Jinnah And Kashmir

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Jinnah and Kashmir The Quaid-e-Azam thanked the National Conference >leadership for the right royal reception given to him but at the same time >said that it was not a reception for his person, but to the All India >Muslim League, the party of ten crore Muslims of India of which he was >President. This annoyed the Hindu leader so much that he left the stage in >distress. > Introduction > >The Quaid-e-Azam is believed to have visited the State of Jammu and Kashmir >at least thrice. According to Mr. Justice Yusuf Saraf, author of "Kashmiris >Fight for Freedom" the Quaid-e-Azam and his wife seemed to have had visited >Kashmir for the first time before 1929. Though this visit was private in >nature, yet as a great Muslim leader he felt concerned at the appalling >conditions of the Kashmiris at that time too. >The second visit of the Quaid-e-Azam was in 1936 during which he hinted to >his first visit, saying that he had visited Kashmir ten years earlier too. >In 1936 the Quaid-e-Azam addressed a meeting held in connection with >Milad-un-Nabi, the birthday of the Holy Prophet (SAW) at the Mujahid >Manzil, Srinagar. The Muslim Conference (at that point of time was led by >Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas and Sheikh Abdullah) in welcome address to Jinnah >appreciated his role as lover of Hindu-Muslim unity. Mr. Jinnah >reciprocated the sentiments and said that the Muslims were in majority in >Kashmir but it was their duty to ensure that the minority community that >is, the Hindus of Kashmir would get justice and fair play at the hands of >the majority community of Kashmir. >Mr. Jinnah, who was once proclaimed as ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity, >had been disillusioned by that time and in his speech regretted that some >of the leaders of the majority community in British India had not been able >to give such an assurance to the Muslim minority. That showed that the >Quaid-e-Azam was not satisfied with the concept of Hindu-Muslim unity in >British India. > >The Muslim Conference, which represented the Muslims of the State 1936, was >converted into National Conference in 1939 as its leaders had come under >the influence of Nehru. Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, who had joined hand with >Sheikh Abdullah in 1939 to found National Conference, realized his mistake >within three years. He returned to the Muslim Conference, which had been >revived by 14 other leaders from Jammu and Kashmir. Soon many others joined >the revived Muslim Conference and once again it became a force to reckon >with. > >The main and the last visit of the Quaid-e-Azam to the State of Jammu and >Kashmir took place in 1944. During this visit he attended a reception by >the National Conference headed by Sheikh Abdullah. Sheikh Abdullah had >thought that with the help of Dogra administration and the active and >crafty Hindus he would suppress the pro-Muslim League elements in the State >and assure Mr. Jinnah that the Kashmiris, Hindus as well as Muslims, were >believers in One Nation Theory of the Congress. A Hindu nationalist Jialal >Kilam presented the address of welcome to the Quaid-e-Azam. > >The Quaid-e-Azam thanked the National Conference leadership for the right >royal reception given to him but at the same time said that it was not a >reception for his person, but to the All India Muslim League, the party of >ten crore Muslims of India of which he was President. This annoyed the >Hindu leader so much that he left the stage in distress. >

> >One Voice With Kashmir > >After the reception of the National Conference, the Quaid-e-Azam moved to >Dalgate, Srinagar where the reception of the Muslim Conference and Kashmir >Muslim Students Union was waiting for him. The Quaid spoke out his heart at >this reception. His clarion call was "Oh ye Muslims, Our Allah is one, our >Prophet (SAW) is one and our Quran is one, therefore, our voice and PARTY >MUST BE ONE". > >In the Muslim Conference annual session at Muslim Park, Jamia Masjid, Mr. >Jinnah was more explicit. He asked the Muslims of Kashmir to beware of the >trap of secularism and nationalism of the Congress brand. > >The Quaid-e-Azam stayed in Kashmir for two months and a week, which showed >his inveterate interest in the affairs of Kashmir and his belief that >Kashmir is a jugular vein of Pakistan. While in Kashmir the Quaid-e-Azam >also remained involved with All India politics. The talks between him and >Mohan Lal Karam Chand Ghandi were initiated by C Rajagopalacharya when >Jinnah was in Kashmir. During his stay in Kashmir the Quaid-e-Azam created >an atmosphere of understanding and support for the Muslim Conference and by >his departure the Whole State was resounding with his slogans and that of >Pakistan. > >The Quaid-e-Azam was a principled constitutionalist and in his meetings he >made it clear that the scheme of partition pertained to British India and >as regards the States some additional formula would have to be envisaged. > >Regarding Srinagar visit of the Quaid-e-Azam in 1944, Alastair Lamb says " >M.A. Jinnah, unlike Jawaharlal Nehru was extremely reluctant at this period >of time to involve himself directly (or the Muslim League which he headed) >in the internal affairs of the Princely State; such action would in his >eyes have been constitutionally improper. (Page 97 Kashmir Disputed >Legacy). > >The Quaid-e-Azam's interest in Kashmir is evident from the fact that he >explained the significance of the name of Pakistan to Mountbatten on 17 May >1947 as follows: > >"The derivation of the word Pakistan – P for Punjab; A for Afghan (i.e. >Pathans NWFP); K for Kashmir; I for nothing because that letter was not in >the word in Urdu; S for Sindh and Tan for the last syllable for >Baluchistan". > >This explanation of the Quaid-e-Azam is contained in the official >publication in the United Kingdom between 1980 and 1993 of the four final >volumes of a selection of British documents relating to the Transfer of >Power in India. > >According to Transfer of Power papers TEX No. 473 the whole word Pakistan, >Liaquat Ali Khan then went on to say, meant "Pure Land". The name Pakistan >it seems was devised by Chaudhry Rehmat Ali in 1933. Since then the K is >the world always bore the same significance: it referred to Kashmir. > >Vital Links >

>The logic behind the partition of the Indian Empire into Muslim and >non-Muslim partition clearly suggested that Kashmir ought to go to >Pakistan. Firstly the state of Jammu and Kashmir was a region with an >overwhelming Muslim majority contiguous to the Muslim majority region of >Punjab, which became part of Pakistan. > >Secondly the economy of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was bound up with >what became Pakistan. Its best communication with the outside world lay >through Pakistan and this was the route taken by the bulk of its exports. > >Third: The waters of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab all of which flowed >through Jammu and Kashmir territory, were essential for the prosperity of >Agriculture life of Pakistan. From a strictly rational point of view, based >on a study of culture and economy of the region, there can be little doubt >that a scheme for the Partition of the Indian subcontinent as was devised >in 1947 should have awarded the greater part of the State of Jammu and >Kashmir to Pakistan. Thus Jammu and Kashmir is undoubtedly Jugular vein of >Pakistan. > >The Indus known in the subcontinent as 'Sindh' is 1800 miles long and is >thus amongst the principal rivers of the world. Rising in western Tibet at >the height of 17000 feet, it cuts across the Laddakh range near Thangra and >continues its northwesterly course between it and Zanskar range for about >300 miles. Zanskar River joins it about 12 miles west of Leh. Before it >enters Hazara, it has already traversed a distance of 812 miles. India has >plans to divert the river at a proper point. > >The river Jhelum has its source in Verinag in southern Kashmir, at a height >of nearly 6000 feet, where it begins in the shape of small stream but by >the time it reaches Baramula town, a distance of 102 miles it assumes the >shape of a big river on account of having joined by its more important >tributaries Sindh and Lidder. The towns of Islamabad, Srinagar, Sopore, >Do-ab-gal, Baramula, Uri and Muzaffarabad are towns at its bank in the >State. The river passes through Woolar Lake where India plans to construct >a barrage, which if completed will starve Pakistan's irrigated Lands. By >the time Jhelum reaches Mangla it has a vertical fall of 4000 feet, which >has been made use of by Pakistan by building a multiple purpose Dam >Project. > >Chanab descends from Lahole in the Chamba range of the Himalayas. It takes >leave of the mountains at Akhnoor in Jammu and Kashmir State. It enters >Pakistan at Khairi Rihal in Gujrat District. > >At Salal, a place 7 miles from Reasi India has constructed a Dam. The Lake >thus formed is being used not only for generation of electricity but also >for irrigation purpose, which would reduce the quantity of water that flows >in Pakistan. In times of War, it can be used to inundate large areas of >Land in Sialkot, Gujranwala and Sheikpura. Parts of its water stands >already diverted at Akhnoor to feed the Ranbir canal, which irrigates large >areas in Jammu, Sambha and Ranbirsinghpura. > >Under the Indus Basin Treaty out of five rivers of the Punjab two rivers >namely Jhelum and Chanab came to Pakistan's shared and three namely Ravi, >Sutlej and Beas went to India's. But all the three Pakistan rivers (Indus >included) either rise in or traverse the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the >agriculture of the Punjab and Sindh to a great extent depends upon the

>melting snows of its mountains. > >The great Mangla Dam, so important to the economy of Pakistan, lies in the >territory, which was once part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. > >The valleys of the major Kashmiri Rivers, now so vital to the economy of >Pakistan also provided until very recently the main lines of communications >between the state and the outside world. The road to Srinagar started at >Rawalpindi and followed the course of the Jhelum into the vale of Kashmir. >The valley of upper Indus gave access to the hill State of Gilgit region. >The Line of the beds of the rivers which created links between the western >part of the Punjab (now Pakistan) and Kashmir also made communications >between eastern part of (India) and Kashmir extremely difficult. The only >road within the State of Jammu and Kashmir, for example, which linked Jammu >(the winter capital of the State) with Srinagar (the Jammu capital) >involves the crossing of Pir Panjal Range by means of Banihal Pass, over >9,000 feet high and snow bound in winter the easiest route between Jammu >and Srinagar lay through west (Pakistan) Punjab by way of Sialkot and >Rawalpindi at the moment of Partition in 1947 > there existed but one road from India to Jammu, by way of Pathankot >(which was again a tehsil of Gurdaspur District, a Muslim majority District >with Pathankot tehsil having marginal Hindu majority); and this was then of >poorest quality and much of it un-surfaced. Thus Kashmir has been described >as the Jugular vein of Pakistan. > >Hindu Intrigues > >Krishna Menon wrote a private letter to Mountbatten on 14 June 1947 warning >him with dire consequences for the future of Anglo-Indian relations, if the >State of Jammu and Kashmir were permitted to go to Pakistan. The gist of >the argument seemed to be that it might be perceived that British policy, >while accepting abandonment of India, was to make Pakistan, strengthened by >accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, into the eastern frontier of a >British sphere of influence in the Middle East. Such development would not >be at all popular in the newly independent India: and it might put at risk >the extensive British interests there. It was essential n Menon's view that >the State of Jammu and Kashmir be brought within the Indian fold. > >According to British Transfer of Power papers, Menon had asked Mountbatten >not to keep this letter; it had however survived among the Mountbatten >papers. > >About the same time Mountbatten requested Nehru to prepare a Note on >Kashmir for him, which Nehru did. Nehru in the Note said: "Kashmir is of >first importance to us because of the great strategic importance of the >frontier state". > >Nehru concluded: "If any attempt is made to put Kashmir into the Pakistan >constituent assembly there is likely to be much trouble because the >National Conference is not in favor of it and the Maharaja's position would >also become difficult. The normal and obvious course appears to be for >Kashmir to join the constituent assembly of India. This will satisfy both >the popular demand and Maharaja's wishes. It is absurd to think that >Pakistan would create trouble, if this happens.". > >Mountbatten disliked the prospect of independence for the State of Jammu

