Labstan 16-20.docx

16.) MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING, INC., A.P. MOLLER SINGAPORE PTE. LIMITED, and JESUS AGBAYANI vs. TORIBIO C. AVESTRUZ G.R. No. 207010. February 18, 2015

Facts: Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. (Maersk), on behalf of its foreign principal, petitioner A.P. Moller Singapore Pte. Ltd. (A.P. Moller), hired Avestruz as Chief Cook on board the vessel M/V Nedlloyd Drake for a period of six (6) months, with a basic monthly salary of US$698.00. Avestruz boarded the vessel on May 4, 2011.

Captain Charles C. Woodward (Captain Woodward) noticed that the cover of the garbage bin in the kitchen near the washing area was oily. As part of Avestruz's job was to ensure the cleanliness of the galley, Captain Woodward called Avestruz and asked him to stand near the garbage bin where the former took the latter's right hand and swiped it on the oily cover of the garbage bin, telling Avestruz to feel it. Shocked, Avestruz remarked, "Sir if you are looking for [dirt], you can 􏰁nd it[;] the ship is big. Tell us if you want to clean and we will clean it." Captain Woodward replied by shoving Avestruz's chest, to which the latter complained and said, "Don't touch me," causing an argument to ensue between them. Later that afternoon, Captain Woodward summoned and required. Avestruz to state in writing what transpired in the galley that morning. Avestruz complied and submitted his written statement on that same day. Captain Woodward likewise asked Messman Jomilyn P. Kong (Kong) to submit his own written statement regarding the incident, to which the latter immediately complied. On the very same day, Captain Woodward informed Avestruz that he would be dismissed from service and be disembarked in India. On July 3, 2011, Avestruz was disembarked in Colombo, Sri Lanka and arrived in the Philippines on July 4, 2011. He 􏰁led a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment for the unexpired portion of his contract, damages, and attorney's fees against Maersk, A.P. Moller, and Jesus Agbayani (Agbayani), an o􏰁cer of Maersk. He alleged that no investigation or hearing was conducted nor was he given the chance to defend himself before he was dismissed, and that Captain Woodward failed to observe the provisions under Section 17 of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) on disciplinary procedures. Also, he averred that he was not given any notice stating the ground for his dismissal. Additionally, he claimed that the cost of his airfare in the amount of US$606.15 was deducted from his wages. Issue: WON procedural due process were followed and that Avestruz was illegally dismissed. Held: Yes. the CA reversed and set aside the rulings of the NLRC and instead, found Avestruz to have been illegally dismissed. Consequently, it directed petitioners to pay him, jointly and severally, the full amount of his placement fee and deductions made, with interest at twelve percent (12%) per

annum, as well as his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract, and attorney's fees of ten percent (10%) of the total award. All other money claims were denied for lack of merit. It is well-settled that the burden of proving that the termination of an employee was for a just or authorized cause lies with the employer. If the employer fails to meet this burden, the conclusion would be that the dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal. In order to discharge this burden, the employer must present substantial evidence, which is de􏰁ned as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, and not based on mere surmises or conjectures. Petitioners maintain that Avestruz was dismissed on the ground of insubordination, consisting of his "repeated failure to obey his superior's order to maintain cleanliness in the galley of the vessel" as well as his act of "insulting a superior o􏰁cer by words or deeds." In support of this contention, petitioners presented as evidence the e-mails sent by Captain Woodward, both dated June 22, 2011, and time-stamped 10:07 a.m. and 11:40 a.m., respectively, which they claim chronicled the relevant circumstances that eventually led to Avestruz's dismissal. The Court, however, 􏰁fin nds these emails to be uncorroborated and self-serving, and therefore, do not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence as would su􏰁ciently discharge the burden of proving that Avestruz was legally dismissed. On the contrary, petitioners failed to prove that he committed acts of insubordination which would warrant his dismissal. Insubordination, as a just cause for the dismissal of an employee, necessitates the concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. The Court a􏰁ffirms the fin􏰁nding of the CA that Avestruz was not accorded procedural due process, there being no compliance with the provisions of Section 17 of the POEASEC as above-cited, which requires the "two-notice rule." As explained in Skippers Pacific, Inc. v. Mira: An erring seaman is given a written notice of the charge against him and is afforded an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Should sanctions be imposed, then a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it shall be furnished the erring seafarer. It is only in the exceptional case of clear and existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel that the required notices are dispensed with; but just the same, a complete report should be sent to the manning agency, supported by substantial evidence of the findings. In this case, there is dearth of evidence to show that Avestruz had been given a written notice of the charge against him, or that he was given the opportunity to explain or defend himself. The statement given by Captain Woodward requiring him to explain in writing the events that transpired at the galley in the morning of June 22, 2011 hardly quali􏰁fies as a written notice of the charge against him, nor was it an opportunity for Avestruz to explain or defend himself. While Captain Woodward

claimed in his e-mail that he conducted a "disciplinary hearing" informing Avestruz of his ine􏰁ciency, no evidence was presented to support the same.

