Hamrick House Private Bill

A PRIVATE BILL

110 th Congress 1st Session H. R. ___________ For the relief of Don Hamrick

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DATE: ____________________ Representative MARION BERRY, 1st District of Arkansas, introduced the following bill;

A PRIVATE BILL

For the relief of Don Hamrick Ex justa causa fiat justitia ruat coelum. (Latin, From just cause let justice be done though the heavens fall asunder.) Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, Ex malis moribus bonae leges natae sunt, (Latin, Out of bad practices good laws are born) is the fundamental purpose for this Private Bill. This Private Bill involves claims against the United States by Don Hamrick, an Able Seaman of the U.S. Merchant Marine for which all available judicial and administrative remedies have wrongfully been denied.

WARNING: Don Hamrick has filed a human rights complaint against the United States for corruption of justice with the INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Petition No. 1142-06.

THIS PRIVATE BILL IS EVIDENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS FOR THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

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Don Hamrick’s Definition of Injustice: The wrongful acts of the judicial and executive branches of the U.S. Government prohibiting the individual citizen from enforcing his statutory, civil, constitutional, and human rights. “If everywhere I turn for remedies as a matter of statutory, civil, constitutional and human rights and I am denied those remedies at each and every step then it stands to reason that unenforceable rights are not rights at all but only revocable or deniable privileges, the illusion of rights. The ultimate remedy therefore becomes civil disobedience, rebellion, rioting, or open civil war for freedom. But for want of an educated public we must suffer this injustice.” The Plaintiff, Don Hamrick.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS PART 1. CLAIMS......................................................................................................1 CLAIM No. (1). Don Hamrick has a Right to a Private Bill Remedy Citing as Precedence Wilke v. Robbins, 551 U.S. ____; 433 F. 3d 755; 1127 S.Ct. 2588 (June 25, 2007). ............................1 CLAIM No. (2). The U.S. Coast Guard’s Final Agency Action wrongfully denied Second Amendment Rights of Don Hamrick and the federal courts wrongfully denied his right to judicial review of that final agency action in violation of his First Amendment to petition and his Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial. ....................................................................................................2 CLAIM No. (3) Civil RICO Act Treble Damages in the amount of $14 Million .................................4 CLAIM No. (4) $1 Million in Compensatory Damages........................................................................5 CLAIM No. (5) The Federal Courts nor the U.S. Coast Guard or any other Federal Agencies recognized Don Hamrick’s right as an unrepresented civil plaintiff with a Civil RICO Act case to act in the capacity of a Private Attorney General. .............................................................................5 CLAIM No. (6) The Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Court Clerk are Fugitives from Justice............................................................................................................................................7

PART 2. CONGRESSIONAL REFORMS .............................................................9 SECTION 1: The Congress is Killing the Right to Petition ..................................................................9 (a)“Private Legislation” .......................................................................................................................... 9 SECTION 2. Brief Legislative History of Civil Defense (50 U.S.C. § 2251 et. seq.).........................13

PART 3. THE CAUSE OF ACTION.....................................................................15 SECTION 1: The U.S. Coast Guard Final Agency Action Denial was Wrongfully Based Upon a Personal Ideology in Violation of the Oath of Office .............................................................15 SECTION 2: There Are No Federal Laws or Regulations on the Second Amendment Rights of U.S. Seamen to Possess or Carry a Handgun, Whether Concealed Carry or Open Carry, Between the Jurisdictions of Domestic Law and Maritime Law. ........................................................16 (1) “National Open Carry Handgun” Will Forever Be an Inherent Human Right of Self-Defense .................................................................................................................................. 16 (2) The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Has General Superintendence Over the U.S. Merchant Marine and Merchant Personnel But Ignores the Role of Seamen’s Second Amendment Rights in Homeland Security ................................................................. 16 SECTION 3: Federal and State Gun Control Laws Abolished Actual Freedom and Reinstated Slavery in Violation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments ..................................................20

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS ...................................23 SECTION 1. Calendar Committee and Judge Reggie B. Walton of the U.S. District Court for DC Violated Court Order of Judge Richard W. Roberts. ....................................................................23 SECTION 2: Judge Edith Jones of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit told the Federalist Society of Harvard Law School on February 28, 2003, “The American legal system has been corrupted almost beyond recognition.”.................................................................................25 (1) Three Contemporary Threats to the Rule of Law ....................................................................... 25 (2) No 'Great Awakening' In Law School Classrooms .................................................................... 26

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SECTION 3. Don Hamrick’s Political Poems Critical of the Federal Judicial System and the United States Government ...................................................................................................................27 (1) “A Nihilistic Form of Government, This United States,” Inspired by Judge Edith Jones. ...27 (2) “Hailing From the Tower of Babel ...............................................................................................28 (3) “Cataclysms” ....................................................................................................................................29 (3) Affirming Judge Edith Jones’ declaration that the Rule of Law has religious origins. .........30 SECTION 4. Annotated Docket Report to Don Hamrick’s Present Case, No. 07-1616 .....................30 SECTION 5. Missing Documents in the Docket Report. ....................................................................34 (1) Missing Document Accompanying the Original Complaint: ....................................................34 SECTION 6. Equal Justice Under the Law Dos not Apply to the Unrepresented Civil Plaintiff........34 (1) Title 9 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual: Criminal Resource Manual § 2404 Extortion Under Color of Official Right - Hobbs Act...........................................................................................34 SECTION 7. The U.S. Supreme Court is Systematically Attacking and Taking Away Various Forms of Remedies. .............................................................................................................................38 SECTION 8. Comments on the Ninth Circuit pro se Task Force Report ............................................43 III. Problems Not Addressed in the Report ........................................................................................43 A. The Role of Bias ..........................................................................................................43 B. Remedies That Fail ......................................................................................................45 C. Common Experiences of Pro Se Litigants ...................................................................47 1. Perjury is tolerated by the judge...........................................................................47 2. Records submitted to the court disappear from the files ......................................47 3. Judges’ opinions fail to address the issues of the lawsuit ....................................48 4. Certain litigants must always win ........................................................................48 5. Different standards are applied to different litigants............................................49 6. Recent handling of civil lawsuits by the courts have instigated a white collar crime wave ...............................................................................................................49 7. Court orders go unheeded ....................................................................................50 8. Judges give orders contrary to law and accepted standards of behavior ..............50 9. Judges refuse to take actions required by law ......................................................50 10. Courts have become inconsistent and arbitrary..................................................51 11. Federalism theory interferes with practical justice.............................................51 SECTION 9. Judge Donald P. Lay, 8th Circuit in Dissenting Opinion: Too Many Summary Judgments and 8th Circuit Too Readily Rubber-Stamping Summary Judgments................................52 (1) Melvin v. Cal-Freshener Corp., 06-1279 (8th Cir., July 12, 2006) ..........................................52 (2) Guerrerro v. J.W. Hutton, Inc., 06-1352 (8th Cir., Aug. 21, 2006) ..........................................52 (3) Green v. Franklin National Bank of Minneapolis, 05-2513 (8th Cir., Aug. 23, 2006) ..........53 (4) United States v. Minnesota Church of Angels, 06-1983 (8th Cir., Mar. 22, 2007) ..............53 SECTION 10. Judicial Reform: Federal Judicial Accountability & Integrity Legislation ..................53 (a) Preamble ............................................................................................................................................53 (b) Definitions ........................................................................................................................................53 (c) Immunity ...........................................................................................................................................54 (d) Special Federal Grand Jury ............................................................................................................54 (e) Professional Counsel .......................................................................................................................54 (f) Establishment of Special Federal Grand Jury Seat ......................................................................54 (g) Filing Fees ........................................................................................................................................54 (h) Annual Funding ...............................................................................................................................55 (i) Compensation of Jurors ...................................................................................................................55

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(j) Annual Budget .................................................................................................................................. 55 (k) Jurisdiction ....................................................................................................................................... 55 (l) Qualifications of Jurors ................................................................................................................... 55 (m) Selection of Jurors .......................................................................................................................... 55 (n) Service of Jurors .............................................................................................................................. 55 (o) Procedures ........................................................................................................................................ 56 (p) Removal ............................................................................................................................................ 56 (q) Indictment ......................................................................................................................................... 56 (r) Criminal Procedures. ....................................................................................................................... 57 (s) Public Indemnification .................................................................................................................... 57 (t) Redress ............................................................................................................................................... 57 (u) Preeminence ..................................................................................................................................... 57

PART 5. CORRUPTION IN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE...........59 SECTION 1. Justice Department Witheld Evidence from the Court...................................................59

PART 6. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS, EX JURE, A HUMAN RIGHT 63 SECTION 1. Five Years of Obstructions of Justice forced Don Hamrick into the Role of a Human Rights Defender ......................................................................................................................63 (1) United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders:........................................................ 63 (2) The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption: ............................................................... 63 (3) United Nations Convention Against Corruption: ....................................................................... 63 (4) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:................................................................ 63 (5) Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ..................................................................................... 64 (6) American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man: .......................................................... 64 SECTION 2. Don Hamrick Acting in the Capacity of a Private Attorney General.............................64 SECTION 3. Don Hamrick Acting in the Capacity of a Human Rights Defender..............................64 SECTION 4: United Nations Charter: Article 51 Inherent Right of Self-Defense Extends to the Right of Personal Self-Defense......................................................................................................66 SECTION 5. Other Constitutions: Human Rights are Created by God. Not by Government. ............67 SECTION 6: Other Constitutions: Personal Self-Defense ..................................................................68 SECTION 7: Other Constitutions: Self-Defense Against Tyranny .....................................................70 SECTION 8: Other Constitutions: Right and Duty of Citizens to Resist or Revolt Against Domestic or Foreign Tyranny..............................................................................................................70 SECTION 9: Other Constitutions: Security against home invasion ....................................................73

PART 7. THE THREE SHIELDS OF FREEDOM..............................................81 SECTION 1. The First Shield of Freedom: In the Interest of Justice ..................................................81 (1) Shared Belief in the “Golden Rule” (a.k.a. Ethics of Reciprocity).............................81 SECTION 2. The Second Shield of Freedom: Equal Justice Under the Law......................................85 SECTION 3. The Third Shield of Freedom: Actual Justice ................................................................86 SECTION 4. The More Things Change The More They Stay the Same............................................86 SECTION 5. A Brief History On the Unchanging Animalistic Human Nature .................................88 SECTION 6. The Myth of the Flat Earth Carried Over to the Myth of Gun Control..........................90

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PART 8. FOR IMMEDIATE CONGRESSIONAL RELIEF............................. 93 SECTION 1. Congressional Findings of Facts. ...................................................................................93 (1) First, Fifth, Seventh, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments Denied: Don Hamrick’s right to judicial review of final agency action was wrongfully denied. ...............................93 (2) Pattern of Wrongful Behavior Becomes New Species of Litigation: Congress Affirms U.S. Supreme Court’s Referral to the U.S. Congress on New Species of Litigation In Re: Wilke v. Robbins (June 25, 2007) ..................................................................................93 (3) Fugitives from Justice: John G. Roberts, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, and Named Judges of the DC Circuit ................................................................................................93 (4) Equal Justice Under the Law Denied: The Seamen’s Suit Law, 28 U.S.C. § 1916, has not be equally applied by the federal courts .......................................................................94 (3) Right’s of Pro Se Civil Plaintiff Denied: The U.S. Supreme Court is biased against the unrepresented civil plaintiff, Don Hamrick...............................................................................94 (4) Judicial and Administrative Remedies Exhausted: Don Hamrick has exhausted all available judicial and administrative remedies. ........................................................................94 SECTION 2. CONGRESSIONAL ORDERS FOR RELIEF ..............................................................94 (1) ORDERED (Expungement of Records) .......................................................................................94 (2) ORDERED (Filing Fees Reimbursed With Interest): ................................................................94 (3) ORDERED (Attorney’ Fees): ........................................................................................................94 (4) ORDERED (Damages): ..................................................................................................................94 (5) ORDERED (Seamen’s Suit Law is Enforceable) .......................................................................94 (6) ORDERED (Permant Injunction Against DOT Bar Notices and against the U.S. Coast Guard from further harassment of and/or retaliation against Don Hamrick) .......................95 (7) ORDERED (Citizen’s Arrest Warrant is verified and validated and enforceable by Don Hamrick with ORDERED assistance from any and all federal law enforcement agencies) .........................................................................................................................................95 (8) ORDERED (Criminal Investigations) ..........................................................................................95 (9) ORDERED (Civil Rights Investigation by U.S. Department of Justice and FBI) .................95 (10) ORDERED (Ethics Investigation by the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Justice) ............................................................................................................................................95 (11) ORDERED (U.S. Department of Justice Federal Guidelines on the Law of Citizen’s Arrest as Applied to Felonies Committed by Employees of Judicial, Executive, and Legislative Branches of the U.S Government for the Unrepresented Civil Plaintiff and the U.S. Citizen) ....................................................................................................................96 (12) ORDERED (U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Coast Guard Guidelines on the Role of Merchant Seamen in Homeland Security in Regard to Second Amendment Rights of Seamen) ....................................................................................96 (13) ORDERED (Second Amendment Endorsement on Driver’s Liense as a Matter of a Constitutional Right): ...................................................................................................................97 (14) ORDERED (Second Amendment Endorsement on Merchant Mariner’s Document as a Matter of a Constitutional Right) ........................................................................................97 (15) ORDERED (Congressional Reports on Second Amendment Positive Applications to Law) ...........................................................................................................................................97 (16) ORDERED (Negotiated Rulemaking for Second Amendment Rights as a Constitutional Norm to Change Legal Norms and Social Norms) ........................................98 (17) ORDERED (Participants in Negotiated Rulemaking). ............................................................99

