Kashmir Conflict And Peacemaking

PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF KASHMIR CONFLICT OF AN D EFROM P A DEMOLITION R T M E N TTO CONSTRUCTION O F IDENTITY A P P L I E D P S Y C H O L O G Y U n i v e r s i t y o f t h e P u n j a b L a h o r e

MS. SHAZIA IRFAN

PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF KASHMIR CONFLICT FROM DEMOLITION TO CONSTRUCTION OF AN IDENTITY

Kashmiri’ Perspective

MS. SHAZIA IRFAN

PREFACE

The misfortune of human beings may be divided into two classes: First, those inflicted by the non-human environment, and, second, those inflicted by other people. As mankind have progressed in knowledge and technique, the second class has become a continually increasing percentage of the total. In old times, famine, for example, was due to natural causes, and, although people did their best to combat it, large numbers of them died of starvation. At the present moment large parts of the world are faced with the threat of famine, but although natural causes have contributed to the situation, the principal causes are human. For six years the civilized nations of the world devoted all their best energies to killing each other, and they find it difficult suddenly to switch over to keeping each other alive. Having destroyed harvests, dismantled agricultural machinery, and

disorganized shipping, they find it no easy matter to relieve the shortage of crops in one place by means of a superabundance in another, as would easily be done if the economic system were in normal working order. As this illustration shows, it is now man that is man’s worst enemy. Nature, it is true, still sees to it that we are mortal, but with no progress in medicine it will become more and more common for people to live until they have had their fill of life. We are supposed to wish to live for ever and to look forward to the unending joys of heaven, of which, by miracle, the monotony will never grow stale. But in fact, if you question any candid person who is no longer young, he is very likely to tell you that, having tasted life in this world, he has no wish to begin again as a ‘new boy’ in another. For the future, therefore, it may be taken that much the most important evils that mankind

have to consider are those which they inflict upon each other through stupidity or malevolence or both. I think that the evils that men inflict on each other, and by reflection upon themselves, have their main source in evil passions rather than in ideas and beliefs. But ideas and

principles that do harm are, as a rule, though not always, cloaks for evil passions.

Excerpt of ‘Ideas that have Harmed Mankind’ Bertrand Russell’s Unpopular Essays

FOREWORD

There is a speech that has been spoken in many languages by the leaders of many countries. It goes like this: “The intentions of our country are entirely peaceful. Yet, we are also aware that other nations, with their new weapons, threaten us. Thus we must defend ourselves against attack. By so doing, we shall protect our way of life and preserve the peace.” Almost

every nation claims concern only for peace but, mistrusting other nations, arms itself in self-defense. The result is a world that has been spending $2 billion per day on arms and armies while hundreds of millions die of malnutrition and untreated disease. The elements of such conflict, a perceived incompatibility of actions or goals, are similar at

all levels, from nations in an arms race, to conflicted Middle Easterners. In the last decade of the twentieth century, in country after country, men, women, and children by the millions were tortured and slaughtered, their homes burned, their lives totally disrupted. Millions of individuals today are refugees from state terror and communal fighting; they live in camps and in flimsy shelters; they trudge through snowy hills carrying a few meager possessions. Today’s civil wars and state-sponsored masskillings are “dirty wars.” It has been well said that they are deep rooted, highly internationalized, fought ruthlessly with enormous human suffering, and difficult to resolve. Social-psychological studies have identified several ingredients of conflict. What’s striking (and what simplifies our task) is that these ingredients are common to all levels of social conflict: Social Dilemmas, Competition, Perceived Injustice, Misperceptions. Let’s have a quick review of the past events to illustrate how comes this list of conflict ingredients:

Having a look on our own history, we come to know that our ancestors believed that after the British would have gone, we’d become the subjects of Hindus. As far our unique ideology, apart from the Hindus, as Muslims was concerned, they believed to get a separate homeland and struggled for it desperately, where they’d be able to spend their lives according to their own beliefs. So inception of Pakistan is associated with social dilemmas to which the Muslims of Indian subcontinent came across. Nations and groups are found often, competing for scarce resources and gaining political power. The effects of such a ‘competition’ helped fuel the Northern Ireland conflict, where since 1969 hostilities between the ruling Protestant majority and the Catholic minority have claimed more than 3,200 lives. (A comparable population proportion would number 515,000 in the United States, 107,000 in Britain, 57,000 in Canada, and 36,000 in Australia.) After 9/11, war against terrorism is what generally is associated with the ‘perceived injustice.’ So, America justifies demolition of Afghanistan as

the consequences of being victimized by the Muslims in general and in specific terms, by Al-Qaeda. In 2003, the United States began the Iraq war presuming (misperception) the existence of “a vast underground network that would rise in support of coalition forces to assist security and law enforcement.” Alas, the network didn’t materialize, and the resulting postwar security vacuum enabled looting, sabotage, and persistent attacks on American forces. Although toxic forces can breed destructive conflict, we can harness other forces to bring conflict to a constructive resolution. These forces of peace and harmony are listed as contact, cooperation, communication and conciliation. Now the question arises: How to bring these forces in action to resolve issues between nations both armed with nuclear weapons and extreme rivalry since their birth? Since 1947, Pakistan and India are in invariable state of war on Kashmir Conflict and went for three deadly wars to claim Kashmir. The tremendous drain of resources incurred by the

two countries on military buildup and arms-race including the acquisition of nuclear bombs is a result of their confrontation over Kashmir. The official propaganda each government has directed against the other created enmity, distrust and hatred in the respective populations of these countries against their “mortal enemy”. This has gone on for over six decades and there is no end in sight. This has poisoned the minds of Indian and Pakistani people. As a result we see political polarization and perennial tensions amongst the people that stand in the way of settling the issues like Kashmir and the normalization of relations between the two neighbors. In addition, another ghastly development has been the rise of political and religious extremism in India and Pakistan. Disputed ownership of Kashmir has resulted in a community socially, economically and more over the fact is to be considered, psychologically paralyzed. People in Kashmir are resilient to a great extent, but they are challenged by a lot of psychological and emotional difficulties. Most of these difficulties are very

rarely talked about. Often they are only expressed through physical complaints. This research paper is concerned with ‘Psychological Impacts of Kashmir Conflict on Kashmiris’

and also covers the ‘History of Peacemaking in Kashmir.’

Ms. Shazia Irfan

Contents PREFACE.....................................................................................................................3 FOREWORD................................................................................................................4 CHAPTER 1.................................................................................................................8 HISTORICAL ORIENTATION..........................................................................................8 ETYMOLOGY............................................................................................................8 EARLY HISTORY.......................................................................................................8 MUSLIM RULE..........................................................................................................9 PRINCELY STATE OF KASHMIR.................................................................................9 BRITISH ERA............................................................................................................9 KASHMIR AFTER PARTITION OF INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT......................................11 DISPUTED LAND - - - POST 1947 ERA....................................................................11 DEMOGRAPHICAL FEATURES.................................................................................13 REFERENCES:.....................................................................................................13 CHAPTER 2...............................................................................................................15 KASHMIR CONFLICT..................................................................................................15 BACKGROUND.......................................................................................................15 PAK-INDO WARS AND VALLEY OF KASHMIR...........................................................15 INDIAN VIEW..........................................................................................................16 PAKISTANI VIEW....................................................................................................18 UNPREJUDICED VIEW.............................................................................................19 REFERENCES:.....................................................................................................20 CHAPTER 1...............................................................................................................21 VIOLENCE AND VICIOUS ASSAULTS ON HUMANITY IN PRACTICE..............................21 HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE............................................................22

INSIDE TERRORISM................................................................................................26 PSYCHOSOCIAL DILEMMAS....................................................................................27 ETHNIC BASIS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PROPAGANDA................................................35 UPSHOT OF KASHMIR TURMOIL.............................................................................36 REFERENCES:.....................................................................................................37 CHAPTER 2...............................................................................................................42 SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY AND KASHMIRIITES[1].......................................................42 Social Identity and the Kashmir Conflict................................................................43 REFERENCES:.....................................................................................................46 CHAPTER 1...............................................................................................................47 RESPONSIBILITY OF A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE IN KASHMIR.......................................47 SUSTAINABLE FUTURE...........................................................................................47 PAK-INDO PEACE TALKS........................................................................................47 INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACTIVISTS........................................................................52 CONCLUSION.........................................................................................................53 CHAPTER 2...............................................................................................................55 RESPONSIBILITY OF A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE IN KASHMIR.......Error! Bookmark not defined.

PART 1: CONFLICT CHAPTER 1 HISTORICAL ORIENTATION ETYMOLOGY Many historians and locals believe that Jammu was founded by Raja Jamboolochan in 14th century BCE. During one of his hunting campaigns he reached the Tawi River where he saw a goat and a lion drinking water at the same place. The king was impressed and decided to set up a town after his name, Jamboo. With the passage of time, the name was corrupted and became "Jammu". According to one "folk etymology", the name "Kashmir" means "desiccated land" (from the Sanskrit: Ka = water and shimeera = desiccate). According to another folk etymology, following Hindu mythology, the sage Kashyapa drained a lake to produce the land now known as Kashmir. In the Rajatarangini, a history of Kashmir written by Kalhana in mid12th century, it is stated that the valley of Kashmir was formerly a lake. This was drained by the great rishi or sage, Kashyapa, son of Marichi, son of Brahma, by cutting the gap in the hills at Baramulla (Varaha-mula). When Kashmir had been drained, Kashyapa asked Brahmans to settle there. This is still the local tradition, and in the existing physical condition of the country, we may see some ground for the story which has taken this form. The name of Kashyapa is by history and tradition connected with the draining of the lake, and the chief town or collection of dwellings in the valley was called Kashyapa-pura name which has been identified with the Kao1r6.nupos of Hecataeus (apud Stephen of Byzantium) and Kaspatyros of Herodotus (3.102, 4.44). Kashmir is the country meant also by Ptolemy's Kao-ir,~pta.

Cashmere is an archaic spelling of Kashmir, and in some countries it is still spelled this way.

EARLY HISTORY Kashmir was one of the major centre of Sanskrit scholars. According to Mahabharata evidence [1], the Kambojas had ruled over Kashmir during epic times and that it was a Republican system of government under the Kamboj [2]. The capital city of Kashmir (Kamboj) during epic times was Karna-Rajapuram-gatva-Kambojahnirjitastava[3][4], shortened to Rajapura,[5][6][7][8] which has been identified with modern Rajauri.[9] Later, the Panchalas are stated to have established their sway. The name Peer Panjal, which is a part of modern Kashmir, is a witness to this fact. Panjal is simply a distorted form of the Sanskritic tribal term Panchala. The Muslims prefixed the word peer to it in memory of Siddha Faqir and the name thereafter is said to have changed into Peer Panjal.[10] The Mauryan emperor Ashoka is often credited with having founded the city of Srinagar. Kashmir was once a Buddhist seat of learning, perhaps with the Sarvāstivādan school dominating. East and Central Asian Buddhist monks are recorded as having visited the kingdom. In the late 4th century AD, the famous Kuchanese monk Kumārajīva, born to an Indian noble family, studied Dīrghāgama and Madhyāgama in Kashmir under Bandhudatta. He later becoming a prolific translator who helped take Buddhism to China. His mother Jīva is thought to have retired to Kashmir. Vimalākṣa, a Sarvāstivādan Buddhist monk, travelled from Kashmir to Kucha and there instructed Kumārajīva in the Vinayapiṭaka.

MUSLIM RULE In the 14th century, Islam gradually became the dominant religion in Kashmir, starting with the conversion in 1323 of Rincana, the first king of a new dynasty from Ladakh. The Muslims and Hindus of Kashmir lived in relative harmony, since the Sufi-Islamic way of life that ordinary Muslims followed in Kashmir complemented the Rishi tradition of Kashmiri Pandits. This led to a syncretic culture where Hindus and Muslims revered the same local saints and prayed at the same shrines. The famous sufi saint Bulbul Shah was able to persuade the king of the time Rinchan Shah from Ladakh to adopt the Islamic way of life, and the foundation of Sufiana composite culture was laid when Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists were coexisting. Several Kashmiri rulers, such as Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin, were tolerant of all religions in a manner comparable to Akbar. However, several Muslim rulers of Kashmir were intolerant to other religions. Sultãn Sikandar Butshikan of Kashmir (AD 1389-1413) and his (former

Brahmin) minister Saif ud-Din are often considered the worst of these. Historians have recorded many of his atrocities. The Tarikh-iFirishta records that Sikandar persecuted the Hindus and issued orders proscribing the residence of any other than Muslims in Kashmir. He also ordered the breaking of all "golden and silver images".

