treasurer, House of Delegates Atty. Oscar Badelles Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Delegates Atty. Justiniano Cortes Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon Atty. Ciriaco Atienza Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon Atty. Mario Jalandoni Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon Atty. Teodoro Almine Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia Atty. Porfirio Siyangco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas Atty. Ricardo Teruel Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas Atty. Gladys Tiongco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao Atty. Simeon Datumanong Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao

The newly-elected officers were set to take their oath of office on July 4, 1989, before the Supreme Court en banc. However, disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities, the Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports. It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be above board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots. What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP. I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. — Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard, Sunday, June 17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin, Jr. in an article, entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8, 1989), and the editorial, entitled "Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989), were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart, soul, money and influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates."

Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a disadvantage because Atty. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations, and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been granted leaves of absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her. Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that government positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary. Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition, mentioned "talk of personnel of the Department of Labor, especially conciliators and employers, notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and comfort to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously, womened, and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes . . ." which allegedly "ranged from P15,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the election, some twelve to twenty votes which were believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000." In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where the convention/election were held) during a recess . . ." Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially reechoed Mauricio's reports with some embellishments. II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE. — Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated June 15, 1989, directed the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of the House of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned reports and to recommend, for the consideration of the Court, appropriate approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to the fundamental principles of the IBP.

In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and. governors would be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to serve." The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in connection with the election of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that there was extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well as expenditure of considerable sums of money by candidates, including vote-buying, direct or indirect." The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel and advice. The meeting between the Court en banc on the one hand, and the outgoing and in-coming IBP officers on the other, was an informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to determine whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national officers. The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Daniel Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording Secretary. A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections. The managers of three five-star hotels — the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they billeted their supporters — were summoned. The officer of the Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge that some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the convention. Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the election of Atty. Drilon. The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia, and Emil Jurado were subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP elections. Their stories were based, they said, on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons who claimed to have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to identify. cdll The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing and assessing evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and the Court, after deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the same. III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS. — Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus: "SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof." Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP elections:

"SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. — The following acts and practices relative to election are prohibited, whether committed by a candidate for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or through another person: (a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material; (b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a statement of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of paper; or causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections; (c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective, judicial, quasijudicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof; (d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as the advertisement thereof; (e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member; (2) giving of food, drink, entertainment, transportation or any article of value, or any similar consideration to any person; or (3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made, offered or promised to any person." Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules: "(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 (Prohibited Acts and Practices relative to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar." At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee, the following violations were established: (1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president, executive vicepresident, the officers of the House of Delegates and Board of Governors. The three candidates for IBP president — Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo — began travelling around the country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July 13, 1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga, and in Baguio City (during the conference of chapter presidents of Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July 3, 1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47) where they announced their candidacies and met the chapter presidents.

Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP chapter officers, soliciting their votes, and securing their written endorsements. He personally hand-carried nomination forms and requested the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP President. He started campaigning and distributing the nomination forms in March 1989 after the chapter elections which determined the membership of the House of Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted photocopies of his nomination forms which read: "Nomination Form I Join in Nominating RAMON M. NISCE as National President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines —————— —————— Chapter Signature"

Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico, Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neri, Roem J. Arbolado, Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano, Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Ernesto A. Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel, Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo, Romualdo A. Din, Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo, Jr., and Manuel S. Pecson. Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the commitments he had obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he obtained only 14 votes in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that some of those who had committed their votes to him were "manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 86-95; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-104). (2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign. — The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show that Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of Environment & Natural Resources (DENR) borrowed a plane from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for Regional Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane manifest (Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of the passengers were IBP candidates. Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that she was informed by Atty. Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3, 1989, pp. 116-118). Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the Drilon ticket, testified that sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of his group to Bicol. He went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While at the DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on an official business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity brother, he asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride on the plane to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to assess their chances in the IBP elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and asked for their support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 5-49). Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her group. He recalled that on May 23, 1989, DENR Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor certain regional development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit the region in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong, Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic Airport bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch with Atty. Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69). (3) Formation of tickets and single slates. — The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed their own slates for the election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989. Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive Vice-President; and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce). The Drilon ticket consisted of: Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice President, Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern Luzon), Acong Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco (Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).

Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano, Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L. Nalapo, Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite, and Oscar V. Badelles. (4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates. Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the convention. He mentioned Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan City to Manila and back. Badelles was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan, h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not in Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon. Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he (Badelles) said that he did not use them, because if he did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he (Badelles) did not want to be committed (t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96). Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2-Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3-Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3Calica). LLpr In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p. 161). (5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to delegates. (a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO — Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the Holiday Inn, which served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three suites were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with breakfast. Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Ernesto C. Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan, Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio Cribe, Juanito Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado, Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy, Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera, Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco Felizmenio, Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo, Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano, James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza, Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven Zach, and Benjamin Padon. Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not 24) rooms, including the presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat. The group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo, the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum of P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms. (b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta signed with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty. Callanta."

Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She suggested that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements with

her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel Martinez's last telephone conversation with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza. Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He made a downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet" showed that the following persons contributed for that down payment: (a) Nilo Peña (Quasha Law Office) P25,000 (b) Antonio Carpio 20,000 (c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office) 10,000 (d) Jay Castro 10,000 (e) Danny Deen 20,000 (f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office) 10,000 (g) Alfonso Reyno 20,000 (h) Cosme Rossel 15,300 (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, pp. 3-4) Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been contributing money every time the IBP embarks on a project. This time, they contributed so that their partners or associates could attend the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention too. Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her delegates at the Philippine Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose name the room she occupied was registered. But she did ask for a room where she could rest during the convention. She admitted, however, that she paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty. Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3, 1989). The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty. Callanta at the Philippine Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto, Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong, Callanta, Peña, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao, Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon, Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula, Array Corot, Dimakuta Corot, Romeo Fortez, Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad, Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza, Felix Macalag, Mariano Benedicto, II, Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta. Atty. Nilo Peña admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior partner, gave P25,000 to Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that some members of his law firm could campaign for the Drilon group (t.s.n. July 5, 1989, pp. 76-78) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention. Most of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of Secretary Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He admitted being sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her slate, two of whom, — Jose Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong — are Sigma Rhoans. They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband being a sigma rhoan. Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members of his own firm who attended the legal aid seminar and the convention. He made the reservation through Atty. Callanta to whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 30-34). Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by soliciting the votes of delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite, his former teacher (but the latter was already committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 22, 29, 39). (c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE. Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 58) on April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45. Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales department manager, credit manager, and reservation manager, respectively of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto, G-Ocampo).

As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those who committed themselves to his candidacy. The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos, Dennis Habanel, B. Batula, John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin, Reymundo P. Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada. (6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government" (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP ByLaws), Mariano E. Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, testified that he took a leave of absence from his office to attend the IBP convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about the significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the husband of Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance there is that the husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho." He cheered up Mrs. Drilon when her spints were low. He talked to her immediate circle which included Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Peña, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They assessed the progress of the campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other groups. The group had sessions as early as the later part of May. Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto toted up a bill of P23,110 during the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls (amounting to P1,356) were recorded as emanating from his room. Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco (candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila). These two rooms served as the "action center" or "war room" where campaign strategies were discussed before and during the convention. It was in these rooms where the supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves. (7) Playing the dues or other indebtedness of any member (Sec. 14[e], IBP By-Laws). Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers who promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued in the name of the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28). She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March, April, May during any election year. This year, the collections increased by P100,000 over that of last year (a non-election year) — from P1,413,425 to P1,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25). (8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws). On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to be distributed his bio-data and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as well as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed their tickets and bio-data. The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They were printed by his own printing shop. (9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws). Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials on the convention floor. Atty. Carpio noted that there were more campaign materials distributed at the convention site this year than in previous years. The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6, 1989, p. 39). Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a candidate for chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket, testified that campaign materials were distributed during the convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law firm campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3, 1989, pp. 142-145).

(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP By-Laws). Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him to withdraw his candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and to run as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July 3, 1989, pp. 137, 149). Atty. Gloria Agunos, personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio and president of the Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of the Department of Labor & Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty. Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala. Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room would be available for her. Atty Paculdo also tried to enlist her support during the chapter presidents' meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July 13, 1989, pp. 43-54). LLphil

Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who had earlier committed his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is admittedly hearsay). When Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied that there was such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo, an IBP candidate who also withdrew. Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to be nominated (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's candidate for Governor became Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104). Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but my wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP chapters informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 111). Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the Western Visayas, expressed his disappointment over the IBP elections because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He testified that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an assistant regional director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to the Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room had been reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, pp. 102-106). Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew that the three candidates had their headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the elections, representatives of Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve, the Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor in Dumaguete City. These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, pp. 101-104). But he declined the offer because he was already committed to Atty. Nisce. Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a businessman, Henry Dy, approached him to convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already committed to Nisce. He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two companions (Atty. Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101). SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED BY THE CANDIDATES Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers.

