Iran

IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 1.History 2.Background 3. The Bushehr project 4. Iranian side 5. U.S. claims 6. International response

History The Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program goes back many decades. In recent years global political change has caused Iran's program to fall under intense scrutiny and even

occasioned charges that Iran is seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Iran, however, has maintained that the purpose of its nuclear program is the generation of power; any other use is a violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which Iran is a signatory. On August 14, 2002, an associate of Mujahedin-e-Khalq and critic of Tehran, Alireza Jafarzadeh, revealed the existence of two secret nuclear sites, a uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and a heavy water facility in Arak. In response, the U.S. has since late 2003 claimed that Tehran is seeking to build nuclear arms in violation of its agreements under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and also that Iran is seeking to develop nuclear missiles. However, no direct evidence has ever been produced that Iran is pursuing a covert nuclear weapons program. On November 14, 2004, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator announced a voluntary and temporary suspension of its uranium enrichment program (not in itself a violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) after pressure from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany acting on behalf of the European Union (known in this context as the EU-3 or EU3). The measure was said at the time to be a confidence-building measure, to continue for some reasonable period of time, six months being mentioned as a reference. On November 24, Iran sought to amend the terms of its agreement with the EU to exclude a handful of the equipment from this deal for research work. This request was dropped four days later. On August 8 and August 10, 2005, the Iranian government resumed its conversion of uranium at the Isfahan facility, allegedly with continued suspension of enrichment activities. This has led to (on September 19, 2005) the European Union pressuring the IAEA was started in 1957 to promote use of nuclear energy for energy production] to bring Iran's nuclear program before the United Nations Security Council.

Background The foundations for Iran's nuclear program were laid in the 1960 under auspices of the U.S. within the framework of bilateral agreements between the two countries. In 1967 the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) was built and run by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The TNRC was equipped with a US supplied 5-megawatt nuclear research reactor. Iran signed and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. With the establishment of Iran's atomic agency and the NPT in place plans were drawn by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (Iran's monarch) to construct up to 23 nuclear power stations across the country together with USA by the year 2000. By 1975, The U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, had signed National Security Decision Memorandum 292, titled "U.S.-Iran Nuclear Cooperation," which laid out the details of the sale of nuclear energy equipment to Iran projected to bring U.S. corporations more than $6 billion in revenue. At the time, Iran was pumping as much as 6 million barrels (950,000 m³) of oil a day, compared with about 4 million barrels (640,000 m³) daily today. President Gerald R. Ford even signed a directive in 1976 offering Tehran the chance to buy and operate a U.S.-built reprocessing facility for extracting plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel. The deal was for a complete "nuclear fuel cycle". The Ford strategy paper said the "introduction of nuclear power will both provide for the growing needs of Iran's economy and free remaining oil reserves for export or conversion to petrochemicals."

The Bushehr project

The Bushehr Nuclear Power Facility is located 17 kilometers south of the city of Bushehr (also known as Bushire), between the fishing villages of Halileh and Bandargeh along the Persian Gulf. The facility was the idea of the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who envisioned a time when the world's oil supply would run out. He said that, "Petroleum is a noble material, much too valuable to burn." Instead, he wanted a national electrical grid powered by clean nuclear power plants. Bushehr would be the first plant, and would supply energy to the inland city of Shiraz. In 1975, the Bonn firm Kraftwerk-Union A.G., a joint venture of Siemens AG and A.E.G Telefunken, signed a contract worth $4 to $6 billion to build the nuclear power plant. Construction of the two nuclear generating units was subcontracted to ThyssenKrupp AG, and was to have been completed in 1981. Kraftwerk-Union was eager to work with the Iranian government because, as spokesman Joachim Hospe said in 1976, "To fully exploit our nuclear power plant capacity, we have to land at least three contracts a year for delivery abroad. The market here is about saturated, and the United States has cornered most of the rest of Europe, so we have to concentrate on the third world." Kraftwerk-Union fully withdrew from the Bushehr nuclear project in July 1979, after work stopped in January 1979, with one reactor 50% complete, and the other reactor 85% complete. They said they based their action on Iran's non-payment of $450 million in overdue payments. The company had received $2.5 billion of the total contract. Their cancellation came after certainty that the Iranian government would unilaterally terminate the contract themselves, following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which paralyzed Iran's economy and led to a crisis in Iran's relations with the West.

