Law-on-pub-officers-batch-1-cases-6-10.docx

GONZALEZ III V OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014. BRION, J.: These two petitions have been because they raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of the power to remove from office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the constitutionally-created office to which they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman. FACTS: G.R. No. 196231: A formal charge for Grave Misconduct was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others. Private complainant, Christian M. Kalaw also filed a similar charge before the Office of the City Prosecutor,. While said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza et at al in the Office of the Ombudsman. Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding that the material allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against the same police officers, for failure of the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite due notice. However, upon the recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza et al guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. Mendoza and his colleagues filed for a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrez for final approval, in whose office it remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service. In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. The IIRC found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman-prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from service. Hence the petition. G.R. No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons and several unknown persons with Plunder and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail. However, the government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential guidelines. Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hook notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious public offenses, the House of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. The Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3, recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate 1|P a g e

charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate government office for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act. Hence the petition. These cases primarily seek to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioners insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. ISSUES: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman. Won granting the President the power
to remove a Deputy Ombudsman
 diminishes the
independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman WoN dismissal of Gonzalez III was correct HELD: First Issue: YES. The Ombudsman's administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy
 Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities. Moreover, the Power of the President to
Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor is
Implied from his Power to
Appoint.

By granting express statutory
power to the President to remove
a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor, Congress
merely filled an obvious gap in
the law. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.

The Power of the President to
Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor is
Implied from his Power to
Appoint. In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman. The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's own role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices. Second Issue NO. Granting the President the Power
to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
does not Diminish the
Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians." Third Issue: WoN dismissal of Gonzalez III was correct No.His removal must be for any of the grounds provided in the removal of the ombudsman. the alleged ground of betrayal of public trust was not present in his case. Congress laid down two restrictions on the President’s exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process. Petitioner Gonzales may not be
removed from office where the
questioned acts, falling short of
constitutional standards, do not
constitute betrayal of public trust. Petitioner's act of directing the PNPIAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be considered a manifestation of his undue interest in the case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people." The factual circumstances that the case was turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that administrative liability was pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even without the private complainant verifying the truth of his statements; that the decision was immediately implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than nine months cannot be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the lack of evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of the parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as he did. There was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention or questionable motivation. The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust. The Office of the President is vested
with statutory authority to proceed
administratively against petitioner
Barreras-Sulit to determine the
existence of any of the grounds for
her removal from office as provided
for under the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act. DISPOSITIVE 2|P a g e

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED. OTHER DOCTRINES Absence of motion of reconsideration; effect of. The omission of the filing of a motion for reconsideration poses no obstacle for the Court’s review of its ruling on the whole case since a serious constitutional question has been raised and is one of the underlying bases for the validity or invalidity of the presidential action. If the President does not have any constitutional authority to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman and/or a Special Prosecutor in the first place, then any ruling on the legal correctness of the OP’s decision on the merits will be an empty one. In other words, since the validity of the OP’s decision on the merits of the dismissal is inextricably anchored on the final and correct ruling on the constitutional issue, the whole case – including the constitutional issue – remains alive for the Court’s consideration on motion for reconsideration. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014. Congress; power to determine modes of removal from office of public officers; must be consistent with the core constitutional principle of independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. The intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that “all other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment” in the second sentence of Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress from extending the more stringent rule of “removal only by impeachment” to favoured public officers. Contrary to the implied view of the minority, in no way can this provision be regarded as blanket authority for Congress to provide for any ground of removal it deems fit. While the manner and cause of removal are left to congressional determination, this must still be consistent with constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the right to procedural and substantive due process; the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure; the principle of separation of powers; and the principle of checks and balances. The authority granted by the Constitution to Congress to provide for the manner and cause of removal of all other public officers and employees does not mean that Congress can ignore the basic principles and precepts established by the Constitution. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014. Constitutional bodies; concept of independence. The independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics – they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these “independent” bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of “independence” would result in the impairment of their core functions. The deliberative considerations abundantly show that the independent constitutional commissions have been consistently intended by the framers to be independent from executive control or supervision or any form of political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the “independence” granted to these bodies prevents presidential interference. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.

Gross negligence; concept of; not present when Deputy Ombudsman reviews a case for nine days. Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. In case of public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. The Deputy Ombudsman cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted on the case forwarded to him within nine days. The OP’s ruling that Gonzales had been grossly negligent for taking nine days, instead of five days as required for Hearing Officers, is totally baseless.Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014. Impeachment; concept of. Impeachment is the most difficult and cumbersome mode of removing a public officer from office. It is, by nature, a sui generis politico-legal process that signals the need for a judicious and careful handling as shown by the process required to initiate the proceeding; the one-year limitation or bar for its initiation; the limited grounds for impeachment; the defined instrumentality given the power to try impeachment cases; and the number of votes required for a finding of guilt. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014. MORALES V CA AND BINAY G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: "All government is a trust, every branch of government is a trust, and immemorially acknowledged so to be[.] Facts: Binay, Jr. was charged with administrative and criminal cases in connection with the allegation that he is involved in anomalous activities attending the procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati. Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable since Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati and Phases III to V transpired during his first term. His re-election as mayor for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic. The Ombudsman issued an order placing Binay, et al. under preventive suspension. The CA granted Binay’s prayer for TRO enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order. According to the CA, it was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO considering that if it were established that the acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that he can no longer be administratively charged. Under the Condonation Doctrine, which applies only to administrative cases, (1) the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct; (2) an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and (3) courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers. Issue: WoN CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and the WPI enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine Ruling: No. However, the condonation doctrine is abandoned, but the abandonment is prospective in effect. 3|P a g e

