Introduction 1. Problem Outline

I

Introduction 1. Problem Outline

Communist regime, Budapest uprising 1956, Prague Spring 1968, Berlin Wall 1989, the ensuing political and economic transformation, democratic consolidation and market liberalization...These are just a few keywords associated with the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region1 and its rather strenuous post-communist transformation process towards young democratic states. Twenty years after these states have begun the transformation with hope for the future, there are indications that this process might still be ongoing - however not in terms of the classical and formal understanding of transformation. The formal transformation has concluded, most recently with the accession to the European Union (EU) in 2004,2 by completing the requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria.3 In the Copenhagen European Council conclusions from 1993 with regards to CEE states, the European Community assured its support vis-à-vis the impending reform. As the Council noted, “peace and security in Europe depend on the success of those efforts.”4 What have been the successes so far? At an event entitled “20 Years Freedom. 1989-2009”5, the former Czech state president Vaclav Havel in a conversation with the former German state president Richard von Weizsäcker mentioned that although much had been achieved in the Czech Republic, the process was advancing more slowly and was considerably more complicated than was thought at the beginning of the transformation.6 Indeed, the hitherto existing outcomes of the transformation in CEE point towards some rather puzzling questions regarding the degree of political stability7 in the region, particularly since the accession to the EU in 2004. Oddly enough, one would think that with the accession, political stability in CEE states would have 1

For a definition of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), please refer to the Appendix. In 2004, the following states joined the EU: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 3 These include political (institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights, protection of minorities), economic (functioning market economy, capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union) and acceptance of the Community acquis (ability to take on obligations of membership). See Accession Criteria (Copenhagen criteria) in Europa Glossary. 4 Copenhagen European Council 1993:1. 5 Refer to the event on 1.10.2009, at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V.: 1.10.2009. 6 Ibid., 1.10.2009. 7 For a working definition of “political stability”, please refer to Chapter I. 2

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increased following their incorporation into EU economic and political structures. Yet in fact, this alone does not promise the certainty of political stability. “ Even so, there are differences even among the EU member states which show that membership is not the only criterion for grouping states, and that within this group states face varying risks as well.”8 The variance in some of the aspects of the outcomes of the post-communist transition in CEE states is rather remarkable. Much of the recent media (particularly in Europe) has been discussing the overall European trend of disappointment in the non-social behavior of social-democrats, the high level of populism within political discourse, and the rising support for radical right-wing organizations and parties, as well as – encompassing all this – the crisis of democracy. There are grounds for believing that these arguments are plausible, yet these tendencies alone do not point to political instability within the countries of the region. This is particularly true as there is an absence of remarkably strong and long-lasting violent events, coups d’état, armed conflicts and revolutions – if political stability is to be defined in these terms9. Moreover, it would be erroneous to interpret the concept of political stability under the indices above, as it would not as such apply to countries analyzed here (considering these are democracies). This means that the measurement of political stability is applied within parameters set by the context and structures of a democratic political regime. Thus, needless to say, armed conflict is not likely to break out in the CEE countries anytime soon – the causes of political instability are rather latent in their source. One of the issues is that there is a certain discontinuity in post-communist countries, “not only in the sphere of politics, but also in economy and social structure.”10 This point is also mentioned later on with regards to the criteria for political stability. Political stability of countries in the region is of key relevance for a) their internal development and the government’s ability to fulfill duties towards its citizens; b) the extent to which these countries can fulfill their regional and international responsibilities and; c) the security and stability of the region and the EU. The Czech Ambassador in Berlin (JUDr. Rudolf Jindrák) mentioned that the political instability in the Czech Republic overshadowed the Czech EU Presidency at the beginning of 2009.11 This comment illustrates the fact that a poor internal political situation can negatively affect external responsibilities and relationships. 8

Lakner/Tóth-Czifra 2008:52. For a definition of “political stability” and its criteria, please see Chapter I. 10 Markus 1998:1. 11 Refer to the event on 2.10.2009 at the Freie Universität Berlin. 9

2

Even though the states, once under the Soviet sphere of influence, have shared common elements – for example, parts of their history, state ideology, centrally-planned economies, et cetera – they each have distinctive characteristics which make a comparative case study fitting for this paper. The region has been able to continuously draw attention and ignite interest. The recent economic crisis has impacted the region enormously and has uncovered weak democratic and structural features in some states of the states. Thus, this point makes aim of the analysis rather interesting. Subsequently, this study intends to focus on possible causes of the difference in the degree of political stability between the countries analyzed here.

2.Political Operationalization 2.1. Object of Analysis (Variables and Hypotheses) and Timeframe When considering political stability (dependent variable (DV)) , multiple factors could be involved in the analysis, such as per capita growth, ethnic fractionalization, trade openness, economic distress, and demographic homogeneity. However, none of these are considered here as independent variables (IVs). This study aims to look at structural factors using the systemic theory (approach by David Easton) as a framework. In addition, the theory of relative deprivation is used when discussing IV2. Moreover, for practical reasons and taking into account the scope of this study, the factors above are not to be discussed as conditional or intervening variables either. Instead, the focus is on two central variables and the assumption that these are capable of explaining the varying degree(s) of political in/stability in CEE. The following IVs form the object of analysis: IV 1: Responsiveness of Political Authorities Hypothesis 1: A higher level of responsiveness of political authorities to inputs, demands and stimuli affects political stability positively. The lower the degree of responsiveness of political authorities, the higher the degree of political instability. Theoretical framework: Systems Theory (Approach by David Easton)

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IV 2: Social Imbalance Hypothesis 2: Social cleavage and imbalances within a society, if not equalized to an extent, can have a negative effect on political stability. The higher the degree of social imbalance, the higher the degree of political instability. Theoretical framework: Theory of Relative Deprivation The above IVs should address the main question of why the degree of political stability in some CEE EU-member states is higher/lower than in other CEE countries (also EU members). This research assumes that political stability depends heavily on different elements and interactions within a given political system12 and particularly on the capabilities and degree of responsiveness of the political authorities13. Furthermore, it is vital to take into account the context of the cases studied, including various (endogenous and exogenous) stimuli14. It is important to consider that these stimuli do not directly influence political stability. In order to test the causal relationship between the DV and IVs, there are couple of points that need to be mentioned with regards to the choice of IVs. As already discussed, there are various possible factors that can influence the degree of political stability. This analysis avoids using some of these for two reasons: 1) there have already been numerous studies on political in/stability employing these variables, and 2) in order to focus on factors found in the systems theory approach by David Easton, as well as in the definition of requirement for political stability.(→ Chapter I) Focusing on structural and systemic factors related to political in/stability was also suggested in a study by Jack Goldstone, Ted Gurr et al.15 The focus of analysis is on the timeframe 1995-2009. The reason for a larger time span is related to the nature of political stability, which is difficult to examine within a short period of time. Sandschneider writes, “In beliebig kurzen Betrachtungszeiträumen ist jedes gegebene System stabil.”16 For the purpose of avoiding false observations fixed to one event or one point in time, using a larger timeframe offers a more objective and clear analysis by excluding some of the possible short-lived factors that may induce a deviation in results or false outcomes. 12

To be used as “system” in the rest of the paper. Refer to Chapter II. 14 Refer to Chapter II for an explanation of the concept. 15 Goldstone/Gurr 2010: 27. 16 Sandschneider 1995: 111. 13

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2.2. Structure of Analysis The chapters are titled according to the variables analyzed. Before chapter one, dependent variable is dealt with, firstly by providing the necessary conceptual and definitional background, and secondly with the operationalization of the DV by specifying and explaining the chosen indicators. Chapter I is concerned with the first IV and its indicators. Th beginning of this chapter includes some background context for each case and a brief definition of stimuli, as these are not only part of the context but are important for the IV. Within this chapter cases are compared according to their empirical measurement. Additionally, there is a brief summary of the case results for IV1. Chapter II discusses the second IV and its indicators. It includes the necessary empirical data for each of the cases. A brief summary of IV2 helps reflect back on the empirical insight(s) won. Chapter III deals with the case comparison of the dependent variable including the indicator measurements of each case, with a brief summary at the end of the chapter. In Chapter IV, the interaction of the variables and their causal relationship is discussed, including the evaluation of hypotheses. Additionally, evaluation and conclusion follow. The Appendix contains a more detailed definition about CEE and particularly relevant information on the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia.

2.3. Theoretical Framework

This analysis is concerned primarily with systems theory, but also with the theory of relative deprivation (IV2). Given the explanatory breadth of the systems theory, the particular approach by David Easton will be employed, especially for the first IV. This approach is fitting for this study as it deals with the theoretical nature of a (political) system and the interacting elements, which have an influence on the system as a whole. Initially, the political equilibrium approach17 was to be used in this analysis. According to this approach, there is a tendency in a (political) system to maintain the given equilibrium. 18 However, after some consideration, this approach has proven unfruitful, since a system – according to Easton 17

“Political equilibrium involves a balance between demands by citizens on the political system and candidates compete for office.”, In: Sutter 2002:202. 18 Ibid., pp. 270.

5

– is not simply at equilibrium, but is constant fluid. Easton’s dynamic response model of a political system19 is appropriate here, insofar as it gives considerable attention to inputs (demands, support) and outputs (decisions, policies) in a system and the resulting feedback loop. Inputs are directed towards political authorities.20 Demands and support are considered by the authorities, upon which they make decisions and thus show their responsiveness to the inputs by taking decisions and implementing reforms and policies. Authorities produce an output which within the feedback loop, flows back to the society. This creates another round of inputs as a reflection of the outcomes of the actions taken by political authorities.21 In order to identify demands and support it is important to form exclusions from the former category of demands. According to Easton, the following should not be confused with demands: expectations, public opinion, motivations, ideology, interests and preferences.22 Seeing that demands can strain the political system, Easton sees the response of the system to those strains as being “as vital to the outcome as the nature of the initial stress itself.” 23 This would complement Eberhard Sandschneider’s idea of political stability (→ Chapter I), which requires flexibility of a system and political authorities to respond to various stimuli. Support24 is another element of input and reflects legitimacy (→ Chapter II). Support is most commonly expressed in political participation and voter turn-out for example. Regarding legitimacy, Easton writes that, if the constant threat of living on a precipice of disorder is to be avoided, at the minimum the authorities require some assurance that within the limits set forth in the political system, limits that I have been calling the regime, they can expect regularly to obtain compliance with respect to the adoption and implementation of outputs and the performance of necessary tasks. The belief in the legitimacy of authorities and regime provides such a stable connection.25 Thus, legitimacy as an indicator for responsiveness of the political authorities is crucial. Another important element of the dynamic response model is outputs. These can be defined as “a stream of activities flowing from the authorities in a system”. 26 It is important here to 19

Easton 1965: 30 Ibid., pp 26. 21 Ibid., pp 32. 22 Ibid., pp 41- 47. With regards to public opinion, he notes that it may be influential in shaping demands and it is crucial that before a public opinion can become a political demand, it „may need to wait for the position of a recognized leader to become known or for an issue to be formed by others.“ Also, he notes that with regards for an interest “to become a demand, there needs to be voiced a proposal that authorative action can be taken with regard to it.” 23 Ibid., pp 38. 24 Ibid., pp 159. ”We can say that A supports B either when A acts on behalf of B or when he orients himself favorably toward B. B may be a person or group; it may be a goal, idea, or institution. I shall designate supportive actions as overt support and supportive attitudes or sentiments as covert support.” 25 Ibid., pp 279. 20

26

Ibid., pp 349.

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distinguish between outputs and outcomes as the consequences of outputs.27 Types of outputs include authoritative and associated, modes include statements and performances. One final key concept Easton’s approach is the feedback loop. It represents the channel through which information is fed back to the authorities, as well as through which the regulative outputs of a system are given.28 The ability of the authorities to produce satisfactory outputs is key for political stability. Easton notes that, a persistent inability of a government to produce satisfactory outputs for the members of a system may well lead to demands for changing of the regime or for dissolution of the political community. It is for this reason that the input-output balance is a vital mechanism in the life of a political system.29

This point is essential because continuity and durability, or rather, the persistence of the production of satisfactory outputs have a definite impact on the stability of a political system. Political stability requires flexibility and the ability to adapt to changing conditions. Inputs, outputs

and

the

resulting

feedback

are

of

crucial

significance

for

stability.

2.4. Methodology and Case Selection

This study is based on the method of comparative analysis which is defined as a systemic analysis of a small-N.30 Admittedly, its inherent problem, as defined by Lijphart, is a weak capacity to sort out rival explanations. This study thus incorporates the potential solutions offered by Lijphart into the design and analysis that follows.31 This means there is a focus on comparable cases, and the number of variables is reduced. The advantage of this is the use of both quantitative and qualitative data to assess the possibility of a causal relationship between the IV and DV. Additionally, Lijphart suggests using a “strong theory that serves to reduce the number of explanatory factors that must be considered.”32 To this end – as mentioned in previous in section 2.1. – the choice of variables has been deducted from the concept of political stability and the theoretical framework(s).

27

Ibid., pp .351.

28

Ibid., pp 367. 29 Easton 1957: 397. 30 Collier 1991:7. 31 Ibid., pp 9. 32 Ibid., pp 18.

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This study is based on primary and secondary literature, various surveys and polls, and strongly on indices and statistical databases such as the Political Stability Index (Economist Intelligence Unit), International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Electoral Database, Polity IV Project, Political Risk Index (PRI), Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank Group), and European Social Survey (ESS). The methodological processes include discourse and content analysis, statistical data evaluation and thus testing of hypothesis and verification of theoretical concepts. The following criteria, in addition to Lijphart’s recommendation to focus on comparable cases, are used to identify cases for comparison: Considered for analysis are: 1) all CEE states, 2) all CEE states out of the group that joined the EU in 2004 (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia), 3) states with similar transformation processes and a variance in the IVs ( Visegrad states: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), 4) states with relatively comparable surface and population size. Thus Poland is not being considered, in addition to the fact that Poland entails some historical and political specifics. Employing these criteria and considering the lack of financial and time resources for this study, three countries were identified, namely Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovak Republic.33

2.5. State of Research Much of the research on political stability has focused on: 1) defining the concept and narrowing it to a measurable scope,34 and 2) empirical research concerned with the classical idea of measuring instability in certain countries and regions where instability was once or is currently more obvious. The most commonly used approach is the large-N study with crossnational, cross-cultural and cross-longitudinal data. However, David Sanders has pointed out the difficulty in measuring political stability cross-culturally – namely, that the contexts for 33 34

From now on Slovak Republic will be referred to as Slovakia. Refer to for example Ake, Sanders, Eckstein.