He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, pp. 9-14). Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses for his campaign which began several months before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for some delegates. The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at convention's end. FINDINGS. — From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly nonpolitical" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws. The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt - the better for them to corral and entertain the delegates billeted therein; the island-hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and bio-data of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied them) in exchange for their support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flip-flop" from one ticket to another for some rumored consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole election process. The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from "activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be minions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance. The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem. The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including some of the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the campaign. CONCLUSIONS. — It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution (Sec. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived

to be inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS: 1. The IBP elections held on June 3, 1989 should be as they are hereby annulled. 2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates (approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1980 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national officers: (a) the officers of the House of Delegates; (b) the IBP president; and (c) the executive vice-president, be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws. 3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [9] IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored. 4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.

5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows: "Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board." 6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows: "(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the House of Delegates." 7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, SecretaryTreasurer and Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed. 8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows: "Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one (1) Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the different Chapters in the region." 9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows: "Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. — At least one (1) month before the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor

for their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region." 10. Section 33(a), Article V hereby is amended by adding the following provision as part of the first paragraph: "No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be held prior to any election in an election year." 11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they are hereby deleted. All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified. 12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3) months after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president. In these special elections, the candidates in the election of the national officers held on June 3, 1989, particularly identified in SubHead 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any position. cdphil 13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises. SO ORDERED

EN BANC [A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC. December 4, 2012.] IN THE MATTER OF THE BREWING CONTROVERSIES IN THE ELECTIONS OF T HE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES. [A.C. No. 8292. December 4, 2012.] ATTYS. MARCIAL M. MAGSINO, MANUEL M. MARAMBA AND NASSER MAROHOMSALIC, complainants, vs. ATTYS. ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, ABELARDO C. ESTRADA, BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., EVERGISTO S. ESCALON AND RAYMUND JORGE A. MERCADO, respondents.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J p:

Subjects of this disposition are the: [1] Resolution Urgently Requesting the Supreme Court to Issue Clarification on the Query of Western Visayas IBP Governor Erwin M. Fortunato Involving the Application of the Rotational Rule in the Forthcoming Elections in his Region 1 (IBP Resolution), filed by the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG); and the [2] Urgent Motion for Clarification with Prayer for Leave of Court to Admit Motion and to Intervene and for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order2 (Urgent Motion) filed by Atty. Marven B. Daquilanea (Atty. Daquilanea), immediate past president of the IBP-Iloilo Chapter. The Court shall likewise act upon the Petition-in-Intervention 3 filed by the IBP-Southern Luzon Region, regarding its qualification to field a candidate for theposition of Executive Vice-President for the 2011-2013 term. Brief Statement of the Antecedents On December 14, 2010, the Court resolved the various controversies persistently pestering the various IBP chapter elections in a resolution, 4 the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves that: 1. The elections of Attys. Manuel M. Maramba, Erwin M. Fortunato and Nasser A. Marohomsalic as Governors for the Greater Manila Region, Western Visayas Region and Western Mindanao Region, respectively, for the term 2009-2011 are UPHELD; 2. A special election to elect the IBP Executive Vice President for the 20092011 term is hereby ORDERED to be held under the supervision of this Court within seven (7) days from receipt of this Resolution with Attys. Maramba, Fortunato and Marohomsalic being allowed to represent and vote as duly-elected Governors of their respective regions; DCATHS 3. Attys. Rogelio Vinluan, Abelardo Estrada, Bonifacio Barandon, Jr., Evergisto Escalon, and Raymund Mercado are all found GUILTY of grave professional misconduct arising from their actuations in connection with the controversies in the elections in the IBP last April 25, 2009 and May 9, 2009 and are hereby disqualified to run as national officers of the IBP in any subsequent election. While their elections as Governors for the term 2007-2009 can no longer be annulled as this has already expired, Atty. Vinluan is declared unfit to hold the position of IBP Executive Vice President for the 2007-2009 term and, therefore, barred from succeeding as IBP President for the 2009-2011 term; 4. The proposed amendments to Sections 31, 33, par. (g), 39, 42, and 43, Article VI and Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws as contained in the Report and Recommendation of the Special Committee dated July 9, 2009 are hereby approved and adopted; and 5. The designation of retired SC Justice Santiago Kapunan as Officer-inCharge of the IBP shall continue, unless earlier revoked by the Court, but not to extend beyond June 30, 2011. SO ORDERED. In the December 14, 2010 Resolution, the Court once again upheld its Resolution in Bar Matter No. 586, dated May 16, 1991, that the "rotation rule" under Sections 37 5 and 39 6 of the IBP By-Laws should be strictly implemented, "so that all prior elections for governor in the region shall be reckoned with or considered indetermining who should be the governor to be selected from the different chapters to represent the region in the Board of Governors." 7 A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied by the Court in its Resolution, dated February 8, 2011. 8 DaScCH On April 15, 2011, Gov. Erwin M. Fortunato (Gov. Fortunato) of IBP-Western Visayas Region wrote a letter 9 to the IBP-BOG seeking confirmation/clarification on whether "Capiz is the only Chapter in the IBP-Western Visayas Region eligible and qualified to run for Governor in the forthcoming election for Governor." 10 As the IBP-BOG was unable to reach a unanimous resolution on the matter, it issued the subject IBP-Resolution, urgently requesting the Court to issue a clarification

on the query of IBP-Western Visayas Region Gov. Fortunato involving the application of the rotational rule for the next regional election. On April 29, 2011, Atty. Daquilanea, the immediate past president of the IBP-Iloilo Chapter, filed the subject Urgent Motion likewise seeking clarification on theapplication of the rotational rule for the election of Governor for IBP-Western Visayas Region for the 2011-2013 term, specifically, whether the IBP-Capiz Chapter would be the only chapter to be allowed to nominate candidates for said election. On May 3, 2011, upon filing of the subject Urgent Motion and the IBP-Resolution, then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona issued a Temporary Restraining Order 11(TRO) suspending the election for Governor of the IBP-Western Visayas Region and directing retired Justice Santiago M. Kapunan (Justice Kapunan), Officer-in-Charge ofthe IBP and Gov. Fortunato of the IBP-Western Visayas Region to file their respective comments thereon. On May 31, 2011, the TRO was confirmed nunc pro tunc by the Court En Banc. 12 On May 17, 2011, the majority of the presidents of the various chapters composing the IBPWestern Visayas Region filed their Respectful Comment-in-Intervention, 13 praying for the lifting of the TRO without prejudice to the resolution on the Urgent Motion. cDCSTA In its Comment, 14 dated June 2, 2011, the IBP-BOG, through Justice Kapunan, presented the view that with the completion of a rotational cycle with the election ofGov. Fortunato representing Romblon, "all chapters are deemed qualified to vie of the governorship for the 20112013 term without prejudice to the chapters entering into a consensus to adopt any pre-ordained sequence in the new rotation cycle provided each chapter will have its turn in the rotation." 15 Like the IBP, Atty. Daquilanea espoused the view that upon the completion of a rotational cycle, elections should be open to all chapters of the region subject tothe exclusionary rule. 16 On June 23, 2011, the IBP-Capiz Chapter filed its Comment-in-Intervention with Motion for Early Resolution, 17 praying for a declaration that it was its turn to serve as Governor for IBPWestern Visayas Region and moving for the early resolution of the controversy. Issues for the Court's Consideration A reading of both the IBP-BOG Resolution and the Urgent Motion discloses that the respective movants are praying that the Court determine whether at the startof a new rotational cycle, nominations for Governor of the IBP-Western Visayas Region are: a] once again open to all chapters subject to the rule on "rotation by exclusion"; or b] limited only to the chapter first in the previous rotation cycle, following the previous sequence or "rotation by pre-ordained sequence." The issue, therefore, in the IBP-Western Visayas Region is whether, after the first cycle, the rotation rule will be the rotation by pre-ordained sequence or rotation by exclusion. The rotation by pre-ordained sequence is effected by the observance of the sequence of the service of the chapters in the first cycle, which is very predictable. The rotation by exclusion is effected by the exclusion of a chapter who had previously served until all chapters have taken their turns to serve. It is not predictable as each chapter will have the chance to vie for the right to serve, but will have no right to a re-election as it is debarred from serving again until the full cycle is completed. EDIHSC As can be gleaned from the records and all pleadings, there is no dispute that the IBP-Western Visayas already completed a full cycle with the election of Gov. Fortunato of Romblon for the 20092011 term. The first governor was Eugene Tan of the IBP Capiz Chapter and, later, all chapters were able to serve as governors. Thus, under the rotation by pre-ordained sequence, only members of the IBP-Capiz Chapter may vie for Governor of the IBP-Western Visayas Region. Under therotation by exclusion, every chapter in IBP-Western Visayas Region may compete again. Resolution of the Court Re: IBP-Western Visayas Region After an assiduous review of the facts, the issues and the arguments raised by the parties involved, the Court finds wisdom in the position of the IBP-BOG, through retired Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, that at the start of a new rotational cycle "all chapters are deemed qualified to vie of the governorship for the 2011-2013 term without prejudice to the chapters entering into a consensus to adopt any pre-ordained sequence in the new rotation cycle provided each chapter will have its turn in therotation." Stated differently, the IBP-BOG recommends the adoption of the rotation

