Law Oriented Behaviour Structure Of Legal Norms

RECHTSTHEORIE 29 (1998), S. 387 - 424 Duncker & Humblot, 12165 Berlin

LAW-ORIENTED BEHAVIOUR AND THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL NORMS By Athanasios Gromitsaris, Jena

I. Introduction

For a very long time légal positivists hâve theorised about thé form of thé légal norm. As early as thé late eighteenth century, Jeremy Bentham had developed a theory on norm individuation; it offers a means of singling out that which is to count as "a law", a légal norm. On thé one hand, Lon Fuller challenged thé idea that individual légal norms or rules could serve as an appropriate focus in légal philosophy. He is not interested in what he once described as thé intramural squabbling of thé légal positivists on thé form of thé légal norm. He sees their approach as stérile, for it is not thé products (légal norms, légal rules) of légal processes that lay bare thé distinctive features of thé law but rather, thé processes themselves.1 On thé other hand, A. M. Honoré, abandoning reconstruction and reductivism and letting thé Benthamite program f ail away, tried to turn to what he called "real laws".2 He embarked on an enterprise constituting "a minor pièce of descriptive sociology"3 and tried to describe "real laws", as opposed to thé laws which thé theorist remodels in thé shape of his théories. He turned to laws and rules as they exist in professional discourse and argument but he had no appropriate sociological theory of description. He remained if not chez Hart, then at least du côté de chez Hart. In thé following it is "légal processes" and "real laws" that are in thé focus of our analysis. We use Max Weber's theory and sociology of law which is a combination of a textual with a contextual approach to law in order to find out which are thé basic prerequisites of a non-positivistic description of law-oriented behaviour.

1 Fuller, 1981, p. 243; see thé book review by Paulson, 1984. 2 Honoré, 1977. 3 Honoré, 1977, p. 99. Hart saw his theory as "an essay in descriptive sociology": Hart, 1961, p. iv. 26 RECHTSTHEOBIE, 3 - 4/98

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II. Three Ways of Thinking About Law

Max Weber contrasts thé sociological study of law with two other ways of thinking about légal norms and institutions: (1) The political and moral attitude toward law and (2) thé dogmatic jurisprudence.4 1. The Political and Moral Attitude Toward Law

This attitude is distinguished by thé fact that it employs a criterion of an extra-légal sort in terms of which thé moral goodness of spécifie légal norms may be assessed.5 On thé one hand thé normative force of thé evaluative standards does not dépend upon their being rules of law. On thé other hand thé légal order contains within itself in certain circumstances a requirement that its component rules be justifiable from a moral point of view. But even if a légal order contains norms with an explicitly ethical content judges view them as evaluative standards which they must respect solely because they are légal norms.6 From thé standpoint of positive law, thé currently normativ ascription of légal responsibility can be modified only within thé institutional framework of légal policy décision effecting a change in thé law, not, however, within thé institutional framework of morality.7 As thé judge is not permitted to rely on his personal view of what is morally right and wrong, his moral judgments hâve to be supported by a reasoning that proves thé presumed validity of thé evaluative standard. Therefore, to describe thé judge's attitude toward thé validity of moral judgements and thé validity of légal norms, one needs thé distinction between légal and extra légal standards of évaluation which Weber's conception of thé political and moral attitude toward law implies.8 Furthermore, as Nicholas Rescher emphasizes, we hâve to distinguish between moral norms and ideals. The latter "reach out beyond thé via negativa of those 'thou shalt not' commandments, toward thé ampler demands of a utopian order of things".9 Surely, idealization strives to •* By using thé "paradigm of thé game scat", Weber distinguishes between (a) "Skatjurisprudenz", (b) "Skatpolitik" or "skatsittliche Normen" and (c) "Skaterkenntnis" or "Skaterfahrung". Weber, 1988a, p. 337 et sequ. On this point see Krawietz, 1993, p. 48. See further Kronman, 1983, p. 7. 5 Weber, 1988a, p. 345: "(M)an kann von ethischen Prinzipien aus seine (des "Paragraphen") normative 'Berechtigung', () seinen Wert oder Unwert () oder seinen 'Nutzen' oder 'Schaden' fur (bestimmte) Interessen diskutieren. 6 See Art. 6 of thé German Constitution: "Pflege und Erziehung der Kinder sind das natùrliche Recht der Eltern und die zuvôrderst ihnen obliegende Pflicht." 7 Krawietz, 1992, p. 52. s Kronman, 1983, p. 10. 9 Rescher, 1987, p. 122.

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outrun thé limits of practicable achievability and enables us to press beyond thé confines of institutional practice. Ideals, regardless of their impracticability, can yield benefits as by-products of thé idealization process. Still, they function "as simply one component within a System" and can be pursued only "within thé limits of thé possible in a complex and no doubt imperfect world". Accordingly, unrealism in thé pursuit of ideals blocks thé way to other desiderata. As far as thé connection of law and morality is concerned, thé view, that thé "claim to correctness is a necessary élément of thé concept of law"10 has - as Eugenio Bulygin points out - to pay more attention to thé distinction between prescriptions, directives and norms on thé one hand and descriptive statements about norms on thé other.11 Given thé moral pluralism prevailing in modem societies, it is not thé business of modem démocratie states to deal in suprême values. Given that neutrality, it is not always easy to know what right and wrong are. Any group will always argue that its own moral codes and enforcement policies or experiments are worthy of support by thé state and thé most bénéficiai to mankind. Even if it would be possible to establish a consensus by means of a rational discourse, which in turn is understood in terms of a non-institutionalized process of reasoned conceptualization and argument (Habermas), nobody can tell what thé state of affairs and thé structure of action after this consensus will be. Who will regulate thé relation between thé validity of thé idéal discourse and thé validity of real laws? 2. The Dogmatic Jurisprudence

Légal scholars need not take an evaluative attitude toward thé légal norm whose correct légal meaning they are expounding.12 A légal scholar employs thé norm as an evaluative standard by using it to assess thé behaviour of various actors in thé légal System including thé behaviour of those responsible for applying thé norm in question. The value judgements of thé légal scholar are based upon his conception of thé correct meaning of a légal norm which he treats as a standard for assessing thé 10 Alexy, 1989, p. 177. Bulygin, 1993, p. 24: "Die Aufgabe des Richters ist, den Angeklagten entweder zu verurteilen oder freizusprechen. Ob er dabei das Recht richtig oder falsch interpretiert hat, wird aus seinem Urteil hervorgehen; es ist nient seine Sache, darilber in seinem Urteil zu reden. 12 Weber, 1988a, p. 348: "(D)ie Frage nach dem, was in concrète 'juristische Wahrheit' ist, d. h. gedanklich nach 'wissenschaftlichen' Grundsatzen aïs solche 'gelten' sotte oder hàtte 'gelten' sollen, ist logisch gànzlich verschieden von der: was de facto empirisch in einem konkreten Fall oder in einer Vielheit von Fàllen aïs kausale 'Folge' des 'Geltens' eines bestimmten 'Paragraphen' eingetreten ist." 11

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II. Three Ways of Thinking About Law

Max Weber contrasts thé sociological study of law with two other ways of thinking about légal norms and institutions: (1) The political and moral attitude toward law and (2) thé dogmatic jurisprudence.4 1. The Political and Moral Attitude Toward Law

This attitude is distinguished by thé fact that it employs a criterion of an extra-légal sort in terms of which thé moral goodness of spécifie légal norms may be assessed.5 On thé one hand thé normative force of thé evaluative standards does not dépend upon their being rules of law. On thé other hand thé légal order contains within itself in certain circumstances a requirement that its component rules be justifiable from a moral point of view. But even if a légal order contains norms with an explicitly ethical content judges view them as evaluative standards which they must respect solely because they are légal norms.6 From thé standpoint of positive law, thé currently normativ ascription of légal responsibility can be modified only within thé institutional framework of légal policy décision effecting a change in thé law, not, however, within thé institutional framework of morality.7 As thé judge is not permitted to rely on his personal view of what is morally right and wrong, his moral judgments hâve to be supported by a reasoning that proves thé presumed validity of thé evaluative standard. Therefore, to describe thé judge's attitude toward thé validity of moral judgements and thé validity of légal norms, one needs thé distinction between légal and extra légal standards of évaluation which Weber's conception of thé political and moral attitude toward law implies.8 Furthermore, as Nicholas Rescher emphasizes, we hâve to distinguish between moral norms and ideals. The latter "reach out beyond thé via negativa of those 'thou shalt not' commandments, toward thé ampler demands of a utopian order of things".9 Surely, idealization strives to 4 By using thé "paradigm of thé game scat", Weber distinguishes between (a) "Skatjurisprudenz", (b) "Skatpolitik" or "skatsittliche Normen" and (c) "Skaterkenntnis" or "Skaterfahrung". Weber, 1988 a, p. 337 et sequ. On this point see Krawietz, 1993, p. 48. See further Kronman, 1983, p. 7. 5 Weber, 1988a, p. 345: "(M)an kann von ethischen Prinzipien aus seine (des "Paragraphen") normative 'Berechtigung', () seinen Wert oder Unwert () oder seinen 'Nutzen' oder 'Schaden' fur (bestimmte) Interessen diskutieren. 6 See Art. 6 of thé German Constitution: "Pflege und Erziehung der Kinder sind das naturliche Recht der Eltern und die zuvôrderst ihnen obliegende Pflicht." 7 Krawietz, 1992, p. 52. s Kronman, 1983, p. 10. 9 Rescher, 1987, p. 122.