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political stability are different and thus the measurements are incompatible. 35 This would point, first, towards a combined analysis using quantitative and qualitative methods, and second, towards the direction of regional analysis with regards to political in/stability. Moreover, when using the comparative method, a study between countries with similar contexts (though not necessarily political systems) should in this case give more fruitful results. The methodology of the more often conducted large-N research on political stability has habitually used computer-based analysis, with the help of specific programs, to calculate the data. Further, the scientific analysis of in/stability has often been based on countries that fall into a specific category of political systems; in other words, non-democracies and hybrid regimes.36 Research regarding political stability in democracies has frequently included standard factors such as economy, ethnic composition, and protection of minorities, among others. One particular study from 1983 pertained to political the political stability of Western democracies.37 Another type of research frequently found with regards to political stability is consultancies’ and business monitors’ political stability risk reports and summaries. These, however, tend to be shorter and are composed for the purpose of giving investors a picture of the political situation in the country of interest.

2.6. Constraints to the Analysis One difficulty for the following analysis stems from the fact that there is no clear onset of political instability in the cases chosen for comparison. This means that political instability cannot be identified as starting with armed conflict, war, revolution or a coup. Rather, it mus be analyzed within a larger timeframe using the criteria for political stability applicable to democratic countries. With regard to methodology, the control method of the predominantly statistical large-N study (a larger number of cases), though potentially betters, is not very suitable for this analysis due to: 1) the lack of resources (financial and technical) and time, and 2) the spacial constraints of this study. 35

Errson/Lane 1983:245. For a list of countries „non-democratic“ and hybrid regimes, refer to EIU 2008:14. 37 Errson/Lane 1983:245. 36

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Another restriction is due to the fact that the focus of recent research on CEE relied heavily on economic factors influencing stability in the region. As such, the available English and German sources are concerned largely with issues relating to the economic crisis and less with systemic problems, including the input-output balance and communication processes mentioned above. (→2.3) Additionally, the language barriers (mainly Hungarian and Slovak) also pose a constraint. Translation has been made where information and data was necessary to obtain. Lastly, the lack of co-operation with regards to requested interviews reduced the opportunity to include those as part of the material to be evaluated.

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Dependent Variable: Degree of Political Stability

Definitional Background: Political Stability Owing to the fact that political stability is a fairly broad concept, numerous (competing) definitions have arisen over time, particularly since World War II. It is important to keep in mind, that the concept is largely dependent on the individual elements and contexts of cases analyzed. While one country may be considered politically instable, the same circumstance would not apply to political instability in another country. However, in order to carry out a comparative political analysis, an integrative definition of the concept is necessary. But first, some of the various ways to employ this concept will be outlined. One of the approaches to political stability focuses on patterns of behavior. Claude Ake views political stability as “the regularity of the flow of political exchanges”.

38

There are

behavior patterns in a society and simultaneously there are limits within which member of society should stay. “Any act that deviates from these limits is an instance of political instability”.39 However, Keith M. Dowding and Richard Kimber have criticized this approach by arguing that, This view [Ake’s] turns stability into something that pertains to acts and not to governments, systems, institutions, and so on. The regularity of exchanges may be stabilizing (i.e. cause X to be stable), but it cannot be what stability itself means.40 Thus they offer a view that there need be elements to stability which are necessary for continuity, and “the continuity of those elements constitutes survival.”41 Furthermore, they argue that although change should not be precluded, instability is not to be solely defined in terms of change.42 38

Ake 1975:273. Ake 1975:273. 40 Dowding/Kimber 1983:233. 41 Dowding/Kimber 1983:237. 42 Dowding,/Kimber 1983:236. 39

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The idea of continuity is also present in Sandschneider’s explanation of stability as a steady state equilibrium (Fließgleichgewicht). Sandschneider sees a system as “stable” when there is a continuous and coordinated fluctuation of the system variables, and no actors or system components have a motivation to change or disrupt the existing or newly established structural and functional arrangements.43 Furthermore, a system requires flexibility and needs to integrate and process external and internal stimuli.44 The flexibility of the (political) system and its responsiveness to specific stimuli would assume that the political authorities are capable of handling the political situation. To further expand on this, Jerzy Mackow sees “political stability” as a state of the political system that is preserved even if there are institutional processes of change, and where if hard cases occur, the governing bodies would not see this as a loss of control over the situation. Otherwise, in such cases, the population might question the system decisions.45 Another interesting definition is offered by Arthur S. Goldberg. His definition also takes into account the various components of a system and the factors influencing the decision-makers, as well as the important part capabilities play in securing stability. Goldberg, distinguishes between the "tenability" (T) of a regime (R) and the "stability" of the system: (T) is the probability that (R) will produce a policy package "without provoking an internal reaction which proves fatal to that regime" and "stability" is the "degree of resistance of (T) to changes in the factors of which it is a function-these factors being the policy preference orderings held by the components of the system and the distribution of capabilities across these components." A "fatal internal reaction" is one which results in a change of the decision-makers.46 Lastly, Harry Eckstein’s view of political stability would be the most valuable here, as it deals particularly with democratic political stability. His definitional constructs are: (1) persistence of pattern-not mere longevity or governmental endurance but persistence in the sense of having the capacity to "adapt to changing conditions, for realizing political aspirations and holding fast allegiances"; (2) legitimacy-not only the absence of strong dissent but the presence of positive acceptance and support; (3) effective decision-making- effective "not in the sense of right action on the basis of some particular scheme of values, but in the basic sense of action itself, any sort of action, in pursuit of shared political goals or in adjustment to

43

Sandschneider 1995:117. For a more detailed explanation of stimuli, please see Chapter II. 45 Mackow 1998: 75. 46 Goldberg 1968:454. 44

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changing conditions"; and (4) authenticity-"the democratic structures must not be mere facades for actual government by nondemocratic structures."47 In summary, for Eckstein, “the term ‘stability,’ when applied to democracies, thus implies four conditions:

persistence

of pattern,

legitimacy,

decisional

effectiveness,

and

authenticity.”48 For the purpose of this paper, Eckstein’s definitional constructs and Sandschneider’s requirements for stability (continuity in system variable and flexibility to respond to stimuli) are most fitting, considering the context of cases compared, meaning their democratic framework.

2. Operationalization and Measurement To measure the degree of political stability, various indices exist, mostly of which employ the large-N method of measurement to obtain results. These indexes include the Political Stability Index from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), the Worldwide Governance Indicators Project (WGI) from the World Bank Group and the Political Capital scores, among others. 2.1. Political In/Stability Indices The EIU Index measures the degree of vulnerability to political instability across 165 countries on a scale from 0 (no vulnerability) to 10 (highest vulnerability). 49 The index itself has two component indexes – underlying vulnerability and economic distress –which are a combination of numerous indicators. The country results for 2009/2010 are compared to those for 2007.50 The WGI index ranges from 1998-2008 and offers political stability scores for 212 countries. It is based “on 35 different data sources from 33 organizations around the world, aggregating the data from hundreds of disaggregated questions.”51 The advantage of this index is that the score for each country can be observed within a longer timeframe and compared to other countries in a given region.

47

Eckstein 1973:458. Eckstein 1992: 184. 49 Refer to EIU: 19.3. 2009 5051 World Bank 2009. 48

51

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Political Capital Institute scores for political in/stability are valuable insofar as they combine qualitative and quantitative analysis. Additionally, the score can also be compared to other years, though only for one specific country (Hungary). Thus, in order to get a more precise assessment of the degree of the DV, it is useful to include public protest events52 (both non-violent and violent) as an additional indicator. 2.2. Public protest events (non-violent and violent) Public protest events indicate a degree of political in/stability, depending on the number, frequency and character of the protests. They show the inputs and demands of the population and a possible proclivity towards social and political unrest. Dissatisfaction with either government performance and/or the situation (particularly socio-economic) in the country will most likely lead to a proclivity to protest. (for social imbalance, see IV2).

52

Under public protest events meant are different forms of protest, such as public demonstrations or political rallies, riots, strikes.

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Chapter I. Independent Variable 1: Responsiveness of the Political Authorities

1. Brief Definitional Background: Political Authorities, Stimuli In short, (legitimate)53 political authority refers to the following elements: 1) actors – the government (political parties, political leaders) and its political institutions. 2) actions – the duties and responsibilities of the actors towards the citizens. Stimuli are categorized according to their source (endogenous and exogenous) and their intent (intended and un-intended).54 The compatability of the structures of a system with a stimulus or stimulus compatibility (Anreizkompatibilität) – is concerned with whether a given stimulus compromises or advances the system; in other words how it functions within the system. How a system or rather its actors perceive the stimuli is key. This ties in with the already discussed concept of political stability, requiring flexibility by the system. Furthermore, it is related to the theoretical framework in which a system is required to act upon inputs and the possible stress these may cause. Again, it is important to mention that stimuli do not as such affect the dependent variable, but are nonetheless a valuable element of the context in which a political system is situated. A good example of this is Sandschneider’s explanation of destabilizing stimuli with regards to the dissolution of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). He explains that on the micro level the destabilizing stimuli – such as the visit of Gorbachov, leadership changes from Erich Honecker to Egon Kranz, escape wave (Fluchtwelle) through Hungary, the abolition of the Breshnev doctrine and the absence of political and economic support from the UDSSR, among others – were important events that helped lead to the fall of the GDR.55 Yet, they did not directly

lead to system failure, as the Sozialistische

Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) managed to cover the destabilization costs over years56. Eventually however, the system was not able to cope any further. This example should clarify the notion that stimuli are not to be confused with the IV. Stimuli are part of the context in which a political system, and thus also political actors, function. 53

Formed and legitimized through democratic processes. Sandschneider 1995:125. 55 Ibid., pp. 120. 56 Ibid., pp. 120. 54

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Relating back to the concept and requirements for political stability, and taking into consideration the theoretical framework used here, it is assumed that this IV has a considerable influence on political stability. In order to measure the degree of the IV, the following two indicators have been chosen: 1.) Worldwide Governance Indicators

57

on a) governance effectiveness and b) voice and

accountability and; 2) Degree of legitimacy measured by a) degree of support (through voter turnout and election results and b) degree of trust (through surveys and polls). The concepts of support and trust are based on Easton’s approach to legitimacy within the wider systems theory. Legitimacy has been ruled out as a possible IV as it is assumed here that it does not directly influence political stability. Rather, it indicates an existence of a deeper problem in case the legitimacy of political

authorizes

is

low

or

a

success

in

case

legitimacy

is

high.

2. Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Two WGI indicators that are particularly relevant to the IV are: → Government Effectiveness (GE): capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.58 → Voice and Accountability (VA): capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.59

Degree of Legitimacy The degree of legitimacy is a central indicator for how the political authorities are fulfilling their responsibilities, responding to demands and dealing with possible stress factors.

57

World Bank 2009 Kaufmann/Kraay/Mastruzzi 2009: 6. 59 Ibid.,pp.6. 58

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There is a general presumption that its [political legitimacy] absence has profound implications for the way that states behave toward citizens and others. States that lack legitimacy devote more resources to maintaining their rule and less to effective governance, which reduces support and makes them vulnerable to overthrow or collapse. Within the ruling elite, doubts about legitimacy undermine self-esteem, which creates splits that accelerate this process. More generally, the concept has become a central part of modern political discourse. 60 There might be an assumption that the concept of (political) legitimacy 61, even though crucial, is difficult to measure. Nevertheless, there are ways to do so, first as a study by Bruce Gilley shows,62 and second by empirically employing Easton’s model of the political system. Gilley establishes three sub-types of legitimacy: views of legality, views of justification and acts of consent.63 For each of these he has two categories: “actions” and “attitudes”, which are measurable, for example by using surveys and opinion polls. Gilley is able to aggregate the data from the indicators in these two categories and the three sub-types. As a result, he obtains measurements of legitimacy for 72 countries.64 Another tool to measure the responsiveness of political authorities (through legitimacy) is the European Social Survey (ESS). It is an impressive tool that can be used from 2002 to 2008. According to Easton, legitimacy indicates the degree to which political authorities have managed to respond to inputs and demands. Typically, members of a political system may find themselves opposed to the political authorities, disquieted by their policies, dissatisfied with their conditions of life and, where they have the opportunity, prepared to throw the incumbents out of office. At times such conditions may lead to fundamental political or social change.65 Degree of Support As the political authorities receive demands from within the population (and/or from interest groups) for wage increases, reform of the social system, et cetera), they need to produce satisfactory outcomes in order to retain their support and, thus, their legitimacy. The authorities will be evaluated according to the extent to which these demands are perceived to have been met. Specific support arising in this way can be of 60

Gilley 2006: 499.

61

From now on only referred to as legitimacy.

62

Gilley 2006:499.

63

Ibid., pp. 502. Ibid., pp. 509.

64

65

Easton 1975: 436.

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considerable significance for the stability or change of a system. Conceivably a person may have little trust in the political authorities and may not even believe in their legitimacy.66 The degree of support is measured through voter turnout and election results.

3.1.1 Voter Turnout Voter turnout, as a form of political participation and, thus, a fundamental element in any democracy is key in indicating the perceived legitimacy of political authorities. It is also necessary in obtaining mathematical values of support. The data is obtained through national elections offices, EU statistics offices and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). The latter provides the latest statistics (including 2009) and details for three election types: presidential, parliamentary and European Parliament (EP) elections.

