Japan Counterplan

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp INDEX 1NC shell

2-4

Solvency – General

5-11

Humanitarian Solvency

12

AT: No solvency – no mil aid

13

Iraq Solvency

14

AT: Checkbook Diplomacy

15

AT: Security Council

16-18

AT: Article 9

19-22

US not suited

23

Japanese wants Leadership

24-26

Inc Leadership

27-28

Japan is a leader

19-31

Net Benefit – Security

32-33

AT: Perm

34 -35

Cp Inc soft power

36

Article 9

37-30

No Solvency

41-43

No Solvency – no flexibility

44

Perm

45-48

Checkbook diplomacy

49

AFF

1

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp – Shell 1/3 Text: The Government of Japan, including relevant agencies, should establish a foreign policy substantially increasing its support of United Nations peacekeeping operations by [insert the Affirmative mandates]. Funding and enforcement are guaranteed. Observation 1 – competition A. Net Benefit – The counterplan does not link to Japan DA or a trade-off DA (such as AIDs trade-off) Observations 2 – Solvency 1. Japan has been successful in peacekeeping missions, but also has increased the quality of the missions The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan – 2000 (“UN Peacekeeping Operations”) http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pamph2000/pko.html To date, Japan has also made contributions in kind. For example, Japan provided refugee relief materials such as tents and blankets to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) working for Kosovar refugees and East Timorese displaced persons in 1999. In the same year, Japan also provided the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) with radios for public information purposes in support of the direct ballot in August 1999.In addition to these field activities, Japan takes an active part in discussions in the United Nations to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. Japan, for example, has been serving as vice-chair for the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the principal UN forum undertaking a comprehensive review of the questions related to peacekeeping operations. With regard to the issue of the safety of peacekeepers, Japan strongly maintained that necessary measures should be taken for significant improvement, and Japan's initiative resulted in the adoption in 1994 of the "Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel," which Japan was the second to ratify. Japan has been actively urging other countries which have not yet done so to become a party to the convention. Japan will continue to cooperate with UN peacekeeping activities not only by participating in actual operations but also by actively engaging in discussions for further improvement of these operations

2

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp – Shell 2/3 2. Japan is capable of a greater role with PKOs for several reasons Bhubhindar – Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic - 2002 (Singh “Japan's post-Cold War security policy: Bringing back the normal state” Contemporary Southeast Asia pg 82) Permanent UN Security Council Seat and Peacekeeping Operations Japan has stepped up efforts in its bid for a permanent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) seat.58 The Japanese Government believes that it is both ready and has the capacity to assume greater global responsibilities through the United Nations, particularly the Security Council. To the Japanese, the bid is justified on several grounds. First, Tokyo is the second-largest financial contributor to the regular UN budget and to the UNPKO budget.59 Japan provides approximately 20.6 per cent of the UN budget, second only to the United States, exceeding the combined contributions of four permanent members of the UNSC (excluding the United States).60 Secondly, the bid is supported by Japan's increased participation in UNPKO, following the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992.61 The key development was Tokyo's deployment of 1,800 troops to Cambodia as part of an UN-sponsored peacekeeping force in 1992.62 Following that experience, Japan conducted successful peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations in Mozambique in 1993, Zaire in 1994, and the Golan Heights in 1996.63 More recently, the Diet passed a revision to the peacekeeping co-operation law, which would allow peacekeeping forces to engage in such activities as monitoring compliance with ceasefire agreements and disposing of surrendered weapons. The amendment also relaxes restrictions on the use of weapons by SDF personnel to virtually protect troops of other countries in the event of an attack.64 Thirdly, Japan's bid for a permanent UNSC seat is also supported by its strong support in promoting international disarmament and non-proliferation while firmly keeping to its three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into its territory.65

3

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp – Shell 3/3 3. The overburdened United States PKOs want the Japan to take a greater role in peacekeeping operations Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003 (Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg 107). On the human resource side of the ledger, during the debate in the aftermath of the deaths of Nakata and Takata, William Perry, US Deputy Secretary of Defense, spoke in Tokyo on the need for Japan to exercise leadership in global issues and that the Cambodian operation was a useful step in the right direction. The desire on the part of the US to see Japan playing an active role at times led to exasperation at the soul-searching and debate within Japan. The Yomiuri Shinbun reported one US State Department source as stating that it hoped that Japan would take a greater burden for US troops stationed within Japan, and in the field of PKOs would make more of a human contribution, even to peace enforcement operations, as the majority of US citizens were believed to have no objection to the despatch of Japanese troops abroad (Yomiuri Shinbun, 7 May 1993). According to a Yomiuri Shinbun opinion poll of April 1993 support for Japan’s participation in PKOs among the Western nations reached a mean of 70 per cent (with France at 73 per cent, the US at 71 per cent, the UK at 69 per cent and Germany at 68 per cent—a higher proportion than in Japan itself, polled at 59 per cent support). This showed a steady increase from a poll conducted in 1992 before the UNTAC operation that estimated support among the West as being 66 per cent in the US and 54 per cent in Japan (Yomiuri Shinbun, 30 April 1993).

4

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE

Japan Cp General Solvency 1/7 Japan is the leader of Asia, who can successfully lead peacekeeping missions. Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003 (Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg 3). In the case of justifying the study of Japan, most scholars are quick to cite the rapid development and economic growth of Japan since the Second World War. However, this task has been undertaken ad nauseum in the literature pertaining to Japan—outlining Japan’s remarkable levels of gross national product (GNP), status as the largest creditor nation and so on—and need not be repeated here. This is very much an upshot of the shock the West received with Japan’s development into an economic superpower from the 1960s and the vast amounts of wealth that accumulated thereafter in Tokyo during the bubble period of the 1980s. As Williams has stated, ‘in a way true of no Asian nation since the vigorous prime of the Ottoman Empire, Japan looms large today in the practical affairs and speculative cares of the contemporary Westerner’ (Williams 1996: xii–xiii). However, despite this attention, the Japanese experience of government, security and foreign policy has singularly failed to enter into the West’s consciousness and it is not so widely expounded why Japan matters. After having justified the reasons for concentrating on PKOs in the post-Cold War period, it is now necessary to shed light on the salience of Japan’s experience, both generally in the field of security and foreign policy, and specifically in the sub-field of peacekeeping. Japan will provide a new perspective on peacekeeping different from the West Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003 (Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg 4). There is an obvious gap in the literature addressing and evaluating sufficiently the contribution Japan can make to PKOs as a nation having renounced its right to belligerency, in addition to the influence the UN and the practice of peacekeeping can exert in the promotion of Japan’s role in international society. As will be demonstrated throughout this book, the Japanese experience of security in terms of its Peace Constitution and the respect accorded to both societal and international organizations, especially the UN, provides us with new ways in which to think about attitudes towards, and the influence of, peacekeeping, as well as the way we think about foreign policy-making and the role of state and non-state actors in this process. It will become apparent in the following chapters that state and non-state actors within and outside of Japan have sought to limit Japan’s peacekeeping role with reference to traditionally anti-militarist ideals and values, whereas the UN has played a crucial role in justifying the Japanese government’s evolving peacekeeping role, and ultimately its incremental, military role. Thus, by studying the debates in Japan surrounding peacekeeping, this book will shed light on Western ways of thinking about international relations and unearth new centers of power, in line with the contention that ‘one should study Japan to understand the totality of human experience.

5

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp Solvency 2/7 Japan reorganized its government to increase its role in the world, including a successful operation in Cambodia. Bhubhindar – Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic - 2002 (Singh “Japan's post-Cold War security policy: Bringing back the normal state” Contemporary Southeast Asia pg 82) Following the Gulf War, the security dimension in Japanese foreign policy gained prominence. In response to the emergence of new external threats, Japan adjusted its security policy to allow for greater participation in the international security environment. It did so in particular ways. First, in 1992, Tokyo enacted the International Peace Co-operation Law, which allowed Japan to play a more active security role through greater participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO). The passing of this Law led to the successful deployment of 1,800 Japanese troops to Cambodia as part of a UNsponsored peacekeeping force in 1992.5 Secondly, Tokyo reformulated the National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) in 1995 - the first time since 1976. That reformulation emphasized Japan taking a greater role in UNPKOs, and the SelfDefence Force (SDF) addressing lowintensity threats such as terrorism.6 Thirdly, in 1996, the Japanese Government agreed to enter into talks with the United States to revitalize the U.S.-Japan alliance to make it more relevant to the postCold War environment. In the new U.S.-Japan Joint Security Declaration, both countries outlined an agenda for a greater role for Japan in expanded defence co-operation, including defence planning, research and development, missile defence, and diplomacy towards China.7

6

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp Solvency 3/7 Japan realizes that it needs to be involved in the worldwide effort in peacekeeping Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003 (Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg 147). Thus, he began to advocate participation in the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) effort in Somalia and ONUMOZ in Mozambique. Kakizawa stressed, unlike Mitsuzuka, not the need to demonstrate what Japan can and cannot do but rather: help dispel the suspicion at home that the passage of the PKO Bill last year was engineered in a hasty, politically-motivated move to send SDF personnel abroad with only Cambodia in mind. The truth is that the International Peace Co-operation Law is an instrument of co-operation for UN peacekeeping operations everywhere in the world and not one of serving Japan’s interests in our part of the world alone. (The Japan Times, 16 February 1993) The position of the new coalition government of Hosokawa was highly supportive of a more active role in PKOs with Hata Tsutomu, as Foreign Minister, stressing the effort that Japan must produce in order to realize peace in international society, ‘we must be determined to sweat and do our utmost to bring about a peaceful world’ (The Japan Times, 11 August 1993). When considered alongside Hosokawa’s speech to the General Assembly (mentioned earlier), which quoted the famed Japanese inter-war internationalist Niitobe Inazō, this demonstrates the administration’s commitment to international society and its standards of behaviour (The Japan Times, 29 September 1993). Furthermore (as mentioned in Chapter 5), the Hosokawa government sanctioned for the first time in two decades the advisory report The Modality of the Security and Defence Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century. This report stressed a new direction for Japan’s foreign and security policy: Japan wants to participate in PKOs, and is accepted worldwide Kohno - Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies – 1999 (Masaharu, “In Search of Proactive Diplomacy: Increasing Japan's International Role in the 1990s” CNAPS Working Paper) Amid these trends, the Japanese commitment to an expanded diplomatic role is irreversible. Proactive engagement through peace making efforts and peace keeping operations are widely supported by the Japanese public in general terms and well understood by the international community as a whole. Nationalistic sentiment prevailing among Japanese will prove to be a temporary phenomenon as was the case in the early 1990s. A series of economic stimulus packages together with structural reforms of the banking system are expected to bear fruit in the not-so-distant future. Those elements will all positively promote proactive diplomacy