>and Kashmir after the Transfer of Power. While publicly declaring that >Maharaja was perfectly entitled to accede either to Pakistan or India, he >personally favored a solution where Maharaja left the decision to Sheikh >Abdullah's National Conference as Nehru's note suggested, Sheikh Abdullah >would surely opt for India. > >Sheikh Abdullah along with Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas was in prison. So the >first important thing was to get him released. For this Nehru himself was >keen to go to Kashmir. It was with great difficulty that Mountbatten was >able to dissuade him on the ground that Nehru must " really look to his >duty to the Indian people as a whole. There were four hundred million in >India and only four million in Kashmir". It was rather irresponsible of the >future Prime Minister of India, Mountbatten observed, to spend so much time >on what was but one of the many grave problems confronting him. > >Mountbatten himself did visit Srinagar but was unable to persuade the >Maharaja to discuss serious matters. Alastair Lamb has however, interpreted >the record on the discussion as implying that the Maharaja would be well >advised to join India if he entertained any hope of retaining his position >in the State. The Congress would keep him on his throne. Mr. Jinnah and his >Muslim League would make sure that his subjects brought about his >overthrow. > >Jawaharlal Nehru, was however, disappointed that Mountbatten had been >"unable to solve the problem of Kashmir" for he observed, "that the problem >would not be solved until Sheikh Abdullah was released from the prison". It >was eventually agreed that Mohan Das Karam Chand Ghandi should go to >Kashmir in Nehru's place to take up the "question of Sheikh Abdullah" and >Mountbatten wrote to Maharaja to pave the way. > >Incidentally Ghandi's visit was not the only visit to the Maharaja by >leading personalities of Indian side on the eve of the Transfer of Power. >There were Kashmir excursions by Acharya Kriplani, the then President of >Congress and the Sikh rulers of Patila, Kapurthala and Faridkot States of >East Punjab which had decided to accede to India. Kapurthala was of course, >a State with a Muslim majority (at least until the massacre that >accompanied Partition) and a non-Muslim ruler. Jinnah desired to visit >Kashmir but Maharaja did not agree. There is no evidence of consultation >with Jinnah on Kashmir by Mountbatten as record shows with Nehru. > >Mountbatten Bias > >According to official British Transfer of Power papers Mountbatten had told >the Nawab of Bhopal and the Maharaja of Indore on 4 August 1947, the state >of Jammu and Kashmir was so placed geographically that it could join either >dominion, provided part of Gurdaspur District was put into East Punjab by >the Boundary Commission- in other words only by giving Gurdaspur to India, >would the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir be presented with a free chance; to >give Gurdaspur to Pakistan was effectively to guarantee that the State of >Jammu and Kashmir would sooner or later fall to that dominion. > > >The geographic and economic links between Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan >were better than those with India, particularly if in the actual process of >Partition the Gurdaspur District of Punjab with Muslim majority were >awarded to Pakistan. A Pakistani Gurdaspur would mean that direct Indian

>land access to the State (which was by no means ideal even across the >Gurdaspur District) would have to be through Kangra District of Punjab (now >in Himachal) over extremely difficult terrain provided foot hill of the >Himalayas by either direct into Jammu or by way of Pathankot tehsil of >Gurdaspur District (where there was a small Hindus majority) if that tehsil >alone went to India; and all this would involve new roads which would take >considerable time to construct. > >The theory of partition was that all Muslim Majority districts contiguous >to the Muslim core of Punjab would go to Pakistan. In the event, with the >awarding of three out of four tehsils of Gurdaspur District to East Punjab >(that is to say the part of Punjab, which was to be Indian) the accession >to India of the State of Jammu and Kashmir became a practical as opposed to >theoretical, possibility. Because two of these tehsils Batala and >Gurdaspur, were with significant Muslim majorities (only Pathankot tehsil >then had a small Hindu majority) this award seemed to go against the basic >spirit of Partition; and the Gurdaspur decision has consequently been the >subject of a great deal of discussion. Mountbatten has been accused, >particularly in Pakistan, of deliberate intent to favor the interests of >India over these of Pakistan. > >Within Pakistan there has been a persistent consensus both among the elites >and the masses that the Boundary Commission led by Cyril Radcliffe in 1947 >has been responsible for most of the India-Pakistan discords with Kashmir >leading the list. Pakistanis have maintained all along that last minute >changes were made in the Boundary Award under manipulation by Mountbatten >and their associates to suit the Indian geo-strategic imperatives. The >cession of Muslim majority areas in Ferozepur and Gurdaspur areas (in >former eastern Punjab) to India at the last moment have always been >perceived in terms of India's long time designs on Kashmir itself. Even >long after Radcliffe's Award, such question were raised not only in >Pakistani and British press but, as the contemporary classified official >documents reveal, inter-departmental concerns dogged the officials in >British Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office and their High >Commissions in South Asia. In a luncheon meeting arranged by > Mountbatten for Radcliffe and attended by Lord Ismay, a close confidant >of the Viceroy, drastic changes were made in the Boundary Award. Rao Ayer, >the Assistant Secretary to the Commission, the Maharaja of Bikaner and V.P. >Menon played a crucial role in influencing the British official decisions >at this juncture, denying Pakistan Muslim majority areas in Gurdaspur and >Ferozepur Districts Menon, to the knowledge of all, was the trusted >confident of Vallabhai Patel and enjoyed closer access to the viceroy whose >personal antagonism to Jinnah was publicly known. > > >On Menon's being confidant of the both Patel and Mountbatten Chaudhry >Mahamood Ali in his book Emergence of Pakistan, has observed: "If a Muslim >officer had been in V.P. Menon's position was known to maintain contact >with Jinnah, no Viceroy could have tolerated it without laying himself open >to the charge of partisanship; in any case, the Congress would have made it >impossible for such an officer to continue in that position". This has also >been endorsed by Alan Cambell- Johnson in "Mission with Mountbatten". > > >A senior Muslim official himself had seen an early version of the map in >Ismay's office in Delhi, which had shown those areas already within India,

>even before the Award was made public. Radcliffe's Secretary, Christopher >Beaumont, in a detailed expose in February 1992, has further provided first >hand substance to such long-held suspicion. > > >Radcliffe had prepared his Award about the distribution of territories of >the Punjab between India and Pakistan by 8 August 1947 by which tehsils of >Ferozpur and Zira were allotted to Pakistan. This was done on the basis of >population ration – Ferozepur with 55 percent Muslim and Zira with 65 >Percent Muslim, but it was Mountbatten's support for a strong >post-independence India against a weakened Pakistan, which made Mountbatten >to pressurize Radcliffe to give these two tehsils to India so that India >have access to Kashmir. British historian Andrew Roberts comes to believe >that "Mountbatten's action over delaying the announcement of Radcliffe >Award after 9 August indicate of him guilty of the errant folly as well as >dishonesty". He pleads in his book that Mountbatten deserved to be >court-martialled on his return to London". > >Pakistan Day Celebrated In Srinagar > >Many Pakistanis, and not only the leaders like M.A. Jinnah and Liaquat Ali >Khan, once they appreciated the implications of the Award by Radcliffe >Commission of the three eastern tehsils of Gurdaspur District to India, >felt profound sense of betrayal. It was understandable that some of them >should begin to contemplate unorthodox and unofficial course of action. > > >While Poonch formally became an integral part of Jammu and Kashmir State in >1935-36, its Muslim inhabitants (some 380,000 out of a total 420,000) >resented the change and never reconciled themselves to being subjects of >that State an attitude, which was to be of great significance in 1947. >Traditionally the people of Poonch had little indeed to do with their >neighbors in the vale of Kashmir across the Pir Panjal Range, and even less >with Jammu: their links had always been across the Jhelum, particularly in >the Hazara District of NWFP. > > >Large number of men from Poonch (mainly Sudhans from Sudhnuti tehsil) had >served in the British Indian army during the War; and Poonch men (Poonchis) >also constituted the strength of the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces; in >1947 the Jagir of Poonch may have contained as many as 60,000 ex-servicemen >who could provide a formidable nucleus for any resistance to the Maharaja. >In June 1947 there began in Poonch a "no tax" campaign which rapidly >developed into a secessionist movement from the state greatly reinforced >throughout much of Poonch (and in Srinagar as well) when on 14 and 15 >August people tried to celebrate "Pakistan Day" (which coincided with >Kashmir Day which had been observed since 1931) in defiance of Maharaja's >orders by displaying Pakistan flags and holding public demonstrations. >Martial Law was introduced. About two weeks after Transfer of Power there >were major clashes between the State Troops in this case and Poonch crowds >resulting in large number of casualties. > >Standstill Agreement > >On 12 August 1947 the new Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir State, Janak >Singh proposed by telegram a Stand Still Agreement both with Pakistan and