3.1.2 Election Results Election results point specifically towards the performance of political authorities, given the quantitative data – obtained mostly through national electoral offices and EP election results (2004 and 2009) – through on which a qualitative analysis can be performed. This means that the success and legitimacy of a government, for example, can be understood by looking at the election results of particular opposition parties. If the election results show a high degree of opposition success, the perceived legitimacy of the government is low.

3.2. Degree of Trust With regards to trust in political authorities, Easton writes that, The presence of trust would mean that members would feel that their own interests would be attended to even if the authorities were exposed to little supervision or scrutiny. For the regime, such trust would reveal itself as symbolic satisfaction with the processes by which the country is run… In addition to its source in socialization, however, we can also expect that trust will be stimulated by the experiences that members have of the authorities over time. The outputs and performance of incumbent authorities may slowly nourish or discourage sentiments of trust. 67 Trust is measured here mostly through the data of the ESS and through opinion polls and surveys, conducted by other polling and research institutes. 66 67

Easton 1975: 438 Easton 1975: 447, 448.

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4. Hungary, the Czech Republic and, the Slovak Republic: Case Comparison of Independent Variable 1 4.1. Context and Stimuli In order to measure the IVs and to better understand the indicator(s) results, it is important to consider the context within which these variables operate and the stimuli that play or might play a role in variability of the IV. While it is not within the scope of the paper to discuss neither the context or the stimuli at length, a short outline of the major elements is necessary. According to Zoltán Lakner, society in Hungary is divided into three parts: 1) the comprador elite of globalism, 2) the national middle class, and 3) the “wretched” masses.68 Within this society, the cleavages that shape the political landscape and rhetoric, or political life consist of a couple of things. First is the defining conflict of the “integration into, or separation from and oppression by, the communist/socialist state-party system.”69 This debate and that around socio-cultural issues70 permeates party politics. It is reflected in election campaigns and the general political discourse. In 2004, after losing the parliamentary election to the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), the Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz) created a new concept where the “true adversary is the post-communist elite exemplified by MSZP-SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats) government.”71 Herwith, Fidesz moved away from the general anti-communist strategy to rather predominantly include the elites instead, or the successors of the previous communist state-party. Thus the communist/anti-communist debate in Hungarian politics can be used, reframed and transformed to fit the political sentiments at a given time. Another major cleavage is the urban/rural divide (created by the industrial revolution) within Hungarian political life. Parties with a right-wing orientation tend to find more supporters in the rural areas than in urban parts of the country (also see indicator results in IV2). Yet, what had proven a false way to use this cleavage for the purposes of winning the election is exemplified by the Fidesz’ loss in 2002. “The placing of the countryside in conflict with Budapest…, though symbolic in origin, had very material effects, intensifying the rejection of Fidesz in the capital to the bitter end and proving the decisive factor in the elections of April 2002.”72

68 69

Lakner 2007:99. Körösényi 1999: 64.

70

Kitschelt 1999:234.

71

Lakner 2007:101. Ibid., pp.100.

72

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The post-communists (MSZP) have tried to define the cleavages according to labor/capital or religious/secular but not communist/anti-communist conflict lines. However, it is interesting that Hungary has a low salience of the economic cleavage,73 even though it has the secondlowest employment rate in Europe.74 That the economic conflict lines are not so strong, could also be related back to Hungary’s early start of economic reforms (already in communist times) and contrary to some other CEE countries (Czech Republic for example),

the

expropriation of most large and small enterprises during the communist times was not as high, thus permitting more room for economic capital.75 According to a recent study from August 2009, welfare issues in Hungary are “significantly less central and relative to nationalism and the Communist legacy.”76 In a comparison between 2003 and 2007, scores for the conflict dimension of “nationalism” were 2.1 (for 2003) and 2.7 (for 2007), with 1 meaning the most significant and 5 meaning insignificant. An increase in the conflict dimension for “communist legacy” was also reflected in the change of scores: from 3.5 (2003) to 2.4 (2007).77 Due to the transformation and a changed economic, political and social framework, the support base for parties has also transformed. For example, changing economic structures have brought about both the decrease and disappearance of work places in industries, which were typically a social-democratic milieu. Thus, the supporter base has decreased and shifted. Similarly, changes in re-privatization and EU guidelines in the area of agriculture – an important industry for Hungary – have resulted in farmers losing out. This has caused voter preferences to shift from the f social-democrats to right-wing oriented parties.78 All of these changes help to elucidate the conflict lines and movements in political and socio-economic settings, which are important to consider when analyzing the IVs below.

The stimuli that arise within and from the Hungarian context include: a falling real GDP rate (which dropped 0,3 % from 2008 to 2009)79, an increase in unemployment rate (from 7.7% in 2008 to 9.6% in 2009)80, a decline in the quality of the healthcare system (ranked 20th out of 31 countries), the strength of the current opposition (Fidesz), an increase in right-wing popularity, discrimination against minorities (particularly Roma), rising energy and food 73

Kitschelt 1999:286. Szlanko.2009 75 Horáková 2002. 76 Whitefield/Rohrschneider 2009:676. 77 Ibid., pp.677. 78 Ibid., pp 97 79 European Commission 2009. 80 Hungarian Central Statistical Office 7.10.2009. 74

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prices (gas by about 10% and fuels and electricity by 3-4%) 81, general dissatisfaction within the population, highly active radical movements82, allegations of corruption with regards to new ministers,83 high frequency and intensity of peaceful demonstration and strikes.84 Furthermore, the global economic crisis has greatly impacted Hungary. The country has received an IMF package that could be threatened by uncertainty surrounding the elections in 2010.85 Slovak-Hungarian tensions86 are a further stimuli that play a role when it comes to stability in the relations with Slovakia. Cleavage and conflict lines in the Czech Republic differ from those in Hungary. Within the Czech context, the focus is primarily upon socio-economic division lines. Needless to say, part of the reason is related to the communist past and the stricter rules under communism in Czechoslovakia than in Hungary. As was mentioned, the extent of expropriation of large and small business varied between the CEE states. In the Czech Republic “virtually no private ownership of service outlets was allowed. In Hungary, by contrast, a significant private sector of small businessmen, primarily in the trade and service sectors, had been growing since 1968, particularly in the 1980’s.”87 In the Czech Republic, the “welfare state” indicator (a study by Stephen Whitefield and Robert Rohrschneider) has an increasing importance: the score for 2003 was 1.6 an for 2007 1.4.88 Within the political discourse, the polarization over economic issues is more significant in the Czech Republic and the socio-cultural divide plays rather a minor role.89 “Market vs. state”90 is the next important conflict dimension. These cleavages point towards: 1) the direction of political, economic and social development in the Czech Republic, 2) domination of issues in Czech political debate, and 3) possible voter preferences and election results (→ Chapter II). Unlike in Hungary, the conflict line along the subject of communism/anti-communism is not very strong in the Czech Republic, as the election results show (→ Chapter II). Moreover, the Czech Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) has a much more extensive supporter base than the communist parties in either Hungary or Slovakia.

81

Political Capital 2008: 3. Ibid., pp.5. 83 Ibid., pp 5. 84 Ibid., pp.5. 85 “Hungary's minority government has navigated the country from the brink of economic collapse but faces near certain defeat in an election next year, bringing new uncertainty that could threaten an IMF package” in Reuters. 7.10.2009. 86 See Reuters News 1.9.2009. 87 Frydman/Rapaczynski/Turkewitz 1997:51. 88 Whitefield/Rohrschneider 2009:677. 89 Kitschelt 1999:266. 90 Ibid., pp 677. 82

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Considering the context above, the following stimuli play a role: the contraction in GDP of a record 5.5% in second quarter in 2009 (4.5% in the first quarter) 91, the rising unemployment was (8.6% in September 2009).92 Apparently, the Czech Republic has been hit harder by the crisis than assumed, yet still not as hard as Hungary who relied on IMF loans to avoid bankruptcy. It is worth noting that Czech Republic is ethnically fairly homogenous (→ Annex), so ethnic issues do not present a key stress factor for the political authorities.. Concerning cleavages, Slovakia shows some similarity to the Czech Republic, but also several differences to both Czech Republic and Hungary. As in the Czech Republic, the “welfare state” indicator is very significant (1.8 in 2003 and 1.6 in 2007). The importance of the “market vs. state” conflict line has increased from 2003 to 2007. This can be related to the 2002 radical neo-liberal reforms of the Mikulas Dzurinda center-right government,93 after which economic issues became more important. It is worth noting a larger decrease in interest in issues relating to “democracy” (from 3.1 in 2003 to 4.4 in 2007). 94 This decline is possibly brought by the results of the 2006 government change, and the fact that the Social Democrats (SMER) have formed a coalition with the radical Slovak Nationalist Party (SNS) and the People's Party - Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). Accordingly, the nationalist rhetoric in Slovak politics has become stronger, especially when it comes to the Hungarian minority and the Roma population. Even though in Hungary a similar nationalist presence has been directed mostly against the Roma population, Slovakia is insofar different as the main cleavage is not along the communist and anti-communist lines. Slovakia also differs from the Czech Republic, as the focus is rather on: 1) the issue of whether one agrees with the leftnationalist authority figures (such as the threefold PM Vladimir Meciar) or opposes the policies and government style of those,95 and 2) the already-mentioned nationalistic tendencies permeating different spheres of social, political, economic, and cultural life. This may be a consequence of a weak democratic opposition and civil society, not only recently, but from the beginning of the transformation.96 In addition, since the transition began, Slovak economy had an overall poorer performance97 than that in Czech Republic and Hungary.

91

See the Economist Intelligence Unit-Viewswire. 9.9.2009. See the Economist Intelligence Unit-Viewswire. Half of Czech unemployed threatened with poverty – expert . 13.10.2009. 93 Fitzmaurice 2003:166. 94 Whitefield,/Rohrschneider 2009: 677. 95 Holländer 2003:365. 96 Holländer 2003:369. 97 Evans/Whitefield 1998: 127. 92

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The following stimuli play a role in Slovakia: decreased GDP (by 5.3%) in the 2nd quarter of 2009 in comparison to the 2nd quarter of 2008,98 diminishing employment rate (in the first half of 2009 it dropped by 3.4%),99 increased tensions in the relationships with Hungary, among others. Rising nationalist sentiments fed with “racist and xenophobic rhetoric used by the country’s politicians (for example Jan Slota) is making the country sink to ‘a dangerous level.’”100 Momentarily, this seems to be a strong factor affecting the political debate. All three countries are to have parliamentary elections in 2010 (Hungary in April, Czech Republic and Slovakia in June). 4.2. Worldwide Governance Indicators 4.2.1. Governance Effectiveness The government effectiveness indicator shows data ranging from 1996 to 2008. Hungary has illustrated a continuous deterioration, finding itself currently at 50th-75th percentile, 101 with the lowest indicator value in 2008 and the highest in 2002. Within the past few years numerous social reform policy issues arose. The opposition-led referendum – to strike down health and university fees – proved a large defeat for the socialist-led government. 94% of the votes were counted, and each of the three questions on the ballot received 82-84% support.102 The global economic crisis and the resulting economic distress in Hungary which - according to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) – is very high (8.0 out of 10.0 in 2009), 103 prompted economic reforms in the shape of sharp budget cuts (including social spending), making this an unpopular measurement with the public. Nevertheless, these alone do not explain the continuous decline in government effectiveness from 2002, with the exception of 2006, which was an election year. Additional assumption is that the degree of conflict between the political camps had an impact on the decline in governance effectiveness. Particularly, the disagreements within parties themselves, as well as between different parties prove to be of detrimental importance for this indicator. The motion of no-confidence against the Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány in March 2009 was the last prominent example of the disagreement within a party (MSZP) itself. Gyurcsány ended up stepping down and Mr. Gordon Bajnai (politically independent) taking over as the PM. The second form of disagreement (between parties) has intensified since 2006. Earlier that year, a tape with a 98

Statistical office of the Slovak Republic 2.9.2009. Statistical office of the Slovak Republic 21.9.2009. 100 Porter 26.9.2009. 101 Indicates rank of country among all countries in the world. 0 corresponds to the lowest rank and 100 to the highest. 102 See Reuters. Hungary’s government suffers big defeat in Referendum. 9.3.2008. 103 See Economist Intelligence Unit..Political Instability Index. Index. Vulnerability to Social and Political Unrest. 99

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speech by Gyurcsány was leaked, where he was admitting that he and his party (MSZP) knowingly lied about the national financial situation (debt) in the run-up to the elections. As a result, large and violent protests against him followed, and this taken together with the above mentioned economic reforms (austerity package) made the conflict between the political camps worse. The rightwing conservative camp, which has been in the opposition since 2002, increasingly seems to be calling the parliamentary system into question. The rift between the camps is exacerbated by disputes over the past that conceal fundamental differences in national politics.104 The above quotation refers to the previously mentioned cleavages, particularly the communist/anti-communist conflict line. The communist past and events such as the 1956 Budapest uprising are instrumentilized for political goals and advantages. Moreover, the Political Capital Analyst evaluated the commitment to reform on part of the governing side as “very weak” (2 out of 10) on the grounds that the, “Government parties do not think of considerable transformations, the main aspect of their political measures and initiatives is to gain popularity and short-term political benefits.”105 This is true for the much needed tax reform, which yet is not on the agenda, as “a step-by-step tax reform can only be successful within two years if it is managed by a smooth schedule stably supported by the parliamentary majority, namely if the political actors throw off their short-term political interests.”106 On a different note, the 2002 high government effectiveness indicator level is presumably related to the efforts stemming from the need to fulfill the pre-accession Copenhagen Criteria, which required certain structural changes and better governance. In comparison, 1998 exhibits the worst government effectiveness levels for the Czech Republic and 2005 and 2008 the best. The 2008 level is slightly lower than 2005, but has improved from 2007. Taking into consideration the weight of the above-mentioned “welfare state” issue, the fact that government effectiveness was highest in 2005 may be related to the increase in social and assistance benefits (social security benefits, pension insurance and sickness insurance, state social care support benefits and unemployment benefits). All of those had seen a continuous