7

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan cp Solvency 4/7 Japan’s past successes make it the perfect candidate to lead further peacekeeping operations The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan – 2000 (“UN Peacekeeping Operations”) http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pamph2000/pko.html Japan, as a responsible member of the international community, has been strenuously working for the maintenance of peace and security. Accordingly, participation in UN peacekeeping operations is today placed as one of Japan's important areas of cooperation for international peace and security. Japan's first substantial participation in a UN peacekeeping operation was in 1989, when 27 electoral observers were dispatched to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. Then in 1992, the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law enabled Japan to send not only its civilian personnel but also its Self-Defense Forces personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. Based on that law, Japan participated in peacekeeping operations in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador and East Timor, and since 1996 has been dispatching a Self-Defense Forces contingent to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), which is deployed on the Golan Heights. Japan's Self-Defense Forces personnel were also sent to assist Rwandan refugees and East Timorese displaced persons as part of international humanitarian relief operations. Japan also cooperated in international election monitoring activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were conducted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1998 and 2000. Iraq shows the greater involvement of Japan in Peacekeeping operations Economist – 2004 (May 6th “Not so nice” http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2656985) Unsurprisingly, the other area in which Japan finishes last is security. It does, after all, have a pacifist constitution. Yet Japan's Self Defence Forces began participating in peacekeeping missions, such as to Cambodia and East Timor, in the 1990s. The index recognizes that such missions tend to help the poor, but makes the assumption that only those approved by the United Nations or other international bodies are helpful. All of Japan's peacekeeping missions have been UN-approved; but since it has contributed few troops relative to its size and military budget, they do not count for much in the index. Japan's decision to send non-combat forces to Iraq earlier this year, after a UN appeal for general assistance, may lift it up the security rankings next time. Many Japanese pacifists regard the deployment as an unholy departure from Japan's traditional way of dealing with the world. Yet on at least one measure, sending soldiers to Iraq was one of the few gestures their country has made which could be seen as comparatively generous.

8

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp Solvency 5/7

Akashi - U.N. undersecretary general for humanitarian affairs, head of the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia – 2000 (Yasushi, Yomiuri Shimbun “Japan Should Expand Peacekeeping Role” http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/japan.htm) Because Japan needs a more visible role that would work towards the creation of global peace and stability and would result in an honorable place for Japan in the international community, it should concentrate its resources and efforts in peacekeeping. The blue helmets/berets have become one of the most recognizable symbols of the United Nations, and have accorded to many of the wearers, respect and a good reputation.22 In conjunction with the constraints upon Japanese participation in such operations, niche diplomacy would advocate the concentration of resources in a specific area of peacekeeping, namely a supplemental role. By "supplemental" it is meant those tasks that require the personnel to be in the area of conflict and under the command of the UN, hence acting as members of the blue helmets. However, a supplemental role does not necessarily mean on the front lines where there is a higher risk of having to resort to force. Such tasks include, for example, election monitoring, acting as civilian police units, infrastructure construction (both for the communities and the UN personnel), transporting goods and personnel and providing medical relief. Such roles are allowable under the International Peace Cooperation Law but more importantly, are agreeable to the Japanese public. In 1995, the Japanese Prime Minister’s office conducted an opinion poll on diplomacy that found that seventy percent of citizens supported peacekeeping.23 Given that Japan is a newcomer to this field and lacks the historical tradition of peacekeeping that Canada has, such a support level is respectable.

9

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp Solvency 6/7 Japan has been successful in peacekeeping operations in various countries Kaneda - a former Vice Admiral in Japan's Self-Defense Forces – 2004 (Hideaki. “How Military Should Japan Be?” http://216.239.39.104/search?q=cache: Q 35gLAJQQEJ:www.project-syndicate.org/commentaries/commentary_text.php4%3Fid %3D1558%26lang%3D1%26m%3Dseries+%22Japan%22+%22peacekeeping%22&hl=e The world will not achieve the Millennium Development Goals without Japan's technological prowess and its focus on “human security”. Just ask the people of the dozens of African countries what a difference Japan has made in promoting health, education and environmental protection there. We need Japan to remain involved in the Organization's political, peacekeeping and human rights work. Just ask the people of Tajikistan, Cambodia, East Timor, Mozambique and Rwanda, for example, how much they appreciate your efforts to help them emerge from conflict and re-build stable, functioning states. And consider how much Japan has done for Afghanistan – organizing a successful pledging conference two years ago here in Tokyo, and I was privileged to attend that conference, and continuing to play a leading role in the country's reconstruction. Since 1992 Japan has been involved in many different peacekeeping operations Richardson - Deputy Director for Intelligence at Headquarters, US Forces, Japan -2000 (David J. “US-Japan Defense Cooperation: Possibilities for Regional Stability” Parameters. http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00summer/richards.htm) Japan has supported a variety of international efforts under the auspices of the UN since 1992. This support has included Japanese assistance in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, and the Golan Heights. The range of functional support has varied in size and complexity. The focus in Angola, Mozambique, and El Salvador was on monitoring elections. Japanese support in 1992-93 to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia included monitoring the cease-fire and storage of collected weapons, advising and training police, construction of roads and bridges, logistical support, and election monitoring. Japanese support to Cambodia involved civilians, members of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, and civilian police, which amounted to a total participation of approximately 1,330 personnel. In another example of Japanese involvement with United Nations overseas operations, Japan has deployed personnel to the Golan Heights in support of the UN Disengagement Observer Force since February 1996. Approximately 50 SelfDefense Force personnel are engaged there in transportation and storage of supplies, road repair, and maintenance of heavy equipment. Personnel are also involved in planning, coordination, and liaison.[24]

10

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp Solvency 7/7 Japan has already made valuable contributions to peace in various parts of the world Auer -Director, Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies – 1997 (James E. “U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE RELATIONS” The Okazaki Institute http://www.vanderbilt.edu/VIPPS/VIPPSUSJ/publications/ought%20to%20%20be.htm.) Within these constraints, Japan has done much. Your country is second only to the U.S. in financial contributions to UN peacekeeping, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars each year. Japan has also actively participated in peacekeeping or humanitarian relief operations in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, and currently in the Golan Heights. The tragic death of the Japanese police officer in Cambodia highlighted the risk that peacekeepers take, but it is important to remember that his sacrifice contributed to the safety and stability of an entire nation long traumatized by war. Around the world, men and women from many UN member states have also made the ultimate sacrifice for the sake of humanity's shared responsibilities. Japan has made very valuable contributions to international peace. The issue is not whether Japan is doing enough, but can it do more?

11

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp Humanitarian solvency 1/1 Japan has participated in humanitarian peacekeeping operations in Rwanda Richardson - Deputy Director for Intelligence at Headquarters, US Forces, Japan -2000 (David J. “US-Japan Defense Cooperation: Possibilities for Regional Stability” Parameters. http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00summer/richards.htm) Humanitarian and disaster relief operations are an area of potential bilateral cooperation which could render significant benefits in the future. The International Relief Cooperation Assignments for Rwandan Refugees represents a missed opportunity for bilateral US-Japan cooperation of this type. Japan responded to a request by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees by sending a Self-Defense Force contingent to Goma, Zaire, from September to December 1994. The contingent was 423 members strong, and supported UN efforts through medical assistance to refugees, water purification, logistical support, liaison, and coordination.[26] Complications arose in attempts to coordinate US airlift to support the Japanese deployment. Ultimately, Japan turned to a contractual arrangement with Russia to support its airlift requirements to Goma. That Japan would have to secure its airlift from a country other than the United States, which routinely stages cargo aircraft from bases in Japan, is very odd. This peculiarity is compounded by the fact that the United States had been involved in supporting operations in Zaire since 1991. From September to October 1991 the United States staged Operation Quick Lift, which provided airlift to transport French and Belgian troops and equipment in support of noncombatant evacuation operations in Zaire. Additionally, the United States engaged in Operation Support Hope in July 1994, providing humanitarian relief and support operations for Rwandan refugees. The ease with which the United States was able to support NATO allies with air-lift reflects the efficacy of NATO's acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA). Conversely, the Rwandan relief operation helped underscore the absence of such an agreement between the United States and Japan, and its potential value in facilitating efficient responses to requirements of this nature.[27]

12

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp AT: No Solvency – no military aid 1/1 Japan can provide all type of aid; just not military aid Japan Economic Insitute Report – 1999 (Barbara Wanner. “SECURITY CHALLENGES HIGHLIGHT COALITION POLICY DISCORD” http://www.jei.org/Archive/JEIR99/9946w4.html) Mr. Obuchi's offer no doubt disappointed Mr. Annan, especially in view of Japan’s participation in the operationally similar 1992-93 U.N. peacekeeping mission in Cambodia but also because of its continued detailing of SDF members to the U.N.'s presence in the Golan Heights. The sevenyear-old peacekeeping support law — a response to the international criticism directed at Tokyo for its perceived too-little-too-late support for the multinational forces fighting in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War — does indeed authorize SDF participation in UNTAET-type missions, if only in logistical, medical or humanitarian support capacities.

