Kennedy Opalo

Opalo

Kennedy Opalo PLSC 480: The Senior Essay

Southern Sudan: the creation of a nation I. Introduction: On January 9th 2005 the Government of Sudan (GoS) signed a peace agreement with the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) marking the end of more than two decades of violent conflict. The peace agreement, typical to most post conflict agreements, had provisions on how to reconcile the incompatibilities between the two warring parties – like resource wealth sharing, a considerable degree of local autonomy for Southern Sudan, guarantees of just government and the like. It was however different (at least in the African context) in one respect: it allowed for a vote by Southern Sudan on whether to secede or not in a referendum that was to be held after a six-year interim period. This was a very unusual settlement to an African conflict pitting a rebel movement against a sitting government. The Sudanese government faced no real threat of being dislodged from power by the SPLM/A, and history was on its side. The success rate of rebel movements in Africa is dismal1. Only Rwanda, Uganda, Zaire (the Democratic Republic of Congo) and Ethiopia have had rebel movements that successfully marched into their respective capitals and took power. It was therefore very unusual that the GoS agreed to the clause on secessionist – especially in light of the foresworn sanctity of Africa’s colonial borders as was stipulated in the original Organization of African Unity (OAU) charter2 and the international community’s abhorrence for secession movements3. 1

African rebel movements have a very low success rate because most of them seem to be driven by the ‘greed motive’ rather than strong ideological beliefs. This makes it possible for governments to buy-out rebel leaders in peace agreements that enable power sharing and the implicit sharing of economic resources. For more on this see Collier and Hoeffler. “Resource Rents, Governance and Conflict.” 2 The OAU Charter, Article II (c) and Article III (3), the OAU further resolved in its 1964 Cairo meeting to respect borders existing on achievement of national independence. 3 Heraclides, Alexis. “Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement.” International Organization. Vol. 44, No. 3

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This paper attempts to uncover the motivations that led to Khartoum’s acceptance of this unusual settlement to Sudan’s civil war. The approach taken in this paper is a theoretical analysis of the war and a historical overview of the evolution of the Sudanese state. The conclusion is that there were two main reasons that forced Khartoum to accept the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, its implications for Sudanese territorial integrity notwithstanding. The first reason was the fact that Sudan had never been a united nation-state with a common sense of nationhood. This national plurality within the state was a direct consequence of historical hostilities between the peoples of the North and the South, the disastrous colonial policies of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium that ran the country between 1898 until independence in 1956 and the continuation of colonialist policies by successive regimes in Khartoum in the post-independence period. The second reason can be attributed to the organizational competence of the leadership of SPLM/A and the movement’s ability to rally international support behind it. As will be shown in the latter part of this paper, the leader of SPLM/A, the late Colonel John Garang de Mabior, was not your typical African rebel leader in the mould of the likes of Laurent Nkunda, Joseph Kony or Foday Sankoh. Throughout the Southern Sudanese insurgency, he exhibited a single minded resolve to bring just government to Sudan in general and Southern Sudan in particular. This, coupled with his mastering of the game of international diplomacy, made it possible for his movement to capture the sympathy of many governments, particularly in the Eastern African region.

Defining the Sudanese Civil War The high incidence of civil wars in Africa has attracted a lot of scholarly attention. Different scholars have come up with different explanations for the occurrence of civil wars in Africa. Broadly categorized, these reasons can be classified as either economic (usually over (1990), pp. 441-378

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access to and exploitation of economic resources) or involving identity (ethnicity, race, religion, etc)4. The economic causes of civil wars have been the most studied5. Some scholars like Keen (1998) have gone as far as declaring that war is a continuation of economics by other means. Game theoretic analysis of civil wars in Africa concludes that aggrieved segments of a state’s population only choose to rebel if the economic gains from the rebellion outweigh those achievable by peaceably engaging the same government6. Different types of economic resources present different levels of civil war risk. Countries with point resources (mostly in the extractive industry) are more susceptible to such wars than those with diffused resources (e.g. high human capital).7 Given this understanding of civil wars in strictly economic terms, equitable distribution of economic resources (whether real or merely in appearance) becomes a preventative measure against the risk of civil war (Azam, 1995). Identity wars have also received considerable attention. Sambanis’ study of such conflicts found out that they are more likely to erupt in states with little or no political freedom and that the risk of their occurrence increases with ethnic heterogeneity8. However, a different study by Collier and Hoeffler established that ethnic heterogeneity actually reduces the risk of conflict because it increases the coordination costs of a rebellion. Their conclusion was that it is not ethnic heterogeneity that raises the risk of conflict but the degree of polarization (polarization being most acute in cases where there are two constituents whose political and/or economic 4

For a detailed discussion on the causes of Africa’s civil wars see Mkandawire, Thandika. “The terrible toll of postcolonial ‘rebel movements’ in Africa: towards an explanation of the violence against the peasantry.” Journal of Modern African Studies: 40, 2 (2002), pp. 181-215 5 See discussions in Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. “On Economic Causes of Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers 50 (1998), p. 563-573, Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers: 56 (2004), pp. 563-505 and Berdal, Mats & David Malone, eds, 2000. Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 6 Azam, Jean-Paul. “Looting and Conflict Between Ethnoregional Groups: Lessons for State Formation in Africa.” Journal of Conflict Resolution: 46; (2002) p. 131-153 7 Addison, Tony, Philippe Le Billon and S Mansoob Murshed. “Conflict in Africa: the cost of peaceful behavior.” Journal of African Economies. Vol. 11, No. 3 (2003), pp. 365-386 8 Sambanis, Nicholas. “Do ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?: A theoretical and empirical inquiry.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 45, No. 3 (2001), pp. 259-282

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differences coincide with identity differences). Their empirical analysis established that polarized societies have a 50% higher risk of descending into civil war than non-polarized societies. Mapping the above mentioned theoretical and empirical findings onto the Sudanese conflict reveals that despite the fact that the war in Sudan has lately been seen as an economic war9, at its outset it was an identity war. When the first Sudanese civil war broke out in 1955, oil (which later acquired a central position in the conflict) had not yet been discovered. The main grievance of the Southern Sudanese was political exclusion by the North (Wawa, 26). The coincidence of such exclusion with the racial and linguistic differences between the North and the South quickly transformed the conflict into an identity war pitting the African, Animist/Christian South against the Arab (mostly ‘Arabized’) and Muslim North. Religion, language and race became polarizing and added fuel to the conflict, consistent with the theoretical predictions discussed above. Khartoum’s post-independence policies of Arabization and Islamization of the South only served to cement the cleavage that already existed between the two sides in the conflict (Ibid., 14). Discovery of oil in Bentiu (in the Southern region) in 1978 changed the incentives for the warring sides.10 It intensified the conflict by enabling the government to increase military expenditure in its war effort against the Southern rebellion. Extraction of oil also heightened Southern resentment due to human rights abuses such as forceful displacement of Southerners in the oil exploration process.11 In the two decades following the discovery of oil, the conflict intensified and pushed economic reasons for the conflict to the forefront. The political and socio-cultural grievances of Southern Sudan remained unresolved, giving the war a complexity that blended economic, political and cultural motivations for rebellion. 9

Sudan Civil War Becoming War Over Oil – UN Report. 04/22/2009 10 Field, Shannon Lee. “The Internal and External Contexts of Oil Politics in Sudan: the role of actors.” In Adar, Korwa G et al. (eds.) Sudan Peace process. 11 Ibid.