104

Von Ahn 2006. Political Capital 2008: 5. 106 Ibid., pp 8. 105

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increase in the last fifteen years since 2005.107 Furthermore, the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU in 2004, in other words the increased availability of funding, can also play a role in defining indicator scores. Hungary though also joined the EU in 2004, but has been showing poorer government effectiveness. Thus, the EU membership (including EU funds) itself is not the sole most important factor for the performance of national governments. 1998 reflects episodes and decisions made in the prior years, including 1998 itself. During the time Vaclav Klaus was PM (1992-1997) several policy areas turned out to be rather unsuccessful. The economy reforms ended up worse than Klaus had promised them to be and numerous social reform elements were increasingly unpopular. The employment benefits were reduced from 90% to 60% of the one’s previous salary and the maximum length of benefits declined from 12 to 6 months.108 The economy contracted and the unemployment rose.109 A call for Klaus’ resignation in May 1997 – both from the opposition (social democrats) and from the side of his own cabinet – was the result. The Trade and Industry Minister Vladimir Dlouhy (from the Cabinet of Vaclav Klaus, The Civic Democratic Alliance - ODA) suggested the resignation of the entire government.110 One further aspect that helped lead the Klaus government to collapse was a funding scandal.111 At the end of 1997, after the government break-up (Klaus’ resignation and that of the entire cabinet), a voter mandate called for the formation of a government “that would reflect voter’s wishes.” The right however, was unable to form a coalition due to personal issues and conflicts. 112 A sum of these incidences and issues, which extended into 1998, impacted the government effectiveness score. If the score for 2009 was already available, we might see a decline in political stability due to the collapse of the government in March 2009, where the PM Mirek Topolanek lost a noconfidence vote.113 Even though, the Czech government exhibits internal weaknesses, the financial market was not affected much.114 This indicates: 1) that the political authorities were better able to deal with the economic crisis, and/or 2) that the economy was in better shape than in other CEE countries before the crisis affected the country.

107

Czech Statistical Office 2005. Terrell/Munich 1996:180, 205. 109 Refer to Hospodarske Noviny. 1998’s most important events. 31.12.1998. 110 Refer to RFERL Newsline 20.5. 1997. 111 Refer to CTK Business News 1.12.2007. 112 Refer to Hospodarske Noviny 1998’s most important events. 31.12.1998. 113 Refer to Forbes 25.3.2009. 114 Ibid. 108

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Slovakia had shown the lowest government effectiveness in 1998. One of the stronger reasons for this was the – often as autocratic described - governing-style of the former PM Vladimír Mečiar (1994-1998). During these years Slovakia was in an international isolation. Some of the policies adopted during this time, or at least between 1996 and 1998 (as the graph below points towards a higher government effectiveness in 1996), have made the situation even less satisfactory. The Czech News Agency (CTK) Business News notes at the end of 1998 that, “The privatisation as undertaken by Vladimir Meciar's government and the reign of the new owners at companies only further worsened the situation”. 115 The Slovak News Agency (SITA) also wrote one day later that, “the year of 1998 was in the sign of interrupted social dialogue because of unfair approach of the previous Vladimir Meciar's government to trade unions”, which meant that 1998 was the hardest year so far. 116 These years also brought a loss of credibility in the eyes of the EU and NATO, which – in case Mečiar’s Ruling Movement for A Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) would have won the 1998 Elections – was not ready to consider Slovakia’s accession to the EU.117 The improvement started in 2003 and the highest level of government effectiveness was reached in 2006. According to Mikulas Dzurinda (Chairman of the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – SDKU), the year 2006 has been rather good for Slovakia due to the acceleration of economic growth, decreasing unemployment rate, records breaking koruna levels and in general improving mood of the population.118 Taking all the years (1996-1998) into account, the government effectiveness indicator for Slovakia shows much lower levels compared to Hungary and the Czech Republic.

115

Refer to CTK Business News. 30.12.1998. Refer to Slovenska Tlacova Agentura. 31.12.1998. 117 Refer to RFERL 8.9.1998. 118 Refer to BBC Monitoring European. 27.12.2006. 116

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Diagram 1. Government Effectiveness Indicator (1996-2008)

Source: Kaufmann, D.; Kraay A.; Mastruzzi M.: Governance Matters VIII. Governance Indicators 1996–2008.

4.2.2. Voice and Accountability The Voice and Accountability indicator analysis will be shorter than governance effectiveness analysis, due to similarities in explanation of scores; in other words the high correlation between government effectiveness and voice and accountability. The indicator was the highest for Hungary in 2004, higher than Czech Republic and Slovakia. However, since then it decreased to its low in 2008. This might have a few reasons: first, similar to government effectiveness, the EU accession in 2004 had a positive impact on the performance of political authorities and institutions. After the above-mentioned scandal Ferenc Gyrscany), voice and accountability of the political authorities and particularly that of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) plunged to its low. A recent poll had shown a clear preference of Hungarian population regarding the upcoming parliamentary elections (April 2010). Only 18% of the respondents would vote for the MSZP, 65% for Fidesz and 12% for the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik). Contrary to Hungary, voice and accountability in the Czech Republic is highest in 2008 and lowest in 2000. The lowest coincides with the government effectiveness levels in 2000, thus there is no extensive need to illustrate the circumstance again. The assumptions for this indicators coincide with the analysis of government effectiveness. Overall voice and accountability has been increasing. 27

Slovak Republic showed the lowest percentiles until 2000, 1996 being the worst year and 2006, but momentarily the score is lower than Hungary. For 1996, it can again be presumed that during the period of the Meciar-led government, due to its autocratic character, voice and accountability was low. It is fundamental to look at the data over a longer period of time, as according to the trends shown, Hungary’s indicator levels have been continuously decreasing since mid-2000’s, even though the data for 2008 is slightly higher than that for Slovakia. Diagram 2. Voice and Accountability Indicator (1996-2008)

Source: Kaufmann, D.; Kraay A.; Mastruzzi M.: Governance Matters VIII. Governance Indicators 1996–2008.

4.3. Degree of Legitimacy Beside the two WGI above, another fundamental indicator for IV1 is the degree of legitimacy. According to the measurement of legitimacy by Gilley, Hungary is ranked 36th (out of 72 countries),119 Czech Republic 31st and Slovakia 46th. However, these results are taken at face value meaning that, compared to other non-democratic countries with surprisingly better ranking (for example China which is 19th), there are factors causing this discrepancy in scores. Therefore, it is necessary to look at the degree of support (through voter turnout and election 119

Gilley 2006:512.

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results) and the degree of trust (through polls and surveys) in order to gain a clearer picture of legitimacy as an indicator for the IV, and thus the assessment of the degree of responsiveness of political authorities.

4.3.1. Degree of Support Support for political authorities can be expressed in different ways (through voter turnout, election results). It can on one hand take on a form of satisfaction or on the other hand express dissatisfaction and a disillusionment with the performance of political authorities.

4.3.1.1. Voter Turnout As the data in Table 1 below illustrates, voter turnout in parliamentary elections in Hungary decreased and shows the lowest percentage (64.4) in the last parliamentary elections in 2006, except for 1998. Furthermore, the relationship between the number of citizens above the voting age (Voting Age Population (VAP) column), which has risen and was the highest in 2006, in relation to those who actually voted (41.1% in the Vote/VAP 120 column) shows a very large decrease in voter turnout. From 2002 to 2006, the decrease amounts to 9.1% and 2006 local elections had an even lower turnout at 46,53%.121 The European Parliament (EP) Elections show a digression between the years 2004 and 2009 in which Hungarian citizens were eligible to participate. A clearer trend will be able to be identified better once there are a few more EP elections in the future. Comparing the results, it can be said that a specific positive correlation between the voter turn-out in national parliamentary elections and those on the EU level exists; in other words, the lack of political support and participation at the national level is reflected in that for the EP elections. Furthermore, the EP election results in 2009 can be taken as an indication for what the political mood is in Hungary. Worth noting is that in all of Europe there has been a continuous decline in voter turnout since 1979 (starting with the EU9).122

120

The total number of votes cast (valid or invalid) divided by the Voting Age Population figure, expressed as a percentage. Refer to the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 121 National Election Office Hungary16.4.2009. 122 Refer to the European Parliament 2009.

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Table 1. Voter Turnout in Hungary (1990-2006)

Source: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA)

This fact points to a disconnection between the population and the political elite in European countries. Table 2 below shows the voter turnout in parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic, indicating a decline since 1990 (then still Czechoslovakia). The first two free elections in 1990 and 1992 are not analyzed in detail as the results were for Czechoslovakia, before the “velvet divorce” in January 1993. It is needless to say, that the imminent collapse of communism has inspired new hopes and expectations – reflected in the high voter turnout – placed on the transformation. Voter turnout reached its bottom at 57.9% in 2002, but rose again to 64.5% in 2006.123 The parliamentary election that was supposed to take place on October 9, 2009 has been postponed until June 2010. The voter turnout for the EP elections has been extremely low in both years of participation (2004 and 2009). Much has not changed in five years (only an increase of 0.01%). In principle, in the five years since the Czech Republic joined the EU, enthusiasm about voting at the EP Elections has not proved to be large. The current President of the Czech Republic and a known Eurosceptic, Vaclav Klaus, dubbed the elections in his country “‘one quarter elections’ referring to the low voter turnout.” 124

123 124

Refer to the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 3.11.2009. Bickerton 1.7.2009.

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Table 2. Voter Turnout in the Czech Republic (1990-2006)

Source: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA)

Similarly, voter turnout in the parliamentary elections in the Slovak Republic (Table 3) diminished, reaching its low in 2006 (54.7%). Presidential elections show an even lower turnout (51.7% in 2009). The EP elections turnout is worse than in Hungary and Czech Republic. Yet, it is interesting to note that contrary to the other two countries, Slovakia has seen an increase in voter turnout of 2.6% from 2004 to 2009. One other detail is to be mentioned here: the Civil Liberties (CL) score for Slovakia in 1994 shows the status “Partly Free”.125 The dominance of Vladimir Meciar’s politics until 1998 is reflected in the CL score “3” for 1994. “He opposed direct presidential elections, resisted economic liberalization, and disregarded the rule of law and a free press.”126 This would correspond to the levels of voice and accountability in Slovakia discussed above. An improvement in all three countries with regards to the Political Rights (PR) and CL scores has been marked in all three countries (score of “1” in 2006).

125

“The two measurements of Political Rights and Civil Liberties have been taken from Freedom House which uses these two categories as indicators of the levels of freedom in a country’s political system. A rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 the least amount of freedom. Each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an overall status. Those whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered Free, 3.0 to 5.0 Partly Free, and 5.5 to 7.0 Not Free.” Refer to the International Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 126 Refer to Freedom House 2002.

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Table 3. Voter Turnout in Slovakia (1990-2006)

Source: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA)

4.3.1.2. Election Results Election results point towards the direction of citizens’ support and the performance of political authorities, more specifically political parties in a given election period. Shown below (Diagram 3) are parliamentary election results since 1990127 in Hungary. The MSZP (center-left) had – due to its nature as a legal successor to the Hungarian Communist Party – very low results in the first free election (8.55%). In the 1994 elections already MSZP has shown a large increase, taking 54.14% of the votes. Its main competitor since 1998 is Fidesz (center-right). The Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) – also a center-right party – who achieved a high percentage (42.49) in 1990 and the SZDSZ – a center-left party – have since 1994 been losing out in support and popularity. SZDSZ was able to form a coalition government with

MDF and Fidesz, but otherwise do not enjoy a large support. The

polarization of parties – mainly a competition between MSZP and Fidesz – regarding main cleavages and issues had a substantial influence in results of the governing party. Mutual accusations and conflicts have possibly also affected the decreasing participation of Hungarian citizens in politics and amplified disillusionment which is reflected in the decreasing voter turnout discussed above. MSZP is the only party that has managed to be re127

This table does not include all parties in Hungary due to space constraints and focus of analysis.

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elected, however the current indication is that in 2010 Fidesz will take the scene and MSZP will be forced to go into opposition. This is a result of a growing dissatisfaction of citizens with the governance levels of MSZP. The reforms and policies of the socialists have not found a strong resonance in the population, but more so on occasion even anger (shown through protest events and referenda). The overspending of the socialist-led government during their governing years, eventually posed one of the major strains on the government, which had to be remedied with budget cuts. This step did not find liking in Hungary and is used by the opposition to instill distrust in the government and gain support for the upcoming election. Diagram 3. Parliamentary Election Results for Hungary (1990-2006)

Source: National Election Office Hungary

Even more of a concern is the increase in popularity of radical forces. The last not only surprising, but a worrisome result was that of the EP elections in 2009. The number of seats in the parliament gained by the right-wing opposition in Hungary was high. Fidesz gained 56.35% and thus 14 out of 22 seats (for Hungary) in the parliament. 128 Furthermore, the radical extremist far-right party Jobbik obtained a significant amount of votes very near to the score of the now-governing MSZP, securing 14.77% (3 seats) and the MSZP 17.37% (4 seats).129 Jobbik has only been formed in 2003 and the large increase in support is of concern for Hungary and the EU. MDF acquired 5.31% and thus 1 seat.

128 129

Refer to European Parliament 2009. Ibid.

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The MSZP had a higher score at the EP elections in 2004 (34,3%) and Jobbik was not on the political stage yet. The expansion in right-wing support echoes the inability of the government to address various socio-economic problems and apply reasonable reforms, deal with factionalism and polarization within the political competition, and avoid scandals such as Gyrscany lying. As both the national and EP election results show, there is low trust and support for the governing party, pointing to a low degree of legitimacy. Referring back to Eckstein (→ Chapter I), voter turnout and election results would be a fitting indication of legitimacy. He sees “legitimacy as, - not only the absence of strong dissent but the presence of positive acceptance and support.130 According to the poll on party preferences in the Czech Republic (conducted by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CVVM)) at the end of September 2009, the current opposition Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) is acquiring popularity and is now ahead of the governing party ODS. CSSD is with 21% ahead of the ODS (18.5%), followed by the new conservative Top 09 party (8.5%) and the KSCM (8%).