13

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp Iraq Solvency 1/1 Japan is perfect country to help to rebuild Iraq because they have sent in peacekeeping operations Gozaimashita - Secretary-General of Japan - 2004 (Arigato. The Secretary-General's Address to the Japanese Parliament www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=789 - 26k) In short, there will be formidable challenges ahead – but they will not be insurmountable if Iraq is supported by a united international community. Japan is among those countries that have taken the lead in embracing this challenge. You have responded to the appeals of the UN Security Council, and shown commendable solidarity with Iraq's plight. You are a member of the “friends of Iraq” grouping that I have just established in New York. You have pledged to contribute generously to reconstruction. And after a difficult debate, you have dispatched the Self-Defence Forces to Samawah to help with reconstruction and humanitarian assistance.

14

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp AT: Checkbook diplomacy 1/1 The Gulf War showed the Japanese that they needed to be involved in directly with PKO instead of financially to stay a world power Mulgan – Professor of International Relations at the University of New South Wales – 1996 (Aurelia George. “International Peacekeeping and Japan's Response to the Challenge of Collective Security” http://www.pol.adfa.edu.au/resources/int_peacekeeping.pdf) The emphasis on financial support in Japan's international contributions continued until the Gulf War, when its reluctance to undertake military support operations to assist the multinational forces10 became a contentious issue in the bilateral relationship with the United States, which put considerable pressure on Japan for engagement beyond mere financial contributions. The lesson learned from the war [Gulf War] was that Japan risked exclusion from the league of 'big players' in world affairs by continuing to substitute international financial contributions for more direct forms of contribution to international security, including human or physical contributions. The Japanese government scrambled to pass legislation establishing a U.N. Peace Cooperation Corps to provide logistic back-up for the multinational forces in the Gulf, only to be defeated by concerted political opposition in the Diet. After the hostilities had ended, it did, however, manage to construct a firm legal and political foundation for the dispatch of Japanese minesweepers to the Persian Gulf.11 This was the first time that SDF activity was described as a contribution to the international community and specifically a contribution in terms of personnel or human resources. According to the Japanese defense white paper, "ensuring safe ship traffic in that sea area at the earliest date possible was called upon by international society. Therefore, the dispatch of the minesweepers was of significance as a measure to contribute to the international community in terms of personnel for peace and humanity".12 Along with Japan's subsequent participation in peacekeeping support functions launched with the passage of the 1992 Law, it represented an important qualitative shift away from so-called 'chequebook diplomacy'.

15

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE

Japan Cp AT: Security Council 1/3 There is not linkage between the Japanese emphasis on PKOs and their bid for a Security Council seat Mulgan – Professor of International Relations at the University of New South Wales – 1996 (Aurelia George. “International Peacekeeping and Japan's Response to the Challenge of Collective Security” http://www.pol.adfa.edu.au/resources/int_peacekeeping.pdf) The Foreign Ministry denies any explicit linkage between peacekeeping and permanent seat issues partly out of fear that such a connection might be counterproductive in the domestic political environment. It continues to base the Japanese claim primarily on financial grounds,23 although the relationship between peacekeeping and a permanent seat is clearly evident in the Foreign Ministry's eagerness for Japan to sustain the momentum in peacekeeping sufficiently to maintain Japan's international credibility and to deflect international criticism that it is failing to do its part. The Peace Cooperation Headquarters in the Prime Minister's Office (which is staffed mainly by seconded Foreign Ministry officials) is always on the lookout for new missions and recently canvassed Macedonia which was earlier rejected as too dangerous. Earlier, the Ministry downplayed the risks of sending peacekeepers to Cambodia24 which later rebounded when a Japanese civilian election monitor and a policeman were killed; it hastily drafted the original peacekeeping law which failed to fly in the Diet in part because it was so poorly conceived; and it was very eager to send peacekeepers to Zaire to aid the Rwandan refugees in spite of strong reservations from the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and the SDF because of the potential dangers involved. Given the Foreign Ministry's more adventurous stance on engagement options, there has been some disagreement between the Foreign Ministry and the JDA/SDF side in decision making about where and when to dispatch Japanese peacekeepers. The SDF supports the peacekeeping enterprise in principle as a means of bolstering its position both domestically and internationally and it is also willing to assume a proper role in the international community, but it is concerned that it may be ill prepared for certain missions in terms of practical matters such as training, equipment and interoperability issues.25 Furthermore its personnel have to wear the physical risks.

16

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp AT: security council 2/3 Japan’s increased interest in PKOs comes from a need to be more international not from a desire for a security council seat Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003 (Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg 149). El Salvador became the third recipient of Japanese peacekeepers in March 1994 with fifteen Japanese personnel despatched to observe the presidential election scheduled for March of that year. At the same time, another UN internationalist norm entrepreneur, Owada Hisashi, was appointed as Japanese Ambassador to the UN was widely regarded as an attempt to secure a permanent seat on the UNSC—an accurate appraisal considering MOFA appoints its own officials; however, not a move to be confused with Japan’s participation in PKOs which is characterised more as an attempt to live up to a norm of international society. This undertaking of international responsibility was also evident in Japan’s active role in drafting and becoming a party to the Convention of the Safety of the UN and Associated Personnel in June 1995, as well as contributing US$500,000 to a project aimed at improving the protection of UN volunteers—a direct consequence of the lessons from the UNTAC operation. Moreover, in April 1997 Owada elaborated a plan to the Committee on Peacekeeping Operations for the strengthening of the UN’s peacekeeping activities stressing co-operation with regional organisations, provision of humanitarian assistance and preventative diplomacy (MOFA 1997b). At the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on 11 April 1997, Japan’s Ambassador to the UN, Owada Hisashi, stressed the importance of the changes in peacekeeping and the role Japan could play in new, multidimensional peacekeeping:

17

JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp AT: security council 3/3 No actions is merely altruistic there is always a hidden motive, but Japan should participate more actively in peacekeeping operations. Akashi - U.N. undersecretary general for humanitarian affairs, head of the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia – 2000 (Yasushi, Yomiuri Shimbun “Japan Should Expand Peacekeeping Role” http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/japan.htm) But the Japanese government has met with formidable obstacles in defining what its role should be. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution has been interpreted by some within the government and among the public, to prohibit the overseas dispatch of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in any capacity, thereby negating any military role that Japan could play in UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs).8 Although the 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law defined the conditions under which the SDF may participate in PKOs – a cease-fire must be in place; the host territories/parties to the dispute must agree to the deployment of a peacekeeping force and must agree to Japanese participation in that force; the force must maintain impartiality; Japan reserves the right to withdraw from the mission if these conditions cease to exist; weapons may be used only as a last resort or in cases of self-defense9 – there is still considerable debate in defining Japan's contribution. Many scholars advocate that Japan continue to be the financial contributor while others argue for it to assist in the development of peacekeeping policy. If Japan's desire to partake in peacekeeping operations was based purely on altruistic reasons, such roles would be appropriate. However, given that few countries partake in such operations completely free from self-interest, both middle power and niche diplomacy theories would advocate a different role for Japan. Taking into consideration Japan's middle power role, its national interest and its commitment to peace, as well as its military strengths and financial situation, niche diplomacy would suggest that Japan physically participate in peacekeeping operations through a supplemental role. This essay will therefore focus on why Japan should play this role and will conclude with some policy implications for Japan and the international community.

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp AT: Article 9 1/4 Article 9 will not prevent the Japanese from solving the problem because PKOs are not allowed to fight Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003 (Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg 43). Fourth, the non-use of force has been generally recognized as a characteristic of PKOs (Liu 1992). It has been said that when the first peacekeeping troops were dispatched to the Palestine in 1948 they carried revolvers, but no ammunition. Provisions for the non-use of force (except for self-defense) are usually contained within the rules of engagement drafted for each operation. Traditionally, only light weapons have been carried because peacekeepers are sanctioned to use force only in self-defense. This goes hand in hand with peacekeeping being regarded as a confidence-building measure and taking a non-threatening stance. Fifth, the military and political neutrality of the UN between belligerents is a necessary condition. PKOs do not target an enemy, which may be the case in a collective security action. Ideally, there are no judgements made by peacekeeping troops as to who is guilty or not and independence between the policies of each belligerent must be retained (Kōzai 1995:27). With all this in mind, Goulding (1993) tentatively defines UN peacekeeping as: Article 9 is flexible, the government has been able to interrupt it the way that they was necessary to respond to challenges Mulgan – Professor of International Relations at the University of New South Wales – 1996 (Aurelia George. “International Peacekeeping and Japan's Response to the Challenge of Collective Security” http://www.pol.adfa.edu.au/resources/int_peacekeeping.pdf) It has been customary for defense policy changes to occur by a process of 'revision by interpretation'. The wording of the constitution remains unaltered, but the interpretation of Article 9 is changed to permit the desired activity of the SDF. Such developments include peacekeeping itself, defense of the sea lanes out to 1000 nautical miles which was Japan's first step into strategic defense in depth,50 and the acquisition of military equipment that enables Japan to project a greater degree of force. Revision by interpretation may occur again in order to accommodate the encroachment of the SDF into the realms of either collective security or collective self-defense. Although in the last resort, interpreting the Japanese constitution is a legal matter (the Supreme Court is entrusted with its interpretation on a legal challenge)51 in terms of practical reality, constitutional interpretation is a political matter. The Constitution means whatever the Japanese government of the day says it does, with the major constraint being the perceptions of political and bureaucratic elites of the outer limits of public tolerance.

