Have Some Particular State That Depends Entirely

Q2. On their way home from CHI, Lucy Suchman and Bonnie Nardi find themselves riding in the cockpit of the airplane. Please describe the discussion that ensues. On what aspects of distributed cognition do they agree/disagree? What does Suchman have to say about Speed Bugs? How does Nardi interpret the pilots (PF and PNF) interactions with each other/with the artifacts in the cockpit? Which theory (situated action or activity theory) does a "better" job of explaining how the cockpit remembers its speed? Finally, pick one aspect (artifact, individual, interaction, etc.) of the socio-technical cockpit system and analyze it from the perspective of a fourth theory of cognition (MHP, Phenomonology, other).

BN: (to pilot) You know Ed Hutchins doesn’t think there is anything going on in your head when you fly this thing. (Suchman’s laugh can be heard in the background) He says everything you need is represented out there (she waves her hand in front of her) and that all you guys are doing is transferring representations from out there to in here (she taps the pilot on the head). Pilot: I’d like to see him try and do it then. (they all share a laugh at Hutchins’ expense) BN: Lucy and I, on the other hand, would much rather think in terms of how you are reacting to the situation as it unfolds. We like to emphasize people, we’re people people. Wouldn’t you say that’s true Lucy? LS: I agree, we understand its hard work to fly an airplane, you never know what’s going to happen moment to moment. You can’t plan for what might happen, every situation is different, it must be very nerve racking. It’s like I always say, “the organization of situated action is an emergent property of moment-by-moment interactions between the actors, and between actors and the environments of their action.” [4] Would you guys agree with that? (the pilots look at each other, its obvious they did not comprehend a word of what she just said) Pilot: …uh, well I don’t know about all that, I just fly and try to land the plane safely. BN: Exactly, you have a goal in mind, an object, the safe arrival of all your passengers. All this stuff (she gestures again), even your friend there (she points to the co-pilot who waves at her) just helps you achieve your goal. Sure all the instruments and readings help out, they represent things about the environment and they mediate your operations, but they have no goal of their own, its you who has the goal. LS: Hang on a second here Bonnie. Having a goal has very little to do with it really. A statement of intent generally says very little about the action that follows. It is very easy, when we start talking about goals, to jump to the

conclusion that we have a plan that we follow in order to reach that goal. Nothing could be further from the truth! It’s like Lenin said, “Life is what happens when you’re busy making plans.” BN: Lucy you should know better than to openly quote communists. LS: No John Lenin, you know, the Beatle. BN: Oh, I wouldn’t know, I hate bugs. Pilot: Speaking of bugs. I think there is something wrong with my speed bug (he taps an instrument on the console) I’m sure we’re at 47 knots, but it keeps slipping so it looks like we’re going faster than that. LS: What’s a speed bug? Pilot: It’s this little thing right here. I can move it anywhere on the speedometer, then I don’t have to think about how fast I should be going. As long as the needle on the speedometer is between the two speed bugs I know that my speed is just fine, around 47 knots. LS: That’s exactly what I’m talking about. You’re not just following some script that tells you to keep your speed at 47 knots, if the situation calls for you to check your speed, you look at your speed bug, if not, you don’t think about it. Checking that speed bug is an embodied skill that you have. BN: Lucy, it almost sounds like you are saying that artifacts are a relevant part of cognition. LS: Not really, they are just part of the environment and have some particular state that depends entirely on the situation. BN: Sure, but if we were at 37 knots and not 47 knots the situation would be different, but the artifact wouldn’t really change. LS: True, but then we are talking about the pilot’s routine practices [4]. BN: …and wouldn’t those need representations? (Lucy is momentarily silent and just as she is about to answer there is a knock at the cockpit door) Pilot: come in. (Martin Heidegger enters talking in a thick German accent…he appears slightly drunk)

MH: Ya…um… it seems all da beer that was present-at-hand is gone. Is there someone who is ready-to-hand me another one? (He looks around expectantly to see who gets the joke, but Lucy and Bonnie just roll their eyes at each other) MH: Vow. Dis is a nice view. I could look out the window for hours and just be, not think, just be. You see because all of our epistemological questions are actually just ontological ones. [6] BN: That’s terrific Martin, really deep, how about you “just be” in your seat for while. LS: I think Martin is absolutely right. Its being-in-the-world that determines our actions, not our conscious thoughts and plans. (Martin looks at Lucy with deep affection) MH: Ya! Dat’s it exactly! When you are flying the plane for the first time everything is new to you and you are conscious of all the activities you do. Then when you are good at it, all those things disappear into the world and you can just be there. BN: Wait a minute it sounds to me like you are describing the way conscious activities can turn into unconscious operations, that’s what activity theory says. (Martin looks at Bonnie with deep affection) MH: Ya! Dat’s it exactly! (Bonnie and Lucy roll their eyes again) Pilot: Wait a minute, I get it. So, when I first check the correct speed, 47 knots, and then set the speed bug to the 40-50 range I have to really think about the speed, it’s present-at-hand. Then when I want to reference it I can just glance at the bug and that knowledge becomes ready-to-hand. In that way the speed bug is a representation that mediates my knowledge of the speed in a way that makes the knowledge embodied. (everyone stares at the pilot, dumstruck) (beat) (heavy footsteps are heard approaching the cockpit) (Edwin Hutchins calls out)

EH: Cockpit! Cockpit! (everyone looks at the door) EH: I was hoping you could settle a little wager that Martin and I have. What is our exact speed right now? (Everyone answers immediately in unison) Everyone: 47 knots. (Hutchins is taken slightly aback and turns to walk back to his seat) EH: (to himself) How did they remember that?

1.

Hutchins. E. "Distributed Cognition." (Short summary paper)

2. Hutchins, E. (1995). "How a cockpit remembers its speeds," Cognitive Science, vol. 19, pp. 265-88. 3. Kuutti, K. (1996). Activity theory as a potential framework for human-computer interaction research. In B. A. Nardi (Ed.), Context and Consciousness (pp. 17-44). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 4. Suchman, L. (1987). Preface, Chapter 1, 3, 4, 8 In Plans and Situated Actions: The problem of human machine communication. 5.

Nardi, B. (1996) Studying context: a comparison of activity theory, situated action models, and distributed cognition. In: B. Nardi (ed.) Context and Consciousness: Activity Theory and Human-Computer Interaction. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.

6. Dourish, P. (2001). Chapters 1, 4 & 7. Where the Action Is. Cambridge: MIT Press.