131

It should be noted that in mid of

September 2009, the KSCM was slightly ahead of the Top 09 with regards to the percentage of respondents that would vote for either.132 The ODS and the CSSD have been the two parties which, since 1996, dominated the political scene. Diagram 4 below shows the summarized parliamentary election results for the top four parties since 1996. The first three parliamentary elections display a decrease in the popularity of ODS until 2002 and two consecutive governing periods for the CSSD (in 1998 and 2002). Between 2002 and 2006, the popularity of ODS has increased in 10.8%, while the KSCM and the conservative center-right Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU-CSL) displayed a clear drop. Moreover, the CSSD also increased in 2.1%. The above mentioned poll results for the upcoming election (2010) point toward the loss of legitimacy of the ODS, particularly due to the government crisis late 2008/early 2009 and the (mis)management of the economic crisis. With the focus on the effects of the economic crisis, other reforms may be pushed aside. „Delayed elections in the Czech Republic did not stop the

130

Eckstein 1966:458. Refer to the Centrum pro výzkum verejného mínení (Public Opinion Research Centre) 8.10.2009. 132 Refer to Angus Reid Global Monitor 15.9.2009 131

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government approving sharp cuts in a 2010 budget, but analysts fear they could put off other necessary reforms” 133

Diagram 4. Parliamentary Election Results for the Czech Republic (1996-2006)

Source: Czech Statistical Office

With regard to the EP election results, the ODS has shown lead (31.45%), followed by the left-wing CSSD (22.36%) and the KSCM (14.18%).134 KSCM “is the only non-transformed ex-communist party in Central Europe”135.and holds a large support base in Czech Republic (12.6%),136 especially compared to the low support for communist parties or their successors in Slovakia and Hungary. According to the November 2009 polls the Czech political scene has become even more polarized, with the ODS and the CSSD holding a tie (29.6% would vote for the CSSD and 28.5% for the ODS in the next parliamentary elections). In the next EP Elections it can be expected that the party preferences would correspond to those in national elections. If so, there might be a an increased move of the CSSD upwards, decrease of support for ODS and an enhanced support for the TOP 09. Slovakia has a relatively large number of parties in parliament, making it rather difficult for any party to gain a majority. Therefore, parties often have to work with each other in order to form coalition governments. Since 2006, the coalition consists of the PM’s Robert Fico Direction-Social Democracy (Smer) and the nationalist and ultra-right People's Party – 133

134 135 136

Reuters. FACTBOX-Five risks to watch in Western Europe. 1.10. 2009. Refer to the European Parliament 2009. Results for Slovakia. Eibl/ Matušková Anna 2007: 122 Refer to Angus Reid Global Monitor. Close National Race Continues in Czech Republic.16.11.2009.

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Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (LS-HZDS) whose leader is Vladimir Meciar, as well as the Slovak National Party (SNS) led by Ján Slota. Momentarily, the opposition consists of the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (SDKU-DS), Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK-MKP) and the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH). There are quite a number of other extra-parliamentary parties. Since the parliamentary elections in 2002, support for Smer has improved by 15.6% (from 13.5% to 29.1%)137 and the SNS had an increase of 7.7% (from 3.3% to 11.7%). In contrast to Hungary, social democrats in Slovakia are not loosing on popularity and according to a recent poll in September 2009, 39.3% of respondents would vote for Smer in the next legislative ballot, 138 in November 2009 it saw an increase to 42.9% of the respondents.139 The other six parties that would make it into the parliament would be the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU) with 13.8 per cent, “followed by the KDH with 9.2 per cent, the SNS with 8.2 per cent, the People’s PartyMovement for a Democratic Slovakia (LS-HZDS) with 6.1 per cent, Bridge (Most-Hid) with 5.4 per cent, and the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK) with 5.1 per cent.”140 In contrast to a polarization between a couple of parties in both Czech Republic and Hungary, the larger number of parties in Slovak political landscape (particularly in the parliament) reduce the possibility of high polarization. The EP elections, as in the case of Hungary and Czech Republic show a correlation between the support for parties at the national level and at the EU level. Smer is at the top with 32.02%, followed by the SDKU-DS (16.99%), the SMK-MPK (11.34%), the KDH (10.87%), the LS-HZDS (8.96%) and the SNS (5.56%). 141 In summary, all three countries have decisive differences when it comes to the degree of support for political authorities, meaning also party support and party preferences. In Hungary the social democrats (MDSZ) have tumbled in their popularity, support for Fidesz and Jobbik expanded. In Czech Republic the social democrats are somewhat ahead of the ODS, followed by the KSČM whereas in the other two countries, communists have lost definite support after the collapse of the communist regime. This is a remarkable characteristic about the Czech Republic and this can be related to the already outlined cleavage differences between the countries (→ Chapter I). In Slovakia, an increase in support for nationalist parties and rhetoric 137

Refer to Parties and Elections in Europe 2009. Refer to Angus Reid Global Monitor. Social Democrats Keep Large Lead in Slovakia. 12.10.2009. 139 Refer to Angus Reid Global Monitor. Smer Drops, but Has Large Lead 3.11.2009. 140 Refer to Angus Read Global Monitor. Social Democrats Keep Large Lead in Slovakia 12.10.2009. 141 Refer to European Parliament 2009. Results for Slovakia. 138

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is obvious from the election results, however the social democrats are in contrast to Hungary still the most dominant force. The difficulty though is the coalition with the nationalist and ultra right-wing parties. Something else to consider when observing the increase in support for nationalist and extremist parties is the degree of ethnic homogeneity in all three countries. Czech Republic, as was mentioned, is the most homogenous amongst all three. Slovakia has a large Hungarian Minority, as well as a Roma minority and Hungary has a large Roma minority.(→ Annex)

4.4. Degree of Trust Easton – in addition to the concept of support – had found the concept of trust pivotal to measuring legitimacy and thus measuring responsiveness and performance of political authorities. Easton notes that, Even if members of a system are able to distinguish between the incumbent authorities and the regime, at what point does distrust of a particular administration begin to erode confidence in all authorities and finally in the regime itself?”142 This does not necessarily mean that a low degree of trust in political authorities will definitely lead to a complete erosion of confidence in the regime itself, meaning a disintegration of the (democratic) ‘rules of the game’. However, a point at which the level of trust in political authorities is significantly low may impact the political participation (for example through voter turnout) which is one of the important elements of democracy. Therefore, one of the criteria for political stability named by Eckstein – namely authenticity (of democratic structures) – would be in question. The degree of trust in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia is measured by polls and surveys. The European Social Survey (ESS) offers a valuable tool in measuring the degree of trust in political authorities (political parties, politicians, parliament).143 Interesting to mention is the ESS correlation between the trust in various political authorities. In other words, there is a high correlation between the trust in politicians and the parliament (0.722). 144 There is an even greater correlation between the trust in political parties and trust in politicians (0.863). ESS 142

Easton 1976:440. There have to date been four rounds of the ESS Survey (2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008). Hungary has taken part in all four rounds of the ESS, whereas the Czech Republic (rounds 1, 2 and 4) and Slovakia (rounds 2, 3 and 4) have taken part in three rounds each. Of the three countries however, only Slovakia has so far been included in the ESS4 data release. Yet, Hungary and the Czech Republic should be included in the pre-Christmas release planned at the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). Information from personal correspondence with NSD, 2.11.2009. 144 1 being complete correlation, 0 being no correlation and -1 being negative correlation. Refer to the European Social Survey. (16.11.2009). 143

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dataset for 2004145 illustrates the degrees of trust (tables 4,5 and 6) in political parties, in politicians and in the country’s parliament. The results (given in percentages) are shown on a scale from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust). Slovakia displays the most lack of trust (highest percentages) for all three types of political authorities. The degree of trust in politicians in the Czech Republic has declined from 2002 to 2004 (9.8% to 19.8%, “no trust at all”) and the same is true for Hungary (from 10.7% to 20.0%).

Table 4. Trust in Political Parties

Table 5. Trust in Politicians

Table 6. Trust in Country’s Parliament

Source: European Social Survey, Dataset ESS2-2004, ed.3.1

145

Refer to the European Social Survey (1.11.2009).

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Interestingly, if calculating the degree of trust in political parties in 2006, Hungary has an increase in percentage for “no trust at all” by 5.9%, corresponding to the electoral results for the social democrats (MSZP) already discussed above. In Slovakia there is also a decrease by 12% in 2006. Same applies to the degree of trust in politicians: from 2002 to 2004, Hungary has an increased distrust by 5.1% and Slovakia a decrease by 13.8%. Lastly, the degree of trust in country’s parliament declined enormously from 2002 to 2004 in both countries, in Hungary by 42.4% and in Slovakia by 30.6%. Within four years (from 2002 to 2006) the degree of trust in politicians in Hungary had decreased by more than double (from 10.7% to 25.1%).146 If looking at the results over a longer period of time, Hungary has been showing the highest degree of change. The responsiveness of political authorities, if measured by the degree of trust, has fallen in all three countries, but mostly so in Hungary.

4.5. Brief Summary: Independent Variable 1 In all three countries, WGIs, the degree of support and the degree of trust have continually varied over a longer period of time. In the 2000’s, both Czech Republic and Slovakia had seen an improvement in the first indicator government effectiveness, whereas Hungary illustrated a decline. However, if the same indicator is observed from 1998 to 2008, the Czech Republic has best overall results, not falling under the 75th percentile. Hungary was under the 75th percentile in 2008 and Slovakia displays five years with the score under the 75 th percentile. Thus, even though Slovakia has again improved in the past year (2008), the overall continuity of low government effectiveness levels show underlying structural problems.

Voice and Accountability decreased in Hungary (particularly since 2004) and since 2000 increased in Czech Republic. Again, the indicator has in general been the lowest in Slovakia, taking the 75th percentile line as a focus point. According to this, Hungary had the best voice and accountability levels, especially in the mid 2000’s. Yet, if seen in terms of fluctuations and change, it experienced the most decrease, particularly since 2004. Overall, the Czech Republic is showing the most stability with regards to the extent of fluctuations in levels of this indicator. All three countries illustrated a low voter turnout on the national and on the EP levels. As it might be expected, the voter turnout was the highest in 1990 (Hungary and Czechoslovakia) 146

Refer to the European Social Survey (ESS). (1.11.2009)

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but the outcomes of the transformation and the performance of the political actors have left an increasingly politically disengaged public. The election results are qualitatively valuable to observe. In Hungary, social democrats have lost a large portion of support, and in Slovakia support for the social-democrats has not only increased, but Smer is well ahead of other competing parties. The support for social democrats in the Czech Republic has been strengthened and the CSSD is ahead of the now governing ODS. The degree of trust is low in all three countries for the three types of political authorities analyzed. Yet, the largest change took place in Hungary. The degree of trust towards political authorities is the most volatile in Hungary and with it the loyalty to a particular party.

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Chapter II. Independent Variable 2: Social Imbalance

Especially during the times of an economic crisis, social balance gains increasingly in importance. In almost all ex-socialist societies and economies there is an increased inequality in distribution of income and wealth.147 After the fall of the communist regime, the transformation that ensued across CEE – due to the nature of the process and the economic and political changes that took place – changed the social structure of the states. Naturally, owning to the “full-employment” strategy in the one-party states, with the transition to market economy, unemployment, social security gaps and social imbalance in general became more visible. Dieter Segert points out that every mass democracy without social balance will stay politically instable.148 The assumption relating to the causal relationship between the IV1 and the DV goes along these lines. In other words, a high degree of social imbalance causes a degree of political instability. For the purposes of this paper, social imbalance refers to regional disparities (within each state), income differences, employment opportunity disparities, the gap between rich and poor, opportunities and access to education and health. The indicators for the IV2 include unemployment and income inequality, measured across different regions within the countries and across different sections of the society.

1. Unemployment The rate of unemployment will reflect not only the economic state of a country, but also the industrial capacities, regional disparities, and the degree of social imbalance. Considered is the “natural” (long-term) rate of unemployment, as well as the cyclical movement of the rate of unemployment.149 The data is sourced from mostly national statistical offices and the International

Labour

Organization

(ILO),

as

well

as

Eurequality

reports.