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Also adding to the complexity of the Southern Sudanese rebellion war was its ‘liberation’ rhetoric. African rebellions are seldom secessionist12. Indeed even the Southern Sudanese rebellion, as is shown below, was not secessionist at the beginning. Garang’s initial motive was to bring just government to all of Sudan. By the mid 1990s however, the calls for Southern secession had grown loud enough to force the rebel leadership to include secession as an option in the peace negotiations. In retrospect, it looks as though Southern Sudanese calls for secession or greater regional autonomy was ineluctable. To understand this, a brief discussion of nationalism and the creation of nation-states is warranted. Nations are the results of processes of active creation and imagination (Anderson, 1983). There are two ways of viewing nationalism. On the one hand, it can be understood as an exclusivist characteristic of all human beings against those that are different – linguistically, racially or otherwise. On the other hand, the same phenomenon can be seen as a product of historical and social factors (Smith, 1986). Creating what Anderson called the “imagined community” is a difficult task, especially in a culturally and ethnically pluralist society. As Finlayson (1998) observes, “belonging to a nation entails belonging to a particular kind of nation with certain characteristics, certain cultural traits, values and ways of being.” Reconciling different identities within the nation is therefore always a difficult task. Finlayson also lays emphasis on the affective character of belonging to a nation13. In this regard he posits that the state and the nation are inseparable, because the state is a category of individual identification and that such identification is “profoundly political.” The best illustration of this is France, a nation-state that blended the nation (an identity) with the state to the extent that until recently there was official refusal to recognize the different ethnicities within the country.

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Weinstein, Jeremy. “Africa’s Revolutionary Deficit” Foreign Policy, 2007 See also the discussions in Dekker, Malova and Hoogendoorn

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Creating a nation-state involves more than control of a territorial unit. The ruling class must always strive to identify with the governed in order to create a lasting “intimate political community”. Otherwise the holders of power lose legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents due to their being “unlike us, people of a different nationality” (Ringmar, 1998). This process of creating the nation-state can be facilitated through rallying against external enemies (like in preWestphalian Europe or colonial Africa) or through active education and cultural dissemination. The latter process is mostly facilitated by a nation’s intellectuals (Cormier, 2003). Contextualizing these ideas of nationalism and creation of nation-states in Sudan reveals serious problems. Like most states in Africa, the geographical entity that is Sudan was a result of the colonial era. The name of the country was derived from the Arabic expression, Bilad al-Sudan (land of the blacks), which described the belt of non-Arab territories to the south of the Sahara desert. The creation of the territory that is Sudan first began when Muhammad Ali, the Ottoman Viceroy of Egypt, conquered Nubia, Sennar and Kordofan in the 1820s.14 Anglo-Egyptian rule prompted a nationalist movement for independence. But the project of nation-creation and political socialization in Sudan was stillborn. Before the country gained independence, the nationalist movement was almost exclusively Northern – at the exclusion of Southern Sudanese – and closely tied with Egypt. Indeed the ‘independence party,’ the National Unionist Party, was sympathetic to the idea of a political union with Egypt.15 The sectarian (Islamic) character of Northern nationalists betrayed their regionalist ambitions.16 Because of their dominance of the national agenda, Northern cultural entrepreneurs masquerading as nationalists made Islam and being Arab central to Sudanese identity. They conflated cultural nationalism with political 14

Holt and Daly (1988) Broadbent, P. B. “Sudanese Self-Government.” Royal Institute of International Affairs. Vol. 30, No. 3 (1954) p. 320-330 16 Holt, Peter M. “Sudanese Nationalism and Self-Determination, Part 1.” Middle East Journal. Vol. 10, No. 3 (1956), pp. 239-247 15

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nationalism. With time, Northern linguicism and racism against Southerners were no longer individuated pathologies that could be overcome by education, but had become structural characteristic of the Sudanese state (see discussions below). But how different was the Sudanese experience different from other African nations? After all, there aren’t calls out there for other African countries to be divided like Sudan will most certainly be after the 2011 referendum. The answer lies in what the nationalist movement created – or in the case of Sudan restored. For most African states, the process of decolonization offered an opportunity for the creation of national awareness (Fanon, 97). Nationalist movements were exercises in nation creation as opposed to nation awakening. The new African nations were therefore created from scratch, with their multiple ethnicities acquiring a sense of belonging in the artificial polities inherited from the colonial era. The ethnic quarrels that emerged later were never secessionist in nature, but were symptomatic of politicians’ use of ethnicity for political and economic gains (see the discussion on African civil wars above). Sudan was slightly different. In Sudan, the nationalist movement did not seek to create a nation from scratch but to restore their independence from foreign domination. As Finlayson observes, nationalism oftentimes seeks to restore a “golden age, a past that has been taken away by colonizers, outsiders.” In the Sudanese case, this restoration was of an indigenous system of government – sectarian and with roots in the Mahdist state – that was oppressive and dominated by the elite from the riverain Northern part of the country at the exclusion of Southern Sudanese, and to some extent Darfurians as well. What resulted was what de Waal calls three Sudans: North, South and West17. As is illustrated below, the cultural chauvinism of the Northern elite and racism ensured that the two Sudans considered here – North and South – remained separated by a grass curtain,

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De Waal, Alex. “Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External Engagement.” Contemporay Politics. (Dec. 10, 2004) 04/22/2009 < http://conconflicts.ssrc.org/hornofafrica/dewaal/>

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well watered by decades of hostile relations between the two sides. Northerners established a system of Weberian social closure (Macdonald, 1985) in which becoming a Muslim and claiming Arab ancestry was akin to “registration.” Southerners, lacking Arab ancestry and being largely Christian or practicing local religions, were excluded from full membership in the post-colonial state. Writing in 1954, Broadbent notes that “the Sudanese themselves (read Northerners) do not wish to have anything to do with the African continent even though the territories to the South and West take a great interest in African affairs.”18 It is these factors that make the Sudanese experience unique in Africa and therefore deserving of special treatment. Northern Sudan had a long history of Islamic government while the South lacked any extensive political unions. This historical accident created a situation in which at independence what emerged was a colonial state that continued colonialist policies hence justifying the secessionist appeals that have emerged out of the Southern rebellion. Hereafter this paper is organized in four sections. Sections II and III look at the history of Sudan and the origins of the North-South divide. Through a brief account of the historical interactions between the north and the south it establishes why the racial, religious and cultural differences between the North and the South proved to be insurmountable in the post-colonial period, at least to the extent that this has happened in most other African countries. Section IV analyzes the motivations for the emergence of the insurgency in Southern Sudan and how the leadership of John Garang influenced the outcome of the Sudanese civil war. Although Garang’s intention was to have more autonomy in the south but in the context of a united Sudan, even he could not stop the Southern resolve to separate itself from the North. Section IV puts the Sudanese civil war in the international context and analyses the role of the international community in the waging of the war and its eventual ending. Successive regimes in Khartoum 18

Broadbent

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attracted an ever changing ensemble of allies and enemies. The Southern rebel leadership knew this and exploited it to their advantage, without forming any permanent alliances. Section V concludes by reviewing the main points in the paper and offers an analysis of the prospects of the expected new nation of Southern Sudan.

II. A history of violence: Before the Ottoman conquest, the geographical entity that is Sudan had several indigenous Kingdoms in the north and loosely defined tribal authorities in the South. The Christian Kingdoms of Nubia – Nobadae, Makoritae and Alodaei – because of their centralized authority, were able to resist initial Arab incursions into their territories and even managed to sign the Baqt treaty with the Arabs. According to the treaty, the Nubians would supply the Arabs with slaves in exchange for cereals and other goods from the Arab world (Hasan, 24). With time however, trade and continued interaction with Arabs from Egypt and beyond led to the collapse of these Kingdoms. They succumbed not through outright conquest, but gradual erosion and infiltration by Arabs and Arabized peoples from the northern regions of the country (Holt and Daly, 15). The gradual Arabization of north continued with the establishment of a Sultanate by invading tribesmen from the south (the Funj) who later adopted Islam and the Arabic language. The Islamization of the Funj dynasty was motivated by both political and commercial reasons. Facing a threat of Muslim Arabs in the north and in need of trade connections with Cairo, the ruling class of the Funj Sultanate accepted Islam to defuse tensions with Abdallab- an Arab statelet to its North - and to open up trade routes into Egypt for its merchants (Holt and Daly, 32). The subsequent dominance of Arabic and Islam in northern Sudan after this period was not necessarily a case of Arab assimilation of indigenous Sudanese but was more of Arab peoples and