PART 9. PROPOSED REMEDIES..................................................................... 103 SECTION 1. The Human Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution............................................103

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SECTION 2. National Open Carry Handgun and the National Drivers Record................................103 SECTION 3. U.S. Merchant Marine Auxiliary and the Privateer Act of 2008 .................................104 SECTION 4. Social Norming the Second Amendment.....................................................................115 (1) The Dilemma for the Right of Citizen’s Arrest......................................................................... 118 (2) National Open-Carry Handgun as a Deterrent .......................................................................... 119 (3) Open-Carry Handgun Supported by 9th & 13th Amendments ................................................. 120 (4) The Meaning of “Bear Arms” ..................................................................................................... 121 (5) Pointing The Way! ........................................................................................................................ 121 (A). Brannon P. Denning, in his law review Gun Shy: the Second Amendment as an “Underenforced Constitutional Norm”, (21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 719, Summer 1998) ................................................................................................................121 (B). In Eric M. Axler’s, The Power of the Preamble and the Ninth Amendment: The Restoration of the People’s Unenumerated Rights, (24 Seton Hall Legis. J. 431 (2000): ............................................................................................................................122 (C.) Mark C. Niles’s Ninth Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due Process Analysis of Personal Autonomy Rights, (48 UCLA L. Rev. 85, October, 2000, p. 123-135): ......................................................124 (i). A Ninth Amendment Adjudicative Mechanism ...............................................124 (D). Senate, Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, The Public Responsibilities of an Educated Citizen, Congressional Record, Extension of Remarks, 79th Congress, 2nd Session (August 1, 1946, legislative day of Monday, July 29), pages A4750-A4753.......................................................................................................131 (6). The Social Norms View of the Second Amendment .............................................................. 132 (7). Excerpts From Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 1537 (2000) .................................................................................... 133 Social Norms ..................................................................................................................134 (8). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Blows the Whistle On Sister Courts’ Second Amendment Deceptions............................................................................................................. 136 (9). A Nation of Lies Governed by Liars Leads to Deception and Corruption as a Social Norm ................................................................................................................................. 136 (10). Social Norms Marketing ........................................................................................................... 136 (11). Berkowitz, Alan D., Applications of Social Norms Theory to Other Health and Social Justice Issues January, 2001 .......................................................................................... 138 Assumptions of Social Norms Theory ...........................................................................138 (12). The Deadly Belief in Gun Control: The Jessica Lynne Carpenter, Merced, California Story........................................................................................................................... 140 (13) Grandmother of Slain Children Protests Trigger Locks and Mandatory Gun Storage .... 142 (14) Marching toward Gun Control is Marching toward Genocide ............................................. 143 (15) Social Norming the Second Amendment is Common Sense ................................................ 145 (16) Excerpts From, Robert C. Ellickson, “The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective From the Legal Academy,” in Social Norms, eds. Michael Hechter and Karl-Dieter Opp. New York, Russel Sage Foundation, 2001, 35-75, citing material from pages 40-45.................................................................................................................................. 145 (A). The Supply Side of the Market for Norms: Change Agents ...................................145 (B). Self-Motivated Leaders...........................................................................................147 (C). Norm Entreprenuers ................................................................................................147 (D). Opinion Leaders......................................................................................................147 (E). The Process of Norm Change..................................................................................148 (17). The Proving Grounds! ............................................................................................................... 148

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(18). Excerpt from Christine Horne, The Enforcement of Norms: Group Cohesion and Meta-Norms, Social Psychology Quarterly, (A Journal of the American Sociological Association.The Enforcement of Norms: Group Cohesion and Meta-Norms) Vol. 64, No. 3, September 2001. .............................................................................................. 150 (19) Social Norming Resources ........................................................................................................ 152 (20) Social Issues Marketing ............................................................................................................. 153

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PART 1. CLAIMS

PART 1. CLAIMS CLAIM No. (1). Don Hamrick has a Right to a Private Bill Remedy Citing as Precedence Wilke v. Robbins, 551 U.S. ____; 433 F. 3d 755; 1127 S.Ct. 2588 (June 25, 2007). The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Wilkie v. Robbins directs Don Hamrick by manner of precedence, to seek relief from the U.S. Congress with a PRIVATE BILL as a remedy to patterns of wrongful behavior of U.S. Government employees that has otherwise been denied by final agency action and denied Bivens and RICO Act remedies by the federal courts. In Robbins, the Court said: We think accordingly that any damages remedy for actions by Government employees who push too hard for the Government’s benefit may come better, if at all, through legislation. “Congress is in a far better position than a court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation” against those who act on the public’s behalf. Bush, 462 U. S., at 389. And Congress can tailor any remedy to the problem perceived, thus lessening the risk of raising a tide of suits threatening legitimate initiative on the part of the Government’s employees. Ibid. (“[Congress] may inform itself through factfinding procedures such as hearings that are not available to the courts”); cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 814 (1982) (recognizing “the danger that fear of being sued will dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible public officials, in the unflinching discharge of their duties” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Id. at 22 (last paragraph in II. C.) In Don Hamrick’s case, as in Robbins, the federal courts and federal agencies have employed a systematic pattern of wrongful and malicious behavior amounting to not only constitutional violations but also violations of human rights of access to the courts, to a civil jury trial, and to a judicial remedy consisting “of an episodic series of small events—events that in isolation may verge on the trivial. But—as the metaphor ‘‘death by a thousand cuts’’ suggests—a series of small harms, in unison or in sequence, can add up to one very large harm indeed.” 1 The combined effect of the Judicial Branch, the Executive Branch, and the Legislative Branch unilaterally restricting available remedies has created unconstitutional conditions of a nihilistic form of Government repugnant to our guaranteed Republican form of Government were remedies are all but abolished. This is, by definition, tyranny most rampant. This type of abuse of authority and abuse of office, in matters where firearms are included under the umbrella of property rights (physical taking) and included under the Second Amendment (non-physical, legislative takings) of the Fifth Amendment ought to be included in Title 18, Part I – Crimes, Chapter 65 – Malicious Mischief; in Title 5, Government Organization and Employees, Part I, The Agencies Generally, Chapter 7, Judicial Review, § 704 Actions Reviewable; in The Federal Tort Claims Act; in Title 28, Part I, Organization of the Courts, Chapter 16 – Complaints Against Judges and Judicial Discipline. Justice Souter delivered the opinion to the Court in Wilkie v. Robbins 551 U.S. ____; 433 F. 3d 755; 1127 S.Ct. 2588 (June25, 2007) Officials of the Bureau of Land Management stand accused of harassment and intimidation aimed at extracting an easement across private property. The questions here are whether the landowner has either a private action for damages of the sort recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), or a claim against the officials in their individual capacities under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

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Citing Laurence H. Tribe, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: CONSTITUTIONAL WRONGS WITHOUT REMEDIES AFTER WILKIE V. ROBBINS [1127 S. CT. 2588 (2007)].

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PART 1. CLAIMS Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §§1961-1968 (2000 ed. and Supp. IV). We hold that neither action is available. Don Hamrick’s case survives Wilkie v Robbins closure of Bivens and RICO Act remedies because Don Hamrick’s case is a literal case of extortion under color of law, 18 U.S.C. § 872 in violation of a seman’s statutory right under 28 U.S.C. § 1916. Citing Wilkie v. Robbins: But even assuming that defendants’ conduct would be “chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year,” 18 U. S. C. § 1961(1)(A), it cannot qualify as a predicate offense for a RICO suit unless it is “capable of being generically classified as extortionate,” 2 Scheidler, 537 U. S., at 409, 410; accord, United States v. Nardello, 393 U. S. 286, 296 (1969). But yet, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Don Hamrick’s Motion to Proceed as a Seaman, (No. 07M24), which accompanied his Petition for Writ of Cetiorari on the vary same category of a pattern of racketeering activity under the RICO Act as Robbins claimed but with Hamrick’s additional Hobbs Act claim of extortion as a predicate act for RICO liability. The strict interpretation of the Rule of Law dictates that Don Hamrick’s case should have been heard by the U.S. Supreme Court and the denial of his Motion to Proceed as a Seaman non sequitur 3 to the Rule of Law. The U.S. Supreme Court affirms the public suspicion about formulating opinions to a preconceived decision before weighing in all the evidence with the remark in Robbins “The point here is not to deny that Government employees sometimes overreach, for of course they do, and they may have done so here if all the allegations are true. The point is the reasonable fear that a general Bivens cure would be worse than the disease.” Ib. at 23. (last paragraph in Section II. B. 1.). Congressional remedy for Don Hamrick is compelling.

CLAIM No. (2). The U.S. Coast Guard’s FINAL AGENCY ACTION wrongfully denied Second Amendment Rights of Don Hamrick and the federal courts wrongfully denied his right to judicial review of that final agency action in violation of his First Amendment to petition and his Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial. The wrongful denial of Don Hamrick’s Seventh Amendment right violates international human rights treaties on access to the courts for judicial remedy of the U.S. Coast Guard’s denial of his Second Amendment rights by way of final agency action. Even if the U.S. Supreme Court refuses to incorporate the Second Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment as applying to the States under the Incorporation Doctrine the States still cannot legislate against the Second Amendment rights of U.S. citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment because U.S. Citizens do not give up their Second Amendment rights just because they travel interstate. Therefore, State gun control laws that places out-of-state citizen’s in jeopardy of arrest for possession of a handgun or other firearms when all else is relating to the possession is law makes those State laws unconstitutional, let alone the human right to life and the human right of self-defense under international human rights treaties. In 2002 the U.S. Coast Guard denied Don Hamrick his Second Amendment right to “NATIONAL OPEN CARRY HANDGUN” endorsement on Don Hamrick’s Merchant Mariner’s Document in recognition of federally required occupational training in small arms in accordance with OPNAVINST 3591.1C: SMALL 2

Emphasis added.

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Latin: “it does not follow” inference or conclusion that does not logically follow from the premises.

