Korean War - Nkorea [sem A - Final]

THE KOR EAN WAR “In the E yes of No rth K orea” Semin ar A LPHA

SCO PE O F PRE SENTA TIO N Background “Big wars usually come about by mistakes, not by design……it is probable that the Korean War would not have occurred if the aggressor had known what the United States would do " -John Foster Dulles – -

US Secretary of State 02 September 1953

Strategy Making Process The Policy-Strategy Match

Intelligence, Assessment, War Plans The Instrument of War Interaction and Adaptation War Termination

Strategy Making Environment International Dimension Material Dimension Institutional Dimension Social Dimension

Conclusion

BACK GROU ND

“In the years after WW II it was not from the defeated but from the victors that the seeds of the next conflict would come.” - Ziegler -

1000 yrs prior WW-II, Korea was a single nation of kingdoms & dynasties, (Chosun Dynasty - latest that existed till 1910)

Under Japan colony, Korea as one territory 38th Parallel - Allied Forces’ Mil Obj in WW-II (LOA of USSR & US in defeating Japan in Korea)

Creation of North and South Korean States with “liberators” as administrators till “independence” Trusteeship plan by Allied Nations (China incl) for Korean Independence US and USSR disagreement on the plan caused emergence of two states (Scty interest of US & USSR in accord with political ideology)

Led to 3rd party (Korea)fighting a proxy war for “administrators” as advocates of the Cold War.

BACK GROU ND Korean War – 1st Conventional War since WWII 1st major test of US containment policy Reasons for the attack - Subject of debate: Feint / Diversionary to weaken Europe’s defense A Soviet probe for “soft spots” Soviet test of US resolve to implement foreign policy of containment desire of North Korea for reunification. SOKOR Militarily weak to resist NOKOR attack, until UN-sanctioned multinational reinforcement came under Gen MacArthur, Involvement of Chinese “volunteers” that pushed MacArthur’s forces on attempt to reunify Korea by force. Chinese intervention and UN counter-attack stabilized conflict at 38th parallel until signing of armistice in July 1953

BACK GROU N D THE WAR AT A GLAN 25 Jun 1950CE: – NOKOR made an initial

attack Jul - Aug – NOKOR advanced farther south Sept 10 - UN FORCES made a stand at PUSAN 38 N

O

BACK GROU ND THE WAR AT A GLAN 25 Jun 1950CE: – NOKOR made an initial

attack Jul - Aug – NOKOR advanced farther south Sept 10 - UN FORCES made a stand at PUSAN Sept 15 – INCHON LANDING by UN FORCES

O

38 N Inchon

BACK GROU ND THE WAR AT A GLAN 25 Jun 1950CE: – NOKOR made an initial

attack Jul - Aug – NOKOR advanced farther south Sept 10 - UN FORCES made a stand at PUSAN Sept 15 – INCHON LANDING by UN FORCES UN FORCES pursued NOKOR to the north UN FORCES Crossed 38th Parallel drove NOKOR to Yalu River 16 Oct – CHINESE Army crossed the Manchurian Border

Oct 19 - Pyongyang was captured

38 N

O

BACK GROU ND THE WAR AT A GLAN 25 Jun 1950CE: – NOKOR made an initial

attack Jul - Aug – NOKOR advanced farther south Sept 10 - UN FORCES made a stand at PUSAN Sept 15 – INCHON LANDING by UN FORCES UN FORCES pursued NOKOR to the north UN FORCES Crossed 38th Parallel drove NOKOR to Yalo River 16 Oct – CHINESE Army crossed the Manchurian Border 26 Nov - Chinese joined the NOKOR, launched counterattack. UN FORCES were forced back