No. The CA's resolutions were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. By merely following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution. However, the condonation doctrine should be abandoned. There is no constitutional or statutory basis to support it. The concept of public office, under the 1987 Constitution, AS A PUBLIC TRUST and the corollary requirement of ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PEOPLE AT ALL TIMES is PLAINLY INCONSISTENT with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense. In fact the LGC and the RRACCS precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post. There is no presumption in any statute or procedural rule that the electorate, when re-electing a local official, do so with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. In reality, most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the public. Condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is unknown. However, the Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application. It should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected. (LONGER VERSION) Morales v CA and Binay Facts: A complaint was filed against Binay and other public officers of the City Government of Makati charging them with administrative cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and criminal cases for violation of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents. Binay, Jr. was alleged to be involved in anomalous activities attending the procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati. The Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order, placing Binay Jr., et al., under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases. Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order. The CA granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, notwithstanding Peña, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor. Citing Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA, it found that it was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the matter and seriousness of the issues raised, considering that if it were established that the acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that he can no longer be administratively charged. Binay’s contention: Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic. In view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to sustain the charges against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office. The Ombudman’s contentions:

The condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. Reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by before it during the administrative proceedings. There is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013. Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and the WPI enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine. Ruling: No. However, the condonation doctrine is abandoned, but the abandonment is prospective in effect. A. The WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was correctly issued. The CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. By merely following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution above. B. The Condonation Doctrine Condonation is defined as "a victim's express or implied forgiveness of an offense, especially by treating the offender as if there had been no offense." Under the Condonation Doctrine, First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct. Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor. Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers. It is not based on statutory law but a jurisprudential creation. It originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija. In which case, as there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court, resorted to American authorities and found that the weight of authorities seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term. The condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case. Also, it would not apply to appointive officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise. C. The doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases. There is really no established weight of authority in the US favoring the doctrine of condonation. The plain difference in setting, including the sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual's judicious re-examination. Pascual was decided within the context of the 1935 Constitution which was silent with respect to public accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public trust. The concept of public office, under the 1987 Constitution, AS A PUBLIC TRUST and the corollary requirement of ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PEOPLE AT ALL TIMES is PLAINLY INCONSISTENT with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense. There is no constitutional or statutory basis to support the notion. In fact the Local Government Code and the RRACCS precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post. If condonation of an elective official's administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. 4|P a g e

The proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any, is infirm. No such presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule. Most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the public. At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is unknown. Liability arising from administrative offenses may only be condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. D. The Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application. It should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected. JOSE C. MIRANDA vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 154098. July 27, 2005. PUNO,J. Good Faith - - Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees Summary: Mayor Miranda was placed under preventive suspension but while suspended, he allegedly did official acts. Ombudsman then filed before the Sandiganbayan an Information charging Mayor Miranda of Usurpation of Authority which is punishable under the RPC. Sandiganbayan then ordered a 90-day preventive suspension against Mayor Miranda. Mayor Miranda questioned the length of the preventive suspension and argued that it is repugnant to the 60-day limit imposed by the LGC. Also, he raised the defense that he did official acts in good faith believing that he can already reassume his position. The SC first held that Miranda cannot anymore question the sufficiency of the Information as he is already estopped due to his act of entering his plea. Also, the allegations in the Information are sufficient enough to raise the issue of WON he committed fraud against the government. On the issue of the legality of the 90-day period, the SC upheld its validity as the suspension is based on the Ombudsman Law and not from the LGC. The differences between the said laws were also explained. As to purpose, the limit in the LGC is motivated by the prevention of being influenced by political will; the same is not a concern in the Ombudsman Law since It is a constitutional body. Also, the Ombudsman law provides for more stringent requirements before a public officer may be preventively suspended; the requirements provided in the LGC are more lenient. Accordingly, due to these differences, it cannot be said that the other is repugnant to the other law. Doctrine: Under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, the suspension of a public officer by the Sandiganbayan is mandatory after a determination has been made of the validity of the Information. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the Court must issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs and buts about it. The Sandiganbayan properly construed Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 as covering two types of offenses: (1) any offense involving fraud on the government; and (2) any offense involving public funds or property. Nothing limits Section 13 only to acts involving fraud on public funds or property. Also, the difference between suspensions by the Ombudsman and the President, governor and mayor under the LGC are clear. The latter are political personages and so the possibility of extraneous factors influencing their decision to impose preventive suspensions is not remote. The Ombudsman, on the other hand, is given the independence of the office which is protected by the Constitution. The two provisions govern differently. In order to justify the preventive suspension by the Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against the officer or employee should involve dishonestly, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) that the charges should warrant removal from the service; or (c)