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outrun thé limits of practicable achievability and enables us to press beyond thé confines of institutional practice. Ideals, regardless of their impracticability, can yield benefits as by-products of thé idealization process. Still, they function "as simply one component within a System" and can be pursued only "within thé limits of thé possible in a complex and no doubt imperfect world". Accordingly, unrealism in thé pursuit of ideals blocks thé way to other desiderata. As far as thé connection of law and morality is concerned, thé view, that thé "daim to correctness is a necessary élément of thé concept of law"10 has - as Eugenio Bulygin points out - to pay more attention to thé distinction between prescriptions, directives and norms on thé one hand and descriptive statements about norms on thé other.11 Given thé moral pluralism prevailing in modem societies, it is not thé business of modem démocratie states to deal in suprême values. Given that neutrality, it is not always easy to know what right and wrong are. Any group will always argue that its own moral codes and enforcement policies or experiments are worthy of support by thé state and thé most bénéficiai to mankind. Even if it would be possible to establish a consensus by means of a rational discourse, which in turn is understood in terms of a non-institutionalized process of reasoned conceptualization and argument (Habermas), nobody can tell what thé state of affairs and thé structure of action after this consensus will be. Who will regulate thé relation between thé validity of thé idéal discourse and thé validity of real laws? 2. The Dogmatic Jurisprudence

Légal scholars need not take an evaluative attitude toward thé légal norm whose correct légal meaning they are expounding.12 A légal scholar employs thé norm as an evaluative standard by using it to assess thé behaviour of varions actors in thé légal System including thé behaviour of those responsible for applying thé norm in question. The value judgements of thé légal scholar are based upon his conception of thé correct meaning of a légal norm which he treats as a standard for assessing thé 10 Alexy, 1989, p. 177. Bulygin, 1993, p. 24: "Die Aufgabe des Richters ist, den Angeklagten entweder zu verurteilen oder freizusprechen. Ob er dabei das Recht richtig oder falsch interpretiert hat, wird aus seinem Urteil hervorgehen; es ist nicht seine Sache, daruber in seinem Urteil zu reden. 12 Weber, 1988a, p. 348: "(D)ie Frage nach dem, was in concreto 'juristische Wahrheit' ist, d. h. gedanklich nach 'wissenschaftlichen' Grundsàtzen aïs solche 'gelten' sotte oder hdtte 'gelten' sollen, ist logisch gànzlich verschieden von der: was de facto empirisch in einem konkreten Fall oder in einer Vielheit von Fâllen aïs kausale 'Folge' des 'Geltens' eines bestimmten 'Paragraphen' eingetreten ist." 11

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correctness of thé norm's application in various cases and contexts. This does not imply that jurists hâve to be formalists and légal positivists. On thé contrary, they are obliged to hâve a contextual approach to thé légal norms they deal with in thé application and singularization process. Before continuing, we should emphasize that thé doctrinal attitude toward law is not restricted to légal scholars in law faculties. Judges and légal practitioners base their arguments on légal dogmatics as well.14 But this does not mean that thé dogmatic jurisprudence is in possession of thé sole right to expound thé correct légal meaning of norms, or that we should défend thé idea of a "unity of rationality" and of a "unity of argumentation".15 Rather, we hâve to differentiate thé rationality of thé légal institutions from thé rationality of thé sciences.16 According to Schelsky's concept of a légal institutional rationality,17 based on législation, légal administration and jurisdiction, thé corrélation between légal science and juridical institutional practices cannot bring about a rational unity of dogmatic jurisprudence and thé practical institutions of légal life. Légal science is an institution itself that interacts with ist various environments. Thus, thé falsification of thé correct légal meaning of a norm takes place not only in thé scientific community of thé dogmatic jurisprudence, but also in thé juridical institutions. Furthermore, institutional practices produce their own criteria of "correctness" which are confirmed or changed in thé light of subséquent décisions and practices. 3. The Sociology of Law

According to Max Weber, one can investigate thé légal order from a sociological point of view without judging thé moral quality of thé law or seeking to expound thé correct meaning of légal norms in a légal dogmatic sensé. A sociological theory of law seeks to describe how thé behaviour of individuals is influenced by their own normative commitments to 13 Weber, 1976, p. 181: "(W)elcher normative Sinn einem aïs Rechtsnorm auftretenden sprachlichen Gebilde logisch ricfttzgerweise zukommen sollte". « Schelsky, 1959, p. 113, speaks of "verwissenschaftlichte Praxis". is According to Habermas, 1981, pp. 62 - 63 and 339 - 340: "juristische Argumentation (musse) in allen ihren institutionellen Auspragungen aïs Sonderfall des praktischen Diskurses begriffen werden" (pp. 62 f.), and further: "die Einheit der Rationalitàt (sei) in der Mannigfaltigkeit der eigensinnig rationalisierten Wertsphàren gesichert" (p. 339). 16 This is clearly expressed in one of Cari Schmitt's first books, Schmitt, 1969, p. 4: "Das in der Praxis aïs geltend anzunehmende Merkmal der Richtigkeit einer Entscheidung und das, was die juristische Verarbeitung des Rechtsstoftes aïs 'geltendes Recht' herausarbeitet, stehen sich aïs zwei Geltungen gegenuber." See further ibid., p. 98. " Schelsky, 1980, p. 53. On this point Krawietz, 1984 and Werner, 1995, pp. 129, 144.

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thé law and by their beliefs regarding thé similar commitments of others.18 It gives an account of thé identification and misidentification of thé relevant normative expectancies in légal processes and of thé conséquent commitment of individuals to action and law-oriented behaviour. From this point of view illégal behaviour is a légal phenomenon, and thé gap between thé applied and thé formai law (law which is "corrupted" by real-world interests) disappears.19 There are countries where formai litigation is used to perpetuate and obscure rather than résolve disputes; jural-bureaucratic maneuvers is used to keep conflicts open but bureaucratically tied up until an extrajudicial, political, and politic solution can be secured. Thus, illégal appropriation is a basic means of land acquisition, and illegality is a common mode of social organisation. Illégal résidence becomes a common and reliable way for some catégories of people to win légal access to land and housing that would otherwise be beyond their means. Usurpation initiâtes settlement and précipitâtes thé légitimation of thé land claims. Executive or législative institutions of government usually will hâve to intervene to déclare thé judicial System checkmated, to legalize usurpation and thereby insinuate illégal and extralegal practices into thé law.20 According to Weber's classical example, so long as a thief conceals his activity because he believes he is violating binding légal rules, his conduct constitutes a légal phenomenon; efforts to break thé law and actions undertaken because of a misunderstanding as to what thé law requires are legally relevant as well.21 But while thé sociologist of law does not treat thé value-commitments of law-oriented behaviour as normative criteria in his own investigation, he must be able to understand thé normative commitments of those whose behaviour he is studying. His attitude is characterized by a "combination of empathy and detachment". To be able to know, what is accepted and valid as law, an outside observer must understand thé behaviour of thé members of thé community. This 18 Weber, 1988 a, p. 350: "Das 'empirische Sein' des Redits aïs Maxime-bildenden 'Wissens' konkreter Menschen nannten wir hier die empirische 'Rechtsordnung'." 19 Weber, 1976, p. 17: "Zwischen Geltung und Nichtgeltung einer bestimmten Ordnung besteht also fur die Soziologie nicht, wie fur die Jurisprudenz (nach deren unvermeidlichem Zweck) absolute Alternative. Sondern es bestehen fltissige Uebergànge zwischen beiden Fâllen, und es kônnen () einander widersprechende Ordnungen nebeneinander 'gelten', jede () in einem Umfang, aïs die Chance besteht, daB das Handeln tatsachlich an ihr orientiert wird." 20 Holston, 1991, pp. 695, 697, 702, 722. There are similar expériences in Greece with an extrême form of "parallel economy" called "para-oikonomia". Papayannakis, 1989, p. 147: "En fait, elle (thé parallel economy) comprend des activités illégales et poursuivies, d'autres qui ne le sont jamais, d'autres qui tout simplement ne sont pas déclarées illégales, d'autres enfin qui sont poursuivies sans être punies et enfin toutes celles qui, légales ou pas, sont légalisées a posteriori et souvent considérées légitimes! " 21 Weber, 1976, p. 16.

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understanding is always based, as Aulis Aarnio emphasizes, partially on thé internai view, and this means that "one can never be a 'pure' external observer".22 III. Légal Theory as a Multi-Level-Approach to Law

Légal knowledge remains highly dépendent on theory. The problem is, what kind of theory? We cannot make out a case for a général theory of law that is other than supported and tested by confirmed observations. General theory of law should be regarded as an intégration of légal theory and sociology of law which can take into account thé way légal practitioners, légal scholars and social action in général describe and présent themselves.23 1. The Standpoint of Légal Practitioners

Légal practitioners usually say they know more than anybody else about thé reality of law, because they know more about their own jobs than dogmaticians or scholars of sociology of law could ever describe. Thus, thé best thing légal scholars and theorists should do is to help them résolve thé practical problems of their professional routine or to get out of their way. Of course, thé people who are closest to thé work really do know it better; but what they don't know is how to describe it. Because this is another type of work. Practitioners operate with only a partial model in mind about why they are doing whatever it is they are doing, and what causes and principles lie behind it. When they describe their work they often leave out thé fact that their description tailors itself to fit their professional ideology and ambitions.24 Further, this best-practices-approach cannot address légal activities which thé practitioners ignore or are not ready to acknowledge. Therefore, a sociological theory of légal practical institutions and law-oriented behaviour tries to cast new light on uncontroversial facts by means of exposing established behavioural possibilities to a comparison with other functionally équivalent possibilities. Under such conditions descriptions of what practitioners actually do can induce a positively evaluated innovation in thé observed behavioural structure. Légal practitioners might then - theoretically - make a décision with regard to thé question as to whether an external inducement of "new" problem solving stratégies is to be considered as more of a nuisance than anything else, or as a positive new addition to and change of thé structure. 22 Aarnio, 1992, pp. 10, 11. 23 On thé concept of thé "multi-level approach" see Krawietz, 1993, pp. 102,104. 24 Schelsky, 1959, p. 137.