by exclusion scheme. The Court quotes with approval the reasons given by the IBP-BOG on this score: 6. After due deliberation, the Board of Governors agreed and resolved to recommend adherence to the principle of "rotation by exclusion" based on thefollowing reasons: AcSEHT a) Election through 'rotation by exclusion' is the more established rule in the IBP. The rule prescribes that once a member of the chapter is elected as Governor, his chapter would be excluded in the next turn until all have taken their turns in the rotation cycle. Once a full rotation cycle ends and a fresh cycle commences, all the chapters in the region are once again entitled to vie but subject again to the rule on rotation by exclusion. b) Election through a 'rotation by exclusion' allows for a more democratic election process. The rule provides for freedom of choice while upholding theequitable principle of rotation which assures the every member-chapter has its turn in every rotation cycle. c) On the other hand, rotation by pre-ordained sequence, or election based on the same order as the previous cycle, tends to defeat the purpose of an election. The element of choice — which is crucial to a democratic process — is virtually removed. Only one chapter could vie for election at every turn asthe entire sequence, from first to last, is already predetermined by the order in the previous rotation cycle. This concept of rotation by pre-ordained sequence negates freedom of choice, which is the bedrock of any democratic election process. HIAEcT d) The pronouncement of the Special Committee, which the Supreme Court may have adopted in AM No. 09-5-2-SC, involving the application of the rotation rule in the previous election for GMR may not be controlling, not being one of the principal issues raised in the GMR elections. 7. Thus, applying the principle of 'rotation by exclusion' in Western Visayas which starts with a new rotation cycle, all chapters (with the exception of Romblon) are deemed qualified to vie for the Governorship for 2011-2013 term without prejudice to the chapters entering into a consensus to adopt any pre-ordained sequencein the new rotation cycle provided each chapter will have its turn in the rotation. 18 The Court takes notice of the predictability of the rotation by succession scheme. Through the rotation by exclusion scheme, the elections would be more genuine as the opportunity to serve as Governor at any time is once again open to all chapters, unless, of course, a chapter has already served in the new cycle. While predictability is not altogether avoided, as in the case where only one chapter remains in the cycle, still, as previously noted by the Court "the rotation rule should be applied in harmony with, and not in derogation of, the sovereign will of the electorate as expressed through the ballot." 19 Thus, as applied in the IBP-Western Visayas Region, initially, all the chapters shall have the equal opportunity to vie for the position of Governor for the next cycle except Romblon, so as no chapter shall serve consecutively. Every winner shall then be excluded after its term. Romblon then joins the succeeding elections after thefirst winner in the cycle. cSCADE Re: Query by IBP-Southern Luzon On July 27, 2012, the IBP-Southern Luzon Region filed its Petition for Intervention, 20 seeking a declaration that it was qualified to nominate a candidate for theposition of Executive Vice-President for the 2011-2013 term. It argued that since the Court removed its member, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, as IBP Executive Vice-President forthe 2007-2009 term, it should not now be prejudiced and disallowed to vie for the position of Executive Vice-President of the IBP for the 2011-2013 term. To do so would be a violation of the rotational system and the principle of equal rotation among the different regions to lead the IBP.

On September 21, 2012, Gov. Fortunato filed an Ex Abundanti Ad Cautelam Vigorous Opposition/Comment, 21 opposing the position of the IBP-Southern Luzon onthe ground that: 1] in its December 14, 2010 Resolution, the Court found that it was only the IBPWestern Visayas chapter and the IBP-Eastern Mindanao chapter that had yet to have their turns as Executive Vice-President. Since IBP-Eastern Mindanao, through now IBP President Roan I. Libarios, was elected as the Executive VicePresident, it is only IBP-Western Visayas which is the only region qualified to file a candidate for the 2011-2013 term; 2] Section 2, Rule 21 of the Rules of Court before the rendition of judgment; and

allows

for

intervention

only

3] Atty. Vinluan was actually able to serve his 2007-2009 term as Executive Vice President even if he was later on disqualified by the Court in December 14, 2010 Resolution. To allow IBP-Southern Luzon to vie for the position of Executive Vice President of the IBP for the 2011-2013 term would allow said chapter to serve twice as Executive Vice President since Atty. Raul R. Angangco of IBP Southern Luzon had already served as Executive Vice President for the 1995-1997 term. The Court finds merit in the contentions of both parties, and thus believes that the IBP-BOG should be given its say on the matter pursuant to the dictates of due process. ScTIAH WHEREFORE, the Court hereby holds that in the IBP-Western Visayas Region, the rotation by exclusion shall be adopted such that, initially, all chapters of theregion shall have the equal opportunity to vie for the position of Governor for the next cycle except Romblon. The Temporary Restraining Order dated May 3, 2011 is hereby lifted and the IBP-Western Visayas Region is hereby ordered to proceed with its election ofGovernor for the 2011-2013 term pursuant to the rotation by exclusion rule. The IBP Board of Governors is hereby ordered to file its comment on the Petition for Intervention of IBP-Southern Luzon, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. SO ORDERED. ||| (Magsino v. Vinluan, A.M. Nos. 09-5-2-SC & 8292 (Resolution), [December 4, 2012], 700 PHIL 109-119)

SECOND DIVISION [Adm. Case No. 3910. August 14, 2000.] JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO DUCUSIN, respondents. Castillo, Salazar, Lazaro, Tuazon and Associates for complainant. SYNOPSIS Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr., the registered owner of the subject property, filed an ejectment case against respondent, their family counsel, who hired workers to construct a piggery in the subject property of complainant. Respondent, however, claimed that the subject property had been sold to him orally. Subsequently, he alleged that subject property was given to him by the father of complainant (Jose Ducat, Sr.), for past legal services. HIaTCc The IBP found Atty. Villalon guilty of Gross Misconduct and suspended him from law practice for two (2) years. Upholding the decision on appeal, the Court held that the acts of respondent lawyer constitute gross misconduct, because: respondent is presumed to know that transfer of any titled real property

must be in writing; when the transfer was first reduced in writing in October, 1991, respondent knew it was Jose Ducat, Sr. who signed said document of sale without any special power of attorney from the registered owner thereof, Jose Ducat, Jr.; and as regards the subsequent Deed of Sale dated December 5, 1991 covering the same property, respondent admitted that there was in fact no consideration for the conveyance. The Supreme Court suspended Atty. Villalon, Jr. from the practice of law for one year because the record did not show that he had any direct participation in the notarization of the questionable deed of sale. The Court enjoins lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of their practice of law. SYLLABUS 1. LEGAL ETHICS; CANON 7 OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; DUTY OF LAWYERS TO UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION. — The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession." The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession. HaEcAC 2. ID.; ID.; GROSS MISCONDUCT; ACTS COMPLAINED OF CONSTITUTE GROSS MISCONDUCT IN CASE AT BAR. — It has been established that the subject parcel of land, with an area of five (5) hectares located in Barrio Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal, is owned by and registered in the name of complainant herein, Jose Ducat, Jr. Respondent Villalon insists nonetheless that the property was orally given to him by complainant's father, Jose Ducat, Sr., allegedly with the complete son, Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law, however, that conveyance or transfer of any titled real property must be in writing, signed by the registered owner or at least by his attorney-in-fact by virtue of a proper special power of attorney and duly notarized. Respondent Villalon, as a lawyer, is presumed to know, or ought to know, this process. Worse, when the transfer was first reduced in writing in October, 1991 per Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land, purportedly in favor of "Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr.," respondent Villalon knew that it was Jose Ducat, Sr. who signed the said document of sale without any Special Power of Attorney from the registered owner thereof, JoseDucat, Jr.; and that Jose Ducat, Sr. also signed it for his wife, Maria Cabrido, under the word "Conforme." As regards the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991, covering the same property, this time purportedly in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. only, respondent Villalon admitted that there was in fact no payment of P450,000.00 and that the said amount was placed in that document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a consideration. All these taken together, coupled with complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.'s strong and credible denial that he allegedly sold the subject property to respondent Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. and that he allegedly appeared before respondent notary public Ducusin, convince us that respondent Villalon's acts herein complained of which constitute gross misconduct were duly proven. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ONE-YEAR SUSPENSION PROPER IN CASE AT BAR. — Unlike the circumstances prevailing in the said case of Aportadera, the record does not show that respondent Villalon had any direct participation in the notarization by respondent notary public Crispulo Ducusin of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991, which was supposedly signed by complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. who, however, strongly denied having signed the same. The earlier Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land dated "this ___ day of October 1991," allegedly signed by Jose S. Ducat, Sr., as vendor, covering the same property, in favor of respondent "Arsenio S.Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr." was not notarized. The record also shows that Jose Ducat, Sr. and complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. are father and son and that they live in the same house at 912 Leo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. It is not also disputed that respondent Villalon has been the lawyer for a number of years of the family of JoseDucat, Sr. TADaCH

