Hungary, Central-eastern Europe And The Role Of Sustainable Development

Hungary, Central-Eastern Europe and the role of sustainable development

To be presented at the International Studies Association Conference Budapest, Hungary- June 2003

Chad Briggs Assistant Professor of Political Science and Environmental Studies California State University Fullerton [email protected]

Abstract: In order to achieve membership, countries in East-Central Europe must quickly adopt European Union standards for the environment. This will be a monumental task, hampered by a long history of environmental damage and unsustainble economic practices, even though new member states are receiving assistance from the West in the form of loans. Despite the influx of new capital, however, sustainable development policies since Rio de Janeiro and Johannesburg have increasingly stressed the importance of turning to private corporations and banks for investment and development funds. By looking at the case of water in Hungary, this paper argues that privatization policies may not be in the best interests of recipient countries, either economically or environmentally.

Notions of sustainable development in the international realm, first articulated in 1987 by the Brundtland Commission in Our Common Future, have attempted to provide guidelines for how to balance economic growth with environmental sustainability. Since that time, the concept of sustainability has changed in both theory and practice, the results of which have been evident in subsequent conferences from the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, to the more recent 2002 summit in Johannesburg, South Africa. Actors as varied as national governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), multi-national corporations (MNCs) and academic institutions, have all worked to put into practice the theory that economic growth can proceed without significantly harming the environment. Originally, the international development agencies (led by institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) had focused development efforts upon less industrialized countries, arguing that proper investment in their economies was the best way to protect natural resources and environmental conditions in those countries. Within Europe, however, more recent attention has been given to the environmental and economic conditions of former communist states of East-Central Europe, particularly as a number of them approach European Union membership late in 2004. Principles of sustainable development have been used as the basis for environmental standards now required by the European Union for Central-East European accession. The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a stark reliance upon heavy industry in Central East European states’ (CEE) economies, largely at the expense of environmental conditions and considerations. State socialist systems controlled both the heavy industry and the agencies responsible for overseeing their behavior, a conflict of interest whereby the political goals of industrial production left environmental regulations unenforced and flagrantly violated. CEE governments often had numerous environmental and health-related laws written into statute, but until the late 1980s citizens did not possess the means to question state complicity. It is notable that in a number of countries, the first groups to openly and successfully challenge communist governments were environmental groups. In Hungary, publicly expressed concerns largely revolved around the quality of water and wastewater discharges into the Danube in Budapest, or the construction of the BÅs-Nagymaros dam on the upper Danube. Even with the demise of the state-run socialist system, environmental concerns in CEE countries must still focus upon the legacy of the past. Years of poor investment into environmental infrastructure will require years of remediation, at the same time that many CEE governments are looking to European Union (EU) membership and further inclusion into the international community. Accession into the EU and integration with western economies requires harmonization with EU standards for environment and health, standards premised upon ideals of sustainable development agreed upon at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and Johannesburg in 2002. CEE Countries will be expected to have enacted environmental legislation fully in compliance with EU regulations by the time of accession (autumn of 2004 for some member countries), while actual environmental quality will be expected to meet standards several years later. While attention to environmental quality is important, it is worth questioning whether the approach currently being advocated by the EU, the World Bank, the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is in the interests of Central and East European citizens. The strong push for standardized regulations, efficiency and 2