>India. Pakistan agreed on 15 August. India procrastinated, arguing that the >matter needed to be negotiated by an official from the State sent to Delhi. >No such official was dispatched for this purpose- no Standstill Agreement >ever concluded. The Indian response was certainly a departure from the >procedure, which Mountbatten had earlier indicated and it suggested that >Indian policy after Independence was going to set out in hitherto uncharted >waters. > >The Maharaja confronted with growing internal disorder (including a full >scale rebellion into the Poonch region of the State), sought Indian >military help without, if at all possible, surrendering his own >independence. > > >On 25 October 1947, before the Kashmir crisis had fully developed and >before Indian claims based on so-called Maharaja's accession to India >(which is alleged to have had been signed on 26 October 1947) had been >voiced, Nehru in a telegram to Attlee, the British Prime Minister, declared >that: > >"I should like to make it clear that (the) question of aiding Kashmir... is >not designed in any way to influence the State to accede to India. Our >view, which we have repeatedly made public, is that (the) question of >accession in any disputed territory must be decided in accordance with the >wishes of the people, and we adhere to this view". > > >An instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India is alleged to have >been signed by Maharaja on 26 October 1947 and the acceptance of this >Instrument was made by Governor General of India on 27 October 1947. > >Another pair of documents consists of letter from the Maharaja to >Mountbatten dated 26 October, 1947 in which Indian military aid is sought >in return for accession to India (on terms stated in an allegedly enclosed >Instrument) and the appointment of Sheikh Abdullah to head the interim >government of State; and a letter from Mountbatten to the Maharaja dated 27 >October, 1947 acknowledging the above and noting that, once the affairs of >the State have been settled and law and order is restored "the question of >the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people". > >Fake Instrument of Accession > >The recent research based on the material in archives and sources as the >memoirs of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India and Prime Minister >Jammu and Kashmir at that time Mehar Chand Mahajan and the recently >published correspondence of Jawaharlal Nehru and V.P. Menon's account (The >Integration of Indian States) prove beyond any shadow of doubt that these >two documents (a) the Instrument of accession and (b) the letter of the >Maharaja to Mountbatten could not possibly have been signed on 26 October >1947. By that time Maharaja had fled from the capital and during October >26, 1947 he was traveling by road from Srinagar to Jammu. His Prime >Minister, M.C. Mahajan who was negotiating with government of India and >senior Indian official concerned in the State matter V.P. Menon were still >in New Delhi where their presence was noted by many observers. There was no >communication between New Delhi and the traveling maharaja. Menon and >Mahajan set out by air from New Delhi to Jammu at about

> IO A.M. on 27 October and the Maharaja learned from them for the first >time the result of his prime minister's negotiations in New Delhi in the >early afternoon of that date. The earliest possible time and date for their >signature would have been the afternoon of 27 October 1947. > >With regard to exchange of letters between Maharaja and Mountbatten, the >former seeking military aid and the latter acknowledging the same and >promising plebiscite, Alastair lamb says " It seems more than probable, >both were drafted by Government of India before being taken to Jammu on 27 >October 1947 (by V.P. Menon and Jammu and Kashmir Prime Minister M.C. >Maharan whose movements, incidentally, are correctly reported in the London >Times of 28 October, 1947) after the arrival of Indian troops at Srinagar >field. The case is very strong, therefore, that the document i.e. >Maharaja's letter to Mountbatten was dictated to the Maharaja". > >Government of India published two documents namely Maharaja's letter and >Mountbatten's reply on 28 October 1947. But the far more important >document- the alleged Instrument of Ascension was not published until many >years later, if at all. It was not communicated to Pakistan at the outset >of overt Indian intervention in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, nor was it >presented in facsimile to the United Nations in early 1948 as part of >Indian reference to the Security Council. The 1948 White Paper in which >Government of India set out its formal case in respect to the State of >Jammu and Kashmir does not contain the Instrument of Accession as claimed >to have been signed by the Maharaja. Instead, it reproduces an unsigned >form of Accession such as, it is implied, the Maharaja might have signed. > >Alastair Lamb writes: "To date no satisfactory original of this Instrument >as signed by the Maharaja has been produced; though a highly suspect >version, complete with the false date 26 October 1947, has been circulated >by the Indian side since the 1960's. On the present evidence it is by no >means clear that the Maharaja ever did sign an Instrument of Accession. >There are, indeed, grounds for suspecting that he did no such thing". > >Indian Intervention & Pakistan's Response > >Indian official intervention was decided on 26 October 1947 and a massive >airlift was immediately organized to fly two infantry battalions into >Srinagar. Over 100 Dakota transport aircraft were assembled at various >airfields around Delhi. Obviously this airlift had to have been product of >much planning which had been started weeks before. There were surely >contingency plans somewhere in the Indian army. The operation in the State >of Jammu and Kashmir presented grave logistical problems particularly in >winter. Publication of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel correspondence leaves one >in no doubt whatsoever that he and his associates had been involved in >military planning about Kashmir for more than a month before the operation >which could have had hardly escaped the notice of senior British military >officers. > > >On the other hand, when, late on 27 October 1947 the Quaid-e-Azam >instructed Pakistani troops to go into the State of Jammu and Kashmir to >try and restore order he was frustrated by the acting Commander in Chief of >Pakistan Army Lt. Gen. Sir Douglas Gracey. By the same token, it would be >seen that British Commanders on the Indian side adopted Nelsoniasn approach >to Indian preparations for intervention in Kashmir.

> > >Instead of carrying out orders of the Quaid-e-Azam Gracey telephone to the >Supreme Commander Field Marshal Auchinleck in Delhi for instructions. On >this Auchinleck flew to Lahore on 28 October. As a result of Auchinleck's >intervention the Quaid-e-Azam invited Mountbatten and Nehru to Lahore the >next day to discuss Kashmir crisis. The invitation was accepted on >telephone and departure of Mountbatten and Nehru was announced in the >afternoon of the same day but four hours after the acceptance it was also >declared that the trip had been cancelled. This meeting was then fixed for >1 November 1947, which was also not attended by Nehru. Mountbatten, >however, came to Lahore on this appointed date. The Quaid-e-Azam in his >three and a half-hour meeting with Mountbatten argued "that the accession >was not bona fide, since it rested on violence and fraud and would thus >never be accepted by Pakistan". > > >Quaid-e-Azam impressed upon Mountbatten the need for arranging plebiscite >in Kashmir under the joint auspices of Governments of India and Pakistan, a >proposal to which Mountbatten showed agreement just to put before the >Indian cabinet. > > >Next day Mountbatten flew to New Delhi from Lahore and placed the proposal >before the Indian cabinet. Nehru however, planned a different strategy. In >a radio broadcast on 2 November 1947 Nehru declared that the Government of >India " are prepared when peace and order have been established in Kashmir >to have a reference held 'not under arrangements to be made by Government's >of India and Pakistan", (as advised by the Quaid-e-Azam), but "under >international auspices like the United Nations". > > >The full Indian presentation was sent to the United Nations on 31 December >and put before the Security Council the next day. Since then the Kashmir >dispute is on the agenda of the United Nations. The world body has passed >numerous resolutions calling for holding UN supervised plebiscite to let >the people of Jammu and Kashmir decide their destiny. Both India and >Pakistan had accepted the UN resolutions. India's founding father Nehru had >pledged more than once not to go back on it "as a great nation". Pakistan >and people of Jammu and Kashmir State are demanding implementation of these >resolutions, which India claims to have become redundant with the passage >of time. > >Mountbatten's breach of trust and Nehru's devious policy had an adverse >effect on the Quaid-e-Azam's health. At the time of Partition he had been >confident of Kashmir's accession to Pakistan because of its Muslim >population and geographical situation. At a public reception at Lahore the >Quaid-e-Azam said: "We have been victim of a deep-laid and well-planned >plot executed with utter disregard for the elementary principles of >honesty, chivalry and honor". > >Jugular Vein > >In May 1948 the Quaid-e-Azam moved to Ziarat for rest where he remained >under medical treatment of a team of doctors including Dr. Riaz Ali Shah >till his death in September 1948. According to Dr. Riaz Ali Shah's Diary

>(Publishing House, Bull Road publication 1950) the Quaid-e-Azam was stated >to have said, "Kashmir is the Jugular vein of Pakistan and no nation or >country would tolerate its Jugular vein remains under the sword of the >enemy". > > >Not only the Jugular vein of Pakistan but also that of Kashmiri community >in particular has been under the sword of the enemy for the last fifty >years. In fact the people of the Indian occupied Kashmir have been pushed >to the wall to have this realization. Those who supported the States >accession to India or remained indifferent at that time now stand >disillusioned. The people of Kashmir particularly the Muslim majority were >gradually subjected to economic strangulation. In early years India did >pump huge funds for development of the occupied State to show to the world >that rapid economic progress was taking place in the area. Several welfare >schemes were launched including free education from primary and >post-graduate level. This gave temporary satisfaction to both classes of >people namely pro-accession and anti-accession. The former saw in it >vindication of their stance. The latter thanked Pakistan for keeping the >Kashmir issue alive forcing India to siphon more and more money to > Kashmir. > > >Simultaneously with spending funds in the State of Jammu and Kashmir >cultural and economic onslaught was let loose in full swing. Hindi was >introduced in almost all-educational institutions; in some it was >compulsorily taught. Roads and institutions were re-christened after the >name of Indian leaders. Wherever there was resistance from the local >population, the move was temporarily suspended. Islamabad town founded by >Islam Khan, a Subedar of Mughal King in 1640, and known for sulphurous >springs and black fish was re-christened as Anantnag (plenty of springs). >The local population resisted the official change in the town's name. All >shops and private buses plying to and from the town carried Islamabad >signboard. But post Office took pains to correct the mail address to >Anantnag. Local people however, persistently post their letters with >Islamabad address. > > >Indian economic tentacles were spread to the farthest corner of the State >by opening offices of State Bank of India (which is like National Bank of >Pakistan). On the roadside one could see signboards of IFFECO (Indian >farmer's cooperative organization for marketing) and All India handicraft >Board. > > >Economic domination by non-Muslim and non-kashmiris mounted. In 80's in >Srinagar alone 42,000 Muslim families had mortgaged their immovable >property to Indian banks at as high rate as 20 percent interest. The Indian >banks were liberal in advancing loans for non-productive ventures but very >niggardly in case of economically feasible projects. Within years the >borrowers were deprived of their belongings through court decrees. > > >No commercial article reached the consumers without passing through >non-Muslim and non-kashmiri agencies. Export business had been monopolized >by non-Muslims and non-kashmiris. In 80's except for one Muslim firm namely