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2. The Epistemological Status of thé Sociological Theory of Law

When empirical research focuses on thé applicability of socially recognized sanctions in thé event of disappointment of normative expectations, or when it turns out to be a sociology of thé légal professions and of thé possibilities of access to law, instead of setting its sights on thé expectation-governed character of human behaviour independently of state intervention and coercion, it limits itself to thé sectional study of thé pathology of légal expectations, ignoring thé actual ongoing regulating and problem-solving activities. Systems theory seeks to résolve this problem by obtaining an access to law as it présents itself. This is an approach that takes profit of empirical research but can also go beyond its restricted possibilities.25 Nevertheless, thé question - what's a légal System? - cannot be answered with a single concept: autopoiesis. The answer lies in a séries of conceptual distinctions produced in thé processes of a second order feedback that characterize thé relations between général Systems theory and middle range théories.28 On thé other hand, général Systems theory may take advantage of thé plurality of middle range théories; it may use their results in order to establish a plurality of conflicting generalizations that may subsequently be capable of respecification by means of middle range théories. This seems to be a reasonable "empirical" way of finding out what thé boundaries and structural constraints of légal communication are. The indeterminacy of thé theory with respect to explicable facts does not necessarily imply a useless redundancy within thé theory itself. It rather implies a kind of theoretic multiplicity. The multiplicity of théories explaining thé "same facts" does not reduce their explanatory value. Différence between théories hinges on what they cannot describe rather than on what they consider to be their common object of observation.27 Systems theory présents itself in thé rôle of thé external observer, who reveals and construes thé paradoxes that block and entangle thé selfdescription of thé légal System. Systems theory is an observer, and it doesn't claim for itself an exceptional position, with priviledged access to law-oriented behaviour. It does not introduce a différence between 25 See on this point Intzessiloglou, 1993, p. 255 et sequ. who - unlike Luhmann regards thé "model-system of Law merely (as) a concept, an analytical instrument that thé () theoretician of Law can use in order to ascertain thé absence or thé présence and thé degree of constitution, intégration, compétition and complementarity of légal Systems coexisting within thé same social environment". 26 Opp/Hummell, 1973, pp. 13 - 26. 27 Atlan, 1991, p. 140: Every theory "est capable de construire un monde qui est le même - celui des faits que nous observons - mais qui est différent en ce qui concerne ce que nous n'observons pas".

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analytical and real facts. It refers - throught its constructs - directly to what is reality for it.28 Science meets itself rather than thé outside world.29 The position of «an observer at ail initiated» - to use a phrase of Henry James (The Awkward Age) - is abandoned in favour of thé restricted point of view. Surely, Systems theory is not to be confirmed in thé classical way. We hâve been taught that a hypothesis is scientific to thé extend to which it entails empirically testable conséquences. But whether it passes thé test of observation or of experiment in thé market of scientific réfutations is essential in order to détermine not its scientific character but its truth value. A hypothesis may be false yet scientific, or true yet unscientific; it may be logically impossible yet empirically possible. Whether an observer makes a mistake or not has nothing to do with thé reality of his opérations; it simply présupposes thé existence of a second observer evaluating thé methods and skills of thé first. On thé level of perception thé distinction between reality and illusion is not possible. Neither thé content nor thé validity sources of knowledge stem from individual consciousness. Truth is based on external sélection30 and is not relative: to put an end to a disagreement about thé meaning of a word, somebody has to look it up in a dictionary. Truth tolérâtes no relativity despite thé variety of opinions. The truth value of an assertion does not dépend on thé will or thé interest of any participant. Such a thing would mean that every observer's relative truth would be cancelling out everybody else's. Furthermore, we hâve been conditioned to accept that a theory is scientific if it entails empirically testable conséquences. The main difficulty is determining what is to be meant by "testable". It has been equated with confirmable, or having possible examples, and with refutable, or having possible counter examples. Systems theory is so général as to be unable to yield any prédictions, not even when enriched with empirical data. There is a "sous-détermination de la théorie par les faits".31 Systems theory décides about and conditions its own applicability. Consequently thé concepts of degrees of confirmation and testability are pointless with regard to this theory.32 Any real System that happens to conform to thé theory 28 Luhmann, 1990, pp. 92, 698 et sequ.; on this point see Nassehi, 1992. 29 "Nous n'avons aucune communication à l'estre" Montaigne writes in his Apologie de Raimond Sebond, 1985, p. 586. so Luhmann /De Giorgi, 1993, p. 123: "Si parla di verità solo quando la selezione dell'informazione non viene imputata a nessuno dei partecipanti () ciô non tocca il fatto che nei sistemi psichici le opinioni necessariamente si differenzino." Atlan, 1991, p. speaks of "dédoublement du jugement": "Le jugement de vérité implique toujours une procédure de vérification () un jugement sur le caractère vrai ou faux du jugement." si Atlan, 1991, p. 130 et sequ. 32 On this point and on what follows Bunge, 1977, pp. 33, 35 et sequ.

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will qualify as a real System. And those concrète System that do not fit thé description just do not qualify. Despite this, Systems theory is corrigible, if not exactly refutable in thé light of empirical research. The application of Systems theory to spécifie situations requires some spécifie, substantive knowledge of thé latter; only this can provide a suitable interprétation and sélection of an équivalent form of thé theory in question. The complexity of thé observed System cannot be reduced to a homogeneous corpus of empirical data. Without concrète items of spécifie information one would be unable to pose thé problem, and hence to solve it. The point is that concrète items of spécifie information are unobtainable without thé help of observations supported by spécifie théories. That means that every application of Systems theory calls for thé formation of new théories or thé use of already existing various spécifie théories, which contribute to thé formation of a spécifie model of thé System of interest. The model is of course to be built with thé concepts of thé Systems theory, if it is to be coupled to thé latter.33 In other words, Systems theory becomes a spécifie theory of thé standard type when enriched with spécifie information concerning thé System to which it is to be applied. And this spécifie theory is subject to thé canons of empirical testability, that is to say, it is corrigible if we can find possible counter examples. Systems theory is confirmable in a sui generis way. It is confirmed by fitting whole familles of théories and by helping in thé formation of spécifie middle range théories that are testable in thé classical way. That means that several points of view could be combined with several perceptions of thé self-présentation of thé object. Consequently Systems theory is scientific if it is compatible with thé bulk of scientific knowledge and if - jointly with subsidiary hypothèses and observerdependent empirical data - it entails middle range théories that in turn entail corrigible and testable conséquences.34 Middle range théories hâve a scientific character because they can be falsified by other research. Systems theory is scientific if, enriched with suitable subsidiary assumptions "it becomes empirically testable either directly or vicariously, i.e. through some (spécifie) theory".35 This resuit is of décisive importance for thé formation of a général theory of law. At thé level of thé binary code: légal/illégal, no sélection, décision or définition are ever possible. Without spécial programs and criteria of sélection, such as norms, régulations, value-commitments, directives and contracts, thé rigid disjunction between légal and illégal behaviour 33 Bunge, ibid.; Marin, 1990: "La pensée complexe ne résoud pas d'elle même les problèmes, mais elle constitue une aide à la stratégie qui peut les résoudre." 34 See Merton, 1957, pp. 5 - 10; Bunge, 1977, p. 35 et sequ. 35 Bunge, 1977, p. 35.

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remains a blind distinction. It has thé meaning that in thé modem functionally differentiated society science, religion, politics, morality or économies cannot replace légal decision-making. But it says nothing about thé institutionalization and boundary maintenance of thé processes that produce, change and reproduce normative expectational structures at thé level of programs. The need for an intégration of middle range théories into thé systems-theory-approach to law results from thé necessity to describe how law-oriented behaviour can be identified in concrète institutional settings. As law is, primarily, not thé product of thé décisions of a state légal staff but is a System of human expérience, actions and norms, it is activities and opérations that actualize and modify institutionally established expectational structures that should be thé object of légal theory and sociology of law. Interprétation of behaviour by means of thé code légal/illégal always takes place within a "frame" of institutionalized expectations. We hâve to turn to a sociological understanding of norms and activities not only at thé level of Systems theory but also at thé level of middle range théories. The latter can help détermine and reconstruct thé meaning that actors (decision-making units, corporate groups or individuals) assign to their action and expérience.36 This leads us to thé conclusion that thé access to légal order can only be obtained by a multi-level-approach to law-oriented behaviour. In this sensé Systems theory is only a part of thé général theory of law (légal theory) which comprises ail thé théories that describe or explain thé social realities and thé normative meaning of thé légal phenomena. Accordingly, thé sociology of organizations, thé institutional theory of law, thé cost-benefit analysis of law or risk analysis are part of a sociological conception of law that is able to investigate thé relations between thé textual and contextual understanding of thé social dimension of law. VI. From 'Real Laws' to 'Real Rules'

Max Weber rejects thé view that defines légal norms as norms that are sanctioned in a particular way.37 The sanctions that accompany légal norms can be physical, psychological or économie in character. He also rejects thé view that defines law in terms of thé types of conduct it seeks to regulate, because ail aspects of human behaviour can become object of légal régulation.38 He finally rejects a third way of defining law in terms of thé procédure by which légal norms are established. The existence of 36 "The meaning thé subjects assign to thé situation they are in and thé behavior they are carrying out plays a greater rôle in determining thé generalizability of an experiment's outcome than does thé sample's démographie representativeness or thé setting's surface realism": Berkowitz /Donnerstein, 1982, p. 249. 37 Weber, 1976, p. 18.

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.1 scparate, spocijjli/.i'd enforcement staff has thé meaning that normative standards for thé évaluation of conduct can be accompanied by rules (Hart's secondary rules) regulating thé sanctioning process by which Infractions of first-order rules applying directly to conduct are identified .•mil punished. The existence of binding norms at thé sanctioning level ilr.iinr.uishes thé law from other normative orders.39 However, thé significance of second-order rules should not be overomphasized. The 'foundations' of Weber's theory of law are not found in "Kconomy and Society" and therefore, not in his "Sociology of Law" oither. Rather, thé foundations are found in his critique of Stammaler's logal theory, published in 1907 and in his essay about thé catégories of thé interprétative sociology, published in 1913. There Weber establishes his sociological theory of norms and an expectational approach to law and social action in général.40 It is thé simultaneous diversification of différent mechanisms for thé formation, innovation and institutionalization of behavioural expectations rather than thé potential for collective, organized reaction in thé form of sanction that is of primary importance for thé légal ordering of life. According to Weber's concept of "Einverstândnis" (common understanding),41 social communication opérâtes on thé basis of expectational structures, not by any prior establishment of rules, even if rules can be inferred from thé way people speak and act. This is a crucial aspect not only of markets and languages but also of law-oriented behaviour. 1. Action-Norms and Reaction-Norms

In defining law as he does, Weber views law-oriented behaviour as a social action, oriented not simply to thé anticipated conduct of others but also to thé probability that violation of some particular norms will bring about a social situation in which crédit and discrédit or rights and duties will hâve to be attributed ex post according to already established binding norms that tolerate no ambiguity. In other words, law oriented 38 For example, thé internai affairs of thé household or religious behaviour: Weber, 1976, pp. 212 - 233. Even thé main légal distinction between is and ought seems to be thé resuit of seemingly extra-légal divination practices: Weber, 1976, pp. 262, 317. 39 Weber, 1976, p. 18. On this point Kronman, 1983, pp. 30 - 31; see further thé distinction between "gesellschaftsbezogenes" and "gesellschaftsgeregeltes Handeln" Weber, 1988b, pp. 445, 447. 40 On this point Krawietz, 1989. According to Krawietz, Weber's expectational approach lies entirely within thé intellectual tradition of German theory and sociology of law ranging over Ihering and Theodor Geiger to Helmut Schelsky and Luhmann. On thé development and methodological shifts of German public law tradition which has had a significant influence - at least via Georg Jellinek - upon Weber's work, see Pauly, 1993. « Weber, 1988b, p. 456.