In 1984, Kraftwerk-Union did a preliminary assessment to see if it could resume work on the project, but declined to do so while the Iraq-Iran war continued. In April of that year, the US State Department said, "We believe it would take at least two to three years to complete construction of the reactors at Bushehr." The spokesperson also said that the light water power reactors at Bushehr "are not particularly well-suited for a weapons program." The spokesman went on to say, "In addition, we have no evidence of Iranian construction of other facilities that would be necessary to separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel." The reactors were then damaged by multiple Iraqi air strikes between March 24, 1984 to 1988. Shortly afterwards Iraq invaded Iran and the nuclear program was stopped until the end of the war. In 1990, Iran began to look outwards towards partners for its nuclear program; however, due to a radically different political climate and punitive U.S. economic sanctions, few candidates existed. In 1995 Iran signed a contract with Russia to resume work on the half complete Bushehr plant. The construction is being done by the state-controlled company Atomstroyexport (Russian for Atomic Construction Export), an arm of Russia's atomic energy ministry, Minatom. The Russians assert that because the reactor will be used for civilian purposes only, their contract is legitimate under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was not until 2002 that the USA began to question Iran's nuclear intentions after the MKO (an anti-government guerrilla group) revealed the existence of the Natanz and Arak facilities.

Iranian side

Iran maintains that nuclear power is necessary for a booming population and rapidly industrializing nation. It points to the fact that Iran's population has more than doubled in 20 years, the country regularly imports gasoline and electricity, and that burning fossil fuel in large amounts harms Iran's environment drastically. Additionally, Iran questions why it shouldn't be allowed to diversify its sources of energy, especially when there are fears of its oil fields eventually being depleted. It continues to argue that its valuable oil should be used for high value products, not simple electricity generation. Iran also raises financial questions, saying that developing the excess capacity in its oil industry would cost it $40 billion, let alone pay for the power plants. Harnessing nuclear power costs a fraction of this, considering Iran has abundant supplies of accessible uranium ore. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its plans to restart its nuclear program using indiginously-made nuclear fuel, and the IAEA even planned to provide assistance to Iran under its Technical Assistance Program to produce enriched uranium. An IAEA report stated clearly that its aim was to “contribute to the formation of local expertise and manpower needed to sustain an ambitious programme in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology”. However, the IAEA was forced to terminate the program under U.S. pressure. Iran has a legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a right which in 2005 the U.S. and the EU-3 began to assert had been forfeited by the clandestine nuclear program that came to light in 2002. Iran and many other developing nations who are signatory to the NPT believe the Western position to be hypocritical, saying that the NPT's original purpose was universal nuclear disarmament. Iran also compares its treatment as a signatory to the NPT with three nations that have not ratified the NPT: Israel, India, and Pakistan.

Each of these nations developed an indigenous nuclear weapons capability: Israel by 1968, India by 1974 and Pakistan by 1998.

U.S. claims Since 2002, the U.S. has countered that Iran does not need nuclear power due to its abundant oil and natural gas reserves since oil power is cheaper to produce than nuclear power. Also, in testimony to Congress in 2003, John Bolton claimed that natural gas currently being flared (burned off without being used) by Iran, if used for electricity generation, could be used to generate 4000 megawatts of continuous electricity - as much as all four Bushehr reactors. (This may be a misleading statement if intended to point out an inconsistent energy policy; flaring of natural gas is common practice in the oil industry as recovering the gas can often be uneconomical or unfeasible - on the other hand, Iran is developing its South Pars gas field for export). One theory behind the U.S.'s resistance to accepting Iran's nuclear power ambition lies in Middle Eastern geopolitics. In essence, the U.S. believes that it should guard against Iran obtaining a nuclear weapons capability.

International response The claims and counterclaims have put pressure on Iran to reveal all aspects of its nuclear program. Some pressure has also come from Iran's trade partners: Europe, Japan, and Russia. Iran has said this to be a result of an attempt by the U.S. government to prevent it from obtaining nuclear technology. Regarding the involvement of the IAEA, under the auspicies of the UN, Iran has responded to the American accusations by cooperating with the agency, since the enrichment activities they have recommenced are not in violation of the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty. In August 2005, Iranian officials said they had lost much of their confidence in the IAEA; the Speaker of the Majlis said that he regarded an IAEA resolution summoning Iran to suspend uranium conversion to be "illegal." Iran's degree of cooperation has, in general, varied depending on other geopolitical issues: at times the IAEA has had to admonish Iran, while at other times it has praised it.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------TimeFrame Event Analysis 1967 Shah of Iran institutes The Shah of Iran was increasingly exploratory research into worried about Iraq and Israel, indigneous production of weaponsboth hostile and well known as grade fissile materials. Small also exploring nuclear capability. 1 research reactor purchased from the U.S. and brought online at the Tehran University 1970 Iran signs the Nuclear NonThe move is cited by U.S. officials Proliferation Treaty as an example of how peaceful dissemination of nuclear technology can and should take place. This niavite is mourned by non-proliferation experts and will come back to haunt the western world. 1979 Islamic Revolution Halts all NBC While other international research relations effects of the revolution in Iran were deemed disastrous, perhaps this was a temporary silver lining in the cloud for diplomats and non-proliferation experts. This was short lived however, as only a decade later the programs were back on again. 1984-1988 Iran acquires SCUD-B Missiles Capable of delivering a prototype from Libya and/or North Korea. nuclear weapon 300 kilometers. Nearly 100 fired at Iraq in the The Iranian Defense Miniistry Iran-Iraq war, but armed with also began its own indigenous