privatization may appear to be laudable environmental goals, but questions remain as to the flexibility and fairness with implementation. Do EU accession-related standards reflect the environmental interests of CEE states, or economic interests of existing EU members? This paper represents background research into the question of new environmental regulation and its appropriateness for CEE governments in addressing environmental issues. Based upon initial research into this area, it may be hypothesized that UN, EU, European Investment Bank, European Bank for Redevelopment and World Bank efforts to privatize environmental industries will result in substantial environmental and economic damages, absent solid and lasting oversight of such industries by government. Prospectus For the sake of clarity and focus, specific attention will be paid to the Hungarian situation and the problem of water quality. Much of the field and document research to support these questions will be undertaken in Hungary and Russia in May through July of 2003, although for practical reasons this paper will be written prior to the actual in-country research. For these reasons it should be stressed that material covered in this presentation is highly conditional, and only describes a background to the topics at hand. In order to examine these issues and questions more carefully, research will be undertaken in Hungary in May to June of 2003, with some additional work in Russia in July. The methodology will involve qualitative case study research, using a comparative context for analysis and a historic time frame. The primary materials will consist not only of scientific data on environmental quality in Hungary and elsewhere, but also interviews with some of the key players and stakeholders in the Hungarian water industry. These interviews include the Budapest water companies (especially FCSM), European partners to privatization (such as Berlinwasser Internat), relevant government ministries (Ministry of Environment and Water), and interested non-governmental groups. A more detailed explanation of the Hungarian situation can then be presented for the ISA conference at the end of June. Background to the problem Like many places in Central and Eastern Europe, Hungary is characterized by a relatively plentiful supply of water, and most of its residents have easy access to drinking water from municipal sources. Several major rivers, most notably the Danube, flow across Hungary’s borders, and this is appreciably supplemented by large groundwater reserves. The problem with water policies in the region is not limited by the total amount of water, but rather by the quality, sources and ecological vulnerability of the water. Ninety-six percent of surface water in Hungary originates in other countries, which greatly limits Hungary’s ability to implement basin-wide approaches to pollution prevention and abatement. At the same time, Hungary adds significantly to pollution pressures upon hydrologic resources to its downstream neighbors. Despite widespread access to municipal (potable) water sources, Hungary and similar countries have

3

substantially lower rates of access to sewerage systems and wastewater treatment facilities.1 The practice of polluting rivers and lakes in Hungary was not an issue of great importance to the communist regime, particularly as municipal drinking water was often drawn from underground sources. Around Budapest for example, most water was pumped from the area around Csepel Island, an industrial area downstream from both the downtown and releases of untreated sewage.2 The reliance upon groundwater, often while ignoring the quality of such water, led to the widespread practice of releasing untreated waste into the Danube and other rivers. Hungarian laws concerning sewage treatment plant design had been standardized and inflexible, resulting in high operating costs and poor operation. When combined with weak political will to invest in such operations, the result was widespread contamination of surface waters in the country. As of the mid-1990s, 84 million m3 of untreated industrial wastewater was leaked or dumped into lakes and rivers every year in Hungary. Agricultural operations were producing nearly 50 million m3 of manure every year, while municipalities dumped 1.3 billion m3 of largely untreated sewage into rivers, mostly the Danube.3 Budapest alone contributed one million m3 daily into the Danube, the same river from which it draws its supplemental water supply. Only 20-25% of the city’s sewage is biologically treated.4 Although Hungary signed the 1994 Sofia Convention, promising to curb pollution in the Danube, the country faces massive challenges in meeting such standards. The heavy reliance upon groundwater carries other problems, as well. Over-reliance upon underground sources have significantly depleted many wells, particularly those from karstic groundwater. Some water development projects, such as the BÅs-Nagymaros dam, have severely affected groundwater levels in the Szigetköz region and downstream from Bratislava. In many ways the BÅs-Nagymaros project was a primary example of how former communist systems placed much more emphasis upon heavy industrial production than upon ecological

1

Until recently, only half of people in Hungary were connected to sewerage systems. See Hans-Peter Nachtnebel. 2000. “The Danube river basin environmental programme: plans and actions for a basin wide approach.” Water Policy, 2, pp. 113-129. 2

The Csepel Island pumps were shut down in the mid 1990s, after it was discovered that iron and manganese levels far exceeded World Health Organization potable water guidelines. Until that time, the use of water purification plants for drinking water had not even been seriously studied. 3

D. Hinrichsen and I. Láng. 1996. “Hungary.” in : Environmental Problems in Eastern Europe. Carter & Turnock (eds.), London: Routledge, pp. 99-100. The amount of sewage released into waters in Hungary each year would cover an American football field to a depth of 200 miles or 322 km. Put another way, it would take 325,000 Olympic-sized swimming pools to contain that amount. 4