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behaviour forces a system of social action to achieve reflexion and explicitly confirm or modify its expectational structure. According to a legalistic view, disputes require access to a forum external to thé original social setting of thé dispute in order to become legally relevant, According to Weber's concept of law, as defined above, individual parties find a variety of solutions out of or away from thé governance structures of thé state. Weber's view of law includes a 'légal order' that falls outside "thé province of thé state".42 We hâve to deny that law only exists when and where légal coercion is guaranteed by thé political authority. Most disputes that under current state rules could be brought to a court are resolved by avoidance and selfhelp away from thé auspices of thé légal centralism by devising private orderings. Nevertheless, thèse solutions acquire a légal character when found at thé level of reflexive regulated processes determining ex post compliance, violation and violated rules. This doesn't exclude an additional access to state decision-making bureaucracy which then attributes right and wrong anew, in accordance with state law. Therefore, in accordance with Max Weber and Theodor Geiger, we think it appropriate to distinguish between action norms and reaction norms and between norm-sentences and rules. As Theodor Geiger puts it, "action norms" and "reaction norms" (or primary and secondary norms) may, but need not be, coupled with one another.43 A purely state concept of law is customarily understood to reflect thé view that only behavioural expectations expressed tay thé buraucratic décision units or somehow derived therefrom are worthy of légal character. Légal norms are thus considered to be a médium of political action. But thé légal order is not inextricably interwoven with thé state. We can conceive of law as consisting primarily of clusters of normative expectations, by means of which persons order their conduct and only secondarily of norms for state décision making developed by thé courts and législation. The formai structures of thé state such as thé judiciary, thé législature, thé executive and thé administrative agency produce and enforce only a part of thé bulk of valid légal expectations. They claim to hâve a jurisdiction extending to ail thé inhabitants of thé territory of a politically organized régional society. 2. Norm-Sentences and Expectations of Conduct

We follow Weber and Geiger in resisting thé tendency to identify norm-sentence and rule. Norm-sentences are "linguistically formulated 42 Krawietz, 1994, p. 48. Evan, 1976, p. 171. Evan bases his distinction between public and private légal Systems on Weber and Ehrlich. 43 Geiger, 1987, p. 105.

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norms" (verbal norms, norms expressed in words) that sustain a "demand expectation", an "expectation of conduct" specified for a certain situation and, by way of support from thé respective system-bearing group, directed to thé "conduct" of thé respective norm addressees.44 By contrast, a rule is thé actual process of selecting norm-oriented behaviour and of confirming or innovating thé normative expectational structure used to sélect norm-oriented behaviour. Rules are thé continuous corrélation between structure and process, they are not substantive structures with a built-in determinacy. They are a good remedy for complexity,45 but their reproduction is based on a built-in indeterminacy. No reproduction of normative expectations is possible without an amount of intrinsic uncertainty: information "cannot be obtained unless there exists uncertainty about thé outcome of an event prior to thé event"; that is to say that thé amount of information obtained from any event "is a function of what could hâve happened but didn't"; it is determined "by thé amount by which thé uncertainty has been reduced".46 According to research into thé precommitment and discrétion of monetary authorities (central banks), credibility can be used as substitute of lacking information. But credibility is itself a scarce resource. It is defined as thé speed with which an observer (for instance, thé public) realises that a shift in préférences has occured.47 Credibility is an institutional product. It can replace information about valid rules only in a context where systematic behaviour of particular agents is possible. This is for example not thé case in an international context where governments change frequently and thé game-theoretic conditions which govern their behaviour lack more than short-term stability.48 Anyway, observer-dependent descriptive or prescriptive représentations of that which is to count as relevant rule, are to be regarded as semantic artefacts which contribute to thé use, confirmation, spécification or generalization of normative expectations.49 Black letter law represents an "unorganized textbook knowledge"50 in a network that associâtes concepts to other concepts and prescriptions to other prescriptions. At thé level of valid norm-sentences thé function of légal dogmatics lies, on thé one hand, in operating as an "inheritance mechanism" in thé network, so that more spécifie concepts or prescrip44 Geiger, 1987, p. 23 et sequ., 34 et sequ. 45 Von Hayek, 1969, p. 171: "Regeln beschrànken immer den Bereich der in Betracht zu ziehenden Umstânde auf einen Teil der môglicherweise bedeutsamen, um so eine Entscheidung praktisch môglich zu machen." 46 Garner, 1975, pp. 3, 7; see further Mathiesen, 1960 and Atlan, 1983. 47 Blackburn, 1992, p. 171. « Epstein I Gintis, 1992, p. 175. 49 Weber, 1988, p. 355 speaks of thé "'Regel' - Charakter der 'empirischen Rechtsordnung' ". 50 Elio I Scharf, 1990, p. 591.

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tions can inherit features of more général concept classes. On thé other hand, doctrinal commentaries rest on an interpretational argument that cannot be properly conceived of "in simply bivalent true-or-false ternis" but has to enter "thé realms of thé better-or-worse, thé arguable, thé préférable, thé more or less persuasive".51 Thus, it has to view norm-sentences as being open ended. Now, thé représentation of légal problems contained in textbook knowledge is not to be identified with problem représentation at thé level of thé playing rules. The efficient récognition and application of relevant knowledge about cognitive and normative expectations to thé problem at hand is always domain-specific. Appropriate domain spécifie knowledge and problem-type schémas émerge with expérience in social institutions which functionally organize and represent related domainspecific expectations, inferences, and methods for solving problems. The shift in problem prototypes and stratégies is a by-product of thé perceived différence between previous and new expériences. Therefore, as one solves a problem, thé problem's représentation becomes "enhanced"5 with social domain spécifie inference rules, facts, and solution méthodologies. Social institutions modify thé textbook problem description by variablizing or constraining thé values on descriptors or by introducing new descriptors into thé sphère of activity. "Enhanced problem représentation" means that a problem's descriptors are determined by thé problem-solving process in thé respective social institutions and not by thé problem statement's original textbook form. According to this view, administration, and bureaucratie organizations in général, seem to deal with information in a différent way from that anticipated from a simple reading of thé theory of décision making. Most organizational décision processes are found to be "solution centered".53 Much of thé textbook-knowledge and thé information gathered and communicated by individuals and organizations before thé décision hâve little décision relevance. Much of thé information that is used to justify a décision is collected and interpreted after thé décision has been made. There seems to be rather a prior calculation of needed information than a kind of thermostatic linkage between observations and actions. The information phenomena noted in organizations provide reasons for decoupling information from décisions.54 The idea of intelligent choice and thé systematic application of information to décision seem to be values belonging to thé core of western ideology. They symbolize that 51 52 53 54

MacCormick, 1994, p. 139. Elio / Scharf, 1990, p. 588 et sequ. Nutt, 1984, p. 447. Feldman / March, 1981, pp. 171 - 186.

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processes are legitimate, décisions good and organisations well managed. What information is satisfactory for décision making is negotiated umong participating organizations. The resuit is "a negotiated informai n n i order"55 that détermines what information will be used in décision m . i k i n g and which organizations "pay" for collecting and using new Information. The negotiated information order is an interorganizational itructure that helps détermine when an administration unit will "optiIMI/.C and when it will satisfice". Information needs to be socially sufficiciit and technically sufficient, but thé two are to some degree independent, so as socially sufficient information need not be technically suffirit-nt and vice versa. A negotiated information order is established when a System of criteria for thé social sufficiency of information is worked out which in turn bring about an ordering of organizational specialization in thé application of décision criteria. This theory would apply on thé environmental impact statements of environmental administrative agencies. When agencies - and environmental groups - hâve thé formai right to review thé environmental impact statements of other agencies, a renégociation of thé information order can occur.56 3. Law-Oriented Behaviour

By comparing thé rules of a game to légal rules, using thé paradigm of thé game scat, Weber shows that thé rules of a game, like thé rules of thé law, form a System of orientational points of view, imposing constraints on thé players' sphère of activity.57 Playing rules permit one to make better guesses about thé moves of thé other players than one could make without thé rules, for playing rules are supposed to be considered binding by other players too. The décisive function of playing rules lies in thé fact that they restrict thé field of possibilities at hand, and thus, they clarify relevant expectations, so that every player can orient his own action to thé normative commitments of thé other players. As Weber emphasizes, this 'sociological' attitude toward légal rules is not restricted to social scientists, but is an attitude that is equally adopted by social actors as well as those performing certain rôles within thé légal order, such as a practicing attorney who, preparing a case for a trial or advising a client, must act like a "scat player" in a stratégie environment, and try to predict how thé behaviour of judges, administrative agencies and clients will be influenced by his own interprétation of thé légal norms and normative commitments to thé law.58 To a certain 55 56 57 58

On this concept and on what follows, see Heimer, 1985, pp. 395, 397. Heimer, 1985, p. 414. Weber, 1988a, p. 338. Weber, 1988a, p. 338 et sequ.; Kronman, 1983, p. 13.