PRINCELY STATE OF KASHMIR By the early 19th century, the Kashmir valley had passed from the control of the Durrani Empire of Afghanistan, and four centuries of Muslim rule under the Mughals and the Afghans, to the conquering Sikh armies. Earlier, in 1780, after the death of Ranjit Deo, the Raja of Jammu, the kingdom of Jammu (to the south of the Kashmir valley) was captured by the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh of Lahore and afterwards, until 1846, became a tributary to the Sikh power.[11] Ranjit Deo's grandnephew, Gulab Singh, subsequently sought service at the court of Ranjit Singh, distinguished himself in later campaigns, especially the annexation of the Kashmir valley by the Sikhs army in 1819, and, for his services, was created Raja of Jammu in 1820. With the help of his officer, Zorawar Singh, Gulab Singh soon captured Ladakh and Baltistan, regions to the east and north-east of Jammu.[11]

BRITISH ERA In 1845, the First Anglo-Sikh War broke out, and Gulab Singh "contrived to hold himself aloof till the battle of Sobraon (1846), when he appeared as a useful mediator and the trusted advisor of Sir Henry Lawrence. Two treaties were concluded. By the first the State of Lahore (i.e. West Punjab) handed over to the British, as equivalent for (rupees) one crore of indemnity, the hill countries between Beas and Indus; by the second[12] the British made over to Gulab Singh for (Rupees) 75 lakhs all the hilly or mountainous country situated to the east of Indus and west of Ravi" (i.e. the Vale of Kashmir).[11] Soon after Gulab Singh's death in 1857, his son, Ranbir Singh, added the emirates of Hunza, Gilgit and Nagar to the kingdom. The Princely State of Kashmir and Jammu (as it was then called) was constituted between 1820 and 1858 and was "somewhat artificial in composition and it did not develop a fully coherent identity, partly as a result of its disparate origins and partly as a result of the autocratic rule which it experienced on the fringes of Empire."[14] It combined disparate regions, religions, and ethnicities: to the east, Ladakh was ethnically and culturally Tibetan and its inhabitants practised Buddhism; to the south, Jammu had a mixed population of

Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs; in the heavily populated central Kashmir valley, the population was overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, however, there was also a small but influential Hindu minority, the Kashmiri brahmins or pandits; to the northeast, sparsely populated Baltistan had a population ethnically related to Ladakh, but which practised Shi'a Islam; to the north, also sparsely populated, Gilgit Agency, was an area of diverse, mostly Shi'a groups; and, to the west, Punch was Muslim, but of different ethnicity than the Kashmir valley.[14] After the Indian Rebellion of 1857, in which Kashmir sided with the British, and the subsequent assumption of direct rule by Great Britain, the princely state of Kashmir came under the paramountcy of the British Crown. Ranbir Singh's grandson Hari Singh ascended the throne of Kashmir in 1925. The Maharajah Hari Singh never represented the will of his subjects, creating tension between the Hindu rulers and the Muslim population of Kashmir. Muslims in Kashmir detested him, as they were heavily taxed and had grown tired of his insensitivity to their religious concerns. The Dogra rule (the name of the municipal governments) had excluded Muslims from the civil service and the armed services. Islamic religious ceremonies were taxed. Historically, Muslims were banned from organizing politically, which would only be tolerated beginning in the 1930s. In 1931, in response to a sermon that had tones of opposition to the government, the villages of Jandial, Makila, and Dana were ransacked and destroyed by the Dogra army, with their inhabitants burned alive. A legislative assembly, with no real power, was created in January, 1947. It issued one statement that represented the will of the Muslim people: "After carefully considering the position, the conference has arrived at the conclusion that accession of the State to Pakistan is absolutely necessary in view of the geographic, economic, linguistic, cultural and religious conditions…It is therefore necessary that the State should accede to Pakistan". This is one of the rare instances that an elected block of the people of Kashmir had been given the chance to speak. Representing the subjects who elected them, they sought accession with Muslim Pakistan. Prem Nath Bazaz, founder of the Kashmir Socialist Party in 1943, a reliable primary source of history, reiterated that a majority of Kashmiris were against the decision of the Maharajah in his book, The History of The Struggle of Freedom In Kashmir. He writes, "The large majority of the population of the State, almost the entire Muslim community and an appreciable number of non Muslims was totally against the Maharjah declaring accession to India." This statement, and the decision reached by the legislative assembly are important because they dispel any belief that the Kashmiris'

religious ties with Pakistan did not necessarily indicate unite. Indeed, the ethnic bond between Kashmir and influenced a majority of the people to seek accession with The Hindu Maharajah would not listen, and continued to decision about which nation to join.

a will to Pakistan Pakistan. delay his

KASHMIR AFTER PARTITION OF INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT Ranbir Singh's grandson Hari Singh, who had ascended the throne of Kashmir in 1925, was the reigning monarch in 1947 at the conclusion of British rule of the subcontinent and the subsequent partition of the British Indian Empire into the newly independent Union of India and the Dominion of Pakistan. As parties to the partition process, both countries had agreed that the rulers of princely states would be given the right to opt for either Pakistan or India or—in special cases—to remain independent. In 1947, Kashmir's population was "77% Muslim and 20% Hindu"[15] To postpone making a hurried decision, the Maharaja signed a "standstill" agreement with Pakistan, which ensured continuity of trade, travel, communication, and similar services between the two. Such and agreement was pending with India. In October 1947, Pashtuns from Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province invaded Kashmir. The ostensible aim of the guerilla campaign was to frighten Hari Singh into submission. "Instead the Maharaja appealed to Mountbatten[16] for assistance, and the Governor-General agreed on the condition that the ruler accede to India."[15] Once the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession, "Indian soldiers entered Kashmir and drove the Pakistani-sponsored irregulars from all but a small section of the state. The United Nations was then invited to mediate the quarrel. The UN mission insisted that the opinion of Kashmiris must be ascertained, while India insisted that no referendum could occur until all of the state had been cleared of irregulars."[15] However, this chain of events is disputed by Pakistan, which claims that the Indian army entered Kashmir before the Instrument of Accession was signed. The Pakistani government immediately contested the accession, suggesting that it was fraudulent, that the Maharaja acted under duress, and that he had no right to sign an agreement with India when the standstill agreement with Pakistan was still in force.

DISPUTED LAND - - - POST 1947 ERA According to the instruments of partition of India, the rulers of princely states were given the choice to freely accede to either India or Pakistan, or to remain independent. They were, however, advised to accede to the contiguous dominion, taking into consideration the geographical and ethnic issues.

In Kashmir, however, the Maharaja hesitated. The Maharaja, fearing pressure from Pakistan army which entered Kashmir, agreed to join India by signing the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947. Kashmir was provisionally accepted into the Indian Union pending a free and impartial plebiscite. This was spelled out in a letter from the Governor General of India, Lord Mountbatten, to the Maharaja on 27 October 1947. In the letter, accepting the accession, Mountbatten made it clear that the State would only be incorporated into the Indian Union after a reference had been made to the people of Kashmir. In the last days of 1948, a ceasefire was agreed under UN auspices; however, since the plebiscite demanded by the UN was never conducted, relations between India and Pakistan soured,[15] and eventually led to two more wars over Kashmir in 1965 and 1999. India has control of about half the area of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir; Pakistan controls a third of the region, the Northern Areas, or historically known as regions of Gilgit and Baltistan; and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. According to Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Although there was a clear Muslim majority in Kashmir before the 1947 partition and its economic, cultural, and geographic contiguity with the Muslim-majority area of the Punjab (in Pakistan) could be convincingly demonstrated, the political developments during and after the partition resulted in a division of the region. Pakistan was left with territory that, although basically Muslim in character, was thinly populated, relatively inaccessible, and economically underdeveloped. The largest Muslim group, situated in the Vale of Kashmir and estimated to number more than half the population of the entire region, lay in Indianadministered territory, with its former outlets via the Jhelum valley route blocked."[17] The UN Security Council on 20 January 1948 passed Resolution 39, establishing a special commission to investigate the conflict. Subsequent to the commission's recommendation, the Security Council ordered in its Resolution 47, passed on 21 April 1948, that the invading Pakistani army retreat from Jammu & Kashmir and that the accession of Kashmir to either India or Pakistan be determined in accordance with a plebiscite to be supervised by the UN. In a string of subsequent resolutions, the Security Council took notice of the continuing failure by India to hold the plebiscite. However, no punitive action against India could be taken by the Security Council because its resolution requiring India to hold a Plebescite was nonbinding, and the Pakistani army never left the part of the Kashmir they occupied as required by the Security Council resolution 47. The Government of India holds that the Maharaja signed a document of accession to India October 26, 1947. Pakistan has disputed whether

the Maharaja actually signed the accession treaty before Indian troops entered Kashmir. Furthermore, Pakistan claims the Indian government has never produced an original copy of this accession treaty and thus its validity and legality is disputed. However, India has produced the instrument of accession with an original copy image on its website. Alan Campbell-Johnson, the press attache to the Viceroy of India states that "The legality of the accession is beyond doubt." The eastern region of the erstwhile princely state of Kashmir has also been beset with a boundary dispute. In the late 19th- and early 20th centuries, although some boundary agreements were signed between Great Britain, Afghanistan and Russia over the northern borders of Kashmir, China never accepted these agreements, and the official Chinese position did not change with the communist takeover in 1949. By the mid-1950s the Chinese army had entered the north-east portion of Ladakh.[17] : "By 1956–57 they had completed a military road through the Aksai Chin area to provide better communication between Xinjiang and western Tibet. India's belated discovery of this road led to border clashes between the two countries that culminated in the Sino-Indian war of October 1962."[17] China has occupied Aksai Chin since 1962 and, in addition, an adjoining region, the Trans-Karakoram Tract was ceded by Pakistan to China in 1965. In 1949, the Indian government obliged Hari Singh to leave Jammu and Kashmir, and yield the government to Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of a popular political party, the National Conference Party. Since then, a bitter enmity has been developed between India and Pakistan and three wars have taken place between them over Kashmir. The growing dispute over Kashmir also lead to the rise of militancy in the state. The year 1989 saw the intensification of conflict in Jammu and Kashmir as Mujahadeens from Afghanistan slowly infiltrated the region following the end of the Soviet-Afghan War the same year. [1]

DEMOGRAPHICAL FEATURES In the 1901 Census of the British Indian Empire, the population of the princely state of Kashmir was 2,905,578. Of these 2,154,695 were Muslims, 689,073 Hindus, 25,828 Sikhs, and 35,047 Buddhists. The Hindus were found mainly in Jammu, where they constituted a little less than 50% of the population.[18] In the Kashmir Valley, the Hindus represented "only 524 in every 10,000 of the population (i.e. 5.24%), and in the frontier wazarats of Ladhakh and Gilgit only 94 out of every 10,000 persons (0.94%)."[18] In the same Census of 1901, in the Kashmir Valley, the total population was recorded to be 1,157,394, of which the Muslim population was 1,083,766, or 93.6%

of the population.[18] These percentages have remained fairly stable for the last 100 years.[19] In the 1941 Census of British India, Muslims accounted for 93.6% of the population of the Kashmir Valley and the Hindus constituted 4%.[19] In 2003, the percentage of Muslims in the Kashmir Valley was 95%[20] and those of Hindus 4%; the same year, in Jammu, the percentage of Hindus was 67% and those of Muslims 27%.[20] In the same Census of 1901, four divisions were recorded among the Muslims of the princely state: Shaikhs, Saiyids, Mughals, and Pathans. The Shaikhs were the most numerous, with clan names (known as krams) including "Tantre," "Shaikh," "Mantu," "Ganai," "Dar," "Damar," "Lon" etc.[18] The Saiyids, it was recorded "could be divided into those who follow the profession of religion and those who have taken to agriculture and other pursuits. Their kram name is "Mir." While a Saiyid retains his saintly profession Mir is a prefix; if he has taken to agriculture, Mir is an affix to his name."[18] The Mughals who were not numerous were recorded to have kram names like "Mir" (a corruption of "Mirza"), "Beg," "Bandi," "Bach," and "Ashaye." Finally, it was recorded that the Pathans "who are more numerous than the Mughals, ... are found chiefly in the south-west of the valley, where Pathan colonies have from time to time been founded. The most interesting of these colonies is that of Kuki-Khel Afridis at Dranghaihama, who retain all the old customs and speak Pashtu."[18] The Hindu population of Kashmir Valley in 1901 was recorded to be 60,641.[18] Among the Hindus of Jammu province, who numbered 626,177 (or 90.87% of the Hindu population of the princely state), the most important castes recorded in the census were "Brahmans (186,000), the Rajputs (167,000), the Khattris (48,000) and the Thakkars (93,000)."[18] REFERENCES:

1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Kashmir#cite_ref-0 2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Kashmir#cite_ref-1 3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Kashmir#cite_ref-2 4. Political History of Ancient India, from the Accession of Parikshit to the ..., 1953, p 150, Dr H. C Raychaudhuri - India; Ethnic Settlements in Ancient India: (a Study on the Puranic Lists of the ..., 1955, p 78, Dr S. B. Chaudhuri; An Analytical Study of Four Nikāyas, 1971, p 311, D. K.Barua - Tipiṭaka. 5. Bhandarkar, R. G. (2001). Asoka. p. 31. 6. Pillai, Madhavan Arjunan (1988). Ancient Indian History. p. 149. 7. Awasthi, A. B. L. (1992). Purana Index. p. 79. 8. Misra, Shivenandan (1976). Ancient Indian Republics: From the Earliest Times to the 6th century A.D. p. 92.