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J p: Before us is a verified letter-complaint 1 for disbarment against Attys. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr., Andres Canares, Jr. and Crispulo Ducusin for deceit and gross misconduct in violation of the lawyer's oath. Investigation proceeded only against respondent Villalon because it was discovered that Andres Canares was not a lawyer while Atty. Crispulo Ducusin passed away on February 3, 1996. 2 In the letter-complaint, 3 complainant alleged that on October 29, 1991, respondent Villalon, as counsel for the family of complainant, spoke to the father ofcomplainant and asked that he be given the title over a property owned by complainant located in Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal and covered by TCT No. M-3023, Emancipation Patent No. 410414, because he allegedly had to verify the proper measurements of the subject property. Sometime in November, 1991, however,complainant and his family were surprised when several people entered the subject property and, when confronted by the companions of complainant, the latter were told that they were workers of Canares and were there to construct a piggery. Complainant complained to the barangay authorities in Pinugay and narrated the incident but respondent Canares did not appear before it and continued with the construction of the piggery in the presence of armed men who were watching over the construction. Complainant then went to respondent Villalon to complain about the people of respondent Canares but nothing was done. Complainant then filed a case for ejectment against respondent Canares. In his Reply however, the latter answered that the subject property was already sold bycomplainant to respondent Canares in the amount of P450,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991 and notarized by respondent Atty. Crispulo Ducusin. Complainant, however, averred that he never sold the property, signed any document nor received any money therefor, and he also denied having appeared before respondent Ducusin who was the notary public for the Deed of Absolute Sale. Complainant discovered that respondent Villalon claimed that complainant's father allegedly gave the subject property to him (respondent Villalon) as evidenced by a document of sale purportedly signed by complainant. In his Comment, 4 respondent Villalon denied that allegations of the complainant and in turn, he alleged that the property was given voluntarily by Jose Ducat, Sr. to him out of close intimacy and for past legal services rendered. Thereafter, respondent Villalon, with the knowledge and consent of Jose Ducat, Sr., allowed the subject property to be used by Andres Canares to start a piggery business without any monetary consideration. A Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land was then signed by Jose Ducat, Sr. to evidence that he has conveyed the subject property to respondent Villalon with the name of respondent Canares included therein as protection because of the improvements to be introduced in the subject property. Upon presenting the title covering the subject property, it was discovered that the property was registered in the name of Jose Ducat, Jr. and not Jose Ducat, Sr., but the latter told respondents Villalon and Canares not to worry because the land was actually owned by him and that he merely placed the name of his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. Jose Ducat, Sr. then suggested that the subject property be transferred directly from Jose Ducat, Jr. to respondent Canares; hence, he (Ducat, Sr.) got the title and guaranteed that he would return the document already signed and notarized, which he did the following day. According to respondent Canares, the trouble began when Jose Ducat, Sr. came to his office demanding to know why he was not allowed to cut the trees inside the subject property by the caretaker of respondent Canares. DACTSa On January 21, 1993, Jose Ducat, Jr. wrote 5 to this Court and averred that he neither signed the Deed of Sale covering the subject property nor did he appear before the notary public Crispulo Ducusin, who notarized the same. He averred that respondents Villalon and Ducusin should be disbarred from the practice of law and respondent Villalon be imprisoned for forging his signature and selling the subject property without his consent. In his Rejoinder, 6 respondent Villalon denied the allegations of complainant and maintained that he is a member of good standing of the Integrated Bar and that he has always preserved the high standards of the legal profession. Respondent Villalon expressed his willingness to have the Deed of Sale examined by the National Bureau of Investigation and reiterated that the subject property was orally given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. and it was only in October, 1991 that the conveyance was reduced in writing. He added that the complainant knew that his father, Jose Ducat, Sr., was the

person who signed the said document for and in his behalf and that this was done with his consent and knowledge. This Court referred 7 the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and approving the report and recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner who found respondent Atty. Villalon guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years and likewise directed respondent Atty. Villalon to deliver to the complainant his TCT No. M-3023 within ten (10) days from receipt of notice, otherwise, this will result in his disbarment. The findings of IBP Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez are as follows: Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner. The sincerity and demeanor they displayed while testifying before the Commission inspire belief as to the truth of what they are saying. More importantly, respondent failed to impute any ill-motive on the part of thecomplainant and his witness which can impel them to institute the instant complaint and testify falsely against him. To be sure, the testimony of the complainant and his witness deserves the Commission's full faith and credence. Respondent's evidence, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. His defense (that he considered himself the owner of the subject property which was allegedly given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow in the face of a welter of contravening and incontrovertible facts. FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. Accordingly, respondent (being a lawyer) knew or ought to know that Jose Ducat, Sr. could not possibly give to him the said property unless the former is duly authorized by the complainant through a Special Power of Attorney. No such authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having given the subject property to the respondent. This denial is not too difficult to believe considering the fact that he (Jose Ducat, Sr.) is not the owner of said property. SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that conveyance of a real property, whether gratuitously or for a consideration, must be in writing. Accordingly, it is unbelievable that he would consider himself the owner of the subject property on the basis of the verbal or oral "giving" of the property by Jose Ducat, Sr. no matter how many times the latter may have said that. THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. "1" for the respondent and Exh. "A-2" for the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Sr. in favor of respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. covering the subject parcel of land which respondent prepared allegedly upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr. is of dubious character. As earlier adverted to, Jose Ducat, Sr. is not the owner of said property. Moreover, said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land is a falsified document as admitted by the respondent himself when he said that the signature over the typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.) was affixed by Jose Ducat, Sr. Being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that the act of Jose Ducat, Sr. in affixing his wife's signature is tantamount to a forgery. Accordingly, he should have treated the said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land has (sic) a mere scrap of worthless paper instead of relying on the same to substantiate his claim that the subject property was given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. Again, of note is the fact that Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having executed said document which denial is not too difficult to believe in the light of the circumstances already mentioned. FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property (Exh. "2" for the respondent and Exh. "A-3" for the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Jr. in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. over the subject property (which respondent claims he prepared upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr.) is likewise of questionable character.Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied having executed said document. He claims that he has never sold said property to Andres Canares, Jr. whom he does not know; that he has never appeared before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin to subscribe to the document; and that he has never received the amount of

P450,000.00 representing the consideration of said transaction. More importantly, the infirmity of the said Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property was supplied by the respondent no less when he admitted that there was no payment of P450,000.00 and that the same was placed in the document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a consideration. Accordingly, and being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know the irregularity of his act and that he should have treated the document as another scrap of worthless paper instead of utilizing the same to substantiate his defense. 8 After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, it appears that the findings of facts and observations of the Investigating Commissioner, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which were all adopted by its Board of Governors, are well-taken, the same being supported by the evidence adduced. The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. 9 Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession." The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession. 10 It has been established that the subject parcel of land, with an area of five (5) hectares located in Barrio Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal, is owned by and registered in the name of complainant herein, Jose Ducat, Jr. Respondent Villalon insists nonetheless that the property was orally given to him by complainant's father, Jose Ducat, Sr., allegedly with the complete knowledge of the fact that the subject property belonged to his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law, however, that conveyance or transfer of any titled real property must be in writing, signed by the registered owner or at least by his attorney-in-fact by virtue of a proper special power of attorney and duly notarized. Respondent Villalon, as a lawyer, is presumed to know, or ought to know, this process. Worse, when the transfer was first reduced in writing in October, 1991 per Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land, 11 purportedly in favor of "Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr.," respondent Villalon knew that it was Jose Ducat, Sr. who signed the said document of sale without any Special Power of Attorney from the registered owner thereof, Jose Ducat, Jr.; and that Jose Ducat, Sr. also signed it for his wife, Maria Cabrido, under the word "Conforme". As regards the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991, covering the same property, this time purportedly in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. only, respondent Villalon admitted that there was in fact no payment of P450,000.00 and that the said amount was placed in that document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a consideration. All these taken together, coupled with complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.'s strong and credible denial that he allegedly sold the subject property to respondent Villalonand/or Andres Canares, Jr. and that he allegedly appeared before respondent notary public Ducusin, convince us that respondent Villalon's acts herein complained of which constitute gross misconduct were duly proven. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the Bar are expected to always live up to the standards of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility inasmuch as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. 12 We find, however, the IBP's recommended penalty of two (2) years suspension to be imposed upon respondent Atty. Villalon too severe in the light of the facts obtaining in the case at bar. In Cesar V. Roces vs. Atty. Jose G. Aportadera, 13 this Court suspended therein respondent Atty. Aportadera for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law for two main reasons: (i) His dubious involvement in the preparation and notarization of the falsified sale of his client's property merits the penalty of suspension imposed on him by the IBP Board of Governors; and (ii) The NBI investigation reveals that: (1) respondent misrepresented himself to Gregorio Licuanan as being duly authorized by Isabel Roces to sell her