US Department of Commerce. 1997. Hungary- Wastewater Pollution Control. International Trade Administration Market Research Report. 4

considerations. The project decreased groundwater tables in the Szigetköz region, exacerbated preexisting water quality issues near Bratislava, and in other ways heavily damaged the flora and fauna of the inland wetland areas of the Danube Bend.5 Other notable events have been the cyanide poisonings of the Tisza River in Romania/Hungary, and into the Danube in the Vojvodina region of Yugoslavia.6 Despite the disturbing nature of these events, it must be said that in many ways such headline issues obscure the more systematic problems faced by CEE governments like Hungary. The low investment in environmental infrastructure during the communist years was not simply evidenced by directed investment into large, so-called ‘megaprojects,’ nor was the environmental damage limited to visible areas or resources. Fortunately, heavy metal deposits and suspended solids were not particularly worrisome within the Austrian and Hungarian sections of the Danube, although some localized pollution has been evident.7 Surface waters have been more susceptible to pollution from organic compounds, such as nitrogen, phosphorous and nitrates leaching from agriculture or wastewater.8 Further damage has been caused by non-point source runoff pollution in the form of oils and other persistent organic compounds, particularly from transportation sources.9 Needless to say, the Hungarian government and its people have many tasks ahead in order to meet EU standards for water quality and effluent emissions. It is not believed that these tasks will be accomplished overnight, but handling water quality and wastewater alone may consume one percent of GDP, roughly the equivalent of what other EU nations spend on all environmental protection. Hungarian Political Situation Hungary has historically possessed surprisingly good environmental laws, but until environmental issues became matters of legitimacy for the state around 1990, they were rarely

5

See Eugene K. Balon and Juraj Hol…ik. 1999. “Gab…íkovo River Barrage System: the Ecological Disaster and Economic Calamity for the Inland Delta of the Middle Danube.” Environmental Biology of Fishes, 54, pp. 1-17. 6

Mark Macklin, et.al. 2003. “The long term fate and environmental significance of contaminant metals released by the January and March 2000 mining tailings dam failures in Maramure County, upper Tisa Basin, Romania.” Applied Geochemistry, 18, 2, pp. 241-257. 7

P. Woitke, et.al. 2003. “Analysis and assessment of heavy metal pollution in suspended solids and sediments of the river Danube.” Chemosphere, 51, pp. 633-642. 8

T. Németh. 1993. “Nitrogen in Hungarian soils: nitrogen management relation to groundwater protection.” Journal of Contaminant Hydrology, 20, pp. 185-208. 9

Non-point runoff pollution is frequently under-acknowledged in importance, and little research has been found thus far on its contribution to general CEE water quality. 5

recognized or enforced. One of the first reactions of the government to calls for more accountability in areas of water quality, was to decentralize the process and devolve jurisdiction to the municipalities in 1991. National responsibility was divided between several ministries, such as Energy, Environment and Transportation.10 Such actions had real consequences for the terms of economic development that were to follow, as many municipalities were forced to sell their holdings to private companies. Such turnovers have not accounted for a large percentage of total municipalities, but they have affected a substantial portion of the Hungarian population. Since 1996, it was decreed that all settlements with a population of more than 2000 had to have and maintain a sewage treatment plant by a certain date. By 2010, there will be 1365 plants in operation, with a daily total capacity of 2.9 million m3. The necessity for this is illustrated by the fact that inhabitants of large urban centers (slightly less than half the national population) daily create 1.8 million m3 of sewage waste. The amount of waste created has remained fairly steady, despite large decreases in overall water use within Hungary since the early 1990s.11 Steps have been taken since the early 1990s to remediate past damage, and new laws are rapidly being adopted to bring Hungary in line with EU regulations. Many loans are being channeled through the EU to Hungary, via the EBRD, EIB and even World Bank. EIB spending alone for 2003 is expected to exceed EUR 1 billion. Many of these loans are given on the condition that water utilities by privatized, meaning that at least their operation be given over to private corporations. An EIB statement on the sale of Budapest Municipal Sewerage Company, indicated that in privatizing, The municipality will retain majority ownership of FCSM.[Budapest Sewerage Co.] However, the devolution of management control to the private sponsors and linking their remuneration to efficiency gains will maximise the benefits of private sector involvement, leading to significant improvements to FCSM's capital and operating efficiency and a higher standard of service.12 If the Budapest deal is illustrative of other projects in East-Central Europe, then it may pose a problem as banks are loaning money to private corporations, while the government has to guarantee profits for the company. Guaranteed profits margins were a problem when such deals

10

See E. Fleit, et.al. 2000. “EU legislation concerning wastewater treatment- tasks for wastewater treatment developments in Hungary.” Water Science and Technology, 41, 9, pp. 1-5. 11