17.) ELIZABETH M. GAGUI, Petitioner, v. SIMEON DEJERO and TEODORO R. PERMEJO, Respondents.

SERENO,

C.J.:

FACTS: On 14 December 1993, respondents Simeon Dejero and Teodoro Permejo filed separate Complaints for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salaries and overtime pay, refund of transportation expenses, damages, and attorney fees against PRO Agency Manila, Inc., and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes. The Labor Arbiter Pedro Ramos rendered a decision ordering respondents Pro Agecy Manila Inc., and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes to pay complainants. The LA also issued a Writ of Execution. When the writ was returned unsatisfied, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued, but was also returned unsatisfied. Respondents filed a Motion to Implead Respondent Pro Agency Manila, Inc. Corporate Officers and Directors as Judgment Debtor. It included petitioner as the Vicepresident/Stockholder/Director of PRO Agenct, Manila, Inc. The LA granted the motion. A 2nd Alias Writ of Execution was issued, which resulted in the garnishment of petitioner bank deposit in the amount of P85,430.48. Since, judgment remained unsatisfied, respondents sought a 3rd alias writ of execution. The motion was granted resulting in the levying of two parcels of lot owned by petitioner located in San Fernando Pampanga. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash 3rd Alias Writ of Execution. Petitioner alleged that apart from not being made aware that she was impleaded as one of the parties to the case, the LA decision did not hold her liable in any form whatsoever. Executive Labor Arbiter denied the motion. Upon appeal, NLRC denied the appeal for lack of merit. NLRC ruled that in so far as overseas migrant workers are concerned, it is R.A. 8042 itself that describes the nature of the liability of the corporation and its officers and directors. It is not essential that the individual officers and directors be impleaded as party respondents to the case instituted by the worker. A finding of liability on the part of the corporation will necessarily mean the liability of the corporate officers or directors. The CA affirmed the NLRC decision. The two Motions for Reconsideration were denied. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be held jointly and severally liable with PRO Agency Manila, Inc. in accordance with Section 10 of R.A. 8042? HELD: LABOR

The

Petitioner LAW:

may

not liability

be

held of

jointly

and

severally

corporate

liable. officers

The pertinent portion of Section 10, R.A. 8042 reads as follows: The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. In Sto. Tomas v. Salac, we had the opportunity to pass upon the constitutionality of this provision. We have thus maintained: the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that the liability of corporate directors and officers is not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities. Hence, for petitioner to be found jointly and solidarily liable, there must be a separate finding that she was remiss in directing the affairs of the agency, resulting in the illegal dismissal of respondents. Examination of the records would reveal that there was no finding of neglect on the part of the petitioner in directing the affairs of the agency. In fact, respondents made no mention of any instance when petitioner allegedly failed to manage the agency in accordance with law, thereby contributing to their illegal dismissal.

18.) INDUSTRIAL PERSONNEL & MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. (IPAMS), SNC LAVALIN ENGINEERS & CONTRACTORS, INC. AND ANGELITO C. HERNANDEZ, vs. JOSE G. DE VERA AND ALBERTO B. ARRIOLA, G.R. No. 205703, [March 7, 2016]

Facts: Petitioner Industrial Personnel & Management Services, Inc. (IPAMS) is a local placement agency duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with petitioner Angelito C. Hernandez as its president and managing director. Petitioner SNC Lavalin Engineers & Contractors, Inc. (SNC-Lavalin) is the principal of IPAMS, a Canadian company with business interests in several countries. On the other hand, respondent Alberto Arriola (Arriola) is a licensed general surgeon in the Philippines. Arriola was offered by SNC-Lavalin, through its letter, the position of Safety Officer in its Ambatovy Project site in Madagascar. The position offered had a rate of CA$32.00 per hour for forty (40) hours a week with overtime pay in excess of forty (40) hours. It was for a period of nineteen (19) months. Arriola

was then hired by SNC-Lavalin, through its local manning agency, IPAMS, and his overseas employment contract was processed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). In a letter of understanding, SNC-Lavalin confirmed Arriola's assignment in the Ambatovy Project. According to Arriola, he signed the contract of employment in the Philippines. On June 9, 2008, Arriola started working in Madagascar. After three months, Arriola received a notice of pre-termination of employment, from SNC-Lavalin. It stated that his employment would be pre-terminated effective September 11, 2009 due to diminishing workload in the area of his expertise and the unavailability of alternative assignments. Consequently, on September 15, 2009, Arriola was repatriated. SNC-Lavalin deposited in Arriola's bank account his pay amounting to Two Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Six Dollars and Eight n Centavos (CA$2,636.80), based on Canadian labor law.