9. Watters. Yuan Chawang. Vol I. p. 284. 10. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Kashmir#cite_ref-

imperialgazet-gulabsingh_10-1. 11.Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908. "Kashmir: History." page 94-95. 12. http://www.kashmirinformation.com/LegalDocs/TreatyofAmritsar.html 13. From the text of the Treaty of Amritsar, signed March 16, 1846. 14. Bowers, Paul. 2004. "Kashmir." Research Paper 4/28,

International Affairs and Defence, House of Commons Library, United Kingdom. 15.Stein, Burton. 1998. A History of India. Oxford University Press. 432 pages. ISBN 0195654463. Page 368. 16.Viscount Louis Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of British India, stayed on in independent India from 1947 to 1948, serving as the first Governor-General of the Union of India. 17. Kashmir. (2007). In Encyclopædia Britannica, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 18. Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908. Oxford University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102. 19. Rai, Mridu. 2004. Hindu Ruler, Muslim Subjects: Islam and the History of Kashmir. Princeton University Press. 320 pages. ISBN 0691116881. page 37. 20. BBC. 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/south_asia/03/kashmir_fu ture/html/default.stm

CHAPTER 2 KASHMIR CONFLICT BACKGROUND In 1947, British rule in India ended with the creation of two new nations, the Union of India and the Dominion of Pakistan and the abandonment of British suzerainty over the 562 Indian princely states. According to the Indian Independence Act 1947, "the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States",[1] so the states were left to choose whether to join India or Pakistan or to remain independent. Jammu and Kashmir had a predominantly Muslim population but a Hindu ruler, and was the largest of the princely states. Its ruler was the Dogra King (or Maharaja) Hari Singh. In October 1947, Pakistani tribals from Dir entered Kashmir intending to liberate it from Dogra rule. Unable to withstand the invasion, the Maharaja signed The Instrument of Accession that was accepted by the Government of India on October 27, 1947.[2]

PAK-INDO WARS AND VALLEY OF KASHMIR The irregular Pakistani tribals made rapid advances into Kashmir (Baramulla sector) after the rumours that the Maharaja was going to decide for the union with India. Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir asked the Government of India to intervene. However, the Government of India pointed out that India and Pakistan had signed an agreement of non-intervention (maintenance of the status quo) in Jammu and Kashmir; and although tribal fighters from Pakistan had entered Jammu and Kashmir, there was, until then, no iron-clad legal evidence to unequivocally prove that the Government of Pakistan was officially involved. It would have been illegal for India to unilaterally intervene (in an open, official capacity) unless Jammu and Kashmir officially joined the Union of India, at which point it would be possible to send in its forces and occupy the remaining parts. The Maharaja desperately needed the Indian military's help when the Pathan tribals reached the outskirts of Srinagar. Before their arrival into Srinagar, India argues that Maharaja Hari Singh completed negotiations for acceding Jammu and Kashmir to India in exchange for receiving military aid. The agreement which ceded

Jammu and Kashmir to India was signed by the Maharaja and Lord Mountbatten.[3] The resulting war over Kashmir, the First Kashmir War, lasted until 1948, when India moved the issue to the UN Security Council. The UN previously had passed resolutions setting up for the monitoring of the conflict in Kashmir. The committee it set up was called the United Nations Committee for India and Pakistan. Following the set up of the UNCIP the UN Security Council passed Resolution 47 on April 21, 1948. The resolution imposed that an immediate cease-fire take place and said that Pakistan should withdraw all presence and had no say in Jammu and Kashmir politics. It stated that India should retain a minimum military presence and stated "that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations". The cease fire took place December 31, 1948. In 1965 and 1971, heavy fighting again broke out between India and Pakistan. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 resulted in the defeat of Pakistan and Pakistan Military's surrender in East Pakistan (Bangladesh). The Simla Agreement was signed in 1972 between India and Pakistan. By this treaty, both countries agreed to settle all issues by peaceful means and mutual discussions in the framework of the UN Charter. In mid-1999 insurgents and Pakistani soldiers from Pakistani Kashmir infiltrated into Jammu and Kashmir. During the winter season, Indian forces regularly move down to lower altitudes as severe climatic conditions makes it almost impossible for them to guard the high peaks near the Line of Control. The insurgents took advantage of this and occupied vacant mountain peaks of the Kargil range overlooking the highway in Indian Kashmir, connecting Srinagar and Leh. By blocking the highway, they wanted to cut off the only link between the Kashmir Valley and Ladakh. This resulted in a high-scale conflict between the Indian Army and the Pakistan Army. At the same time, fears of the Kargil War turning into a nuclear war provoked the then-US President Bill Clinton to pressure Pakistan to retreat. Faced with pressure from the international community, Pakistan Army withdrew the remaining troops from the area ending the conflict. India reclaimed control of the peaks which they now patrol and monitor all year long. Newly elected US President Barack Obama has also shown his keen interest in taking measures to end the rivalry between Pakistan and

India, and to resolve Kashmir Conflict to restore the peace in Kashmir valley, in fact, to ensure the peace in Asia as a whole.

INDIAN VIEW The Indian claim to Kashmir centers on the agreement between the Dogra Maharaja Hari Singh, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Lord Mountbatten according to which the erstwhile Kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir became an integral part of the Union of India through the Instrument of Accession. It also focuses on India's claim of secular society, an ideology that is not meant to factor religion into governance of major policy and thus considers it irrelevant in a boundary dispute. Another argument by India is that, in India, minorities are very well integrated, with some members of the minority communities holding positions of power and influence in India. Even though more than 80% of India's population practices Hinduism, a former President of India, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, is a Muslim while Sonia Gandhi, the parliamentary leader of the ruling Congress Party, is a Roman Catholic. The current prime minister of India, Manmohan Singh, is a Sikh and leader of opposition, Lal Krishna Advani, is a Hindu. Indian viewpoint is succinctly summarized by Ministry of External affairs, Government of India.[4] [5]

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India holds that the Instrument of Accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India, signed by the Maharaja Hari Singh (erstwhile ruler of the State) on 26 October, 1947, was completely valid in terms of the Government of India Act (1935), Indian Independence Act (1947) and international law and was total and irrevocable.[6] The Constituent assembly of Jammu and Kashmir had unanimously ratified the Maharaja's Instrument of Accession to India and had adopted a constitution for the state that called for a perpetual merger of the state with the Indian Union. India claims that this body was a representative one, and that its views were those of the Kashmiri people at the time. India believes that all differences between India and Pakistan including Kashmir need to be settled through bilateral negotiations as agreed to by the two countries when they signed the Simla Agreement on July 2, 1972.[7] India does not accept the Two Nation Theory that forms the basis of Pakistan. United Nations Security Council Resolution 47 was never able to be implemented as Pakistan failed to withdraw its forces from Kashmir which was the first step in implementing the resolution.[8] Now the resolution is obsolete since the geography and demographics have been permanently altered.

The resolution was passed by United Nations Security Council under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.[10] Resolutions passed under Chapter VI of UN charter are considered non binding and have no mandatory enforceability as opposed to the resolutions passed under Chapter VII.[11] India is a secular state and the many ethnic minorities in Kashmir would be treated as second class citizens in Islamic republic of Pakistan. Indian Government has repeatedly asked Pakistan not to allow its territory to be used for terrorist attacks against India.[12] India has asked United Nations that It should not be leave unchallenged or unaddressed claims of moral, political and diplomatic support for terrorism, which were clearly in contravention of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 which is a Chapter VII resolution that makes it mandatory for member states to not provide active or passive support to terrorist organizations.[13][14] Specifically it has pointed out that Pakistan Governments support to Terrorist organizations Jaishe-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba is in direct violation of this resolution.[15] Indian Government has repeatedly called on United States to declare Pakistan a Terrorist state.[16][17][18][19] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172 [20] tacitly accepts India's stand that all outstanding issues between India and Pakistan need to be resolved by mutual dialogue ( and does not call for a plebiscite) The state of Jammu and Kashmir was made autonomous by Article 370 of the Constitution of India.[21] India points to the recent state elections held in phases in November–December 2008. High turnouts were seen in spite of calls for boycott by Kashmiri Muslim separatists.[22]. The Pro Indian Party National Conference emerged as the winner.[23] In a diverse country like India, disaffection and discontent are not uncommon. Indian democracy has the necessary resilience to accommodate genuine grievances within the framework of our sovereignty, unity and integrity. Government of India has expressed its willingness to accommodate the legitimate political demands of the people of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.[24] [9]

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PAKISTANI VIEW Pakistan's claims to the disputed region are based on the rejection of Indian claims to Kashmir, namely the Instrument of Accession. Pakistan insists that the Maharaja was not a popular leader, and was regarded as a tyrant by most Kashmiris. Pakistan also accuses

India of hypocrisy, as it refused to recognize the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan and Hyderabad's independence, on the grounds that those two states had Hindu majorities (in fact, India occupied and forcibly integrated those two territories). Furthermore, as he had fled Kashmir due to Pakistani invasion, Pakistan asserts that the Maharaja held no authority in determining Kashmir's future. Additionally, Pakistan argues that even if the Maharaja had any authority in determining the plight of Kashmir, he signed the Instrument of Accession under duress, thus invalidating the legitimacy of his actions. Pakistan also claims that Indian forces were in Kashmir before the Instrument of Accession was signed with India, and that therefore Indian troops were in Kashmir in violation of the Standstill Agreement, which was designed to maintain the status quo in Kashmir (although India was not signatory to the Agreement, signed between Pakistan and the Hindu ruler of Jammu and Kashmir).[25][26]. From 1990 to 1999 some organizations report that Indian Armed Forces, its paramilitary groups, and counter-insurgent militias have been responsible for the deaths 4,501 of Kashmiri civilians. Also from 1990 to 1999, there are records of 4,242 women between the ages of 7-70 that have been raped.[27][28]. Similar allegations were also made by some human rights organizations.[29] In short, Pakistan holds that:  The popular Kashmiri insurgency demonstrates that the Kashmiri people no longer wish to remain within India. Pakistan suggests that this means that either Kashmir wants to be with Pakistan or independent.  According to the two-nation theory which is one of the theories that is cited for the partition that created India and Pakistan, Kashmir should have been with Pakistan, because it has a Muslim majority.  India has shown disregard to the resolutions of the UN by not holding a plebiscite.  The Kashmiri people have now been forced by the circumstances to rise against the alleged repression of the Indian army and uphold their right of self-determination through militancy. Pakistan claims to give the Kashmiri insurgents moral, ethical and military support.  Recent protests in Indian administered Kashmir show a large number of people showing increased anger over Indian rule with massive rallies taking place to oppose Indian control of the state.[30]

Pakistan also points to the violence that accompanies elections in Indian Kashmir[31] and the anti Indian sentiments expressed by some people in the state.[32]  Pakistan has noted the wide spread use of extra-judicial killings in Indian-administered Kashmir carried out by Indian security forces while claiming they were caught up in encounters with militants. These fake encounters are common place in Indian-administered Kashmir and the perpetrators are spared criminal prosecution. These fake encounters go largely uninvestigated by the authorities.[33] [34]  Pakistan points towards reports from the United Nations which condemns India for its human rights violations against kashmiri people.[35] 

UNPREJUDICED VIEW For the last six decades India has maintained its occupation of the Kashmir Valley by political manipulation and brutal military force. The massacres of the Kashmiri Muslims by Indian forces amount to war crimes under international law; however, the ultimate responsibility for this genocidal policy lies with the New Delhi rulers. If Indian government wants to continue with the occupation of Kashmir and also expect that people of Kashmir will forego their demands for freedom because they face a great military and economic power like India, which has extended its cooperation with other imperialist powers like America and Zionist Israel, then one thing is certain: the situation will get worse; violence and terror will flourish. The 10-million Muslims of the Kashmir Valley want independence from Indian colonial rule and oppression. The best course left for India is to make a break with its previous policy, and accede to the right to self-determination of the Kashmiris. This will not weaken India; instead, it will show the strength of Indian democracy as well of the humane aspects of Indian cultural tradition. Whether the people of the Kashmir Valley decide to join India or Pakistan, or they opt for full independence should be for them to decide. No matter what decision they make to determine their future as stipulated by the UN resolutions should be their and their alone. However, it is far from certain that they will choose to join Pakistan, but if they do so that should not worry India. In such a case, Hindu Jammu and Buddhist Ladakh will certainly join India. Thus, by a wise and courageous step Indian leaders can create the political conditions under which a new era of good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan can materalise if they allow the people of the Kashmir Valley to control their own destiny instead of the inhumane treatment and humiliation at the hands of

the Indian state and its armed forces. Once the main bone of contention between India and Pakistan is removed then the two former rivals and “enemies” can become friends and concentrate on socio-economic problems of their people within a peaceful atmosphere. An independent and self-governing entity in the Kashmir Valley will bring hope and good-will to its neighbours. By removing the biggest unresolved problem of Kashmir that has fueled hostility and has caused immeasurable damage, the two countries will also be able to contain the forces of communalism and religious fanaticism that plague India and Pakistan. REFERENCES: 1. http://www.opsi.gov.uk/RevisedStatutes/Acts/ukpga/1947/cukp

ga_19470030_en_1 2. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,793895,00. html 3. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,977469,00. html?promoid=googlep 4. http://meaindia.nic.in/jk/kashmirissue.htm 5. http://meaindia.nic.in/jk/19jk01.pdf 6. http://meaindia.nic.in/jk/19jk01.pdf 7. http://meaindia.nic.in/jk/sim-ag.htm 8. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1399992/A-brief-history-ofthe-Kashmir-conflict.html 9. http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/kashmir/kashmir_mea/UN .html 10. http://www.pakun.org/statements/Security_Council/2003/05132 003-01.php 11. http://www.dawn.com/2004/08/05/op.htm 12. http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/04/17/pakistan.india. talks/index.html 13. http://www.un.int/india/ind892.pdf 14. http://www.state.gov/s/ct/index.cfm?docid=5108 15. http://secint04.un.org/india/ind575.pdf 16. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/414485.stm 17. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html? res=9403E5D61539F934A25754C0A9649C8B63&sec=&spon=& partner=permalink&exprod=permalink 18. http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/BB05Df01.html 19. http://www.dawn.com/2009/02/08/top4.htm 20. http://www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-1172%281998%29.pdf 21. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501021007356124,00.html 22. http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-11/2008-11-17voa33.cfm?CFID=86869934&CFTOKEN=89052312

23. http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/12/28/indian.kashmir

.vote/index.html 24. http://meaindia.nic.in/jk/kashmirissue.htm 25. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1762146.stm 26. http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Pages/Brief.htm 27. http://www.mediamonitors.net/suliman1.html 28. http://www.countercurrents.org/kashmir-hashmi310307.htm 29. http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/asia/india.html 30. http://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2008/08/18/asia/OUKWD-

UK-KASHMIR-PROTESTS.php 31. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7744724.stm 32. http://www.dawn.com/2008/12/08/top10.htm 33. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6367917.stm 34. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/01/29/india-prosecute-

police-killings-jammu-and-kashmir 35. http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/1058F3E39 F77ACE5C12574B2004E5CE3?opendocument