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their language and cultural habits being absorbed by the indigenes (Hasan, 176). After a couple of centuries the term Arab had effectively been emptied of its ethnic significance and described many of the peoples with trace to significant Arab ancestry or who wanted to claim such ancestry for political reasons19. Since Arab traders did not travel with their women, they oftentimes took local women – mainly from ruling families – as wives. Because of the matrilineal descent characteristic of the indigenous peoples in the north, the descendants of these Arab traders found themselves in positions of authority and continued to reproduce the domination of Arab and Islamic culture over pre-existing local traditions.20 The Arabization and Islamization of the North was gradual and largely assimilationist. Southern encounter with Arabs and later the Arabized peoples of the North was completely different. The demand for slaves to be used as soldiers, domestic servants or concubines was high in the Arab world, particularly in Egypt. The tribal regions of the south, lacking any central authority21, were a fertile ground for slave raiding. Gray (1961) points out that the Southern regions, with “their scanty technological equipment, their complete illiteracy, their ignorance of commerce, their minute social horizons and their lack of any broad political allegiance,” were decisively disadvantaged in their encounter with the intruding Northerners. Northern merchants repeatedly made incursions into the south in search for slaves and ivory. Even the Ottomans could not put a stop to the slave trade. Indeed, Muhammad Ali himself valued the practice because it provided him with much needed manpower for his armies. Slavery was, implicitly, officially sanctioned by the Ottoman governors of Sudan (Hill, 35). Even those nominally opposed to the practice, like Khedive Ismail and Khedive Said, only did so in order to justify the expansion of their rule deeper into the south (Holt and Daly, 75). 19

Wolfers, Michael. “Race and Class in Sudan.” Race and Class: 23 (1981), pp. 65 - 81 Deng, Francis (1973). “Dynamics of Identification: a basis for national integration in the Sudan.” Africa Today. Vol. 20, No. 3 (p. 19-28) 21 Holt, P. M. “Sudanese Nationalism and Self-Determination Part 1.” 20

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The divide between the North and South was not just because of the scourge of slavery. There was also a cultural dimension to it. Southerners did not have any centrally organized states. They also did not have a monotheistic religion. These factors led the incoming Arabs to view the Southerners as “savage, naked abids (slaves).” According to Robinson, “the flourishing slave trade in northern Sudan and Islamic sanction undoubtedly contributed to the contemptuous attitude of the Northerners to the [pagan] South” (Robinson, 36). The states to the north, both in the Nile basin and out west in Darfur, depended on slave raiding, among other forms of economic plunder of the south, to reproduce themselves in “wars without end.”22 Some Southern communities got co-opted into the illicit slave trade. In order to do this, the North exploited existing tribal rivalries in the south. The raiding of other tribes for slaves and cattle suddenly was made lucrative (Robinson, 48). The level of assimilation of Arabs that took place in the North did not occur in the South. There was almost no Arab settlement in the south due to geographical barriers as well as southern climatic conditions that were not conducive to the Northern way of life. Non-assimilation in the South was also for pragmatic economic reasons. Proselytizing to the south would have transformed the region from being dar-el-harb (land of war) into dar-el Islam (land of Islam) thereby robbing the slave raiders of a vital economic resource since Muslims were forbidden from enslaving fellow Muslims (Deng, 1995:69). By the time the south was incorporated into the geographical entity known as Sudan – beginning with the Ottoman conquest - the identities of the two regions (the North Arab and Muslim and the South Black and Polytheist) had already been essentialized. Indeed by the 19th century the derogatory term abid (slave) was already being used in reference to black Southerners. The continuation of the slave trade and the Islamic sanction

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See De Waal, Alex. “Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External Engagement” Scoial Science Research Council, 2004.

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against unbelievers cemented the contemptuous attitudes of northerners towards southerners, effectively creating a racial hierarchy in the country that persists up to this date (Robinson, 36). Because of the socially constructed superiority of Arabs and their religion (Islam), Northerners of all ethnic stock felt the pressure to Arabize themselves and to adopt Islam. Race and religion therefore immediately acquired the status of tools of domination. The perceived superiority of Northerners stemmed from their claimed Arab ancestry and advanced political and military organization. The resultant socio-political structure was true to Lieberson’s23 observesation that “when the population migrating to a new contact situation is superior in technology (particularly weapons) and more tightly organized than the indigenous group, the necessary conditions for maintaining the migrants’ political and economic institutions are usually imposed on the indigenous population.” Northern Sudan thus acquired an Arab identity while the southern regions remained Bilad al-Sudan, a hinterland to be exploited and pillaged up until and including the brief existence of the millenarian Mahdist state (1881-1898)24. Even after colonization, Sudan maintained this structure. Southern Sudan was a colony within a colony. The significance of geography in formation of race relations and the resultant territorial structure of the same has been appreciated by anthropologists like T.P. Jones and D. McEvoy25. In the typical African colonial context, the use of space as a separator and signifier of positions in the racial hierarchy was actualized by the separation of colonist and native quarters (Fanon, 4). The creation of a barrier between the dominant and the dominated groups was necessary to ensure a reproduction of the socially constructed racial hierarchies and systems of domination. In Sudan, there was no need to invent the barrier between the North and South. Geography provided 23

Liberson, Stanley. “A social theory of race and ethnic relations.” American Sociological Review. Vol. 26, No. 6 (1961), pp. 902-910 24 This state was founded by Muhammad Ahmad who claimed that he was the Mahdi – the expected Islamic redeemer. See Holt, P. M. The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881-1898. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1958. 25 Jones, T.P. and D. McEvoy (1978). “Race and Space in Cloud-Cuckoo Land.” Area, Vol. 10, No. 3 (162-166)

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it. The grass curtain that separated the North and the South and the Islamic tradition of distinguishing between “land of Islam” and “land of war” permanently placed Southerners in a disadvantaged position. Geography therefore served to reinforce Southerners’ Otherness – vis-àvis Northerners - within the Sudanese polity. The question of why the initial Arab immigrants assimilated in the North but did not quite do the same when they encountered the Southerners can simply be explained by the fact that Arab interactions with indigenous Northerners took place before attitudes about the ‘Otherness’ of Southerners had been cemented in the Arab psyche. As Fields26 observes, “ideological context tells people what to notice.” By the time the North encountered the South more substantively in the latter period of the 19th century and beyond, Northern socio-cultural ideas of Southern ‘barbarity’ and ‘paganism’ informed this interaction and therefore made assimilation problematic.

III. One state, two destinies: The Colonial (Condominium) Period: In 1898, the combined effort of Britain and Egypt overthrew the millenarian Mahdist State that had dominated Sudan since 1881. Thereafter Sudan became an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, jointly administered by Egypt and Britain27. The colonial administration, laden with its own racial attitudes enhanced the existing racial and cultural differences between the North and the South. None other than the British civil secretary, Sir Harold McMichael, referred to the Southerners as “savages” (Deng, 1995: 78). Even when it came to government, the colonial view of the south as an incorrigible backward place prevailed. Lord Cromer, a one time consulgeneral in Cairo, argued that law and order could only be maintained in the south under tribal 26

Fields, Barbara J. “Ideology and Race in America.” Region, Race, and Reconstruction: Essays in Honor of C. Vann Woodward. Ed. J. Morgan Kousser and James M. McPherson. New York / Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 143-177. 27 The Condominium existed only on paper. In reality, colonial Sudan from 1989 to 1956 was essentially governed by Britain with “Egypt as little more than a mere rubber stamp partner.” Deng (1995)