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extent, social actors and légal practitioners must be a kind of sociologist of law, because they are in need of information about norms and institutional facts in oder to use them as a means to a practical-professional end - promoting a client's interests or predicting particular outcomes. Thus, sociological understanding of law-oriented behaviour is to be considered a décisive prerequisite for being a successful légal practitioner. Successful lawyers are distinguished by their légal skills not only in responding to problems and causes of action once begun but also by their ability to anticipate that problems might arise. "Préventive lawyering" seeks to ensure that client behaviour takes a course with least potential légal hazard.59 Further, it is taken to include attempts to influence law création or reform. Lawyer's capacity to influence practical business behaviour consists in scanning thé environment in order to identify emerging légal issues on thé one hand and in staying in touch with developments in thé business (which has to run as a business and is not there for lawyers) on thé other. The successful integrated lawyer (inhouse business lawyer) hat to be a translater that can move out of his own language System and put things in a way managers can understand. Given thé fact that problems are observer-dependent, problem représentations hâve to be translated,60 and as we ail know, every translation is bound to betray thé original: traduttore, traditore! Learning to be an effective translater61 contains a number of skills basic to professional practice: a common language between business management and légal management has to be developed which makes it possible for thé lawyer to shift between self-referencing and other-referencing; légal judgement has to take into considération commercial judgement, and vice versa. This close relationship to thé business world led légal practitioners62 to abandon thé conceptualist utopia (not thé conceptual constructions) of thé Pandectists and dévote their attention to developing légal instruments that could advance thé purposes of corporate economy and help law expand into new areas of social life.63 59 Mackie, 1989, p. 74 et sequ. eo Deleuze / Guattari, 1991, p. 32 are aware of this problem, and they even see it as thé main problem of philosophera: "on se fait parfois de la philosophie l'idée d'une perpétuelle discussion comme 'rationalité communicationelle" ou comme 'conversation démocratique universelle'. Rien n'est moins exact () Les interlocuteurs ne parlent jamais de la même chose." 61 Mackie, 1989, p. 94 et sequ., 102 et sequ. 62 Osiel, 1990, p. 2058: "It is thé skill in practical reason and complex judgement that thé practicing bar and bench most esteem in their peers." 63 According to Dezalay, 1992, p. 118 et sequ., 131 et sequ., thé foreign offices of thé "Big Eight" accounting firms and Wall Street law firms hâve seized virtually thé entire european market for advice concerning thé law of corporate and public finance partly because european lawyers are not trained and experienced as "légal entrepreneurs".

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'Sociological' understanding of légal norms is equally indispensable in Miicinl areas beyond thé professional activities of légal practitioners. In f n r t , social actors are met with thé difficulty to identify and harmonize rimlïicting normative expectations as they go about their business. As nppmpriate expectations are embedded in institutional settings that eut llmuigh thé usual distinctions between state and society, formai and informai behaviour, or markets and hiérarchies, thé problem is to find «ml. how access to thé appropriate institutional setting and problem défin i lion becomes possible. From a normativist point of view, thé difficulty lies with thé récognition of thé appropriate rules. But this is actually an aspect of thé wider problem of meaning. Meaning arises for Weber in multiple settings and can be looked at differently depending on its relaI ionship to various observers. We can distinguish64 at least: a) thé actor's mlonted meaning b) meaning to thé other participants c) meaning on .•ivorage d) meaning in terms of a dogmatic System e) meaning in ideall.ypical terms f) meaning as discovered by social scientists or historians H) meaning to self and h) institutional meaning. In addition, there are thé possibilités of corrélation, feed-back and second-order observation or double hermeneutic.65 Thus, thé self-description of law-oriented behavlour is described by thé sociologist or evaluated by thé légal scholar, but i h c i r concepts are in turn reinterpreted or incorporated into features of law-oriented behaviour. However, it is not clear how a person becomes aware of rules. We rarely hear a subject announce a rule in recognizable form while acting. The fact that persons seldom mention a rule in abstract form seems to be consistent with thé hypothesis that ail knowledge is encoded in highly instantiated, episodic form, called cases. Rule violation is easier to be detected. But how does an actor become aware of a rule? Would she or ne pause for a while then mumble "l'd better not do that again", or would she carry on without interrupting her activity?66 In most cases, at thé level of action norms thé process will go on without visible pauses. Contrarily, thé firings of secondary rules always manifest themselves as interruptions of normal processing in thé actions System. This is due to thé fact that action has, now, to take place at a new level, that of reflexive processes. Still, while we explain much of people's behaviour in terms of rulemaking, rule-breaking or rule-following, we cannot explain ail of it in this way. Compliance does not always occur because of extrême risk aversion, that is to say, because individuals overweight low probability 64

See on this systematization Albrow, 1990, p. 211. 65 Ibid.,p. 279etsequ. 66 See VanLehn, 1991, p. 3. 27 RECHTSTHEOHIE, 3 - 4/98

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events - for instance thé low probability of audit, combined with high penalty on detected tax évasion. Compliance also occurs when there is no chance of détection or thé expected value of thé rule-breaking (say, thé tax évasion gamble) is négative. Furthermore, compliance does not necessarily occur from a belief by individuals that rule-breaking (évasion) is wrong, "since their behaviour is unchanged by either (morally) loaded or neutral instructions".67 Therefore, compliance can be explained neither by thé probability of sanctions nor by thé distinction between légal and illégal or right and wrong. Besides, we should not loose sight of how much external perceptions really matter. If thé amount of ambiguity is too high, outsiders (external perceptions) may demand a formalization of what people already do into norm-sentences setting out thé way in which people behave. The System has thus to demonstrate to thé outside world that there really are rules, and put in place some visible policing mechanisms.68 The available évidence indicates that an individual's normative beliefs are not consistent with his behaviour and that norms can change rapidly and without intensive resocialization. Rules do not merely refer to "shared beliefs about ranking norms, membership norms, and reality assumptions".69 They also affect behaviour by specifying thé actions and attributes that will validate particular identities. The behaviour of individuals tends to be consistent with thé norms of older colleagues, insofar as their professional identity is controlled by thèse colleagues. Ail this suggests that lacking direct information about thé subjects' normoriented behaviour and rule acquisition practices, one must use thé subjects' overt behaviour and - especially - thé respective situation context to inf er normative-commitments or changes in attitude and problem-solving rules. Thus, we can conclude: We can learn a lot about appropriate 'situation-expectations fits' by studying misfits,70 but we may not identify norm- and law-oriented behaviour with thé probability of sanctions. 4. Globalization and Formalization of Law-Oriented Behaviour

Law-oriented behaviour takes place in a world, in which local and global modes of coordination and guidance are intertwinned. Global economy requires formalized communication networks. Large companies are likely to hâve workers, supplier s, shareholders and customers from différent value Systems. Normative commitments dépend less on shared, 67 Alm, étal., 1992, p. 36. 68 This point has been very important for thé formalization of thé rules of thé City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, see Hobson, 1990, pp. 168, 252. es On this point and what follows, see Cancian, 1976, pp. 355, 362 - 363. '0 See Hochschild, 1980, p. 568.

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iiiis|i(ikcii customs and values and more on laws and formai statements < > f cl lues. Obligations to friends, family, and countrymen are not of thé une nature as obligations to Etrangers in thé sphère of non-intimate n u l distant social relations.71 The internationalization of thé economy i un:, |>;ii allol with thé process of producing normative commitments that i i i r v.-ilid everywhere. Nevertheless, familial and national amoralism as \ v r l l as corruption in thé political, judiciary, and civil service continue to c - i r a i ! - barriers to entry into local business. The growing sensé of légal . u n i inoral responsibility to Etrangers doesn't replace thé informai netwni'ks based on local personal connections or money relationships. Indeliriulcncies and interdependencies go hand in hand. On thé one hand, as institutions like church, family, éducation, and thé state are less effective al shaping shared values and norms in citizens, global organizations and international business hâve to create formalized norms to guide employt'cs, shareholders and other stakeholders, while at thé same time toleratiiii; a variety of local and individual values. On thé other hand, participating in thé international System leads to .iilupUng outward oriented policies, and accepting thé respective internai n mal norms and assumptions about states and their management as well OH ubout contractual and other légal commitments.72 For instance, it has bccn proved that state interests in Africa are not determined solely by a patrimonial or patronage-oriented political logic. The world community of states and thé international System of political, économie and légal communication develop not only broadly accepted patterns of action and norms but they also institutionalize new rôles for traditional and new actors.73 As a resuit, changes and international predictability are induced in local settings. Thus, investment codes hâve been rewritten in many countries so as to favour thé foreign investment.74 Further, inclusion in thé international System can be used as a resource of legitimacy for an established local authority. Lacking an anti-colonial struggle to refer to, a government can tie thé legitimacy of its authority to thé inclusion of thé state in thé international System, "to a new économie deal for thé people".75 The highly developed set of international institutions for finance renders business indépendant of thé patrimonial features of states and local patronclient networks. n On this point and on what follows, see Ciulla, 1991, pp. 75,77, 83. 72 Fischer, 1990, p. 58; Huntington, 1996, p. 524 et sequ. overlooks this argument laying .stress upon «shared values». 73 For example thé institutionalization of thé kin State's rôle in protecting ethnie minorities, Varsanyi, 1989, p. 133. On thé rôle of other participants in thé international légal order (besides thé states) see Attar, 1994, p. 56 et sequ. who speaks of "les intervenants" or "sujets dérivés", parcellaires, fragmentaires. 74 Ngwasiri, 1989, p. 200. 75 Fearon, 1988, pp. 136, 137.