PART 2: PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST KASHMIRIITE IDEOLOGY CHAPTER 1 VIOLENCE AND VICIOUS ASSAULTS ON HUMANITY IN PRACTICE Psychological and emotional injuries may be the most enduring effects of major conflicts between nations in the present era, yet historically, they may be the least addressed in terms of rebuilding a society and preventing violence. In recent world conflicts, terrorism has been purposely utilized against civilians as a means of attacking the self-esteem and morale of “the enemy,” as well as simple retribution. In fact, this is what has been happening in Kashmir valley since 1989 (beginning of insurgency as called by India, and interpreted as ‘freedom movement’ by Pakistan). Kashmiriites are the victims of violence. They are being: brutally murdered, displaced, and expropriated (direct violence); assaulted economically and socially (structural violence); and victimized on religious and racial grounds (Cultural violence). Insurgency in Kashmir has existed in various forms, mainly on the Indian administrated side of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Kashmir has been the target of a campaign of militancy by

all sides in the conflict. Thousands of lives have been lost since 1989 due to the intensified insurgency. Casualties include Muslim and Hindu civilians (men, women, and children), Indian Armed Forces, and Kashmiri and foreign militants. The Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan has been accused by India of supporting and training mujahideen[1][2] to fight in Jammu and Kashmir.[3][4] While, International Human Right Groups have accused Indian army of committing grave Human rights violations in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir.[5] A 1996 Human Rights Watch report accuses the Indian military and Indian-government backed paramilitaries of "committ[ing] serious and widespread human rights violations in Kashmir."[6] One such alleged massacre occurred on January 6, 1993 in the town of Sopore. TIME Magazine described the incident as such: "In retaliation for the killing of one soldier, paramilitary forces rampaged through Sopore's market setting buildings ablaze and shooting bystanders. The Indian government pronounced the event 'unfortunate' and claimed that an ammunition dump had been hit by gunfire, setting off fires that killed most of the victims."[7] In addition to this, there have been claims of disappearances by the police or the army in Kashmir by several human rights organizations.[8][9] Many human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch (HRW) have condemned human rights abuses in Kashmir by Indians such as "extra-judicial executions", "disappearances", and torture;[10] the "Armed Forces Special Powers Act", which "provides impunity for human rights abuses and fuels cycles of violence. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) grants the military wide powers of arrest, the right to shoot to kill, and to occupy or destroy property in counterinsurgency operations. Indian officials claim that troops need such powers because the army is only deployed when national security is at serious risk from armed combatants. Such circumstances, they say, call for extraordinary measures." Human rights organizations have also asked Indian government to repeal [11] the Public Safety Act, since "a detainee may be held in administrative detention for a maximum of two years without a court order."[12] Islamic militants are accused of violence against the Kashmir populace.[13] Thousands of civilian Kashmiri Hindus have been killed in Kashmir over the past 10 years by Islamic militants organisations or Muslim mobs.[14] Human rights organisations put the figure of the number killed since the late 80's at 11,000.[15] Tens of thousands of Kashmiri Pandits have emigrated as a result of the violence. Estimates of the displaced varies from 170,000 to 700,000.

Thousands of Pandits have to move to Jammu because of terrorism. [16]

HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE[17] Before the onset of conflict in Kashmir, the term Human Rights was not popularly known but, when the conflict started in the early 90's, human rights became a major issue in Kashmir and all sections of the Kashmiri society got involved in Human Rights issues. They sent memorandums to the United Nations for humanitarian intervention in Kashmir. Overnight, groups like Amnesty International became a household name. Professionals like doctors, lawyers, social activists, bureaucrats and retired judges constituted District and local level committees. Physicians for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and other international human rights groups began reporting on human rights in Kashmir. A number of reports were published expressing deep concern at human rights abuses committed on all sides, particularly a systematic pattern of human rights abuses and impunity by the Indian government. But the Indian government has banned international human rights groups like Amnesty International from visiting. Even the ICRC was banned for a number of years and was only permitted limited access to officially listed prisons and Joint Interrogation centers to ensure the fair and humane treatment of the thousands of imprisoned Kashmiris. ICRC operations in Kashmir are severely curtailed by a very restrictive Memorandum of Understanding with the Indian government which does not permit unfettered access, unannounced visits to detention centers, or access to the “unofficial” prisons and detention centers. Given that inte international human rights groups have not been permitted to rnational visit Kashmir, the primary responsibility of human rights documentation, research and advocacy has fallen on local Kashmiri actors. It has been a lonely and dangerous endeavor those who have taken up this important work. For the most part, Kashmiri society was not adequately prepared to contend with the crisis of human rights issues that has dominated life in Kashmir since the early 1990’s. Proper Human Rights work has not been properly addressed and understood by Kashmiri political groupings involved in an independence struggle. At the beginning of the 1990’s, Indian human rights organizations visited Kashmir and reported human rights situation through their reports. Groups from South India, such as the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberty Council (APCLC), also documented the human rights situation in

Kashmir, but these reports were dismissed by the government of India as misleading and intended to “demoralize” the army. In Kashmir, the Kashmir Bar Association and the Jammu Bar association also did some documentation but it was not done in a professional manner. The only organization, which documented the human right violations in Kashmir in an organized manner, was the Institute of Kashmir Studies (IKS). The Institute of Kashmir Studies (IKS) was founded in the year 1992. The IKS emerged as an organized institute and, according to its commitment, it was to provide intellectual impetus, assist and coordinate research on issues and problems relevant to Kashmir. It had many objectives but most of its activities remained confined to human right documentation. The human right division of the IKS, under the name and style of Jammu and Kashmir Human Rights Awareness and Documentation Centre (J&K HRADC), undertook studies on human rights, to highlight the human right violations perpetrated on the people of J&K. IKS published almost 40 publications mostly relating to human rights violations. The information by IKS was disseminated to more than 400 organizations in India and internationally. Since the IKS office bearers were also affiliated with a right-wing political party, they had a lot of human and financial resources which enabled their work. But independent observers questioned the reports of the IKS as it was accused of politicizing human right issues. After the detention of its chairman in November 2002, who was detained under the Public Safety Act, the president of Jamaat –e- Islami took over the responsibility of IKS. Soon after the detention of its chairman, the president of Jamaat suspended the activities of IKS. Thus, political forces interfered in the human rights work of the IKS, while the credibility of the well-researched IKS reports were impacted by perceived involvement of the very same. Recent efforts to initiate objective well-founded human rights documentation work in Kashmir have graduated to a higher level as Kashmir civil society has stepped in. At present, the Public Commission on Human Rights (PCHR), an independent organization of Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (CCS), is documenting human right situation on a monthly basis through its publication “Informative Missive” which is also available on the website: http://geocities.com/informativemissive. Besides the Informative Missive, the Kashmiri Women’s Initiative for Peace and Disarmament (KWIPD), a constituent of CCS, through its quarterly magazine “Voices Unheard” is documenting and disseminating violations against women and children. Please see http://www.geocities.com/kwipd2002. The CCS also monitored the

Jammu & Kashmir assembly elections last year in November 2002, through its report Independent Election Observer’s Team Report. Besides CCS, the Department of Sociology from the University of Kashmir has written reports regarding the effect of violence on Kashmiri society. Thousands of people have been the victims of enforced disappearances by the government. Another CCS member, the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP), has brought together hundreds of Kashmiri families whose members have been the victims of Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (EID) by the Indian government. The APDP is a collective campaigning organization that seeks truth and justice on this severe human rights issue in Kashmir. Recently, in April 2003, APDP organized a worldwide hunger strike, coordinated in different cities across the world, pressing for an end to disappearances, prosecution of perpetrators, and appointment of a commission to probe into all enforced disappearances. The APDP, along with other CCS member organizations, has helped families pursue legal cases as well as highlight this issue through reports, videos, and seminars. Impunity is granted to the security forces under Section 6 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) which reads as, no prosecution, suit or other legal proceedings shall be instituted except with the prior sanction of centre, against any person in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act. There are innumerable cases in which the army officials have carried out liquidations and assassinations of non-combatant Kashmiris, but no action has been taken against them. This has occurred not withstanding the Supreme Court’s directive that, while deciding the legal validity of AFSPA, the complaints against armed forces must be investigated. The whole system of human right violations functions on the basis of impunity, and legal impunity is one of the facets. The other facets are political impunity which sustains itself on an institutionalized lie. When it comes to political assassinations, the perpetrators are convinced they have better served their country by torturing, killing, or making the enemy disappear, and all this convinces the perpetrators that they are unaccountable and have license to do anything in the name of patriotism and the territorial integrity of India. This paper examines the psychological impact of terror-related violence on Kashmir’s social environment. Historically, both state and non-state actors have resorted to the same approaches in terrorizing civilian populations, while using different weapons and techniques. For both, the goals of terror are political. However, the

challenges of social and economic order cannot be adequately undertaken unless we clearly understand the psychology of political violence. These concepts in many ways guide domestic and foreign policy, but have clear distinctions. On the one hand, a distinction can be made between violence undertaken because persons have a right to defend their home, and actions undertaken supposedly to “alter the behaviors and attitudes of multiple audiences,”[18] whether they are ‘conspiratorial’ or not. Kashmir’s experience could prove important in analyzing the psychological impact of political violence. Together with its atmosphere of fear, the Kashmiri militants have created an atmosphere of widespread discontent. In this regard, “the secrecy of planning and the visibility of results” may be illustrative of a more general phenomenon in which individual and population vulnerability to violence is linked to terror. At least this has been the position of researchers who have been active in the field, and the particular case of Kashmir. He who murders a man…it is as if he murdered the entire human race; and if anyone saves a life, it is as if he saved the lives of all mankind. -Qur’an The violent oppression, and injuries of great persons, (and I would add nations) are not extenuated, but aggravated by the greatness of their persons; because they have least need to commit them. -Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan These two statements – the first found in the Qur’an, the holy book of Islam, and the second by Thomas Hobbes, a seventeenth century European scholar – express a dominant theme of contemporary writings on modern political terrorism. Political terrorism, we are told, wrestles between the role of ideas and its political organization. On the one hand, powerful ideological forces are creating a complex movement, “especially under the banner of Islam”[19] thus diminishing the traditional significance of the nation-state. On the other hand, political organizations command “moral inhibitions”[20] as a reasonable alternative “to alter the attitudes and behavior of multiple audiences.”[21] As one writer has put the issue however, “terrorism and our conceptions of it depend on…context…and on how groups and individuals who participate in or respond to the actions we call terrorism relate to the world in which they act.”[22] Kashmir’s experience could prove important in contextualizing political terrorism. Terror-related violence has left a death toll running into tens of thousands and a population brutalized by fighting and fear. Together with its atmosphere of fear, the

Kashmiri militants have created an atmosphere of widespread discontent. The advent of political terrorism has put the question of the relationship between ideas and political organizations in a new guise, but it is in fact an old issue. In the nineteenth century for example, “the failure of nonviolent movements contributed to the rise of terrorism.”[23] The result is paradoxical. Terrorism works as a “protest leading to reform of underlying conditions;”[24] and, it works to “destroy the infrastructure”[25] of the society. In effect, “the nonstate or substate users of terrorism – are constrained in their options by the lack of active mass support and by the superior power arrayed against them.”[26] Let’s consider the PalestinianIsraeli struggle. “Terrorism followed the failure of Arab efforts at conventional warfare against Israel.”[27] Whereas the Palestinians gave primacy to “winning their struggle through violence,”[28] Israel emphasized political determination for relations. “Decoded, the grievance can be summed up to the social and economic conditions in the country.”[29] These issues are as central to human destruction, as both opening statements with respect to the subject of modern political terrorism, as it is important to deconstructing the milieu of fear in Kashmir. Whereas the Qur’an advocates altruism, Hobbes discusses and describes what humankind is capable of. In Kashmir, what appears to one as the logical and desirable seems to another, a matter ideological irrationality. This paper will first look at the impact of terror-related violence on Kashmir’s social environment. Then, assess the overarching goal of political terrorism in Kashmir. Taken together, this paper examines the trajectory of terror-related violence, its historical associations, and reaches in mental health.

INSIDE TERRORISM The study of terrorism focuses undue attention on the state level impact. These realist and neo-realist notions of security position states as unitary actors and the most important entity in the international system. That said, the idea of terrorism is generally considered one and the same with protecting the territory and national interests of a state from external and increasingly internal aggression or interference. Only threats to the security and existence of states have been considered detrimental to global security and thus worthy of global action. However, the factors that engender insecurity among the people living within states are not limited to the perpetuation of the state. The mental health and broadly speaking security of people within states are related to their quality of life, and therefore terror-related violence must

include a number of social and economic issues. According to the World Health Organization’s (WHO) 2002 World Report on Violence and Health, more than 1.6 million people died because of violence, including collective violence such as conflicts within or between states. This complex notion of political terrorism wrestles between a relationship of terror-related violence and social fear. In contextualizing the issue, “it is critically important to assess the effects of terrorism on society and on the political process, as well as the responses to terrorism by society and by political structures.”[30] On the one hand, politics largely determines the framework on social activity and channels it in directions intended to serve the interests of the public. On the other hand, the political process itself tends to create an “imbalance between the resources terrorist are able to mobilize and the power of the incumbent regime.”[31] This in turn leads to a transformation of the political system and social environment. It also fosters a reciprocal interaction between politics and fear of “violence in the pursuit of change.”[32] A number of varying and somewhat overlapping definitions of terrorism exist. This concept focuses on the politics of the people. Martha Crenshaw defines political terrorism in terms described as “the direct activity of small groups.”[33] To provide a perspective on the nature of political terrorism, Crenshaw points to the social, political and economic context of the individual political actors. “There is nothing automatic about the choice of terrorism. Like any political decision, the decision to use terrorism is influenced by psychological considerations and internal bargaining, as well as by reasoned or strategic reactions to opportunities and constraints, perceived in light of the organization’s goals.”[34] Walter Reich, in an analysis of the psychology of terrorism borrows his definition from the U.S. State Department: “Premeditated, politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine state agents, normally intended to influence an audience.”[35] This definition, like Crenshaw’s tending to isolate the condition under which decisions are made, which Reich defines as the act of “premeditation.” Others prefer to look at terrorism as a conscious design “to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little.”[36] Of course, these analyses are not without emphasis on the last half of the nineteenth century but

it captures the increasing complexity and difficulty of defining the issue. For example, since 1947 the conflict between India and Pakistan over the territorial rule of Kashmir has shaped attitudes towards terrorism. What started as essentially an indigenous popular uprising against external rule has created a social environment “beleaguered by terrorism, repression, misery and destitution.”[37] Political terrorism has been largely characterized as a “movement of political violence….fueled by ethnic, religious and linguistic factors.”[38] The inconsistencies and failures of government policies in Kashmir have allowed “social elements to encourage votaries of political violence through passive as well as active support.”[39] Further, “peasants in villages formerly under the militants’ sway have been disillusioned with killings, rapes, and criminal activities.”[40] It is in this context that the concept of political terrorism can be best understood. In Kashmir, political terrorism is largely characterized by “movements of political violence directed against the state, and in turn, involves repressive measures that are often seen as a state of terrorism.”[41]