2. Income Inequality Income inequality is an important indicator as it directly illustrates the labor market outcome not only the height of incomes, but more importantly how it is distributed within a society. The wider the income gap and the distribution of the income, the higher the social imbalance 147

Schüsselbauer 2009:103. Segert 2008:71. 149 Johnson/Layard 1986:921. 148

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levels. Income statistics are drawn from national statistical offices and surveys and polls from the ESS database. 3. Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic: Case Comparison of Independent Variable 2 3.1 Unemployment As in the most former communist countries, soon after 1989 many jobs were lost due to privatization and restructuring measures. Seeing that joblessness is one of the key determinants of poverty, the loss of many jobs had induced an increase in poverty rate(s) as well. Since 1989, there has been a disappearance of over 20% of jobs. This has a large influence on the system of stratification.150 In 2008, with regard to the unemployment levels, the Hungarian Central Statistical Office made a note of the fact that Hungary still lags behind the EU-27 (almost 8%).151 Between 1998 and 2007, the unemployment rate in 2006 (7.5%) was the highest except in 1998.152 This strengthens the assumption that the current high unemployment rates are not solely due to the economic crisis which recently had a large impact on Hungary. Rather, other reasons exist which help explain the increase in unemployment rate over the years. These are mainly related to structural issues. Unemployment is not evenly distributed in the population. It affects youth in quite large terms and it is becoming even more of a problem in the already economically depressed regions. 153 In a study, “48% of young people between 25-29 claimed to have had experienced unemployment, but while only 31% of those living in Budapest did, 57-61% of those from the Northern, North-Eastern part of Hungary did.”154 Furthermore, among the group of 20-24 year olds, the unemployment rate is twice the national average.155 In general, “the regional differences in the labour market situation are invariably significant.” The employment rate is the highest in Central Hungary (55.1%) and lowest in Northern Hungary (43%). 156 Unemployment increased more in the regions characterized by rather disadvantageous situation.157 The unemployment rate gap between Central Hungary and Northern Hungary (age-group 15-64) was 6.4 % in 1998 and by 2007 it increased to 7.5%.158 150

Fodor/Sata/Toth 2007:9. Hungarian Central Statistical Office 8.5.2008. 152 Ibid. 153 Fodor/Sata/Toth 2007:10. 154 Ibid., pp.10. 155 Fodor/Sata/Toth 2007:10. 156 Refer to the Hungarian National Statistical Office. 7.10.2009. 157 Refer to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office 8.5.2008. 158 Ibid. 151

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After the fall of communism, privatization in the Czech Republic was pretty quick. Early industrial development and advanced infrastructure formed better economic conditions for post-communist development. Parallel to the economic progress went the rise of work productivity. Already in 1992 the individual businessmen (license holders) increased by 35%.159 Changes in sectoral structures (decrease of primary and secondary sectors, increase in area of services et cetera) were reflected in long-term (natural) unemployment which is lower in Czech Republic than in some other CEE countries. In 2001 unemployment was 9.2%.160 The unemployment rate in the 2nd quarter of 2009 was 6.3%, compared to the 2nd quarter of 2008 (4.2%).161 Unlike other transition economies (including Hungary and Slovakia), registered unemployment in the Czech Republic did not rise dramatically (as in other countries: from zero to double digits) at the beginning of the 1990s. This has something to do with efficient labour market policies.162 However, throughout the mid –and latet 1990s, hen unemployment rapidly increased. In 1994 it was 3.2%, in 1998 already 7.5%, in 2000 it increased further to 8.8%.163 In 2003 the unemployment rate reached its highest point (10.2%).164 Yet, it decreased again and even now – taking in account the economic crisis – the unemployment rate is still not as high as it was in 2003. According to the European Commission though, the Czech Republic is marked by a high dispersion of unemployment rates.165 This means there are high labor market disparities. Still, the regional differences in these disparities are not as high as in Hungary. The Czech Republic is – with regards to the regional socio-economic development – one of the most homogenous countries in Europe.166 This is also due to high population density, nivelization policies, planned localization of production capacities and additional “social criteria”.167 Slovakia has a high long-term (natural) unemployment levely, in addition to a high level of dispersion of unemployment rates which has increased. In contrast to the Czech Republic, Slovakia’s sectoral restructuring resulted in a much higher unemployment rate in 2001 (16.4%).168 Even though both countries were at a considerably comparable levels of 159

Nekola/Machonin/Tucek 2006:8. Ibid., pp.8. 161 Refer to the Czech Statistical Office. 2009. 162 Terrell/Sorm 1999:34. 163 Nesporova, A. Unemployment in the Transition Economies. In Economic Survey of Europe 2002, No.2. Chapter 3, pp.6. 164 Radio Praha 11.2.2003. 165 European Comission. Eurostat..6.11.2009 166 Nekola/Machonin/Tucek 2006:31. 167 Ibid., pp. 31. 168 Nekola/Machonin/Tucek, 2006:8. 160

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development before and soon after the “Velvet Divorce”, there was a difference in development of national economies. The unemployment rates are higher than in Hungary and Czech Republic, not just cyclically, but long-term. In May 2009, the unemployment rate in Slovakia was 11.1%.169 The number of non-qualified workers increased in Slovakia (from from 28.6% in 1992 to 34.7% in 2001) and fell in Czech Republic (from 30.6% in 1992 to 28.3% in 2001). As a result, income differences will be higher between these two states. Regional differences in unemployment range from “approximately 5% in Bratislava to as much as 25% or more in the east and south of the country.” 170 Thus, similarly to Hungary, there are noticeable regional discrepancies in employment. Additionally, a larger imbalance in the labour market influences the possibilities of trade unions to negotiate. The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) has measured the performance of OECD countries for employment to population ratio for 2007. The Czech Republic is rated in the middle four deciles, Hungary and Slovakia in the lowest three.171 The change (arithmetic difference) in employment to population ration between 2003 and 2007 shows the following: the Czech Republic is still in the middle four deciles, Hungary is in the bottom three deciles, and Slovakia has seen a positive adjustment (top three deciles of performance).172

Income Inequality Especially during the first decade of the transformation process, “social inequality and poverty” increased sharply in Hungary.173 This includes higher income inequality and poverty rates. In 1987, the richest 10% of the population made “about 5 times as much as the poorest,…this factor increased to 8 by 2003.”174 Another factor to consider when thinking about income inequality is the increase among the wealthy (those living on over 200% of the median national per capita household income, and at the same time increase among the poor (those making less than 50% of the national median), which points to a decline in middle categories/middle class.175 The post-communist change in the structure of the type of 169

Refer to the European Commission Eurostat 2008. Refer to theEuropean Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 9.10.2006. 171 Refer to OECD 2009:11. 172 Ibid., pp. 12. 173 Fodor/Sata/Toth 2007:4. 174 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 175 Ibid., pp.7. 170

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workplace ownership (state or private) contributed to an unequal income distribution. Generally, incomes earned in the state sector are higher those in the private sector, but since the transformation there are less state-sector jobs. Yet, the highest job grades (for example managers) earn less in a state paying job than in the private sector.176 Seeing that there less jobs in the state sector, more in the private sector and the highest paying positions are in the private sector, it follows that there will be a larger proportion of top earners in the private sector than in the state sector. As a result, the gap in income inequality will widen. Important to mention is that, the depth of poverty experienced by the poor (the average difference between the income of the poor and the poverty threshold)…ranged from 25-33% over the years, but this is one indicator which exhibited growth over the past 5 years. In other words, while there hasn’t been an increase in the size of the poor population, those in poverty have become poorer, i.e., more distanced from the national average.177

The Gini Coefficient178 (measuring inequality levels) for mid-2000’s is the same for Czech Republic and Slovakia (0.268), and is higher for Hungary (0.291).179 Poverty rates in the mid2000’s were the lowest for the Czech Republic (0.058), middle-level for Hungary (0.071) and the highest for Slovakia (0.081).180 Comparing the poverty rates and the Gini Coefficient, it is assumed that even though poverty rates in Hungary are lower than those in Slovakia, the highest level of the Gini Coefficient in Hungary points towards higher inequality when it comes to income distribution. The data from the ESS supports this last assumption. To the statement “Government should reduce differences in income levels”, the public in Hungary had the highest percentage in the section “strongly agree” and the agreement with this statement increased within the years. In 2002, 40.4% strongly agreed (compared to Czech Republic 22.3%). In 2004, 50.6% strongly agreed (compared to Czech Republic 28.5% and Slovakia 25.4%). In 2006, 53.4% strongly agreed (compared to Slovakia 33.0%).181 Evidently, there is also an increase in the Czech Republic and Slovakia with regards to the strength of the agreement with the statement, however the levels are remarkably high in Hungary. 176

Ibid., pp.11. Ibid., pp.12. 178 “The Gini coefficient is defined as the area between the Lorenz curve (which plots cumulative shares of the population, from the poorest to the richest, against the cumulative share of income that they receive) and the 45° line, taken as a ratio of the whole triangle. The values of the Gini coefficient range between 0, in the case of "perfect equality" (i.e. each share of the population gets the same share of income), and 1, in the case of "perfect inequality" (i.e. all income goes to the individual with the highest income).” Refer to OECD. 179 Refer to OECD, Society at Glance: OECD Social Indicators 2009. 180 Ibid. 181 Refer to the European Social Survey 2002, 2004 and 2006. 177

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Slovakia and Hungary are specifically showing higher poverty rates and Gini Coefficients, however the sentiment that the government should do something to reduce the social imbalance is the highest in Hungary. Furthermore, according to a “Government Responsibility” survey (Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research (CESifo GmbH)),182 the population of Hungary thinks to the largest extent that the government should take more responsibility to provide for the population. Between 1995-1998 38.3% thought so, comparable to 29.2% in Slovakia and 18.2% in the Czech Republic.183 The situation is somewhat different in the Czech Republic than in Hungary concerning the structures which evolved during the transformation period and that play a role for income inequality and social imbalance. Beside the lower Gini Coefficient and lowest poverty rates (in comparison to Hungary and Slovakia), the middle class in the Czech Republic plays a role in stabilizing the socio-economic and political situation. The middle-class “by itself does not generate resistance in public opinion”.184 Yet, even in the Czech Republic the polarization in the social structure is stronger than it was in the period from 1939 to 1989.185 A “new high class” (businesspeople, managers, bankers, politicians, certain part of lawyers, some popular artists and sportsmen) has been established. Their acquiring of income exceeds the usual system of meritocracy.186 In addition, there has emerged a class of an, extremely poor part of population including not only homeless people and other socially inadaptable groups, but as of 1998 also qualified workers from unpreferred sectors or sectors affected by crisis, people whose salaries were withheld by their employers and people unemployed over a long period of time.187 Consequently, the Czech Republic exhibits a class structure of the current capitalist societies. Interestingly, public opinion polls have measured and registered “strong and unceasing animosity against the newly emerging group of parvenus” and the first potential source of social tensions listed was “wealth”.188 This corresponds to the cleavages discussed earlier and the most important division lines around social welfare and market vs. state. 182

“How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. Sentences: “People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves vs. The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for”. Response:1-10.” See Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich. 183 184

Ibid.

Tucek 2006: 17. 185 Ibid., pp. 17. 186 Ibid., pp.17. 187 Ibid., pp.17. 188 Ibid., pp.29.

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Citizens in Slovakia are in general less content with the social situation than for example in the Czech Republic. This applies to all areas examined (politics, economy, living standard, overall situation).189 The level of income deprivation is higher in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. The highest income deprivation felt was among workers (26.6%) and unemployed (29.4%), least so by entrepreneurs.190 As seen in the table below, Slovakia also illustrates the highest poverty rate in mid 2000’s. There is a structural problem which, as has been explained in the unemployment section, influences poverty levels due to the long-term natural unemployment rate. Even though income distribution, according to the Gini Coefficient, is better than in Hungary, income distribution according to poverty levels is worse than in Hungary. Table 7. Summary of Income Distribution Data for mid-2000’s Hungary Czech Republic Slovakia

Gini Coefficient 0.29 0.27 0.27

Poverty Levels 7.1 5.8 8.1

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)

4. Brief Summary of Case Comparison Social imbalance is higher in Hungary and Slovakia. Unemployment in Hungary has increased, and so have regional disparities, as well as income inequality. Income distribution measured in Gini Coefficient is the highest in Hungary. Slovakia has a problem of high longterm unemployment rates and higher poverty rates, however exhibits a lower Gini coefficient than Hungary. Structural factors which make a more equal income distribution more difficult in Hungary could play a role in the discrepancy between poverty levels and income distribution. One of the explanations for the lowest poverty rates and a lower income inequality in the Czech Republic, might be found in the fact that the middle-class is stronger than in the other two countries. In the Czech case, the middle class holds the most stability. It is an open question if an increase in the middle-class would also be a stabilizing factor in Hungary and Slovakia, and/or what would happen if the middle-class shrinks in the Czech 189 190

Tucek 2006: 33. Ibid., pp. 32.

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Republic. However, if the gaps between the high income earners and low to extremely low income earners keep increasing, as might be the case in Hungary, the proclivity to social unrest is likely to correspondingly increase as well.

Chapter III. Degree of Political Stability (Dependent Variable): Case Comparison

48

1. Political Instability Indices191 According to various indices, political stability in Hungary has been deteriorating since 2007. The EIU Political Instability Index192 (table 8) places Hungary in the category of “high risk” countries. Hungary is in 83rd place, its instability score went up from 2.1 in 2007 to 6.1 for 2009/2010 (10 being “very high risk”). The economic distress for 2009/2019 is 8.0 and underlying vulnerability is 4.2. 193 Thus, economic distress plays a role as an additional burden on the government. Furthermore, if the government is not able to cope with this stress factor either due to structural and already existent faults in the system, or due to low level of responsiveness by implementing reforms, the political instability will be higher. Yet, economic distress is not the direct factor, as it can been seen from the already discussed Tables 1, 2 and 3 regarding voter turnout and election results (Diagrams 3 and 4), which show a continuous decline in support over years and not just a sudden change in 2008 and 2009. Table 8. EIU Political Instability Index for 2009/2010194 (Hungary)

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)

The WGI Indicator for Political Stability (for all three countries) is shown below in diagram 4 . In It is clearly visible that political stability in Hungary has deteriorated and is the lowest in 2008. A larger rise in stability was marked in 1998, when the center-right Fidesz won the elections, however it soon dropped again. It rose substantially in 2002 and 2003, after which it weakened to reach its low in 2008. The social democrats (MSZP) won the elections in 2002 against the previously governing (1998-2002) center-right Fidesz. These changes illustrate, 191

Indices is used as a plural for “Index” instead of indexes. The Political Instability Index shows the level of threat posed to governments by social protest. The index scores are derived by combining measures of economic distress and underlying vulnerability to unrest. The index covers the period 2009/10, and scores are compared with results for 2007. 193 Refer to the Economist Intelligence Unit.. Political Instability Index. Index Vulnerability to Social and Political Unrest. 194 The first column shows the country rank, the second underlying instability, the third economic distress, the fourth political instability score, and the last political instability score for 2007. 192

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that the continuity and persistence of pattern in a political system, as one of the criteria for (democratic) political stability according to Eckstein, is not given in a rather volatile system. The Fidesz government did not show desired responsiveness and performance, thus it was voted off. The MSZP won the elections twice in a row (2002 and 2006), however due to their inability to deal with some key issues (discussed in Chapter I) the prognosis for winning the election in 2010 is rather bleak. Diagram 5. Political Stability Indicator 1996-2008 (WGI)

Source: Kaufmann, D.; Kraay A.; Mastruzzi M.: Governance Matters VIII. Governance Indicators 1996–2008.