only conventional warheads. Also fired 10 Chinese Silkworm cruise missiles one hitting U.S. flagged tanker in Persian Gulf another striking in Kuwait. Major loss in the Iran-Iraq War, led to Hashemi Rafsanjani's covert pledge to never allow Iran to be the victim again, some believe aiding in his election as the President in 1989.

missile development program as well as acquired Chinese SA-2 equivalent missiles (100 km range) and SCUD Cs from North Korea (200 km range). 1988 While Iran's so called moderate government postures to win favor in Europe and other western capitals, their actions clandestinely prove otherwise. One intelligence analyst from AFI claims Iran is the world's leading terrorist exporter and will also stop at nothing to a)develop NBC weapons capabilities, and b) use the technologies to futher their power base in the Middle East. MILNET believes this analysis is on the mark, with further evidence of this Iranian mindset shown througout this document. Included are eyewitness reports from covert operators who found themselves targets or near targets of Iranian covert operations to gain knowledge and material on the open and black markets. 1988-1996 Iran agrees to purchase and Documented publicly in 1996, begins to take delivery of portions however it is thought that of a research reactor that could classified intelligence data shows easily be used as a training purchases and delievery of reactor for a plutonium (weapons equipment began in the late grade) production facility. 1980s. Intelligence analysts cite (purchase in 1990 from China). confirmed dual and single use China also sells Iran an purchases thorughout the period. electromagnetic isotope separation unit which can be used Several anonymous sources in the to generate enriched uranium for Intelligence community indicate weapons grade material. covert sanctions or clandestine pressure brought to bear by western intelligence agencies against the suppliers in nations "friendly" to U.S. and its allies. Some of these companies are in allied nations as well. Cited are France,Germany as well as China

and a number of the former nations of the Soviet Union. 1994

1995

1996

1997

Iran signs purchase agreement with China and U.S. President Clinton enacts an oil embargo against Iran as a sanction. Iran signs cotnract with Russian U.S. Diplomatic response pledges for completion of Bushehr to add commercial sanctions to reactors. anyone supplying Iran. Few sanctions follow however, and none against Russia. Adds more Chinese and North An open secret 2 were the plans Korean missiles to the Iranian announced and presumably ballistic missile inventory, carried through to acquire North including SCUD-C and CSS-8 Korean NoDong missiles which (modified Chinese SA-2) could reach Saudi Arabia, Israel, Also has continued to purchase or Turkey. Also exposed to the more capable cruise missiles current SCUD-B and SCUD-C missiles are Afghansitan, Bahrain, India, Iraq,Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar, Syria, United Arab Emirates and the Southern Asian nations of the former Soviet Union. The U.S. publicly available analysis indicates that the Iranians, in 1996, also fielded a number of SU-24 bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons. U.S. Intelligence indicates with a Rather than respond with full very high confidence 3 , confirmed denials to U.S. revleations of hard by several allied nations, that evidence of the Iranian program, Iran has increased funding and the government has admitted to effort in their NBC programs as existence of equipment choosing well as made progress in missile deception -- "it's all for peaceful programs. energy research". The rationale used is that Iran would rather sell its own non-nuclear energy resources, thus gain revenue, and use nuclear energy to sustain their modest domestic energy needs. Meanwhile the technology purchases and builds continue to point to more than is necessary,

1998

Intelligence Community sources 1 indicate the U.S. and its allies have pressured the Ukrainian manufacturer of steam turbines, Turboatom to renig on their contract with Iran.

1999

The U.S. finally imposes commercial sanctions against companies in Russia.