>Indo-Kashmir Carpet, six other exporters licensed to export carpets from >Kashmir were non-Muslim, non-kashmiri firms. > > >The original industries for which Kashmir was known for namely carpet>manufacturing, fruit cultivation, wood carving, embroidery and paper mache >had gone in quandary. After occupation Indian Government made it a point to >recruit all leading skilled labor as instructors to train persons in >Himachal Pradesh in the same trade. Thus industries like embroidery and >fruit cultivation had gradually centered in Himachal Pradesh. With closure >of short land routes leading to Pakistan after Indian occupation, fresh >fruits of Kashmir could not reach markets. Kashmir type carpets started to >be manufactured in Amritsar (Punjab) and Mirzapur (UP). Wood carving on >Kashmir pattern had been started in Saharanpur (U.P). Himachal, Saharanpur >Mirzapur and Amritsar products elbowed out the Kashmiri products from >market on account of being cheaper because of less transport expenses. >Patterns of Kashmiri artcraft were fed into Indian machines to make >Kashmiri handicrafts uneconomical. > > >Tourism remained the only industry in the field till the resistance >movement was afoot in late 90's. The clientele was largely Hindu from >India. This too posed a cultural threat to Kashmiris. Guides and attendants >would say "Nomaskar" with folded hands lest they should be deprived of >their tips'. In 90's a Muslim guide was asked what was his name, he replied >'X,Y,Z". He did not disclose his name and faith till he found that his >addressed was a Muslim. > > >Even the National Conference elements who supported accession to India in >early years are now disillusioned and repentant in their hearts of heart. >In early 80's a National Conference stalwart admitted: " We had apprehended >that by merger with Pakistan, Kashmir culture would be eroded under Punjab >domination as the Punjabis are of aggressive temperament. But now we feel >that Kashmiri culture was to go anyway and our Islamic character would >undoubtedly have the Hindu impact. But now that the mistake had been done, >its rectification will depend on time and circumstances. " If ballot had >been allowed to have a free play Kashmiris would have kept their separate >identity intact. But that was not so be so. There may be no immediate >reaction on the surface but after fifteen years or so, Kashmir will be a >base for Pakistan provided Pakistan is intrinsically strong at that time", >he said after regaining self-confidence. > > >As the Kashmiris are keen to keep their religion and cultural ethos intact, >the Hindu minority backed by Indian government is equally enthusiast about >not letting the Muslim influence spread in areas where Muslims are not in >majority, say Jammu and Laddakh. Administrative arrangements are often made >at the instance of Indian Government so that Hindu majority areas, even at >district and tehsil level get as much free hand as possible. > > >In recent years Laddakh Hill Council was constituted to give them an >internal autonomy. Hindu Pundits of Kashmir valley also staged a drama of >leaving their hearths and homes to shift to Jammu to give communal color to >the ongoing struggle for the right to self-determination by the people of

>Jammu and Kashmir. > > >Jammu also has been getting more autonomous as compared to the past. There >used to be one Director Education for the entire Jammu and Kashmir State. >Now there are two full-fledged Directors of Education separately in charge >of Jammu and Kashmir with separate funds of equal amount. > >A chairman of Jammu and Kashmir State Public Service Commission had to quit >his job, as he did not oblige to recruit a certain percentage of Hindu >teachers irrespective of their low merit for appointment in State schools. >Sheikh Abdullah had been told by Indian Government that certain percentage >of Hindus had to be taken for recruitment as schoolteachers. When a Muslim >and Kashmiri Chairman was not obliging he was replaced by a Sikh to do the >needful. > >Similarly there was no longer any Director of Health for the State. Instead >there were two Deputy Directors separately in charge of Jammu and Kashmir. >May be the State is ultimately divided into three separate administrative >units- Kashmir, Jammu and Laddakh as Indian Punjab was divided into >Himachal Pradesh, Haryana and Punjab to save Hindu areas from Sikh >domination. > >Even in the Kashmir valley the Muslim police officers are kept debarred >from training in arms handling. The Muslim personnel may be promoted to the >rank of Deputy Superintendent of police but his subordinate Hindu sepoy >would be trained to handle arms while he would remain deficient in this >field. > >Jammu, culturally and linguistically, is more akin to Himachal Pradesh then >to Kashmir valley. The atmosphere of the valley is so different that Hindu >tourists returning from Kashmir start feeling at home as soon as they cross >Banihal tunnel (now named as Jawaharlal tunnel) and similarly Muslims on >entering into Kashmir valley by crossing the tunnel feel a sense of >familiarity. > >In 80's this scribe was stationed at New Delhi as A.P.P. correspondent and >used PTI (Press Trust of India and Indian counterpart of A.P.P) office for >functioning. A friendly PTI Staffer had been seen in office for a week or >so in a summer month. On return he said he had been to a hill station. On >being asked whether he had gone to Kashmir, he candidly stated, "Who would >go to Kashmir? Hatred for us is writ large in the eyes of Kashmiris. >Militancy had not surfaced by that time. > >Autonomy > >Sheikh Abdullah is stated to have had a dream of internal autonomy for >Jammu and Kashmir within India. This unrealistic dream could never come >true and indeed did not. But in the process of dreaming Sheikh Abdullah put >the jugular vein of the entire Kashmiri community under the sword of Hindu >India. He walked out of prison to become the so-called Prime Minister of >Jammu and Kashmir. His honeymoon with Nehru ended soon and he again went to >jail in 1953. And for the rest of his life he had been unsuccessfully >clamoring for pre-1953 status for the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which was >never restored. >Till 1953 a special permission was required for Indians to enter Kashmir.

>Till 1953 accession was considered to be conditional. In 1953 India claimed >the fraudulent accession of Jammu and Kashmir to be final. Till 1953 the >chief executive of Jammu and Kashmir was called Prime Minister and not the >chief minister. > >During his chief minister-ship Sheikh Abdullah did keep senior civil posts >in the state to be held by Kashmiris and projected this as decentralization >policy. But this was more for his personal convenience rather than by >conviction or a matter of policy. Kashmiri bureaucrats obviously desired >not to be transferred outside the State. Thus they were more submissive and >willing to do any dirty job for the chief minister while Indian >Administrative Service officers consulted Delhi before executing any >apparently extraordinary orders from the chief minister. > > >As regards Article 370 of the Indian constitution giving special status to >the State of Jammu and Kashmir, it has been amended so many times that it >has lost the import it was intended for. Autonomy had been consistently >eroding. Earlier this year Hindu nationalist party BJP won parliamentary >polls in India with election promises to do away with whatever was left of >Article 370 for the State of Jammu and Kashmir, repealing personal Law for >Muslims in India, constructing Rama temple in place of Babri Mosque pulled >down by Hindu fanatics seven years back in Ayodhya and making India a >nuclear weapon state. Within 40 days of coming into power of BJP, India >with a series of underground nuclear tests had already become the sixth >nuclear power state in the world with BJP redeeming one of the pledges. > > >Sheikh Abdullah had returned to power in Jammu and Kashmir State in 1976, >of course, without winning anything extra for state subjects or repairing >any damage done to the State's autonomy. His duplicity was more than >exposed. In Jammu and Kashmir he was described at clever and cunning man >and his slogan of State's self-assertion as mere stunt. > >Demographic Changes > >The people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir however, remained one and >determined to resist any attempt to destroy their distinct Muslim entity. >The restrictions imposed by the late Maharaja on granting state subject >certificate to any outsider remained in force on paper but with scant >respect by the powers that be. In early 80's Dr. Mehboob Beg, son of Afzal >Beg who had founded Inquilabi National Conference after falling apart form >Sheikh Abdullah in 1976, alleged that 1500 domicile certificates were >issued over signatures of Sheikh Abdullah chief Minister alone. The number >of the subjects certificates issued at tehsil level was immensely large. >This had upset the ratio of population of Muslims vis a vis non-Muslims. >Corruption was rampant in the state and the entire administration from top >to bottom was involved in it. Dr. Mehboob, physician by profession had left >his job to step into his father's shoes. > > >The Congress (I) circles alleged that Sheikh Abdullah and his family >members were rolling in millions. There was hardly a metropolitan place in >India where Sheikh or his family members did not own real estate, mostly in >form of picture houses. >

> >Through various factors, the complexion of population was changing in the >State to the disadvantage of the Muslims. According to early 80's census >figures the growth rate in Muslim population was dwindling as compared to >Hindus, According to official explanation more Muslims were taking to >family Planning. > >The census (1981) figures were as follows: > > >Kashmir Valley------27 Lac (Including Hindus) >Jammu ---------------- 24 Lac (there is a Muslim belt in Jammu too) >Laddakh---------------3 lac. > > >Thus the population of Kashmir valley was equal to that of Jammu and >Laddakh put together. So the Muslims have only a thin edge majority. > > >While attempts were being made to save as many Hindus from Muslim cultural >influence, an effort was also being made to cut cultural moorings of the >Muslim. Well to do persons particularly upstart families were taking to >western type of education, which in any case take the young generation away >from its cultural heritage. > >New inscription mostly in Hindi were being put on the tombs of old Muslim >saints to say that they had equal followings among Muslims and Hindus in a >bid to appease and attract Hindu tourists and at the same time inculcate >among Muslims a feeling that they had no separate spiritual heritage. A >Muslim Malik teamed up with Hindu Pundits to organize "Charri Mubrarak' and >Amar Nath cave pilgrimage and share the offerings. Hindi was replacing Urdu >in many educational institutions to be taught along with Kashmiri language. >The intention was that with the passage of time Urdu disappears and its >elimination might cause a communication gap between Kashmiris and >Pakistanis. > >Ploy of Resettlement Bill > >A private bill Jammu and Kashmir Grant of Permit for Resettlement >(Permanent Return to the State) Bill 1980 piloted by Abdul Rahim Rathor was >adopted by the Indian occupied Jammu and Kashmir legislature with the >support of the ruling National Conference. This was an enabling provision >to grant for permit for resettlement in the State of any person who had >been a State subject and migrated to the territories now forming Pakistan >(it did not apply to Azad Kashmir) between March 1947 and May 14, 1954. >Ostensibly it was intended to give a deceptive impression to the general >public that there were many Kashmiri Muslims who had migrated to Pakistan >were but now being repentant and dissatisfied with living conditions in >Pakistan and wanted to return to the State, which was still paradise on >Earth. Indeed it was a camouflage in the sense that under its garb the >motive was to give permit of residence to those Hindu migrants from >Pakistan at the time of Independence and from other places in > India subsequently to offset Muslim majority complexion of the state. > > >According to the some Srinagar citizens the real purpose of the bill was to