PSYCHOSOCIAL DILEMMAS The dispute in Kashmir has derelict the psychosocial environment. According to researchers at the University of Kashmir’s Population Research Center, based in the Indian administered capital, Srinigar, the demographic and health picture of the State constitutes a cause for “serious and urgent”[42] concern. “The dispute…continues to have an adverse affect on the health of Kashmiris.”[43] Researchers at the International Institution for Population Sciences (IIPS) agree. In 1998-99, at the height of the separatist movement, field officers conducted a study of ‘important aspects of health.’ The project, titled National Family Health Survey (NFHS-2) covered a number of topics with important policy implications such as nutrition, primary health care, reproductive health, women’s autonomy, and domestic violence. They collected information from 2,786 households between April 22 1999 and September 20, 1999, and interviewed 2,744 eligible women in these households. One health investigator on each survey team also took blood samples to assess the prevalence of diseases in Jammu and Kashmir. The findings suggest health and other societal neglect may be a consequence of terror-related violence. For example:

 49.8 percent of Women reported accessing government health facilities for sickness;  69.8 percent of Women are reportedly illiterate;  55.5 percent of Women are involved in making decisions about their own health care, but only one-fourth make these decisions by themselves, and only about one-tenth of Women do not need permission to go to the market or to visit friends or relatives.  Under 5, childhood mortality rate is 80.1 percent. “Male children are much more likely to have received all vaccinations than female children (61 percent compared to 50 percent).”[44] In addition, “twenty-two percent of ever-married Women have experienced beatings or physical mistreatment since age 15, and 9 percent experienced such violence in the 12 months preceding the survey. Most of these Women have been beaten or physically mistreated by their husbands.”[45] Researchers suggest that the proliferation of political terrorism has “led to the neglect of the preventive, promotive, public health and aspects of health care.”[46] Two theoretical perspectives explain the role of political terrorism on the health of Kashmir. First, “terrorism is assumed to display a collective rationality.”[47] That is, “the benefits of a successful terrorist campaign would presumably be shared by all individual supporters of the group’s goals, regardless of the extent of their active participation.”[48] The second perspective is strategic choice. “The wide range of terrorist activity cannot be dismissed as irrational and thus pathological, unreasonable, or inexplicable.” Since Women are the inactive participants, expected to benefit from the struggle, insulating society from access to quality health services seems a reasonable sacrifice for all. In Origins of Terrorism, Crenshaw pushes the argument a step further with evidence that in a similar context, “terrorism can be understood as an expression of political strategy.”[49] Political terrorism she argues “is a willful choice made by an organization for political and strategic reasons, rather than as the unintended outcome of psychological and psychosocial factors.”[50] A strategic analysis report conducted in New York and Germany indicates however that “average citizens may adopt a collectivist’s conception of rationality because they recognize that what is individually rational is collectively irrational.”[51] For example, “the central question about the rationality of some terrorist organizations, such as the West German groups of the 1970s or the

Weather Underground in the United States, is whether or not they had a sufficient grasp of reality – some approximation, to whatever degree imperfect – to calculate the likely consequences of the courses of actions they chose.”[52] This is not to suggest terrorist activity is ‘reasonable’ or ‘rational.’ Rather, “rational expectations may be undermined by fantastic assumptions about the role of the masses,”[53] and “the misperception of conditions can lead to unrealistic expectations.”[54] The reasoning suggests, “that the belief that terrorism is expedient is one means by which moral inhibitions are overcome.”[55] A community survey done by Médecins Sans Frontières in 2005 found high levels of ongoing violence across the region, with civilians caught in the middle. The majority of people surveyed stated having been exposed to crossfire (86%) and round-up raids (83%). High numbers of people reported being subjected to maltreatment (44%), forced labour (33%), kidnapping (17%), torture (13%) and sexual violence (12%). [56] Exposure to violence has potentially important implications for mental health [57]. This paper presents the findings of the community assessment survey done by Médecins Sans Frontières in 2005. The study, which was done to inform program planning, assessed the mental health and socio-economic impact of the ongoing violence, and the sources of support. Following excerpts from the Médecins Sans Frontières survey revealed that: Psychological distress was mostly expressed through symptoms such as nervousness, tiredness, being easily frightened and headache (Table 1). The prevalence of suicidal ideation is striking: one-third of those surveyed had had thoughts of ending their life in the past 30 days. Over a third of respondents were categorized as suffering from psychological distress (SRQ ≥ 12) using the Indian validated SRQ (33.3%, 170; CI: 28.3–38.4). The design effect for the SRQ was 1.4. Females scored significantly higher (43.8% vs. 24.1%, OR 2.5; CI: 1.7–3.6; p < 0.001). Feelings of personal insecurity were significantly associated with psychological distress (SRQ ≥ 12) for both males and females (Table 2). Psychological distress among males was significantly (p < 0.01) associated with all self-experiences (defined as 'ever happened to you') and most consequences of violence. Psychological distress among females was significantly (p < 0.01) associated with witnessing events (except hearing about/witnessing rape), as well as the self-experience of some events (maltreatment,

arrested/kidnapped) independence.

and

feelings

of

lack

of

safety

and

For both genders, not feeling safe is associated with at least twice the odds of suffering from psychological distress (Table 3). For males, violation of modesty, forced displacement, and disability were all associated with a significantly increased likelihood (three times the odds) of suffering from psychological distress. For women, the witnessing of people being killed or tortured or dependency on outside assistance doubled the odds of suffering psychological distress. The majority of respondents (63.9%, 326) had recently visited a health postor clinic: nearly half had visited a health facility more than once (46.3%, 235) in the past 30 days. Overall, nearly half (49.6%, 253) of respondents rated the health facilities as poor. Women more frequently rated their physical health as bad or very bad (male: 24.1% vs. female: 36.3%, OR 1.8; CI: 1.2–2.6; p < 0.005), and visited the health facilities more than men (male: 40.0% vs. female: 54.7%, OR 1.8; CI: 1.3–2.6; p = 0.005). The number of women who had been on medication for six or more days was significantly higher than men (male: 30.7% vs. female: 46.0%, OR 1.9; CI: 1.3–2.8; p < 0.001). A high level of psychological distress (SRQ ≥ 12) was significantly (p < 0.01) associated with poor or very poor self-rated health for both males (OR 4.4) and females (OR 3.4). For males this was also associated with a higher likelihood of visiting the clinic two times or more (Table 4). For both males and females, high psychological distress was also associated with a higher likelihood of being unable to or having to cut back on work or performance of daily activities.

The most common ways of coping were withdrawal (isolation, not talking to people) and aggression (Table 5). Religion was also reported as a helpful source of support. The data presented in this article were gathered to inform MSF's programme to provide mental health support in Kashmir. Using the SRQ (a tool that has been validated in other Indian studies) we found the population had been exposed to high levels of violence which resulted in one third of the respondents suffering from psychological distress and considering suicide. For both genders, currently not feeling safe was associated with psychological distress. For males 'violation of modesty', displacement, and disability were associated

with psychological distress while risk factors for females included witnessing killing and torture. Respondents with high psychological distress rated their own health and socio economic functioning as poor. The most common coping mechanism was withdrawal. Overall, one-third of respondents reported psychological distress. This compares to a prevalence of 36% found in a study done in among Afghan women in a refugee camp [58] using the same instrument and similar cutoff score, but differs substantially from another SRQ study done in a non-conflict area in India [59] where 18% prevalence of psychological distress was found among low-income urban women, using a relatively low cut-off score (7/8). (Using this lower cut-off would have given a prevalence of psychological distress of 71.4%). The contextual difference in these studies – exposure to chronic violence as compared to 'common' stressors of daily life for women in low urban settings – may account for this difference.

The Self Reporting Questionnaire (SRQ) showed that a third of respondents had contemplated suicide. Suicidal thoughts are common for depressive disorders [60] but do not always lead to a suicide attempt. Our findings are in line with a previous study that reported high suicide rates in this region [61]. A high prevalence of suicidal thoughts is more often reported among populations suffering from chronic violence, with a similar prevalence (33%, 96,

n = 297) reported in a population of Afghan refugee women in Pakistan using the same questionnaire (SRQ). In our study women had significantly higher psychological distress than man. This is in line with other studies showing women suffering more from anxiety disorders than men after confrontation with violence [62]. Feeling safe was found in other studies to be an important precondition for being able to deal with adverse traumatic experiences [63][64], and this was also found in our study. For males, the most important risk factors for developing psychological distress were 'violation of modesty', displacement and disability. It is possible that these experiences are the most distressing because they interfere with the cultural values and roles of males in Kashmir society: upholding their dignity and being able to protect and feed their families. Those who self-experienced 'violation of modesty' had a threefold chance of suffering from psychological distress (p = 0.001). 'Violation of modesty' is regarded as very degrading and in the few studies on male sexual violence is associated with multiple perpetrators and high levels of physical beating [65][66], which can further contribute to psychological distress. For women most psychological distress was associated with feelings of powerlessness – dependency on others for daily living, and witnessing killing and torture. Women have lower confrontations with violence, which can be partly explained by their being largely confined to the home [67]. The significant association of witnessing and psychological distress among females may relate to feelings of helplessness and guilt caused by the witnessing may be more traumatic than experiencing the violence themselves. Both males and females with high levels of psychological distress rated their own health as much poorer compared to those who did not have high levels of psychological distress (male: OR 4.4; female: OR 3.4). Non-specific health complaints have been associated with (traumatic) stress in other studies. It is also possible that people do not understand the relationship between physical symptoms and mental stress or have difficulty to articulate their emotional status and use physical symptoms to articulate mental distress. High psychological distress among males was significantly associated with visiting health services more frequently. Increased use of medical services by those suffering from traumatic-stress related problems are common, with up to a 25% increase in number of visits to health care facilities reported in other studies. We found this relationship in our survey for males, but not for females. This

may be explained by the fact that for both cultural and security reasons females depend on male escorts in order to access health services, restricting their movements. In our population, high psychological distress is associated with substantially increased likelihood of socio-economic dysfunction, and this has been reported in both Western and Asian contexts. Socio-economic dysfunction can have broad implications, for example by reducing capacity of females to give care to the children or for males to generate income (according to traditional roles). The most common coping mechanisms such as withdrawal (self-isolation, stop speaking) and aggression may also be symptomatic of depression and/or anxiety disorder (including post-traumatic stress disorder, PTSD). Religion and family assistance are mentioned less frequently as sources of support. This is in contrast to a study conducted in Afghanistan that showed religion and reading the Koran as the two main coping mechanisms for two being confronted with violence [68]. It is also concluded that the high levels of violence confronted by the Kashmiri population have resulted in high prevalence (33%) of mental health problems. Poor self-rated health and likelihood of poor socio-economic functioning were associated with high levels of psychological distress. Mental health problems in this context of chronic violence should receive full attention through the provision of appropriate community-based services that would improve access to care and reduce the burden on the health system. With killings, torture, rapes, molestations, disappearances and detentions becoming the order of the day in Kashmir, psychiatric disorders have seen a sharp increase post-1989. In 1989, about 1,700 patients visited the valley's lone psychiatric hospital and by the year 2003, the number had gone up to 48,000. Before the onset of the armed struggle, certain disorders that were not known to Kashmiris started showing a significant presence amongst the civilian population. The Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PSTD), one of the psychiatric diseases, which was completely unrecognised before 1990 has witnessed a major upsurge. Major Depressive Disorder (MDO) follows this. There are other mental diseases like bipolar disorder, panic, phobia; general anxiety and sleep disorders that have also shown four-fold increase as told by Dr Arshad of the

Psychiatric Diseases Hospital in Srinagar. Substance Use Disorder or drug addiction and suicidal tendencies has been another repercussion of the ongoing conflict in Kashmir. Dr Arshad further added that the patients who come to seek help are largely in the productive age group of 25-30 years [69]. Dr Mushtaq Marghoob, a leading psychiatrist of the valley states that women bear the brunt of every tragedy. They have to support the family after the death of their husbands, fathers, sons or brothers. Dr Arshad further adds that women form a major part of the patients who are suffering from PSTD (almost 50 per cent). For women whose husbands have died, psychotherapy has failed to produce desired results. A woman from Batmaloo, Srinagar saw the body of her brother who was killed in custody by soldiers of the Indian army, the body had been split open and his heart had been taken out. The shock rendered her in a state of disturbed bereavement and PSTD ever since. According to Dr Marghoob, women have become increasingly suicidal and are resorting to sleeping pills, injections and inhalations [70]. Even though a large number of people visit the Psychiatric Diseases Hospital in Srinagar, however, this is only a tip of the iceberg as large numbers of patients visit hospitals at the district and sub-district levels. Nearly every person, particularly women, suffer from general anxiety and the uncertainty pertaining to the security of their family members. This always keep them in a state of unrest and anxiety. Even in their houses people are harassed, beaten up or taken into custody by the troops. The fact that the situation doesn't seem to get any better, doesn't promise a better mental state of the civilian population, especially women, in Kashmir. In past few years, murders, rapes, torture, custodial deaths, and enforced disappearances have witnessed an upsurge, but the response of the state in addressing these atrocities doesn't promise hope for justice. The official figures of these atrocities are far too less than the reported ones. The factual human rights situation in Kashmir has always been rendered invisible by the national security concerns of the government and the state centric approach of the Indian media [71]. Living in this environment of hopelessness, there are people like Parveena who are still willing to give a tough fight to powers-that-be. Parveena says, "I am determined to fight till my last breath, with or without anyone's support". People like Parveena need to be lauded for their determination. It is being constantly projected in the mainstream media that the situation in Kashmir has improved, but the ever-increasing rate of

human rights violations in the valley tell us a different story. People continue to suffer while the much-hyped slogan of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh proclaiming 'Zero Tolerance' towards human rights abuse stares him hard in the face!