38 N

O

BACK GROU ND THE WAR AT A GLAN 25 Jun 1950CE: – North KOREANS made

an initial attack Jul - Aug – N. KOREANS advanced farther south Sept 10 - UN FORCES make a stand at PUSAN Sept 15 – INCHON LANDING by UN FORCES UN FORCES pursued NKOREANS to the north UN FORCES Crossed 38th Parallel drove NKOREANS to Yalo River 16 Oct – CHINESE Army crossed the Manchurian Border 26 Nov - Chinese joined the NOKOR launched counterattack. UN FORCES were forced back 10 Jul 1951 – Truce talks began at Kaesong 27 Jul 1953 – Cease-Fire signed at PANMUNJOM

Cease-fire line of July 27, 1953 OO

38 N

STRATE GY PRO CE SS

COMPONENTS OF STRATEGY

Ends

Ways

goals or strategic objectives

implementing policies and programs and the corresponding commitment of appropriate resources

Means instruments of national power

Contextual Situation external forces and trends such as: the Societal/Ideological Forces and Trends, Organizational and Technological Forces and Trends, and the Opportunities and Threats

STRATE GY PRO CE SS

THE POLICY-STRATEGY MATCH

To NOKOR in 1950, US-bac ked ROK in the South War, Peace, and International Politics “if you can achieve your ends quickly, before the other side can organize to stop you, chances are they will not want to go the trouble of undoing what you have done" – David Ziegler –

installme nt in K or ea ’s long his tor y of oc cupat ion by f or eign powe rs

Not a situat ion Kim Il Sung would ac cept (ev en as DP RK has her o wn t ies with Mos cow and B eiji ng)

Soluti on simpl e: inv ade and unify , which is the end stat e as well Main strategy - s urpri se att ac k, A “blit zkrieg ”-li ke mov ement for tot al inv asion of South So uth K or ean Milita ry - ill- equip ped & ill tr ained

US Def ens e Strat egy for Far East ex cluded Korean Penins ul a as part defense perim eter.

of her

STRATE GY PRO CE SS

Pre-Korean War Han River Railway and Highway Bridges, Seoul

INCHON LANDING

THE POLICY-STRATEGY MATCH

Most critica l - s upp ort of bot h th e So viets and t he Ch ines e. No rt h Ko re an’s s tr at egy - sou nd & accu ra te on ba tt lef ield sce nar io wit h ad eq uat e p re pa ra tion. Major an d c rit ical lap se on h er asse ssmen t - Po ssibili ty o f US / UN in te rv ent ion Tru man D oc trine ; Ma rs hall Pla n US Co nta inmen t Po li cy

STRATE GY PRO CE SS

INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, WAR PLANS

No rt h Ko re a’s in te lef fo rt s p rio r h er So uth in va sion e man ate d fm activ ities in 1 948 t o 1 95 0.

Korean War, War Of The Outposts, Central Sector, Korea

Korean War, Battle of the Kumsong Salient, July 1953

KPA were mem bers of ant i-J apanese gueri lla forces of pre-WW II High sens e of National is m and dedicated for an independent Korea. In charge of NOKOR Mil St rat egy f or Reunif ic at ion Spy Network

Es tab of DPRK & e lectio n of leade r, und erg ro un d election in S ou th Ko re a Ac tivit y pro vide d b asis f or DPRK t o spea rh ead u nif ication ef for ts

STRATE GY PRO CE SS

Korean War, War Of The Outposts, Central Sector, Korea

Korean War, Battle of the Kumsong Salient, July 1953

INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, WAR PLANS

2 Mo nt hs bef or e inv asion of So ut h, thou sa nds of N OKO R s pies we re exec ute d b y RO K, pr elud e t o KPA agg re ssive a ctio n Su rp ris e att ack ba sed o n we ak ness of RO K mili tary fo rc es to de fe nd territ or y CO G wa s Se ou l, th e sea t o f RO K’s politic al lead ers hip DP RK e xpe cte d pop ular su ppo rt f m sout h due t o c hao tic po litic al & econ omic s itu ation