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5. International Communication and National Laws

Law-oriented behaviour of global players (mostly large organizations) is characterized by thé simultaneous orientation toward différent national and international légal Systems. Organizations hâve an informational or a resource perspective on their societal environment and other organizations in it.76 According to thé first perspective, environment is conceived as information-uncertainty, and power dépends on control over uncertainty. From thé resource perspective thé environment is a source of scarce resources, which are sought after by a population of organizations that competes for as well as shares them. Accounting standards and financial régulation are thé main tools used by thé national laws to regulate thé way organizations manage both their information uncertainty and resource dependence. Dependence and uncertainty may vary independently of each other but it is their joint effect that explains thé interrelation of money, uncertainty and authority in interorganizational networks. An appropriate explanation of such joint effects is conditional upon thé description of thé existent institutipnal environments77 of global organizations. We hâve to emphasize that institutions are not to be identified with organizations. Institutionalization processes eut through thé boundaries of organizations and function Systems. Therefore, to give an example, thé "Geldmarktabhangigkeit des deutschen Kapitalmarktes"78 is to count as an institution although it cannot be adequately described in ternis of interorganizational networks. In what follows, we give an example of how a Systems theory approach can incorporate an institutional approach to law. The institutional constraints of international law-oriented behaviour cannot be distilled from thé plurality of national blackletter laws. Whith thé help of Systems theory we focus our attention on law-oriented behaviour as a type of social communication that occurs under thé auspices of thé distinction légal/illégal. National laws are programs that détermine thé use of this distinction by constraining thé values on its two descriptors. By means of thé institution theory we concentrate on rulegoverned behaviour as it présents itself in relation to a spécifie issue, combining thus, a textual and contextual norm-theoretic approach. As thé flow of information around thé world has increased greatly, investors hâve begun looking abroad for better returns on their portfolios, and companies hâve seeked access to thé international capital mar76

For a discussion of thé distinction and an extended bibliography, see: Aldrich / Mindlin, 1978. 77 Tolbert, 1985, pp. 2, 3. 78 Fuchs, 1989.

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kets. Conversely, thé securities industry, facing increasing compétition for business from electronic, régional and international exchange, i M i r i ' . l r i l to attract listings from foreign companies whereas thé regulaI I I I N bodies for securities markets had to reach compromises on disclorules with thé foreign companies. Regulators had to relax their IQI "imting requirements in order not to de ter foreigners from thé local l ' M - k exchange, while foreign listing companies had to provide an information bridge for local investors.79 Globally minded international compunies who obtained a full listing for their shares on several stock c«xchanges around thé world had access to various capital pools, but they hud to deal with thé diversity of international accounting and auditing practice and thé indeterminacy of "true and fair view".80 They had to exercise in restating their accounts according to différent standards.81 It lurncd out that thé main influence on disclosure was based on thé patIci-ii of ownership, thé scope of companies' opérations and thé distinction Ix'tween market oriented and bank oriented financial Systems.82 Companies of thé bank oriented type83 (Germany, Japan) tend to underroport earnings and book values because of accelerated dépréciation policics and unrestricted provisions ("hidden reserves"). Bank oriented finann.il Systems hâve normaly a less developed market for risk capital, so that savings are primarily transformed in thé form of crédits through banks. Shareholdings are less dispersed and commercial banks ("Hausbank"rnncept) hâve very often large shareholdings in individual firms.84 Thus, rnntrolling blocs of shares are relatively seldom transacted and hostile l.ikrover bids ar not common. In Germany private companies (GmbH) are mon; important relative to public ones. For a second or third génération (iwner of a Mittelstand company, loyalty to his company, to thé community in which it is based and to thé workforce is likely to be more important lhan thé shorttermism of a purchaser of thé market oriented type. Commrivial banks use financial distress or insolvency to reorganize problem l i i i n s . 8 5 They act as reorganization specialists, whereas - in market ni icnted Systems - this rôle is normally played by an external group of Hhareholders. Access to international capital markets and exposure to thé disclosure and control demands of foreign institutional investors could iiow bring this ownership structure under a higher amount of stock 7" See Moran, 1991. "<> From a german point of view, see Grofifeld, 1986, p. 196 et sequ. »i See Kirchner, 1978. »2 CIFAR 1993. ":l On thé distinction between bank-oriented and market-oriented financial sysl.cins, see Berglôf, 1990 and further Roe, 1991. 11/1 Adams, 1994; Bundesverband deutscher Banken, 1994. 85 Zimmerer, 1993; Hess/Fechner, 1991.

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market pressure and cause some changes in thé cross-holdings, voting strength of préférence chares and takeover prévention devices of thé companies of thé bank oriented type. As thé two main types of financial Systems are fundamentally différent, global players find themselves in différent stratégie environments86 To identify thé officiai and 'invisible' barriers for foreign actors as well as thé institutionalized forms of légal, political and économie constraints, they hâve to develop their own 'sociology of law', which in turn has to be taken into account by thé scientific analysis of their laworiented behaviour. V. Social Intégration Through Law-Oriented Behaviour? 1. Contracts

Max Weber has associated thé growing importance of contracts in modem society as a source of légal rights and obligations with thé expansion of thé market as a form of économie organization and thé rôle played by money. The contractual character of modem society allows a decentralization of thé law-making process. Modem contracts are purposive contracts. Unlike status contracts, which effect a total change in thé personalities of thé individuals involved and create an ail-inclusive fraternal relationship, purposive contracts are delimited in thé sensé that they neither affect thé status of thé parties nor give rise to new qualifies and obligations of comradeship and brotherliness but aim solely at some spécifie performance, commodity or resuit.87 Modem individuals find themselves - as légal persons - at thé centre of a web of contractual associations; their identity is irreducible to thé séries of relationships created by thé contracts themselves, because they can always enter an additional contract without acquiring a new or losing their identity. Contract law has its foundation in thé ancient dualism of légal relations within thé kinship group and between différent kindship groups. It begins where thé self-sufficient houshold community ends and régulâtes thé impersonal relationships of formai économie exchange with outsiders within thé market community.88 The contract itself, as an institution, has thé ability to transform social relationships, thé two crucial effects being (a) thé convergence of 'kinsmen' and 'strangers' that générâtes migrant labour groups and extra-familial labour89 and (b) thé independence of (international) business of (local) personal relationships.90 Nevertheless, se Diïser, 1990, p. 117 et sequ., 122 et sequ. 87 Weber, 1976, p. 401; Kronman, 1983, p. 100 et sequ. 88 Weber, 1976, p. 402.

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r m i t i .11-1 nal l'reedom produces both inclusion and exclusion: on thé one i i n u l , rvery légal person can enter a contract, but on thé other hand, ' "iitracts create law only for thé parties. Further, thé effect of contracI M i l aurccments on thé rights of third parties is a spécial problem, which K i lu I » ' solved from an external point of view in thé various institui ii mal settings in which contracts are embedded. The behaviour of non|. H i ii i|i;mts, although of gréât importance to thé parties, cannot be iilmlnistered by thé contractual order. The rest of society becomes relevfiut. «nly in ternis of a réservoir of extra-contractual prerequisites of thé r n n l i .H I 2. Organizations

A r i - o n l i i i g to Weber, thé development and continuai spread of thé dern form of thé organization of corporate groups in ail fields of ..M i . i l ad.ivity is besides purposive contracts thé most crucial phenomriioii of modem society. On thé one hand bureaucratie organization is cnmpli'tely indispensable for thé needs of mass administration today. On I h c ot.her hand there are clusters of normative expectations which hâve I h c i r l'ocus on formai or informai organizations relatively independent of i l i c 1 bureaucratie exercise of state control on thé basis of technical Knowledge. The validity of thèse normative expectations and thé possibilit.ii-s l'or their enforcement extend only to thé members of thé organisaI ion or organizations-set. This means that thé inner-directedness of organi/.;it,ions doesn't affect thé behaviour of non-members which is subject to ni lier mechanisms of guidance and control, such as market coordination, l>i)lit.ical power, public opinion, formai légal authority, or generalized média of social communication. The question of what constitutes a part ni an organization or a member of interorganizational relationships is, if poscd in isolation, a spurious one.91 A formalistic définition that u n - I n d e s or excludes ex ante clients, suppliers, independent organizai i i m s , departments or merely temporary commitees is due to thé concept i o n of organization as an organism and implies a reification of interori'..nii/.,-iUonal sets. 'Tins becomes obvious in thé cases of failure in network organizations Ih.-il. seek to use an 'internai market' as an alternative to hierarchy as a modo of internai coordination within thé firm. Hère organizational units buy and sell goods and services among themselves at priées established and verified in thé open market. The most common mistep in such inter8» On thé corrélation between migrant labour, money contract and freedom, see Weber, 1988e, pp. 489, 506. 90 Roitman, 1990, p. 686. 91 Negandhi, 1975. p. 251 et sequ.

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nal networks turned out to be corporate intervention in resource flows or in thé détermination of transaction priées. Corporate décision making inclines to rather dictate priées and processes than simply manage internai economy. This means that bureaucracy turns thé essential relationships among autonomous network's components into relationships among included organisation-members: they can no longer be external and thus highly visible to ail parties - and they can no longer reflect voluntary and explicit commitments. Hierarchical politics, power and influence rather than performance are guiding members behaviour.92 At thé level of network intégration thé concept of membership refers to firms and to thé network's ability to efficiently allocate member firms, uncoupling and recoupling them with minimum cost and minimum loss of operating time as well as of visibility and explicitness in thé essential normative relationships among components. Therefore, we hâve to conclude that thé concept of membership in organizations does not stand for a général principle of social intégration; rather, it is a symbol of interdependence and independence, of inclusion and exclusion at thé same time.93 But a général principle of social intégration should perhaps be sought at a completely différent level, that of thé inclusion of individuals in thé légal order as a totality representing thé whole of society. 3. Citizenship

The distinction between inclusion and exlusion in thé légal System illuminâtes a problem that premodern societies solved by creating and separating various "spécial law communities".94 In those social segments (religious, ethnie groups or politically autonomous clans and cities) which were politically integrated by a common suprême authority, like thé Roman empire or thé islamic states, thé body of laws to be applied by thé judicial officers differed in accordance with thé characteristics of thé component groups. Thus, an individual had thé right to be treated as thé member of a spécial law community and to demand that thé norms of that légal order be applied to his dealings with other members and sometimes even with outsiders. An individual's cognizable légal identity and total légal status were determined by his membership in thé law community to which he belonged. This meant that relations with strangers were beyond thé law.95 According to Weber, despite thé émergence of thé political community, spécial law is a widespread phenomenon in 92 See Miles/Snow, 1992, pp. 55, 65 et sequ. 93 See Luhmann/De Giorgi, 1993, p. 327 et sequ. 94 "Sonderrechte": Weber, 1976, p. 410; Kronman, 1983, p. 108. 95 "Der Einzelne tràgt (seine) Rechtskonfession mit sich herum": Weber, 1976, p. 418.