the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed against him. On the other hand, the LGC requirements for suspension (at any time after the issues are joined), are that (a) there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is strong, (c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. FACTS: The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda then the mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, under preventive suspension for 6 months for alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713, but while suspended, he allegedly did official acts. Subsequently, Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro filed a Complaint for usurpation of authority or official functions against Mayor Miranda with the Office of the Ombudsman. Sandiganbayan then ordered a 90-day preventive suspension against Mayor Miranda. Mayor Miranda questioned the length of the preventive suspension and argued that it is repugnant to the 60-day limit imposed by the LGC. Also, he raised the defense that he reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer and that he did official acts in good faith believing that he can already reassume his position. He also averred that, on the day he reassumed office, he received a memorandum from DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez instructing him to vacate his office and he immediately complied with the same. Ombudsman then filed with the Sandiganbayan an Information against Mayor Miranda for violation of Art. 177 RPC, penalizing usurpation of authority. Sandiganbayan ordered a reinvestigation in light of the manifestations made by prosecution and defense counsel. After reinvestigation, Special Prosecution Officer Coquia recommended the dismissal of the case and held that Miranda reassumed his office in good faith and on mistake of fact due to the difficult questions of law involved. Ombudsman Desierto referred Coquia’s resolution to the Ombudsman’s Chief Legal Counsel for review. The Chief Legal Counsel disagreed with Coquia and recommended the filing of the case against Mayor Miranda based on the following grounds: That Mayor Miranda;s invocation of good faith was belied by the fact that he received a memorandum from the DILG informing him that his view of the preventive suspension period was untenable and that he should serve out its remaining period That Miranda violated the orders of both the Ombudsman and the DILG Ombudsman Desierto addopted the recommendation of the Chief Legal Counsel and the case was re-raffled. Subsequently, the prosecution filed an amended Information with the Sandiganbayan, to which the Mayor Miranda interposed a negative plea The prosecution then filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to suspend Mayor Miranda pendente lite based on Sec. 13 RA 3018 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) Mayor Miranda opposed this motion on the ground that the offense of usurpation of authority or official functions under Art. 177 RPC is not embraced by Sec. 13 RA 3019 Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution suspending Mayor Miranda from office for 90 days based on the finding that he violated Art. 177 RPC which involves fraud. It was further held that Mayor Miranda’s act fell within the catch-all provision “… or for any offense involving fraud upon government” Mayor Miranda’s MR was denied, hence this petition ISSUES: Issue # 1: WON the acts alleged in the complaint falls under the scope of Sec. 131 RA 3019 (Yes) 1

Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. - Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution

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Ratio # 1: Sec. 13 RA 3019 cannot be limited only to acts involving fraud on public funds or property. Sandiganbayan properly construed Sec. 13 RA 3019 as covering two types of offenses: Any offense involving fraud on the government; and Any offense involving public funds or property In the case at bar, Mayor Miranda’s act fell within the catch-all provision “or for any offense involving fraud upon government” Fraud upon government was committed when Mayor Miranda allegedly assumed the duties and performed acts pertaining to the Office of the Mayor under pretense of official position Mayor Miranda’s acts in assuming the duties and function of the Office of the Mayor despite his suspension from said office resulted to a clear disruption of office and worst, a chaotic situation in the affairs of the government as the employees, as well as the public, suffered confusion as to who is the head of the Office. SC held that this actuation constitutes fraud which in the general sense is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another or by which an undue and unconscious advantage is taken of another Also, the rule is that under Sec. 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory after a determination has been made of the validity of the Information. In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the information filed is valid and Mayor Miranda in fact acquiesced to the validity of the Information when he pleaded not guilty. Further, the acts alleged in the Information constitute fraud upon government or public funds or property, as required by law. When accused-mayor appointed persons in various positions, he indirectly dealt with the city's funds as those persons appointed will be given their respective salaries, benefits and other monetary consideration which will be paid wholly or mainly out of the city's funds. Additionally, when he performed acts pertaining to the Office of the Mayor, i.e.[,] approval of vouchers, and payment of other expenses which is subject to proof, he likewise indirectly dealt with the funds of the city. However, the dissenting opinion presents another view on this issue and holds that there was actually no fraud. The dissent holds that: it would be fraud of public funds if these public officials just collected their salarieswithout rendering service to the government. that "fraud upon government" must be read so as to require that malversation of funds was committed. In answering the dissent, SC said that adopting the dissenting opinion's line of reasoning would render superfluous the phrase "fraud upon government" as malversation is subsumed by "any offense involving public funds or property." Moreover, the SC is not convinced that Mayor Miranda reassumed office under an honest belief that he was no longer under preventive suspension. In Mayor Miranda’s affidavit, he admitted that he refused to leave his position despite the memorandum of Undersecretary Sanchez and left only a few days after recceipt thereof due to the coercion of the PNP. This contradicts his assrtion that he immediately complied with the memorandum of Undersecretary Sanchez. As the SC said in various cases, if petitioner (and his counsel) had an iota of respect for the rule of law, they should have assailed the validity of the order of suspension in court instead of taking the law into their own hands. Issue # 2: WON the suspension is proper (yes) Ratio # 2: and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government.

It should be stressed that petitioner was suspended by the Sandiganbayan. Under Sec. 13 RA 3019, this suspension is mandatory if the Information is sufficient. On the other hand, the dissent argues that the Information is insufficient rendering the suspension invalid. The SC pointed out the fact that Mayor Miranda entered his plea and that it is a basic rule that entering a plea waives any objection the petitioner may have to the validity of the information unless the case falls under the exceptions. Also, in determining the sufficiency of the information, the test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The Information in the case at bar satisfied this test especially when it is stated therein the specific acts which constitute usurpation of official functions. If the purpose of the preventive suspension was to enable the investigating authority to gather documents without intervention from petitioner, then, from respondents' submission, we can only conclude that this purpose was already achieved, during the nearly month-long suspension of petitioner. Granting that now the evidence against petitioner is already strong, even without conceding that initially it was weak, it is clear to us that the maximum six-month period is excessive and definitely longer than necessary for the Ombudsman to make its legitimate case against petitioner. Issue # 3: WON suspension issued in this case violated the 60-day limit imposed by the LGC (No) Ratio # 3: In the case at bar, the SC expressly stated that its decision was rendered without subscribing to the petitioner’s claim that the LGC as been violated. The Court only ruled that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in imposing a 6-month preventive suspension since it was admitted that the documents required were already obtained by 19 July 1999 or 24 days after the imposition of the preventive suspension. Therefore, the purpose for which the suspension was imposed was already served. The dissent also cited the Rios case. The SC answered that said case is not applicable in the case at bar since the powers of the Sandiganbayan were at issue in that case, not those of the Ombudsman as in this case. It is also worth noting that Rios cited Sec. 63 LGC as its legal basis wherein it is clear from the provision that it is only meant as a cap on the discretionary power of the President, governor and mayor to impose excessively long preventive suspensions. The Ombudsman, on the other hand, is not subject to political pressure given the independence of the office which is protected by no less that the Constitution. LGC vs Ombudsman Law: Difference in the requirements for suspension to be valid (from Hagad case) Requirements to justify preventive suspension of a public official

