Indus Water Treaty

INDUS WATER TREATY ISSUE: Lack of water-sharing agreement leads India to stem flow of tributaries to Pakistan on 1 April 1948 OBJECTIVE: Negotiate an equitable allocation of the flow of the Indus River and its tributaries between the riparian states. DATES OF NEGOTIATION: 1951-1960 PARTIES INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATION: The Indus Waters Treaty is a water-sharing treaty between the Republic of India and Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The treaty was signed in Karachi on September 19, 1960 by the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the then President of Pakistan Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan. The World Bank is a signatory as a third party.

INDIAN PRIME MINISTER JAWAHARLAL NEHRU AND PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN FIELD MARSHAL MOHAMMAD AYUB KHAN SIGNING THE IWT, KARACHI ON SEPTEMBER 19,1960

PROVISIONS:

INDUS & TRIBUTRIES

The Indus System of Rivers comprises three Western Rivers the Indus, the Jhelum and Chenab and three Eastern Rivers - the Sutlej, the Beas and the Ravi; and with minor exceptions, the treaty gives India exclusive use of all of the waters of the Eastern Rivers and their tributaries before the point where the rivers enter Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan has exclusive use of the Western Rivers. Pakistan also received one-time financial compensation for the loss of water from the Eastern Rivers. The countries agree to exchange data and co-operate in matters related to the treaty. For this purpose, treaty creates the Permanent Indus Commission, with a commissioner appointed by each country. The treaty is considered controversial as the state of Jammu and Kashmir was deprived of control of its water while benefitting the Indian state of Punjab. Kashmiri farmers or businesses cannot use the water of their rivers as a result of this treaty. The government of Jammu and Kashmir has time and again demanded compensation for decades. This aspect is downplayed by the governments of India as well as Pakistan. ORIGIN OF INDUS RIVER: The waters of the Indus basin begin in the Himalayan Mountains of disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. They flow from the hills through the arid states of

Punjab and Sind, converging in Pakistan and emptying into the Arabian Sea south of Karachi. Where once there was only a narrow strip of irrigated land along these rivers, developments over the last century have created a large network of canals and storage facilities that provide water for more than 26 million acres - the largest irrigated area of any one river system in the world. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND: The partition of the Indian subcontinent created a conflict over the plentiful waters of the Indus basin. The newly formed states were at odds over how to share and manage the water resources of Indus basin. Furthermore, the geography of partition was such that the Source Rivers of the Indus basin were in India. Pakistan felt its livelihood threatened by the prospect of Indian control over the tributaries that fed water into the Pakistani portion of the basin. Where India certainly had its own ambitions for the profitable development of the basin, Pakistan felt acutely threatened by a conflict over the main source of water for its cultivable land. INTER-DOMINION ACCORD: During the first years of partition the waters of the Indus were apportioned by the Inter-Dominion Accord of May 4, 1948. This accord required India to release sufficient waters to the Pakistani regions of the basin in return for annual payments from the government of Pakistan. The accord was meant to meet immediate requirements and was followed by negotiations for a more permanent solution. Neither side, however, was willing to compromise their respective positions and negotiations reached a stalemate. Pakistan wanted to take the matter to the International Court of Justice but India refused, arguing that the conflict required a bilateral resolution. INDUS WATER TREATY: By 1951, the two sides were no longer meeting and the situation seemed intractable. As one anonymous Indian official said at the time, "India and Pakistan can go on shouting on Kashmir for all time to come, but an early settlement on the Indus waters is essential for maintenance of peace in the subcontinent". Despite the unwillingness to compromise, both nations were anxious to find a solution, fully aware that the Indus conflict could lead to overt hostilities if unresolved. In this same year, David Lilienthal, formerly the chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and of the US Atomic Energy Commission visited the region to write a series of articles for Colliers magazine. Lilienthal had a keen interest in the subcontinent and was welcomed by the highest levels of both Indian and Pakistani governments. In his journals he insisted the World Bank to be the part of dispute and resolve it in the best interest of both the nations. Lilienthal's idea was well received by officials at the World Bank, and, subsequently, by the Indian and Pakistani governments. Eugene R. Black, then president of the World Bank told Lilienthal that his proposal "makes good sense

