Himachal Pradesh Juristic Best

Mandir Shivji Maharaj Darla vs Negi And Ors. Dated 29/6/1971 J U D G M E N T D.B. Lal, J. 1.

This

is

a

second

appeal

under

Section

104

of

the

Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms

Act,

1953

(hereinafter

to

be

referred

as

the

Abolition Act), and has been directed against the decision dated 10th October 1969 of the District Judge. Mahasu. 2. Dhumi who has since died and whose legal representatives are Negi and six others, respondents in this Court, applied to the Compensation Officer under Section 11 (1) of the Abolition Act for acquisition on payment of compensation, the right, title and interest of the land-owner whom they described as "Shri Mandir Shivji Maharaj Darla through next friends Jagat Ram, Jagar Nath, Masat Ram, Dittu and Amar Chand Tehsil Arki, Mahasu District." The dispute related to 11-16 bighas area of 25 plots specified in the petition and situate in village Darla of the

Tehsil

of

Arki.

appellant-landowner petitioners

were

not

The on the

petition the

was

contested

allegations,

tenants,

that

the

by

that land

the the

itself

could not be defined so as to attract the provision of Section 11 of the Abolition Act, that the temple as such could

not

be

proceeded

against

because

it

is

not

a

juridical person; and that the idol being in the position of a minor had no other means of livelihood.

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The points

learned

in

favour

application.

Compensation of

However,

the he

Officer

petitioners

removed

from

decided and

all

these

granted

the

ambit

of

the his

order the 'abadi' area of the disputed land over which the temple itself and other buildings appurtenant thereto had existed. The landowner came in appeal before the District Judge, but confined its contentions to only two points, namely,

that

the

temple

land-owner

is

not

a

juridical

person and that the idol is in the position of a minor and had no other means of livelihood and as such the case falls within exemption provided in Clause (2) of Section 11 of the Abolition Act. The District Judge repelled these two contentions and granted the application. 3. The landowner has felt aggrieved of the decision of the learned District Judge and has preferred this second appeal. 4. As described above, the landowner is "Shri Mandir Shivji Maharaj Darla" and it is apparent the idol of Lord Shiva is incorporated in the title specified in the application. In Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradhyumna Kumar Mullick, AIR 1925 PC 139 it was held :-"Hindu

idol

is,

according

to

long

established

authority, founded upon the religious customs of the Hindus, and the recognition thereof by Courts of Law, a "Juristic entity". It has a judicial status with the power

of

suing

and

being

2

sued.

Its

interests

are

attended to by the person who has the Deity in his charge and who is in law its manager with all the powers which would, in such circumstances, on analogy, be given to the manager of the estate of an infant heir." 5. In Thakardwar (Pheru Mal of Amritsar) v. Ishar Dass, AIR 1928 Lah 375, it was held that a temple is not a juridical person but an idol installed in the temple is a juridical person. It is, therefore, well settled that an idol is a juridical person and is in the position of a minor or an infant

heir,

whose

interests

are

looked

after

by

its

manager. In the case of alienation of endowed property, it was

observed

by

Supreme

Court

in

AIR

1967

SC

1044,

Bishwanath versus Thakur Radha Ballabh Ji as follows: -"When

such

an

alienation

has

been

effected

by

the

Shebait acting adversely to the interests of the idol, even a worshipper can file the suit, the reason being that the idol is in the position of a minor and when the person representing, it leaves it in a lurch, a person

interested

certainly

be

in

clothed

the

worship

with

an

of

the

ad-hoc

idol

can

power

of

representation to protect its interest." Therefore, it could be stated in the instant case that Lord Shiva whose idol is installed in the temple is a juridical person

and

as

such

could

be

proceeded

against

in

the

petition under Section 11 of the Abolition Act. Similarly

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the

idol

being

a

juridical

person

could

file

an

appeal

before the learned District Judge as well as before this Court. It cannot be stated that the appeal has been filed by the temple as such. The very name of Lord Shiva is incorporated in the title of the appeal. 6. It is also evident that the position of the idol is that of a minor and therefore, obviously the benefit which can be

deduced

in

favour

of

the

minor

under

Clause

(2)

of

Section 11 can very well be deduced in favour of the idol which is in the position, of a minor. In this connection, it was

contended

that

the

idol

being

a

perpetual minor

shall be at an advantageous position. That may be so, but the fiction which has treated idol to be a minor and which has ripened into law, should have its logical inference under Section 11 so as to attract the benefit under Clause (2) of that section. It is to be appreciated that the idol is always needed to be looked after by its manager, since it is dependent upon others, and the means of livelihood of the

idol

will

extinguishments

have of

to its

be

taken

rights

into

under

consideration

Section

11

of

for the

Abolition Act. While at one place the tenants have been given

the

benefit

of

acquiring

the

right,

title

and

interest of their landowner, in the very same statute, at another place the interest of a minor landowner has been protected, in the sense that a minor who does not possess means of livelihood has been exempted under Clause (2) of Section 11. Both the objects are, prima facie, laudable and the idol should not be deprived of the advantage when, by

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its peculiar situation, it is relegated to the position of a

minor

who

has

to

depend

upon

the

management

of

its

Shebait or manager. If we examine the present case from this aspect, we have to ascertain if the idol has any sufficient means of livelihood.

It

livelihood

is

also

would

abundantly

necessarily

clear

mean

that

sufficient

means

of

means

of

livelihood and not bare subsistence which may be possible to achieve in most of the cases. In the Hindu Law relating to

temples

and

religious

endowments,

the

deity

is,

conceived as a living being and is treated in the same way as the master of the house would be treated by his humble servant.

This

has

been

so

stated

in

AIR

1923

Cal

60,

Rambrahma Chaterjee v. Kedar Nath Banerjee. It is everyday experience afforded looked

that

all

after

the

the

idol

is

facilities

throughout

not of

the

only food

course

worshipped and

of

raiment the

day

but

is

and

is

by

its

worshippers. That is why, provision is to be made for its 'Puja', 'Bhog' and other necessities as are required for a living person. The maintenance of the temple in which the idol is installed is also a necessary requirement. As

evidence

from

the

judgment

of

the

learned

District

Judge, the annual expenses of the temple are of Rs. 8,000/or Rs. 9,000/- and these are to be met from the income of the properties belonging to the temple and also from the offerings considered

made that

to the

the

temple.

offerings

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Both of

the

the

Courts

temple

have

below been

sufficient

to

meet

could

be

stated

not

this

expense

not

to

and

possess

therefore

the

sufficient

idol

means

of

livelihood so as to attract Clause (2) of Section 11 of the Abolition

Act.

But

there

is

one

great

flaw

in

this

reasoning. The offering is decidedly a fluctuating income. There can be no certainty that the offering would be to that extent in any particular year. Therefore, it would not be

proper

to

depend

upon

such

offerings.

The

permanent

income is derived from the fields belonging to the temple. If

these

temple

fields

and

are

removed

proprietary

from

rights

the

are

ownership

conferred

of

the

upon

the

respondents, the idol-appellant would be deprived of its permanent income. From this point of view, it can be stated that the appellant has no other source of income, except the property in dispute. It is evident; that in such a situation

the

sufficient

appellant

means

of

cannot

livelihood

be and

stated it

to

would

possess not

be

appropriate to deprive it of the income derived from the land in dispute. 7. The appeal, is, therefore, allowed and the judgments of the

learned

District

Judge

as

well

as

of

the

learned

Compensation Officer are set aside. The application under Section 11 of the Abolition Act shall stand dismissed. 8. No order is made as to costs. Appeal allowed.

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