STRATE GY PRO CE SS

THE INSTRUMENT OF WAR Nort h Korea’ s m ain ins trument was Nort h Korea Peopl e’s Liberati on Arm y (N KPA) 10 I nf Div , 1 Armo re d B de ( 5 D iv s - w ell tr ained hav in g f ought w ith C hina ’s P LA ) 130, 000 m en + 100, 000 res er ves

Sov iet Union support ed NKPA: Tr ng & eq uipt e.g . t ank s, ar tille ry , & sm all ar ms; Sov iet adv is or y st af f d re w t he att ac k as sault plan; Pro vided air cra ft to def end agains t U. S. bomber s PROC int er vene d by sendin g t ro ops t o r ep el adv anc ing US tr oop s tow ar ds its N or th Kor ea bord er 4 A rmy G roup s of 33 Div s and 3 mot or iz ed Art y D ivs PLA di sgui se d as CP VA to avo id decl ar in g war aga in st U N and US Fo rces

STRATE GY PRO CE SS

THE INSTRUMENT OF WAR

Launc h surprise at tac ks at daw n wit h art y & mort ars creat ing mas siv e barrage General m aneuv er to pres s enem y forces closely , engage t hem thru front al holding att ac k, whi le t urning enemy f lank & inf ilt rating troops to his rear NKPA Cons cript ion of loc al res idents in cont rolled areas NOKOR and Chines e Army sus tained their forces for 3 years against UN and US NKPA fol low ed Sov iet m odel (rigid system of pr io rit ies t o r eg ulate flo w of s upplies to t he fr ont )

stati c defense and abilit y to mount strong & sus tained of fensiv e opns NKPA and Chines e "volunteer“ resorted to ps ychological warf are & propaganda cam paign

STRATE GY PRO CE SS

THE INSTRUMENT OF WAR

NORTH VS SOUTH United Nations Command: Communist Forces North Korea 260,000 China 2,300,000 Total: 2,560,000

vs .

South Korea 590,911 USA 302,483 Australia 2,282 Canada 6,146 New Zealand 1,389 United Kingdom 14,198 Turkey 5,455 the Netherlands 819 Luxembourg 44 Colombia 1,068 Belgium 900

Ethiopia France Greece Philippines South Africa Thailand Total: 932,964

1,271 1,119 1,263 7,000 826 1,294

STRATE GY PRO CE SS

THE INSTRUMENT OF WAR

NORTH VS SOUTH

STRATE GY PRO CE SS

THE INSTRUMENT OF WAR

ARRAY OF FORCES Comparison of ROK & DPRK’s Military Forces

STRATE GY PRO CE SS

THE INSTRUMENT OF WAR

ARRAY OF FORCES Comparison of ROK & DPRK’s Military Equipment

STRATE GY PRO CE SS

"War is a continuation of politics with an admixture of other means" – Clausewitz –

Korean War, "Operation Comback“

Thousands of Chinese and North Korean Communist POWs were released from POW Compounds

INTERACTION AND ADAPTATION

North Korea’s strategy for reunification was “Total War” Strategy successful & well implemented in early stages of invasion using speed and surprise, NOKOR preoccupation to defeat Pusan ignored establishment of control of other parts of SOKOR that proved costly Defenders able to adapt to NOKOR strategy § Strategic successes did not drive changes in political objectives § No timely reassessment of political objectives or strategy.

STRATE GY PRO CE SS

WAR TERMINATION

ARMISTICE CONDITION

2. The Demarcation Line was defined and ran approximately along the frontlines of the opposing forces. 3. Both sides were to withdraw two kilometers from the Demarcation Line to establish a de-militarized Zone. 4. Hostilities wereKorean to cease Korean War, North flagand withinduring 72 hours captured 1 theall 7thpersonnel Marines will be pulled out from demilitarized drive on Chosin Reservoir. zone. 5. All Prisoners who wished to be repatriated were to be handed over within sixty days. 6. The Military Commanders on both sides recommend to their government that a political conference be setup within ninety days to draw up a Korean Peace Treaty Panmunjom cease fire talks. October 11, 1951

Korean War effort to reunify divided peninsula since WW-II proved a seesaw war that ended in stalemate Obj to reunify not achieved due: differences of ideology; and interference of external forces with opposing interest and views.