>distribute the property left by Muslims in Jammu among favorites of Sheikh >Abdullah. The evacuee property had already been given to Hindus and lacks >of rupees were being received by way of rent and the Bill aimed at finally >distributing the booty among the favorites. > > >A provision of the Bill lay down that the applicant for resettlement was to >take an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of India and to undertake to >faithfully observe the laws of the State and India. > > >In early 80's militancy was not visible on surface, yet the youth looked >conscious and determined to fight their own battle. They admitted that >Pakistan had done its outmost for them and had suffered in return. The >people in the valley were on the whole Islam-loving and pro-Pakistan. It >was a privilege to parade as a Pakistani. They love you. Every body would >offer you a cup of tea. You do not have to introduce yourself. Their just >coming to know that you are a Pakistani was enough. Even not very bold >persons would come to whisper in your ear: We know you. We are pleased to >see you here. They did not wait to be introduced or to introduce themselves >and would disappear in the crowd. > > >An attendant in a tourist bungalow said, "We too were very keen on >Pakistan. Probably it was not our luck to be Pakistanis". Love for Islam is >inexhaustible. On occasion of Shab-e-Bara't mosques were full for the >entire night for what they called "Shab" which included Zikar, Naatkhwani >and Waaz. > >In early 80's too there was massive Indian military presence in the State. >But even bus drivers were bold enough to defy military officer's >instructions. The bus driver that drove the scribe and family members from >Srinagar to Jammu ignored the signals of a military sergeant on a bridge >and later talked to him with his head high. > >He probably defied the traffic signal in a bid not to waste time since I >had told him that we were to catch Jhelum Express train the same evening at >Jammu for Delhi. > >In spite of the heavy odds created by landslides on the main road and >diversions, the driver reached Jammu well in time for the train. At Jammu >he saluted me and said "Saab aap ka khadim hen, aap ke kam khadim hen, >Pakistan ke ziada khadim hen" (we are your servants, More of Servants to >Pakistan that to you). > > >The people of Kashmir are engaged in a heroic resistance struggle and have >lain down and continue to lay supreme sacrifices to relieve jugular vein of >Pakistan and that of their own from enemy's sword as willed by the >Quaid-e-Azam. > > >May Almighty Allah bless them with success- Ameen. > >Jinnah and Kashmir The Quaid-e-Azam thanked the National Conference >leadership for the right royal reception given to him but at the same time

>said that it was not a reception for his person, but to the All India >Muslim League, the party of ten crore Muslims of India of which he was >President. This annoyed the Hindu leader so much that he left the stage in >distress. > Introduction > >The Quaid-e-Azam is believed to have visited the State of Jammu and Kashmir >at least thrice. According to Mr. Justice Yusuf Saraf, author of "Kashmiris >Fight for Freedom" the Quaid-e-Azam and his wife seemed to have had visited >Kashmir for the first time before 1929. Though this visit was private in >nature, yet as a great Muslim leader he felt concerned at the appalling >conditions of the Kashmiris at that time too. >The second visit of the Quaid-e-Azam was in 1936 during which he hinted to >his first visit, saying that he had visited Kashmir ten years earlier too. >In 1936 the Quaid-e-Azam addressed a meeting held in connection with >Milad-un-Nabi, the birthday of the Holy Prophet (SAW) at the Mujahid >Manzil, Srinagar. The Muslim Conference (at that point of time was led by >Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas and Sheikh Abdullah) in welcome address to Jinnah >appreciated his role as lover of Hindu-Muslim unity. Mr. Jinnah >reciprocated the sentiments and said that the Muslims were in majority in >Kashmir but it was their duty to ensure that the minority community that >is, the Hindus of Kashmir would get justice and fair play at the hands of >the majority community of Kashmir. >Mr. Jinnah, who was once proclaimed as ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity, >had been disillusioned by that time and in his speech regretted that some >of the leaders of the majority community in British India had not been able >to give such an assurance to the Muslim minority. That showed that the >Quaid-e-Azam was not satisfied with the concept of Hindu-Muslim unity in >British India. > >The Muslim Conference, which represented the Muslims of the State 1936, was >converted into National Conference in 1939 as its leaders had come under >the influence of Nehru. Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, who had joined hand with >Sheikh Abdullah in 1939 to found National Conference, realized his mistake >within three years. He returned to the Muslim Conference, which had been >revived by 14 other leaders from Jammu and Kashmir. Soon many others joined >the revived Muslim Conference and once again it became a force to reckon >with. > >The main and the last visit of the Quaid-e-Azam to the State of Jammu and >Kashmir took place in 1944. During this visit he attended a reception by >the National Conference headed by Sheikh Abdullah. Sheikh Abdullah had >thought that with the help of Dogra administration and the active and >crafty Hindus he would suppress the pro-Muslim League elements in the State >and assure Mr. Jinnah that the Kashmiris, Hindus as well as Muslims, were >believers in One Nation Theory of the Congress. A Hindu nationalist Jialal >Kilam presented the address of welcome to the Quaid-e-Azam. > >The Quaid-e-Azam thanked the National Conference leadership for the right >royal reception given to him but at the same time said that it was not a >reception for his person, but to the All India Muslim League, the party of >ten crore Muslims of India of which he was President. This annoyed the >Hindu leader so much that he left the stage in distress. > > >One Voice With Kashmir

> >After the reception of the National Conference, the Quaid-e-Azam moved to >Dalgate, Srinagar where the reception of the Muslim Conference and Kashmir >Muslim Students Union was waiting for him. The Quaid spoke out his heart at >this reception. His clarion call was "Oh ye Muslims, Our Allah is one, our >Prophet (SAW) is one and our Quran is one, therefore, our voice and PARTY >MUST BE ONE". > >In the Muslim Conference annual session at Muslim Park, Jamia Masjid, Mr. >Jinnah was more explicit. He asked the Muslims of Kashmir to beware of the >trap of secularism and nationalism of the Congress brand. > >The Quaid-e-Azam stayed in Kashmir for two months and a week, which showed >his inveterate interest in the affairs of Kashmir and his belief that >Kashmir is a jugular vein of Pakistan. While in Kashmir the Quaid-e-Azam >also remained involved with All India politics. The talks between him and >Mohan Lal Karam Chand Ghandi were initiated by C Rajagopalacharya when >Jinnah was in Kashmir. During his stay in Kashmir the Quaid-e-Azam created >an atmosphere of understanding and support for the Muslim Conference and by >his departure the Whole State was resounding with his slogans and that of >Pakistan. > >The Quaid-e-Azam was a principled constitutionalist and in his meetings he >made it clear that the scheme of partition pertained to British India and >as regards the States some additional formula would have to be envisaged. > >Regarding Srinagar visit of the Quaid-e-Azam in 1944, Alastair Lamb says " >M.A. Jinnah, unlike Jawaharlal Nehru was extremely reluctant at this period >of time to involve himself directly (or the Muslim League which he headed) >in the internal affairs of the Princely State; such action would in his >eyes have been constitutionally improper. (Page 97 Kashmir Disputed >Legacy). > >The Quaid-e-Azam's interest in Kashmir is evident from the fact that he >explained the significance of the name of Pakistan to Mountbatten on 17 May >1947 as follows: > >"The derivation of the word Pakistan – P for Punjab; A for Afghan (i.e. >Pathans NWFP); K for Kashmir; I for nothing because that letter was not in >the word in Urdu; S for Sindh and Tan for the last syllable for >Baluchistan". > >This explanation of the Quaid-e-Azam is contained in the official >publication in the United Kingdom between 1980 and 1993 of the four final >volumes of a selection of British documents relating to the Transfer of >Power in India. > >According to Transfer of Power papers TEX No. 473 the whole word Pakistan, >Liaquat Ali Khan then went on to say, meant "Pure Land". The name Pakistan >it seems was devised by Chaudhry Rehmat Ali in 1933. Since then the K is >the world always bore the same significance: it referred to Kashmir. > >Vital Links > >The logic behind the partition of the Indian Empire into Muslim and >non-Muslim partition clearly suggested that Kashmir ought to go to

>Pakistan. Firstly the state of Jammu and Kashmir was a region with an >overwhelming Muslim majority contiguous to the Muslim majority region of >Punjab, which became part of Pakistan. > >Secondly the economy of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was bound up with >what became Pakistan. Its best communication with the outside world lay >through Pakistan and this was the route taken by the bulk of its exports. > >Third: The waters of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab all of which flowed >through Jammu and Kashmir territory, were essential for the prosperity of >Agriculture life of Pakistan. From a strictly rational point of view, based >on a study of culture and economy of the region, there can be little doubt >that a scheme for the Partition of the Indian subcontinent as was devised >in 1947 should have awarded the greater part of the State of Jammu and >Kashmir to Pakistan. Thus Jammu and Kashmir is undoubtedly Jugular vein of >Pakistan. > >The Indus known in the subcontinent as 'Sindh' is 1800 miles long and is >thus amongst the principal rivers of the world. Rising in western Tibet at >the height of 17000 feet, it cuts across the Laddakh range near Thangra and >continues its northwesterly course between it and Zanskar range for about >300 miles. Zanskar River joins it about 12 miles west of Leh. Before it >enters Hazara, it has already traversed a distance of 812 miles. India has >plans to divert the river at a proper point. > >The river Jhelum has its source in Verinag in southern Kashmir, at a height >of nearly 6000 feet, where it begins in the shape of small stream but by >the time it reaches Baramula town, a distance of 102 miles it assumes the >shape of a big river on account of having joined by its more important >tributaries Sindh and Lidder. The towns of Islamabad, Srinagar, Sopore, >Do-ab-gal, Baramula, Uri and Muzaffarabad are towns at its bank in the >State. The river passes through Woolar Lake where India plans to construct >a barrage, which if completed will starve Pakistan's irrigated Lands. By >the time Jhelum reaches Mangla it has a vertical fall of 4000 feet, which >has been made use of by Pakistan by building a multiple purpose Dam >Project. > >Chanab descends from Lahole in the Chamba range of the Himalayas. It takes >leave of the mountains at Akhnoor in Jammu and Kashmir State. It enters >Pakistan at Khairi Rihal in Gujrat District. > >At Salal, a place 7 miles from Reasi India has constructed a Dam. The Lake >thus formed is being used not only for generation of electricity but also >for irrigation purpose, which would reduce the quantity of water that flows >in Pakistan. In times of War, it can be used to inundate large areas of >Land in Sialkot, Gujranwala and Sheikpura. Parts of its water stands >already diverted at Akhnoor to feed the Ranbir canal, which irrigates large >areas in Jammu, Sambha and Ranbirsinghpura. > >Under the Indus Basin Treaty out of five rivers of the Punjab two rivers >namely Jhelum and Chanab came to Pakistan's shared and three namely Ravi, >Sutlej and Beas went to India's. But all the three Pakistan rivers (Indus >included) either rise in or traverse the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the >agriculture of the Punjab and Sindh to a great extent depends upon the >melting snows of its mountains. >