ETHNIC BASIS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PROPAGANDA[72] Conflict influences health outcomes, and is used as a perpetual mechanism of moral disengagement. To borrow a thought of David Rapoport, researcher at the University of California, Los Angeles, one of the most ‘arresting’ issues of political terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir has been the “revival of terrorist activities to support religious purposes,”41 and the mitigating role “self sanctions plays…in the regulation of inhumane conduct.” The demographic health picture is a good indicator of the State, and constitutes a case for this analysis. It suggests normal “selfsanctions can be disengaged by reconstructing conduct as serving moral purposes, obscuring personal agency in detrimental activities, disregarding or misrepresenting the injurious consequences of one’s actions, or by blaming and dehumanizing the victims” as has been evidenced by the Kashmir study. Religion is an important aspect of the dispute. Partition in 1947, gave India’s Muslims a State of their own: Pakistan. This common faith underpins Pakistan’s claims to Kashmir, where many areas are Muslim dominated. The Muslim population of the Indian-administered State, Jammu and Kashmir is over 60 percent, making it the only State within India where Muslims are in the majority. The argument of religiosity is also important because of the dichotomy in Islam. The Shia and Sunni Muslims have distinct ideology. For example, “formal religious education is a pattern common throughout Sunni Islamists movements; which unlike Shia counterparts, are profoundly hostile to the religious establishment.” In the case of Kashmir, the majority of Muslims are Sunni. Second, according to Albert Bandura the overarching relevance of religion suggests ‘intensive psychological’ mechanisms at play for the actors involved in this context. On the one hand, religion does not play a role because “victims are incidental to the terrorists’ intended objectives and are used simply as a way to provoke psychosocial conditions designed to further broader aims.” On the other hand, third party violence (Women and children in Kashmir who do not access health care services out of fear) “is a much more horrific undertaking than political violence in which

particular political figures are targeted.” In effect the “threat to human welfare stems mainly from deliberate acts of principal rather than from unrestrained acts of (religious) impulse.” Third, research by Crenshaw and others point to the fact that political terrorism bears some economic logic. “Terrorism has an extremely useful agenda-setting function.” Crenshaw insists that individual actors calculate the cost and benefit. “If it provokes generalized government repression, fear may diminish enthusiasm for…..” but, “if the reasons behind violence are skillfully articulated, terrorism can put the issue of political change on the public agenda.” In Kashmir, the benefits of the struggle for independence of the whole or part of the State; outweighs costs of health, especially for Women. “By spreading insecurity – at the extreme, making the region ungovernable – the organization hopes to pressure the regime into concessions or relaxation of coercive controls” by India and Pakistan. “Political opportunism and internal rivalries sharpen the emphasis on militant politics, particularly when religious symbolism and revivalism are used to mobilize followers.” However, “given the existence of so many psychological devices for disengagement of moral control, societies cannot rely entirely on individuals, however righteous their standards, to provide safeguards against (psychosocially) destructive ventures.”

UPSHOT OF KASHMIR TURMOIL[73] Another important aspect of terror-related violence in Kashmir is its associations and contemporary interpretations. “In its contemporary form, political violence raises new issues of public policy for the State and necessitates a reexamination of societal and economic processes.” There are several groups pursuing the rival claims of Kashmir. Not all are armed, but since the dispute erupted in 1989, the number of armed separatists has grown from hundreds to thousands. The most prominent are the Pakistani Hizbul Mujahideen. November 1999: “Today, I announce the break-up of India, Inshallah. We will not rest until the whole of India is dissolved into Pakistan.” Indian-administered Kashmiris have also been victims of “brutal… Human Rights violations.”

Sources claim “four hundred thousand Kashmir Pandits have been pushed out of the Valley by the terrorists.” This fact is corroborated by the sharp increase in the incidences of domestic violence and infant mortality during this period. Another “twenty thousand people have been killed in Kashmir alone since 1990.” The strategy of political terrorism has been “one of surrogate warfare,” especially on the part of Pakistan. Walter Laqueur: “Pakistan helped to transform the conflict between communities in Kashmir into a jihad, a holy war, complete with Islamists vying for martyrdom.” In this regard, the social environment is considered “more vulnerable to full-scale attack.” In 1998, both India and Pakistan declared nuclear powers, and threatened attack. Although the United States intervened, “the incidence showed how dangerous the situation had become and how easily a major terrorist attack could have led to war with incalculable consequences.” Further, “the rising fear has led the international community to initiate a covert process of bringing Kashmiri militants and moderates together in order to discuss ways of resolving the conflict peacefully.” One scholar suggests “independence and freedom are very different, and all too often the attainment of one meant the end of the other, and the replacement of foreign overlords by domestic tyrants, more adept, more intimate, and less constrained in their tyranny.” Along with the high rate of population growth and displacement, the mortality rate for Women and children are distressingly high. Almost one third of the total deaths occur among children below the age of 5 years; infant mortality is around 65 per thousand live births. And, the severity of malnutrition is exceptionally high. Wallace suggests that unless government abandons “heavy-handed military action” with militants, these “problems, including political violence…come back full circle to politics.” According to the IIS report, awareness of AIDS is particularly low among women from households with low standard of living, Women who are not regularly exposed to any media, and illiterate Women. “Less than one-third (32 percent) of Women in Jammu and Kashmir have even heard of AIDS.” Among Women who have heard of the disease, 46 percent learned from the radio, suggesting that government efforts to promote AIDS

awareness have been marginal. Only 2 percent reported learning about the disease at a public health facility. With only one in four women allowed exposure to mass media in Jammu and Kashmir, AIDS programs will have to find innovative ways of reaching these hard to reach Women. Another feature of the findings is that health centers across the Valley lack basic infrastructures and are not well equipped with the basic facilities to provide health. The majority of health centers does not have their own buildings and are functioning from rented or abandoned buildings, which do not have proper sanitation, water supply, and electricity. The conflict has created a major problem to the general health, and a widespread epidemic threatens all. Since Kashmiris are reluctant to travel for health services, a strong community outreach initiative is needed. Wallace rightly suggests the “dangers involved in repression as well as militant factionalism provide powerful inducements to seek a safer style.”

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49.Crenshaw, Martha. “The logic of terrorism” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Edited by Walter Reich. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998. pp. 8. 50.Crenshaw, Martha. “The logic of terrorism” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Edited by Walter Reich. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998. pp. 9. 51.Crenshaw, Martha. “The logic of terrorism” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Edited by Walter Reich. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998. pp. 9. 52.Crenshaw, Martha. “The logic of terrorism” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Edited by Walter Reich. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998. pp. 13. 53.Crenshaw, Martha. “The logic of terrorism” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Edited by Walter Reich. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998. pp. 13. 54.Crenshaw, Martha. “The logic of terrorism” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Edited by Walter Reich. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998. pp. 13. 55.Crenshaw, Martha. “The logic of terrorism” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Edited by Walter Reich. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998. pp. 10 56. de Jong K, Ford N, van de Kam S, Lokuge K, Fromm S, van Galen R, Reilley B, Kleber R: Conflict in the Indian Kashmir Valley I:Exposure to Violence. Confl Health 2008, 2(1):10. 57. de Jong J, Komproe IH, van Ommeren M, El Masri M, Araya M, Khaled N, Put W van der, Somasundram D: Lifetime events and posttraumatic stress disorder in 4 post conflicts settings. JAMA 2001, 86:555-562. 58. Lopes Cardoso B, Bilukha OO, Gotway Crawford CA, Shaikh I, Wolfe MI, Mitchell I, Gerber ML, Anderson M: Mental health, social functioning, and disability in postwar Afghanistan. JAMA 2004, 292:575-584. 59. Jaswal SKP: Gynaecological and mental health of low-income urban women in India. In PhD thesis London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; 1995. 60.American Psychiatric Association: Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders. In 4th edition Text revised APA, Washington, DC; 2001.

61. Margoob MA, Singh A, Ali Z: A study of suicide attempts in

Kashmir valley over the past six months experience from psychiatric outpatient population. Indian Psychiatric Society North Zone 1997. 62. Tolin DF, Foa EB: Sex Differences in Trauma and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Quantitative Review of 25 Years of Research. Psychological Bulletin 2006, 132:959-992. 63. Creamer M, Burgess P, Pattison P: Cognitive processing in posttrauma reactions. Some preliminary findings. Psychol Med 1990, 20:597-604. 64.Creamer M, Burgess P, Pattison PL: Reaction to trauma: a cognitive processing model. J Abnormal Psychology 1992, 101:452-459. 65. Pino NW, Meier RF: Gender differences in rape reporting. Sex Roles 1999, 40:979-990. 66. Kaufman A, Divasto P, Jackson R, Voorhees D, Christy J: Male rape victims: Non institutionalized assault. Am J sychiatry 1980, 137:221-223. 67. de Jong K, Ford N, van de Kam S, Lokuge K, Fromm S, van Galen R, Reilley B, Kleber R: Conflict in the Indian Kashmir Valley I: Exposure to Violence. Confl Health 2008, 2(1):10. 68. Lopes Cardoso B, Bilukha OO, Gotway Crawford CA, Shaikh I, Wolfe MI, Mitchell I, Gerber ML, Anderson M: Mental health, social functioning, and disability in postwar Afghanistan. JAMA 2004, 292:575-584. 69. Lopes Cardoso B, Bilukha OO, Gotway Crawford CA, Shaikh I, Wolfe MI, Mitchell I, Gerber ML, Anderson M: Mental health, social functioning, and disability in postwar Afghanistan. JAMA 2004, 292:575-584. 70. Jaswal SKP: Gynaecological and mental health of low-income urban women in India. In PhD thesis London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; 1995. 71.American Psychiatric Association: Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders. In 4th edition Text revised APA, Washington, DC; 2001. 72. http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation /1/7/9/4/6/pages179462/isa07_proceeding_179462-11.html 73. http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation /1/7/9/4/6/pages179462/isa07_proceeding_179462-11.html

CHAPTER 2 SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY AND KASHMIRIITES[1] The term social identity is defined, by the eminent British Social Psychologist Tajfel, as; “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.” Tajfel, together with Turner also proposed the Social Identity Theory in the mid-late 1970s. This theory postulates that humans categorize and attach themselves and others into groups as a way of describing peoples’ attributes, including ones’ own, and in doing so it is assumed that humans have a basic need to see themselves positively compared to others. To help categorize, there is also a tendency to exaggerate the perception of intra-group similarities and the perception of inter-group differences. This process of identification with a group serves to provide a sense of security and increases self-esteem, and also helps humans to simplify and make sense of the complex world by organising people into groups. However, by simplifying the

world, there is a natural tendency to stereotype. Thus, it can be said that “stereotypes spring less from malice of the heart than the machinery of the mind.” This answers how and why individuals acquire a social identity. Social Identity Theory goes further to state that group attachment is stronger if an individual lacks a positive personal identity or selfesteem. This leads to increase identification of the individual with, for example, a religious extremist group for a sense of belonging and a stable identity, and thus self-esteem. The black-and-white categorization and notions that these groups tend to provide, also helps the individual make sense of the complex world. The stronger the attachment to a group, the stronger would be the process of stereotyping and group bias, and it is this process which underpins ethnocentrism, and thus, one can begin to see the link between social identity and conflict. An early theory which explores this relationship between social identity and conflict has been expressed by Sumner, a Sociologist and an Anthropologist, in 1906 in his concept of ‘ethnocentrism’ which is a characteristic of all human social groups where; “one’s own group is the centre of everything, and all others are scale and rated with reference to it. … Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones … ethnocentrism leads a people to exaggerate and intensify everything in their own folkways which is peculiar and which differentiates them from others.” But how social categorization and identity actually results in violent conflict requires further elaboration. Many societies exist where there are distinct group identities living harmoniously together, such as the orthodox Jewish community and the fundamentalist Muslim community in North London, despite the Arab-Jewish tensions in the Middle-East. Some other factor must be required in the equation which equals to violent conflict. This is thought to be a threat to one’s own identity or to the existence of the group which one belongs to, which then arouses negative out-group attitudes and antagonisms. This threat can be due to either realistic or subjective factors and in many cases the threat has elements of both. The Human Needs Theory of the Social Psychologist Burton, speculates that humans have basic physical needs, such as food and shelter, but also certain ontological needs such as identity, recognition and security. These needs are themselves not a source of conflict, except for when they are violated or suppressed; where

the denial of social and psychological needs is a more important cause of conflict than physical needs. The pursuit of ethnic identity, for example, justifies violent behaviour and can also be at the expense of life itself. He used the term ‘structural violence’ to describe damaging deprivations, including economic ones, caused by social institutions and policies which, and perhaps deliberately, are discriminatory and suppress human needs. At the political level, the alienation that this causes leads to a low-turn out in electoral processes and the formation of alternative groups with which to identify. However, many societies exist with determinants of conflict or where one’s identity can be threatened, such as poverty, oppression or lack of national identity. Thus, as mentioned, apart from the real threats to identity, there must also be a subjective element to it to arouse conflict. This role is powerfully played by the politics of identity; in the quest for power or to achieve political ends, leaders can manipulate personal experiences, create or exacerbate differences in ethnic, religious or other groups via social discourse to mobilize support and even invoke conflict. Via school and mass media, political rhetoric and symbolism also evokes past injustices and suffering. This exploitation of personal experiences helps identify, bind and mobilize people together into an abstract group. In addition, the exaggerated differences created between different groups, not only helps people make sense of the world, as discussed, but also helps in demonizing the other groups to create ‘enemies’. Needless to say the psychology of this simple categorization is also applicable to leaders themselves, implying that their stereotypes may ‘spring less from malice’.