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laws (with military supervision) that catered for practices like witchcraft, and other such ‘backward practices,’ which were prevalent among “the savages of this region” (Deng, 1995: 79). In short, the British were skeptical of the southern region’s readiness for modernity (Wai, 1973). Informed by their own racist perception of Southerners, British colonial officials reinforced the racial, cultural and spatial differences between the North and the South highlighted above through the four elements that comprised the ‘Southern Policy.’ The first element was the Closed District Ordinance Act of 1922. The policy required that Northerners, traders and otherwise, acquire permits before entering the South. It was designed supposedly to stop the slave trade and other forms of exploitation of the South – including the spread of Islam and Arab culture, mode of dress or settlement (Petterson, 7). It also discouraged Southerners from travelling to the North to find work. Holt and Daly (1961: 138) observe that “everything was done to encourage tribal consciousness.” This policy did nothing but to reinforce the grass curtain that already existed between the South and the North, especially in light of the rather ugly racial history between the two regions of the Sudan. Continued emphasis of Southern ‘Otherness’ “reminded Southerners that they were different from the Northerners and that the latter were the sons of the slave trader”28 The second element of British Southern Policy arose from the Rejaf Conference of 1928 which identified six languages (Dinka, Zande, Shilluk, Nuer, Bari, and Latuko) indigenous to the south that were to be used, along with English, as media of instruction in Southern primary schools (Holt and Daly, 139). This language policy differed from the north where Arabic continued to be the language of government and instruction in school. The colonial language policy encouraged particularism in the south – a political move designed to stem and attenuate any hint of homogeneity within the region (Holt and Daly, 139). Instead of fostering cohesion and 28

Beshir, Mohammed Said. The Crossroads of Africa. London, UK: p. 20

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a (sub) national consciousness, it raised the salience of tribal and ethnic differences in Southern Sudan. The third element of the policy was the British colonial government’s decision to grant the various missionaries leeway in curriculum development in their respective “spheres of influence.” But British permission of Christian missionaries in the south did not translate into active support. While accepting the near unity of religion and the state in the north and sometimes even supporting it (A British official went as far as calling the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium an Islamic State29) the colonial government did not invest much in the spread of Christianity in the south (Deng, 1995: 80). Whatever resources that were available were used to “conquer peoples, not to liberate their minds.” Leaving the investment in education to the missionaries was a cost cutting measure (Collins, 198). The inconsistency of this particular element of the policy notwithstanding, it directly contributed to the continued alienation of the south from the north of the country. The fourth and final misstep of the colonial government was the 1924 adoption of indirect rule to administer the two regions of the country. In the north, Muslim Sheikhs were given leeway in judicial matters while in the south tribal chiefs were used to pacify their respective populations (Holt and Daly, 133). This was a direct move by Britain to limit the influence of newly independent Egypt on northern educated urban intellectuals who were increasingly becoming more vociferous in their calls for independence – Egypt at some point even claimed sovereignty over Sudan.30 The British policy missteps highlighted above directly contributed to the insurmountable integration challenges that were to face the newly independent state of Sudan. The possibility of creating an independent state in the south, to be incorporated into the wider British East Africa, 29 30

Deng (1990) Mills, David E. “A failed nationalist endeavor: Egyptian-Sudanese textile trade, 1935-1945.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2004) p. 175-194

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had at times been considered. A report in 1920 stated that “the possibility of the southern (black) portion of the Soudan being …… linked up with some central African system” was “borne in mind” (Holt and Daley, 139). The different and unequal policies pursued in the north and south led to the creation of a plurality of national consciousness within Sudan. It is this feeling of having a different destiny from the north that made southerners hesitant about independence (Wawa, 145). However, after having been convinced of an equitable stake in the post-colonial state, Southern delegates at the 1947 Juba Conference accepted the idea independence within a united Sudan. But they were soon to learn that they had been short-changed. For instance, in 1955, out of 800 posts (left vacant by departing colonial officials) that were to be Sudanized, only 8 were allocated to southerners (Petterson, 8). It was only a matter of time before the Southerners rebelled against Khartoum. In 1955, soldiers in Torik mutinied against the government. Although the mutiny was successfully suppressed, the seeds of rebellion had already been sown. The Post-Colonial Period: Sudan gained independence on the 1st of January 1956 amid much fanfare in the north but apprehensive reservation in the south. There was widespread fear in the south that independence meant for the region a mere change of masters – from the British to the Arabs (Wawa, 139). The concept of two Sudans – north and south - had already been etched onto the minds of all Sudanese (see map). At independence and in the immediate post-independence period the government of Ismail al-Azhari adopted a politics of exclusion that only served to widen the chasm between the north and the south (Collins, 455). Sooner than later it became clear that the north had reneged on its promise of a federal constitution and was bent on pursuing forceful Arabization and Islamization of the entire country in order to achieve “national unity through uniformity.31” The south, after realizing it had no future in a united Sudan, started agitating for 31

Deng, Francis. “War of visions for the nation.” Middle East Journal, vol. 44, No.4 (1990), pp. 596-609

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independence in 1957 – through the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and the Anya –Nya, its military wing. After fifteen years of conflict, the SSLM signed a peace agreement with the government (under Jaafar Nimeiry) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The agreement granted Southern Sudan significant regional autonomy (Adar et al., 25). However, Nimeiry abrogated the Addis Ababa agreement in 1983 by dividing the Southern Sudan into three regions – a check on the growing powers of Southern leaders – and by instituting the infamous September (Islamic) laws which moved Sudan closer to adopting universal Sharia law. This move sparked the rebellion that started the second Sudanese civil war led by the SPLM/A under the leadership of the late Colonel John Garang de Mabior. Given the unequal relationship between the north and the south, the threat of post-colonial ‘internal colonialism’ was always a reality even in the pre-independence period. Indeed in 1941, Muhammad Mahjub (future prime minister of Sudan), described Arabization and Islamization of Sudan as “inevitable,” a direct hint of the northern elite’s intention to dominate the south.32 The successive regimes of post-colonial Sudan continued to sow the seeds of discord through policies of socio-cultural, political and economic marginalization. The government began to earnestly Arabize and Islamize the south in its efforts to create national unity - In 1957, Khartoum announced the nationalization of all Christian schools in Southern Sudan in order to begin the process of Arabizing the south. The following year (1958) the government opened six Islamic seminaries in the south and in 1964 it expelled Christian missionaries on the grounds that they were obstacles to national integration (Sharkey, 2008). But Khartoum’s involvement in education in the south was more political than anything else. Southerners remained grossly underrepresented in institutions of higher learning. For instance, in 1972, only 35 of the 1641 places at the University of Khartoum were taken up by southerners; in 1984 only 9 of 1637. Even in Juba, 32

Mahjub, Nahwa al-ghad, p. 212. As cited in Sharkey

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the Southern capital, southern students remained marginalized. Of 158 students admitted to the “scientific and technical faculties” in 1984, only 4 were Southerners (Holt and Daly, 2004). From a value neutral perspective, the pursuit of a national language and culture does not seem completely outlandish. “It is not surprising that a government seeks to centralize the political system and integrate the society within its borders” (Lesch, 1998). Here, an application of Lesch’s theoretical analysis of the modes of nation-creation is in order. Lesch observes that there are two type of nationalism: ethnic and territorial. Pre-independence nationalists in Sudan can be classified as ethnic nationalists. They agitated for independence based on their Arab identity and not on behalf of all the peoples of Sudan. As has been noted above, the Sudanese nationalist movement failed at creating a national consciousness among all Sudanese. The lack of a cohesive identity in the post-colonial period created the need to integrate the south into the new state. On this front Khartoum had two options. It could either integrate the Southerners using a ‘control model’ (through “control” and “repression”) or it could adopt an ‘ethnic pluralist model’ in which it guaranteed autonomy for the many peoples of the Sudan while at the same time fostering national cohesion (Lesch, 1998: 9). It chose the former. In an attempt to create an ‘imagined community’ along the hegemonic attitudes of northern elites – a la Gramsci33 - it initiated assimilationist policies that were “rigid” and “ruthless” leading to Southern suspicions of cultural imperialism34 and eventual rebellion (Deng, 1995: 136). Arabization as a policy of national integration largely failed (Sharkey, 2008). Khartoum’s language policy and promotion of Islam only served to provide a cause for the Southern

33

Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Trans. Q Hoare, GN Smith. New York, NY: International, 1971. Gramscian understanding of the state as “hegemony protected by the armour of coercion”. The state formation aa struggle against otherness. Hegemony is fragile and has to be reinforced by cultural inscription which transforms “the fragile into the monumental” and “endows it with misplaced conreteness” 34 Sudan African National Union, ‘The memorandum presented by the Sudan African National Union to the Commission of the Organisation of African Unity for Refugees’ as cited in Sharkey