Dóra Vimola. 2000. “Water Management Policy and its Principles within the European Union.” Periodica Polytechnica Ser. Soc. Man. Sci., 8, 2, pp. 173-177. Water use decreased since 1990 primarily because of improvements in industrial and agricultural efficiency. Per capita municipal use has not changed significantly. 12

European Bank for Redevelopment. 1998. Budapest waste-water services privatisation, Hungary. EBRD project summary document. 6

surfaced in Chile, and they would not be any more politically palatable in East-Central Europe.13 The favor of technical solutions and private investment The extent of environmental pollution in CEE states is so significant that a large portion of the countries’ GDP will have to be allocated to meeting EU requirements for environmental protection and standards. The exact figures are often contentious, but range in the area of 3-5% of total GDP for most given countries, amounting to an enormous investment of what are already scarce government resources.14 The European Union has provided funds to assist in meeting requirements for membership, but in most cases they only fund up to 75% of costs for a given project. The remaining costs are still far too large to rely upon a polluter-pays principle, by which costs of environmental protection are borne primarily by polluting industries and the fines they pay. Rather, costs of environmental protection will have to be paid by society as a whole, with crucial support coming from Western and Northern European states. In some ways the situation is similar to that of developing countries, although it is by no means completely comparable. CEE states have lower per capita income than those of the EU, at times only a fraction of what could be found in France or Germany. Waste generated and energy used per unit of GDP is higher than in the EU, indicating inefficiency in the use of resources and treatment of waste. Despite suffering from greater inefficiency, it is interesting to note that with lower levels of income citizens of CEE states produce less waste and use less energy than their Western counterparts.15 If one of the primary aims of the EU is to increase economic prosperity, it should be recognized that with economic growth will come greater strains upon natural resources and environmental systems. Economic wealth is closely correlated with increases in consumption. The somewhat conflicting expectations for both growth and increased environmental quality is why it is important to examine current policies of sustainable development. Is it possible to increase economic growth in CEE significantly, while at the same time substantially improving environmental protection? Three questions must be raised in this context of drawing up new environmental regulation and projects. First, with the billions of Euros in aid being given to CEE states over the course of only a few years, can this money be spent effectively and

13

The nature of trade agreements and loans often forces particular policies upon an unwilling recipient. This has been the cause of much political controversy in Latin America, Africa and Asia over the past few years. See Tony Clarke. 2003. “Water Privateers: International trade agreements and loan conditions are pushing the privatization of public water systems around the world.” Alternatives, 29, 2, pp. 11-15. 14

See Fleit, op.cit. By comparison, the United States currently spends approximately 3% of its GDP on national defense. 15

Sándor Kerekes and Károly Kiss. 2000. “Basic Environmental Requirements for EU Accession: An Impact Study on Hungary.” Environment, Development and Sustainability, 2, p. 61. 7

efficiently given the short time frame? Second, will the need to provide 25% matching funds from the new-member states impose unacceptable costs on certain sectors of the population or environment? Last, are the conditions under which these funds are made available suitable for the recipient countries, or are they more likely to favor the interests of other states or organizations? The three questions are closely interrelated, and there is reason to doubt that the answers will be very positive for those entering the EU. Despite the best efforts of individuals or of single organizations working on sustainable development, policy directions may emerge that differ significantly from their original intent. In practice, concepts of sustainable development have evolved over the years into a process which favors technical solutions and often the transfer of authority from public sectors to private corporations. This policy emphasis, reflected in a number of World Bank and EBRD documents, shifts alternatives away from what may be lower-cost or more politically stable alternatives. Technicism is the process by which problems are defined in technical terms as problems to be solved through the application of technical means, rather than as social or political issues in need of debate. The tendency to apply technicism to environmental issues is to resort to what Shrader-Frechette refers to as a ‘naturalistic fallacy,’ or the tendency to believe that ethical or political problems can be explained away by reference to science or technical knowledge alone.16 Although the concepts of technicism and privatization may appear to be quite distinct, for a number of reasons in CEE they have a close relationship. Out of the many concepts that arose from the Rio de Janeiro conference in 1992, one of the most important was that of decentralized control. It was felt that environmental policies and development could only be effective if the state developed partnerships directly with local, nongovernmental and business interests. The idea of decentralization is hardly new, as much of the environmental policy literature had addressed such approaches over the years.17 Yet as Allouche and Finger wrote in their 2001 article on World Bank water policy, only two of the four principles developed at the 1992 Dublin Conference on Freshwater have received primary attention from western lenders. Principle two of the conference stressed the importance of a “participatory approach” to water resources management, including a large number of stakeholders in the decision-making process, such as the public, planners, scientists and local government officials.18 This second principle was not at all controversial, and it was included partly in response to past criticisms of World Bank planning methods. As with all political