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp AT: Article 9 2/4 There are many roles that the SDF can participate in that do not violate article 9 Kaneda - a former Vice Admiral in Japan's Self-Defense Forces – 2004 (Hideaki. “How Military Should Japan Be?” http://216.239.39.104/search?q=cache: Q 35gLAJQQEJ:www.project-syndicate.org/commentaries/commentary_text.php4%3Fid %3D1558%26lang%3D1%26m%3Dseries+%22Japan%22+%22peacekeeping%22&hl=e Of course, the obligation of the Self-Defense Forces not to engage in offensive combat operations remains unchanged. With its expanded roles, however, the Self-Defense Forces are well prepared to engage in other military operations, such as shadowing and chasing spy ships, anti-terror activities, and missions to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Japan's warships can help with sanctions monitoring and minesweeping. Its ships and aircraft can rescue stranded nationals. But these incremental changes in Japan's military capacity and policies, though necessary and effective, can be sustained only with a clear national consensus on the country's defense interests. The international community's demand that Japan participate directly in resolving global tensions has helped, by changing the terms of domestic debate. The old deadlock on security issues is relaxing, and the Japanese public, recognizing the changed international environment, mostly embraces the Self-Defense Forces' deployment in pursuit of international and regional responsibilities. Relaxations to Article are coming, already peacekeeper are allowed to defend themselves Daily Yomiuri – 2002 (“Untie SDF's Hands for PKOs” April 18 http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/etimor/2002/0418jap.htm) The revision of the peacekeeping cooperation law last year enabled SDF members to use arms to defend PKO personnel from belligerents in other countries that are "under the protection of Japanese peacekeepers." However, they may only defend individuals--they may not defend troops in an organized, tactical sense. The use of arms is limited to self-defense, and SDF members are not allowed to use arms for the fulfillment of their duties--a practice authorized by the United Nations. The is because the government is unable to extricate itself from the Cabinet Legislation Bureau's interpretation that use of arms by SDF members might develop into the exercise of military force, which is prohibited under the Constitution.

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Japan Cp AT: Article 9 3/4 The Defense Guidelines show the effort of Japan to increase their security Richardson - Deputy Director for Intelligence at Headquarters, US Forces, Japan -2000 (David J. “US-Japan Defense Cooperation: Possibilities for Regional Stability” Parameters. http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00summer/richards.htm) The revised Defense Guidelines reflect proactive Japanese efforts to meet the responsibilities of being a world power. They enhance regional stability by adding flexibility to the partnership's ability to respond to regional crises. In today's complex threat environment, that flexibility is a vital weapon in the security planner's arsenal. The catastrophic potential of high-tech threats from a multiplicity of sources also lends urgency to the concept of "preventive defense." Japan's higher profile on the international security stage, as exemplified by its participation in international peacekeeping and disaster relief operations, is a manifestation of preventive defense. Since Japan started peacekeeping operations in 1992 many bills have been passed increasing the flexibility of the operations Hwang - policy analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage Foundation 2004 (Balbina. “A New Security Agenda for the U.S. Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1749.cfm) In 1992, the SDF began to take part in U.N. peacekeeping operations in various parts of the world. Since then, it has been subject to increasing public scrutiny on how it fulfills its duties. Three contingency bills passed in June 2003 improve the legal framework for the SDF to carry out necessary activities in times of civil and military emergencies, but the SDF is still limited in its ability to deploy an effective missile defense system

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp AT: Article 9 4/4 Article 9 has already been weaken with growing worldwide threats Hwang - policy analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage Foundation 2004 (Balbina. “A New Security Agenda for the U.S. Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1749.cfm) Perhaps most important, Japan's security environment has become more unpredictable and unstable because of North Korea's increased belligerence, including its 1998 test launch of a longrange ballistic missile over Japan and its current nuclear programs. While Japan remains primarily a status quo power, other countries in the region are not. For example, China has territorial disputes with its neighbors and great power ambitions, while North Korea remains dedicated to revisionist goals. At the same time, Japan's growing economic interaction with China raises troubling strategic issues for the future as China's economy continues to grow while Chinese security objectives in the region are uncertain. In addition, new non-state threats, including global terrorism, have come to the force. As a result, the Japanese government has taken unprecedented steps in its foreign policy in recent months. In addition to deploying SDF troops to Iraq and three destroyers to the Indian Ocean, the Japanese Diet in May 2003 passed three wartime preparedness bills that specify the government's ability to mobilize military forces and adopt other emergency measures

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Japan Cp US not suited 1/1 The United States is not fond of peacekeeping operations that they consider messy and detract from other military missions Giarra – former Defense Department Official – 1999 (Paul. “Peacekeeping: As Good For The Alliance As It Is For Japan?” February 9 http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0699.html) But beyond that, the U.S. military loathes peacekeeping operations. They are open-ended, messy and lack clear objectives. They wear out troops and equipment, and detract from traditional warfighting budgets, training, experience, and martial valor. The U.S. military has avoided them wherever possible. So even when the JSDF had been disposed to cooperate in the past, it didn't happen.

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp Want ldp 1/3 Both the United States and Japan realize that Japan needs to redefine its role in the world, including being involved in more peacekeeping operations Akashi - U.N. undersecretary general for humanitarian affairs, head of the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia – 2000 (Yasushi, Yomiuri Shimbun “Japan Should Expand Peacekeeping Role” http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/japan.htm) Japan also hopes to use middle power diplomacy to augment its international reputation and prestige. After Japan surrendered to the allies and forever renounced war as a means of dispute settlement (Article 9 of its Constitution), it engaged on a pacifist course, playing no active role in the maintenance or promotion of international peace and security. Such a stance was agreeable to the United States during the Cold War, but in the wake of the collapsed bipolar system, Japan's pacifist approach to the collective security arrangement is no longer acceptable. Indeed, during the Gulf War Japan's lack of participation in peacekeeping came under intense criticism from the United States which felt that Japan’s financial contribution (approximately thirteen billion dollars) was too little too late.5 As Alex Morrison observes, "there is developing a consensus that those states with resources and an interest in resolving conflict have an obligation to do so. This obligation overrides notions of well-defined neutrality, consent or altruism."6 Even within Japan there developed the desire to redefine its role in the international community. As a draft report prepared by the Special Study Group on Japan's Role in the International Community states: The recent war in the Persian Gulf has made it clear that appeals for peace are not enough, that peace in some cases cannot be realized without united action by the international community. The Japanese are coming to agree that maintaining peace requires efforts including the participation of personnel.7 Japan’s goals in the coming era include a greater international role, which peacekeeping operations will help to achieve the goal Akashi - U.N. undersecretary general for humanitarian affairs, head of the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia – 2000 (Yasushi, Yomiuri Shimbun “Japan Should Expand Peacekeeping Role” http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/japan.htm) As previously stated, niche diplomacy advocates that the pursuit of national interest, and participate in the international system, be based on comparative advantage. It is therefore necessary to examine Japan's foreign policy goals with regards to the United Nations. According to publications from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there are two basic and interrelated goals that Japan seeks to attain: assuming a more responsible or honourable international role and creating a global framework based on cooperation, peace and security.10

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp Want leadership 2/3 Japan wants a greater leadership role, but first the country must be given the responsibility Kaneda - a former Vice Admiral in Japan's Self-Defense Forces – 2004 (Hideaki. “How Military Should Japan Be?” http://216.239.39.104/search?q=cache: Q 35gLAJQQEJ:www.project-syndicate.org/commentaries/commentary_text.php4%3Fid %3D1558%26lang%3D1%26m%3Dseries+%22Japan%22+%22peacekeeping%22&hl=e Every Japanese citizen may have his or her own opinion, but a clear majority appear to agree that Japan must become a prominent nation in promoting international and regional security, as well as economic growth. To achieve these ends, Japan must be endowed with responsibilities equivalent to the country's national power, while securing the safety, comfort, and prosperity of Japan and preserving the people's identity as Japanese with pride and honor East Timor shows the government’s willingness to participate in further operations Downer – Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs – 2001 (Alexander. “Japan's Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Force in East Timor Welcome” Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/releases/foreign/2001/fa166_01.html) I welcome this week’s announcement of Japan’s significant contribution to the United Nations peacekeeping operation in East Timor. I understand Japan will contribute a self-defense force engineering unit. The international community has done a remarkable job in East Timor, but more remains to be done. Japan’s announcement underlines its commitment to staying the course in East Timor. It adds to Japan’s already significant contribution to building a stable and democratic future for the people of East Timor. Japan’s announcement also demonstrates the Koizumi Government’s preparedness to make a more active contribution to regional security, including through peacekeeping activities. Australia strongly welcomes this and looks forward to working with Japan, East Timor and other partners in ensuring the continued smooth operation of the UN peacekeeping presence in East Timor.