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PART 1. CLAIMS ARMS TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION, dated May 13, 2002; ENCLOSURE (3) QUALIFICATION CRITERIA FOR SECURITY PERSONNEL (AFLOAT) dated May 13, 1992, 4 through the Military Sealift Command, shipping companies, and the Seafarers International Union. The small arms training falls under the GENERAL REQUIREMENTS AND CLASSIFICATIONS FOR ABLE SEAMEN, 46 U.S.C. § 7306(a)(3): "To qualify for an endorsement as able seaman authorized by this section, an applicant must provide satisfactory proof that the applicant is qualified professionally as demonstrated by an applicable examination or educational requirements ." The small arms training was a fulfilling requirement for 33 C.F.R. § 104.220 COMPANY OR VESSEL PERSONNEL WITH SECURITY DUTIES: Company and vessel personnel responsible for security duties must have knowledge, through training or equivalent job experience, in the following, as appropriate: (a) Knowledge of current security threats and patterns; (b) Recognition and detection of dangerous substances and devices; (c) Recognition of characteristics and behavioral patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security; (d) Techniques used to circumvent security measures; (e) Crowd management and control techniques; (f) Security related communications; (g) Knowledge of emergency procedures and contingency plans; (h) Operation of security equipment and systems; (i) Testing and calibration of security equipment and systems, and their maintenance while at sea; (j) Inspection, control, and monitoring techniques; (k) Relevant provisions of the Vessel Security Plan (VSP); (l) Methods of physical screening of persons, personal effects, baggage, cargo, and vessel stores; and (m) The meaning and the consequential requirements of the different Maritime Security (MARSEC) Levels. There are no federal laws or regulations for or against the “National Open Carry Handgun” endorsement and the security regulation does not provide for arming watchstanding Able Seamen (STCW) or dayworking Able Seamen while the vessel is transiting known pirate waters or at other times requiring 4

Current edition is OPNAVINST 3591.1E: SMALL ARMS TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION, dated February 20, 2007; ENCLOSURE (1) RANGE REGULATIONS; ENCLOSURE (2) SMALL ARMS DRY FIRE TRAINING PROCEDURE AND GUIDELINES; ENCLOSURE (3) QUALIFICATIONS FOR PISTOLS – M9 Beretta Pistol and the M11 9mm Compact Pistol (Selection for U.S. civilian Able Seamen are limited to the M9 9mm Beretta Pistol; ENCLOSURE (4) QUALIFICATIONS FOR RIFLE - M14, M16 (series) rifles, M4A1, M727, and Mk-18 Carbines, Rifle selection for U.S. civilian Able Seamen limited to the M14.; ENCLOSURE (5) QUALIFICATION CRITERIA FOR SHOTGUNS - 12-gauge 00 buckshot and slugs; ENCLOSURE (6) QUALIFICATION CRITERIA FOR LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY MACHINE GUN PERFORMANCE EVALUATION - M60 and MK43 (variants) 7.62MM medium machine guns, M240 (variants) 7.62MM medium machine guns, and MK46 Mod 0 (M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW)) 5.56MM light machine guns (not available to civilian Able Seamen).

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PART 1. CLAIMS extra security. The federal regulation, 33 C.F.R. § 104.22, places unarmed company and vessel personnel with security duties at grave risk of personal injury or death when security duties require that they approach and confront suspicious persons. It is unrealistic and suicidal to expect crew members to comply with 33 C.F.R. § 104.22 without the security of firearms. The U.S. Coast Guard did not support and defend the Second Amendment of the Bill of Rights as part of the Constitution as required by the Oath of Office. Instead the U.S. Coast Guard followed the International Maritime Organization’s Maritime Safety Committee policy on, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS: GUIDANCE TO SHIPOWNERS AND SHIP OPERATORS, SHIPMASTERS AND CREWS ON PREVENTING AND SUPPRESSING ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS, MSC/Circ.623/ Rev.3, dated May 29, 2002, paragraphs 45 and 46 states: Firearms 45

The carrying and use of firearms for personal protection or protection of a ship is strongly discouraged.

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Carriage of arms on board ship may encourage attackers to carry firearms thereby escalating an already dangerous situation, and any firearms on board may themselves become an attractive target for an attacker. The use of firearms requires special training and aptitudes and the risk of accidents with firearms carried on board ship is great. In some jurisdictions, killing a national may have unforeseen consequences even for a person who believes he has acted in self defence.

CLAIM No. (3) CIVIL RICO ACT TREBLE DAMAGES in the amount of $14 Million Because of the U.S. Coast Guard’s wrongful detention, harassment, and defamation of Don Hamrick for exercising his First Amendment and Second Amendment rights and for involving the U.S. Coast Guard as a Defendant in his federal litigation Don Hamrick and the 5-year ordeal of obstructive federal litigation by the federal courts and the U.S. Department of Justice Don Hamrick seeks damages from the U.S. Congress in this Private Bill. Don Hamrick used a 2003 TSA wrongful detention case 5 with a settlement of $50,000 for 3 hours of wrongful detention to arrive at his $14 million amount. That mathematical equation worked out as follows: $50,000 for 3 hours of wrongful detention ÷ 3 hours = $16,666.67/hour $16,666.67 x 24 hours = $40,0000/day $40,0000/day x 12 days of wrongful detention by U.S. Coast Guard = $4.8 million $4.8 million x RICO Act Treble Damages = $14.4 Million The U.S. Coast Guard in Washington, DC had Don Hamrick taken off a U.S. Government PrePosition vessel anchored off the coast of Lithuania and placed in a hotel for what turned out to be 12 days, and under orders of the Coast Guard, was told to wait for the arrival of two civilian special agents of the U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service to be criminally interviewed. The ship left the very next day for a 10-day exercise with the U.S. Navy stranding Don Hamrick in Lithuania at company’s expense for the hotel bill and his own expenses for meals and other miscellaneous expenses which were never reimbursed. To cause the Coast Guard’s wrath Don Hamrick emailed a Second Amendment advocacy article in support of his application for the endorsement. The article cover had a photo of someone aiming a handgun at the 5

http://www.cnsnews.com/Nation/archive/200308/NAT20030801b.html (Still available as of December 14, 2007).

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PART 1. CLAIMS viewer point-blank with the caption, “Who do you want holding this gun? The criminal? Or, the lawabiding citizen.” Don Hamrick had been emailing the U.S. Coast Guard officer in Washington, DC on a recurring basis for 6 months prior to the emailing of that Second Amendment article on May 25, 2002. The day before, on May 24, 2002, the U.S. Coast Guard officer mailed a letter to Don Hamrick’s home address affirming the April 19, 2002 (coincidentally on Patriot’s Day) Final Agency Action denying the endorsement. The Coast Guard did not email Don Hamrick about that letter to which the Coast Guard officer knew full well Don Hamrick was aboard ship anchored off the coast of Lithuania. The U.S. Coast Guard maliciously perceived this as a threat in retaliation for the May 24, 2002 letter without taking into consideration that Don Hamrick was not aware of the May 25, 2002 Coast Guard letter. The U.S. Congress statutorily waived sovereign immunity for U.S. seamen disputing Final Agency Actions of the U.S. Coast Guard under 46 C.F.R. § 1.01–30(a) which states: “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit any party from seeking judicial review of any Commandant’s decision . . .” The U.S. Coast Guard retaliated against Don Hamrick for bringing suit against the Coast Guard in addition to others, including the President of the United States, George W. Bush on a Petition for Writ of Mandamus followed by five years of abusive of judicial procedures by the federal courts and the U.S. Department of Justice. The most egregious of these is the U.S. Department of Justice claiming the United States did not waive sovereign immunity from a suit such as this with the federal courts agreeing to that convenience in defiance of the actual waiver of sovereign immunity under 46 C.F.R. § 1.01–30(a). That is only the tip of the troubles Don Hamrick has experience with the federal courts and the U.S. Department of Justice. CLAIM No. (4) $1 Million in Compensatory Damages Don Hamrick’s pursuit of his Second Amendment right through the U.S. Coast Guard’s administrative appeals process and through judicial review in the federal courts for an agonizing five years has not been without adversity or injury. has incurred medical injury to his health in the form of high blood pressure causing the end of his 19-year career as a seamen with the Seafarers International Union because by the act of Because Don Hamrick was fired off a U.S. container ship in Europe for high blood pressure that unexpected event knocked him out of his financial juggling act of putting his wages earned toward the expenses of pursuing his Second Amendment rights in the federal courts has financially ended his membership with the Seafarers International Union. Don Hamrick, at age 52, must start his life financially from scratch. Because Don Hamrick devoted his life from 2002 to the present pursuing and defending the constitutional rights of American seamen through the administrative process with the U.S. Coast Guard and through the judicial review process in the federal courts on his own initiative without an attorney and faced insurmountable obstacles Don Hamrick rightfully claims that the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard should provide honorary recognition under 14 U.S.C. § 93(a)(22) for his significant contribution to the recognition of rights and duties of U.S. Merchant Marine personnel as a vital component to the Common Defence clause of the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution which consists of not only the National Defense but also the Common Defence of actual freedom for the people of the United States through the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms as an additional part of compensatory damages.. CLAIM No. (5) The Federal Courts nor the U.S. Coast Guard or any other Federal Agencies recognized Don Hamrick’s right as an unrepresented civil plaintiff with a Civil RICO Act case to act in the capacity of a Private Attorney General. Citing from David F. Herr, ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, (Thomson West, 2006 ed., Chapter 35 Civil Rico, pp. 792-793, footnotes generally omitted):

5

PART 1. CLAIMS Congress enacted the 1920 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to respond to the “infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce.” Congress targeted organized crime through a broad statutory scheme that included severe criminal penalties, fines, imprisonment, asset forfeiture, and civil remedies in an effort to undermine the economic power of racketeering organizations. The statute further enabled private individuals to act, in effect, as private attorneys general 6 to sue for injury to their businesses or property caused by a RICO violation. Civil RICO claims have alleged wrongs actionable under state and common law; as well as other federal statutes. Although the statute was targeted at organized crime, courts have broadly construed RICO’s provisions, and its scope has extended well beyond its original aim. Early efforts by lower courts to restrict claims that appeared to exceed RICO’s original goals were overruled by Supreme Court decisions that broadened the statute’s reach. RICO claims can now be found in a variety of contexts, including insurance and business disputes, antiabortion and other protests, consumer financial services litigation family law, and whistle-blower actions. Although the nontraditional uses of RICO have continued to expand despite significant criticisms by commentators and the courts, Congress has shown little inclination to narrow the statute’s focus or reach. Citing Paul A. Batista, Civil Rico Practice Manual, 2nd Ed. 2006 Cumulative Supplement (Wolters Kluwer Law & Busines,): § 6.29 Agencies of the United States as RICO Defendants In Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 393 (6th Circuit, 1991) ─ which, like the Tenth, has been highly conservative in its treatment of civil racketeering issues ─ held that a federal agency is not subject to any civil RICO liability: Section 1962 states a requirement of “racketeering activity” as a predicate for a civil RICO action. Section 1961(1), in turn, defines “racketeering activity,” which requires that the defendant be, variously, “chargeable,” “indictable,” or “punishable” for violations of specific state and federal criminal provisions. The assertion that the [federal agency] was engaged in RICO conspiracy under section 1926(d) was patently defective as a matter of law, since it is self-evidence that a federal agency is not subject to state or [federal] criminal prosecution. Berger 933 F.2d at 397. § 6.30 ─ Individual Federal Officials as RICO Defendants The automatic immunity accorded to federal agencies from RICO liability does not extend automatically to individual federal officials. While federal officials may qualify for the absolute or limited immunity available to them in all types of federal civil litigation, they do not receive the same underlying protection that federal agencies receive in the RICO context. This distinction was made clear in Mceily v. United States, 6 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Circuit, 1993) in which the Fifth Circuit held that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), “as a federal agency, is not chargeable, indictable or punishable for violations of 6

18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (West 2003). See Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000) (“The object of civil RICO is thus not merely to compensate victims but to turn them into prosecutors, ‘private attorneys general,’ dedicated to eliminating racketeering activity.”).

