Law Case Digest.docx

16. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation783 scra 490 G.R. No. 180402. February 10, 2016.*REYES, J.: FACT: Pilipinas Shell subsequently filed two separate claims for the refund or credit of the excise taxes paid on the foregoing sales, totaling P49,058,733.09. Due to the inaction of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on its claims, Pilipinas Shell decided to file a petition for review with the CTA.CTA Second Division rendered its Decision granting Pilipinas Shell’s claim but at a reduced amount of P39,305,419.49

The arguments raised by the CIR are basically the same as those raised before the CTA Second Division and En Banc, that is, Pilipinas Shell is not entitled to a refund/credit of the excise taxes paid on its sales and deliveries to international carriers for the following reasons: (1) excise taxes are levied on the manufacturer/producer prior to sale and delivery to international carriers and, regardless of its purchaser, said taxes must be shouldered by the manufacturer/producer or in this case, Pilipinas Shell; (2) the excise taxes paid by Pilipinas Shell do not consitute taxes erroneously paid as they are right fully due from Pilipinas Shell as manufacturer/producer of the petroleum products sold to international carriers; (3) the intent of the law

Whether or not the CTA erred in granting refund/tax credit?

RULING:

NO. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court must adhere to the principle of law laid down in Pilipinas Shell and apply the same in the present case, especially since the facts, issues, and even the parties involved are exactly identical. Thus, the Court hereby holds that Pilipinas Shell’s claim for refund/tax credit must be granted pursuant to Pilipinas Shell, as its petroleum products sold to international carriers for the period of November

2000 to March 2001 are exempt from excise tax, these international carriers being exempt from payment of excise tax under Section 135(a) of the NIRC.

Immutability of Judgment 17. Bigler vs. People 785 scra 497

G.R. No. 210972. March 2, 2016.*PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Facts: the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Libel and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of one (1) year, eight (8) months, and twenty-one (21) days to two (2) years, eleven (11) months, and ten (10) days, and to pay the costs of suit. Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied for being filed 2 days late. Consequently, he was arrested and taken into custody. Petitioner filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that the RTC: (a) reopen the criminal proceedings against him; (b) allow him to file a notice of appeal. The RTC denied petitioner’s Urgent Omnibus Motion and, likewise, denied due course to his Notice of Appeal. the RTC found as immaterial petitioner’s contention that he did not receive the Order of his conviction, considering that he filed his Motion for Reconsideration two (2) days beyond the prescribed 15-day period reckoned from the promulgation of the RTC order. the CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto. Issue: Whether or not petitioner belatedly filed his Motion for Reconsideration, thus, rendering said judgment final and executory Ruling: Yes. Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down. Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule as the Court has the power and prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the demands of substantial justice considering: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special orcompelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect. Nonetheless, the Court has the power relax the same in order to serve the demands of substantial justice. In a catena of similar cases where the accused failed to perfect their appeal on their respective judgments of conviction, the Court corrected the penalties imposed, notwithstanding the finality of the decisions because they were outside the range of penalty prescribed by law. There is thus, no reason to deprive herein petitioner of the relief afforded the accused in the aforesaid similar cases.

18. Navarra vs. Liongson 790 SCRA 155

G.R. No. 217930. April 18, 2016.*MENDOZA, J.: FACTS: Jose Liongson, the deceased husband of respondent Yolanda Liongson, filed a complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution against Spouses Navarra and Spouses Bernardobefore the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners argue that it is beyond the power of the CA to amend its original decision in this case, dated December 8, 2011, for it violates the principle of finality of judgment and its immutability. They point out that the said CA decision had acquired finality, hence, it could no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification was meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, or it would be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred and violated the principle of immutability of judgment HELD: Well-settled is the rule that a judgment that has acquired finality "becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land." The rationale of this doctrine is to avoid delay in the administration of justice and in order to put an end to judicial controversies. The issue posed before the Court is not of first impression. It involves three conflicting final and executory judgments rendered by the RTC and the CA. Where a certain case comprises two or more conflicting judgments which are final and executory, the Court, offered three (3) options in resolving the same. First, the court may opt to require the parties to assert their claims anew; second, to determine which judgment came first; and third, to determine which of the judgments had been rendered by a court of last resort.

University of the Philippines vs Hon. Pura Ferrer-Calleja. (211 SCRA 451; GR No. 96189, July 14. 1992, Narvasa, C.J.) FACTS: The Organization of Non-Academic Working Personnel of UP (ONAPUP) filed a petition for certification election with the BLR, to which UP did not object. It claimed to have a membership of 3,236 members—more than 33% of the 9,617 persons constituting the non-academic personnel of four UP campuses Diliman, Manila, Los Baños, and Visayas. On April 18, 1990, All UP Workers’ Union filed a comment and alleged that its membership covers both academic and non-academic personnel, and that it aims to unite all rank-and-file employees in one union. It assented to the holding of the certification election provided that appropriate organizational unit was first clearly defined. It observed in this connection that the Research, Extension and Professorial Staff (REPS), who are academic non-teaching personnel, should not be deemed part of the organizational unit. UP’s General Counsel was of the stand that there should be two unions—one for the nonacademic/administrative, and one for the academic personnel. ISSUES: Wheter or not the professors, associate professors and assistant professors are considered exercising manegerial or highly confidential function? And should there be a bargaining unit separate and distinct from that of the non-academic employees of UP? LAW APPLICABLE TO THE CASE: Executive Order No. 180, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations CASE HISTORY: August 7, 1990 - Director Calleja ruled on the matter. She declared that xx should embrace all the regular rank-and-file employees, teaching and non-teaching, of the University of the Philippines, including all its branches” and that there was no sufficient evidence “to justify the grouping of the non-academic or administrative