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rebellion. For the Northern elite the Arabization and Islamization policy was both socio-political and pragmatic. Arab cultural chauvinism created perverse incentives for the government to promote Arabic and Islam. Northern intellectuals – like Mirghani Ali and Ahmad Nasr35 - fanned the flames of racial discrimination by creating stories that depicted the peripheries (non-Arab parts of Sudan) as primitive societies that benefited from Arab civilization. Interestingly, even Arabs who were fairly liberal on the issue of race and saw it as an all encompassing category that can include all peoples of all hues, still insisted that the only way of uniting Sudan was through Arabization and Islamization36. Indeed, many of the political parties in the north had religious roots and oftentimes competed on who would make Islam the national religion and Sharia the basis of the Sudanese constitution (Holt and Daly, 168; Warburg, 65). The pragmatic motive for promoting Islam was the ready supply of cash from pan-Arabist ideologues in places like Libya and Saudi Arabia (Sharkey, 2008). Political power was tightly controlled by the Arab-Muslim elite from the central northern region. Their pretences to enlist the support Southerners and other Arabized and Islamized peoples – in the western region especially – was necessitated by demographic practicalities and not by a belief in the equality of all peoples of Sudan (De Waal, 2004). Successive regimes in Khartoum, and especially the military regimes that dominated most of Sudanese history, were “tactless to the point of provocation” in the appointment of administrative officials in the south (Holt and Daly, 178). Using differentials in human capital between the two regions as an excuse, Khartoum systematically excluded Southern participation in government (Garang, 1987: xv). The other problem that complicated the northern political situation (and how it affected the south) was 35

Ahmad ‘Abd al-Rahim Nasr, al-Idara al-baritaniyya wa’l-tabshir al-islami wa’l-masihi fial-Sudan (Wizarat alTarbiya wa’l-Tawjih, Khartoum, 1979), pp. 25–6; Mirghani Hasan ‘Ali, Shakhsiyyat ‘amma min alMawrada (n.p., [Omdurman, early 1990s?]), p. 43. Cited in Sharkey 36 ‘Abd al-Majid ‘Abidin, Dirasat Sudaniyya: majmu’at maqalat min al-adab wa-al-tarikh, second edition (Khartoum University Press, Khartoum, 1972), pp. 38–40. Cited in Sharkey

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the fact that nearly all the parties were sectarian (Gray, 35; Warburg, 65). The Islamization of politics in the north marginalized politicians that were willing to compromise with the south on matters of religion and political power-sharing – the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Turabi, had a hand in most government decisions beginning in 197737 and it is the same Islamists that forced Jafaar Nimeiry to abrogate the Addis Ababa Agreement which granted the south regional autonomy and shelter from Sharia laws. It is also true that the 1989 coup that ousted the government of Prime Minister al-Mahdi was instigated by the National Islamic Front (NIF) because of their fear that Sadiq al-Mahdi, then Prime Minister, was going to make a deal with the Southern rebels. Political marginalization of the south was also a direct result of political instability in the north. The sectarian parties in the north engaged in constant struggles for power, against each other and within the parties themselves (Holt and Daly, 189). Military rule (punctuated by numerous coup attempts) dominated most of the years between 1969 and the present. All this, coupled with the fact that for all but 10 years between 1957 and 2005 the Southern rebellion was in force, made it almost impossible to have any meaningful political interaction between the north and the south. Economic marginalization of the south in the post-colonial period was a function of the civil war, northern negligence and unequal access to opportunity. The first civil war lasted between 1957 and 1972. Within this period the Sudanese economy struggled with the problems of poor infrastructure, a lack of foreign aid - since neither the USSR nor the United States saw it as strategic - and a civil war that continued to drain its treasury.38 In actuality, economic marginalization of the south took place in two ways. In the first instance, Khartoum controlled the amount of grants going to the Southern government –during the interwar period. For example, 37 38

Woodward, Peter. “Peacemaking in Sudan.” In Furley and May (eds.) Ending Africa’s Wars. Barlow, Robin (1982). “Economic growth in the Middle East, 1950-1972.” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2

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out of the pledged development spending in the south in the period 1972-8, only 23.2% (20% by some estimates39) of the money was delivered40. The second instance of marginalization was the exploitation of Southern resources without equitable sharing of the returns. Southerners were rarely consulted before the exploitation of resources present in the region. A case in point was the Jonglei Canal project. The project’s intention was to divert the waters of the Nile from the Sudd (where most of it was through evaporation) onto the lower reaches of the River Nile for irrigation and navigational purposes. Egypt, herself heavily dependent on the Nile, had a heavy hand in the project - the project was conceived in 1914 when Sudan was still under Anglo-Egyptian rule. Southerners were not sufficiently consulted during the design and implementation of the project. The resulting suspicions caused riots by students and political turmoil in the south41. The most discussed unequal exploitation of Southern resources involves oil. In the late 1970s, Sudan struck oil in the border regions between the north and the south. Immediately thereafter, the Nimeiry administration started trying to redraw the 1956 borders in an attempt to place the oil wells in the north42. As has been noted above, the discovery of oil raised the stakes in the civil war. For most of the 1980s, the Southern rebels resolved to disrupt oil production in order to deprive Khartoum of revenue for armament. They succeeded in their efforts when in 1984 the US oil company Chevron withdrew from the south after several of its employees were killed. Oil production resumed in the 1990s under the NIF backed administration of Omar alBashir. Under al-Bashir Khartoum pursued a relentless policy of scorched-earth warfare to create 'security' for the foreign oil companies. The south continued to be denied access to revenue since “all Sudanese revenues, from all oil projects and concession sales, [went] directly to the National 39

40

Holt and Daly, p. 204 Gray (1961)

41

Kasfir, Nelson (1977). African Affairs, vol. 76, No. 303 (p. 143-166) Reeves, Eric (2002). “Oil development in Sudan.” Review of African Political Economy. Vol.29, No. 91(p. 167169) 42

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Islamic Front, unencumbered by any credible mechanism for equitable or productive distribution.”43 In addition to this blatant robbery, instead of constructing an oil refinery in the south (around Bentiu) where the oil was discovered, the government chose Kusti, a town squarely in the north (Holt and Daly, 204). The marginalization of southerners by successive post-colonial governments of Sudan has been well documented (Idris, 83). The northern government developed policies that treated northerners like citizens but southerners like subjects (Mamdani, 1996). The same Khartoum regimes consistently marginalized Southerners in decision making “at virtually all levels, including the management of local affairs” (Deng, 1995: 177). Lacking any means of political recourse, the Southern elite decided to wage war against Khartoum. The first civil war (1957-72) sought to address these grievances. SSLM and its military wing the Anya-Nya fought for greater regional political and economic autonomy. The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement ended hostilities but only until 1983 when war resumed following the abrogation of the same agreement by the Nimeiry government.

IV. De Mabior and his men: The late Colonel John Garang de Mabior was born on 23rd June 1945 in Southern Sudan. He attended the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania before proceeding on to earn doctorate degree in Economics from Iowa State University (Shimanyula, 16). He later joined the Sudanese army and rose to the rank of colonel. In 1983 there was a mutiny in Bor, a garrison in the south of the country. Nimeiry sent Garang to quell this rebellion. It is at Bor that Garang went through a road-to-Damascus conversion leading to the formation of the SPLM/A. As stated above, the organization and operations of the SPLM/A set it apart from other rebel movements in Africa. The natural question then is, why? 43

Ibid.