6

PART 1. CLAIMS state and federal criminal provisions.” Id. In contrast, as McNeily stressed, individual FDIC officials could face RICO liability, since individual federal officials can violate RICO’s predicate acts. Id. See also Brown v. Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579, 587 (5th Circuit, 1999) (“McNeily does not support the grant of immunity to FBI agents”). CLAIM No. (6) The Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Court Clerk are Fugitives from Justice The Seamen’s Suit law, 28 U.S.C. § 1916 provides: “In all courts of the United States, seamen may institute and prosecute suits and appeals in their own names and for their own benefit for wages or salvage or the enforcement of laws enacted for their health or safety without prepaying fees or costs or furnishing security therefor.” Appended to this Private Bill are annotated copies of Court Orders from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit unlawfully compelling payment of that Court’s filing fee from Don Hamrick, who, being a seaman, is exempt from paying their filing fee. Other documents including the August 30, 2007 letter from the Krista Jaffe, Private First Class, Supreme Court of the United States Police, Threat Assessment Unit, confirming the U.S. Supreme Court received $600 in filing fees from Don Hamrick. That letter it stated: The purpose of this letter is to advise why you have not received reimbursement from the Supreme Court of the United States for your filings. In No. 03-145 (Hamrick v. Bush, et al.), you submitted the docket fee of $300.00. The petition for a writ of certiorari was denied October 6, 2003. In No. 04-1150 (Hamrick v. Bush, et al.), the motion for leave to proceed as a seamen was denied. The docket fee of $300.00 was also submitted in this case, and the petition for a writ of certiorari is denied by this Court, the petitioner is not reimbursed the docket fee. Why a letter from the U.S. Supreme Court Police Threat Assessment Unit? Because Don Hamrick visited the staff of Arkansas U.S. Senator Mark Pryor at the U.S. Senate seeking congressional assistance in obtaining the return of the extorted under color of law $600 in filing fees from the U.S. Supreme Court by way of a Citizen’s Arrest Warrant for the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, John G. Roberts and the Court Clerk. The staff promptly called the U.S. Supreme Court Police for assistance. The Capitol Police and the U.S. Marshals Service arrived with the U.S. Supreme Court Police as though Don Hamrick had committed a criminal act. Although no arrests were made by anyone that day the incident triggered the U.S. Supreme Court Police to investigate my claims of Extortion Under the Color of Law, 18 U.S.C.§ 872 of filing fees from a seaman, Don Hamrick, in violation of the Seamen’s Suit law, 28 U.S.C. § 1916. Krista Jaffe of the U.S. Supreme Court Police made no references to the Seamen’s Suit law and addressed the matter in all absence to the allegation of Extortion Under Color of Law. The letter was essentially a coverup of the extortion because if Krista Jaffe did mention Don Hamrick’s statutory right of exemption from the U.S. Supreme Court’s filing fee the letter would, be necessity, trigger official investigations by the U.S. Supreme Court Police, the U.S. Marshals Service, the FBI, and the U.S. Department of Justice and in strong probability would cascadingly trigger congressional investigations by the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. So, Krista Jaffe committed the criminal act of covering up the extortion.

7

PART 1. CLAIMS Don Hamrick would latter file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari that would have all the incriminating Court Orders from the DC Circuit as admissible evidence proving just cause for the self-styled Citizen’s Arrest Warrants for the Chief Justice and the Court Clerk. The requisite Motion to Proceed as a Seaman accompanied the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Both were filed with the U.S. Supreme Court. The Motion to Proceed as a Seaman was given “No. 07M24.”

THE U.S. SUPREME COURT DOCKET REPORT FOR NO. 07M24 No. 07M24 Title:

Docketed: Lower Ct: Case Nos.:

Don Hamrick, Petitioner v. George W. Bush, President of the United States, et al. November 13, 2007 United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (07-2400)

~~~Date~~~

~~~~~~~Proceedings and Orders~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Nov 5 2007 Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed as a seaman filed. Nov 14 2007

DISTRIBUTED for Conference of November 30, 2007.

Dec 3 2007 Motion Denied. Under the strict interpretation of the Rule of Law it is Don Hamrick’s understanding that if the law on Extortion Under Color of Law, 18 U.S.C. § 872 and the Seamen’s Suit law 28 U.S.C.§ 1916 are clear, and his case for Second Amendment rights of seamen under U.S. law and maritime law are construed to fall under the safety clause of the Seamen’s Suit law then Don Hamrick, in fact and law, has the statutory right to proceed as a seaman in any court of the United States. The Court Orders of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia compelling Don Hamrick to pay that Court’s filing fee and the above denial of the Motion to Proceed as a Seaman are unlawful administrative acts that are not protected by absolute immunity nor any other immunities. In the matter of the denied Motion to Proceed as a Seaman the Petition for Writ of Certiorari with its evidence of extortion under color of law and the Citizen’s Arrest Warrants for the Chief Justice and the Court Clerk it can now be substantiated that the Chief Justice and the Court Clerk have unlawfully resisted Citizen’s Arrest, escaped Citizen’s Arrest, and by strict interpretation of the Rule of Law, they are now fugitives from justice.

8

PART 2. CONGRESSIONAL REFORMS

PART 2. CONGRESSIONAL REFORMS SECTION 1: The Congress is Killing the Right to Petition “While the absolute number of private bills submitted by individual members of Congress has remained relatively steady, the number that have become private laws has shown a precipitous decline.” (Citing Matthew Mantel, PRIVATE BILLS AND PRIVATE LAWS, 99 Law Library Journal 87, 90 (May 2007)). Footnote 24 in Mantel’s article only listed data from 96th Congress (1979) to the 108th Congress (2003). Don Hamrick found the data to create a more expanded chart from the 80th Congress (1947) to the present day 110th Congress (December 12, 2007).

(a)“PRIVATE LEGISLATION” House Document No. 109-153, A HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 1813–2006 Section II–Jurisdictions History of the Judiciary Committee, “PRIVATE LEGISLATION,” pp. 143-148 http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/cdocuments/hd109-153/browse.html Nearly half of all the laws enacted by Congress have been private laws. 7 Unlike public law, which applies to public matters and deals with individuals only by classes, the provisions of private law apply to “one or several specified persons, corporations, [or] institutions.” 8 Private legislation has its foundation in the right to “petition the government for a redress of grievances” 9 guaranteed to all citizens by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 7

According to data obtained from CANNON’S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, v.7, §1028, the CALENDAR OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND HISTORY OF LEGISLATION FROM THE 74TH THROUGH 79TH CONGRESSES, and the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD’S RESUME OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITY FROM THE 80TH THROUGH 109TH CONGRESSES, BETWEEN 1789 AND 2006, Congress enacted a total of 94,120 laws. Of these, 45,937 — 49 percent — have been private laws. 8

HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, v.4, §3285.

9

PART 2. CONGRESSIONAL REFORMS Congress sometimes chooses to enact private law to grant relief in situations where no other legal remedies are available. Private legislation is premised on the idea that public law cannot cover all situations equitably, and sometimes Congress must address special circumstances with specially targeted legislation. In this sense, private law has been called “an anomaly,” 10 since it is intended to address specific problems that public law either created or overlooked. The 1st Congress enacted 10 private laws. The 59th Congress–the historic high water mark of private legislation–enacted 6,249. Reporters observing the 59th Congress (1905–1906) noted that, on one occasion, 320 private pension bills passed the House in an hour and a half, “an average of three each minute.” One reporter characterized the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole as presiding with “auctioneer-like qualities” as these private pension measures were raised and rapidly adopted in turn. 11 Today Congress enacts very little private legislation. In the last 10 Congresses combined it has enacted just 159 private measures, a mere two percent of the amount passed in the 1905–1906 sessions alone. In the 108th Congress, just one percent of the laws enacted by Congress were private – the lowest percentage of private legislation enacted at any time in the nation’s history. The first private law enacted by Congress in 1789 awarded a year-and-a-half’s pay at the rank of Captain to a foreign citizen serving in the U.S. military. 12 Since that time, Congress has enacted over 45,000 private laws dealing with issues both commonplace and extraordinary: providing pensions or lump sum payments to soldiers and widows, satisfying sundry monetary claims against the government, correcting military records, eliminating the “political disabilities” of Civil War rebels, fixing immigration problems, extending patents, providing vessel documentation, refunding tariffs or overpayments, expediting the naturalization process for a potential Olympian, authorizing the Speaker of the House to wear a foreign military decoration, and permitting the family of an immigrant murdered in a post 9/11 hate crime to remain in the United States. Historically, most private legislation introduced in the House of Representatives was considered by various private claims Committees in the House 13 or by the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. 14 THE 1946 LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION ACT, 15 however, transferred jurisdiction over both immigration and claims to the House Committee on the Judiciary, along with jurisdiction over patents. Thus, since 1947, only a fraction of private measures dealing with sundry matters such as public lands, vessel 9

U.S. CONGRESS, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.Doc. 108– 241, 108th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 2005), §208, p. 90. (Hereafter referred to as “HOUSE MANUAL”). 10

“PRIVATE BILLS IN CONGRESS,” Harvard Law Review, vol. 79, June 1966, p. 1684.

11

“Three Pensions a Minute,” New York Times, May 12, 1906, p. 9.

12

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY’S GUIDE TO CONGRESS, 5th ed., vol. I (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 2000), p. 526. 13

These include the House Committees on Claims; Pensions and Revolutionary Claims; Private Land Claims; Revolutionary Claims; Military Pensions; Invalid Pensions; Revolutionary Pensions; War Claims; and Pensions. David T. Canon, Garrison Nelson, Charles Stewart III, Committees in the U.S. Congress, 1789–1946, vol. 1, (Washington: CQ Press, 2002), pp. VI-XXXV.

14

U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Committee Print, 92nd Cong. 2nd sess., (Washington: GPO, 1972), p. 5. 15

P.L. 79–601, 60 Stat. 812.

10

PART 2. CONGRESSIONAL REFORMS documentation, military awards, veterans’ benefits and legislation relating to tax and tariffs introduced in the House have been referred to Committees other than the House Committee on the Judiciary. While the overall volume of private law has not been large in recent years, the internal workload of the Judiciary Committee and of its Members and professional staff, in dealing with private legislation has remained significant. Over the last 27 years, the House Judiciary Committee has processed 91 percent of all private laws enacted. In addition, the importance of the task of reviewing such legislation is as high as ever. In its truest sense, each private measure referred to the House Judiciary Committee represents a plea for relief from a petitioner who, in theory, has no other recourse. The problems involved may touch on some of the most important and emotionally-charged subjects imaginable: a mother’s plea to bring an adopted child into the United States, the death of a soldier’s toddler due to government negligence, payments justly owed to a small business but tied up in bureaucratic red tape. Since 1947, private immigration and claims bills have been handled in the House by subcommittees of the full Judiciary Committee, initially known as Subcommittee No. 1 (dealing with immigration and nationality) and Subcommittee No. 2 (dealing with claims against the government.) 16 Currently, such measures are referred to one Judiciary subcommittee, the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, for review. Individual private cases are examined by the Subcommittee to determine if they meet the criteria for private relief and are in keeping with precedents and with Congress’s overarching goal of making equitable law. The decline in the introduction of private legislation in recent decades stems primarily from incremental reforms made by Congress to delegate the authority to address most private grievances administratively or through the courts. Examples of this progression include the creation of the United States Court of Claims in 1855, the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act, and the passage of similar statutes permitting administrative settlement of most military claims. 17 Likewise, changes in immigration law have, at times, led to reductions in the introduction of private legislation in Congress. 18 Congress has also made numerous internal reforms that have had the effect of reducing the amount of private legislation introduced. For example, section 131 of the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act barred the introduction of private bills addressing grievances that might be resolved by the Tort Claims Procedure of Title 28, bills to grant a pension, to construct a bridge over a navigable stream, or to correct a military or naval record. These provisions were made part of the standing rules of the House in 1953, and are currently codified in Rule XIII, clause 4. 19 As former House Judiciary Committee Chairman Emanuel Celler noted, these changes initially did “effect some change in the private bill workload,” reducing the percentage of 16

CRS Typed Report, (TRENDS IN ACTIVITY ON PRIVATE LEGISLATION IN CONGRESS), by Richard S. Beth, p. 8.

17

CRS Typed Report, (TRENDS IN ACTIVITY ON PRIVATE LEGISLATION IN CONGRESS), by Richard S. Beth.

18

Other changes in immigration law have arguably led to increases in the introduction of private bills at certain points in congressional history. For more information on immigration policy and its effect on private legislation, see TRENDS IN ACTIVITY ON PRIVATE LEGISLATION IN CONGRESS, by Richard S. Beth, and CRS Report RL33024, PRIVATE IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION, by Margaret Mikyung Lee. 19

HOUSE MANUAL, §822, p. 601.