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M i o i l c ' i n society as well. Modem law has created anew a gréât mass of i i r i l p ii I icularisms but, as Weber points out, it has done so upon a difi. 1 1 n i liasis, which refers to économie or technical qualities.96 Wlini cconomic contacts between strangers became necessary an indei" i n l c n l body of norms had to be developped. Thèse norms were con- i l lïom thé beginning as norms of thé market or as norms of a wider I H I | I | M - . I | community, distinct from thé légal orders of thé various groups in \ \ l n r l i différent individuals belonged. They regulated thé relationships "i i i . n i ^ c r s in law.97 The modem, western concept of thé state (and n . i l mil state) is based on thé émergence of thé political community as w r l l ;is !ho notions of citizenship and legal-rational authority; it suggests n i un i l y of political and légal sovereignty.98 An individual's membership in i l i r pohUcal community - his citizenship - came to be conceived in thé iinr .-ik'ilr.-ict terms as thé légal personality of thé parties to a modem, kct-oriented contract. Thr significance of thé fact that membership in thé political commun i i v r i n i l d be treated as a légal construction for which personal characi. 1 1 h.'s were ultimately irrelevant, becomes clearer if we take into conii li i i l ion thé ability of thé colonial state to create new catégories of Ubjei is. In thé libéral tradition in thé West, thé theorisation of rights is • il i u n i l'rom an inévitable opposition between thé state and thé individH i l This aspect has tended to be reproduced in thé colonial setting: ail r p identities and idéologies were regarded as nothing but a "carryi i v r i of 'tradition'".99 The colonial practice in relation to group idenn i i r s tended to exhibit a sharp duality. On thé one hand, déniai of thé l i r.iiiinacy of any identity apart from that statutorily defined by thé i î l e ; on thé other, a statutory récognition of "frozen identities" as thé i . ri.s of community (résidence), or work (job réservation and rémunérat i o n ) , or provision of services (schools, hospitals), or political processes i i ! • . lions, constituencies). This duality reflects thé tension between thé br.inry of state formation (thé political history of countries) and that of "' i . i l transformation (thé social history of peoples). A comparison of thé I.M i l K H I of thé sub-categories of colonial subjects with that of metropolii n i i i l i/.ens100 shows that new distinctions were used to treat ail colonial i i l > | i r t s (natives and non-natives) "as a resource to be managed by thé i oloniul state for thé saké of 'économie development'". Finally, thé end 11(1

Wtber, 1976, pp. 410, 503 - 504; Kronman, 1983, pp. 109 - 112. »'' Weber, 1976, p. 503. 11 : .!•!• on this point Pauly. 1995; on Weber's concept of thé state and thé correlal i m i between bureaucracy, democracy and nationality see Anter, 1995, p. 83 et Ncqu., 131 et sequ. H" On this point and on what follows, see Mamdani, 1990, pp. 372 - 373. i»« On this point, see Sack, 1993, p. 429.

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of colonialism didn't mean thé end of thé state in thé colonies. It is with thé 'independence' that entire communities became 'non-citizens' in foreign territories, and thé significance of cross-border migrant labour - in Africa, a traditional institution feeding thé labour needs of commodity agriculture - became enormous.101 Moreover, a host of secessionist movements brought about thé invevitable balkanisation. In thé West, thé notion of citizenship disjoins thé concept of membership in a political community from thé identity of thé person. Ideally, while nationality, religion and state are delinked, political unity fuses with légal unity.102 On thé other hand, participation in thé welfare state doesn't encompass political participation.103 The voting rights of immigrants is thé most famous example. As immigrants hâve mostly no access to thé central104 aspects of thé realm and order of symbols, of values and beliefs which govern thé host country, they implicitly cultivate thé myth of repatriation and social intégration "at home". They tacitly establish an instrumental, monofunctional106 relation to thé host country. On thé one side - according to Weber's concept of closure10' System boundaries are maintained against outsiders and procédures are developed to maintain distinctions of honour and prestige within thé System. On thé other side, immigrants show thé tendency to be a '"nonpolitical' speech community".107 Being parasitical as well as oppositional in nature, their vocabulary of politics stands both against and in need of thé dominant political vocabulary and culture. Thus, it confirms a dominant/subordinate cultural relationship and is not likely to work for thé cause of thé "Verfassungspatriotismus".108 Rather, it restricts thé discursive reproduction of thé immigrants' political culture in its ability to promote interests and needs effectively. The immigrants' political discourse shares thèse characteristics with other "nonpolitical" speech communities such as workers.109 But nationality supplies 'nonpolitical', 101 Mamdani, 1990, P. 367. 102 See thé example of thé citizenship of thé "Volksdeutschen" Seeler, 1960. i°3 Alpa, 1992, p. 32: "la cittadinanza si trasforma in 'appartenenza' a una categoria sociale () un significato più pregnante di quelle ancora corrente che désigna il vincolo tra un soggetto e uno stato". 104 On thé distinction between center and periphery see Eisenstadt, 1968, pp. XXX, XXXIII. 105 On this point, see Weber, 1972, p. 27: "Denn daB die blofie Tatsache des Heimatwechsels bei der Arbeit zu den mâchtigsten Mitteln ihrer Intensivierung gehôrt, steht durchaus fest." According to Weber, a "polish girl" or a "migratory italian laborer" get transformed as if by miracle into virtuous workers when placed in an industrial setting in a capitalist country. 106 Weber, 1976, p. 23. 107 Huspek/Kendall, 1991, p. 15. i°8 On this concept, see Habermas, 1992, p. 642. 109 Ibid., p. 14.

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n.M H n i , - i l speech communities with symbolic resources for voicing critical ini'Ti'sts in hard times of social and économie exclusion. I n ;i functionally differentiated society, thé nation as 'community' may, l i n l need not play thé rôle of a symbolic substitute for thé non existent Norlrl.iil représentation and intégration.110 The view of thé nation as n illonal community, endowed with thé attributes of independence, conI l i i n a n e e for thé future and sovereignty, may, but need not be thé focus of i" ople's sensé of belonging and identification as well as a major compoi i r n i of their personal identities. However, even under thé régime of funch o n . i l diffcrentiation and globalization, thé symbolic resources of thé mil ion as community to which "we" belong, "our" forfathers belonged iind "our" descendants will belong, are significant.111 The national comn i i i i i i l y supplies thé function Systems of society with semantic artefacts I H h ;is national éducation, national law, national literature, national paiiics or national church. Nations still put limits to thé multination . i l i / a l ion of shareholdings in thé parent companies of global enterprise r i o u p s . On thé other hand, although thé global company is exposed to n i . i i i v nirisdictions, and even though its management and workforce are i n i i l i in.ilional, it usually has a home government and a home tax author>\\ i h . M matters to it more than others.112 Hi Miles, in certain religious environments, for example Eastern Orthoi l i n i v , nationality fuses with religion and thus,'diverges markedly from U n 1 Western secular notion of thé nationstate. In this case, those of .nu il lier religion, even if citizens of thé nation-state, are not viewed as I I . I M H J ; a national identity. This is due to thé "millet System"1 3 of thé i il l o i n,-in empire which replaced Byzantium and enhanced thé Orthodox l ' I n i r e l i ' s power as ruler over thé Orthodox community within thé conMiniInl.N of Ottoman rule by delegating to it administrative and civil M i i l i o r i l . y , and merging religious and political functions. As a resuit, thé .1 nietion of thé national identity incorporated religion as a crucial iponent of thé personal identity. Under thé rule of thé newly conI M M led nation-state, this led (and leads) to restrictions on thé exercise ..I i e h | > i o i i s freedom which violate thé European Convention on Human Idr.lii. 1 . and thé underlying values of thé European Community.114 As a H" l'uni n, 1995, p. 54 et sequ. n i / / i / , 1992, p. 124. H ' !.. pp. 114, 117. II ' Tins means that thé question of ethnie minorities could only be addressed h mu ,-i western point of view and in western catégories. To this problem: Afshar, r i ' M . | > . 132. I I I l'ollis, 1993, pp. 347, 349-350; see further Makrides, 1994, p. 76. Charges hnvc been brought against Greece before thé European Commission and thé K u i n p e a n Court of Human Rights; see EuGRZ 1993, p. 228.

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resuit, we conclude that citizenship implies a partial inclusion. It does not run parallel with participation in thé welfare state, in thé national community or in thé central aspects of thé symbolic and institutional order. 4. Individual Rights

In a functionally differentiated society religions righteousness, financial distress and légal assertions are subject to différent mechanisms of sélection. For instance, economists see law as a "giant pricing machine".115 Their problem is that before policies - introduced by rulemaking - become economically effective, they "suffer thé ravages" of thé political and légal Systems.116 On thé other hand, jurists base their work and their reality assumptions on thé distinction between norms and facts, taking, thus, thé risk of intervening in an institutionally irrelevant reality. The constitutional protection of civil and political rights on thé one side, of social, économie and cultural ones, on thé other side, symbolizes thé multi-inclusion of persons in thé functionally differentiated society. From a normative point of view, under thé influence of thé doctrine of indivisibility of human rights, thé idea of a global approach - which no longer distinguishes between thé two catégories of rights - is gaining some ground.117 Nevertheless, although thé multi-inclusion of persons in sub-systems is legally protected, it can only partly be prescribed and enforced, let alone coordinated. Légal décisions and enforcement processes can neither replace thé opérations of thé other societal subsystems nor totally neutralize thé informai rules of inclusion administered within patron-client networks.118 Therein lies thé difficulty of thé so-called state intervention. Every effort in designing général rules of inclusion seems to be met with thé fact that "every good regulator of a System must be a model of that System".119 The protection of inclusion cannot replace inclusion because direct control of sub-systems by law is not attainable. The légal enforcement of inclusion would hâve to adequately represent thé internai complexity of thé controlled sub-system. This either leads to over-simplification by de-differentiation or to ungovernability because of hypercomplexity. Nevertheless, thé mère existence of formai rules of inclusion which are valid for everybody, for nationals H5 Veljanovski, 1990, p. 15. ne Ibid., p. 85. H' Trindade, 1990. 118 On thé conflict between 'statalismo" and "Catena clientelare", sçe Zincone, 1992, p. 156 et sequ. us Canant/Ashby, 1970.