16

Kristin Shrader-Frechette. 1985. Science Policy, Ethics, and Economic Methodology: Some Problems of Technology Assessment and Environmental Impact Analysis. Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishers. 17

Admittedly, another impetus to such thinking may have been the then-newly acknowledged environmental conditions in former communist states, which were themselves the very models of centralization. 18

Jeremy Allouche and Matthias Finger. 2001. “Two Ways of Reasoning, One Outcome: The World Bank’s Evolving Philosophy in Establishing a ‘Sustainable Water Resources Management’ Policy.” Global Environmental Politics, 1, 2, pp. 42-47. 8

concepts, however, the real importance lies with the interpretation and execution of such a principle. The fourth principle was far more controversial, and stated that water was to be treated as an economic, not merely a social, good. While stressing the right of all human beings to have access to clean water at an affordable price, the fourth principle is based upon the argument that failure to recognize the economic value of water has led to harmful and wasteful policies in the past.19 Water policies in the western United States, for example, often encourage the draining of entire rivers for purposes as varied as agriculture to golf courses, while the subsidization of such practices by the government and relative lack of pricing on water does not force conservation.20 Others saw the shift to economic goods as being at least slightly at odds with past UN policies, particularly as water is listed as a basic human right under the International Covenant on Human Rights. Fearing that by designating water as a ‘need’ rather than a ‘right’ would allow more selective services and quality to go only to those most able to pay.21 The World Bank in the 1990s extended its role beyond simply providing money for development, but also compelled countries (and particularly governments) to work more efficiently with the economy. With its sister institutions the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and EBRD, the development industry began to see the state as impeding the performance of economies. As a consequence, policies have been developed to reduce the role of the state in many economic sectors, including water. Without state funds, however, it would be difficult to find the necessary capital to improve or expand water infrastructure, leading the development industry to turn to multi-national corporations.22 Lending institutions could therefore not only focus upon water as an economic good, but could accomplish the decentralization called for in 1992. In other words, it precipitated a shift in thinking from water resources development to water resources management, with the management function increasingly given over to corporations. Development (i.e., building of infrastructure) became secondary to a focus upon management of existing resources (i.e., privatization). As a result of World Bank policies, the 1990s saw a significant increase in water privatization throughout the world, and expectations remain that this trend will increase in future years. This increase will be particularly notable in areas suffering from a relative lack of water infrastructure maintenance or investment, while changes in public to private operation of water in North America in Europe will be much more modest. Recent years have also seen a marked increase in ‘tied aid’ in the area of water, meaning loans or grants available only under the

19

Ibid.

20

See Marc Reisner. 1993. Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water. New York: Penguin Books. 21

Maude Barlow. 2001. “Commodification of water- the wrong prescription.” Water Science and Technology, 43, 4, pp. 79-84. 22

Allouche, op.cit. The impetus for this change is questionable, as it is possible that the corporations themselves were behind much of the change to privatization agendas. 9