>The great Mangla Dam, so important to the economy of Pakistan, lies in the >territory, which was once part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. > >The valleys of the major Kashmiri Rivers, now so vital to the economy of >Pakistan also provided until very recently the main lines of communications >between the state and the outside world. The road to Srinagar started at >Rawalpindi and followed the course of the Jhelum into the vale of Kashmir. >The valley of upper Indus gave access to the hill State of Gilgit region. >The Line of the beds of the rivers which created links between the western >part of the Punjab (now Pakistan) and Kashmir also made communications >between eastern part of (India) and Kashmir extremely difficult. The only >road within the State of Jammu and Kashmir, for example, which linked Jammu >(the winter capital of the State) with Srinagar (the Jammu capital) >involves the crossing of Pir Panjal Range by means of Banihal Pass, over >9,000 feet high and snow bound in winter the easiest route between Jammu >and Srinagar lay through west (Pakistan) Punjab by way of Sialkot and >Rawalpindi at the moment of Partition in 1947 > there existed but one road from India to Jammu, by way of Pathankot >(which was again a tehsil of Gurdaspur District, a Muslim majority District >with Pathankot tehsil having marginal Hindu majority); and this was then of >poorest quality and much of it un-surfaced. Thus Kashmir has been described >as the Jugular vein of Pakistan. > >Hindu Intrigues > >Krishna Menon wrote a private letter to Mountbatten on 14 June 1947 warning >him with dire consequences for the future of Anglo-Indian relations, if the >State of Jammu and Kashmir were permitted to go to Pakistan. The gist of >the argument seemed to be that it might be perceived that British policy, >while accepting abandonment of India, was to make Pakistan, strengthened by >accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, into the eastern frontier of a >British sphere of influence in the Middle East. Such development would not >be at all popular in the newly independent India: and it might put at risk >the extensive British interests there. It was essential n Menon's view that >the State of Jammu and Kashmir be brought within the Indian fold. > >According to British Transfer of Power papers, Menon had asked Mountbatten >not to keep this letter; it had however survived among the Mountbatten >papers. > >About the same time Mountbatten requested Nehru to prepare a Note on >Kashmir for him, which Nehru did. Nehru in the Note said: "Kashmir is of >first importance to us because of the great strategic importance of the >frontier state". > >Nehru concluded: "If any attempt is made to put Kashmir into the Pakistan >constituent assembly there is likely to be much trouble because the >National Conference is not in favor of it and the Maharaja's position would >also become difficult. The normal and obvious course appears to be for >Kashmir to join the constituent assembly of India. This will satisfy both >the popular demand and Maharaja's wishes. It is absurd to think that >Pakistan would create trouble, if this happens.". > >Mountbatten disliked the prospect of independence for the State of Jammu >and Kashmir after the Transfer of Power. While publicly declaring that >Maharaja was perfectly entitled to accede either to Pakistan or India, he

>personally favored a solution where Maharaja left the decision to Sheikh >Abdullah's National Conference as Nehru's note suggested, Sheikh Abdullah >would surely opt for India. > >Sheikh Abdullah along with Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas was in prison. So the >first important thing was to get him released. For this Nehru himself was >keen to go to Kashmir. It was with great difficulty that Mountbatten was >able to dissuade him on the ground that Nehru must " really look to his >duty to the Indian people as a whole. There were four hundred million in >India and only four million in Kashmir". It was rather irresponsible of the >future Prime Minister of India, Mountbatten observed, to spend so much time >on what was but one of the many grave problems confronting him. > >Mountbatten himself did visit Srinagar but was unable to persuade the >Maharaja to discuss serious matters. Alastair Lamb has however, interpreted >the record on the discussion as implying that the Maharaja would be well >advised to join India if he entertained any hope of retaining his position >in the State. The Congress would keep him on his throne. Mr. Jinnah and his >Muslim League would make sure that his subjects brought about his >overthrow. > >Jawaharlal Nehru, was however, disappointed that Mountbatten had been >"unable to solve the problem of Kashmir" for he observed, "that the problem >would not be solved until Sheikh Abdullah was released from the prison". It >was eventually agreed that Mohan Das Karam Chand Ghandi should go to >Kashmir in Nehru's place to take up the "question of Sheikh Abdullah" and >Mountbatten wrote to Maharaja to pave the way. > >Incidentally Ghandi's visit was not the only visit to the Maharaja by >leading personalities of Indian side on the eve of the Transfer of Power. >There were Kashmir excursions by Acharya Kriplani, the then President of >Congress and the Sikh rulers of Patila, Kapurthala and Faridkot States of >East Punjab which had decided to accede to India. Kapurthala was of course, >a State with a Muslim majority (at least until the massacre that >accompanied Partition) and a non-Muslim ruler. Jinnah desired to visit >Kashmir but Maharaja did not agree. There is no evidence of consultation >with Jinnah on Kashmir by Mountbatten as record shows with Nehru. > >Mountbatten Bias > >According to official British Transfer of Power papers Mountbatten had told >the Nawab of Bhopal and the Maharaja of Indore on 4 August 1947, the state >of Jammu and Kashmir was so placed geographically that it could join either >dominion, provided part of Gurdaspur District was put into East Punjab by >the Boundary Commission- in other words only by giving Gurdaspur to India, >would the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir be presented with a free chance; to >give Gurdaspur to Pakistan was effectively to guarantee that the State of >Jammu and Kashmir would sooner or later fall to that dominion. > > >The geographic and economic links between Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan >were better than those with India, particularly if in the actual process of >Partition the Gurdaspur District of Punjab with Muslim majority were >awarded to Pakistan. A Pakistani Gurdaspur would mean that direct Indian >land access to the State (which was by no means ideal even across the

>Gurdaspur District) would have to be through Kangra District of Punjab (now >in Himachal) over extremely difficult terrain provided foot hill of the >Himalayas by either direct into Jammu or by way of Pathankot tehsil of >Gurdaspur District (where there was a small Hindus majority) if that tehsil >alone went to India; and all this would involve new roads which would take >considerable time to construct. > >The theory of partition was that all Muslim Majority districts contiguous >to the Muslim core of Punjab would go to Pakistan. In the event, with the >awarding of three out of four tehsils of Gurdaspur District to East Punjab >(that is to say the part of Punjab, which was to be Indian) the accession >to India of the State of Jammu and Kashmir became a practical as opposed to >theoretical, possibility. Because two of these tehsils Batala and >Gurdaspur, were with significant Muslim majorities (only Pathankot tehsil >then had a small Hindu majority) this award seemed to go against the basic >spirit of Partition; and the Gurdaspur decision has consequently been the >subject of a great deal of discussion. Mountbatten has been accused, >particularly in Pakistan, of deliberate intent to favor the interests of >India over these of Pakistan. > >Within Pakistan there has been a persistent consensus both among the elites >and the masses that the Boundary Commission led by Cyril Radcliffe in 1947 >has been responsible for most of the India-Pakistan discords with Kashmir >leading the list. Pakistanis have maintained all along that last minute >changes were made in the Boundary Award under manipulation by Mountbatten >and their associates to suit the Indian geo-strategic imperatives. The >cession of Muslim majority areas in Ferozepur and Gurdaspur areas (in >former eastern Punjab) to India at the last moment have always been >perceived in terms of India's long time designs on Kashmir itself. Even >long after Radcliffe's Award, such question were raised not only in >Pakistani and British press but, as the contemporary classified official >documents reveal, inter-departmental concerns dogged the officials in >British Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office and their High >Commissions in South Asia. In a luncheon meeting arranged by > Mountbatten for Radcliffe and attended by Lord Ismay, a close confidant >of the Viceroy, drastic changes were made in the Boundary Award. Rao Ayer, >the Assistant Secretary to the Commission, the Maharaja of Bikaner and V.P. >Menon played a crucial role in influencing the British official decisions >at this juncture, denying Pakistan Muslim majority areas in Gurdaspur and >Ferozepur Districts Menon, to the knowledge of all, was the trusted >confident of Vallabhai Patel and enjoyed closer access to the viceroy whose >personal antagonism to Jinnah was publicly known. > > >On Menon's being confidant of the both Patel and Mountbatten Chaudhry >Mahamood Ali in his book Emergence of Pakistan, has observed: "If a Muslim >officer had been in V.P. Menon's position was known to maintain contact >with Jinnah, no Viceroy could have tolerated it without laying himself open >to the charge of partisanship; in any case, the Congress would have made it >impossible for such an officer to continue in that position". This has also >been endorsed by Alan Cambell- Johnson in "Mission with Mountbatten". > > >A senior Muslim official himself had seen an early version of the map in >Ismay's office in Delhi, which had shown those areas already within India, >even before the Award was made public. Radcliffe's Secretary, Christopher

>Beaumont, in a detailed expose in February 1992, has further provided first >hand substance to such long-held suspicion. > > >Radcliffe had prepared his Award about the distribution of territories of >the Punjab between India and Pakistan by 8 August 1947 by which tehsils of >Ferozpur and Zira were allotted to Pakistan. This was done on the basis of >population ration – Ferozepur with 55 percent Muslim and Zira with 65 >Percent Muslim, but it was Mountbatten's support for a strong >post-independence India against a weakened Pakistan, which made Mountbatten >to pressurize Radcliffe to give these two tehsils to India so that India >have access to Kashmir. British historian Andrew Roberts comes to believe >that "Mountbatten's action over delaying the announcement of Radcliffe >Award after 9 August indicate of him guilty of the errant folly as well as >dishonesty". He pleads in his book that Mountbatten deserved to be >court-martialled on his return to London". > >Pakistan Day Celebrated In Srinagar > >Many Pakistanis, and not only the leaders like M.A. Jinnah and Liaquat Ali >Khan, once they appreciated the implications of the Award by Radcliffe >Commission of the three eastern tehsils of Gurdaspur District to India, >felt profound sense of betrayal. It was understandable that some of them >should begin to contemplate unorthodox and unofficial course of action. > > >While Poonch formally became an integral part of Jammu and Kashmir State in >1935-36, its Muslim inhabitants (some 380,000 out of a total 420,000) >resented the change and never reconciled themselves to being subjects of >that State an attitude, which was to be of great significance in 1947. >Traditionally the people of Poonch had little indeed to do with their >neighbors in the vale of Kashmir across the Pir Panjal Range, and even less >with Jammu: their links had always been across the Jhelum, particularly in >the Hazara District of NWFP. > > >Large number of men from Poonch (mainly Sudhans from Sudhnuti tehsil) had >served in the British Indian army during the War; and Poonch men (Poonchis) >also constituted the strength of the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces; in >1947 the Jagir of Poonch may have contained as many as 60,000 ex-servicemen >who could provide a formidable nucleus for any resistance to the Maharaja. >In June 1947 there began in Poonch a "no tax" campaign which rapidly >developed into a secessionist movement from the state greatly reinforced >throughout much of Poonch (and in Srinagar as well) when on 14 and 15 >August people tried to celebrate "Pakistan Day" (which coincided with >Kashmir Day which had been observed since 1931) in defiance of Maharaja's >orders by displaying Pakistan flags and holding public demonstrations. >Martial Law was introduced. About two weeks after Transfer of Power there >were major clashes between the State Troops in this case and Poonch crowds >resulting in large number of casualties. > >Standstill Agreement > >On 12 August 1947 the new Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir State, Janak >Singh proposed by telegram a Stand Still Agreement both with Pakistan and >India. Pakistan agreed on 15 August. India procrastinated, arguing that the