personnel into an organization unit apart and distinct from that of the academic or teaching personnel. Motion for reconsideration was denied. RULING: No. Professors, associate professors and assistant professors cannot be considered as exercising such managerial or highly confidential functions as would justify their being categorized as “high-level employees” of the University of the Philippines. Our labor laws do not provide the criteria for determining the proper collective bargaining unit. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.. non-academic rankand-file employees of the University of the Philippines shall constitute a bargaining unit to the exclusion of the academic employees of the institution. OPINION: I agree with the Supreme Courts decision. Indeed, if there is no exercise of authority and use of independent judgment, then it cannot be considered as power of prerogative pertaining to high level employees; such is only exercise by the Board of Regents. And in this case is true that there are dissimilarity in the nature of the work and duties as well as in the compensation and working condition of academic as against non teaching workers. Government Service Insurance System vs. Cancino-Erum 680 SCRA 44 A.M. No. RTJ-09-2182. September 5, 2012.* BERSAMIN, J.: FACTS: Civil Case No. MC08-3660 was raffled on July 21, 2008 xxx, there is no need to spin the roulette, which was used in the raffle of cases, since it was only the court of the undersigned which has not received its share of civil cases with application force a TRO/Injunction for the particular “round.” Judge Valenzuela clarified that FGU Insurance Corporation was not a party in Civil Case No. MC08-3660. He assured that all the parties in Civil Case No. MC08-3660 were given the opportunity to argue for or against the issuance of the TRO; that although he had granted a period of five days to STRADCOM within which to file its own comment/opposition to Martizano’s application for the TRO, he did not wait anymore for STRADCOM’s written comment/opposition owing to the public interest involved and the urgency of resolving the issues concerning DO 2007-28. He said that the nonimposition of a bond on Martizano was justified under Rule 58, Section 4(b) of the Rules of Court; that he

denied the motion to dismiss because the requisites for the grounds relied upon were not met; and that the supposed anomaly attending the raffle proceedings was only the product of GSIS’s “polluted mind. ISSUE: Were the respondents properly held administratively liable for violating the standing rules on the raffle of cases? RULING: NO. The Court dismisses Administrative charges against the respondents. Given the urgent nature of TRO or injunction cases, each of them had to be immediately attended to. This peculiarity must have led to the adoption of the practice of raffling such cases despite their number being less than the number of the Branches in Mandaluyong City. The practice did not absolutely contravene Circular No. 7 in view of the circular itself expressly excepting under its fourth paragraph, supra, any incidental or interlocutory matter of such urgent nature (like a TRO application) that might not wait for the regular raffle. The urgent nature of an injunction or TRO case demands prompt action and immediate attention, thereby compelling the filing of the case in the proper court without delay. To assume that a party desiring to file an injunction or TRO case will just stand idly by and mark time until his favored Branch is the only Branch left without an assigned injunction or TRO case is obviously speculative. Moreover, the “anomalous situation” is highly unlikely in view of the uncertainty of having the favored Branch remain the only Branch without an injunction or TRO case following the series of raffle.

Jonsay vs. Solidbank Corporation (now MetropolitanBank and Trust Company) 788 SCRA 552 : G.R. No. 206459. April 6, 2016.* REYES, J.: FACTS: Momarco, controlled and owned by the Spouses Jonsay, is an importer, manufacturer and distributor of animal health and feedmill products catering to cattle, hog and poultry producers. On November 9, 1995, and again on April 28, 1997, Momarco obtained loans of P40,000,000.00 and P20,000,000.00, respectively, from Solidbank for which the Spouses Jonsay executed a blanket mortgage over three parcels of land they owned in Calamba City, Laguna. Momarco religiously paid the monthly interests charged by Solidbank from November 199510 until

January 1998, when it paid P1,370,321.09. Claiming business reverses brought on by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Momarco tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a moratorium or suspension in its interest payments. Solidbank proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose on the mortgage, and at the auction sale held on March 5, 1999, it submitted the winning bid of P82,327,249.54,12 representing Momarco’s outstanding loans, interests and penalties, plus attorney’s fees of P3,600,000.00. ut Momarco now claims that on the date of the auction the fair market value of their mortgaged lots had increased sevenfold to P441,750,000.00. The RTC ruled that the mortgage contract and the promissory notes prepared by Solidbank, which the Spouses Jonsay signed in blank, were contracts of adhesion; that Solidbank failed to take into account Momarco’s payments in the two years preceding 1998 totaling P24,277,293.22 (this amount was not disputed by Solidbank); that the interest rates, ranging from 19% to 30%, as well as the penalties, charges and attorney’s fees imposed by Solidbank, were excessive, unconscionable and immoral, and that Solidbank has no carte blanche authority under the Usury Law to unilaterally raise the interest rates to levels as to enslave the borrower and hemorrhage its assets. CA rendered judgment affirming the RTC in toto, but later reversed its decision, the CA not only found the parties’ mortgage contract valid, but also declared that Solidbank’s extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage enjoyed the presumption of regularity. ISSUE: Whether or not CA was correct in in amending its decision? RULING: YES The rule is that while the decision of a court becomes final upon the lapse of the period to appeal by any party, but the filing of a motion for reconsideration or new trial interrupts or suspends the running of the said period, and prevents the finality of the decision or order from setting in. A motion for reconsideration allows a party to request the adjudicating court or quasi-judicial body to take a second look at its earlier judgment and correct any errors it may have committed. As explained in Salcedo II v. COMELEC, 312 SCRA 447 (1999), a motion for reconsideration allows the adjudicator or judge to take a second opportunity to review the case and to grapple anew with the issues therein, and to decide again a question previously raised, there being no legal proscription imposed against the deciding body adopting thereby a new position contrary to one it had previously taken.