property; (2) it was respondent who prepared the various deeds of sale over Isabel's subdivision lots; (3) Isabel was already confined at a hospital in Metro Manila on January 4, 1980, the deed's date of execution; (4) respondent knew that Isabel was hospitalized in Metro Manila when he subscribed the deed; (5) he knew that Isabel died in Metro Manila soon after her confinement; and (6) he did not give the seller a copy of the questioned deed of sale. 14 Unlike the circumstances prevailing in the said case of Aportadera, the record does not show that respondent Villalon had any direct participation in the notarization by respondent notary public Crispulo Ducusin of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991, 15 which was supposedly signed bycomplainant Jose Ducat, Jr. who, however, strongly denied having signed the same. The earlier Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land dated "this ___ day of October 1991," allegedly signed by Jose S. Ducat, Sr., as vendor, covering the same property, in favor of respondent "Arsenio S. Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr." was not notarized. The record also shows that Jose Ducat, Sr. and complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. are father and son and that they live in the same house at 912 Leo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. It is not also disputed that respondent Villalon has been the lawyer for a number of years of the family of Jose Ducat, Sr. WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct, and he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent Villalon is further directed to deliver to the registered owner, complainant Jose Ducat Jr., the latter's TCT No. M-3023 covering the subject property within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, at his sole expense; and that failure on his part to do so will result in his disbarment. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Villalon's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. ECISAD SO ORDERE ||| (Ducat, Jr. v. Villalon, Jr., Adm. Case No. 3910, [August 14, 2000], 392 PHIL 394-405)

EN BANC [G.R. Nos. L-10236-48. January 31, 1958.] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EUSTACIO DE LUNA, ET AL., defendants-appellees. Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Felicisimo R. Rosete for appellant. Luis F. Gabinete for appellee Eustacio de Luna. Pedro B. Ayuda for appellee Estela R. Gordo. Alejandro P. Capítulo for appellees Angelo T. Lopez and Alawadin I. Bandon. Francisco de la Fuente for appellee Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez. Bienvenido Peralta for appellee Abraham C. Calaguas. Santos L. Parina, Generosa H. Hubilla, Maria Velez y Estrellas, Jaime P. Marco, Roque J. Briones, Balbino P. Fajardo and Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr., in their own behalf. SYLLABUS 1. BAR FLUNKERS; OATH AS LAWYERS BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC CONSTITUTES CONTEMPT OF COURT. — Although know that they did not pass the bar examination. Although they sought admission to the Bar under the Bar Flunkers Act, they were subsequently notified of the resolution of the Supreme Court denying their petitions. This notwithstanding, they took their oaths as lawyers before a notary public and formally advised the Court, not only of such fact, but,

also that they will practice in all courts of the Philippines. Held: The oath as lawyer is a prerequisite to the practice of law and may taken only before the Supreme Court by those authorized by the latter to engage in such practice. The resolution of the Supreme Court denying appellees' petition for admission to the Bar implied, necessarily, a denial of the right to take said oath, as well as prohibition of the taking thereof. By taking oaths before a notary public, appellees expressed clearly their intent to, and did, in fact, challenge and defy the authority of the Supreme Court to pass upon and settle, in a final and conclusive manner, the issue whether or not they should be admitted to the bar, as well as, embarrass, hinder and obstruct the administration of justice and impair the respect due to the courts of justice and the Supreme Court, in particular, in violation of section 3, subdivision (b) of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Such acts, therefore, constitute contempt of court. 2. CONTEMPT OF COURT; MEANS BY WHICH CONTEMPT MAY BE COMMITTED: "HOLDING OUT TO THE PUBLIC AS ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW"; CASE AT BAR. — The lower court is, seemingly, under the impression that appellees could not be guilty of contempt of court unless they actually engaged in the practice of law or "held out to the public" as lawyers "by means of circulars." Such view is inaccurate, for "assuming to be an attorney . . . and acting as such without authority," is, only one of the means by which contempt of court may be contempt of court may be committed, under said Rule 64, section 3, of the Rules of Court. Besides by taking "the oath of office 3, of the Rules of Court. Besides by taking "the oath of office as attorney-at-law" and notifying the Supreme Court that they had done so and would "practice law in all courts of the Philippines that they had done so and would "practice law in all courts of the Philippines", the appellees had, for all intents and purposes, held out to the public" as such attorney-at-law (U.S. vs. Ney and Bosque, 8 Phil. 146). 3. id.; id.; jurisdiction OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE TO TRY AND PUNISH THE CONTEMPTS AT BAR. — If the contemptuous acts were committed not against the Court of First Instance where the amended informations for contempts were filed, but against the Supreme Court, does the former court have jurisdiction to try and punish said contempts? In the first place, according to said information, the act charged were committed in contempt of the Supreme Court, as well as of all other courts of the Philippines, including the Court of First Instance of Manila. In the second place, pursuant to Section 44 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, courts instance have original jurisdiction over criminal cases, in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two thousand pesos. Inasmuch as a fine not exceeding P1,000 may be imposed in the cases of contempt under consideration, it follows that the same is within the original jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the Supreme Court, in view of the inherent power of the latter to punish those guilty of contempt against the same. 4. ID.; ID.; CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF LOWER COURT AND SUPREME COURT; COURT AGAINST WHOM THE ACT WAS COMMITTED HAS PREFERENTIAL RIGHT. — In the vent of concurrent jurisdiction over the cases of contempt of court, the court against whom the act of contempt was committed has the preferential right to try and punish the guilty party. However, the court concerned (the Supreme Court in the present case) may elect not to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over the acts of contempt in question, as it did in the present case, when the said court referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for investigation and appropriate action. In such a case the Court of First Instance of Manila may not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction over the case.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, J p: This is an appeal, taken by the prosecution, from an order, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, granting a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant in each one of the above entitled cases, for lack of jurisdiction and, also, upon the ground that the facts alleged in the amended informations, filed in said cases, do not constitute the crime of contempt of court with which said defendants (Eustacio de Luna, Jaime P. Marco, Santos L. Pariña, Estela R. Gordo, Angelo T. Lopez, Generosa H. Hubilla, Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez, Abraham C. Calaguas, Roque J. Briones, Alawadin I. Bandon, Balbino P. Fajardo, Maria Velez y Estrellas and Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr.) are charged. It is alleged in said amended informations that, on or about the 22nd day of December, 1954, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the person accused in each one of these cases

". . . well knowing that he has not passed the bar examination and was not in any way authorized to take his oath as a lawyer and after having been duly informed and notified that certain portions of Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, are unconstitutional and therefore void and without force and effect, and that all the petitions of the candidates including the accused who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952, inclusive, for admission to the bar were refused and denied by the Resolution of the Honorable, the Supreme Court, promulgated on March 18, 1954, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and contemptuously disobey and resist in an insolent and defiant manner the said Resolution of the Supreme Court directed to him and each and everyone of the petitioners, and perform acts constituting improper conduct and manifestations that tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in all courts of the Philippines and impair the respect to and attack the authority and dignity of the Honorable, the Supreme Court and all other inferior courts by then and there, without being lawfully authorized to do so, taking an oath as a lawyer before a notary public and making manifestations to that effect before the Honorable, the Supreme Court." After quoting from Rule 64, section 4, of the Rules of Court, the pertinent part of which reads: "Where the contempt . . . has been committed against a superior court or judge, or against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such superior court . . . ." (Italics our.) and from the Corpus Juris Secundum, the rule to the effect that "It is a well-established rule that the power to judge a contempt rest exlusively with the court contemned and that no court is authorized to punish a contempt against another. Accordingly, disobedience of the order of a state court is not punishable as for contempt by a court of another state or by a federal court." the lower court concluded that the contemptuous act allegedly committed by appellees herein "was committed not against" said court "but against the Supreme Court of the Philippines" and that, accordingly, the Court of First Instance of Manila "has no jurisdiction to try and punish" the appellees herein. This conclusion is untenable. The above-quoted provision of the Rules of Court is permissive in nature. It is merely declaratory of the inherent power of courts to punish those guilty of contempt against the same. It does not declare that jurisdiction of the court concerned to so punish the guilty party is exclusive. Indeed, in promulgating said Rules of Court, this Court could not have validly denied to other Courts, to which the jurisdiction may have been vested by statute, the right to exercise said authority, for the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, under Article VIII, section 13, of the Constitution, is limited to the promulgation of "rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," and does not extend to the determination of the jurisdiction of the courts of justice in the Philippines. In fact, section 2 of said Article VIII of the Constitution explicitly ordains that "Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts," thereby implying, necessarily, that such power is withheld from the Supreme Court. Needless to say, the aforesaid view, quoted from Corpus Juris Secundum, is good law only "unless otherwise provided by statute" (17 C.J.S., 81), and such statute, providing "otherwise", exists in the Philippines. Moreover, the amended informations specifically allege that the defendants herein did "perform acts constituting improper conduct and manifestations that tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in all courts of the Philippines and impair the respect to and attack the authority and dignity of the Honorable, the Supreme Court and all other inferior courts." To put it differently the acts charged were committed, according to said amended informations, in contempt of the Supreme Court, as well as of "all other courts of the Philippines," including the Court of First Instance of Manila. Thus, the very authorities cited in the order appealed from do not justify the same. Again, section 236 of Act No. 190 and section 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court provide that a person guilty of any of the acts of contempt defined, respectively, in section 232 of said Act and section 3 of said Rule 64, "may be fined not exceeding one thousand pesos, or imprisoned not more than six months." Pursuant to section 44 of the Revised Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296), courts of first instance have original jurisdiction over criminal cases "in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two