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp Want ldp 3/3

Iraq shows how Japan is seeking a more proactive role in the world Hwang - policy analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage Foundation 2004 (Balbina. “A New Security Agenda for the U.S. Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1749.cfm) Koizumi's firm stance on pursuing a more proactive foreign policy indicates Japan's desire to become a more equal partner of the United States. While some may criticize Japan's contribution to Iraq as stemming from obedience to U.S. demands, it should instead be seen as an important act of foreign policy independence. Moreover, Japan's active involvement in Iraq lays the groundwork for future contributions to international security not just in the region, but also beyond. The U.S.-Japan alliance has proven the test of time, but both partners must make the effort to ensure that it will remain relevant and productive in the future. A strong and credible foreign policy by Japan is necessary to maintain global order Kuriyma – advisor to the Japanese minister of foreign affairs and a visting professor at Waseda University – 2000 (Takakazu, Japan Review of International Affairs, “Challenges for Japan’s foreign policy future, p 215-6) In the twenty-first century Japan will have to further extract itself from its passive approach to foreign policy; it cannot allow itself to be satisfied with its efforts made to date. While keeping its foreign policy strategy centered on the two sets of coordinates described above, the nation must adopt a more proactive stance, participating actively in the work of building a new international order. In short, Japan must carry out a foreign policy in keeping with its responsibilities as a major power. To the ears of the Japanese born since the end of World War II, the term major power may ring an unpleasant, discordant bell, bringing to mind the militaristic policies of prewar and wartime Japan. As I use the term, however, it simply describes a country with the capacity to exercise substantial influence on international political and economic relations, and it has no direct connection to the way in which that influence is wielded. Within a country the formation and maintenance of order is the duty of the national government. But in the international community, where there is no suprantnational authority, these tasks fall to the major powers. If such a power were to refuse to take on those tasks, this would represent a threat to the global order.

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp Inc ldp 1/2 Peacekeeping operations will increase the leadership of Japan but only if they take an active role instead of sitting on the side lines Akashi - U.N. undersecretary general for humanitarian affairs, head of the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia – 2000 (Yasushi, Yomiuri Shimbun “Japan Should Expand Peacekeeping Role” http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/japan.htm) Many scholars offer advice on how Japan should get involved. After acknowledging that Japan has the "will, the need and the capacity to assume more global responsibilities," Alan James considers the various roles that Japan could play with regards to UN peacekeeping.16 One possible role is policy input to international peacekeeping, since its International Peace Cooperation Law puts Japan in a better position vis-à-vis the great powers to determine the appropriateness of traditional peacekeeping operations or peace enforcement actions in a given situation. Alternatively, Japan could continue its financial contributions to the UN’s peacekeeping assessments (Japan, at just over 15%, is second to the US in terms of assessed contributions). In applying niche diplomacy to these roles, however, it is clear that concentrating its resources here would not necessarily gain for Japan increased international recognition since such recognition will only come through more high profile activities. In an age of media revolution in which the picture is mightier at swaying public opinion than is the pen, the pursuit of Japan’s foreign policy goals requires that it wear blue (i.e., partake in PKOs).17

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp Inc ldp 2/2 Participating in PK operations will show the world that Japan is ready to take on their global obligations Richardson - Deputy Director for Intelligence at Headquarters, US Forces, Japan -2000 (David J. “US-Japan Defense Cooperation: Possibilities for Regional Stability” Parameters. http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00summer/richards.htm) The revised Guidelines symbolize Japan's progress toward the goal of contributing to international security in ways commensurate with its economic might. The past asymmetric relationship between Japan's economic prowess and its military posture was brought home during the Persian Gulf War, during which Japan contributed significant financial sums ($13 billion) to the coalition campaign but was criticized nevertheless for its use of "checkbook diplomacy." The result was a growing perception outside Japan and even within Japan itself that Japan's role must reflect the human risks that world powers assume in fulfilling their global obligations. The desire to make Japan a meaningful player in the international security arena is reflected in the writing of Ichiro Ozawa, an influential Japanese political leader who led a political coalition to bring down the Liberal Democratic Party, which had ruled Japan for most of the last 50 years. Ozawa's bestselling book Nihon kaizo keikaku (Plan to Reform Japan) puts forth the idea that Japan must become a "normal country." Proponents of this view believe "normalization" may be achieved by participating in collective defense, undertaking international efforts to support United Nations peacekeeping operations, and enhancing the US-Japan bilateral partnership to allow greater flexibility to deal with security requirements.[19]

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp Japan is a leader 1/3 Japan has a duty to promote the Asian community, peacekeeping operations such as East Timor provide an excellent opportunity Daily Yomiuri – 2002 (“Untie SDF's Hands for PKOs” April 18 http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/etimor/2002/0418jap.htm) For its part, Japan, as a member of the Asian community, has a duty to do all it can to help the country develop. The pillar of Japan's contributions to the country is the participation of the SelfDefense Forces in U.N. peacekeeping operations in East Timor. About 680 SDF personnel, the largest contingent to date, recently were dispatched to the country. The SDF members, who will engage in logistic activities, such as the repair of roads and bridges, over the next two years, already have embarked on some activities. Peacekeeping operations will help Japan become a normal country Daily Yomiuri – 2002 (“Untie SDF's Hands for PKOs” April 18 http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/etimor/2002/0418jap.htm) PKOs are international joint activities conducted under the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining peace in the international community. In this respect, they bear no relation to the use of military force as the exercise of the state's right. As far as arms use in PKO activities is concerned, the government should set rules of engagement that would enable SDF officers to carry out the same activities as troops from other countries. So that Japan's contributions to the international community are recognized, we believe it is the duty of the Japanese government to position the PKO mission as one of the SDFs' main duties, on a par with its defensive role in the event of armed attack on this country. Japan should try harder to become a "normal country."

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Japan cp Japan is a leader 2/3 Kohno - Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies – 1999 (Masaharu, “In Search of Proactive Diplomacy: Increasing Japan's International Role in the 1990s” CNAPS Working Paper) The passage of time and the beginning of new era are not the only explanations for the emergence of a more proactive Japanese foreign policy. In fact, the Japanese public simultaneously developed an awareness that Japan should play a more active role in international affairs over a long period of time. Thus, it could be argued that the end of the Cold War merely happened to coincide with a time of heightened awareness among the Japanese people about foreign affairs. Since foreign countries began to recognize Japan as an "economic superpower" in the 1970s, Japan has been called upon to play an increasingly active role in the international community. These heightened demands gradually began to sink in with the Japanese. Japan has jumped out of shell recently trading with other countries, thus security is more important than ever, especially peacekeeping operations Hwang - policy analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage Foundation 2004 (Balbina. “A New Security Agenda for the U.S. Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1749.cfm) A confluence of recent developments, however, has led Japan to become more proactive in its foreign policies. Economically, Japanese interests have shifted from Southeast Asia toward Northeast Asia, particularly China. In 2003, Japan's trade with China exceeded $132.4 billion, setting a record high for the fifth consecutive year. Japanese exports to China surged 43.6 percent to $57.2 billion, while imports from China rose 21.9 percent to $75.2 billion. In contrast, JapanU.S. trade has been declining, with exports falling 2.6 percent and imports increasing by only 1.7 percent in 2003. Since 2002, Japanese imports from China have exceeded imports from the United States.4 South Korea remains an important economic partner. Thus, Japan's interests in promoting and maintaining stable and secure relations in Northeast Asia have never been more important. Politically, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has been instrumental in promoting a more proactive foreign policy. Since assuming leadership in April 2001, Koizumi has overseen an increasing centralization of policy decision-making amidst the decreasing popular prestige of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the institutions and bureaucracies that have traditionally controlled foreign policy decision-making.

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp Leader is a leader 3/3 Japan should promote more peacekeeping operations as a leader and a promoter of these missions since the creation of the UN Auer -Director, Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies – 1997 (James E. “U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE RELATIONS” The Okazaki Institute http://www.vanderbilt.edu/VIPPS/VIPPSUSJ/publications/ought%20to%20%20be.htm.) Japan is an integral part of the world community and truly a world power -- perhaps more so than even many of its own citizens realize. Japan's prominent international trade creates a very tangible link to events almost anywhere. Around the world, Japan matters, and not simply because its economy is the second largest in the world. Politically, Japan has a distinguished record as an active promoter of peace ever since becoming a member of the United Nations. Its contributions have earned deep gratitude in many corners of the globe. And yet, despite the praiseworthy role Japan has played in helping to resolve crisis after crisis, there remain many here and abroad who believe that Japan could do more to contribute to international peace and security.

Participating in PK operations will allow the Richardson - Deputy Director for Intelligence at Headquarters, US Forces, Japan -2000 (David J. “US-Japan Defense Cooperation: Possibilities for Regional Stability” Parameters. http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00summer/richards.htm) The revised Guidelines symbolize Japan's progress toward the goal of contributing to international security in ways commensurate with its economic might. The past asymmetric relationship between Japan's economic prowess and its military posture was brought home during the Persian Gulf War, during which Japan contributed significant financial sums ($13 billion) to the coalition campaign but was criticized nevertheless for its use of "checkbook diplomacy." The result was a growing perception outside Japan and even within Japan itself that Japan's role must reflect the human risks that world powers assume in fulfilling their global obligations. The desire to make Japan a meaningful player in the international security arena is reflected in the writing of Ichiro Ozawa, an influential Japanese political leader who led a political coalition to bring down the Liberal Democratic Party, which had ruled Japan for most of the last 50 years. Ozawa's bestselling book Nihon kaizo keikaku (Plan to Reform Japan) puts forth the idea that Japan must become a "normal country." Proponents of this view believe "normalization" may be achieved by participating in collective defense, undertaking international efforts to support United Nations peacekeeping operations, and enhancing the US-Japan bilateral partnership to allow greater flexibility to deal with security requirements.[19]

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp Net Benefit – Security 1/2 Japan needs to participate in PK operation for security Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003 (Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg 47). Examining the motives for this increased participation in peacekeeping, altruism can be pointed to in two ways. First, the humanitarian desire exists, as it always has done, to assist a fellow member of the international system, demonstrated in the operations in Somalia. Second, participation in peacekeeping has been regarded by a number of traditional and reliable peacekeepers, such as Canada and Finland, as a norm for responsible members of international society that can enhance a state’s reputation and standing. Realist motivations can also be pointed to. Contributing to peacekeeping can also be inspired by a desire to enhance security. As a means for achieving security in Asia, the ASEAN states championed the UNTAC operation in Cambodia. The issue of security can also be seen in the contributions of smaller states hoping to enhance their reputation in case they need to receive peacekeeping assistance in the future. This is what Findlay has called ‘a down payment on future assistance’ (Findlay 1996:8). Japan’s security depends on its ability to be involved outside of Asia Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003 (Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg 147). Kakizawa Kōji, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Miyazawa cabinet, summed up the expanded sense of commitment by stressing that ‘our place in the world today has evolved to a point where this country can no longer afford to remain preoccupied only with the affairs of Asia but must raise its sights beyond it’ (The Japan Times, 16 February 1993).