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Rebellions can be as a result of economic considerations in which case they can be seen as either investment (with a view of benefiting in the post-conflict period) or business (looting during the war) – although sometimes rebellions could be mistakes especially if one of the combatants underestimates the other side’s military capability (Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom, 2004). This sort of economic calculus is not restricted to rebel leadership but informs the choices of rebel soldiers as well. The returns from the rebellion (whether economic or political) must outweigh the costs – although there has been noted exceptions to this rule, especially in identity wars in which collective rationality and the ‘martyr syndrome’ sometimes override individual cost-benefit considerations (Muller and Opp, 1986). Assuming individual self-interestedness as a motivator for those joining a rebellion, a problem emerges for rebel leaders with regard to attracting recruits and keeping them disciplined once they enlist. Here, Weinstein’s analysis of resource mix and information asymmetries and how they affect the structure of rebel movements is instructive (Weinstein, 2005). Weinstein contends that economic endowment presents a curse on rebel movements because it tends to attract “looters” and consumers (who see rebellion as a business) rather than investors (who see rebellion as investment in a better future). Besides resource availability, the military strength of governments also determines the structure of rebellions. Rebel movements that face governments with strong armies have to adapt and become credible armies while those facing weak governments can afford to be less structured and concentrate more on pursuing economic goals,44 sometimes even going to the extent of colluding with the very same weak governments they purport to fight in robbing the civilian population.45

44

Herbst, Jeffrey. “Economic Incentives, Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa.” Journal of African Economies. Vol. 9, No. 3 (2000), pp. 270-294 45 The best documented example of this is Sierra Leone in Keen, David (2005). Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone. New York, NY: Palgrave.

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The SPLM/A largely avoided the war-lordism and looting that have characterized many an African rebellion.46 The movement had “unusually highly disciplined forces” which enabled it to score vital victories against Khartoum, especially in the very early stages of the conflict (Holt and Daly, 204). It also managed to avoid fractious disintegrations that are typical of African rebel movements. The only major challenge came from Riek Machar, who in 1991 formed a splinter rebel group- the SPLA-Nasir. But the splinter movement floundered and soon became unpopular with the Southern masses as it emerged that it was being armed by Khartoum47. The SPLM/A’s superior organization can be attributed to the fact that at the start of the rebellion the exploitation of point resources – in this case oil – was not in full swing in Sudan. The movement therefore avoided the ‘resource curse’ and instead of using economic gain as a recruiting incentive relied on identity and political grievances. As Weinstein posits in his paper, rebellions founded on identity and political grievance, as opposed to greed for resources, tend to be better structured and more disciplined. The other reason for SPLM/A’s high discipline is the fact that it was facing a formidable opponent in Khartoum. Sudan has a fledgling arms industry48 and armed with oil revenue and support from Arab nations could afford high levels of military expenditure. In addition to the above mentioned structural factors, the impressive organization of the SPLM/A can also be attributed to the foresight of Garang. His high education and international exposure set him apart from other African rebel leaders (most of them half-literate junior officers) whose rebellions have been marked by fractious war-lordism and at times bizarre superstitions.49 Garang was also a pragmatist who was not restricted by ideological beliefs or greed for power. At

46

Weinstein, Jeremy. “Africa’s Revolutionary Deficit” Foreign Policy, 2007 Rolandsen (2005) 48 Economist. “A mysterious air raid in Sudan: a battle between two long arms.” 04/02/2009, 04/22/2009 49 Doom, Ruddy and Koen Vlassenroot. “Kony’s message: a new koine? The Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda.” African Affairs: 98 (1999), pp. 5-36 47

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the outset, Garang fashioned himself as a leftist, championing the rights of not just Southerners but all Sudanese who were under the yoke of the repressive Nimeiry regime50 and would not be tempted even by buyout offers from Khartoum.51He believed that “no war of liberation as we are fighting is fought in order for a particular person to be a leader.” (Garang,1987). The SPLM/A’s and Garang genuine commitment to the liberation of Southern Sudan was also evident in the movement’s establishment of a rudimentary civil administration in the areas under its control throughout the duration of the war (Rolandsen, 2005). While the military wing of the movement (SPLA) continued its fight against the Sudanese army, the political wing (SPLM) continued its agitation for political change in the north under the umbrella entity called the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). The NDA provided an avenue for SPLM cooperation with political parties from the north that were increasingly being marginalized and repressed by the al-Bashir regime (Lesch,1998: 200). Meanwhile, in the south the SPLM/A continued to consolidate its position in the captured areas by establishing civilian administrative structures at the grassroots level (Lesch, 1998: 201), even as it avoided calls for secession. Secession-talk was avoided because for the latter part of the 1980s the SPLM/A’s main backer, Mengistu, was fighting secessionist forces in Eritrea and the last thing he wanted was for a bad precedent to be set in the region. Indeed as late as 1996 when creating the Civilian Authority for the New Sudan (CANS) the movement establishment avoided the use of the term “government” in order to avoid sending the wrong signal that they were seceding (Lesch, 1998: 201). However, as the peace process picked up steam in the early 2000s political pressure from the grassroots on the issue of self-determination could no longer be ignored. The Southern

50

It can be argued that John Garang’s socialist rhetoric was meant for a particular audience – socialist Ethiopia under Mengistu Haile Mariam who was his chief benefactor in the early stages of the war until Mengistu was deposed by Meles Zenawi. 51 Shimanyula, 23

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Diaspora was particularly vocal in its criticism of Garang for his reservations when it came to the issue of self-determination. Garang’s superior leadership abilities were also evident in his desire to be seen as democratic, even during the war. In 1994, the SPLM/A organized the National Convention, to legitimize its leadership in the aftermath of the 1991 fallout with Machar, among others. Garang got elected unopposed as chairman of the movement and its military wing. Besides legitimizing the movement leadership, the National Convention served as the point of departure from the old school of thought of liberation within a united Sudan without the option of secession. Instead it adopted principles of establishing civilian government structures in the south, democratization and accountability of the movement through elections and most importantly, declaration of “New Sudan” – which meant independence if Khartoum remained opposed to the right of Southern Sudanese to political, economic and religious freedoms (Rolandsen, 111)

V. Diplomacy by other means: Foreign military help: To fully understand the Sudanese civil war, one must place it in the international context. Throughout the duration of the war, both Khartoum and the SPLM/A received help from sources outside of the country. Analysis of international involvement in civil wars reveals two broads reasons for such involvement: instrumental reasons (for economic, political or other gain) and affective considerations (like in irredentist movements)52. Because of the direct benefits of involvement, help to rebels or governments fighting rebels mostly comes from close neighbors.53 On secessionist rebellions, studies have established a mixed set of possible reactions from the international community. States react to such movements by “diffusion and encouragement, 52

Ibid. Harbom, Lotta and Peter Wallensteen. “Armed Conflict and International Dimensions, 1946-2004.” Journal of Peace Research: 42 (2005), pp. 623-635 53

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reconciliation or isolation and repression”54. In the Sudanese case, international involvement was for both instrumental and affective reasons. Arab countries aided Khartoum because of affective ties in Islam and the Arabic language and in the case of Egypt, economic reasons centered on the control of the waters of the Nile. 55 The SPLM/A got help from African governments in the context of African brotherhood against an Arab aggressor and, in the case of Ethiopia and Uganda, to counter Khartoum’s support for rebels in the two countries. The international dimension of the conflict between Khartoum and SPLM/A has been well analyzed by Ann Lesch56. In fact such involvement goes back to the first civil war when Uganda, Ethiopia and Israel all backed the Anya-Nya in their rebellion against Khartoum. Khartoum on the other hand got support from the Soviet Union and Egypt, its northern neighbor who had always been skeptical about self-determination in southern Sudan because of the potential implications such a phenomenon would have in the management of the waters of the Nile River. International involvement in the war continued after the resumption of hostilities in 1983. Both the SPLM/A and Khartoum got outside military help by forming ever-shifting alliances due to ever changing regional and global geopolitical considerations. The SPLM/A’s initial support came from Ethiopia and Namibia. The socialist government of Ethiopia under Mengistu Haile Mariam had fallen out with Khartoum because of the latter’s support of dissidents within Ehtiopia. Mengistu therefore provided bases for Garang’s forces and provided military supplies to the extent that it could. The Mengistu connection may explain the SPLM/A’s initial rhetoric about the need to create “a united Sudan under a socialist system”57 54