11

PART 2. CONGRESSIONAL REFORMS private measures enacted from 55 percent immediately before the reforms, to 34 percent after their adoption. 20 Additional reforms undertaken by the House Judiciary Committee in 1947 barred stays of deportation simply because of the introduction of a private bill for “stowaways, deserting seamen, and border jumpers.” The Committee realized that a large fraction of private immigration bills were being introduced by Members, not with the hope of them becoming law, but simply to stay deportation proceedings. The simple introduction of a relief bill meant that the alien would not be deported while the measure was pending, whether or not the measure was ever acted upon. The volume of private legislation introduced, and as a result, the workload of the House Judiciary Committee, however, remained unmanageably large despite these reforms. In the 90th Congress (1967–1968), for example, House Judiciary Subcommittee No. 2 was referred 779 private claims bills and oversaw the enactment of 116 of them into law. Subcommittee No. 1 was referred over 6,000 private immigration bills. 21 According to former Rep. William Cahill, this represented “the largest number [of private immigration bills] ever introduced” up to that time. 22 While the Judiciary panel worked hard to meet its responsibilities – its immigration subcommittee held 37 meetings and oversaw the enactment of 216 private laws – the strain from such legislative volume meant that it was simply, “unable to remain current.” 23 In response to this challenge, the restrictions on stays of deportation for certain petitioners were further broadened. According to Rep. Cahill, in 1967, the Committee rule “was broadened to include those who entered the United States as transients en route to third countries and [who] illegally remain[ed] in this country.” 24 New Judiciary Committee rules adopted in 1969, and amended in 1971, further tightened procedures for the consideration of private immigration measures and contributed signifi cantly to an overall decline in their introduction. Specifi cally, the rules altered Committee policy by eliminating the stay of deportation of various additional petitioners that used to be automatic upon the introduction of a private immigration bill. These Judiciary Committee rules changes led the introduction of private immigration bills to “drop sharply.” 25 The marked reduction in private laws enacted in recent decades stem largely from these reforms, but doubtless also stems in part from periodic accusations of impropriety or the appearance of impropriety in the introduction of private measures. In 1969 and 1976, Members and staff in both chambers were accused of soliciting and accepting bribes in exchange for the introduction of private immigration measures. 26 In addition, the widely

20

Rep. Emanuel Celler, remarks in the House, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, daily edition, vol. 95, pt. 15, May 12, 1949, p. A2901. 21

U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES, Committee Print, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington: GPO, 1968), p. 9.

22

Rep. William T. Cahill, remarks in the House, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 115, pt. 20, Mar. 12, 1969, p. H1629.

23

Ibid., p. H1630.

24

Rep. William T. Cahill, remarks in the House, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 115, pt. 20, Mar. 12, 1969, p. H1629.

25

Richard L. Madden, “Private Immigration Bills Found to Drop Sharply,” New York Times, Oct. 25, 1972, p. 14.

26

“Rep. Helstoski Denies He Got Payoffs,” New York Times, June 26, 1976, p. A5.

12

PART 2. CONGRESSIONAL REFORMS publicized 1980 FBI Abscam bribery sting operation revolved, in part, around requests for the introduction of private bills in exchange for money. 27 Today, in considering private immigration bills, the Judiciary Committee generally reviews only those cases that are of such an extraordinary nature that an exception to the law is needed and acts favorably on only those private bills that meet certain well-defined precedents. The Subcommittee has published detailed rules of procedure for the consideration of private immigration and claims bills, and works regularly with Members and staff to guide them in the framing and drafting of private legislation on behalf of their constituents. 28 ---SECTION 2. Brief Legislative History of Civil Defense (50 U.S.C. § 2251 et. seq.) On January 12, 1951: H.R. 9798, The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, became Pub.L. 920 (64 Stat. 1228). It authorized a Federal civil defense program. On August 8, 1958:

H.R. 7576 became Pub.L. 85-606 (72 Stat. 532). It amended the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 adding the thermonuclear provisions.

On October 5, 1994:

Pub.L. 103-337 (108 Stat. 3101) repealed the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950.

In 5 U.S. Code Cong. And Adm. News 2182-2183 (1994) TITLE XXXIV CIVIL DEFENSE: Civil defense programs were originally designed to protect “life and property in the United States from attack.” In 1981, the law was amended to permit states to use civil defense funds to prepare for natural disasters “in a manner that . . . . does not detract from attack-related civil defense preparedness.” Section 3402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Pub.L. 103-160) eliminated this restriction. The Civil Defense Act now reflects the “all-hazard” approach to emergency management, i.e., states are permitted to use the funds for all kinds of emergencies and disasters. The committee believes that it should get out of the civil defense business for two reasons. First, the program has lost its defense emphasis. The threat of attack is no longer the driving force behind the program. Rather, the chief threats today come from tornadoes, earthquakes, floods, chemical spills, and the like. Civil Defense gave way to FEMA. Seven years later on September 11, 2001 the United States was attacked by terrorists. President Clinton dropped the guard abolishing Civil Defense. Instead of resurrecting Civil Defense President Bush created the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to which precipitated relentless thefts of constitutional rights, powers, and duties of citizenship as evidence in this Private Bill. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is the exact centralization of the federal government that was feared at the Constitutional Convention and in The Federalist Papers. 27

Charles R. Babcock, “FBI ‘Sting’ Ensnares Several In Congress,” The Washington Post, Feb. 3, 1980, p. A1.

28

SUBCOMMITTEE RULES OF PROCEDURE are available on the House Committee on the Judiciary’s website: http://judiciary.house.gov/Printshop.aspx.

13

PART 2. CONGRESSIONAL REFORMS Further evidence of a grave need for the restoration of Second Amendment rights to its full constitutional limits, i.e., National Open Carry Handgun, is found in the growing epidemic of singleshooter suicidal mass murders in Gun-Free Terrorist Zones in schools, malls, and now churches.

14

PART 3. THE CAUSE OF ACTION

PART 3. THE CAUSE OF ACTION SECTION 1: The U.S. Coast Guard Final Agency Action Denial was Wrongfully Based Upon a Personal Ideology in Violation of the Oath of Office That Don Hamrick’s cause of action arose in 2002 from a judicial review of the U.S. Coast Guard’s final agency action denial (46 C.F.R. § 1.01–30) of his application for an endorsement on his Merchant Mariner’s Document, such endorsement to read, “National Open Carry Handgun” for which there were and still are no federal laws or regulations for or against that particular endorsement. The reason given for the denial is found in the U.S. Coast Guard’s letter dated April 19, 2002: Dated April 19, 2002 Dear Mr. Hamrick: This is to address your appeal of a decision by the Commanding Officer, Coast Guard National Maritime Center concerning your Merchant Mariner's Document. In your letter of 19 January 2002, you applied to have your Merchant Mariner's Document endorsed "National Open Carry Handgun." The Commanding Officer, Coast Guard National Maritime Center replied to you in his letter of 22 February, denying your application. You appealed that decision in your letter of 16 March to Secretary of Transportation Norman Y. Mineta, and supplemented your appeal with your letter 29 March, also to Secretary Mineta. Your appeal was forwarded to me for final agency action as outlined in 46 CFR 1.03-15(j). I am impressed with your scholar ship and zeal in formulating arguments in support of your application for a "National Open Carry Handgun" endorsement on your Merchant Mariner's Document, but I am not persuaded to agree with you. 29 As you have noted, the laws and regulations do not provide for such an endorsement nor do they prohibit it. Instead, the matter is left to my judgment. 30 My decision, after considering all the material your have submitted, is that it would not be in the best interest of marine safety or security 31 to initiate the endorsement you have applied for. Your appeal is therefore denied and the Commanding Officer, National Maritime Center is directed not to place any endorsements regarding firearms on any merchant mariner's licenses or documents. This decision constitutes final agency action as cited above. Capt. J. P. Brusseau Director of Field Activities Marine Safety, Security and Environmental Protection

29

Emphasis added.

30

Emphasis added.

31

Emphasis added.

15

PART 3. THE CAUSE OF ACTION SECTION 2: There Are No Federal Laws or Regulations on the Second Amendment Rights of U.S. Seamen to Possess or Carry a Handgun, Whether Concealed Carry or Open Carry, Between the Jurisdictions of Domestic Law and Maritime Law. (1) “NATIONAL OPEN CARRY HANDGUN” WILL FOREVER BE AN INHERENT HUMAN RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE See Part 4 on the international human right aspect of the Second Amendment. The Second Amendment right to openly keep and bear arms for personal safety, security and selfdefense against the common criminal of society and against government tyranny, whether implied or explicitly included, under the right to life provisions of international human rights treaties and especially so under the United Nations CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE. Federal and State gun control laws violate the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution and the privileges and immunities of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the U.S. citizenship of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United Nations global gun control agenda violates the United Nations Charter, Article 2, Clause 7 to which United States has the international remedy under the VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 1969 and VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES BETWEEN STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OR BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1986 (2) THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY HAS GENERAL SUPERINTENDENCE OVER THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE AND MERCHANT PERSONNEL BUT IGNORES THE ROLE OF SEAMEN’S SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN HOMELAND SECURITY Because there are no federal laws or regulations for or against Don Hamrick’s requested endorsement for National Open Carry Handgun on the Merchant Mariners Document, Capt. Brusseau should have given full weight of the Second Amendment to Don Hamrick’s application and acted in accordance with the "Oath of Office" [CG-9556 (Rev. 8-05)] that states: "Having accepted this appointment, I, [Capt. Brusseau], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same, that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God. " (3) That Capt. Brusseau abandoned his duty to support and defend the constitutional rights of seamen under the Bill of Rights by ignoring Don Hamrick’s individual right under the Second Amendment as an Able Seaman in their administrative final agency action in favor of a treasonous political ideology more in line with the United Nations global gun control agenda attacking the Second Amendment. (4) That in 2002, U.S. civilian Able Seamen taking employment aboard U.S. Government vessels of the Ready Reserve Fleet and of the Pre-Position Fleet in support of the U.S. military are required to have small arms training in accordance with OPNAVINST 3591.1C: SMALL ARMS TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION, dated May 13, 2002; ENCLOSURE (3) QUALIFICATION CRITERIA FOR SECURITY PERSONNEL (AFLOAT) dated May 13, 1992, 32 through the Military Sealift Command, shipping companies, and the Seafarers International Union. 32

Current edition is OPNAVINST 3591.1E: SMALL ARMS TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION, dated February 20, 2007; ENCLOSURE (1) RANGE REGULATIONS; ENCLOSURE (2) SMALL ARMS DRY FIRE TRAINING PROCEDURE AND GUIDELINES; ENCLOSURE (3) QUALIFICATIONS FOR PISTOLS – M9 Beretta Pistol and the M11 9mm Compact Pistol (Selection for U.S. civilian Able Seamen are limited to the M9 9mm Beretta Pistol; ENCLOSURE (4) QUALIFICATIONS FOR RIFLE - M14, M16 (series) rifles, M4A1, M727, and Mk-18 Carbines, Rifle selection for U.S. civilian Able Seamen limited to the 16

PART 3. THE CAUSE OF ACTION (5) That small arms training falls under the GENERAL REQUIREMENTS AND CLASSIFICATIONS FOR ABLE SEAMEN, 46 U.S.C. § 7306(a)(3): "To qualify for an endorsement as able seaman authorized by this section, an applicant must provide satisfactory proof that the applicant is qualified professionally as demonstrated by an applicable examination or educational requirements ." (6) That 33 C.F.R. § 104.220 COMPANY OR VESSEL PERSONNEL WITH SECURITY DUTIES requires the following: Company and vessel personnel responsible for security duties must have knowledge, through training or equivalent job experience, in the following, as appropriate: (a) Knowledge of current security threats and patterns; (b) Recognition and detection of dangerous substances and devices; (c) Recognition of characteristics and behavioral patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security; (d) Techniques used to circumvent security measures; (e) Crowd management and control techniques; (f) Security related communications; (g) Knowledge of emergency procedures and contingency plans; (h) Operation of security equipment and systems; (i) Testing and calibration of security equipment and systems, and their maintenance while at sea; (j) Inspection, control, and monitoring techniques; (k) Relevant provisions of the Vessel Security Plan (VSP); (l) Methods of physical screening of persons, personal effects, baggage, cargo, and vessel stores; and (m) The meaning and the consequential requirements of the different Maritime Security (MARSEC) Levels. (7) That 33 C.F.R. § 104.22 places unarmed company and vessel personnel with security duties at grave risk of personal injury or death when security duties require that they approach and confront suspicious persons. It is unrealistic and suicidal to expect company personnel to comply with 33 C.F.R. § 104.22 while unarmed.