The Political Capital Institute and weekly Figyelő have also noted that political risk has continued to increase in the past 18 months195. The political risk index (PRI) in 2007 was 66, and 68 in 2008/09. The PRI values are shown in the in Table 9 below. PRI was the highest (meaning political risk the lowest) in 2003 and 2008-2009 illustrates the highest political risk.196

Table 9. Political Risk Index Values for Hungary (2003-2008/2009) 195

Refer to the Political Capital Institute and weekly Figyelő. Political Risk increased further in Hungary. 3.6.2009. 196 Ibid., Pp.1.

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Year

2003

2004

2005

2006

71

68

70

66

PRI

2007 66

20082009 64

Source: Political Capital Institute

With regards to political instability, the Political Capital Institute writes that, Following the resignation of the minority government and the formation of the new administration, Hungary continues to be characterized by political instability. If, despite a persistently unfavourable political climate, the Bajnai-Cabinet is able to govern more effectively, it may complete the current term with less than one year to go. However, the outcome of the European Parliamentary election and the autumn budget debate may be crucial, and it cannot be ruled out that following the EP election the slim parliamentary majority behind the prime minister will disappear, resulting in an early election. 197 According to the Political Stability Indicator in Diagram 5, the degree of political stability in the Czech Republic was the highest in 1996 and the lowest (50th-75th percentile) in 2000. An increase in the degree of political stability, with fluctuations in 2004 and 2005, has been marked up to 2008. The EUI (Table 10) displays a much better ranking for Czech Republic than for Hungary. In the Czech Republic, the two sub-indicators are lower (4.0 for “economic distress” and 4.0 for “underlying vulnerability”). Table 10. EIU Political Instability Index for 2009/2010 (Czech Republic)

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)

In contrast to Hungary, whose last two years (2008 and 2007 show lower percentiles of political stability), political stability in Slovakia, according to the WGI rose in 2007 and 2008. However, if the WGI indicator is observed over a longer period of time, it is quite visible that overall, Slovakia is illustrating the most political instability, as it has the most 197

Ibid., Pp. 2.

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amount of years within the 50th-75th percentile. The EUI ranking (Table 11) places Slovakia in the middle, between Hungary and Czech Republic. Yet, an “underlying instability” is larger in Slovakia than in Hungary, even though Hungary had been ranked with a high risk of political instability. Therefore, it can be assumed that economic distress is an important stress factor on the political authorities. Table 11. Political Instability Index for 2009/2010 (Slovakia)

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)

The overall higher political instability in Slovakia indicates the need to observe the levels of political stability across a longer period of time – particularly as there may be some stimuli (for example economic distress) that cause a short-term increase in some political instability scores. However, the underlying instability (structural and governance) –play a long-term role in affecting political stability.

2. Public Protest Events (Violent and Non-Violent) Beside the political instability indices, public protest events – violent and non-violent – is another important indicator. It shows a presence of latent, or in some cases manifest social unrest. Outlined below are public protest events that took place/are scheduled to take place in Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia.198 In Hungary, connecting to the quotation by Political Capital (regarding the autumn budget) above, following the presented autumn budget for 2010, thousands protested on October 10th, 2009 against the 2010. The budget “allows for further cuts to central government spending of some HUF 400 billion (EUR 1.48 billion).” 199 Here included are funding cuts for local 198

As there is no particular index for this indicator, most of the information has been retrieved from news agencies by using text analysis. 199 Refer to Budapest Times 12.10.2009.

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governments. The protest was organized by Fidesz, which according to the polls will win the 2010 election in April or May and intends to rewrite the 2010 budget if it comes to power. This protest, ”aims to stop what the party [Fidesz] says is the ‘most dangerous budget in the past 20 years’ and will endanger social services.”200 If so, this may increase the possibility of social unrest. Considering that Gordon Bajnai’s socialist-backed interim government already cut government spending since taking office in April 2009, the new budget 2010 is making for some burning debate and could potentially cause social unrest. Over the past years, continuous protests (demonstrations, riots) took place. The appointment of Gordon Bajnai as the PM in April 2009, replacing Ferenc Gyurcsany, was followed by protests in April 2009 in Budapest . Several thousand people protested and the antigovernment demonstrators demanded “that parliament be dissolved and an early election called.”201 In December 2008,

radical right demonstrated against Slovakia’s policies towards

Hungarians.202 On March 15, 2007 around 100,000 people rallied demanding the Socialist prime minister (Ferenc Gyurcsany) resign. Police and rioters clashed.203 Farmer demonstrations took place over three days in Eastern Hungary in July 2007. The farmers demanded compensation for lost revenues.204 In September 2007, far-right protesters ahead of the 51st anniversary of 1956 uprising, were dispersed by riot police using tear gas and water cannon. In October 2006, “violent anti-government protests in Budapest overshadow 50th anniversary commemorations of the 1956 uprising against Soviet rule.”205 There is still an uncertainty about what the 1956 anti-Soviet uprisings meant and how these are to be interpreted. In September 2006, violence erupted as thousands have rallied in Budapest to demand the resignation of Prime Minister Gyurcsany. He had admitted that his government had lied 200

Refer to Reuters: Thousands Protest Against Hungary’s 2010 Budget. 10.10.2009. Refer to BBC: Protests as Hungary PM sworn in. 14.4.2009. 202 Refer to MTIE. Radical right demonstrates against Slovakia's policies towards Hungarians. 1.12.2008. 203 Refer to New York Times. Rally in Hungary. 16.3.2007. 204 Refer to MIT-EcoNews. Farmer demonstration ends in E Hungary. 27.7.2009 205 Refer to Timeline: Hungary 17.8. 2009. 201

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during the election campaign.206 BBC noted that these riots might have been the worst in decades but furthermore these protests have much more deeper economic and political roots.207 In July 2002, demonstrators in Budapest demanded of the government not to destroy ballots from the elections in April 2002, as these should be recounted due to election fraud. Analysts pointed out that these demonstrations are not a direct threat to investment, but that political tensions are rising. They noted that problems could occur if the disturbances continue in the country. 208 Nationalist sentiments in Hungary did not start only recently with the economic crisis, even though this situation amplified these sentiments. Four rallies took place in 2001, where the Hungarian Revisionist Movement demanded the restoration of Hungarian borders.209 The numerous protests mentioned above are not just – in their number – but also due to their continuity an indication of political instability. In the Czech Republic, the protests are less in number and as a rule not as violent as in Hungary. In 2009, the following have taken place or are scheduled to take place: •

December: farmers plan a demonstration in Prague to protest against lower budget for agriculture for next year.210

•

October: farmers protested low milk prices.211

•

October: Czech Roma female activists demonstrated against increasing intolerance and racism in Prague.212

•

October: supporters of far-right parties and movements protested against police crackdown on extremists.213

•

September: demonstration against the position of Pope Benedict XVI.214

206

Ibid. Refer to BBC. Economic woes fan Hungarian riot fires. 19.9.2009 208 Refer to Interfax. Demonstrations not a Threat to Investment, but Political Tensions Rising, say Analysts. 22.7.2002. 209 Refer to BBC Monitoring European. Rally demanding restoration of Greater Hungary held in Budapest. 4.9.2001. 210 Refer to CTK Business News. Farmers to demonstrate in Prague against low prices. 10.11.2009. 211 Refer to CBS. Czech Farmers Protest Low Milk Prices. 29.10.2009. 212 Refer to Prague Daily Monitor. Czech women protest against racism in Prague. 24.10.2009. 213 Refer to CTK Daily News. Dozens of Czech extremists protest against police crackdown. 21.10.2009. 214 Refer to BBC Monitoring Newsfile. Protest against Pope's approach to condoms held in Czech capital. 28.9.2009. 207

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•

June: Rallies staged in towns in support of detained far-right activists.215

•

June: Farmers block traffic in seven regions in a protest against low purchase prices of milk.216

•

May: around 20,000 Czech and foreign trade unionists protested in against the threatened erosion of workers' rights by governments and businesses.217

In November 2008, more than 500 supporters of the far-right Worker’s Party clashed with police in a march on a Roma suburb.218 In June 2007, while US President George Bush was visiting, hundreds protested against US plans for a radar base near Prague (it would have been part of a missile defense shield).219 In January 2001, “the biggest street protests since the overthrow of Communism and a strike by journalists lead to the resignation of Jiri Hodac as director-general of state television. Hodac is widely seen as a political appointee and accused of compromising editorial independence.”220 In Slovakia, the intensity and number of public protest events is primarily lower than in Hungary.221 Protest events concerned with nationalistic issues seem to predominate. The following protest events, among others, have taken place over the course of the years: In November 2009, an anti-government rally in Bratislava with regards to corruption scandals222 took place. The same year in September, a demonstration was organized by the far-right Slovak Togetherness “ in protest against crime allegedly soaring among Romanies.”223

215

Refer to BBC Monitoring European. Rallies staged in three Czech towns in support of detained far-right activists. 12.06. 2009. 216 Refer to CTK Business News. Czech farmers block traffic over milk prices in seven regions. 29.6.2009. 217 Refer toReuters. Unions protest in Prague over economic crisis. 16.05.2009. 218 Refer to Reuters. UPDATE 1-Czech rightists clash with police, 14 hurt. 17.11.2008. 219 Refer to BBC Timeline. Czech Republic. 16.9.2009. 220 Ibid. 221 The number of research results gave a smaller amount of news titles with the following search terms: protest, riot, rally, demonstration. 222 Refer to TASR. Around Hundred People Hold Anti-government Rally in Bratislava. 7.11.2009. 223 Refer to BBC Monitoring European. About 400 attend protest against alleged Romany crime in Slovakia. 5.9.2009.

55

In August 2009 an Anti-Romany demonstration in East Slovakia224 took place and a day later a Candle demonstration condemning attacks against Roma (organized by the Roma Initiative) was organized. 225 In March 2008, nationalists demonstrated against Kosovo’s independence. 226 In February 2004, police and troops were brought in to end rioting by Romany population protesting against cuts in benefits in parts of eastern Slovakia. In 2006 a strike by doctors and nurses over pay and sell-offs in the health-care sector was intervened in by the Court.

3. Brief Summary: Dependent Variable Case Comparison The EUI Index and the WGI political stability indicator both point to an increased political instability in Hungary. Since the mid-2000’s stability has diminished, 2008 and 2009 being the most unstable years (see also the PRI values). The Czech Republic is the most stable according solely to the EIU and WGI indicators, even though 2000 and 2004 the instability was higher than in Hungary. Political stability in Slovakia is the weakest when considered long-term. Seven years show levels under the 75th percentile. Public protest events as such do not mean that political stability in any country is completely shaken, as: 1) protest events take place in Western democracies as well, without a noticeable increase in political instability, and 2) a these events are an element of political participation and the way for the population to express political power. However, the intensity and frequency of the events above, taking in consideration the context in the CEE countries, is illustrative of a certain degree of political instability. According to this indicator, all of the countries have seen protest events, demonstrations and strikes over a longer period of time. Nevertheless, those in Hungary are the most violent and of the biggest in proportion. In the Czech Republic a large demonstration took place in 2001, however the frequency of such bigger demonstrations is lower than in Hungary. Thus this indicator would point towards an elevated level in political instability in Hungary. Chapter IV: Interaction of Variables, Evaluation and Conclusion 224

Refer to BBC Monitoring European. Police disperse anti-Romany demonstration in east Slovakia. 8.8.2009. Refer to SITA. Roma Initiative Organizes Candle Demonstration to Condemn Attacks . 9.8.2009. 226 Refer to TASR. Nationalists Demonstrate on Behalf of Serbia's Right to Kosovo. 5.3.2008. 225