Social Identity and the Kashmir Conflict Racine, a Social Scientist, argues that the identity factor has marked the political history of South Asia in the last fifty years; with the religious, ethno-linguistic, caste-based and other forms of diversity, the list of categories is never exhaustive and the birth of Pakistan is probably due to the pressure of all these multiple identities. Indeed, the people of the various regions in Kashmir differ vastly in terms of their cultural, ethno-linguistic, religious or other forms of identity resulting in a complex social heterogeneity; the region held by India (IJK) consists of Muslims, Hindus, Buddhist and Sikhs. Not only are these different religious populations further differentiated by caste, sects, ethnicity and language, there is generally no clear geographical boundaries demarcating each group. On the Pakistani side, although nearly all are Muslims, Shias dominate the Northern Areas and Sunnis are the majority in AJK

(Azad Jammu & Kashmir). In addition, the people in the Northern Areas are culturally distinct from each other as well as those in AJK. And although maps tend to depict the Northern Areas as part of Kashmir, there is a growing population in this region, particularly in Gilgit who do not even see themselves as Kashmiri nor Pakistani. This social heterogeneity is reflected in the complex political cleavage constituted by conflicting national identities and state allegiances. In the Indian side there are three such divisions; proIndia, pro-Pakistan and pro-independence for Kashmir and social identity do not necessary correspond to political aspirations, for example, the Muslims of Jammu, who are not Kashmiri-speaking, do not necessary support the demands of independence of Muslims in the valley but support accession and integration with India. ProPakistan and pro-independence allegiances are also present in the Pakistani side, but in the Northern Areas, those who do not identify themselves as Pakistani or Kashmiri are not only demanding independence from both India and Pakistan, but also from the rest of Kashmir, arguing that Gilgit & Baltistan were never part of Kashmir. To add to the complexity many people in Baltistan, together with many in Ladakh, including both Muslims and Buddhists, are also demanding ‘Greater Ladakh’ as a separate entity combing various areas of Ladakh and the Northern Areas. This is because they see themselves as belonging to one ethnic group, and to preserve and express their ethno-cultural identity. As a resident of Baltistan states “..we have no recognition, people don’t know us, if someone asks ‘where are you from?’ and we reply ‘Baltistan’, they respond by asking ‘you mean Balochistan?’ or ‘where is Baltistan?’, even those within Pakistan .. a person can live without clothes but not without identification ..we want to live our lives with an identity.” Similarly many locals also want to see Kashmir as an independent state as a means to show there Kashmiri identity and in Ladakh, the demand for ‘Union Territory’ is also to give Ladakhis a voice and raise their own identity, as Samphel, Congress Party politician, argues also stating that it was the talk of the identity issue which actually led to this demand. Merely from this observable myriad of consciousness of identities and conflicting political allegiances, one can construe a contributing factor to the intractable nature of the Kashmir dispute. With regards to how the threat to identity, by the denial of physical and ontological needs, have contributed to the Kashmir conflict can be potentially traced right back from the Mughal period. However, one can argue, from the theoretical perspective presented above, that it is the modern day policies of state governments that have been largely responsible for the insurgency movement today. The

process of constitutional integration and the demands for abolition of Article 370 to bring IJK on par with other states of India, particularly threatened the security of the Kashmiri identity making them more adamant in retaining their distinct identity. At the same time the suppression of civil liberties in the name of ‘national interest’ and integration, such as the stringent use of preventive detention laws, kept dissent and any challenge to power checked. Unable to express their discontent and with their identity being under threat, the Kashmiri community thus sought political space for expression to assert its identity and to make sure that its dignity was not compromised. The result has been that the dissent shifted to the ‘extra-systemic space’ which took the form of alienation and militancy. A stark example of India’s repression in the current era, which many point to as the trigger for militancy, is the rigged elections in 1987 against the influential Muslim United Front and the arrest of its contenders and supporters en masse. In the Northern Areas, a region which is under direct control by the Government of Pakistan, the denial of voting rights at the National Assembly since partition, together with the imposition of repressive laws such as the Frontier Crime Regulation (1947-74), probably contributed and is contributing to the independence movement there. Research carried out by the Kashmir Study Group revealed that there was a strong sense of alienation among Kashmiri Muslims with both India and Pakistan due to their repressive policies, including economic ones, and lack of interest of the Kashmiri people. Ganguly, a Political Scientist, also attributes the origins of the insurgency to the unparallel developments between the mobilization of people, which was also aided by the mass media, and their need for expression of their discontent and identities. He also highlights the theory of the ethnic ‘security-dilemma’ to explain the origins of violence in Kashmir. If an ethnic group feels threatened, their group-identity will become more significant with increased attachment and in-group identification, leading to greater negative misperceptions of others resulting in hostilities towards them. These hostilities then makes other groups feel threatened, stimulating the same processes and culminating into a cycle of action and reaction. This corresponds to the Social Identity Theory and demonstrates the link between identity and conflict in the region. From an alternate perspective, interestingly, an Indian official stated that by giving Kashmir a ‘special status’ in trying to preserve its identity and restricting non-Kashmiris from moving into Kashmir, India has caused more problems in IJK. Whereas Pakistan has

dispersed the Kashmiri identity by allowing others move into AJK. This view also corresponded with the views of a Pakistani official, who conveyed that in AJK there was not a threat to the Kashmiri identity in terms of its loss of culture. This is thought to be due to the nature of the Kashmiri identity in AJK being different from IJK where in the former, the Kashmiri identity is not so strongly held as in IJK with the religious factor playing a major role in the identity of people in AJK. The other reason is due to integration; open borders which allows Pakistanis and Kashmiris in AJK to move freely and work well together, hence, there are no clash of identities. This also corresponds with the author’s recent findings in the region where Kashmiris in IJK saw there identity as distinct from any other, many adding that its values such as peace-loving, religious and brotherhood, did not match any other people of the world. Most also did not see themselves as Indian and stated that neither did the rest of India see Kashmiris as Indians, and complained of the discrimination they faced when travelling outside of Kashmir. On the other hand, many of the Kashmiris interviewed on the Pakistan side also saw themselves as Pakistanis and stated that people in the rest of Pakistan also accepted them as Pakistanis, this being exemplified by the hospitality they showed to Kashmiris during the October 2005 earthquake. The role identity politics has played in the insurgency movement can said to have its origins during the British period with the rise of Hindu and Muslim nationalistic ideology. The justification for partition also manufactured differences between Muslims and Hindus and is clearly expressed in Jinnah’s Two-Nation Theory rhetoric; “The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religions, philosophies, social customs and literatures. They neither intermarry nor dine together and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects of life and on life are different. .. To yoke together two such nations under a single State, .. must lead to growing discontent and final destruction ..” A more recent water-shed example of the play of leaders being the Ayodhya movement which started mobilizing Hindu public opinion from the mid-1980s, and created a powerful Hindu-Muslim cleavage based on the issue of the Babri mosque. The demolition of this mosque triggered violence between Hindus and Muslims killing 1,700 people, simply to increase the electoral strength of the Bharatiya Janata Party. The repercussions of this tragic event was that it also made the Kashmiris more determined for independence and re-confirmed Jinnah’s Two-Nation Theory in the minds of many

Pakistanis and thus, further intensified the Kashmir conflict. The misperceptions and prejudices carried by these movements are also applicable to leaders themselves where Lamb argues that “propaganda can all too easily turn into dogma believed implicitly by those who carried it in the first place.” This can lead to conflicting diplomatic positions which can be difficult to leave from, as has been in the case over Kashmir. REFERENCES: 1. http://www.kashmirwatch.com/showbiz.php? subaction=showfull&id=1222248365

PART 3: PEACEMAKING CHAPTER 1 RESPONSIBILITY OF A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE IN KASHMIR SUSTAINABLE FUTURE We must recognize that . . . we are one human family and one earth community with a common destiny. We must join together to bring forth a sustainable global society founded on respect for nature, universal human rights, economic justice, and a culture of peace. Towards this end, it is imperative that we, the peoples of the earth, declare our responsibility to one another, to the greater community of life, and to future generations. (Anonymous)

PAK-INDO PEACE TALKS The “patently rigged” 1987 elections – which “conveyed a message that the Kashmiris of the valley simply would not be allowed or trusted to freely exercise their franchise,” especially coming as they did after Farooq’s dismissal in 1984, which had demonstrated the central government’s contempt for constitutional norms – proved incendiary. A Kashmiri movement for democracy began in the valley, including mass demonstrations against rigged elections and affirmations of Kashmiriyat as the cohesive force holding together a multiethnic Kashmiri nation desirous of self-determination. 1987 saw sporadic bursts of violence, riots, and strikes, but “a fundamentally qualitative change in the scope and extent of violence occurred during 1988. … Violence and instability in the valley became endemic in 1988,” with the violence orchestrated and deliberate, the targets carefully chosen, and the aims of militants extending beyond unseating Farooq’s regime (which was voted out of office in December 1989). Bombings, strikes, and demonstrations had become endemic by 1989. However, Kashmiri activists were far from unanimous in their aims. Some wanted a plebiscite so they could join Pakistan, some wanted plebsicite with a “third option” of independence of the entire state as it existed in 1947, some (Hindus and Sikhs of the Jammu region)

considered themselves part of the Indian Union, and some (Buddhist Ladakhs and Shia Muslims of the Kargil area) did not support the protest movement. A government crackdown, including a new bill to curb the press in August 1989, left the valley in a “state of siege.” However, the central state showed its weakness by caving into JKLF demands for the release of several jailed militants in exchange for the release of Rubaiya Sayeed, daughter of the new minister for home affairs, kidnapped in December 1989. This period was also one of growing communal tension within India and a spate of communal violence that began with the police’s firing on a protest among local Muslims at the reopening of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya in February 1986. With Hindu-Muslim violence throughout the state, the army and paramilitary forces were increasingly called upon to maintain law and order, but the governor hinted that Hindus’ safety could not be guaranteed. By early 1990, tens of thousands of Hindus had fled to Jammu. The government passed the draconian Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act in July 1990, giving security forces impunity even to kill, yet the violence continued. A combination of Farooq’s ineffectual governance and Congress’s preoccupation with larger problems (corruption scandals, its shrinking electoral base, the chance of war with Pakistan in 1987, etc.) increased the influence of the MUF. Then, with the success of the Afghan resistance and Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, plus Pakistan’s readiness to divert arms to Kashmir, thousands of recruits started to cross into Azad Kashmir and Pakistan’s North-West Frontier province starting in late 1989 for training. Among the earliest recruits were candidates who had been kept out of the 1987 elections, especially from the MUF. The bulk of the recruits, however, were young, unemployed college graduates. Muslim students blamed Indian rule for their limited prospects, despite the role of corrupt state regimes in siphoning off much of the development aid provided by the Indian government. In 1989, militant groups boycotted the state elections, and “The more the democratic political process lost its meaning, the more a fullscale insurgency came to be unleashed”. By the mid-1990s, the Kashmir valley was largely in control of militant groups. In its first six years, the insurgency killed over 15,000 insurgents, security personnel, hostages, and bystanders, and around 200,000 (mostly Hindu Kashmiris) fled their homes and businesses in valley for Jammu and elsewhere in India. Property damage has been extensive, as well. Despite imposition of official or

unofficial curfews after dusk, human rights violations, kidnappings, and extortion by militants, the abuses, indiscriminate harassment, rapes, and arson of Muslim property by paramilitary forces worked to swing popular opinion toward militant groups and the cause of azadi (sovereignty). Faced with the Gulf War and its economic effects, as well as divisions within the government, the regime of Narasimha Rao (who came to power in June 1991 after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi) could devote limited attention to Kashmir. Nearly 400,000 Indian Army and paramilitary troops (from the Indian Army, Border Security Forces, Central Reserve Police Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, and Rashtriya Rifles) have been deployed in the state, in India’s most substantial counterinsurgency operation to date. Security-related activities have taken up nearly 60 percent of the annual administrative expenses of the state. Counterinsurgency measures have all along included torture of militants and suspected militants to extract information, coerce confessions, or mete punishment. In addition to severe, widespread torture by the military (which has extensive powers and virtual impunity under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act of 1978, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities [Prevention] Act 1987, and other laws), Amnesty International and other human rights groups have reported killings, torture, and hostage-taking by militants. In response, and amid mounting diplomatic pressure, the Indian government permitted a team of international jurists to visit Kashmir in 1993, set up a National Human Rights Commission (though granting it only limited investigative powers), and increased human rights education and efforts to improve the army’s image. Even so, military officers are seldom investigated; any young Muslim man has been likely to be taken as a suspect and arrested, tortured, killed, or disappeared; children frequently cannot attend schools and the standard of education has declined; general lawlessness prevails; militancy has become a way of life for many Kashmiri youths; medical facilities are insufficient; and substantial injuries and deaths have occurred among civilians caught in crossfire. Militant tactics such as attacks on women not wearing burqa in the early days of the insurgency or the kidnapping of civilians (including foreign tourists) also alienated many civilians, even though key militant groups condemned certain such atrocities.