>matter needed to be negotiated by an official from the State sent to Delhi. >No such official was dispatched for this purpose- no Standstill Agreement >ever concluded. The Indian response was certainly a departure from the >procedure, which Mountbatten had earlier indicated and it suggested that >Indian policy after Independence was going to set out in hitherto uncharted >waters. > >The Maharaja confronted with growing internal disorder (including a full >scale rebellion into the Poonch region of the State), sought Indian >military help without, if at all possible, surrendering his own >independence. > > >On 25 October 1947, before the Kashmir crisis had fully developed and >before Indian claims based on so-called Maharaja's accession to India >(which is alleged to have had been signed on 26 October 1947) had been >voiced, Nehru in a telegram to Attlee, the British Prime Minister, declared >that: > >"I should like to make it clear that (the) question of aiding Kashmir... is >not designed in any way to influence the State to accede to India. Our >view, which we have repeatedly made public, is that (the) question of >accession in any disputed territory must be decided in accordance with the >wishes of the people, and we adhere to this view". > > >An instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India is alleged to have >been signed by Maharaja on 26 October 1947 and the acceptance of this >Instrument was made by Governor General of India on 27 October 1947. > >Another pair of documents consists of letter from the Maharaja to >Mountbatten dated 26 October, 1947 in which Indian military aid is sought >in return for accession to India (on terms stated in an allegedly enclosed >Instrument) and the appointment of Sheikh Abdullah to head the interim >government of State; and a letter from Mountbatten to the Maharaja dated 27 >October, 1947 acknowledging the above and noting that, once the affairs of >the State have been settled and law and order is restored "the question of >the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people". > >Fake Instrument of Accession > >The recent research based on the material in archives and sources as the >memoirs of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India and Prime Minister >Jammu and Kashmir at that time Mehar Chand Mahajan and the recently >published correspondence of Jawaharlal Nehru and V.P. Menon's account (The >Integration of Indian States) prove beyond any shadow of doubt that these >two documents (a) the Instrument of accession and (b) the letter of the >Maharaja to Mountbatten could not possibly have been signed on 26 October >1947. By that time Maharaja had fled from the capital and during October >26, 1947 he was traveling by road from Srinagar to Jammu. His Prime >Minister, M.C. Mahajan who was negotiating with government of India and >senior Indian official concerned in the State matter V.P. Menon were still >in New Delhi where their presence was noted by many observers. There was no >communication between New Delhi and the traveling maharaja. Menon and >Mahajan set out by air from New Delhi to Jammu at about > IO A.M. on 27 October and the Maharaja learned from them for the first

>time the result of his prime minister's negotiations in New Delhi in the >early afternoon of that date. The earliest possible time and date for their >signature would have been the afternoon of 27 October 1947. > >With regard to exchange of letters between Maharaja and Mountbatten, the >former seeking military aid and the latter acknowledging the same and >promising plebiscite, Alastair lamb says " It seems more than probable, >both were drafted by Government of India before being taken to Jammu on 27 >October 1947 (by V.P. Menon and Jammu and Kashmir Prime Minister M.C. >Maharan whose movements, incidentally, are correctly reported in the London >Times of 28 October, 1947) after the arrival of Indian troops at Srinagar >field. The case is very strong, therefore, that the document i.e. >Maharaja's letter to Mountbatten was dictated to the Maharaja". > >Government of India published two documents namely Maharaja's letter and >Mountbatten's reply on 28 October 1947. But the far more important >document- the alleged Instrument of Ascension was not published until many >years later, if at all. It was not communicated to Pakistan at the outset >of overt Indian intervention in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, nor was it >presented in facsimile to the United Nations in early 1948 as part of >Indian reference to the Security Council. The 1948 White Paper in which >Government of India set out its formal case in respect to the State of >Jammu and Kashmir does not contain the Instrument of Accession as claimed >to have been signed by the Maharaja. Instead, it reproduces an unsigned >form of Accession such as, it is implied, the Maharaja might have signed. > >Alastair Lamb writes: "To date no satisfactory original of this Instrument >as signed by the Maharaja has been produced; though a highly suspect >version, complete with the false date 26 October 1947, has been circulated >by the Indian side since the 1960's. On the present evidence it is by no >means clear that the Maharaja ever did sign an Instrument of Accession. >There are, indeed, grounds for suspecting that he did no such thing". > >Indian Intervention & Pakistan's Response > >Indian official intervention was decided on 26 October 1947 and a massive >airlift was immediately organized to fly two infantry battalions into >Srinagar. Over 100 Dakota transport aircraft were assembled at various >airfields around Delhi. Obviously this airlift had to have been product of >much planning which had been started weeks before. There were surely >contingency plans somewhere in the Indian army. The operation in the State >of Jammu and Kashmir presented grave logistical problems particularly in >winter. Publication of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel correspondence leaves one >in no doubt whatsoever that he and his associates had been involved in >military planning about Kashmir for more than a month before the operation >which could have had hardly escaped the notice of senior British military >officers. > > >On the other hand, when, late on 27 October 1947 the Quaid-e-Azam >instructed Pakistani troops to go into the State of Jammu and Kashmir to >try and restore order he was frustrated by the acting Commander in Chief of >Pakistan Army Lt. Gen. Sir Douglas Gracey. By the same token, it would be >seen that British Commanders on the Indian side adopted Nelsoniasn approach >to Indian preparations for intervention in Kashmir. >

> >Instead of carrying out orders of the Quaid-e-Azam Gracey telephone to the >Supreme Commander Field Marshal Auchinleck in Delhi for instructions. On >this Auchinleck flew to Lahore on 28 October. As a result of Auchinleck's >intervention the Quaid-e-Azam invited Mountbatten and Nehru to Lahore the >next day to discuss Kashmir crisis. The invitation was accepted on >telephone and departure of Mountbatten and Nehru was announced in the >afternoon of the same day but four hours after the acceptance it was also >declared that the trip had been cancelled. This meeting was then fixed for >1 November 1947, which was also not attended by Nehru. Mountbatten, >however, came to Lahore on this appointed date. The Quaid-e-Azam in his >three and a half-hour meeting with Mountbatten argued "that the accession >was not bona fide, since it rested on violence and fraud and would thus >never be accepted by Pakistan". > > >Quaid-e-Azam impressed upon Mountbatten the need for arranging plebiscite >in Kashmir under the joint auspices of Governments of India and Pakistan, a >proposal to which Mountbatten showed agreement just to put before the >Indian cabinet. > > >Next day Mountbatten flew to New Delhi from Lahore and placed the proposal >before the Indian cabinet. Nehru however, planned a different strategy. In >a radio broadcast on 2 November 1947 Nehru declared that the Government of >India " are prepared when peace and order have been established in Kashmir >to have a reference held 'not under arrangements to be made by Government's >of India and Pakistan", (as advised by the Quaid-e-Azam), but "under >international auspices like the United Nations". > > >The full Indian presentation was sent to the United Nations on 31 December >and put before the Security Council the next day. Since then the Kashmir >dispute is on the agenda of the United Nations. The world body has passed >numerous resolutions calling for holding UN supervised plebiscite to let >the people of Jammu and Kashmir decide their destiny. Both India and >Pakistan had accepted the UN resolutions. India's founding father Nehru had >pledged more than once not to go back on it "as a great nation". Pakistan >and people of Jammu and Kashmir State are demanding implementation of these >resolutions, which India claims to have become redundant with the passage >of time. > >Mountbatten's breach of trust and Nehru's devious policy had an adverse >effect on the Quaid-e-Azam's health. At the time of Partition he had been >confident of Kashmir's accession to Pakistan because of its Muslim >population and geographical situation. At a public reception at Lahore the >Quaid-e-Azam said: "We have been victim of a deep-laid and well-planned >plot executed with utter disregard for the elementary principles of >honesty, chivalry and honor". > >Jugular Vein > >In May 1948 the Quaid-e-Azam moved to Ziarat for rest where he remained >under medical treatment of a team of doctors including Dr. Riaz Ali Shah >till his death in September 1948. According to Dr. Riaz Ali Shah's Diary >(Publishing House, Bull Road publication 1950) the Quaid-e-Azam was stated

>to have said, "Kashmir is the Jugular vein of Pakistan and no nation or >country would tolerate its Jugular vein remains under the sword of the >enemy". > > >Not only the Jugular vein of Pakistan but also that of Kashmiri community >in particular has been under the sword of the enemy for the last fifty >years. In fact the people of the Indian occupied Kashmir have been pushed >to the wall to have this realization. Those who supported the States >accession to India or remained indifferent at that time now stand >disillusioned. The people of Kashmir particularly the Muslim majority were >gradually subjected to economic strangulation. In early years India did >pump huge funds for development of the occupied State to show to the world >that rapid economic progress was taking place in the area. Several welfare >schemes were launched including free education from primary and >post-graduate level. This gave temporary satisfaction to both classes of >people namely pro-accession and anti-accession. The former saw in it >vindication of their stance. The latter thanked Pakistan for keeping the >Kashmir issue alive forcing India to siphon more and more money to > Kashmir. > > >Simultaneously with spending funds in the State of Jammu and Kashmir >cultural and economic onslaught was let loose in full swing. Hindi was >introduced in almost all-educational institutions; in some it was >compulsorily taught. Roads and institutions were re-christened after the >name of Indian leaders. Wherever there was resistance from the local >population, the move was temporarily suspended. Islamabad town founded by >Islam Khan, a Subedar of Mughal King in 1640, and known for sulphurous >springs and black fish was re-christened as Anantnag (plenty of springs). >The local population resisted the official change in the town's name. All >shops and private buses plying to and from the town carried Islamabad >signboard. But post Office took pains to correct the mail address to >Anantnag. Local people however, persistently post their letters with >Islamabad address. > > >Indian economic tentacles were spread to the farthest corner of the State >by opening offices of State Bank of India (which is like National Bank of >Pakistan). On the roadside one could see signboards of IFFECO (Indian >farmer's cooperative organization for marketing) and All India handicraft >Board. > > >Economic domination by non-Muslim and non-kashmiris mounted. In 80's in >Srinagar alone 42,000 Muslim families had mortgaged their immovable >property to Indian banks at as high rate as 20 percent interest. The Indian >banks were liberal in advancing loans for non-productive ventures but very >niggardly in case of economically feasible projects. Within years the >borrowers were deprived of their belongings through court decrees. > > >No commercial article reached the consumers without passing through >non-Muslim and non-kashmiri agencies. Export business had been monopolized >by non-Muslims and non-kashmiris. In 80's except for one Muslim firm namely >Indo-Kashmir Carpet, six other exporters licensed to export carpets from

