Judicial Admission

WHAT IS A JUDICIAL ADMISSION? A: A judicial admission is a formal statement made either by a party or his or her attorney, in the course of judicial proceeding which removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. It is a voluntary concession of fact by a party or a party’s attorney during such judicial proceedings including admissions in pleadings made by a party. It may occur at any point during the litigation process. An admission in open court is a judicial admission. A judicial admission binds the client even if made by his counsel. www.tanjutcolaw.com

(Tanjutco Law Office)

Admission made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake (Yu v. Magpayo, 44 SCRA 163). There is no showing in this case of such fact. In another case, the Supreme Court ruled that an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him. All proofs submitted by him contrary thereto and inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether or not objection is interposed (Elayda v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 349). XXXXXX G.R. No. 108028 July 30, 1996 PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. CRISTINA M HERNANDEZ THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE OR WEIGHT TO THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED. 6 ". . . an attorney who is employed to manage a party's conduct of a lawsuit . . . has prima facie authority to make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, . . . which unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive." 24 (Emphasis supplied.) In fact, "judicial admission are frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are made . . . for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, . . . they bind the client, whether made during, or even after, the trial." 25 The foregoing find basis in the general rule that a client is bound by the acts of his counsel who represents him. 26 For all intents and purposes, the acts of a lawyer in the defense of a case are the acts of his client. The rule extends even to the mistakes and negligence committed by the lawyer except only when such mistakes would result in serious injustice to the client. 27 No cogent reason exists to make such exception in this case. It is worth noting that Atty. Ulep, appellant's counsel in the lower court, agreed to the stipulation of facts proposed by the prosecution not out of mistake nor inadvertence, but

obviously because the said stipulation of facts was also in conformity of defense's theory of the case. It may be recalled that In view of the foregoing, the stipulation of facts proposed during trial by prosecution and admitted by defense counsel is tantamount to a judicial admission by the appellant of the facts stipulated on. Controlling, therefore, is Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which provides that: An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

Anent the last assignment of error, suffice it to say that we do not find any compelling reason to reverse the findings of the lower court that appellant's bare denials cannot overthrow the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses against her.

Well established is the rule that denials if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative, self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 38 That she did not merely deny, but likewise raised as an affirmative defense her appointment as mere nominee-president of Philippine-Thai is a futile attempt at exculpating herself and is of no consequence whatsoever when weighed against the positive declarations of witnesses that it was the appellant who executed the acts of illegal recruitment as complained of. 24 25 26 27 38

McCormick on Evidence 2nd Ed. p. 641. 31 C.J.S. 537 People vs. Ravelo, 202 SCRA 655; Ayllon vs. Sevilla, 156 SCRA 257. Villa Rhecar Bus vs. De La Cruz, 157 SCRA 13; De La Cruz vs. C.A., June 29, 1989. People v. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64; People vs. Marti, 193 SCRA 57; People vs. Song, et al., 204 SCRA 135.

XXXXXX Aguenza vs Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. : [G.R. No. 74336. April 7, 1997] "THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN REVERSING AND [SETTING] ASIDE THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE LOAN OF P500,000.00 PROCURED 21 MARCH 1978 BY RESPONDENTS VITALIADO ARRIETA AND LILIA PEREZ IS NOT A CORPORATE LIABILITY OF RESPONDENT INTERTRADE AND THAT PETITIONER IS

NOT LIABLE THEREON UNDER THE 'CONTINUING SURETYSHIP AGREEMENT' DATED 4 MARCH 1977.

THE CONCLUSION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT THAT THE LOAN OF P500,000.00 PROCURED 21 MARCH 1978 BY RESPONDENT VITALIADO ARRIETA AND LILIA PEREZ IS A CORPORATE LIABILITY OF RESPONDENT INTERTRADE AND CONSEQUENTLY RENDERING PETITIONER LIABLE IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AS A SURETY UNDER THE 'CONTINUING SURETYSHIP' OF 4 MARCH 1977, IS GROSSLY ERRONEOUS AND PREMISED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS.

THE CONCLUSIONS AND CONSTRUCTION REACHED BY RESPONDENT COURT FROM THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE OF RECORD, ARE INCORRECT RESULTING IN AN ERRONEOUS DECISION GRAVELY PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF PETITIONER."[5] The petition has merit. The principal reason for respondent appellate court's reversal of the trial court's absolution of petitioner is its finding that the loan made by private respondent Arrieta and Lilia Perez were admitted by Intertrade to be its own obligation. After a careful scrutiny of the records, however, we find and we so rule that there is neither factual nor legal basis for such a finding by respondent Appellate Court. First, the general rule that "the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader"[6] is not an absolute and inflexible rule[7] and is subject to exceptions. Rule 129, Section 4, of the Rules of Evidence, provides: "Section 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made." (Underlining supplied)

In other words, an admission in a pleading on which a party goes to trial may be contradicted by showing that it was made by improvidence or mistake or that no such admission was made, i.e., "not in the sense in which the admission was made to appear or the admission was taken out of context."[8] In the case at bench, we find that the respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in appreciating the "Answer" filed by the lawyer of Intertrade as an admission of corporate liability for the subject loan. A careful study of the responsive pleading filed by Atty. Francisco Pangilinan, counsel for Intertrade,

would reveal that there was neither express nor implied admission of corporate liability warranting the application of the general rule. Thus, the alleged judicial admission may be contradicted and controverted because it was taken out of context and no admission was made at all. [5] Memorandum of Petitioner dated July 15, 1988, pp. 10-11, Rollo, pp.132-133. [6] Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227 [1948]. [7] Gardner v. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 585 [1984], citing Granada v. Philippine National Bank, 18 SCRA 1 [1966]. [8] Evidence of Francisco, 2nd edition [1994], p. 36.

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