Security forces have battled “at least a dozen major insurgent groups of varying size and ideological orientation, as well as dozens more minor operations”. The most prominent groups are the nominally secular (despite its Muslim leadership and attacks on Hindusin 1989 and 1990), pro-independence Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which seeks unification of and sovereignty for the Pakistan- and India-controlled portions of the state; and the radical Islamic, pro-Pakistan Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) and the similarlyinclined Hizbollah, Harkat-ul-Ansar (with members of Pakistani, Afghani, Lebanese, Egyptian, Algerian, Saudi, Syrian, and Sudanese origin), and Ikhwanul Muslimeen.2 These “fundamentalist” Islamic, irredentist groups demand and Islamic state associated with Pakistan, though they have failed to impose strict customs such as requiring veiling for women. Thirty or so of these militant groups joined in the Kul-Jammat-e-Hurriyat-e-Kashmir (All Kashmir Freedom Front, Hurriyat), seeking a plebiscite on selfdetermination, an Islamic Kashmiri society, and unification with Pakistan while dissociating themselves from militancy. By 1993, the JKLF seemed to have lost military ascendancy to HUM (which got more arms and support from Pakistan), although it still claimed to have 85 percent of the people’s political support, with most Kashmiris preferring sovereignty to joining Pakistan. The JKLF and other groups were torn between working toward a nonviolent political solution or pursuing militant action, as well as rift by personal disagreements and rivalries. Moreover, Indian Muslims outside Kashmir have been reluctant to lend support to the Kashmiri Muslim cause since the state’s withdrawal would encourage anti-Muslim sentiments in India and give the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) a political advantage. The insurgency has sharpened communal differences among Hindus in Jammu, Buddhists in Ladakh, and Muslims in valley, trumping other shared values of Kashmiri nationalism. The Praja Parishad Party has campaigned for devolution of the state into three autonomous regions (Jammu, Ladakh, and Kashmir) and the integration of Jammu with India. The party feels the Hindu region has been discriminated against by the Muslim-dominated state because of cultural and linguistic differences and fears a plebiscite, if held, would favor Pakistan. Ladakh has also campaigned for autonomy through the Ladakh Buddhist Association, founded in 1989. The Indian government had given eight communities in Ladakh scheduled tribe status by 1989, but the region remained restive. While Pakistan has denied playing the role India claims it has in furthering militancy in Kashmir, it has played a critical part. It is

estimated that Pakistan has provided training to several thousand Kashmiri militants, as well as serving as a staging ground, sanctuary, and source of arms and resources for them. In 1993, Pakistani aid to militants (particularly protégés of Pakistan’s Jamaat-I-Islami party rather than secular militias) was estimated at over $3 million per month. That aid was suspended temporarily due to pressure from the US, but then resumed on a smaller scale in 1994. Also, large numbers of both Pakistani and Afghan fighters have joined Kashmiri militant groups, bringing increasingly more sophisticated arms and communications. In particular, emigration of Afghan mujahideen to Kashmir picked up after the collapse of the Najibullah regime in Afghanistan in 1992, with an estimated 1,000 having arrived by 1995. Some joined with HUM and others with pro-Pakistani groups. These fighters tended to be especially vicious in their tactics and strategies, and to show little regard for the local population. India and Pakistan opened bilateral talks in January 1994 after over a year’s hiatus, but these quickly foundered. Pakistan sought to internationalize the Kashmir issue anew by getting a resolution condemning India’s human rights abuses in Kashmir passed at the March 1994 UN Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva. India foiled that attempt, condemning Pakistan, in turn, for training and arming militants. Presidential rule had been extended in February 1992, with no obligation to revert to an elected government. However, Narasimha Rao announced on 15 August 1994 that a political process would be initiated for normalization of affairs in the valley. The government released some top political activists and other detainees and announced plans for a state election. However, prominent Kashmiri leaders, including Hurriyat members (who felt the polls were a façade for the benefit of international critics and lacked confidence that India would really return the rights they had eroded over the years) and Farooq Abdullah (who demanded a return to autonomy qua pre-1953 and a substantial economic package for the state), said they would boycott the polls. Then in October, militants stole and burned the Srinagar electoral rolls. Moreover, institutional roadblocks complicated plans. No census had been conducted in the state in 1991, so electoral constituencies had not been delimited since 1971, plus the civil administrative machinery had virtually collapsed and state-level government employees were too demoralized to be counted on to serve in polling duties. Still, promising to return Kashmir to its

status as of 1975, the government made preparations for elections in December 1995, though Hurriyat still refused to participate. A violent standoff between insurgents and the Indian army at the Charar-e-Sharief shrine near Srinigar in May 1995 set off another round of protests and ended the plans for an election. 1996 brought renewed efforts at normalization, as the government both attempted to suppress or negotiate with militants (not least to create an alternate political base to Hurriyat) and to win the public over with elections. The May 1996 general election (in which Rao was defeated) extended to Kashmir – the first elections held in the state since 1989. Only the BJP, Congress, and independents participated, and the polling took place amid heavy security. The National Conference grudgingly agreed to participate in the state elections, held in September 1996. Farooq Abdullah was reelected as chief minister and the state returned to civilian rule. Turnout was limited, and both Hurriyat and Pakistan dismissed the results. The government also created several counterinsurgency movements ahead of the elections, assembling over 1,000 fighters to try to “liberate” part of the valley from militants. However, political violence continued. The following year marked the fiftieth anniversary of Indian independence. Kashmiri activists used celebrations as chance to demonstrate their defiance against Indian rule, raising Pakistani flags, holding protest rallies, and reiterating demands for a UN-sponsored referendum. A BJP-led coalition government under Atal Behari Vajpayee came to power for the first time in March 1998. The regime declared that all of the former Jammu and Kashmir, including the parts now held by Pakistan, belonged to India. The government also raised public awareness of India’s nuclear program with a series of tests in May 1998, unleashing an immediate, outraged response from the international community. Pakistan announced later that month that it, too, had conducted tests, also prompting international disapproval and sanctions. Once both countries agreed to a moratorium on nuclear testing and committed to signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by September 1999, sanctions were relaxed. The two governments agreed to resume formal talks to ease tensions. These began in late 1998 and included visits and memoranda of understanding. India and Pakistan agreed in the Lahore Declaration of February 1999 to intensify efforts to resolve all issues, including Kashmir, to ease visa restrictions, and not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs, plus to abide by the moratorium on nuclear tests unless extraordinary events warranted their resumption.

However, within a few months, India and Pakistan were again close to war, with severe attacks along the LOC, especially in Kargil district. Pakistani-linked militants took over Indian-occupied defensive positions and India retaliated with aerial bombardments in Kargil in May 1999. Pakistan then shot down several Indian aircraft. These clashes were supplemented by a crackdown on political dissent in the Kashmir valley and curbs on the media both in India and Pakistan (which could not halt a “cyber-war” of propaganda from both sides), and were particularly worrisome given the nuclear threat. Pakistani Prime Minster Nawaz Sharif requested an urgent meeting with US President Clinton in July, then issued the Washington Declaration, saying his government would take “concrete steps” to restore the LOC and requesting the militants to withdraw. Nawaz Sharif was criticized for this diplomatic surrender; he was ousted by Musharraf in a bloodless, domestically-supported coup in October. The Kargil clashes and outcome brought both domestic political criticism and human and financial losses on both sides, also entailing a huge loss to Pakistan’s international credibility. Then, India shot down a Pakistani naval aircraft in August 1999. The violence in Kashmir increased to an average of an estimated seven deaths per day between fall 1999 and summer 2000. India stepped up security, but both sides sought a de-escalation of the conflict. Both the BJP (which ultimately won) and Congress pledged in campaigning for the September 1999 elections that they would reopen talks with Pakistan if elected. Pakistan launched a series of initiatives in 200001 to attempt to curtain arms trading and possession, and both sides attempted (without success) to negotiate ceasefires in 2000. Both Pakistan and India still sought international favor for their positions, as at the September 1999 UN General Assembly session or with Pakistan’s endorsing a call for Clinton to mediate in bilateral talks. Musharraf and Vajpayee held a failed summit at Agra in July 2001. The talks included unofficial discussion of an autonomy package for both India- and Pakistan-controlled areas, returning the state to its pre-1952 status. Pakistan wanted Kashmir formally recognized as the central issue of conflict between the two countries, which India was finally ready to grant. However, India demanded that Pakistan eschew support for violence in return, which Pakistan would not do. India declared both Jammu and the Kashmir valley “disturbed areas” and gave security forces free rein. With the events of 11 September 2001, Pakistan became a key US ally in the war on terrorism. Pakistan broke its links with the Taliban and tried to curb Islamic extremists. However, an attack by Islamic

extremists on India’s parliament on 13 December 2001 (killing fourteen) led India to cancel transport links with Pakistan, recall its ambassador, and send 500,000 troops to the border. In January 2002, under US pressure, Musharraf announced to the Pakistani people that the country would no longer allow its soil to be used for terrorism, then soon arrested almost 2,000 Islamic militants and closed over 300 of their offices. Colin Powell urged India to reciprocate, but fearing that the mujahideen would just relocate to Azad Kashmir, India said its troops would remain through the spring. In response to India’s non-cooperation, in March, Pakistan released most of the militants it had detained. State elections have been scheduled for September 2002 and the government is trying to get talks going with Kashmiri groups to ensure wide participation – but doing so will require making concessions to give citizens hope of more than just a change of leadership. Those who want an independent Kashmir may be as much opposed to Pakistan’s “occupation” of Azad Kashmir as with India’s position in valley, even though Pakistan is officially committed to accept the right of self-determination. Azad Kashmiris are now waiting for their own constitutional position to be finalized and the Northern Areas have never been integrated into Pakistan, either. The JKLF in particular has attempted to foster an independence movement in the latter. The Pakistani government has instituted reforms to satisfy demands for constitutional representation, but has not formally integrated the Northern Areas because doing so would jeopardize Pakistan’s demand for the whole issue to be resolved under the terms of UN resolutions.

INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACTIVISTS International actors have played a role in validating India and Pakistan’s claims to pursuing a “just cause,” mediating between the two states, and censuring abuses by either state, but also in intensifying the conflict. Both India and Pakistan have sought international assistance throughout the conflict, initially from the UN and subsequently also from potential mediators such as the US. However, India has distanced itself from attempts at international mediation since the 1948- 49 UN resolutions. The 1972 Simla agreement with Pakistan allowed India to claim the issue to be just bilateral rather than international. When Pakistan subsequently called for third party mediation to break the deadlock, India refused. International attention and censure has helped to keep human rights abuses and the nuclear threat somewhat in check. American,

British, and European legislators and human rights activists have investigated and lodged complaints, particularly with intensifying international focus on human rights abuses in the 1980s, on the two states’ nuclear capabilities in the 1990s, and on combating (Islamicoriented) terrorism more recently (since that campaign implicates most of the countries with a stake in Kashmir and since Kashmiri insurgents had close ties with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan). However, these critics could do little else, especially with both India and Pakistan implicated, the chance of destabilizing the subcontinent further if a plebiscite were held, and as western business interests gained more of a foothold in the region, making western governments less willing to antagonize India. Western inability to pressure India effectively has been popularly interpreted as a lack of resolve and has added to anti-western feeling, since it seems to demonstrate a double standard with regard to democracy and human rights. Moreover, most Kashmiris probably are dissatisfied with their current image as being part of a transnational, terrorist war of religious zealots. The greater attention given Kashmir by the US amidst the latter’s attacks on Afghanistan may help force a solution. Also, Pakistani support for the insurgency has become more tenuous given Pakistan’s unstable position and renunciation of support for the Taliban, as well as the pressure on Pakistan to crush local militant organizations and cease backing militant groups in Kashmir. While India’s charges of a “foreign hand” that has “hijacked” the cause in Kashmir are probably overstated, it is not just Pakistani support that has exacerbated the conflict. The Indian government claims that militants have come not only from Pakistan and Azad Kashmir, but from Afghanistan and (in smaller numbers) Sudan, Egypt, and Lebanon. Pakistan claims its support is only moral and diplomatic as opposed to material and financial as India alleges. A February 1993 report by the US House of Representatives’ “Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare” stated that Pakistan sponsored and promoted separatism and terrorism especially in Kashmir as a long-term strategy. The 500-mile LOC has remained open, despite efforts to seal it, and international jurists concluded in the 1990s that there were links between groups in Azad Kashmir and operations in Indian-held Kashmir although per the Simla agreement, Pakistan was obliged to discontinue any military assistance.

CONCLUSION The threat of terror-related violence and the factor of fear make the Kashmir dispute potentially “one of the most dangerous disputes in

the world.” Historically, both state and non-state actors have resorted to the same approaches in terrorizing civilian populations, while using different weapons and techniques. However, the psychosocial environment is inextricably linked to politics. Political terrorism is undertaken because persons have a right to defend their home, and supposedly to “alter the behaviors and attitudes of multiple audiences,” whether they are ‘conspiratorial’ or not. In its ends, it is sometimes seen as a “reasonably informed choice among available alternatives” It remains to be seen to what extent India and Pakistan will yield to the dispute. There is gross inadequacy of health and psychosocial services, and negligence. In most of the health centers the abandoned and dilapidated facilities that have been supplied to health professionals are so old that they have either become redundant or are a health risk. Another important aspect of the findings in the studies reviewed is that proper records are not being maintained by the health centers, and health awareness materials are not being duly distributed due to illiteracy, violence and fear. As these and other issues are central both to the contemporary debate on modern political terrorism and to the argument of this paper, Kashmir’s experience is very important in contextualizing political terrorism and deconstructing the milieu of fear. Terror-related violence has left a death toll running into tens of thousands and a population brutalized by fighting and fear. Together with its atmosphere of fear, the Kashmiri militants have created an atmosphere of widespread discontent. In this regard, “the secrecy of planning and the visibility of results” may be illustrative of a more general phenomenon in which individual and population vulnerability to violence has created a veil of terror. Terror-related violence is paradoxical. Terrorism works as a form of “protest leading to reform of underlying conditions;” and, it equally “destroys the infrastructure” of the society involved. In effect, “the nonstate or substate users of terrorism – are constrained in their options by the lack of active mass support and by the superior power arrayed against them.” Just as the Qur’an advocates altruism, and Hobbes synthesizes what humankind is capable of, likewise, these issues are central to the conflict in Kashmir. What appears to one as the logical and

desirable seems to another, as undoubtedly unfair. “Those who make peaceful evolution impossible, make violent revolution inevitable.” The implications of this vexing analysis are that the trajectory of terror-related violence on Kashmir’s psychosocial environment has significant reaches on the mental health of the society.

CHAPTER 2 HOW CAN THIS BE John Connon and W. Harrison Childers

Mothers moaning soft and low Sad to see their children go Off to fight the latest foe How can this be?

A father bows his head and cries As he begins to realize Sons will fight and sons will die How can this be?

We can talk about hatred We can talk about war We can talk about killing While we all keep score We can count all the bodies And count them once more How can this be?

Madly plunging into war Marching to the lies once more Who knows what they’re dying for? How can this be?

It’s the same old trajedy What a hollow legacy No one learns from history

How can this be?

We can talk about hatred We can talk about war We can talk about killing While we all keep score We count them once more How can this be?

Children have to pay the price For debts they do not owe Time and time again they pay The children can’t say no

Grieve for every wounded child Sharpenel, mines, and bombs gone wild Innocence and love defiled How can this be?

Now this madness all must cease The entire world cries out for peace Sing along and share the dream

When will this be? It’s up to you and me.