>Kashmir were non-Muslim, non-kashmiri firms. > > >The original industries for which Kashmir was known for namely carpet>manufacturing, fruit cultivation, wood carving, embroidery and paper mache >had gone in quandary. After occupation Indian Government made it a point to >recruit all leading skilled labor as instructors to train persons in >Himachal Pradesh in the same trade. Thus industries like embroidery and >fruit cultivation had gradually centered in Himachal Pradesh. With closure >of short land routes leading to Pakistan after Indian occupation, fresh >fruits of Kashmir could not reach markets. Kashmir type carpets started to >be manufactured in Amritsar (Punjab) and Mirzapur (UP). Wood carving on >Kashmir pattern had been started in Saharanpur (U.P). Himachal, Saharanpur >Mirzapur and Amritsar products elbowed out the Kashmiri products from >market on account of being cheaper because of less transport expenses. >Patterns of Kashmiri artcraft were fed into Indian machines to make >Kashmiri handicrafts uneconomical. > > >Tourism remained the only industry in the field till the resistance >movement was afoot in late 90's. The clientele was largely Hindu from >India. This too posed a cultural threat to Kashmiris. Guides and attendants >would say "Nomaskar" with folded hands lest they should be deprived of >their tips'. In 90's a Muslim guide was asked what was his name, he replied >'X,Y,Z". He did not disclose his name and faith till he found that his >addressed was a Muslim. > > >Even the National Conference elements who supported accession to India in >early years are now disillusioned and repentant in their hearts of heart. >In early 80's a National Conference stalwart admitted: " We had apprehended >that by merger with Pakistan, Kashmir culture would be eroded under Punjab >domination as the Punjabis are of aggressive temperament. But now we feel >that Kashmiri culture was to go anyway and our Islamic character would >undoubtedly have the Hindu impact. But now that the mistake had been done, >its rectification will depend on time and circumstances. " If ballot had >been allowed to have a free play Kashmiris would have kept their separate >identity intact. But that was not so be so. There may be no immediate >reaction on the surface but after fifteen years or so, Kashmir will be a >base for Pakistan provided Pakistan is intrinsically strong at that time", >he said after regaining self-confidence. > > >As the Kashmiris are keen to keep their religion and cultural ethos intact, >the Hindu minority backed by Indian government is equally enthusiast about >not letting the Muslim influence spread in areas where Muslims are not in >majority, say Jammu and Laddakh. Administrative arrangements are often made >at the instance of Indian Government so that Hindu majority areas, even at >district and tehsil level get as much free hand as possible. > > >In recent years Laddakh Hill Council was constituted to give them an >internal autonomy. Hindu Pundits of Kashmir valley also staged a drama of >leaving their hearths and homes to shift to Jammu to give communal color to >the ongoing struggle for the right to self-determination by the people of >Jammu and Kashmir.

> > >Jammu also has been getting more autonomous as compared to the past. There >used to be one Director Education for the entire Jammu and Kashmir State. >Now there are two full-fledged Directors of Education separately in charge >of Jammu and Kashmir with separate funds of equal amount. > >A chairman of Jammu and Kashmir State Public Service Commission had to quit >his job, as he did not oblige to recruit a certain percentage of Hindu >teachers irrespective of their low merit for appointment in State schools. >Sheikh Abdullah had been told by Indian Government that certain percentage >of Hindus had to be taken for recruitment as schoolteachers. When a Muslim >and Kashmiri Chairman was not obliging he was replaced by a Sikh to do the >needful. > >Similarly there was no longer any Director of Health for the State. Instead >there were two Deputy Directors separately in charge of Jammu and Kashmir. >May be the State is ultimately divided into three separate administrative >units- Kashmir, Jammu and Laddakh as Indian Punjab was divided into >Himachal Pradesh, Haryana and Punjab to save Hindu areas from Sikh >domination. > >Even in the Kashmir valley the Muslim police officers are kept debarred >from training in arms handling. The Muslim personnel may be promoted to the >rank of Deputy Superintendent of police but his subordinate Hindu sepoy >would be trained to handle arms while he would remain deficient in this >field. > >Jammu, culturally and linguistically, is more akin to Himachal Pradesh then >to Kashmir valley. The atmosphere of the valley is so different that Hindu >tourists returning from Kashmir start feeling at home as soon as they cross >Banihal tunnel (now named as Jawaharlal tunnel) and similarly Muslims on >entering into Kashmir valley by crossing the tunnel feel a sense of >familiarity. > >In 80's this scribe was stationed at New Delhi as A.P.P. correspondent and >used PTI (Press Trust of India and Indian counterpart of A.P.P) office for >functioning. A friendly PTI Staffer had been seen in office for a week or >so in a summer month. On return he said he had been to a hill station. On >being asked whether he had gone to Kashmir, he candidly stated, "Who would >go to Kashmir? Hatred for us is writ large in the eyes of Kashmiris. >Militancy had not surfaced by that time. > >Autonomy > >Sheikh Abdullah is stated to have had a dream of internal autonomy for >Jammu and Kashmir within India. This unrealistic dream could never come >true and indeed did not. But in the process of dreaming Sheikh Abdullah put >the jugular vein of the entire Kashmiri community under the sword of Hindu >India. He walked out of prison to become the so-called Prime Minister of >Jammu and Kashmir. His honeymoon with Nehru ended soon and he again went to >jail in 1953. And for the rest of his life he had been unsuccessfully >clamoring for pre-1953 status for the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which was >never restored. >Till 1953 a special permission was required for Indians to enter Kashmir. >Till 1953 accession was considered to be conditional. In 1953 India claimed

>the fraudulent accession of Jammu and Kashmir to be final. Till 1953 the >chief executive of Jammu and Kashmir was called Prime Minister and not the >chief minister. > >During his chief minister-ship Sheikh Abdullah did keep senior civil posts >in the state to be held by Kashmiris and projected this as decentralization >policy. But this was more for his personal convenience rather than by >conviction or a matter of policy. Kashmiri bureaucrats obviously desired >not to be transferred outside the State. Thus they were more submissive and >willing to do any dirty job for the chief minister while Indian >Administrative Service officers consulted Delhi before executing any >apparently extraordinary orders from the chief minister. > > >As regards Article 370 of the Indian constitution giving special status to >the State of Jammu and Kashmir, it has been amended so many times that it >has lost the import it was intended for. Autonomy had been consistently >eroding. Earlier this year Hindu nationalist party BJP won parliamentary >polls in India with election promises to do away with whatever was left of >Article 370 for the State of Jammu and Kashmir, repealing personal Law for >Muslims in India, constructing Rama temple in place of Babri Mosque pulled >down by Hindu fanatics seven years back in Ayodhya and making India a >nuclear weapon state. Within 40 days of coming into power of BJP, India >with a series of underground nuclear tests had already become the sixth >nuclear power state in the world with BJP redeeming one of the pledges. > > >Sheikh Abdullah had returned to power in Jammu and Kashmir State in 1976, >of course, without winning anything extra for state subjects or repairing >any damage done to the State's autonomy. His duplicity was more than >exposed. In Jammu and Kashmir he was described at clever and cunning man >and his slogan of State's self-assertion as mere stunt. > >Demographic Changes > >The people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir however, remained one and >determined to resist any attempt to destroy their distinct Muslim entity. >The restrictions imposed by the late Maharaja on granting state subject >certificate to any outsider remained in force on paper but with scant >respect by the powers that be. In early 80's Dr. Mehboob Beg, son of Afzal >Beg who had founded Inquilabi National Conference after falling apart form >Sheikh Abdullah in 1976, alleged that 1500 domicile certificates were >issued over signatures of Sheikh Abdullah chief Minister alone. The number >of the subjects certificates issued at tehsil level was immensely large. >This had upset the ratio of population of Muslims vis a vis non-Muslims. >Corruption was rampant in the state and the entire administration from top >to bottom was involved in it. Dr. Mehboob, physician by profession had left >his job to step into his father's shoes. > > >The Congress (I) circles alleged that Sheikh Abdullah and his family >members were rolling in millions. There was hardly a metropolitan place in >India where Sheikh or his family members did not own real estate, mostly in >form of picture houses. > >

>Through various factors, the complexion of population was changing in the >State to the disadvantage of the Muslims. According to early 80's census >figures the growth rate in Muslim population was dwindling as compared to >Hindus, According to official explanation more Muslims were taking to >family Planning. > >The census (1981) figures were as follows: > > >Kashmir Valley------27 Lac (Including Hindus) >Jammu ---------------- 24 Lac (there is a Muslim belt in Jammu too) >Laddakh---------------3 lac. > > >Thus the population of Kashmir valley was equal to that of Jammu and >Laddakh put together. So the Muslims have only a thin edge majority. > > >While attempts were being made to save as many Hindus from Muslim cultural >influence, an effort was also being made to cut cultural moorings of the >Muslim. Well to do persons particularly upstart families were taking to >western type of education, which in any case take the young generation away >from its cultural heritage. > >New inscription mostly in Hindi were being put on the tombs of old Muslim >saints to say that they had equal followings among Muslims and Hindus in a >bid to appease and attract Hindu tourists and at the same time inculcate >among Muslims a feeling that they had no separate spiritual heritage. A >Muslim Malik teamed up with Hindu Pundits to organize "Charri Mubrarak' and >Amar Nath cave pilgrimage and share the offerings. Hindi was replacing Urdu >in many educational institutions to be taught along with Kashmiri language. >The intention was that with the passage of time Urdu disappears and its >elimination might cause a communication gap between Kashmiris and >Pakistanis. > >Ploy of Resettlement Bill > >A private bill Jammu and Kashmir Grant of Permit for Resettlement >(Permanent Return to the State) Bill 1980 piloted by Abdul Rahim Rathor was >adopted by the Indian occupied Jammu and Kashmir legislature with the >support of the ruling National Conference. This was an enabling provision >to grant for permit for resettlement in the State of any person who had >been a State subject and migrated to the territories now forming Pakistan >(it did not apply to Azad Kashmir) between March 1947 and May 14, 1954. >Ostensibly it was intended to give a deceptive impression to the general >public that there were many Kashmiri Muslims who had migrated to Pakistan >were but now being repentant and dissatisfied with living conditions in >Pakistan and wanted to return to the State, which was still paradise on >Earth. Indeed it was a camouflage in the sense that under its garb the >motive was to give permit of residence to those Hindu migrants from >Pakistan at the time of Independence and from other places in > India subsequently to offset Muslim majority complexion of the state. > > >According to the some Srinagar citizens the real purpose of the bill was to

>distribute the property left by Muslims in Jammu among favorites of Sheikh >Abdull

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