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i - l l ;is l'or allons, has an at least symbolic integrative effect.120 Acinclusion occurs at thé level of "intermediate" institutions: Local ii.ni|',«' and trading Systems, community planning and socially responi M c mvrstment, community associations, neighbourhood partnerships, m n i i i | > l n y m < > n t action centres, resource and support centres, religious mmnities and urban or community studies and technical aid centres, H" \ . i l l play a very important rôle in determining thé conditions of I Iniion,121 i l " - légal construction of thé political membership and thé inclusion in U n |")lit,ical System do not détermine thé multi-inclusion of thé person in l i n "Hier sub-systems. The multi-inclusion is guaranteed by means of I h r mdividual rights provisions of thé modem constitutions, but thé coni i i n l m n a l protection of rights doesn't explicitly address thé question of h" lias thé ability and compétence to define thé content of thé individH i l i i/'.hts. 122 Distinctions such as libertarianism and légal paternalism "i i r|'.iilat,ory state and social selfregulation are partly due to thé continn..M l'ffort to answer this question. Libertarians place gréât emphasis ni vnluntariness: a person gives shape to her or his rights by means of M i i i i i ; voluntarily. The state has no right to legislate what people should ' I " i long as their actions harm no one else. On thé contrary, according i" l'r.'il p.it.ernalism, thé state law and légal institutions may thwart a i 's own goals if it is for thé person's own good. But there's thé rub, I l l i r i larians reply: thé state goals for a person do not coincide with his ils l'or himself.123 The solution seems to lie with a compromise, an i | i | > i ï > . - i r h that privilèges neither thé action and self-détermination of thé m i l i v i i l t i a l nor thé demands of thé institutional totality.124 5. Constitutions and Issue Avoidance

No matter how thé content of human rights is defined, thé rights proi i i i i - d by a constitution are not subject to political revision. For thosé wli" believe that there is a conflict between constitutionalism and i l ' in'icracy, thé tension stems from thé fact that constitutions remove cer1 " Viola, 1992, p. 68: "Per vivere insieme qualche cosa deve essere commune, ftiNN'mirhe solo le regole formali"; Zincone, 1992, p. 243: "Per integrazione inteni l i . i i n i ) la capacità di fare accetare ai vecchi e ai nuovi membri di una comniunità i l i - ' nmmuni di convivenza civile." i:n Sec IFP "Lokale Ôkonomie", 1994. 1 ' ' I.iensee, 1980; Badura, 1989, p. 43. 1 ••' < Hospers, 1980, p. 265. 12* On thé définition of matrimony, see Friauf, 1986, p. 2600: "Art. 6 I GG aïs Frciheitsrecht und personal geprâgte Institutsgarantie"; further Louven, 1993, p. 13: "Die Beurteilung der Gleichgeschlechtlichkeit mag sich verândern. Das Kochtsinstitut Ehe darf darunter nicht leiden."

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tain topics from collective délibération and public review: Paradoxically, it is thé removal of subjects from thé public sphère that is regarded as a means of ensuring thé proper functioning of thé démocratie process and social intégration. The removal is also supposed to divert resources from unresolvable problems to soluble ones.125 The distinction between thé universal suppression of a thème and thé mère transferral of that thème to a différent institutional context makes clear that everything dépends on thé agenda to which forbidden décisions are transferred. To exclude a topic (for instance, voting rights of immigrants)126 from thé national législative agenda may be to place it on thé local agenda and to subject it to thé control of local majorities. On thé other hand, a décision may be withdrawn from thé jurisdiction of ail branches and levels of government and consigned to private individuals.127 The classical example is thé exclusion of religion from politics: religious disputation might factionalize thé System and pose a threat to inclusive political citizenship. "Neutral territory" or "institutional neutrality"128 hâve played an essential rôle in unifying multidenominational societies, whereas religious indoctrinators remained free to practice their arts outside school walls and public institutions.129 By imposing "gag rules" on themselves, both thé political and thé légal System avoid issues that might threaten intégration and democracy. But privatization of issues like abortion, redistribution of property, thé rôle of women in society or thé rights of racial and ethnie minorities and homosexuals through constitutional law immunizes them from public scrutiny.130 In addition, if resolution through political and légal processes is unavailable, people may lose faith in thé system and resort to extralegal means. The distinction between issues that produce conflict and issues that do not, is thus inadéquate to décide which issues to remove from law-making and normal politics. This brings up thé main difficulty - thé problem of identification of thé issues that should be justifiably privatized on thé grounds of thé fear of factionalization and draining of public resources to insoluble problems.131 A sélection criterion is viewed in thé question whether thé issue sought to be privatized by constitutional law can be considered a right. Rights provisions are designed to fence off certain areas from majoritarian control. But as thé category of interests that can 125 Holmes, 1988, pp. 24, 26. 126 From thé point of view of german constitutional law thé définition of "Staatsvolk" coïncides with thé one of "Gemeindevolk", therefore an issue removal is not possible. 127 Holmes, 1988, p. 41. 128 Schlaich, 1972, p. 129.

129 Ibid., p. 44. iso Sunstein, 1988, p. 340.

13l Ibid., pp. 340 - 342.

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417

ic(|uiic I l i c status of a right is relatively small, thé removal of issues h c i n i i h c public sphère remains limited. AU this suggests that "issuei lance" and "stratégie self-censorship" cannot bring about social m i e l ' i . i h n n ; they will sometimes promote thé proper functioning of thé i ci i l •! i i - :.|)here, but sometimes they will not. VI. Conclusions i c i ; . i l norms are symbolized by norm-sentences which should not be i c i . ni il'u-d with thé norms as such. They are thé product of processes « l i n h Imt.h regulate behaviour and confirm or modify thé normative i . i i n l . i n l usrd to regulate behaviour. In this sensé légal norms are 'rules' i n . I ( I r p r i i t l on thé formation of social expectations of a normative charic in in private and public institutions. The concept of rule is a token of U n i-nrrrl.-il.ion between normative expectational structures and thé on l ' . m i i ' M-IccUon of anticipated or unanticipated events. Déviation and | i h . n i c c make sensé only in thé light of existing normative expecta-. w l i i i - h , in turn, are modified or confirmed by déviation and complii .t % nal décisions seem to be premissed on normative information n, i i i u n ml l»t> distilled from textbooks or précédents. On thé contrary, it I n - lirought into connection with them, ex post. Therefore, instead of . H . I I I I I I : l'or "real laws" (A. M. Honoré) we should search for "real Mil.

W i n l i - I I if command or imperative theory of légal norms départs from i l H i n . i h i n of a state monopoly in thé powers of law making, thé recognii n u i ihi-ory sees thé légal character of thé norm depending not on thé i » > i l n i i l y of state intervention, but on a discource deciding about thé I . H i whH.her thé norm is reasonably acceptable or worthy of recognii n in Arrurding to Max Weber it is thé simultaneous diversification of i h l l i M ni mrchanisms for thé formation, innovation and institutionalizaI I . . M "I c-xpt'ctations rather than coercion as such that is of primary i n i p i i i i.nicc for thé légal ordering of action. Law-oriented behaviour i ' i INCS u vast range of actions. A social action is law-oriented if (a) a n i . i h v r standard for thé évaluation of conduct and (b) thé possibility . i l i r l l r r i i i i ) ' , on compliance and déviation are among thé background . . M n M u n i s of thé action itself. l i n - , implies a shift from a legalistic perspective to a more sociologic n l l y Ncnsitive one which is bare of prefabricated reality assumptions il i Hit 1 rôle of thé state, modernization and functional differentiation. Tlion'fore, describing law-oriented behaviour as it understands and pre. n i i l self, is an enterprise that présupposes thé successful intégration ni l'T,al theory and sociology of law. It has to entail middle range thé-

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Ml

ories that in turn entail corrigible hypothèses and observer-dependent data about law-oriented behaviour in various institutional settings. At thé level of thé distinction between légal and illégal behaviour, modem légal Systems are ail-inclusive. They include every single social action which can be evaluated as legally right or legally wrong. The formalization of normative expectations makes exchange relations between légal and moral strangers more predictable but cannot replace informai rules and décisions about inclusion and exclusion. At thé level of contracts and organizations légal Systems produce both inclusion and exclusion. While contracts produce légal norms that are not binding for nonparties, organizations cannot regulate non-member behaviour. Extracontractual binding effects and prerequisites hâve to be administered by other institutions (for instance, organizations or thé state). Similarly, extra-organizational binding effects can only be brought about by extraorganizational institutions such as thé market or thé generalized média of communication. Besides, although constitutions prescribe thé societal multi-inclusion of persons by means of instituting civil, social, political and économie rights, thé légal protection and enforcement of individual rights remain internai opérations of thé légal System which cannot replace thé opérations of other sub-systems. Finally, deleting divisive and/or unanswerable questions from thé political agenda by constitutional law will sometimes decrease and sometimes increase factional struggle.

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A l i n , ,1 H ni ( 11)112): W h v (io people pay taxes? In: Journal of Public Economies 48, l > | i '.'.I :ill >:; :, . • ' . • . ] , f U | » i , ( l ( IKIIU); I.u peiKona. Tra cittadinanza e mercato, Milano

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i l l M H ) 'l'ouï, N o n , Peut-Etre. Education et Vérité, Paris AMmi >! I I U I M ) l,e droit international entre ordre et chaos, Paris

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MMI/MMI, I' ( I H M l l ) lier Schutz von Religion und Weltanschauung durch das GrundMMeU, TObln^i'ii H^iylttf, K ( I D D l l ) Capital Structure as a Mechanism of Control: a Comparison of |''|IIMIII'|M| Systems, in: Aoki/Gustafsson/Williamson (eds.), The Firm as a INi'xuti of Treaties, London, pp. 236 - 262 llerknmit.-. L. / Donnerstein, E. (1982): External validity is more than skin deep, In American Psychologist 37, pp. 245 - 257 Itliti'k'liuru, K. (1992): Credibility and Time-Consistency in Monetary Policy, in: llnwd / l
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