thousand pesos." Inasmuch as a fine not exceeding P1,000 may be imposed in the cases of contempt under consideration, it follows that the same are within the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila, although such jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the Supreme Court, in view of the inherent power of the latter to punish those guilty of contempt against the same. It may not be amiss to add that, in the event of such concurrent jurisdiction over cases of contempt of court, it would be a good practice to acknowledge the preferential right of the court against which the act of contempt was committed to try and punish the guilty party. However, insofar as appellees herein are concerned, on February 3, 1955, this Court passed and promulgated a resolution of the following tenor: "The Court received from Pedro B. Ayuda a communication of the following tenor: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SUPREME COURT MANILA "IN-RE ATTORNEYS WHO TOOK THE OATH BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT No. 972. "Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez "Pedro B. Ayuda "Alawadin I. Bandon "Abraham C. Calaguas "Balbino P. Fajardo "Claro C. Gofredo "Estela R. Gordo "Generoso H. Hubilla "Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr. "Angelo T. Lopez "Eustacio de Luna "Jaime P. Marco "Santos L. Pariña "Florencio P. Sugarol, and "Maria Velez y Estrellas. Attorneys. xxx xxx xxx "MANIFESTATION "COMES NOW the undersigned for and in representation of the above-named attorneys and to this Honorable Court, hereby respectfully makes manifestation that they have taken the oath of office as Attorneys-at-Law on December 22, 1954 before Mr. Anatolio A. Alcova, a Notary Public in and for the City of Manila, with office at R201 Regina Building, Escolta, Manila, in pursuance of the provisions of Republic Act No. 972; "There are attached to this manifestation seventeen (17) copies of the oath of office as Annexes 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F', 'G', 'H', 'I', 'K', 'L', 'M', 'N', 'O', 'P', and 'Q'. "Messrs, Alejandro P. Capitulo, Claro C. Gofredo, and Florencio P. Sugarol of the group took the bar examinations in August, 1954. They also had taken their oath before this Honorable Tribunal, January 20, 1955. "This manifestation is made for all legal effects as they will practice law in all the Courts of the Philippines. "Manila, Philippines, January 28, 1955. (Sgd.) PEDRO B. AYUDA In his own behalf and on behalf of the others in his capacity as president of the 1946 - 1952 BAR EXAMINEES ASSOCIATION, 2034 Azcarraga, Manila. "It appearing that the persons mentioned, except Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol, have not passed the Bar Examinations, it was resolved: "A. To refer the matter to the Fiscal, City of Manila for investigation and appropriate action in connection with Section 3 (e), Rule 64;

"B. As Pedro Ayuda has assumed to be an attorney without authority, he is given 10 days from notice hereof, within which to explain why he should not be dealt with for contempt of this Court; "C. The notary public Anatolio A. Alcoba, member of the Bar, who has illegally administered the oath to the said persons in disregard of this Court's resolution denying them admission to the Bar (except Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol), is hereby given ten days to show cause why he should not be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law; "D. The clerk of Court is directed to furnish copy of this resolution to the Court of Appeals and to all courts of first instance, the Court of Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission, and the Department of Justice; "E. As to Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol, proper action will be taken later in their respective cases." (pp. 36-37, rec., G. R. No. L- 10245.) It is clear, from the foregoing resolution, that this Court did not intend to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over the acts of alleged contempt committed by appellees herein and that we preferred that the corresponding action be taken by the City Fiscal of Manila in the Court of First Instance of Manila. In fine, the latter had no justification whatsoever in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction over the cases at bar. The next question for determination is whether the acts charged in the amended informations constitute contempt of court. After quoting the allegation of said amended informations to the effect that the defendant in each one of the instant cases ". . . did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and contamptuously disobey and resist in an insolent and defiant manner the said Resolution of the Supreme Court directed to him, and each and everyone of the petitioners and perform acts constituting improper conduct and manifestations that tend directly and indirectly to impede obstruct or degrade the administration of justice . . ." the lower court had the following to say: "From this allegation, there is no hint whatsoever that any command, order or notification from the judicial court or any non- judicial person, committee or body clothed by law with power to punish for contempt has been disobeyed or violated by the herein accused. Moreover, there is nothing shown in the resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court of March 18, 1974 directing the accused not to take their oath as lawyers. The mere fact of taking an oath by any person as a lawyer does not make him automatically a lawyer without having completed the requirements prescribed by the Supreme Court for the admission to the practice of law. It is necessary before his admission to the Bar that he passes the required bar examinations and is admitted by the Supreme Court to practice law as attorney. Our statutes punish as criminal contempt one 'assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as such without authority.' (par. F. Rule 64, Rules of Court.) The mere taking of oath as lawyers by herein accused, in the humble opinion of this Court, is not tantamount to practice law. However, if this had taken one step further, as for example, after taking their oaths, they have held out themselves as lawyers to the public, received cases for litigants, appeared before any court of justice personally or by filing pleadings therewith, would be considered that they are really engaged in the practice of law. These accused have not committed any of these acts as enunciated by our Supreme Tribunal in the case of Bosque and Ney, 8 Phil., 146, nor have they disobeyed or defied any command, order or notification of this Court or of the Honorable Supreme Court. What they have done only was the taking of their oath as lawyers before a notary public who was not authorized by law to take their oath as lawyers, as the latter can only aware as such before the Supreme Court or any member thereof. "Pursuant to the above stated reasons, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that no criminal contempt has been committed by the herein accused before this Court and neither before the highest Tribunal of this land." The aforementioned quotation from the amended informations is, however, incomplete. It did not include the allegation to the effect that the defendant in each one of the cases at bar took his "oath as a lawyer before a notary public" and filed the manifestation transcribed in the resolution above quoted,

"well knowing that he has not passed the bar examination and was not in any way authorized to take his oath as a lawyer and after having been duly informed and notified that certain portions of Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, are unconstitutional and therefore void and without force and effect, and that all the petitions of the candidates including the accused who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952, inclusive, for admission to the bar were refused and denied by the resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court, on March 18, 1954, . . .." In other words, appellees knew that they did not pass the bar examination. Although they, likewise, sought admission to the Bar under the provisions ofRepublic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, they were subsequently notified of the resolution of this Court denying said petition. Inasmuch as the oath as lawyer is a prerequisite to the practice of law and may be taken only, before the Supreme Court, by those authorized by the latter to engage in such practice, the resolution denying the aforementioned petition of appellees herein, implied, necessarily, a denial of the right to take said oath, as well as a prohibition of or injunction against the taking thereof. When, this notwithstanding, appellees took the oath before a notary public, and formally advised this Court, not only of such fact, but also, that "they will practice in all the courts of the Philippines," they, accordingly, disobeyed the order implied, and resisted the injunction implicit, in said resolution, thus violating section 232 of Act No. 190, which declares in part: "A person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished as for contempt: "1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge." and section 3, subdivision (b), Rule 64, of the Rules of Court, which is identical. This case is, in principle, analogous to that of U.S. vs. Ney and Bosque (8 Phil., 146), which involved two lawyers, an American, C.W. Ney, and a Spaniard, Juan Garcia Bosque, who sent out a circular, signed "Ney and Bosque", stating that they had established an office for the general practice of law in all courts of the Islands and that Bosque would devote himself especially to consultation and office work relating to Spanish Law. Accused of contempt of court, both were convicted as charged, although upon different grounds. As regards the Spaniard, it was held that a former order of this Court denying his admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, on account of alienage, "was directly binding upon him;" that the aforementioned circular "amounted to an assertation of his right and purpose" to engage in such practice of law; and that "consequently the conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order made in a proceeding to which he was a party." As regards Ney, he was found guilty of "misbehaviour" committed by "an officer of the court." Likewise, by their aforementioned acts, as set forth in the amended informations, appellees herein expressed clearly their intent to, and did, in fact, challenged and defy the authority of this Court to pass upon and settle, in a final and conclusive manner, the issue whether or not they should be admitted to the bar, as well as, embarrass, hinder and obstruct the administration of justice and impair the respect due to the courts of justice in general, and the Supreme Court, in particular. Thus, they performed acts constituting an "improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice," in violation of section 3, subdivision (b) of said Rule 64. ". . . Acts which bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend its dignity, affront its majesty, or challenge its authority constitute contempt of court.". . .. (12 Am. Jur. 395.) The lower court is, seemingly, under the impression that appellees could not be guilty of contempt of court unless they actually engaged in the practice of law or "held out to the public" as lawyers "by means of circulars." Such view is inaccurate, for "assuming to be an attorney . . . and acting as such without authority," is, only one of the means by which contempt of court may be committed, under said Rule 64, section 3, of the Rules of Court. At any rate, by taking "the oath of office as attorney-at-law" and notifying the Supreme Court that they had done so and would "practice law in all courts of the Philippines", the appellees had, for all intents and purposes, "held out to the public" as such attorneys-at-law (U.S. vs. Ney and Bosque, supra). Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed, and let the records of these cases be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision. It is so ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur. ||| (People v. De Luna, G.R. Nos. L-10236-48, [January 31, 1958], 102 PHIL 968-979)