M14.; ENCLOSURE (5) QUALIFICATION CRITERIA FOR SHOTGUNS - 12-gauge 00 buckshot and slugs; ENCLOSURE (6) QUALIFICATION CRITERIA FOR LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY MACHINE GUN PERFORMANCE EVALUATION - M60 and MK43 (variants) 7.62MM medium machine guns, M240 (variants) 7.62MM medium machine guns, and MK46 Mod 0 (M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW)) 5.56MM light machine guns (not available to civilian Able Seamen).

17

PART 3. THE CAUSE OF ACTION (8) That the International Maritime Organization’s Maritime Safety Committee policy on, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS: GUIDANCE TO SHIPOWNERS AND SHIP OPERATORS, SHIPMASTERS AND CREWS ON PREVENTING AND SUPPRESSING ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS, MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3, dated May 29, 2002, paragraphs 45 and 46 states: Firearms 45

The carrying and use of firearms for personal protection or protection of a ship is strongly discouraged.

46

Carriage of arms on board ship may encourage attackers to carry firearms thereby escalating an already dangerous situation, and any firearms on board may themselves become an attractive target for an attacker. The use of firearms requires special training and aptitudes and the risk of accidents with firearms carried on board ship is great. In some jurisdictions, killing a national may have unforeseen consequences even for a person who believes he has acted in self defence.

Pirates/armed robbers have succeeded in entering ship 51

Early detection of potential attacks must be the first line of defence, action to prevent the attackers actually boarding the second, but there will be incidents when attackers succeed in boarding a ship. The majority of pirates and armed robbers are opportunists seeking an easy target and time may not be on their side, particularly if the crew are aware they are on board and are raising the alarm. However, the attackers may seek to compensate for the pressure of time they face by escalating their threats or the violence they employ. When attackers are on board the actions of the master and crew should be aimed at: .1 securing the greatest level of safety for those on board the ship; .2 seeking to ensure that the crew remain in control of the navigation of the ship; and .3 securing the earliest possible departure of the attackers from the ship.

52

The options available to the master and crew will depend on the extent to which the attackers have secured control of the ship, e.g. by having gained access to the bridge or engine room, or by seizing crew members who they can threaten, to force the master or crew to comply with their wishes. However, even if the crew are all safely within secure areas, the master will always have to consider the risk to the ship the attackers could cause outside those areas, e.g. by using firebombs to start fires on a tanker or chemical carrier.

53

If the master is certain that all his/her crew are within secure areas and that the attackers cannot gain access or by their actions outside the secure areas they do not place the entire ship at imminent risk, then he/she may consider undertaking evasive manoeuvres of the type referred to above to encourage the attackers to return to their craft.

54

The possibility of a sortie by a well-organized crew has, in the past, successfully persuaded attackers to leave a ship but the use of this tactic is only appropriate if it can be undertaken at no risk to the crew. For an action like this to be attempted the master must have clear knowledge of where the attackers are on the ship, that they are not carrying firearms or other potentially lethal weapons and that the number of crew involved significantly outnumbers the attackers they will face. If a sortie

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PART 3. THE CAUSE OF ACTION party can use water hoses, they stand an increased chance of success. The intention should be to encourage the attackers back to their craft. Crew members should not seek to come between the attackers and their craft nor should they seek to capture attackers as to do so may increase the resistance the attackers offer which will, in turn, increase the risk faced by members of the sortie party. Once outside the secure area, the sortie party should always stay together. Pursuit of an individual attacker by a lone crew member may be attractive but if it results in the crew member being isolated and seized by the attackers, the advantage turns to the attackers. Crew members should operate together and remain in constant communication with the bridge and should be recalled if their line of withdrawal to a secure area is threatened. 55

If the crew do apprehend an attacker, he/she should be placed in secure confinement and well cared for. Arrangements should be made to transfer him/her to the custody of officers of the security forces of a coastal State at the earliest possible opportunity. Any evidence relating to this activities should also be handed over to the authorities who take him/her into custody. The pirates/armed robbers begin to gain control and take one or more of the ship's crew into their custody

56

If the attackers have gained control of the engine room or bridge, have seized crew members or can pose an imminent threat to the safety of a ship, the master or officer in charge should remain calm and, if possible, seek to negotiate with the attackers with the intention of maintaining the crew's control over the navigation of the ship, the safe return of any hostages they may hold and the early departure of the attackers from the ship. There will be many circumstances when compliance with the attackers' demands will be the only safe alternative and when resistance or obstruction of any kind could be both futile and dangerous.

57

In the event of attackers gaining temporary control of the ship, crew members should, if it is safe and practicable, leave Close Circuit Television (CCTV) records running.

58

As there have been occasions when entire crews have been locked up, consideration should be given to secreting equipment within areas in which the crew could be detained to facilitate their early escape. The pirates/armed robbers have stolen property/money, etc.

59

At this stage it is essential that the pirates/armed robbers are assured that they have been given everything they demand and a strong reassurance that nothing has been secreted may persuade the pirates/armed robbers to leave. The pirates/armed robbers start to disembark from the ship

60

If the crew are in their secure positions, it would be unwise of them to leave this security until it is confirmed that the pirates/armed robbers have left the ship. The pirates/armed robbers have disembarked from the ship

61

A pre-arranged signal on the ship's siren will alert the crew to the "all clear".

(9) That Don Hamrick has represented himself in his 5 years of federal litigation and encounter an unjustified anomaly of having nearly every motion denied and his cases dismissed with prejudice in the majority of times and always affirmed at the appellate courts as to imply judicial bias against the unrepresented plaintiff.

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PART 3. THE CAUSE OF ACTION (10) That Don Hamrick now has a human rights complaint at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Petition No. 1142-06, against the United States for human rights violations of the right of access to the federal courts, to a civil jury trial, retaliation for exercising constitutional rights and his human rights to prove the Second Amendment is a universal human right. (11) That upon the lawful accumulation of evidence of felony extortion under color of law, 18 U.S.C. § 872 by federal judges appended to this Private Bill as a matter for the Congressional Record that implicates the present Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, John G. Roberts from his time as a judge at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit Don Hamrick, did in fact and law, apply to the U.S. Marshals Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigations and various divisions of the U.S. Department of Justice for remedies and every approach was rejected leaving Don Hamrick with a dwindling amount of remedies left, namely the right to make citizen’s arrest of federal judges, including the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court and their court clerks for felony extortion under color of law in clear violation of the Seamen’s Suit law, 28 U.S.C. § 1916 by way of Citizen’s Arrest Warrants. (12) That Don Hamrick’s complaints to federal law enforcement agencies were not only ignored but he was criminally interrogated and investigated by the U.S. Marshals Service for his lawful activities in re: Citizen’s Arrest Warrant. This included seeking information and advice from the U.S. Marshals Service as a law abiding, unrepresented civil plaintiff only to be rebuffed and treated as a criminal suspect. (13) That the U.S. Coast Guard unlawfully retaliated against Don Hamrick for being named as a defendant in his civil RICO Act complaint because he was lawfully pursuing his case as an represented civil plaintiff and as Private Attorney General, (and at the time he was unaware that he was also acting as a Human Rights Defender) by conspiring with and relating hearsay evidence to the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to issue Bar Notices in 2004 and 2006 and the DOT did issue those Bar Notices prohibiting Don Hamrick from visiting any DOT, FAA, or U.S. Coast Guard headquarters building in the District of Columbia. The problem with the Bar Notices is that they (1) do not detail the offense Don Hamrick was alleged to have committed; (2) the Bar Notices do NOT include administrative appeal procedures to contest the Bar Notices violates the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C § 551-559; Negotiated Rulemaking Procedure, 5 U.S.C § 560-570a; Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution in the Administrative Process 5 U.S.C § 571-584; and Judicial Review 5 U.S.C § 701-706.

SECTION 3: Federal and State Gun Control Laws Abolished Actual Freedom and Reinstated Slavery in Violation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments (1) That Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation stated: “That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.” 33 (2) Actual Freedom Defined: Citing Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 US (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857): "[If blacks were] entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens... It would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognized as citizens in any one State of the Union, the right to enter every other

33

Emphasis added.

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PART 3. THE CAUSE OF ACTION State whenever they please, singly or in companies...; and it would give the full liberty of speech...; to hold meetings upon public affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went." 34

34

Emphasis added.

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PART 3. THE CAUSE OF ACTION

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PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS SECTION 1. Calendar Committee and Judge Reggie B. Walton of the U.S. District Court for DC Violated Court Order of Judge Richard W. Roberts. ORDER OF RECUSAL

REVISED ORDER OF RECUSAL

January 13, 2004

January 20, 2004

Plaintiff Don Hamrick has filed an action against United States Attorney General John Ashcroft and others, and the action was randomly assigned to me. Plaintiff has filed a motion for recusal, alleging that an appearance of impropriety exists because I was appointed by former President Clinton. Plaintiff offers no evidence that could reasonably call into question my impartiality in these proceedings on the basis of my status as a Clinton appointee.

Plaintiff Don Hamrick has filed an action against United States Attorney General John Ashcroft and others, and the action was randomly assigned to me. Plaintiff has filed a motion for recusal, alleging that an appearance of impropriety exists because I was appointed by former President Clinton. Plaintiff offers no evidence that could reasonably call into question my impartiality in these proceedings on the basis of my status as a Clinton appointee. Accordingly, his motion will be denied.

However, there is now pending in the United States Court of Federal Claims a class action lawsuit filed by a class of present and former Department of Justice attorneys seeking damages against the United States for alleged violations of the Federal Employees Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 5541-97 (1994). See John Doe, et al., on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated v. United States, Civil Action No. 98-896C. I am currently a member of that class. Since Canon 3C(1) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges requires a judge to “disqualify himself . . . in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” the Committee on Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference of the United States has opined that recusal is required from any proceeding in which the Attorney General appears as a real party in interest, unless a waiver of such disqualification pursuant to Canon 3D1 is submitted by all parties involved in the suit. Plaintiff’s motion for recusal makes plain that he would not waive my disqualification under Canon 3C(1). Thus, my recusal from this case is now appropriate. For the reasons stated above, it is therefore ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for recusal [4] be, and hereby is, GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to reassign this matter to the Calendar Committee. Because United States District Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle of this Court is also a named defendant in this suit, I recommend to the Calendar Committee that it seek to have a judge from another district assigned to this matter. When 1. the general provisions of Canon 3C(1) serve as the basis for disqualification, Canon 3D permits a judge to continue to participate in a proceeding if all of the parties and lawyers, after notice of the basis for the disqualification, agree in writing to waive the disqualification under a procedure independent of the judge’s participation. SIGNED this 13th day of January, 2004. RICHARD W. ROBERTS United States District Judge

However, there is now pending in the United States Court of Federal Claims a class action lawsuit filed by a class of present and former Department of Justice attorneys seeking damages against the United States for alleged violations of the Federal Employees Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 5541-97 (1994). See John Doe, et al., on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated v. United States, Civil Action No. 98-896C. I am currently a member of that class. Since Canon 3C(1) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges requires a judge to “disqualify himself . . . in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” the Committee on Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference of the United States has opined that recusal is required from any proceeding in which the Attorney General appears as a real party in interest, unless a waiver of such disqualification pursuant to Canon 3D1 is submitted by all parties involved in the suit. Plaintiff’s motion for recusal makes plain that he would not waive my disqualification under Canon 3C(1). Thus, my recusal from this case is now appropriate. For the reasons stated above, it is therefore ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for recusal [4] be, and hereby is, DENIED. However, I am recusing myself sua sponte. The Clerk of the Court is directed to reassign this matter to the Calendar Committee. Because United States District Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle of this Court is also a named defendant in this suit, I recommend to the Calendar Committee that it seek to have a judge from another district assigned to this matter. 1. When the general provisions of Canon 3C(1) serve as the basis for disqualification, Canon 3D permits a judge to continue to participate in a proceeding if all of the parties and lawyers, after notice of the basis for the disqualification, agree in writing to waive the disqualification under a procedure independent of the judge’s participation. SIGNED this 20th day of January, 2004. RICHARD W. ROBERTS United States District Judge