Heraclides (1990) Kornegay, Francis A. “Regional and International Implications of the Sudanese Peace Agreement.” In Adar, Korwa G. et. al. (eds) Sudan Peace Process 56 Lesch, Ann Mosley. “External involvement in the Sudanese civil war.” In Smock (ed.) Making war and waging peace, foreign intervention in Africa 57 Lesch, Ann Mosley. “Negotiations in Sudan” in Smock (ed.) Making war and waging peace, foreign intervention in Africa. 55

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Ethiopia, together with Libya and the then South Yemen, also had wider geopolitical considerations as it sought to contain Egyptian and Sudanese influences in the wider horn of Africa region (Lesch, 1993: 85). From SPLM/A’s perspective, Ethiopia was a strategic partner because Addis Ababa was the seat of the OAU (later African Union). In Addis, the movement established contacts with other African countries like Libya (Gaddafi readily supported the movement because of his anti-Nimeiry sentiments), Chad, the Central African Republic, Uganda and Zaire – the latter four being valuable launching bases against Sudanese forces because of their shared borders with Sudan. Ethiopia also facilitated SPLM/A contacts with Israel and Cuba, two countries that provided military advice and possibly training. From the hodgepodge of countries bankrolling the SPLM/A, it is clear that Garang was pragmatic rather than ideologically-driven in choosing who to seek help from. In fact, for all his initial socialist rhetoric it is doubtful if he ever had any meaningful contacts with the Soviet Union except indirectly through Ethiopia and/or Cuba. His policy of diversifying his international sanctuaries served him well when his key backer, Mengistu, was overthrown in 1991 (Lesch, 1993: 89). The war with the south greatly shaped Khartoum’s foreign policy. The overthrow of Nimeiry in 1985 brought with it a new alignment in the war. The new government appealed to the Arab world for help against the Southern rebellion which was trying to “impose an African identity on the Muslim Arab majority in Sudan” (Lesch, 1993: 91). Quick to respond to these calls were non other than Libya’s Gaddafi. With Nimeiry gone, he immediately ceased arming the SPLM/A and called on Garang to end his rebellion. Prime Minister Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi’s appeal to pan-Arabism earned him a supply of weapons from Iraq, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan58. Due to his poor prosecution of the war with the south and ever deteriorating economic conditions,

58

“Sudan’s foreign Policy: In search of arms aid and allies” in John O. Voll (ed.) Sudan: State and Society in Crisis. Bloomington, IN: Indian University Press, 1991

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Al-Mahdi was ousted in coup by the army (under Omar al-Bashir) with the support of the NIF. The new regime, with its Islamic extremism quickly sought help from Libya, Iran and Iraq. But its new-look ultra-Islamic image lost it a few friends. Egypt for one was wary of political Islam – embodied in the Muslim Brotherhood - in Sudan because President Mubarak feared that the same would spill over into Egypt. Soon, many Arab countries became wary of Sudan’s terrorist connections and its alliance with rogue nations – Sudan supported the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Lesch, 1993: 96). Outside of the Arab world and the wider Eastern Africa region, Sudanese diplomacy was marred by its poor human rights record, continued execution of an unpopular war and its support for international terrorism – Sudan provided a safe haven for Osama bin Laden between 1991 and 199659. The role of the United States, both in directing the peace process and causing a change of tact in Khartoum was critical. In 1997 the US government imposed sanctions against the NIF government. The same sanctions were reinvigorated by the US Congress when it passed the Sudan Peace Act in 2002. 60 In the same year the US pledged to be fully engaged in the InterGovernmental Authority for Development61 (IGAD) - led peace initiative that had been going on for the better part of the 1990s. The quest for peace in the region: IGAD and the troika By 2002, when the peace process got some traction, the second Sudanese civil war had been going on for 19 years. The long duration of the war can be mostly be explained by three factors: international involvement, the discovery of oil and ethnic polarization. International involvement has been noted to be the single biggest cause of the persistence of African civil wars (Furley and May, 2006). Such interventions are blamed primarily for making rebellions cheaper 59

Dagne, Ted (2002). “Sudan: Humanitarian crisis, peace talks, terrorism and US policy.” Issue Brief for Congress. Sudan Peace Act 2002. 04/22/2009 < http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/19897.pdf> 61 Regional body comprising Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda formed in 1986 to tackle problems of famine and aridity in the wider Eastern Africa region. 60

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through their provision of cash and equipment to rebel groups. 62 But the type of intervention also matters. On the whole, a biased intervention (direct military help) leads an increased likelihood of an end to such conflicts than ‘neutral’ interventions (Regan, 2002). As discussed above, there was heavy international involvement in the Sudanese civil war. Also relevant in the Sudanese case is the fact that autocratic regimes tend to end civil wars faster than democratic regimes (Elbadawi, Ibrahim A. and Nicholas Sambanis, 2000). The instability of successive regimes in Khartoum and powerful sectarian influences lent Khartoum the instability and pressures for accountability that make democracies less successful in ending wars either militarily or through unilateral peace agreements. Internal capabilities of rebels and governments also determine the duration of wars (Licklider, 1993). As has been noted above, the resumption of oil exploitation in the 1990s lined Khartoum’s coffers and enabled it to continue pursuing a military end to the conflict rather than through negotiations. But even the oil revenues were not enough to fund the war indefinitely. Plus economic constraints caused by sanctions and strained relations with international financial organizations, reduced ideological fervor for the war and unpopularity of the draft in the north forced Khartoum into accepting a negotiated settlement as an option in ending the war.63 The third factor that contributed to the duration of the Sudanese war was its ethnic character. Studies have shown that ethnic/identity polarization prolongs conflicts because of the inflexibility of essentialised ethnic identities (Kauffman, 1996). Kauffman also posits that ethnic wars can only end in one of three ways: outright victory by one side, through externally imposed peace or through territorial separation. In the case of Sudan, the racial/ethnic and religious divide between the south and north fuelled the conflict between SPLM/A and Khartoum for nearly two decades. The only possibilities of settlement were through either a military victory by Khartoum 62

Elbadawi, Ibrahim. “External Intervention and the Duration of Civil Wars.” World Bank Economic Development Institute, 2000 63 Woodward in Furley and May.

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or territorial separation/greater autonomy. However, in light of Licklider’s study which identified military victory as the most stable outcome of identity wars 64 and in view of the stalemate that existed between the two sides, partition or greater autonomy – via a negotiated settlement became the more desirable option, especially for SPLM/A. This was consistent with Zartman’s conclusion that most civil wars end in de-facto secessions, with the government receding to the capital and rebels controlling the peripheral territories in the country (Zartman, 1995). But given the dismal record of the sustainability of negotiated settlements, (between 1940 and 1990 only 20% of civil wars were ended in a negotiated settlement as opposed to military victory65) finding a peaceful resolution to the Sudanese civil war was always going to be a challenge. The IGAD peace initiative began in 1994 with the Declaration of Principles (DOP), expressing the need for Khartoum to grant economic, political and religious freedoms (by becoming a secular state) failure to which the South would have the right to independence as had just happened in Eritrea66. The establishment of a secular state was especially central to the provision of the option to secede.67 But no sooner had the IGAD process started than Egypt and Libya threw a spanner in the works. At the formation of IGAD, Ethiopian suspicion of Egypt led to the exclusion of the latter in IGAD. Egyptian concerns over the use of the waters of the Nile informed its suspect view of IGAD. It is this regional power play and Islamic solidarity with Sudan that motivated Egypt and Libya to form a parallel peace process in the form of the Joint Libyan-Egyptian initiative that did not mention the call for secularism – as a deliberate spoiler of

64

Licklider, Roy. “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993.” The American Political Science Review. Vol. 89, No. 3 (1995), pp. 681-690

65

Walter, Barbara F. “The critical barrier to civil war settlement.” International Organization: 51, 3 (1997), pp. 335364 66 Deng, Francis and Mohamed Khalil. Sudan’s Civil War: the peace process before and since Machakos. Peace and Government Program, Africa Institute of South Africa, 2004. 67 Ibid.