EN BANC [A.C. No. 244 . March 29, 1963.] IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO, vs. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner. SYLLABUS 1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; ADMISSION TO BAR OBTAINED UNDER PRETENSES. — Admission to the Bar obtained under false pretenses must be revoked.

FALSE

2. ID.; REQUISITES TO BECOME ATTORNEY-AT-LAW. — Before the study of law, an applicant for admission to the Bar must have

DECISION

BENGZON, J p: After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar. About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor-General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially in the following particulars: (a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and (b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education". Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge; but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of U. S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school. We have serious doubts about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school official. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records. This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano

University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948- 1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education." (italics on "previous") Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examination is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential. The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered. Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concu ||| (Diao v. Martinez, A.C. No. 244, [March 29, 1963], 117 PHIL 490-492)

EN BANC [A.M. No. 1270-RET. August 31, 1981.] RE: RETIREMENT BENEFITS OF THE LATE CITY JUDGE ALEJANDRO GALANG, JR. SYNOPSIS The widow of the late Judge Alejandro Galang, Jr. who died of "Metatastic Retroperitorial Angiosarcoma" whose application for retirement benefits underRepublic Act No. 910, as amended, was approved by this Court for the payment of a five-year lump sum, filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of this Court dated February 14, 1980, denying the payment of ten-year lump sum retirement benefits to the surviving legal heirs of said Judge as approved by the Government Service Insurance System. The motion was based on the grounds among others, that the opinion of the Government Service Insurance System should be accorded strong persuasive effect and out of humanitarian considerations. The Supreme Court ruled that the total period of government service of the late Judge Galang is only thirteen (13) years, one (1) month and fourteen (14) days, which falls short of the 20 years required by Section 3 in relation to Section 1 of Republic Act 910 as amended; hence, the case falls instead under Section 2 of said law under which he is entitled to only fiveyear lump sum gratuity. Motion denied. SYLLABUS 1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; JUDICIARY RETIREMENT ACT; REPUBLIC ACT 910 AS AMENDED; TEN-YEARS' LUMP SUM GRATUITY UNDER SECTION 1 and 3; REQUISITES TO BE ENTITLED THERETO. — It is clear from Section 3 in relation to Section 1 of Republic Act 910 as amended, that to be entitled to the lump sum payment of the gratuity equivalent to ten years' salary and allowances, a member of the judiciary should have retired by reason of permanent disability contracted during his incumbency in office and prior to the date of retirement and should

have rendered, at the least, twenty (20) years service in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government, or both. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FIVE-YEARS' LUMP SUM GRATUITY UNDER SECTION 2, APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. — Section 2 of Republic Act 910 as amended, grants a five year lump sum gratuity to the heirs of a member of the Judiciary, who dies while in actual service, or who, without having attained the required twenty years service under Section 1 of said law, shall have to retire upon reaching the age of 65 years or upon other causes such as illness or permanent physical disability. In the case at bar, the application for retirement benefits of Judge Galang whose total period of government service is only thirteen (13) years, one (1) month and fourteen (14) days, which is far short of the 20-years required by said law, properly falls under Section 2 thereof and his heirs have already received the five-year lump sum gratuity to which he is entitled. TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; JUDICIARY RETIREMENT ACT; REPUBLIC ACT 910 AS AMENDED; SECTION 2 AS INTERPRETED IN RESOLUTION OF JUNE 28, 1977 IN AM NO. 519-RETIREMENT; APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. — It will be noted that the requirement for the heirs to receive a lump sum of five years gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary and allowances received by the Justice or Judge who dies while in actual service that "by reason of his length of service in the Government [of at least twenty years service in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government, as provided in Section 1 of the Act] he was already entitled to the benefits of this Act", has been eliminated by the Court since the case of the late Judge Isaac Puno, Jr. who died at age 41 with only over two (2) years of service inthe Government. (AM No. 589-Retirement, Resolution of June 28, 1977.) The Court's rationale was that if under the same section a Justice or Judge who, without having attained the twenty-years length of service retires because of "illness or permanent disability . . . which render him incapacitated to continue in his position" is entitled to the five years lump sum gratuity provided by the cited Section, then neither should such length of service be required of the Justice or Judge who dies or is killed in actual service, since there is no more permanent or total physical disability than death. The heirs of the deceased Judge Galang at bar as well as of other judges who died in actual service, although with less than twenty years length of service, have been paid the five-years lump sum gratuity following the ruling in the case of Judge Puno. The heirs are not entitled to receive more, even if the deceased had twenty years or over of government service.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p: The late City Judge Alejandro Galang, Jr., who died of "Metatastic Retroperitorial Angiosarcoma" — a terminal disease, on August 29, 1979, while in the service, filed two days before his death, or on August 27, 1979, with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) an application, dated August 25, 1979, for total and permanent disability benefits "under the provisions of his insurance policy." After his death, his widow, Ramona T. Galang, filed with this Court on November 27, 1979, a similar application for retirement benefits under "Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 5095," docketed as Administrative Matter No. 1270-Ret. We approved on December 6, 1979 the payment of a five-year lump sum gratuity of P260,160.00 due the deceased. In the meanwhile, the application for retirement with the GSIS was approved by it "effective August 28, 1979." In a letter, dated January 23, 1980, the Manager of the Survivorship Benefits Department informed the Court, through the Court Administrator, that Judge Galang was found to be totally and permanently disabled by the System "not earlier than August 28, 1979" and requested that the balance of P260,160.00 be remitted to the System so that Judge Galang's tenyear lump sum benefits may be paid to his surviving legal heirs. By resolution dated February 14, 1980, the Court resolved to deny the payment of ten-year lump sum retirement benefits to the surviving legal heirs of JudgeGalang and to advise the GSIS accordingly. Submitted now for resolution is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the widow based mainly on the grounds that the opinion of the GSIS on the matter, though not binding on the Court, should be accorded strong persuasive effect; that the filing of the application directly with the

GSIS was simply an error of procedure; and out of humanitarian considerations, it appearing that the late Judge Galang discharged his official duties under very difficult circumstances and left a widow and eight minor children one of whom is physically disabled. In a subsequent Motion, the widow requested for time to submit Judge Galang's complete service record before resolution of her plea for reconsideration. cdll Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 1057, 1797, 2614, 4627 and 5095 and by Presidential Decree No. 1438, provides: "Section 1. When a justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals, a judge of Court of First Instance, Industrial Relations, Agrarian Relations, Tax Appeals, Juvenile and Domestic Relations, or a city or municipal judge who has rendered at least twenty years service in the judiciary or in any other branch of the Government, or in both, (a) retires for having attained the age of seventy years, or (b) resigns by reason of his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, he shall receive during the residue of his natural life, in the manner hereinafter provided, the salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation. And when a justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals, a judge of Court of First Instance, Industrial Relations, Agrarian Relations, Tax Appeals, Juvenile and Domestic Relations, or a city or municipal judge has attained the age of sixty years and has rendered at least twenty years service in the Government, the last five of which shall have been continuously rendered in the judiciary, he shall likewise be entitled to retire and receive during the residue of his natural life, also in the manner hereinafter provided, the salary which he was then receiving. . . ." "Sec. 2. In case a justice of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals or a Judge of the Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Court, Agrarian Relations, Tax Appeals, Juvenile and Domestic Relations, city or municipal court, or any other court hereafter established, dies while in actual service, his heirs shall receive a lump sum of five years' gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances received by him as such Justice of Judge, if by reason of his length of service in the Government he was already entitled to the benefits of this Act. The same benefits provided for in this section shall be extended to any incumbent justice of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, or a judge of the Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Court, Agrarian Relations, Tax Appeals, Juvenile and Domestic Relations, or city or municipal court, or any other court hereafter established, as the case may be, who, without having attained the length of service required in Section one hereof, shall have to retire upon reaching the age of sixty five years, or upon other causes, such as illness or permanent physical disability, to be certified to by the tribunal to which the justice concerned belongs, or by the Supreme Court in the case of an incumbent judge of the Court of First Instance, and other similar courts of record, or a city or municipal judge, which render him incapacitated to continue in his position." "SEC. 3. Upon retirement, a justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals, or a judge of the Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Court, Agrarian Relations, Tax Appeals, Juvenile and Domestic Relations, city or municipal court, or any other court hereafter established shall be automatically entitled to a lump sum of five years' gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances he was receiving on the date of his retirement; and thereafter upon survival after the expiration of this period of five years, to a further annuity payable monthly during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the amount of the monthly salary he was receiving on the date of his retirement. Provided, however, That if the reason for the retirement be any permanent disability contracted during his incumbency in office and prior to the date of retirement he shall receive only a gratuity equivalent to ten years' salary and allowances aforementioned with no further annuity payable monthly during the rest of the retiree's natural life." It is clear from the aforequoted Section 3 in relation to Section 1, that to be entitled to the lump sum payment of the gratuity equivalent to ten years' salary and allowances, a member of the Judiciary should have retired by reason of permanent disability contracted during his incumbency in office and prior to the date of retirement and should have rendered, at the least, twenty (20) years service in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government, or both.