2000

The Wisconsin Project publishes an excellent chronology 4 of the Iranian Nuclear program after several media outlets cite CIA information on Iranian progress. Slow progress by the Russian contractors on the Bushehr complex. March 2001MILNET and AFI publish articles on the threat posed by Iran, including not only terrorist activities and support but the ongoing nuclear program. The U.S. Government and media

and defying the dual use paradigm by magnitudes. This appears to be a waste of time, since steam turbines are a necessary development for a peaceful use of nuclear power, the focus and energy should be on more nefarious items. Some analysts believe the semi-public revealation may be a cover for other equipmetn that was being shipped through Turboatom, thus stopping the turbine shipments may have also severed a clandestine equipment pipeline. This cannot be confirmed, however. Sanctions against Russa itself do not take place leaving many to wonder how effective commercial sanctions against Russian companies will be without a sanction against the country itself. Part of the problem, most analysts believe, is that U.N. sanctions are extremely difficult if not impossible to levy against a permanent member of the U.N. security council, so the U.S. cannot take any Russian sanctions to the next step. Some believe Russia is succumbing to pressure from the world community and is dragging their feet. But slow progress is still progress and members of the intelligence community continue to forecast a nuclear weapon by 2002. Iran's denial continue to fit the pattern of deception expected. As 2002 looms closer, the Intelligence Community does not alter its estimates for a nuclear weapon by 2002.

outlets also charge Iran with harboring terrorists and continuing to build a nuclear program. 1/29/2002 U.S. President Bush names Iran The denials are again, part of the as part of the 'Axis of Evil' in the pattern against increasing State of the Union Address. Iran worldwide pressure to own up to denies they support terrorism and their nuclear program. The say they do not participate in President's speech clearly puts nuclear weapons trade or pressure on Iran, Iraq, and North development. Korea. MILNET publishes an article citing hopes diplomatic pressure will prevent Iran and North Korea from testing their first device, and indeed to abandon their programs. MILNET is pessimistic, however. 5 12/13/2002 CNN Splashes commercial U.S. Intelligence analysts and satellite photo of Iranian nuclear several anonymous sources facility and cites U.S. spy satellite confirm that the Iranian facility photos that reveal the site is more has far more traffic in military than it seems. IAEA demands weapons researchers than a Iran reveal the purpose of their peaceful energy facility should nuclear facilities, Iran denies host. Clearly something sinister is existence. going on at the site. Iran's denials fit the pattern of deception expected. MILNET and AFI had earlier published articles on the Iranian threat repudiating the denials.

2/9/2003

Iran finally reveals the existence U.S. diplomacy may manage to of their nuclear sites and invites tame the beast, however while in IAEA, and the follow up report MILNET hopes along with most from the IAEA demands more others that diplomacy will details, clearly indicating the succeed, history has shown that IAEA has found the evidence that rogue nations tend to use traces of weapons grade material diplomacy as cover while they has been found. Iran refuses. complete their work. MILNET believes Iran will be the next nation to test a nuclear weapon, if not beaten to the punch by North Korea.

3/17/2003

Iran's program is thought to be further ahead than North Korea's program, however no clear evidence of fissile material in place prevents the Intelligence Community for confirming either country has a testable weapon. Most analysts will say, however, "Any time Now". Media hype and political agendas Time magazine 7 splashes photos aside, it is clear everyone must taken from their own sources take notice of the Iranian refusal that show the Iranian facilities to reveal their program. Their and warns that the U.S. may find continued refusal indicates the itself embroiled in another secrecy and progress in the conflict shortly. (photo is linked toprogram. As the program gets the Time Magazine article and closer to the completion of a test may get unlinked if Time moves device, MILNET believes the or deletes the image). dialog will get shriller and the denials eventually to cease, the refusal to accept or deny being the indicator the weapon(s) are ready.

June 2004 All media outlets report on the MILNET concurs with media ElBadarai (IAEA chairman) hysteria in this case, having 10 report that cites Iran may predicted this from as early as already have all the ingredients to 1996 and tracked the progress test a nuclear weapon. Traces of since then. weapons grade material continue to be found and the possible sites MILNET believes Iran is waiting for weapons grade material for the appropriate moment to manufacture continue to be conduct its test, already having overly busy. constructed one or more devices. Sources which wish to remain anonymous are split 50-50 on whether the device is actually ready for test. This is a state of affiars very similar to the months leading up to the first test of a device by India. June 2004 Federation of American Scientists The FAS is perhaps a notorius 9 continues to support the claims anti-U.S. Government operation that Iran's nuclear program is when it comes to things nuclear or sufficient to build nuclear any sort of weapon for that weapons matter, making their analysis

appear very much independent of U.S. political interests.

IRAN’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS

AMMAR HASSAN 6940 XI