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp Net Benefit – Security 2/2 Japan should participate in PKOs to ensure security in the whole Asian region Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003 (Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg 145). Japan’s motives for contributing to operations in East Timor also demonstrates its rising profile in East Asia and desire to construct a stable security regime in the region. In explaining the dispatch of SDF engineering units to East Timor in March and April 2002, MOFA cited the fact that ‘as East Timor faces many challenges, Japan as an Asian nation will continue to actively support East Timor’ (MOFA 2002a). This represents a considerable shift from a policy of having previously supported Jakarta economically (JEI Report, 18 June 1993). In a speech given in Singapore during a tour of ASEAN countries on 14 January 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi cited the specific cases of conflict prevention in the region such as Mindanao, Aceh and East Timor and claimed that ‘in co-operation with the countries of ASEAN, we intend to make an even more active contribution to ensure regional stability here in Southeast Asia’ (MOFA 2002b). This demonstrates how the once constraining norm of anti-militarism in its East Asian variant, based upon fear of a resurgent Japanese militarism and perceived by the Japanese government, has been transformed over the decade since the UNTAC mission into a constitutive, encouraging East Asians norm. Participation in PKOs is facilitated by the goal of ensuring regional stability through co-operation and encouraged by the attitudinal shift among Japan’s East Asian neighbors, prompting Lieutenant General Winai Phattiyakul, the Thai commander of UNTAET, to state, ‘I expect much from the SDF. I think they are highly capable’ (Daily Yomiuri, 8 April 2002).

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp AT: Perm 1/2 AT: Perm – Japan needs to be separate from the United States pg 143 Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003 (Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg 143). This enthusiasm was accompanied by Koizumi referring to Bush as akin to Gary Cooper in the Hollywood western, High Noon (Asahi Shinbun, 28 September 2001). As Okamoto has written, the US–Japan relationship remains ‘the essential alliance’ (Okamoto 2002:59) and because ‘[f]or Japan, the United States is the country’s only ally, Japan concentrates all its attention on smoothing its relations with the United States’ (Okamoto 2002:63). This was evident in the overreaction the Japanese government to the events of 11 September 2001 in offering and providing more than the US was actually requesting of Japan, such as the dispatch of state-of-the-art Aegis destroyers. However, the flip-side to the strengthening of the norm of bilateralism is that the Japanese government does not want to be seen as blindly following the US and to this end has requested considerable prior warning if the ‘war on terrorism’ is to be expanded to other nations within Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ (Daily Yomiuri, 12 Japan must articulate its own independent foreign policy to escape foreign pressure from the U.S. and preserve the U.S.-Japan Alliance Funabashi – Washing Beureu chief of Asashi Shimbun – 1994 (Yoichi, Japan’s International Agenda, “Introduction: Japan’s International Agenda for the 1990s” pg 7) First, the use of foreign pressure does not help generate healthy policy debates or create a good milieu in which to promote Japan’s own initiative. It shifts debate away from the issue of what Japan should do in its own interest and toward what other countries want Japan to do. For this very reason, it often arouses nationalist feeling’s and emotionalizes the issue. Second, it provides a “cover” for those who actually pursue their own wealth. Second, it provides a “cover” for those who actually pursue their own agenda (e.g., sending Self-Defense Forces aborad) under the guise of policy coordination with others, particularly with the United States. Abused gaiatsu politics undermines the U.S.-Japanese relationship because it tends to pertuteute the patron-protégé relationship and love-hate emotions between the two countries.

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp AT: Perm 2/2 Japan must take strong policy without the US to be a leader in Southeast Asia South China Morning Post – 2003 (Brad Glassman, staff writher, ‘Why Weak friends make poor allies” pg 13) It is equally important that Japan shelf its passivity, both in relation with the US and when implementing foreign policy. There are times when it has to be able to say no to the US with confidence and with good reason, and also provide a credible, alternative policy. Japan has accumulated significant goodwill in Asia, but it is all for nothing to draw upon it. The most important thing if for Japan to get its economy back in shape so it can be a strong and reliable partner. Yet even the most optimistic forecasts put recovery a decade away. A failure to act will make irreverence look good in comparison.

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp Cp inc Japan’s soft power 1/1 The Cp enhances Japan’s soft power leadership – allowing it to influence the direction of the world community and make it conductive to its values Funabashi – The Washington Bureau chief of the Asahi Shimbun – 1994 (Yoichi, Japan’s International Agenda, “Introduction: Japan’s International Agenda for the 1990s” pg 11) Japan must establish its self-image in the world. It must express its cherished values and selfenlightened interests. Yet a new self-image projection should not be radical; rather, a conscious effort should be make to develop it incrementally. Japan’s unorthodox power portfolio (“economic giant and military dwarf”) should not be viewed as an unstable and transitional phenomenon. On the contrary, the portfolio’s very nature gives Japan a golden opportunity to define its power and role in radically changing world of the 1990s. The changing nature of power in the increasingly interdependent world will upgrade economic and technological capacity, educational quality, and the developmental model effect in which Japan excels. The widespread perception that the Gulf War, after all, underscores the supremacy of military power as the ultimate power element should not alter Japan’s new strategy of being a global civilian power. Japan should search for various avenues of enhancing political power based on economic strength, not on military might, in order to stimulate a new perception of a new perception of the changing nature of power in the world, community and the recognition that Japan should be accepted as a prototype of the global civilian power. It can said that “global civilian power” is a concept of power that fits well with Japan’s long-term national interests. IF Japan’s adoption of this concept is internationally accepted and if Japan thus can contribute to the “civilization “ of the international community, it could in turn contribute to the creation Japan’s economic interests are global, and they require Japan’s global commitment. Thus, Japan’s power must be global in dimension.

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp - Aff Article 9 1/4 Article 9 prevents the Japanese from being able to fully participate in PKOs Dobson – Proffessor of International Relations of Japan at the University of Sheffield – 2003 (Hugo, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement. Pg 49). Debates within the Diet thereafter centered around the question of whether Japan would be forced under UN membership to dispatch Japanese troops abroad on missions like that in Korea, or if Japan could fulfill the criteria for membership if it were not to dispatch troops on peacekeeping operations. In June 1954 the House of Councilors eventually silenced debate on the issue and approved a resolution preventing the dispatch overseas of the SDF (Ogata 1995:252). All these debates attest to the emergence and existence of (and tensions between) the norms of antimilitarism and UN internationalism. Throughout these debates, the government continually stressed Japan’s right to individual self-defense but not collective self-defense. Thus, the SDF Law, enacted in 1954, contained articles prohibiting the dispatch of SDF troops abroad mainly in consideration of what Japan might be obliged to do under the terms of the treaty with the US, although with obvious implications for participation in PKOs. During this period Article 9 was the oft-quoted restricting frame of the anti-militarist norm. For example, upon being questioned by LDP politician Namagi Yoshio, Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo acknowledged the argument for sending troops abroad but insisted that in the case of Japan, due to Article 9 and its denial of the right of belligerence, it would be improper for Japan to contribute and overstep the bounds of the Constitution (Proceedings of the 19th Regular Diet Lower House Committee on Foreign Affairs, no. 16, 13 March 1954:10–13). This opinion was reiterated by Shimoda Takezō, Chief of the Treaties Division, stressing the dispatch of Japanese troops within the limits imposed by the Constitution as being ‘impossible’ (Proceedings of the 19th Regular Diet Lower House Committee on Foreign Affairs, no. 27, 27 March 1954:9–10).

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp - Aff Article 9 2/4 Article 9 will not allow full participation in PK operations: Japan is not the best actor to implement the plan Bhubhindar – Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic - 2002 (Singh “Japan's post-Cold War security policy: Bringing back the normal state” Contemporary Southeast Asia pg 82) Japan's behavior in the security sphere is not considered normal, as it does not fulfill the two features highlighted above. First, despite being a member of the United Nations, Japan had given up its right to the use of force. It has a Constitution that renounces war as an instrument of national security policy. The core of this distinctive aspect of its Constitution is Article 9, which imposes restrictions on the conduct of Japan's security policy. In it, Japan renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation; repudiates the use of force as a means for settling international disputes; and does not recognize the state's right to belligerency. 15 Renouncing the right to belligerency engendered a "pacifist" sentiment among the Japanese people. Both the Peace Constitution and the emergent pacifist sentiment facilitated the task of economic reconstruction, but imposed limitations on Japan's participation in regional security affairs. The Japanese have different rules from other countries; making cooperation impossible Timeasia. Com – 2001 (Matt Rees. Japan's peacekeepers in Israel are well-trained, disciplined and prepared to deliver the goods April 30 http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/japan_view/military.html) Such influence isn't readily apparent on the Golan. For the men on the ground who make up Japan's only overseas military operation, the curbs on their duties are surreal, a day-to-day life ripped out of the pages of Catch-22. Soldiers aren't allowed even to shovel snow from the street with troops from other countries because that would be an exercise of collective security. If the stable situation in their section of the Golan were to deteriorate into conflict, Furusho's men are allowed to shoot to kill only in self-defense. The Canadians have orders to use lethal force to protect themselves, U.N. civilian employees and the Japanese. That's one reason why the guard at Camp Zirouani's gate is always Canadian. "Japanese troops can't work together with other troops," says Gen Nakatani, who was in the army for four years and, as a member of parliament, has visited the Golan contingent. "They're there with other teams but have to operate within Japan's own rules and regulations."