The service record of the late Judge Galang shows that his government service commenced on August 1, 1969 to April 16, 1972 (2 years, 8 months, 15 days) as Special Assistant to Secretary Maceda, Office of the President; then from April 17, 1972 to August 28, 1979 (7 years, 14 months, 11 days) as City Judge, City Court of Manila, adding up to a period of 10 years and 26 days of government service. Additional proof of his government service submitted by his widow consisted of certified photographic copies of his appointments as Secretary I, Public Service Commission from October 7, 1958 to June 30, 1959 (8 months, 23 days), and from July 1, 1959 to September 30, 1959 (3 months); certification and affidavits to the effect that he was employed as Legal Officer III, Bureau of Customs from October 5, 1964 to November 30, 1966 (2 years, 25 days), or, an additional period of 2 years, 11 months and 48 days or 3 years and 18 days. Thus, the total period of government service of the late Judge Galang is only thirteen (13) years, one (1) month and fourteen (14) days, which is far short of the 20 years required by law. prcd Judge Galang's case properly falls under Section 2 of the law, as amended, supra, which grants a five-year lump sum gratuity to the heirs of a member of the Judiciary, who dies while in actual service, or who, without having attained the required twenty years service under Section 1, shall have to retire upon reaching the age of 65 years or upon other causes such as illness or permanent physical disability. Judge Galang's heirs have already received the five-year lump sum gratuity to which he is entitled. ACCORDINGLY, considering that Judge Galang's length of service in the Government falls short of the requisite twenty years, we hereby deny, much to our regret, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by his widow, Ramona T. Galang. SO ORDERED. Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur. Fernando, C.J, took no part. Teehankee, J., files a brief concurrence. Separate Opinions TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: The applicable section of the Judiciary Retirement Act, Republic Act No. 910 as amended by Republic Act No. 5095 and P.D. No. 1438 dated June 10, 1978, is Section 2, the pertinent part of which provides that: "Sec. 2. In case a justice of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals or a judge of the Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Court, Agrarian Relations, Tax Appeals, Juvenile and Domestic Relations, city or municipal court, or any other court hereafter established, dies while in actual service, his heirs shall receive a lump sum of five years' gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances received by him as such Justice of Judge, if by reason of his length of service in the Government he was already entitled to the benefits of this Act. The same benefits provided for in this section shall be extended to any incumbent justice of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, or a judge of the Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Court, Agrarian Relations, Tax Appeals, Juvenile and Domestic Relations or city or municipal court, or any other court hereafter established, as the case may be, who, without having attained the length of service required in Section one hereof, shall have to retire upon reaching the age of sixty-five years, or upon other causes, such as illness or permanent physical disability, to be certified by the tribunal to which the justice concerned belongs, or by the Supreme Court in the case of an incumbent judge of the Court of First Instance, and other similar courts of record, or a city or municipal judge, which render him incapacitated to continue in his position." It will be noted that the requirement for the heirs to receive a lump sum of five years gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary and allowances received by the Justice or Judge who dies while in actual service that "by reason of his length of service in the Government [of at least twenty years servicein the judiciary or in any other branch of the Government, as provided in Section 1 of the Act] he was already entitled to the benefits of this Act", has been

eliminated by the Court since the case of the late Judge Isaac Puno, Jr. who died at age 41 with only over two (2) years of service in the Government. 1 The court's rationale was that if under the same section a Justice or Judge who, without having attained the twenty-years length of service retires because of "illness or permanent disability . . which render him incapacitated to continue in his position" is entitled to the five years lump sum gratuity provided by the cited Section, then neither should such length of service be required of the Justice or Judge who dies or is killed in actual service, since there is no more permanent or total physical disability than death. llcd The heirs of the deceased Judge Galang at bar as well as of other judges who died in actual service, although with less than twenty years length of service, have been paid the five-years lump sum gratuity following the ruling in the case of Judge Puno. 2 The heirs are not entitled to receive more, even if the deceased had twenty years or over of government service. The only benefit that the Act grants the heirs of the deceased Justice or Judge who dies in actual service under the cited Section is the said five-years lump sum gratuity, regardless of the length of service ||| (In Re: Galang, Jr., A.M. No. 1270-RET (Resolution), [August 31, 1981], 194 PHIL 14-21)

REPUBLIC ACT No. 6397 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR. Section 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. Section 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court. Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved: September 17, 1971

MALACAÑANG Manila PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 181 May 4, 1973 CONSTITUTING THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES INTO A BODY CORPORATE AND PROVIDING GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE THERETO FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ITS PURPOSES WHEREAS, the Supreme Court of the Philippines, by virtue of its rule-making power and conformably to the provisions of Republic Act No. 6397, has ordained the integration of the Philippine Bar by Resolution of January 9, 1973, for the fundamental purposes of elevating the standards of the legal profession, improving the administration of justice, and enabling the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively; WHEREAS, pursuant to the said Resolution and in accordance with Court Rule 139-A, effective January 16, 1973, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines has been organized, its various organs have been established, and its officers, both national and local, have been duly elected and have entered into the exercise and discharge of their respective powers and duties; and

WHEREAS, the Integrated Bar, in the pursuit of its lofty objectives, obviously merits the aid and support of the people and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, particularly in the form of direct material and financial assistance, at least during the initial years of its corporate existence; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, and Proclamation No. 1104 dated January 17, 1973, do hereby order and decree as part of the law of the land that; Section 1. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines is hereby constituted into a body corporate, by the name, style and title of "Integrated Bar of the Philippines," with principal office in the Greater Manila Area. Section 2. The Integrated Bar shall have perpetual succession and shall have all legal powers appertaining to a juridical person, particularly the power to sue and be sued; to contract and be contracted with; to hold real and personal property as may be necessary for corporate purposes; to mortgage, lease, sell, transfer, convey and otherwise dispose of the same; to solicit and receive public and private donations and contributions; to accept and receive real and personal property by gift, devise or bequest; to levy and collect membership dues and special assessments from its members; to adopt a seal and to alter the same at pleasure; to have offices and conduct its affairs in the Greater Manila Area and elsewhere; to make and adopt by-laws, rules and regulations not inconsistent with the laws of the Philippines or the Rules of Court, particularly Rule 139-A thereof; and generally to do all such acts and things as may be necessary or proper to carry into effect and promote the purposes for which it was organized. Section 3. All donations or contributions which may be made by private entities or persons to the Integrated Bar shall be exempt from income and gift taxes, and the same shall further be deductible in full and shall not be included for purposes of computing the maximum amount deductible under Section 30, paragraph (h), of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended. Section 4. All taxes, charges and fees that may be paid by the Integrated Bar or any of its Chapters to the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be refundable annually to the former for the period extending up to December 31, 1978. Section 5. The Integrated Bar shall receive by way of donation or lease at a nominal rent from the Government of the Republic of the Philippines a parcel of land in the Greater Manila Area as a suitable site for the construction of a building for the Integrated Bar, with full power to mortgage or otherwise encumber the same. Section 6. The foregoing provisions shall without prejudice to the exercise by the Supreme Court of its rule-making power under the Constitution or to the provisions of Court Rule 139-A. Section 7. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the purposes of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the fiscal year 1973-1974. Section 8. This Decree shall take effect immediately. Done in the City of Manila, this 4th day of May, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-three.