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Ombudsman Law the evidence of guilt should be strong, and the charge against the officer or employee should involve dishonestly, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; that the charges should warrant removal from the service; or the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case

LGC there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of the evidence of culpability is strong the gravity of the offense so warrants, or the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other

filed against him

evidence

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. The six-month period of preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman was indubitably within the limit provided by its enabling law. This enabling law has not been modified by the legislature. In answering the dissent that the difference between the two laws violates the equal protection clause, SC holds that there is substantial distinction to justify it. The Constitution has endowed the Ombudsman with unique safeguards to ensure immunity from political pressure. Among these statutory protections are fiscal autonomy,fixed term of office and classification as an impeachable officer. Disposition: Sandiganbayan decision affirmed; Mayor Miranda suspended for 90 days OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. DECHAVEZ G.R. NO 176702 November 13, 2013 BRION, J FACTS: Dechaves served as the president of the Negros State College of Agriculture (NSCA) from 2001 until his retirement in April 2006. On May 5, 2002, on a Sunday, Dechavez with his wife drove the college service Suzuki Vitara to go to Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. On their way back to the NSCA, they figured in a vehicular accident resulting in minor injuries to them and damage to the vehicle. To claim insurance, Dechavez executed an affidavit before the GSIS which subsequently granted Dechavez's claims amounting to P308,000.00, while the NSCA shouldered P71,000.00 as its share in the vehicle's depreciation expense. On November 11 2002, 20 faculty and staff of the NSCA asked the COA to conduct an audit investigation of NSCA’s expenditures in the accident. The COA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Hence the complainants went before the Ombudsman, Visayas, charging Dechavez with Dishonesty under Section 46(b)(l), Chapter 6, Tile I of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Ombudsman dismissed Dechavez from the service with all accessory penalties after finding him guilty. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied. On appeal, the CA reversed the Ombudsman’s findings. It found that complainants failed to sufficiently show that Dechavez had deliberately lied in his May 10, 2002 affidavit. Dechavez sufficiently proved that he went on an official tip. MR likewise denied. The Ombudsman argues that the guilt of Dechavez has been proven by substantial evidence -the quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings. It likewise invokes its findings and posits that because they are supported by substantial evidence, they deserve great weight and must be accorded full respect and credit. Dechavez counters that the petition raises factual issues that are improper for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. He adds that the present case has been mooted by his retirement from the service on April 9, 2006, and should properly be dismissed. Issues: (1) Can the SC review questions of facts under Rule 45? (2) Did Dechavez’s retirement render moot the present case? Held. (1) Yes. The rule that the Court will not disturb the CA' s findings of fact is not an absolute rule that admits of no exceptions. A notable exception is the presence of conflict of findings of fact between or among the tribunals' rulings on questions of fact. The case before us squarely falls under this exception as the tribunals below made two critical conflicting factual findings. (2) No. Retirement from the service during the pendency of an administrative case does not render the case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce

the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. OCA vs. Juan: Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable. Baquerfo v. Sanchez: Cessation from office of respondent by resignation or retirement neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Court's at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. Jurisdiction, once it attaches, cannot be defeated by the acts of the respondent save only where death intervenes and the action does not survive. A.M. No. 14155-Ret. November 19, 2013 RE: APPLICATION FOR SURVIVORSHIP PENSION BENEFITS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9946 OF MRS. PACITA A. GRUBA, SURVIVING SPOUSE OF THE LATE MANUEL K. GRUBA, FORMER CTA ASSOCIATE JUDGE. RESOLUTION LEONEN, J.: We stand in awe of death s inevitability and tragic immutability, but we can temper the effects of the law on those it leaves behind. This case involves a judge of the Court of Tax Appeals1 who died while in service. He died at the age of 55 years, two (2) months, and six (6) days. He died prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9946, which substantially amended the benefits provided in Republic Act No. 910. We are asked to decide whether the death gratuity benefits and the survivorship pension benefits under Republic Act No. 9946 apply to this case. We rule to grant death gratuity benefits. Manuel K. Gruba (Judge Gruba) was born on April 19, 1941. He began his government service on December 3, 1979 as Senior Revenue Executive Assistant I at the Bureau of Internal Revenue. He rose from the ranks at the Bureau of Internal Revenue until he was appointed as an Associate Judge of the Court of Tax Appeals on September 17, 1992. On June 25, 1996, Judge Gruba passed away. The cause of his death was natural and was reported as brain stem/midbrain stroke, basilar artery thrombosis, embolic event.2 He was 55 years old when he died. He was in government service for a total of 16 years, six (6) months, and 21 days. In those years, he rendered service for three (3) years, nine (9) months, and eight (8) days in the Judiciary. The surviving spouse of Judge Gruba, Mrs. Pacita A. Gruba (Mrs. Gruba), applied for retirement/gratuity benefits under Republic Act No. 910.3 In a Resolution dated September 24, 1996, this Court approved the application filed by Mrs. Gruba. Per certification dated October 25, 2012 by the Court of Tax Appeals’ Office of Administrative and Finance Services, the five-year lump sum retirement benefit under Republic Act No. 910 was remitted to the Government Service Insurance System effective June 26, 1996. A total of P1,486,500.00, representing the five-year lump sum gratuity due to Judge Gruba, was paid to his heirs.4 On January 13, 2010, Congress amended Republic Act No. 910 and passed Republic Act No. 9946. Republic Act No. 9946 provided for more benefits, including survivorship pension benefits, among others. The law also provides a retroactivity provision which states: SEC. 3-B. The benefits under this Act shall be granted to all those who have retired prior to the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the benefits shall be applicable only to the members of the Judiciary: Provided, further, That the benefits to be granted shall be prospective. On January 11, 2012, Mrs. Gruba applied for survivorship pension benefits under Republic Act No. 9946.5 In a Resolution dated January 17, 2012, this Court approved the application of Mrs. Gruba. She