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Interaction of Variables

The EUI political instability index for the DV show the most underlying instability for Slovakia (5.0), the lowest for Czech Republic (3.3) and a middle score for Hungary (4.2). However, economic distress (recently owing to the global financial crisis) is the highest in Hungary (8.0) and the lowest in Czech Republic (4.0). With regards to the IV1, Hungary has been worsening in terms of government effectiveness and voice and accountability, and has been going through the largest change within a shorter period of time when it comes to the degree of trust in political authorities. As a result, it can be said that the degree of responsiveness of the political authorities is – at least since the mid-2000’s – the lowest in Hungary. The indicators (government effectiveness and voice and accountability) illustrate and correspond with this assessment. When the political authorities do not deal well with stimuli such as economic distress, do not take the demands (policy and social reform issues) into account, do not distance themselves from populist rhetoric and show an increased polarization between different political camps, then the indicators show a negative direction of the degree of responsiveness. In Slovakia, the long-term political stability correlates with the long-term government effectiveness indicator. Taking the DV values for all three countries and comparing them with corresponding values of the IV1, which are considerably more negative for Hungary and Slovakia, it can be said that the hypothesis (1): The lower the degree of responsiveness of political authorities,

the higher

the degree of political

instability, is thus for the most part confirmed. Yet, there is a crucial point to consider that would at this point require an adjustment in the hypothesis. Looking at long-term results, further than the last three to five years, instability levels for Slovakia would mean that the degree of UV1 – if the hypothesis is to be validated – would also be long-term the lowest of all three countries. This is partly the case as the legitimacy indicators also show. A crucial point then is the structural framework of a political system that – when taking the systems theory in consideration – if not properly functioning will not be able to respond well to any stimuli and thus increase the levels of instability within a country. This means that the underlying vulnerability (structural factors) in Slovakia definitely affect political stability in the long-run. However, the reasons for a higher instability in Hungary are among others, the lack of flexibility (see Sandschneider), the inability of the political 57

authorities to adjust to arising stimuli, respond to demands and inputs, and reduce the tension between political camps. As expected, Czech Republic – in comparison to Hungary and Slovakia - has the highest degree of responsiveness of political authorities and the corresponding lowest degree of political instability. Eckstein’s criteria for political stability that play a particular role in this analysis are: a) the persistence of pattern (capability to adjust to changing conditions and holding fast allegiances) and effective decision-making. These proved to resonate with the country cases analyzed. The criteria are shown to be weak in IV1, especially for Hungary and Slovakia. The persistence of pattern (including adaptability and holding on to allegiances) seems to be a particular problem in Hungary. The political system, and particularly the political party system exhibits volatility and the decision-making is consequently ineffective. In Slovakia, structural barriers, as most of the issues are on a long-term basis, inhibit not only a stability (persistence of pattern), but also allow for some rather peculiar government coalitions. The adjustment to the first hypothesis would thus be: The lower the degree of responsiveness of political authorities in a structurally vulnerable political system, the higher the degree of political instability. Easton’s model of a dynamic political system, combined with Eckstein’s approach to political stability is very useful when looking at the particular relationships within a democratic political system. The criteria that Eckstein sets can be fulfilled if the, according to Easton’s model, the input-output balance functions. As regards to the IV2 (social imbalance), the highest long-term unemployment as in Slovakia will presumably affect social and therefore also political stability – if not now – then within the course of time. Similarly to IV1, Hungary had experienced a rise in unemployment in the past few years, particularly since the global economic crisis, which has also been a case due to the structure of the very export oriented Hungarian economy (→ Annex). Yet, income distribution seems to be a larger problem in Hungary, so this fact and the fact that more Hungarian citizens than Czech or Slovak (as seen in the results of surveys and polls) would 58

expect the government to reduce income inequality is reflected in the indicator of the dependent variable (public protest events). The question however is why, if Slovakia has long-term high unemployment rates, protest levels (particularly relating to socio-economic issues) are not more numerous and more intense, not to a larger degree against the minority groups, but also against the political authorities? It could be: 1) that instead of large protests against the government, the dire socio-economic conditions increase nationalist sentiments (and the nationalist parties are part of the momentarily governing coalition); 2) that the income inequality (lower Gini Coefficient) has not reached the crucial point which would demand public protest; and 3) the blame for difficult socio-economic conditions is placed upon minority groups, not government. The theory of relative deprivation does not to its full extent apply here, seeing that the factors such as employment, income and poverty should move the population to express their demands towards the political authorities. The perception of inequality is – according to the discussed IV2 above – higher in Hungary than in Slovakia, even though the difference in numbers (Gini Coefficient) is not large. This means that the hypothesis (2): The higher the degree of social imbalance, the higher the degree of political instability; cannot be fully confirmed. There is a correlation, as it can be seen in the case of Hungary and the number and intensity of protest events, yet these are also not only concerned with questions of social imbalance, but also with questions along the already mentioned conflict line (communist/anti-communist). Worthy of note is that an already existent social imbalance in this case and in the case of Slovakia, in order to strongly affect political stability would need a catalyzing element (for example nationalist parties, organizations, figures) to use the social inequality as an instrument for accomplishing populist-framed political goals. Unfortunately, these actors have already entered the stage in both countries. For others, for example the trade unions, it is hard to organize as in Slovakia and in countries like Hungary these have lost a large amount of trust and support, due to their close relation to the socialist ideology. The theory of relative deprivation is possibly not quite applicable to countries analyzed here, rather to more underdeveloped countries with a non-or less developed market economy. Important to consider is the fact that Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia are members of the EU, which of course has in interest in the stability of these countries. Evaluation and Conclusion 59

The aim of this paper was to analyze possible causes (IVs) of the variation in the degree of political in/stability in CEE, particularly Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia. The research and the final result have provided insight in the causes for this variation, as well as raised some new questions. First important is that the countries compared are democracies and thus the criteria (Eckstein) for political stability differ from those for non-democratic or hybrid countries. The framework for analyzing political stability has hence been given by Easton’s dynamic model of a political system where the input-output balance plays a key role in ensuring the criteria for political stability are fulfilled and the system is not endangered. IV1 (responsiveness of political authorities) takes up a valuable place within this theory, as these authorities are dealing with demands, inputs and are producing outputs (policies, decisions). Herewith, political authorities play a regulative role. Their ‘performance’ is measured by the degree of legitimacy they have within the population. The results have clearly shown that legitimacy is rather on a downward direction in the region, with a variation between the countries. This points to a problem regarding the way political authorities are shaping their responses towards various endogenous and exogenous factors. The fascinating part about the results are some unexpected elements that have come up in the course of the analysis and have so influenced the results. This makes the analysis of political in/stability rather complex, especially in democracies, where the manifest onset of political instability is almost completely absent. These elements that render the task rather intricate include the political culture in CEE, historical background (transformation plays a larger role in setting some of the conditions), cleavages, cultural considerations et cetera. In spite of this, due to the scope of this paper all of these elements could have not been discussed in very poignant detail or not at all. Reflecting back, they have played a role in the process of looking at some of the factors from a different point of view. Additionally, political party system(s) would have proved to be a suitable conditional variable, yet the study would be blown out of proportion if more than one to three independent variables and a dependent variable would have been discussed. Why the party system was not used as an independent variable is for the following reasons: 1) there have been numerous studies on party systems influencing political stability, and 2) political authorities is a much more encompassing term, including parties (but not only) and also the way these function. 60

Consequently, more than two IVs would have proved to be too much, as the paper included three countries and was focused on a combination of a quantitative and qualitative analysis. Even so, with the amount of information available, it was a demanding task to separate the necessary from that which could possibly be suitable for a different, future study. IVs reflects a significant issue, not only related to any time and any country, but particularly so of an importance in CEE and the future development in individual countries. It could influence political stability, if the empirical conditions fit the “relative deprivation theory”, however the acquired result deviated somewhat from the expectations at the beginning of the study and proved to an extent paradoxical out of the following reason. Slovakia had pointed toward higher social imbalance (higher unemployment and poverty levels), with naturally some differences between the years, yet this did not correspond with the EIU political instability index, but it did to a large extend correspond with the WGI political stability indicator. The reason for this proved to be the observation over a certain period of time. Using a larger time-span did not only help sort out latent factors that might have/did play a role, but it would have been a mistake with regards to the results if a shorter time-span was used. It (longer time-span) proved to be imperative point for the whole analysis. Because of the observation framework (with regards to time), it can be concluded that Hungary is more susceptible to sudden intervening elements (economic crisis, Gyrscany “lying speech”, et cetera) which indicates that the political authorities: a) do not have the systems in place to deal and respond to these factors, b) volatile and polarized political landscape has much to do with the low responsiveness, c) population is disengaged with the political elite. Therefore, political instability (according to indices in Chapter II) is momentarily higher in Hungary than in Slovakia and Czech Republic. Nevertheless, it is debatable if overall Hungary has a higher degree of political instability than Slovakia. At the beginning of the analysis, the expectation was that Hungary will show a much larger variation in political instability (which according to EIU it did), than Slovakia. It was surprising to observe that Slovakia is also quite instable, however with other elements causing the lower EIU scores. Clearly, the data for the Czech Republic has illustrated a higher degree of political stability which closely corresponds to the data of both IVs. Yet, the Czech Republic might (in the future) not prove as stable as the indices point to now. This depends on the way the cleavages are dealt with. Given, it makes it more simple to deal with these due to 61

a large extent ethnically homogenous nature of the country, but a combination of the following few factors could make the country more instable: the increasing capitalist development, “wealth” being an issue that is on top of the list people would consider as a potential source of social unrest, in addition to an increase government volatility and a foreseeable growing economic disparity in the population. Lastly, one fundamental point to mention that fills in between the criteria for political stability, is the relationship between the populace and the political authorities and elite. Indicators in IV1 have shown that the disillusionment with the politics and its elite has led to very little support and trust. For a democratically framed society, political participation, support and trust are key to ensure the relationship noted here functions. Political parties are a substantial element of a democratically formulated political system. These perform a communication role, represent different interest groups and offer a variety of political choices. Therefore, they are functionally invaluable, as is an effective civil society. At the moment, CEE is at a decisive point, twenty years after officially starting the transformation process. Yet, the (unofficial) transformation is not yet finished, it is ongoing. “In other words, the transformation process …continues in a new era, with new people and new instruments.”227

Annex

227

Hatala 2009.

62

__________________________________________________________________________ a) Region and Country Information 1. Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) The definition of “Central and Eastern Europe” in a narrow sense refers to Rumania, Poland, the Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia), Czechoslovakia (since 1993 Czech Republic and Slovakia) and Hungary. However, in a wider sense included are Ukraine, Belarus, former Yugoslav countries, Bulgaria and even Greece as “Border peoples of the Occident” (Halecki).228 The difficulty of defining the region depends on its transforming nature, its history and perspective of individual states. For the purposes of this paper, the above mentioned narrow definition is used, and to simplify the problem of defining CEE, Jan Kren to the most part embraces “the view that Central Europe is the area lying between the German border – wherever it happens to be – and the territory of the former Soviet Union. This roughly comprises Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.”229 Thus when talking about CEE, here meant are primarily these countries, even though the analysis does not include Poland. Important to mention when talking about CEE is the Visegrad group (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland) created originally in 1991. The purpose was to mutually “focus on regional activities and initiatives aimed at strengthening the identity of the Central European region.”230 Yet, Bronisław Geremek had explained that the Group did not experience the success anticipated at first, as one of the major points is that the economies are not complementary, rather these are in competition.231 This is an interesting position to consider for the future of the regional cooperation. The Visegrad states are members of the EU and NATO. Often there is a tendency to write about CEE as if it was one country, without depicting the differences between those. The following short portrait (necessary and basic information) should thus try to clarify the individual elements (mostly related to politics/political landscape) of each state. The factual information below, unless otherwise indicated, is drawn from the CIA World Factbook232 as it is updated regularly. 228

Meyers Grosses Universal Lexikon. Band 1984:366. Fehér 2007:137. 230 Declaration of Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic on cooperation of the Visegrád Group countries after their accession to the European Union (12.5.2004), European Navigator. Accessed. 24.11.2009. http://www.ena.lu/. 231 Refer to the Interview with Bronisław Geremek, 11.6.2008. 232 Refer to the CIA World Factbook. 229

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2. Country Information 1) Hungary Total area of Hungary is 93,028 sq km, with a population of 9,905,596 (July 2009 est.). Urban population makes up 68% of the total population. The ethnic composition is made up of 92.3% Hungarian, 1.9% Roma, 5.8% other or unknown. Hungary is a parliamentary democracy, with the current President President Laszlo Solyom (since 5 August 2005) and Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai (since 20 April 2009). The members of the unicameral National Assembly are elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms. The system is that of proportional and direct representation. After the fall of the communist regime, Hungary went through a transformation from a centrally-planned to a market economy. 80% of the GDP accounts to the private sector. The foreign investment has been quite widespread since 1989. The inability of the government to service its debt induced an assistance package (from IMF) of over $25 billion. Hungary has been experiencing negative growth in 2009 due to the economic crisis, decreased demand for Hungarian goods and low domestic consumption. Hungary’s primary exporting partner is Germany ( 26.5%), then Italy 5.4%, Romania 5.3%, Austria 4.9%, Slovakia 4.7%, France 4.7%, UK 4.5%, Czech Republic 4% (2008). 2) Czech Republic Through a peaceful “Velvet Revolution” Czechoslovakia regained its independence from the Soviet bloc. Soon after (January 1993) Czechoslovakia underwent a “velvet divorce” and split into two states Czech Republic and Slovakia. The total area is 78,867 sq km with a population of 10,211,904 (July 2009 est.). According to the 2001 census, the ethnic composition is the following: Czech 90.4%, Moravian 3.7%, Slovak 1.9%, other 4%. The population in the country is not very religious (Roman Catholic 26.8%, Protestant 2.1%, other 3.3%, unspecified 8.8%, unaffiliated 59% ). Czech Republic is a parliamentary democracy. Since 2003, the President is Vaclav Klaus and the Prime Minister (since April 2009) is Jan Fischer. Czech Republic has a bicameral Parliament which consists of the Senate (members elected by popular vote for a six-year term) and the Chamber of Deputies whose members are elected by popular vote for a term of four years.

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With regards to economic stance, Czech Republic has an open investment climate and thus has also had a successful transition from centrally planned economy to a market economy. 56.2% of the labor force is in the services sector, 40.2% in industry and 4.6% in agriculture. Czech economy is very export-driven, but due to the global economic crisis the demand for Czech exports in Western Europe dropped. Thus the economy contracted in 2009. Exporting partners include Germany (30.6%), Slovakia( 9.2%), Poland (6.5%), France (5.3%) and other Western European countries. 52% of the exports are machinery and transport equipment. 3) Slovakia Slovakia is a parliamentary democracy with the surface area of 49,035 sq km and a population size of 5,463,046 (July 2009 est.). According to the 2001 census, ethnic composition is as follows: Slovak 85.8%, Hungarian 9.7%, Roma 1.7%, Ruthenian/Ukrainian 1%, other and unspecified 1.8%. Main religion is Roman Catholic (68.9%), followed by Protestant (10.8%), Greek Catholic (4.1%), other or unspecified 3.2%, and none 13%. Current (since 2004) President is Ivan Gasparovic and Prime Minister since 2006 is Robert Fico. The President is elected by a popular vote for a five-year term. The members of the unicameral National Council of the Slovak Republic are elected on the basis of proportional representation for a four-year term. Slovakia adopted the Euro in January 2009. Most of the labor force is in services (56.9%), 39% in industry and 4% in agriculture. Strongest export partners are Germany (20%), Czech Republic (13.1%), (France 6.7%), Poland (6.6%), Hungary (6.3%) and other Western European states. The commodities exported are: vehicles 25.9%, machinery and electrical equipment 21.3%, base metals 14.6%, chemicals and minerals 10.1%, plastics 5.4%.

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