all round". Black wrote that the Bank was interested in the economic progress of the two countries and had been concerned that the Indus dispute could only be a serious handicap to this development. India's previous objections to third party arbitration were remedied by the Bank's insistence that it would not adjudicate the conflict, but, instead, work as a conduit for agreement. Black also made a distinction between the "functional" and "political" aspects of the Indus dispute. In his correspondence with Indian and Pakistan leaders, Black asserted that the Indus dispute could most realistically be solved if the functional aspects of disagreement were negotiated apart from political considerations. He envisioned a group that tackled the question of how best to utilize the waters of the Indus Basin - leaving aside questions of historic rights or allocations. Black proposed a Working Party made up of Indian, Pakistani and World Bank engineers. The World Bank delegation would act as a consultative group, charged with offering suggestions and speeding dialogue. In his opening statement to the Working Party, Black spoke of why he was optimistic about the group's success: Black's hopes for a quick resolution to the Indus dispute were premature. While the Bank had expected that the two sides would come to an agreement on the allocation of waters, neither India nor Pakistan seemed willing to compromise their positions. While Pakistan insisted on its historical right to waters of all the Indus tributaries, the Indian side argued that the previous distribution of waters should not set future allocation. Instead, the Indian side set up a new basis of distribution, with the waters of the Western tributaries going to Pakistan and the Eastern tributaries to India. The substantive technical discussions that Black had hoped for were stymied by the political considerations he had expected to avoid. The World Bank soon became frustrated with this lack of progress. What had originally been envisioned as a technical dispute that would quickly untangle itself became an intractable mess. India and Pakistan were unable to agree on the technical aspects of allocation, let alone the implementation of any agreed upon distribution of waters. Finally, in 1954, after nearly two years of negotiation, the World bank offered its own proposal, stepping beyond the limited role it had apportioned for itself and forcing the two sides to consider concrete plans for the future of the basin. The proposal offered India the three eastern tributaries of the basin and Pakistan the three western tributaries. Canals and storage dams were to be constructed to divert waters from the western rivers and replace the eastern river supply lost by Pakistan. While the Indian side was amenable to the World Bank proposal, Pakistan found it unacceptable. The World Bank allocated the eastern rivers to India and the western rivers to Pakistan. This new distribution did not account for the historical usage of the Indus basin and repudiated Pakistan's negotiating position. Where India had stood for a new system of allocation, Pakistan felt that its share of waters should be based on pre-partition distribution. The World Bank proposal was more in line with the Indian plan and this angered the Pakistani delegation.

They threatened to withdraw from the Working Party and negotiations verged on collapse. But neither side could afford the dissolution of talks. In December of 1954, the two sides returned to the negotiating table. The World Bank proposal was transformed from a basis of settlement to a basis for negotiation and the talks continued, stop and go, for the next six years. One of the last stumbling blocks to an agreement concerned financing for the construction of canals and storage facilities that would transfer water from the eastern Indian rivers to Pakistan. This transfer was necessary to make up for the water Pakistan was giving up by ceding its rights to the eastern tributaries. The World Bank initially planned for India to pay for these works, but India refused. The Bank responded with a plan for external financing supplied mainly by the United States and the United Kingdom. This solution cleared the remaining stumbling blocks to agreement and the Treaty was signed by the Prime Ministers of both countries in 1960. The Indus Waters Treaty is the only agreement that has been faithfully implemented and upheld by both India and Pakistan. Although its negotiation was often arduous and frustrating for the World Bank and for the Indian and Pakistani delegations, the final outcome was amenable to all parties. The Indus waters are the life blood of Pakistan and much of western India; functional cooperation was necessary for both sides to survive and prosper. The example of the Indus Waters Treaty suggests that cooperation between India and Pakistan is possible in cases where the benefits of agreement are plentiful and pressing, overwhelming the political hedging that prevents other forms of reconciliation. SALIENT FEATURES OF INDUS WATER TREATY: After nine years of negotiations, the Indus Waters Treaty was finally signed on September 19, 1960, with the cooperation of the World Bank. The salient features of the Indus Waters Treaty are: •

Three Eastern rivers namely Ravi, Sutlej and Beas were given to India.