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp - Aff Article 9 3/4 Article 9 only allows the Japanese to fight in cases of self-defense – not making them the ideal participation in further PK operations Mulgan – Professor of International Relations at the University of New South Wales – 1996 (Aurelia George. “International Peacekeeping and Japan's Response to the Challenge of Collective Security” http://www.pol.adfa.edu.au/resources/int_peacekeeping.pdf) The fact remains, however, that under the current interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, Japan cannot deploy the SDF for any military purpose othern than the defense of Japanese territory. The domestic debate is couched in terms of the contrast between the right of individual self-defense (kobetsuteki jieiken) which is granted under the Constitution, and the right of so-called 'collective self-defense' (shudanteki jieiken),45 which is prohibited. Although the Japanese Constitution and Article 9 did not achieve the main goal of its American designers - that is, mandating the permanent disarmament of Japan- it has achieved their associated objective preventing the Japanese armed forces from undertaking military action outside Japan. Article 9 prevents collective security; therefore, Japan cannot fight unless in self-defense Mulgan – Professor of International Relations at the University of New South Wales – 1996 (Aurelia George. “International Peacekeeping and Japan's Response to the Challenge of Collective Security” http://www.pol.adfa.edu.au/resources/int_peacekeeping.pdf) According to the Japanese government, the current interpretation of Article 9 confines "the use of armed strength...to the minimum level necessary"46; and because the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds the minimum limit...[it is] constitutionally not permissible."47 This interpretation also bans the overseas dispatch of the Japanese military to foreign territorial land, sea and airspace for the purpose of using force (kaigai hahei) "because such a deployment of troops overseas generally goes beyond the minimum limit necessary for self-defense.48 The implications of these provisions are that Japan has reached the outer limits of the current interpretation of Article 9 with the abolition of the current freeze on Japanese involvement in PKF – and even that is contested.49 Japan's involvement in any kind of overseas military operation, whether in a U.N. or U.S. alliance context, therefore gives rise to serious constitutional issues. The most obvious options are: a continuation of the status quo, a change in the official interpretation of the constitution, or revision of the constitution itself. The last option is the least likely because of procedural obstacles and the political impossibilities of getting the required support either amongst Diet members or the Japanese public.

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East Timor shows the extent that Article 9 prevents solvency Richardson - Deputy Director for Intelligence at Headquarters, US Forces, Japan -2000 (David J. “US-Japan Defense Cooperation: Possibilities for Regional Stability” Parameters. http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00summer/richards.htm) In the autumn of 1999 the self-imposed restrictions for Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping operations factored into deliberations on how to support international efforts in East Timor. Unable to directly participate in peacekeeping operations because the situation did not meet all of the five conditions noted above, Japan donated $100 million to the United Nations Trust Fund to facilitate participation by other countries in the multinational force. Japan subsequently supported the UN High Commission on Refugees by sending three Japan Air SelfDefense Force C-130s and 150 personnel to conduct airlift operations ferrying food and medical supplies between Surabaya and Kupang in West Timor. Japan's support to UN efforts in East and West Timor serves to illustrate the dynamics of its current international security posture in terms of its contributions and its limitations.[23]

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Japan Cp - Aff No Solvency 1/3 Japanese are critical of being involved in PK operations that they have no say because they are not a security council member Ozawa - Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations – 2004 (Toshiro. The Fifth Committee Fifty-eighth session of the United Nations General. June 4 Assembly http://www.un.int/japan/statements/ozawa040603.html) Speaking of Japan, we must point out that the Government of Japan is not blessed with a budgetary mechanism that can easily absorb a more than 60 percent increase of a major budget item. We must also point out that there is criticism within Japan for providing money to PKOs for the benefit of those parties who may or may not be willing to settle their conflicts. This criticism is reinforced by the fact that Japan, not being a Permanent Member of the Security Council, has often no say in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the long term policies of individual PKOs, despite Japan's obligation to shoulder about one fifth of the related costs. Needless to say, such criticism arises out of Japan's strong commitment to peace on the one hand, and on the other, the frustration regarding the obligations incurred from assessed contributions for peacekeeping budgets. It would be intolerable for the Government of Japan to be left out of discussions especially if those discussions are held without due consideration for facing "the moment of truth" for cases where there is a perceived lack of will to pursue peace. To avoid misunderstanding, we wish to point out that this remark is based on the well known fact that nation-building cannot take place in the absence of peace and security. The Japanese do not have the monetary funds to give to the PK operations without trading off other trade that they provide Ozawa - Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations – 2004 (Toshiro. The Fifth Committee Fifty-eighth session of the United Nations General. June 4 Assembly http://www.un.int/japan/statements/ozawa040603.html) In reality, the very steep increase in the peacekeeping budget will consume resources that could have been allocated for humanitarian assistance or poverty reduction. Japan's share of the burden is expected to reach $900 million. This would be an amount almost equal to the total Japanese annual voluntary contributions to all the United Nations funds and programmes such as UNICEF, and to specialized agencies such as the WHO. This being the case, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the next assessments for peacekeeping may impact Japan's support to emergency and humanitarian assistance through international organizations in a devastating manner. We have mentioned before that $900 million is equivalent to about one tenth of Japan's total ODA, and is slightly more than Japan's current annual bilateral assistance to the African countries. We beg you to think about it. With $900 million, every child in the world suffering dehydration from diarrhea could be provided with oral rehydration salt, 50 million children could be vaccinated against tuberculosis and measles, or 400 million children could be provided with schooling stationery for education

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp - Aff No Solvency 2/3 Increased peacekeeping operations will trade off with further attempts of the Japanese to lessen poverty worldwide Ozawa - Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations – 2004 (Toshiro. The Fifth Committee Fifty-eighth session of the United Nations General. June 4 Assembly http://www.un.int/japan/statements/ozawa040603.html) Despite my previous remarks, we should not spare resources for the noble cause of consolidating peace. However, if there are cases where PKOs continue to exist because the parties concerned profess a desire for a consolidation of peace without a real interest to pursue peace -- (and, we confess that we do not know whether such cases exist or not since we do not participate in the Security Council deliberations), -- then, my delegation would like to pose another question which we think should be seriously considered by all the members here. Our [Japan’s] resources are not unlimited. This is a reality whether we like it or not. If we [Japan] consumes those limited resources in the name of peace, there may be little left for helping those who are in extreme poverty and are unable to live in dignity even though they live in peace. We hope that all of you here would give serious thought to this another unintended reality. And, we urge the Security Council to give more serious thoughts to the exit and completion strategies of the ongoing PKOs. So, the question is: "Is it truly the consensus of the international community that resources be diverted from efforts to help children suffering from poverty and diseases?" My government and the people of Japan wish to terminate the vicious cycle of conflict and poverty and to extend a helping hand to those people courageous enough to abandon their weapons and fight poverty. That is Japan's philosophy and its sincere wish. Japan not only is against the participation in peacekeeping affairs but the UN peacekeeping cooperation law puts limits on the activities allowed by the Japanese Akashi - U.N. undersecretary general for humanitarian affairs, head of the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia – 2000 (Yasushi, Yomiuri Shimbun “Japan Should Expand Peacekeeping Role” http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/japan.htm) Such a new breed of peacekeepers should act far more effectively than conventional peacekeepers, even as their actions should be clearly distinct from the enforcement of peace processes. Namely, we can say that the vexed struggle to realize a fourth-generation peacekeeping operation has just started. What troubles me at this point in the fast-changing development of the United Nations' perspective is the attitude of the Japanese government, which has remained averse to playing an active role in peacekeeping operations. It would be better if Japan could at least fully participate in classical peacekeeping operations. However, under the U.N. Peacekeeping Cooperation Law, the freeze on Japan's participation in the main PKO role-namely, peacekeeping forces--has not been lifted. Logistical support remains the only possible peacekeeping area in which Japan can participate. The law also puts unreasonable restraints on the use of weapons for self-defense in peacekeeping activities.

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Japan Cp - Aff No Solvency 3/3 There are various reasons why Japan would fail if given greater peacekeeping operation responsibilities Hwang - policy analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage Foundation 2004 (Balbina. “A New Security Agenda for the U.S. Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1749.cfm) First, while popular aversion to an overtly activist role overseas has lessened in recent years, it has not completely disappeared. These sentiments continue to block a vigorous public debate over the constraints imposed by Article 9 of the constitution and some of its more restrictive interpretations, despite new policies such as the deployment of SDF forces to Iraq. Second, Japan's sluggish economy and the government's inability to institute sweeping political and economic reforms undermine Japan's credibility, both domestically and abroad. In addition, more than a half-century after World War II, Japan's Asian neighbors continue to harbor resentment against Japan's perceived reluctance to own up to its wartime history, further undermining Japanese leadership in the region. Third, ironically, Japan's close and enduring security alliance with the United States is the greatest constraint on Japanese foreign policy initiatives. As long as Japan relies on the U.S. security guarantee, it has little reason to initiate more active policies.