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received P1,026,748.00 for survivorship pension benefits from January 1, 2011 to April 2012.6 In a Resolution dated November 27, 2012, this Court revoked the Resolution dated January 17, 2012 and directed the Court of Tax Appeals to discontinue the payment of the survivorship pension benefits to Mrs. Gruba. However, this Court stated that Mrs. Gruba was not required to refund the survivorship pension benefits received pursuant to the Resolution dated January 17, 2012.7 This Court required the Office of the Chief Attorney to report on the matter. In a Comment dated May 14, 2013, the Office of the Chief Attorney recommended that the heirs of Judge Gruba be entitled to the 10-year lump sum death benefit under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 9946. This Resolution adopts in part the recommendation of the Office of the Chief Attorney. The issues for our resolution are the following: (1) whether Republic Act No. 9946 applies to Judge Gruba; (2) whether the heirs of Judge Gruba are entitled to the 10-year lump sum gratuity benefits under Republic Act No. 9946; and (3) whether Mrs. Gruba is entitled to survivorship pension benefits under the same law. We decide the first two issues in favor of the heirs of Judge Gruba. However, we deny the application for survivorship pension benefits of Mrs. Gruba. The rationale for retirement benefits Retirement laws are social legislation. In general, retirement laws provide security to the elderly who have given their prime years in employment whether in the private sector or in government. These laws ensure the welfare of individuals who are approaching their twilight years and have limited opportunities for productive employment that give them a steady income stream. In the private sector, retirement packages are usually crafted as "forced savings" on the part of the employee. In government, lucrative retirement benefits are used as an incentive mechanism to encourage competent individuals to have careers in government. This Court often states: [R]etirement benefits receivable by public employees are valuable parts of the consideration for entrance into and continuation in public office or employment. They serve a public purpose and a primary objective in establishing them is to induce competent persons to enter and remain in public employment and render faithful and efficient service while so employed.8 (Emphasis supplied) Due to this extraordinary purpose, the Constitution provides guidelines on periodically increasing retirement benefits.9 On several occasions, this Court has liberally interpreted retirement laws in keeping with its purpose. In Government Service Insurance System v. De Leon:10 Retirement laws, in particular, are liberally construed in favor of the retiree because their objective is to provide for the retiree’s sustenance and, hopefully, even comfort, when he no longer has the capability to earn a livelihood. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security, and well-being of government employees may be enhanced. Indeed, retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose.11 This general principle for retirement benefits applies to members of the Judiciary. However, Congress made a special law specifically for retiring justices and judges. This law on "retirement pensions of Justices arise from the package of protections given by the Constitution to guarantee and preserve the independence of the Judiciary."12Aside from guaranteeing judicial independence, a separate retirement law for justices and judges is designed to attract intelligent members of the Bar to join the Judiciary. It compensates for the opportunity cost of having profitable private practices. The rationale for death benefits Aside from considering old age retirement benefits, the law also protects the welfare of the heirs and surviving spouses of employees who die before or after retirement. "The law extends survivorship benefits to the surviving and qualified beneficiaries of the deceased member or pensioner to cushion the beneficiaries against the adverse economic effects resulting from the death of the wage earner or pensioner."13

The law usually takes into account the nature of the employment and the vulnerability of the individual to risks that might lead to an early demise. Therefore, military personnel, by virtue of Republic Acts No. 3056, 5976, and 541, and justices and judges, by virtue of Republic Act No. 910 as amended by Republic Act No. 9946, are given generous death benefits. The law recognizes the threats these kinds of government employees face because of their positions. In order to minimize the adverse effects of unexpected deaths while in service, the law extends benefits to the deceased employee’s loved ones. It is also the law’s way of sympathizing with the loss of these families. Death benefits remind the heirs that despite their loss, their departed love one had valuable contributions to society, and the State is grateful for these contributions. These benefits also provide more incentive for the independence of those who serve in the Judiciary. They allow peace of mind since members of the Judiciary know that they could provide for their spouse and their children even beyond their death. Retirement, disability retirement, and death as modes of terminating employment Retirement benefits are usually conditioned on compliance with certain requirements.1âwphi1 Common requirements include age and years in service. Upon reaching a certain age and compliance with the years of service, an employee becomes entitled to benefits by operation of law. An exception to compliance with age and service requirements is disability retirement. It is still considered a form of retirement, but the condition for compliance is not usually age or years in service. Disability retirement is conditioned on the incapacity of the employee to continue his or her employment due to involuntary causes such as illness or accident. The social justice principle behind retirement benefits also applies to those who are forced to cease from service due to disabilities beyond their control. In line with the doctrine of liberal interpretation of retirement laws, this Court has often construed death as disability retirement. "[T]here is no more permanent or total physical disability than death."14 The term "retirement," when used in a strict legal sense, refers to mandatory or optional retirement. However, when used in a more general sense, "retire" may encompass the concepts of both disability retirement and death. All of these concepts involve events that happen to an employee beyond his or her control. In case of mandatory or optional retirement, reaching a certain age due to mere passage of time is beyond the control of the individual. In the case of disability retirement and death, acquiring an illness or accident is beyond the control of the individual. In Re: Resolution Granting Automatic Permanent Total Disability Benefits to Heirs of Justices and Judges,15 this Court rejected the Department of Budget and Management’s insistence that "death while in actual service" and "retirement due to permanent physical disability" are distinct and separate circumstances. In this case, the Department of Budget and Management refused to release additional gratuity benefits to judges on account that they died while in actual service without being able to apply for permanent physical disability benefits. Since this case occurred prior to the issuance of Republic Act No. 9946, there were gaps in the law. Gratuity payments due to permanent physical disability were twice as much as gratuity payments caused by death while in active service. This Court, in order to maximize the benefits given to the heirs, treated death as retirement due to permanent physical disability. Hence, we stated: In Re: Retirement Benefits of the late City Judge Alejandro Galang, Jr., this Court has had the occasion to construe Republic Act No. 910, particularly the phrase "permanent physical disability" found in Section 2 thereof. There, this Court considered death "while in actual service" to be encompassed by the phrase "permanent physical disability." For, as aptly pointed out by then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee in his concurring opinion in that case, "there is no more permanent or total physical disability than death." When the law has gaps which tend to get in the way of achieving its purpose, thus resulting in injustice, this Court is allowed to fill the open spaces therein.16 Retiring due to physical disabilities is not far removed from the situation involving death of a judge or justice. This explains why retirement laws necessarily include death benefits. The gaps in the old law prompted Congress to improve death benefits given to the heirs of deceased judges and justices. 8|P a g e