•

Three Western rivers, Indus, Jhelum and Chenab were given to Pakistan.

• Pakistan to meet the requirements of its Eastern river canals from the Western rivers by constructing replacement works. • Safeguards incorporated in the treaty to ensure unrestricted flow of waters in the Western rivers. • Both parties were to regularly exchange flow-data of rivers, canals and streams. • A permanent Indus Waters Commission was constituted to resolve the disputes between the parties. The Treaty sets out the procedure for settlement of the differences and disputes. It also provides for settlement of disputes through the International Court of Arbitration.

Thus, future prospects persuaded the two countries to agree to a partition of the Indus Basin waters. Both countries were expected to exploit their respective water shares with the help of an Indus Basin Development Fund to be administered by the World Bank.

ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION WORK IN PAKISTAN AS PART OF IWT The Indus Basin Project involved construction of two large dams, five barrages, one siphon and seven link canals as detailed below in Tables, to transfer 14 MAF of water from the Western rivers. There are three systems of link canals. Two of the systems, the Rasul-Qadirabad-Balloki-Suleimanki System (R.Q.B.S.) and the Trimmu-Sidhnai-Mailsi-Bahawal System (T.S.M.B) connect the Jhelum River through to the Sutlej and the third system Chashma-Jhelum System (C.J) connects the Indus with the Jhelum.

ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION WORK IN PAKISTAN AS PART OF IWT – CANALS Link Canals Constructed in Pakistan under the IWT From -To Rivers

Link Canal Name

Description

1. Jhelum – Chenab

Rasul-Qadirabad

30 miles long; provides 19,000 cusecs Jhelumwater to Chenab

2. Chenab – Ravi

Qadirabad-Balloki

104 miles long; provides 18,600 cusecs water to Ravi

3. Ravi – Su tlej

BallokiSuleimanki II

39 miles long; provides 6,500 cusecs water toSutlej

4. Indus – Jhelum

Chashma-Jhelum

63 miles long; provides 21,700 cusecs water to Jhelum

5. Indus – R avi

Trimmu-Sidhnai

44 miles long; provides 11,000 cusecs water to Ravi

6. Ravi – Su tlej

Sidhnai-Mailsi

60 miles long; provides 10,000 cusecs water to Sutlej

7. Indus – Panjnad

Taunsa-Panjnad

38 miles long; provides 100,000 cusecs water to Sutlej

ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION WORK IN PAKISTAN AS PART OF IWT RESERVOIRS Reservoirs Constructed in Pakistan under IWT Mangl a

On Jhelum at Mangla, Mirpur Distt.; completed in 1968

Tarbe la

On Indus ; completed in 1977; Gross storage 11.62 MAF; Live storage 9.7 MAF; Generates 3478 MW power

ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION WORK IN PAKISTAN AS PART OF IWT BARRAGES & SYPHONS Barrages Constructed in Pakistan under IWT Marala

On Chenab ; completed in 1968; Max. discharge 1.1 Million cusecs

Qadirab ad

On Chenab ; completed in 1967; Max. discharge 900,000 cusecs

Sidhnai

On Ravi ; completed in 1965; Max. discharge 167,000 cusecs

Rasul

On Jhelum ; completed in 1967; Max. discharge 876,000 cusecs

Chashm a

On Indus ; completed in 1971; also has a reservoir of 0.75 MAF; Max. discharge 1,176,000 cusecs

Mailsi

On Sutlej ; a gated siphon; Max. discharge 429,000 cusecs

OTHER ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTIONS ON THE INDUS RIVER SYSTEM Other Important Engineering Structures Jinnah Barrage

Constructed 1946; Max. discharge 950,000 cusecs

Taunsa Barrage

Constructed 1959; Max. discharge 750,000 cusecs

Guddu Barrage

Constructed 1962; Max. discharge 1,200,000 cusecs

Sukkur Barrage

Constructed 1932; Max. discharge 1,500,000 cusecs

Kotri Barrage

Constructed 1955; Max. discharge 750,000 cusecs

Ghazi Barotha

Constructed 2004; Max. discharge 500,000 cusecs; Power generation 1450 MW