Armistice Agreement followed by both forces: Demarcation Line was defined and Demilitarized zone established; Cessation of Hostilities; Repatriation of POWs; and Political conf for Korean Peace Treaty;

STRATE GY PRO CE SS

WAR TERMINATION

Korean War, North Korean flag

captured during 1 the 7th Marines drive on Chosin Reservoir.

Panmunjom cease fire talks. October 11, 1951

War termination was carried out due to exhaustion With 2 different ideologies, road to unification becomes rough. Both were not able to accomplish objectives None emerged victorious UN gained from war by demonstrating power of collective security action against aggression Served as warning

STR AT EGY ENVI RONMENT

International Dimension NOKOR’s policy obj - Unification of Korea & Means to achieve it - Total Invasion of South Critical to DPRK’s strategy of invasion support of its allies USSR & China with Ideology as primary link; USSR’s and China’s support to NOKOR not public due to possible repercussion of another WW Strategic alliance necessary since NOKOR was dependent on USSR & China for logs, cbt spt, & experience USSR’s motivation is advancement of security interest

THE IRON CURTAIN

STR AT EGY ENVI RONMENT

Material Dimension

COMPARATIVE:

STR AT EGY ENVI RONMENT

Material Dimension

COMPARATIVE:

STR AT EGY ENVI RONMENT

Institutional Dimension For NOKOR and communist allies, no rivalry among military services seen. Attributed to the form of govt with authoritarian party rule, where all state policies are dictated by party leaders Subjects are subservient to all policies imposed by the party. Hence, no accounts of intragovernment, civil-military, and intramilitary conflict among their ranks.

STR AT EGY ENVI RONMENT

Institutional Dimension For SOKOR and her allies, rivalry existed between Pres Truman’s limited war aims and Gen MacArthur’s open criticism, causing the latter’s relief in Apr 1951 Nevertheless, this did not change overall outcome of the war owing to UN and US intervention.

STR AT EGY ENVI RONMENT

PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

Social Dimension Ult imat e g oa l is r eu nificatio n bu t we re p re vent ed du e to diff ere nc e in id eo logies Fre ed oom fro m v estig es of colonia lis m Ag gra vat ed by re sp ec tive all ies (US and USSR ) an d ho w Kor ea su ffe re d in t he P ro xy Wa r of th e Co ld Wa r Bo th ar e ada man t o n th eir id eo logies, sup po rt ed by th eir “spo ns oring n atio ns ,” t hus a stale ma te in th e end Re unific at ion wo uld b e lon g and har d, un les s o ne sid e wou ld sacr ific e he r ide olog y f or th e “cou nt ry ”

CONCL USIO N

“For Korea to achieve lasting peace and reunification, one (either North or South) has to sacrifice her ideology. . . “ – GRP ALPHA –

Kore an War wa s a war in furthera nce of No rt h Ko rea’ s r eun ificati on po li cy exacer bated by the Cold Wa r that end ed in a st alem at e, wh ere Kore a be came the victi m. Withou t the sup erp owe rs interfere nce, it is hig hly po ssibl e that North Kore a cou ld ha ve ach ieve d he r re uni ficatio n goa l. One ma jor ove rsigh t o f No rth Kore a is he r fai lur e t o asse ss prob ab le rea ction of US & UN in the pursui t of her war strateg y aga inst t he Sou th. Prel ud e t o arms ra ce, mi li tary bu il d-up , a nd succe edi ng proxy wars. War end ed wher e it al l st arted - 38 th Par all el; T he di fferen ce?

En d of P res entat ion Good day!