Aggrieved, Arriola filed

a complaint against the petitioners for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, vacation leave and sick leave pay before the Labor Arbiter (LA). He claimed that SNC-Lavalin still owed him unpaid salaries equivalent to the three-month unexpired portion of his contract, amounting to, more or less, One Million Sixty-Two Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Six Pesos (P1,062,936.00). He asserted that SNCLavalin never offered any valid reason for his early termination and that he was not given sufficient notice regarding the same. Arriola also insisted that the petitioners must prove the applicability of Canadian law before the same could be applied to his employment contract. The petitioners denied the charge of illegal dismissal against them. They claimed that SNCLavalin was greatly affected by the global financial crises during the latter part of 2008. The economy of Madagascar, where SNC-Lavalin had business sites, also slowed down. As proof of its looming financial standing, SNC-Lavalin presented a copy of a news item in the Financial Post showing the decline of the value of its stocks. Thus, it had no choice but to minimize its expenditures and operational expenses. It reorganized its Health and Safety Department at the Ambatovy Project site and Arriola was one of those affected. The petitioners continued that the pre-termination of Arriola's contract was valid for being consistent with the provisions of both the Expatriate Policy and laws of Canada. The said foreign law did not require any ground for early termination of employment, and the only requirement was the written notice of termination. Even assuming that Philippine laws should apply, Arriola would still be validly dismissed because domestic law recognized retrenchment and redundancy as legal grounds for termination. In their Rejoinder, 13 the petitioners presented a copy of the Employment Standards Act (ESA) of Ontario, which was duly authenticated by the Canadian authorities and certified by the Philippine Embassy. Issue/s : (1) WON RESPONDENT ARRIOLA WAS VALIDLY DISMISSED PURSUANT TO THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT Held: NO. Article 279 of our Labor Code has construed security of tenure to mean that the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by law. Concomitant to the employer's right to freely select and engage an employee is the employer's right to discharge the employee for just and/or authorized causes. To validly effect terminations of employment, the discharge must be for a valid cause in the manner required by law. The purpose of these two-pronged qualifications is to protect the working class from the employer's arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of its right to dismiss. The petitioners simply argued that they were suffering from financial losses and Arriola had to be dismissed. It was not even clear what specific authorized cause, whether retrenchment or redundancy, was used to justify Arriola's dismissal. Worse, the petitioners did not even present a single credible evidence to support their claim of financial loss. They simply offered an unreliable news article which deserves scant consideration as it is undoubtedly hearsay. Time and again the Court has ruled that in illegal dismissal cases like the present one, the onus of proving that the employee was dismissed and that the dismissal was not illegal rests on the employer, and failure to discharge the same would mean that the dismissal is not justified and, therefore, illegal.

19.) PEOPLE VS SOLINA Facts: Ma. Fe Torres Solina a.k.a. Ma. Fe Baylon Gallo appeals her case to this Court after the Court of Appeals (CA) in its Decision dated March 11, 2010 affirmed with modification her conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale under Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (R.A. 8042). Accused-appellant maintains her denial that she was engaged in the business of recruiting possible workers for jobs abroad. She insists that like all the private complainants, she was also an applicant for a job as an overseas worker and that she merely accompanied them to a recruitment agency. She alleges that private complainant Dela Vega and Dela Cruz conspired together, used her name, and represented themselves to the other applicants as being authorized to collect documents and fees and that she only met the other private complainants in the trainings/seminars she attended. Anent the acknowledgment receipt signed by her and presented by the prosecution as evidence, accused-appellant argues that it does not prove that the money received by her was the consideration for private complainant Garces' placement abroad. Issue: WON the Accused-Appellant guilty of illegal recruitment? Held: Yes. All the elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are present, namely: (1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (2) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13 (b)of the Labor Code,or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code (now Section 6 of R.A. 8042); and (3) the offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group. More importantly, all the said elements have been established beyond reasonable doubt. Accused-appellant's defense of denial cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the witnesses presented by the prosecution. As is well-settled in this jurisdiction, greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than the accused's denial and explanation concerning the commission of the crime. Based on the factual findings of the RTC, the combined and corroborative testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution show that it was appellant herself who informed them of the existence of the job vacancies in Japan and of the requirements needed for the processing of their applications. It was properly established that it was accused-appellant who accompanied the private complainants to undergo training and seminar conducted by a person who represented himself as connected with the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA). Evidence was also presented that the private complainants, relying completely on accused-appellant's representations, entrusted their money to her. Finally, since there were six (6) victims, the RTC therefore did not commit any error in convicting accused-appellant of the charge of illegal recruitment in large scale. 20.) JAKERSON GARGALLO VS DOHLE