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp No solvency – no flexibility 1/1 The Five principles of the law prevent flexibility and create more red tape that make it impossible for Japan to be effective Japan Economic Insitute Report – 1999 (Barbara Wanner. “SECURITY CHALLENGES HIGHLIGHT COALITION POLICY DISCORD” http://www.jei.org/Archive/JEIR99/9946w4.html) In the East Timor case, however, the SDF's hands are tied in large part by a clause in the peacekeeping support law that rendered inactive a provision that permitted the military's involvement in situations that might require the use of force. In order to get the controversial initiative through the Diet in June 1992, the LDP was forced to agree to this freeze as part of a deal with two opposition parties. Dovish critics had charged that allowing the SDF to perform even unarmed duties outside Japan exceeded the limits of Tokyo's long-standing interpretation of Article IX of the constitution, the so-called war-renouncing clause. Successive governments have said that this clause bars the participation of the SDF in collective defense activities. Moreover, the administration of then-Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu had little choice but to bow to pacifist forces' demands for the inclusion of five principles in the law governing the deployment of the SDF for U.N. peacekeeping missions — even in an unarmed capacity. First and foremost, a viable ceasefire must be in effect. In addition, all warring parties must accept the U.N. peacekeeping mission, and the U.N. must adopt a neutral stance with regard to the conflict. If any one of these conditions is not met, the SDF must be guaranteed the right to withdraw immediately. The fifth principle allows the military to use side arms only for self-defense.

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp - Aff Perm 1/4 Perm – Japan cannot work without the US – have them work together Bhubhindar – Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic - 2002 (Singh “Japan's post-Cold War security policy: Bringing back the normal state” Contemporary Southeast Asia pg 82) Secondly, the role of Japan's military has been deliberately constrained in its growth and missions by established social and legal norms. As the euphemism implies, the SDF is to be limited to selfdefense, and is not to take part in collective defense efforts.16 Although the SDF's role has expanded over the years - from an organization devoted to relief and welfare to a greater role in managing regional security, international peace-keeping, and disaster relief - it is still very limited. The highly critical Japanese public, which is very influential in shaping the role and responsibilities of the SDF, is not supportive of an enhanced military role for it. In the eyes of the public, the SDF lacks a convincing political rationale and this has led to the military being remarkably insulated from Japanese society.17 As a result, the SDF draws its greatest political strength from outside Japan, especially through its security ties with the United States.18 Cambodia shows that Japan and the United States need to work together to be the most effective; Japan cannot by itself be successful Kohno - Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies – 1999 (Masaharu, “In Search of Proactive Diplomacy: Increasing Japan's International Role in the 1990s” CNAPS Working Paper) Japan-U.S. relations were stable during the Cold War period and Japan relied heavily on the United States for its national security. The world was split into two blocs. There was little room, and actually no need, for the Japanese to question the legitimacy of the Japan-U.S. alliance. When the Cold War finally came to an end, the world entered into a new but uncertain era. Japan and the United States shared the view that the potential for instability and uncertainty would persist in the Asia-Pacific region. Both Japan and the United States had to redefine their cooperative framework and reaffirm their roles under new circumstances. The United States, a champion of peace in the post-Cold War era, had to ask friends and allies to share the burden of seeking and maintaining this peace, as the United States faced difficulties with its domestic economy. The United States also had to rely more on multilateral organizations such as the United Nations and NATO, as the world faced various kinds of transnational challenges. Japan, for its part, tried to stand ready to cooperate with the United States to solve issues of mutual concern. Policy coordination was a must, because if issues were left unresolved, there existed the danger that the common understanding of the other's role would be undermined. Both fully share the view that "alliance" does not necessarily imply a monolithic union. For example, with the Cambodian peace process, although Japan occasionally took steps that were different from the United States, there was no doubt that both Japan and the United States shared a common goal-to restore a durable peace in Cambodia and to build up a stable and prosperous Indochina. This mutual exercise on the Cambodian issue reinforced that lesson. In

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp Perm 2/4 The Honduras disaster proves that Japan cannot operate in PK operations without the United States Giarra – former Defense Department Official – 1999 (Paul. “Peacekeeping: As Good For The Alliance As It Is For Japan?” February 9 http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0699.html) Instead, alliance cooperation was notable by its absence when the JSDF deployed to Honduras after Hurricane Mitch last fall. What could have been a golden opportunity to cooperate on problems, demonstrate solidarity, and showcase Japan's Western Hemisphere debut, wound up as a unilateral show of the flag. The Japanese contingent operated on its own -- and went home after just two weeks, even though hundreds of Hondurans were showing up daily. As a matter of both principle and practice it is vital for the U.S. and Japan to get back on the same PKO wavelength. How we work together in small but consequential ways now will set the course for much more important missions in the future. The cooperation between the US and Japanese will keep the alliance strong Hwang - policy analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage Foundation 2004 (Balbina. “A New Security Agenda for the U.S. Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1749.cfm) Japan's decision in late 2003 to dispatch 1,000 Self-Defense Forces (SDF) troops to Iraq marks an important milestone in the U.S.-Japan alliance and is one example of greater cooperation between the two allies on a range of important security issues. Japan's response--not just its response to regional threats such as North Korea, but also its assistance in global conflicts such as in the war on terrorism and Iraq, as well as its cooperation on ballistic missile defense (BMD)--demonstrates that this alliance is reliable in times of crisis. Yet, if the U.S.-Japan alliance is to remain strong and endure as a true partnership in the 21st century, the United States should not just rely on common security threats in the present to forge cooperation in the future. To provide vision for and direction to the alliance, the Bush Administration should:

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp Perm 3/4 Perm – have Japan and the United States work toghethor in peacekeeping operations working together to solve the problems Auer -Director, Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies – 1997 (James E. “U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE RELATIONS” The Okazaki Institute http://www.vanderbilt.edu/VIPPS/VIPPSUSJ/publications/ought%20to%20%20be.htm.) In a speech October 16 at Japan's National Defense Academy, Foley went on, the United States, and others, would like to see Japan do more on the world stage. "The United States, and I believe the world community as a whole, would welcome greater Japanese participation in peacekeeping operations," Foley told his audience of Japanese cadets. "When Japan is ready to do so," Foley added, "I would urge that our two countries [Japan and United Statees ], as allies, explore how we might coordinate our training and planning to be able to serve together most effectively in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions." The U.S. Ambassador said that while America's bilateral alliances in the region "have proven their worth and remain essential," there is an "increasing need for collective action to deal with problems that may threaten peace and stability." A close alliance between the two powers is needed now more than ever because of the increased threats to worldwide security Hwang - policy analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage Foundation 2004 (Balbina. “A New Security Agenda for the U.S. Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1749.cfm) The U.S.-Japan alliance was created in the aftermath of World War II and became the anchor for building stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia during the Cold War. The current security environment, however, is dramatically different. Some Cold War threats such as North Korea persist, while new threats from non-state actors, including terrorists, have emerged. Continued close cooperation between the United States and Japan could prove critical to defeating these threats.

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan Cp Perm 4/4 Japan and the US would be able to handle more peacekeeping operations together with more success than if they each tried separtely Auer -Director, Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies – 1997 (James E. “U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE RELATIONS” The Okazaki Institute http://www.vanderbilt.edu/VIPPS/VIPPSUSJ/publications/ought%20to%20%20be.htm.) The United States, and I believe the world community as a whole, would welcome greater Japanese participation in peacekeeping operations. When Japan is ready to do so, I would urge that our two countries, as allies, explore how we might coordinate our training and planning to be able to serve together most effectively in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. In the years and decades to come there are likely to arise crises in which the international community feels a duty to intervene with humanitarian or peacekeeping assistance. The sense of duty may stem from a moral imperative to help innocent victims or out of recognition that unchecked aggression ultimately threatens us all. In any case, during the course of your professional careers there are unfortunately likely to occur crises which our two countries will see a clear need to help resolve. Let us prepare for those moments, so that when they appear suddenly we are ready to come to the defense of the principles in the United Nations charter that we have promised to uphold. I have every confidence that Americans and Japanese working together can achieve more than we would separately. And in the process we may be able to develop more creative approaches to our future challenges. Any mutual efforts in peacekeeping must begin with the recognition that we share a common interest in peace and stability. There is no higher calling for us, as individuals or as nations, than the promotion of peace. In closing, I return to the question I posed at the outset: How can Japan best contribute to international peace and security? I encourage each Japanese cadet present today to ask yourself, not only what are you going to do for Japan in the years ahead, but what is Japan going to do for the world? As I have tried to elaborate in my remarks today, I believe that a tighter U.S.-Japan security partnership and fuller Japanese participation in peacekeeping efforts offer the best avenues for answering that large question.

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JAPAN CP – MASON FILE Japan cp Checkbook diplomacy 1/1 Kohno - Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies – 1999 (Masaharu, “In Search of Proactive Diplomacy: Increasing Japan's International Role in the 1990s” CNAPS Working Paper) This was one of the important lessons Japan learned in the post-Cold War period, especially with regard to the Gulf War. Although Japan had made a major financial contribution-nearly thirteen billion dollars-its voice was not heard in decision-making circles. To the contrary, Japan's contribution was criticized as being "too little, too late," and belittled as "checkbook diplomacy." Japan was not well informed of the discussions taking place in decision-making circles, namely, the U.N. Security Council. The Cambodian peace process also posed a big question for Japan. As mentioned above, just when Japan began to have both the will and capability to make a meaningful contribution to the Cambodian peace process, the P-5 closed the door of opportunity in their face. It was a painful lesson learned by Japanese diplomats who worked on the Cambodian issue either in the United Nations or in Tokyo. Recently, Japan has become more and more outspoken on the issue of U.N. reform, particularly on Security Council reform, which has been an outstanding issue for some decades. Cambodia and the Gulf War made no little impact on the Japanese view of U.N. reform. Japan's annual contributions to the United Nations will surpass 20% of the total U.N. budget by the year 2000. One positive aspect is that Japan's eligibility to become a permanent member of the Security Council has increased since its conventional foreign policy has improved and it is backed by its economic power and its record of playing a political role in Cambodia and other issues. But the situation represents another case of "taxation without representation," which needs to be resolved.

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