Emphasis added. Judge Richard W. Roberts was originally assigned to my RICO Act case. I filed a motion for recusal and he granted Don Hamrick’s motion for recusal on January 13, 2004. But one week later, on January 20, 2004, he revised that motion to deny Don Hamrick’s motion so that he could recuse himself

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PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS sua sponte. In that motion Judge Roberts recommended to the Calendar Committer that a judge from another district be assigned to Don Hamrick’s case remained unchanged. However, Judge Reggie B. Walton, a judge in that same U.S. District Court as Judge Roberts, was assigned to Don Hamrick’s civil RICO Act case under questionable circumstances that imply judicial misconduct at the administrative level where Judge Reggie B. Walton is not protected by absolute immunity because Calendar Committee assignments are not judicial acts. On January 15, 2004, Judge Walton was assigned to Don Hamrick’s civil RICO Act case for the Second Amendment (No. 03-2160) while still presiding over another Second Amendment case, Seegars v. Ashcroft, (No. 03-0834). On January 29, 2004, a full two weeks after being assigned to Don Hamrick’s case for the Second Amendment, Judge Walton ruled in the Seegars case “that the Second Amendment does not apply to the District of Columbia.” Under the Canons and under 28 U.S.C. § 455, he was not qualified to preside over Don Hamrick’s case. This fact implies judicial misconduct on the parts of the (1) Court Clerk, (3) Judge Walton himself and (3) the Calendar Committee for not complying with Judge Richard W. Roberts Court Order that, “The Clerk of the Court is directed to reassign this matter to the Calendar Committee.” By whatever the circumstances were that Judge Walton got assigned to Don Hamrick’s case there is the distinct appearance that Judge Walton had a pre-disposed opinion on the merits of Don Hamrick’s case to dismiss his case with prejudice. The following are allegations of violations of the Canons that Don Hamrick presents to Congress on Judge Reggie B. Walton: Canon 1: Judge Walton did not uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. Canon 2A. Judge Walton did not act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Canon 3: Judge Walton did not perform his duties of judicial office impartially nor diligenly. Canon 3B(1) & (5): Judge Walton presided over and decided Don Hamrick case in which is was not qualified by reason of bias or prejudice from the Seegars case. Canon 3B(2): While Judge Walton was not swayed by a fear of criticism as evidenced in his Seegars opinion that the Second Amendment does not apply to the District of Columbia he was apparently swayed by partisan politics and public clamor whether of his own political ideology on the Second Amedment or was misinformed by the politicalization of the U.S. Department of Justice over the then upcoming presidential election in 2004 as evidenced by the U.S. Department of Justice failure or refusal to inform Judge Walton of the Justice Department's imminent internal release on August 24, 2004, of their Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General [John Ashcroft] titled Whether the Second Amemdment Secures an Individual Right, in which the conclusion was, "The Second Amendment secures a right of individuals general, not a right of States or a right restricted to persns serviing in militias." The politicalization of the U.S. Department of Justice is evidenced in that the Memorandum Opinion was not only withheld as evidence from Don Hamrick's case vindicating the merits of his case but that the Memorandum Opinion was not released to the public until mid-December, well after the November presidential elections. These two events are sufficient to proof Judge Walton was externally swayed by partisan politics and personally swayed by his Seegars opinion. The Docket Report shows that Judge Walton denied or ignored nearly all of Don Hamrick’s motions, judicial notices of adjudicative facts, and other pleadings while he granted every motion and pleading by the Government Defense Attorney, Dennis Barghaan. Judge Walton denied Don Hamrick’s case with prejudice. On Appeal the DC Circuit affirmed Judge Walton’s dismissal of my RICO Act claims but remanded my case for further proceedings on Second Amendment grounds. Judge Walton, response to the

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PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS DC Circuit’s Mandate issued a dirty trick of a so called “Scheduling Order” that resembled more like a repeat of Rule 7 pleadings than a Rule 16 Scheduling Order in anticipation of Rule 26 Discovery Order.

SECTION 2: Judge Edith Jones of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit told the Federalist Society of Harvard Law School on February 28, 2003, “The American legal system has been corrupted almost beyond recognition.” Excerpted from MassNews.com March 7, 2003 report by Geraldine Hawkins Judge Edith Jones said: z The question of what is morally right is routinely sacrificed to what is politically expedient. The change has come because legal philosophy has descended to nihilism. z "The integrity of law, its religious roots, its transcendent quality are disappearing. z "The first 100 years of American lawyers were trained on Blackstone, who wrote that: 'The law of nature . . . dictated by God himself . . . is binding . . . in all counties and at all times; no human laws are of any validity if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all force and all their authority . . . from this original.' The Framers created a government of limited power with this understanding of the rule of law - that it was dependent on transcendent religious obligation," said Jones. z The business about all of the Founding Fathers being deists is "just wrong," or "way overblown." They believed in "faith and reason," and this did not lead to intolerance. z Having lost sight of the moral and religious foundations of the rule of law, we are vulnerable to the destruction of our freedom, our equality before the law and our selfrespect. It is my fervent hope that this new century will experience a revival of the original understanding of the rule of law and its roots.

(1) Three Contemporary Threats to the Rule of Law (1) The first contemporary threat to the rule of law comes from within the legal system itself. (2) The second threat to the rule of law comes from government, which is encumbered with agencies that have made the law so complicated that it is difficult to decipher and often contradicts itself. "Agencies have an inherent tendency to expand their mandate," says Jones. "At the same time, their decision-making often becomes parochial and short-sighted. They may be captured by the entities that are ostensibly being regulated, or they may pursue agency self-interest at the expense of the public welfare. Citizens left at the mercy of selective and unpredictable agency action have little recourse." 35 (3) The third and most comprehensive threat to the rule of law arises from contemporary legal philosophy. "Throughout my professional life, American legal education has been ruled by theories like positivism, the residue of legal realism, critical legal studies, post-modernism and other philosophical fashions," said Jones. 35

Emphasis added due to the quote having direct application to the U.S. Coast Guard final agency action denying Don Hamrick’s Second Amendment application to the Merchant Mariner’s Document for an endorsement for “National Open Carry Handgun” as a matter of a constitutional right. 25

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS "Each of these theories has a lot to say about the 'is' of law, but none of them addresses the 'ought,' the moral foundation or direction of law." Jones quoted Roger C. Cramton, a law professor at Cornell University, who wrote in the 1970s that "the ordinary religion of the law school classroom" is "a moral relativism tending toward nihilism, 36 a pragmatism tending toward an amoral instrumentalism, a realism tending toward cynicism, an individualism tending toward atomism, and a faith in reason and democratic processes tending toward mere credulity and idolatry."

(2) No 'Great Awakening' In Law School Classrooms The judge said ruefully, "There has been no Great Awakening in the law school classroom since those words were written." She maintained that now it is even worse because faith and democratic processes are breaking down. "The problem with legal philosophy today is that it reflects all too well the broader postEnlightenment problem of philosophy," Jones said. She quoted Ernest Fortin, who wrote in Crisis magazine: "The whole of modern thought . . . has been a series of heroic attempts to reconstruct a world of human meaning and value on the basis of . . . our purely mechanistic understanding of the universe." Jones said that all of these threats to the rule of law have a common thread running through them, and she quoted Professor Harold Berman to identify it: "The traditional Western beliefs in the structural integrity of law, its ongoingness, its religious roots, its transcendent qualities, are disappearing not only from the minds of law teachers and law students but also from the consciousness of the vast majority of citizens, the people as a whole; and more than that, they are disappearing from the law itself. The law itself is becoming more fragmented, more subjective, geared more to expediency and less to morality. ... The historical soil of the Western legal tradition is being washed away . . . and the tradition itself is threatened with collapse." Judge Jones concluded with another thought from George Washington: "Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism who should labor to( subvert these great pillars of human happiness – these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens."

36

Emphasis added. Judge Jones view of a nihilistic form of government inspired Don Hamrick to write a political poem titled “A Nihilistic Form of Government, This United States.” See page ___. 26

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS SECTION 3. Don Hamrick’s Political Poems Critical of the Federal Judicial System and the United States Government (1) “A Nihilistic Form of Government, This United States,” Inspired by Judge Edith Jones.

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PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (2) “Hailing From the Tower of Babel On April 1, 2005 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg gave a speech at the 99th Annual Meeting of The American Society of International Law on The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication. 37 Her first words cited Deuteronomy 16:20 that did not come from the King James Bible. In light of her political activism I wrote this poem in defiance of her goals to bastardize our Constitution with foreign court opinions in matters having no jurisdiction to foreign courts.

HAILING FORM THE TOWER OF BABEL ©2005 Don Hamrick Ruth Bader Ginsburg chanting from an uncommon Writ “Justice, justice shall you pursue, that you may thrive!” “Where, o’ where may our justice be found?” Says the twit, “But in the security of foreign lands to contrive!” O’ what Bible does this Supreme Court Justice follow? Her read is certainly not from the King James! She will have us pursue justice as some elusive swallow Always beyond our reach, to spite her claims. “We can ignore our Constitution,” she implies, “Because it no longer controls our authority. Comparative analysis, will protect us,” she belies “Against all threats in the global fratority.” “O’ contraire!” We, the People say, “Our Constitution is altogether just! We shall follow the Constitution for our sake! We say what it means, as we must!” From Deuteronomy to Genesis, my comparative analysis The Supreme Court today is our Tower of Babel. We are held in this awkward state of paralysis, Because there is no sense to Ginsburg’s rabble. Defiant lines are drawn! Is civil war sensed? Our highest court split by globalists’ sophistry. Judicial review in league to conspire against, Popular constitutionalism finding its place in history. Oh! Dear God, I pray to thou! For answers in these troubled days. Why hast thou judges forsaken thou? With no force of arms we are as slaves. Amen.

37

http://www.asil.org/events/AM05/ginsburg050401.html 28

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (3) “Cataclysms” “CATACLYSMS” (A poem in Diamante form) © 2005 Don Hamrick Freedom Independence, autonomy Speaking, associating, traveling Action, responsibility, permission, dependence Obedience, submission, oppression Laws, regulations Slavery Speech dialog, lecture learning, questioning, teaching research, email, government, investigate harassing, intimidating, threatening coercive, abusive Silence Association, Mingle, Join Participating, discriminating, voting Society, congress, estrangement, alienation Disassembling, segregating, dividing Suppression, stealth Isolation Judges Constitutional, law Deliberating, theorizing, concluding Adjudicator, marshal, partisan, crony Corrupting, lying, betraying Biased, prejudiced Criminals Government Guidance, balance Regulating, administrating, delegating Republic, commonwealth, nihilistic, despotic Racketeering, marauding, transgressing Indiscriminate, desultory Anarchy

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PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (3) Affirming Judge Edith Jones’ declaration that the Rule of Law has religious origins. The King James Bible Deuteronomy 16:18-20, 18: Judges and officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates, which the LORD thy God giveth thee, throughout thy tribes; and they shall judge the people with just judgment. 19: Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect persons, neither take a gift; for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of the righteous. 20: That which is altogether just shalt thou follow, that thou mayest live, and inherit the land which the LORD thy God giveth thee.