Facts: On July 20, 2012, petitioner filed a complaint for permanent total disability benefits against respondents before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). 6 The complaint stemmed from his claim that: (a) he accidentally fell on deck while lifting heavy loads of lube oil drum, with his left arm hitting the floor first, bearing his full body weight; (b) he has remained permanently unfit for further sea service despite major surgery and further treatment by the company-designated physicians; and (c) his permanent total unfitness to work was duly certified by his chosen physician whose certification must prevail over the palpably self-serving and biased assessment of the company-designated physicians.

For their part,

respondents countered that the fit-to-work findings of the company-designated physicians must prevail over that of petitioner's independent doctor, considering that: (a) they were the ones who continuously treated and monitored petitioner's medical condition; and (b) petitioner failed to comply with the conflict-resolution procedure under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). Respondents further averred that the filing of the disability claim was premature since petitioner was still undergoing medical treatment within the allowable 240-day period at the time the complaint was filed. The Labor Arbiter (LA) and the NLRC gave more credence to the medical report of petitioner's independent doctor and, thus, granted petitioner's disability claim, and ordered respondents to jointly and severally pay petitioner his permanent total disability benefits, albeit at different amounts.However, the CA disagreed with the conclusions of the LA and the NLRC, and dismissed petitioner's complaint. It ruled that the claim was premature because at the time the complaint was filed: (a) petitioner was still under medical treatment by the company-designated physicians; (b) no medical assessment has yet been issued by the company-designated physicians as to his fitness or disability since the allowable 240day treatment period during which he is considered under temporary total disability has not yet lapsed; and (c) petitioner has not yet consulted his own doctor, hence, had no sufficient basis to prove his incapacity. The CA likewise gave more credence to the fit to work assessment of the company-designated physician who treated and closely monitored petitioner's condition, over the contrary declaration of petitioner's doctor who attended to him only once, two (2) months after the filing of the complaint. In its September 16, 2015 Decision, the Court upheld the CA's dismissal of petitioner's claim for permanent total disability benefits, but ordered Dohle Seafront and Dohle Manning, jointly and severally, to pay petitioner the income benefit arising from his temporary total disability which lasted for 194 days from his repatriation on March 11, 2012 until his last visit to the company-designated physician on September 21, 2012 17 (the date when he was declared fit to work) 18 plus 10% of the total amount of the income benefit as attorney's fees. Meanwhile, the Court found no basis to hold Padiz solidarily liable with Dohle Seafront and Dohle Manning for the payment of the monetary awards to petitioner, absent any showing that he acted beyond the scope of his authority or with malice. Issue: WON Petitioner entitled to claim permanent total disability benefits.

Held: Yes. The Court notes that, except as to the issue of respondents' liability for the payment of income benefit, the arguments propounded in petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration had been adequately passed upon in its September 16, 2015 Decision. In essence, petitioner argues that: (a) the lapse of the 120-day period from the onset of disability rendered him permanently and totally disabled because the extension of the medical treatment was unjustified; and (b) resort to a third doctor is a mere directory, not a mandatory requirement. The Court had already disposed of the foregoing matters in its September 16, 2015 Decision, dismissing the complaint on the grounds of: (a) premature filing; and (b) failure to comply with the mandated conflict-resolution procedure under the POEA-SEC. There being no cogent reason to depart from the aforementioned ruling, the Court denies petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration insofar as it seeks to reinstate the NLRC's ruling finding petitioner entitled to permanent total disability benefits. Nonetheless, the Court concurs with petitioner's asseveration that it was erroneous to absolve Padiz from joint and several liability with Dohle Seafront and Dohle Manning for the payment of the income benefit arising from his temporary total disability in view of Section 10 of Republic Act No. (RA) 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," as amended by RA 10022. Section 10 of RA 8042, as amended, expressly provides for joint and solidary liability of corporate directors and officers with the recruitment/placement agency for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). While a corporate director, trustee, or officer who entered into contracts in behalf of the corporation generally cannot be held personally liable for the liabilities of the latter, in deference to the separate and distinct legal personality of a corporation from the persons composing it, personal liability of such corporate director, trustee, or officer, along (although not necessarily) with the corporation, may validly attach when he is made by a specific provision of law personally answerable for his corporate action, as in this case.

Therefore, the Court finds Padiz jointly and solidarily liable with Dohle Seafront and Dohle Manning for the payment of the income benefit arising from petitioner's temporary total disability, and, to such extent, grants petitioner's motion for reconsideration.