condition that the utility be privatized. Such loans from the World Bank now constitute almost 100% of its water development funds, and have also been seen in Eastern Europe.23 Privatization On a global scale, the results of privatizing a natural monopoly have been mixed, at best. High profile cases have emerged in South America, where prices in Bolivia rose so much that it sparked political protests and forced the American-based corporation to withdraw its investment. Notable cases have also been present in Ontario, Canada, where the privatization of water testing helped contributed to the deaths of 7 people from e.coli bacteria in the small town of Walkerton.24 Efforts to privatize water in Atlanta recently have proven unsuccessful, while earlier privatization of water utilities in the UK received mixed marks from economists studying the companies’ performance.25 The relevant literature concerning privatization of water is expanding, and it is neither possible nor necessary to consider all possible aspects of the situation. As it relates to Central-Eastern Europe, several factors and influences should be taken into account. The first issue to consider is that corporations have different regulative ideals than do governments. This is a crucial point, because it should not be assumed that corporations act in a particular fashion purely out of malice or disinterest.26 Rather, their legal mandate for action is to generate profits for their shareholders, and it is this focus upon profit maximization that may result in policy distortions. By contrast, a politician running for office often uses the campaign as a regulative ideal, and it is this dedication that may result in other policy distortions. In the case of water utilities, there are a number of the notable side-effects. Examples might be an effort to establish full-cost recovery for water delivery (which makes water bills more regressive according to income levels), efforts to invest more in areas with higher rates of return (meaning that wealthier neighborhoods would receive better service, or any service at all), and efforts to increases prices where inelastic demand exists (resulting in far higher water bills). Although there may be some basic similarities, not all privatization programs are the

23

Center for Public Integrity. 2003. The Water Barons. 24

Another 2300 fell ill from the bacteria. Some commentators believe that privatization only exacerbated previously low infrastructure investments. See Elizabeth Brubaker. 2002. “No More Walkertons.” The National Post (Toronto), 23 January, p. FP17. 25

David S. Saal and David Parker. 2001. “Productivity and Price Performance in the Privatized Water and Sewerage Companies of England and Wales.” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 20, 1, pp. 61-90. 26

Considering the charges of fraud and corruption brought against the two largest water conglomerates in the world, French multinationals Vivendi and Suez Lyonaise des Eaux (its water arm has since been renamed Ondeo), it would be very easy to prejudice any research on this subject. 10

same. Varying degrees of involvement may be seen with private interests, from the state simply contracting out maintenance jobs via public bidding, to full private control of resource rights and infrastructure operations. The exact mix of responsibilities and oversight make a large difference in determining the success of any project, and one should therefore be wary of making blanket statements regarding privatization processes. The emphasis that has been placed upon water as an economic good, the desire for privatization, and the structure of PHARE/EU funding itself, has resulted in a strong concentration upon high-cost and high-technology solutions to water quality issues. The focus upon higher-cost alternatives exists for several reasons, the most salient of which is the requirement that any EU funds be given for a minimum amount (between 5-10 million Euros). It is also the case that EU standards are not context or geographically specific, so that they may not be entirely appropriate to the country adopting them.27 This problem may be common in any large country or confederation, but evidence has already surfaced suggesting that current regulation of water and wastewater in Hungary tends toward overproduction of water supplies and heavy investment in certain areas at the expense of others.28 As with any program where enormous sums are invested in a short period of time, it is fairly easy for such investment to be asymmetrical to actual or even projected need. The questions persist as to how effectively EU funds can be applied in such a short time frame, and whether they are likely to be effective in significantly restoring environmental conditions. The case of Hungary is therefore not necessarily indicative of all CEE states, but it may be illustrative of the problems when attempting to overcome past environmental damage in so short a time period. Conclusion When dealing with issues of how to balance economic growth with environmental protection, Hungary is not in a good position to bargain. The country believes it has a historic right to enter the EU, yet it realizes at the same time that there are many hurdles to its accession. Lacking the necessary resources to ameliorate past environmental damage on its own, countries like Hungary are forced to accept the conditions laid out by the EU, EIB, EBRD and World Bank, even if those policies are not in the best environmental interests of Hungary. Concepts of sustainable development are much easier to agree to in theory than in practice, and their current evolution may favor ideals of World Bank and IMF economists more than Hungarian environmental regulators. The purpose of this research is to caution that future growth and the process of privatization cannot be the prime motivators for proper environmental protection. Cost-effective and target-effective policies must be the sustained goals of affected governments, and it is not

27

See Sándor Kerekes and Károly Kiss. 2000. “Basic Environmental Requirements for EU Accession: An Impact Study on Hungary.” Environment, Development and Sustainability, 2, p. 60. 28

Ibid., p. 68. 11

enough simply to find the necessary capital investment for economic growth. Considering the strong relationship between economic growth and consumption of natural capital, making economic growth a priority does not mean that environmental issues will be addressed. Absent strong oversight from CEE governments, the UN-inspired concepts of sustainable development may guarantee profits for multinationals while harming economic and environmental interests domestically.

12