Republic Act No. 9946 applies retroactively to those who died or were killed while they were in government service Republic Act No. 910 was enacted in 1954 to provide for retirement benefits of justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. Through various amendments, the coverage of Republic Act No. 910 now includes justices of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, as well as judges of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Shari’a District Court, Shari’a Circuit Court, and any other court hereafter established.17 Republic Act No. 910 provides for two basic benefits: retirement and death benefits. The retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 910 may be availed in two ways. One way is through compulsory retirement of a judge or justice by attaining the age of 70 years old and complying with the service requirement of 20 years in the Judiciary or any other government branch. The other way is through optional retirement of a judge or justice by attaining the age of 57 years old and complying with the service requirement of 20 years in government, the last 10 of which must be continuously rendered in the Judiciary.18 The optional retirement requirements were modified in Republic Act No. 5095. To qualify for optional retirement under that law, a judge or justice must serve at least 20 years in government, and the last five (5) years of service must be continuously rendered in the Judiciary.19 The death benefits under Republic Act No. 910 entitle the heirs of a deceased justice or judge to a five-year lump sum of the salary the justice or judge was receiving during the period of death. The five-year lump sum is conditioned on the compliance with the service requirement of 20 years. Noncompliance with the service requirement entitles the heirs only to a two-year lump sum. In 2010, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9946, otherwise known as An Act Granting Additional Retirement, Survivorship, and Other Benefits to Members of the Judiciary, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 910. Republic Act No. 9946 introduced major innovations for retirement of the members of the Judiciary. The first change made was the inclusion of additional allowances in the computation for monthly pensions and gratuity payments.20 Second, the service requirement for compulsory and optional retirement was modified. Under Republic Act No. 9946, only 15 years in the Judiciary and any other branch of government are required. For optional retirement, the last three (3) years must be rendered continuously in the Judiciary.21 The third major innovation of the law is that noncompliance with the service requirement will entitle the retiree to a monthly pension pro-rated to the number of years rendered in government.22 The fourth major innovation is the benefits given to justices or judges who contracted permanent disability or partial permanent disability during incumbency.23 The last two innovations of Republic Act No. 9946 are more relevant to this case at bar. The fifth major innovation of Republic Act No. 9946 is the expansion of death benefits given to the heirs of a deceased justice or judge.24Finally, the law specifies that pension benefits given under this law will be received by the surviving spouse of the retired justice or judge upon the justice’s or judge’s demise.25 This last innovation is the most important and the reason why the law was amended in the first place. Republic Act No. 9946 provides for a retroactivity clause in Section 4, adding Section 3-B to Republic Act No. 910: SEC. 3-B. The benefits under this Act shall be granted to all those who have retired prior to the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the benefits shall be applicable only to the members of the Judiciary: Provided, further, That the benefits to be granted shall be prospective. (Emphasis supplied) An initial look at the law might suggest that the retroactivity of Republic Act No. 9946 is limited to those who retired prior to the effectivity of the law.26 However, a holistic treatment of the law will show that the set of amendments provided by Republic Act No. 9946 is not limited to justices or judges who retired after reaching a certain age and a certain number of years in service. The changes in the law also refer to justices or judges who "retired" due to permanent disability or partial permanent disability as well as justices or judges who died while in active service. In light of these innovations provided in the law, the word "retired" in Section 3-B should be construed to include not only those who already retired under Republic Act