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the IGAD process. It was only until the US intervened that the initiative was frozen in favor of the IGAD process.68 The peace process proceeded at a snail’s pace in Kenya throughout most of the mid 1990s even as the war raged on69. The process only picked up pace in 2002 when Sudan acquired greater strategic importance in light of the Bush Administrations war on terror. Concerns about terrorism and pressure from the congressional black caucus and Christian groups forced President Bush to pay more attention to the conflict. He thus appointed Senator John Danforth to be special peace envoy to Sudan. Sen. Danforth began by testing the seriousness of the warring parties about peace by proposing four things: (1) a ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains region to facilitate relief assistance; (2) the creation of “days tranquility” to administer immunizations and provide humanitarian relief assistance; (3) an end to aerial bombardment of civilian targets; and (4) the creation of an Eminent Persons Group on slavery in Sudan.70 Both sides in the conflict agreed to these proposals and so the troika – comprising of Britain, Norway and the US – became participants in the IGAD peace process. On its part, Khartoum was eager to avoid military reprisals in the aftermath of September 11 in addition to wanting to improve bilateral relations with the US and its international image.71 The year 2002 also saw a significant breakthrough in peace negotiations leading to the adoption of the Machakos Protocol, signed on 20th July 2002, which guaranteed religious freedom in Southern Sudan, failure to which it had the right to secede.72 Between the Machakos protocol and the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, there was sustained US pressure on Khartoum – in the form a threat of sanctions and international isolation – to remain 68

Woodward in Furley and May. Deng and Khalil 70 Ibid. 71 International Crisis Group. Capturing the moment: Sudan’s peace process in the balance. ICG, 2002 72 Ibid. 69

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honest to the peace process73. The concerted effort of the troika and IGAD member countries managed to facilitate a negotiated settlement that, in general terms, was satisfactory to both Khartoum and SPLM/A. The CPA, on top of guaranteeing religious, cultural and economic freedom to Southern Sudan, also gave it the option to vote for secession in a referendum to be held in 2011.74 In the six-year interim period (2005-2011), Southern Sudan would have regional autonomy and the President of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) would be the first Vice President of Sudan. Also in the agreement was a clause for the maintenance of three armies: Sudan Armed Forces, Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Joint Integrated Units (JIU) to guarantee security for both sides. Equitable sharing of the returns from oil exportation was also enshrined in the agreement75. Despite the initial cold reaction by the US to the self-determination clause, Washington eventually came around and fully backed the agreement as it was.76

VI. Conclusion: The CPA brought an end to one of the bloodiest conflicts on the continent of Africa. The second Sudanese civil war cost between 500,000-1.5 million lives.77 Thousands more were displaced both internally and in refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia. The CPA, with its provision for secession by Southern Sudan, provided Southern Sudanese with a chance to be in charge of their own destiny. The inclusion of the region in Sudan was done as an after thought by the British colonial government. Indeed the first time Southerners were consulted on the issue was in 1947 at the Juba Conference (Collins, 412). In light of the history between the two sides highlighted in this paper, inclusion of Southern Sudan in Sudan was always going to be 73

Ibid. Waihenya 75 Biel, Melha Rout. Southern Sudan after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement: a document on the latesty (sic) political development after John Garang. Netzbandt-Verlag, 2007. 76 Ibid. 77 Jackson, Richard. “Africa’s wars: Over: Overview, causes and the challenges of conflict transformation.” In Furley and May (eds.) Ending Africa’s Wars. 74

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problematic. Neither side has ever accepted the other as an equal member of the Sudanese polity – the north sees the south merely as an exploitable hinterland while the south sees the north as a colonizing force. There are no rewards for guessing the outcome of the 2011 referendum. This paper sought to find out why Khartoum accepted the CPA in full knowledge of the consequences. The conclusion arrived at here is that the CPA was a reflection of the fact that Southern and Northern Sudanese, because of the historical reasons highlighted above, have never seen themselves as belonging to one nation-state. This fact was further compounded by the policies of separate and unequal treatment of the two regions of the country by successive regimes in Khartoum and the excellent organization of the SPLM/A under the late John Garang which forced Khartoum to the negotiating table on terms favorable to the Southern cause. Looking into the future, Southern Sudan is faced by several challenges. The loss of John Garang in a helicopter accident in late 2005 severely dented Southern optimism and robbed GOSS of one of the most competent leaders on the continent of Africa (at least judged by his leadership of the SPLM/A). Decades of conflict left the region largely undeveloped, lacking basic infrastructure and heavily dependent on foreign food aid78. The other problem facing GOSS and the sustainability of the CPA is the persistence of other armed groups79 that have contributed to general insecurity in the region and the unresolved status of the Abyei and the Nuba mountains which at times has nearly reignited the civil war (Meyer). The conflict in Darfur has also raised the stakes for Khartoum as 2011 approaches since independence for Southern Sudan will definitely invigorate Darfuris’ demand for independence as well.

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Sharp, Buzz. “Food aid and development in Southern Sudan.” World Food Program, 2006 Arnold, Mathew B. and Chris Alden. “This gun is our food: demilitarizing the white Army militias of Southern Sudan.” NUPI Working Paper, 2007 79

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Keen, David. The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998. Licklider, Roy. “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993.” The American Political Science Review. Vol. 89, No. 3 (1995), pp. 681-690 Lesch, Ann Mosely. The Sudan – contested national identities. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998 Licklider, Roy. 1993. “How civil wars end: Questions and methods”. In Stopping the killing: How civil wars end, edited by Roy Licklider. New York: New York University Press. Macdonald, Keith M. “Social Closure and Occupational Registration.” Sociology. Vol. 19, No. 4, (1985), pp. 541-556 Mamdani, Mahmood. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996 Mauhood, Philip. “State Formation in Tropical Africa.” International Political Science Review. Vol. 10, No. 3 (1989), pp. 239-250 Meyer, Gabriel. War and Faith in Sudan. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2005 Mueller, Edward N. and Karl-Dieter Opp. “Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action.” The American Political Science Review. Vol. 80, No. 2 (1986), pp. 471-488 Nhema, Alfred and Paul T. Zeleza. The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes & Costs. Pretoria, SA: UNISA Press, 2008. Olson, Mancur. The logic of collective action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971 Petterson, Donald. Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict and Catastrophe. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999. Regan, Patrick M. “Third-party interventions and the duration of intrastate conflicts.” Journal of Conflict Resolution: 46 (2002), pp. 55 – 73 Ringmar, Erik. “Nationalism: The Idiocy of Intimacy.” The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 49, No. 4 (1998), pp. 534-549 Rolandsen, Oystein H. Guerrilla government: political changes in the Southern Sudan during the 1990s. Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2005 Sharkey, Heather J. “Arab Identity and Ideoology in Sudan the politics of language, ethnicity and race.” African Affairs, 107/426 (2008), pp. 21-43 Shimanyula, James Bandi. John Garang and the SPLA. Nairobi, Kenya: Africawide Network, 2005 37

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Smith, Anthony. The Ethnic Revival. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981 Smith A. D. “The myth of the modern nation and the myths of nations.” Ethnic and Racial Studies: 11, 1 (1986), pp. 1-26 Smock, David (ed.) Making war and waging peace: foreign intervention in Africa. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993 Tvedt, Terje. Angels of mercy or development diplomats? NGOs & foreign aid. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1998 Wai, Dunstan M. The African-Arab conflict in the Sudan. New York, NY: Africana Publishing, 1981 Waihenya, Waithaka. The mediator: Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan peace process. Nairobi, Kenya: Kenway Publications, 2006 Warburg, Gabriel. Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society: The Case of Sudan. London, UK: Frank Cass, 1978 Wawa, Yosa. The Southern Sudanese pursuits of self-determination: documents in political history. Kisubi, Uganda: Mirianum Press, 2005 Weinstein, Jeremy M. “Resources and the Informaton Problem in Rebel Recruitment.” Journal Conflict Resolution: 49 (2005), pp. 598-624 Zartman, I. William. Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars 1995-1996. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995 Acknowledgements: Professor David Simon; Yale University Dorothy Woodson; Curator, African Collections at Sterling Memorial Library

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Map of Sudan80

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Source: < http://moinansari.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/us-israeli-plan-for-sudan.jpg>

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