No. 910 but also those who retired due to permanent disability. It also includes judges and justices who died or were killed while in service. Providing retroactivity to judges and justices who died while in service conforms with the doctrine that retirement laws should be liberally construed and administered in favor of persons intended to be benefited.27 "[T]he liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security, and well-being of government employees may be enhanced."28 Ensuring the welfare of families dependent on government employees is achieved in the changes made in Republic Act No. 9946. It will be consistent with the humanitarian purposes of the law if the law is made retroactive to benefit the heirs of judges and justices who passed away prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9946. Judge Gruba who passed away prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9946 is still covered by the law by virtue of Section 3-B. "Retired" here is not construed in the strict dictionary definition but in its more rational sense of discontinuance of service due to causes beyond one’s control. It should include the cessation of work due to natural causes such as death. Therefore, the death of Judge Gruba produces effects under Republic Act No. 9946 for his family. In the past, this Court has liberally granted benefits to surviving heirs of deceased members of the Judiciary despite incomplete compliance with the requisites of Republic Act No. 910.29 Since there was a gap in the law, this Court’s Resolution dated September 30, 2003 in Re: Resolution Granting Permanent Total Disability Benefits to Heirs of Justices and Judges Who Die In Actual Service provided for benefits of judges and justices who died in actual service but were not able to comply with the age and service requirements stated in Republic Act No. 910.30 This Resolution was incorporated in Republic Act No. 9946. This Court also applied the survivorship pension benefits to surviving spouses of justices and judges who died prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9946 in 2010. For example, Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando passed away in 2004, but his widow, Mrs. Emma Q. Fernando, was given survivorship pension benefits31 despite the fact that Chief Justice Fernando’s death occurred prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9946. Congress has been liberal in according retirement and death benefits to justices and judges. These benefits are incentives for talented individuals to join the Judiciary. For current members, these benefits assure them that the government will continue to ensure their welfare even in their twilight years. These benefits allow the best and the brightest lawyers to remain in the Judiciary despite its risks because they know that their family’s welfare will be addressed even in their passing. The first proviso of Section 3-B ("Provided, That the benefits shall be applicable only to the members of the Judiciary") should be interpreted to mean individuals who were members of the Judiciary immediately prior to retirement, disability retirement or death. This proviso is meant to exclude individuals who were former members of the Judiciary but accepted positions in other branches of government. In other words, former judges or justices who retire from non-judicial positions are excluded.32 If this proviso is interpreted to exclude benefits provided by the law to heirs and surviving members, it will be contrary to the purpose of the law. Representative Fredenil H. Castro, one of the sponsors of House Bill No. 1238, the precursor of Republic Act No. 9946, "explained that the bill was aimed to assure justices and judges ‘that their surviving spouses are given adequate and substantial benefits through survivorship pension.’"33 In addition, it will also be contrary to jurisprudence stating "retirement laws should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited and all doubts as to the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes."34 Note that this Court referred to "persons intended to be benefited" and not merely "retirees." There is recognition that the retired or deceased judge is not the only beneficiary of retirement and death benefit laws but also his or her family. The last proviso of Section 3-B ("Provided, further, That the benefits to be granted shall be prospective) might likewise cause some confusion. To clarify, when the law states "benefits to be granted shall be prospective," it refers to pensions given to justices or judges or survivorship pension benefits given to the surviving spouses. It means that those who have 9|P a g e

been continuously receiving pension benefits before Republic Act No. 9946 may not demand the differential of the previously paid pension benefits. This "prospectivity" provision does not apply to lump sum payments or one-time gratuity benefits given by reasons of death. The heirs of Judge Gruba are entitled to death gratuity benefits under Republic Act No. 9946, Section 2 Under Republic Act No. 9946, Section 2 provides for death benefits under varying circumstances: SEC. 2. In case a Justice of the x x x Court of Tax Appeals, x x x dies while in actual service, regardless of his/her age and length of service as required in Section 1 hereof, his/her heirs shall receive a lump sum of five (5) years’ gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance received by him/her as such Justice or Judge: Provided, however, That where the deceased Justice or Judge has rendered at least fifteen (15) years either in the Judiciary or any other branch of Government, or both, his/her heirs shall instead be entitled to a lump sum of ten (10) years gratuity computed on the same basis as indicated in this provision: Provided, further, That the lump sum of ten (10) years gratuity shall be received by the heirs of the Justice or the Judge who was killed because of his/her work as such: Provided, That the Justice or Judge has served in Government for at least five (5) years regardless of age at the time of death. When a Justice or Judge is killed intentionally while in service, the presumption is that the death is work-related. (Emphasis supplied) This provision provides death benefits to justices or judges who died while in service as well as those who suffered work-related deaths. The presumption is that if a justice or judge was killed intentionally, the death is considered work-related. The provision contemplates three scenarios. First, if a justice or judge dies while in service, regardless of his or her age and length of service, his or her heirs are entitled to a five (5)-year lump sum of gratuity. Second, if a justice or judge dies of natural causes while in service, regardless of his or her age, but has rendered at least 15 years in government service, his or her heirs are entitled to a 10-year lump sum of gratuity. Finally, if a justice or judge is killed intentionally and the death is considered work-related, regardless of his or her age, but has rendered at least five (5) years in government service, his or her heirs are entitled to a 10-year lump sum of gratuity. In all these scenarios, the law dispenses with the requirement of the judge’s or justice’s retirement for the surviving heirs to receive benefits upon the judge’s or justice’s demise. This is an improvement from the benefits given under Republic Act No. 910. The law became more attuned to the reality that death can occur anytime during the tenure of a judge or justice. It recognized the risks judges and justices face in dispensing their duties and responsibilities, risks similar to those experienced by members of law enforcement or the military. The law provides for contingencies for judges and justices who unexpectedly left their loved ones who depended on them for support and sustenance. Judge Gruba’s death follows the second scenario under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9946. He died due to natural causes while serving the Judiciary. He rendered 16 years, six (6) months, and 21 days in government service, thereby complying with the 15-year service requirement under the law. His heirs became entitled to a lump sum of 10 years gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary, plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation, and other allowances such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance. The fact that the heirs of Judge Gruba received death benefits under Republic Act No. 910 prior to amendments in Republic Act No. 9946 does not preclude the heirs from receiving the 10-year lump sum in full. This is the effect of the retroactivity mentioned in Section 3-B of Republic Act No. 9946. This is also in keeping with a policy declaration under Article XVI, Section 8 of the Constitution stating that "the State shall, from time to time, review to upgrade the pensions and other benefits due to retirees of both the government and the private sectors." However, Mrs. Gruba is not qualified for survivorship pension benefits under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9946

When Mrs. Gruba applied for benefits under Republic Act No. 9946, she was not claiming additional gratuity benefits. She was invoking the second paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 910 as amended by Republic Act No. 9946, thus: Upon the death of a Justice or Judge of any court in the Judiciary, if such Justice or Judge has retired, or was eligible to retire optionally at the time of death, the surviving legitimate spouse shall be entitled to receive all the retirement benefits that the deceased Justice or Judge would have received had the Justice or Judge not died. The surviving spouse shall continue to receive such retirement benefits until the surviving spouse’s death or remarriage. According to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9946, survivorship pension benefits are given to surviving spouses of retired judges or justices or surviving spouses of judges or justices who are eligible to retire optionally. This means that for the spouse to qualify for survivorship pension, the deceased judge or justice must (1) be at least 60 years old, (2) have rendered at least fifteen years in the Judiciary or in any other branch of government, and in the case of eligibility for optional retirement, (3) have served the last three years continuously in the Judiciary. When the judge or justice is neither retired nor eligible to retire, his or her surviving spouse is not entitled to those benefits. This was the reason behind our Resolution dated November 27, 2012, wherein we revoked the approval of Mrs. Gruba’s application for survivorship pension benefits. The Resolution discontinued the payment of Mrs. Gruba’s survivorship pension benefits. We no longer required Mrs. Gruba to reimburse survivorship pension benefits received by virtue of the earlier Resolution dated January 17, 2012 considering that she received those payments in good faith. Mrs. Gruba could have been entitled to survivorship pension benefits if her late husband were eligible to optionally retire at the time of his death. However, we are faced with a situation where the justice complied only with two of three requirements for optional retirement. He served government for a total of 16 years, six (6) months, and 21 days. In those years, he rendered service for three (3) years, nine (9) months, and eight (8) days in the Judiciary. Judge Gruba neither retired compulsorily prior to his death nor was he eligible for optional retirement at the time of his death. He would have qualified for the government service requirements. However, his age at the time of his death did not make him qualified for optional retirement. He was only 55 years old, and the law required the age of 60 for eligibility for optional retirement. It was unfortunate that Judge Gruba died five years short of the optional retirement age. However, survivorship benefits are an offshoot of retirement benefits. Administrative Circular 81-2010 qualified that "the legitimate surviving spouse of a Justice or Judge who (1) has retired or was eligible to retire optionally at the time of death; and (2) was receiving or would have been entitled to receive a monthly pension" is the individual qualified to receive survivorship benefits. This suggests that survivorship pension benefits are extensions of retirement benefits given to judges and justices, and retirement benefits in government service are governed by law.35Noncompliance with the clear text of the law means that the benefit cannot be granted. We note, however, that if Judge Gruba were eligible to optionally retire under Republic Act No. 9946 at the time of his death and despite the fact that he passed away prior to the amendatory law’s passage, his widow would have been entitled to the survivorship pension. The law was passed on January 13, 2010, and any surviving spouse of a judge or justice who died prior to this date but was retired or eligible to retire optionally should be covered by Republic Act No. 9946 by virtue of its retroactivity clause. Republic Act No. 9946 has recognized the risks and contingencies of being involved in public service in the Judiciary.1âwphi1 Death gratuity benefits have been improved to take into account the various circumstances that might surround a judge’s or justice’s death. However, the application of the law is not without limits. The law accommodates the heirs of Judge Gruba by entitling them to receive the improved gratuity benefits under Republic Act No. 9946, but it is clear that Mrs. Gruba is not entitled to the survivorship pension benefits. Despite the fact that Mrs. Gruba is not entitled to receive survivorship pension, she no longer needs to return the survivorship pension benefits she received from January 2011 to April 2012 amounting to P1,026,748.00. This Court, in the past, have decided pro hac vice that a 10 | P a g e

surviving spouse who received survivorship pension benefits in good faith no longer needs to refund such pensions. In Re: Application for Survivorship Pension Benefits of Hon. Juanito C. Ranjo, Former Deputy Court Administrator (DCA),36 we initially resolved to award survivorship pension benefits to DCA Ranjo’s surviving spouse, Mrs. Ranjo. In a latter Resolution, we ruled that DCA Ranjo was not entitled to receive benefits under Republic Act No. 9946; hence, it was erroneous to award survivorship pension benefits to his widow. However, this Court ruled that the application of the resolution revoking survivorship pension benefits "appl[ies] prospectively, not retroactively and adversely to [Mrs. Ranjo]."37 This Court found that Mrs. Ranjo accepted this amount in good faith, and the same could be said about Mrs. Gruba. This Court has made similar pronouncements on other benefits erroneously received by government employees.1âwphi1 This Court agreed that employees who have erroneously received rice allowances,38 productivity incentive bonuses,39 representation and transportation allowances (RATA),40 anniversary bonuses,41 year-end bonuses,42and cash gifts43 no longer need to refund the same. The reasoning was that: Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance the refund of x x x benefits x x x, which amounts the petitioners have already received. Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such benefits.44 Analogously, when Mrs. Gruba received the survivorship pension benefits, she accepted them in good faith, knowing that this Court positively pronounced that she was entitled to them in the Resolution dated January 17, 2012. When we revoked this Resolution, such revocation should only apply prospectively in the interest of equity and fairness.45 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, WE RESOLVE TO GRANT a lump sum of 10 years gratuity benefits under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9946 to the heirs of Judge Gruba, subject to the availability of funds, and DENY the prayer of Mrs. Gruba to receive survivorship pension benefits. SO ORDERED