SECTION 4. Annotated Docket Report to Don Hamrick’s Present Case, No. 07-1616 Date Filed

09/10/2007

09/10/2007

#

Docket Text: U.S. District Court for DC, No. 07-1616

1

COMPLAINT against UNITED NATIONS, UNITED STATES ( Filing fee $ 0.00, receipt number FEE NOT PAID) filed by DON HAMRICK. (Attachments: # 1 Complaint (continuation)# 2 Civil Cover Sheet)(tg, ) (Entered: 09/13/2007) [HAMRICK COMMENTARY: It is a federal question of ethics for the Court to apply minimalism standards of entries into the Docket Report online. The above entry does not accurately convey the true nature of the case. Although it is admitted true that it is unreasonable to enter captions of extreme length such as this complaint it is a reasonable expectation to enter enough length to convey the nature of the case. An example of reducing the caption’s extreme length in this complaint would read as follows: “CIVIL RICO ACT COMPLAINT FOR RACKETEERING ACTIVITIES, THREEFOLD DAMAGES AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS UNDER RULE 5.1 OF THE FED.R.CV.PRO., AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS.”]

2

NOTICE OF RELATED CASE by DON HAMRICK. Case related to (Case No. 03-344 and 04-065 - USDC Western District of NC), (Case No. 02-1434, 02-1435, 03-2160, 04-0422, 042040, and 05-1993, USDC, DC), (Case No. 06-0044 USDC, AK). (tg, ) (Entered: 09/13/2007) [HAMRICK COMMENTARY: This is an extract copy of Page 4 from the COMPLAINT at Entry #1 above. Covered up from the original not shown in the copy of page 4 is “Exceptions to Tort Liability Cannot Be Claimed under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a): The U.S. Coast Guard did not have the discretionary duty to deny Plaintiff's Application for National Open Carry Handgun endorsement on his Merchant Mariner's Document on the personal judgment of the Coast Guard Officer that such an endorsement provided. . .” It is a questionable matter of ethics to coverup the bottom section of a page from a complaint because the altered copy is implied to be faithful representation of the original to which in this case it is not.” Moreover, the top section of the page was titled: 28 U.S.C. § 1963 REGISTRATION OF JUDGMENTS FOR ENFORCEMENT IN OTHER DISTRICTS: Hamrick v. George, US District Court for the Western District of NC, Charlotte Division, Case No. 03-cv-0344-W, ORDER, November 9, 2006. Judge Frank D. Whitney: “If Plaintiff elects to exercise his appeal rights, the Court finds that 28 U.S.C. § 1916 waives the requirement of prepayment of docket fees or furnishing security therefor , and the Clerk of Court is so instructed.” The Court Docket does not show this registration and Judge Collyer has not yet issued an Order In Re the registration such that Don Hamrick could beyond all doubt proceed with the Citizen’s Arrest Warrant. Don Hamrick construes this delay as judicial misconduct by deliberately obstructing justice by protecting the targeted judges from citizen’s arrest.]

30

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS Date Filed

#

Docket Text: U.S. District Court for DC, No. 07-1616

09/10/2007

SUMMONS (3) Issued as to UNITED NATIONS, U.S. Attorney and U.S. Attorney General. (tg, ) (Entered: 09/13/2007)

10/09/2007

3

Emergency MOTION for Ex Parte Order Verifying and Validating Plaintiff's Citizen's Arrest Warrants and Petition for Ex Parte Order to Federal Law Enforcement Agencies to Assist the Plaintiff With the Citizen's Arrest Warrant by DON HAMRICK(tg, ) "Leave to File GRANTED" by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer. Modified to add text on 10/10/2007 (tg, ). (Entered: 10/10/2007) [HAMRICK COMMENTARY: The requisite evidence of extortion under color of law was included to satisfy the probable cause question for a self-styled citizen’s arrest warrant. However, Judge Rosemary M. Collyer has not yet issued an Order or an opinion on this Emergency Motion, essentially nullifying the Emergency nature of the arrest. Moreover, it is standard procedure to sit on disfavored Motions, even though possessing issues of merit under the Rule of Law, to cause them to be ruled moot upon dismissal. This unethical procedure does the most serious damage to any unrepresented civil plaintiff’s case because judges take full advantage of the disfavored status of the unrepresented civil plaintiff for they are not welcomed in the courtroom by the judges. This goes to judicial bias and misconduct.]

4

ERRATA (Addendum to Civil Complaint) by DON HAMRICK 1 Complaint filed by DON HAMRICK. (tg, ) (Entered: 10/18/2007) [HAMRICK COMMENTARY: It is a question of ethics not to enter into the Docket Report Online the captions of court documents verbatim. This ERRATA document is captioned, {“ADDENDUM TO CIVIL TO CIVIL COMPLAINT: THERE IS AN ONGOING LEGAL DEBATE ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS AS AN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT! BY FACT OF SUCH ONGOING PUBLIC DEBATE A PUBLIC INTEREST IS HEREBY ESTABLISHED COMPELLING THE COURT TO TAKE JURISDICTION OVER MY CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED NATIONS AND AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE. This is a Case of First Impression! "To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice." Magna Carta, clause 40”} Entering the captions verbatim, regardless of their length, accurately conveys the nature of the case. Reducing captions to minimalism standards gives judges greater freedom to dismiss unpopular cases without raising suspicions. (i.e. Cohen v. Common Wealth of Virginia)]

5

NOTICE OF RELATED CASE by DON HAMRICK. Case related to Case Number P-114206. (tg, ) (Entered: 10/18/2007) [HAMRICK COMMENTARY: Here again, as with #4 above the Docket gives no indication that the related case is a human rights case at the international (hemispheric) level. This invokes the federal question of Fraud and False Statements under 18 U.S.C § 1001. The caption actually reads as, “MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ADJUDICATIVE FACTS: RELATED HUMAN RIGHTS CASE! Don Hamrick, pro se -v- United States & United Nations, InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, Case No. P-1142-06.]

10/19/2007

6

MEMORANDUM Opinion in Support of 3 MOTION for Order filed by DON HAMRICK by DON HAMRICK. (tg, ) ("Let this be filed." by Judge R. M. Collyer). (Entered: 10/19/2007) [HAMRICK COMMENTARY: Again the Docket Report gives no clue on the nature of the case. Again a lengthy caption can be respectfully paraphrased as in this entry is paraphrased to read as, “PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE MEMORANDUM OPINION IN SUPPORT OF HIS EMERGENCY [MOTION] FOR EX PARTE ORDER ON FEDERAL QUESTIONS IN RE CITIZEN'S ARREST AND THE SEAMEN'S SUIT LAW.”]

10/19/2007

7

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 10/19/07. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 10/19/2007)

10/17/2007

10/17/2007

31

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS Date Filed

10/19/2007

#

Docket Text: U.S. District Court for DC, No. 07-1616

8

ORDER dismissing 1 Complaint and requiring Plaintiff to file an amended complaint on or before November 19, 2007. The amended complaint must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. If Plaintiff fails to timely file an amended complaint in compliance with Rule 8, this case may be dismissed. See Order for further details. Signed by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer on 10/19/07. (lcrmc2) (Entered: 10/19/2007)

10/22/2007

Set Deadlines/Hearings: Amended Complaint due by 11/19/2007. (cdw) (Entered: 10/22/2007)

10/22/2007

9

Civil Statement from Plaintiff re Current Political Events, and War and Treason by the Bush Administration. (tg, ) (Entered: 10/24/2007) [HAMRICK COMMENTARY: Excessive paraphrasing can also conceal the true nature of the case. The verbatim caption in this document reads, “PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OPINION: EXCLUDING CURRENT POLITICAL EVENTS HAVING DIRECT EVIDENTIARY VALUE TO THE CASE AT HAND FROM JUDICIAL REVIEW IS CONTRIBUTING TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE UNITED STATES: WAR AND TREASON BY THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION IS EXACERBATING THE SECESSION MOVEMENT: "OVER HALF OF THE 50 STATES HAVE SECESSION MOVEMENTS.”]

10/24/2007

AMENDED COMPLAINT against UNITED NATIONS, UNITED STATES filed by DON HAMRICK.(tg, ) (Entered: 10/25/2007) [HAMRICK COMMENTARY: Again not entering a caption verbatim can be purposely 10 misleading especially when the caption contains a Protest Statement impugning the integrity of the judge for ordering an Amended Complaint because the original Complaint contained political poems severely criticizing the federal courts. In this document the caption reads, “AMENDMENT COMPLAINT: JUDICIAL BIAS.”]

10/25/2007

ERRATA (Addendum to Amended Complaint) by DON HAMRICK 10 Amended Complaint filed by DON HAMRICK. (tg, ) (Entered: 10/26/2007) [HAMRICK COMMENTARY: Again the minimalism standard of Docket Report entries unfairly conceals the nature of the case to avoid extra scrutiny. This document includes 11 protest language on the integrity of the judge. The verbatim caption reads, “ADDENDUM TO AMENDED COMPLANT: DO I HAVE ANY ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS? : "CONTUMACIOUS BEHAVIOR" OF FEDERAL COURTS AND U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE : (CC: INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS)”

11/21/2007

Civil Statement from Plaintiff re Mandatory Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts. (tg, ) "Let this be filed" by Judge R. M. Collyer. Modified to add text on 12/3/2007 (tg, ). (Entered: 12/03/2007) [HAMRICK COMMENTARY: A pattern of behavior is developing in this Docket Report of editing down captions in a manner that purposely conceals language impugning the integrity of the federal courts. The verbatim caption in this document reads, “MANDATORY 12 JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ADJUDICATIVE FACTS: CHANGE IN RULE 40.2 OF THE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES VALIDATES PLAINTIFF'S CITIZEN'S ARREST WARRANT : MEMORANDUM OPINION IN SUPPORT OF CITIZEN'S ARREST WARRANT FOR EXTORTION UNDER COLOR OF LAW : EVIDENCE OF JUDICIAL BIAS BY THE U.S SUPREME COURT AGAINST AN UNREPRESENTED CIVIL PLAINTIFF : EVIDENCE OF EXTORTION BY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT UNDER COLOR OF LAW, 18 U.S.C. § 87, AND : EVIDENCE OF OBSTRUCTIONS OF JUSTICE BY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT.”]

32

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS Date Filed

#

Docket Text: U.S. District Court for DC, No. 07-1616

11/21/2007

Civil Statement. Plaintiff's Memorandum Opinion on Abusive Use of Sua Sponte Dismissals and Summary Judgment Dismissals When Genuine (Triable) Issues of Material Facts Preclude Dismissals and the Federal Courts Short-Sheeting the Role of the Private Attorney General (tg, ) "Let this be filed" by Judge R. M. Collyer. (Entered: 12/03/2007) [HAMRICK COMMENTARY: This Docket Report entry provides the caption verbatim. Therefore, this verbatim entry establishes that fact that entry of captions is purely at the whim 13 of the data entry operator with no apparent standardization policy on data entry of captions to court documents. The inference here is that the data entry operator is imposing his/her own sense of loyalty to the Courts, fear of incriminating judges in accountable acts of wrongdoing, or simply trying to make entries into the Docket Report in such a manner is not to incur derisive attention from judges. Therefore, it can be construed that there does exist a bias against unrepresented civil plaintiffs by all court personnel.]

11/21/2007

Leave to File Denied. Addendum to Civil Rico Act Complaint "Use or Lose It" doctrine on the Second Amendment. (5 Volumes) (tg, ) "Leave to file DENIED" by Judge R. M. Collyer. (Entered: 12/03/2007) [HAMRICK COMMENTARY: In comparing the Docket Report entries to the files on my laptop that I use to write these documents I discovered a Motion missing from the Docket Report that accompanied the original Complaint submitted to the Court for filing. That Motion is: “MOTION FOR COURT ORDER TO TRANSFER THE COURT RECORDS OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE FROM THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS, NO. 1:06CV0044 TO THIS COURT AS PLAINTIFF'S ADDENDUM TO THE PRESENT COMPLAINT FOR DUE CAUSE FROM THE APPEARANCE OF JUDICIAL BIAS OF THAT COURT ON THE BASIS OF PUBLIC RECORDS UNDER RULE 1005 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE THAT THERE IS NEW RELEVANT & DIRECT EVIDENCE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS IS WAGING A WAR OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE SECOND AMENDMENT WHERE UPON THE UNITED NATIONS LOSES THEIR PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES FROM CIVIL LAWSUIT BY A UNITED STATES CITIZEN FOR BREACH OF TREATY AND VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS THEREBY CASTING DOUBT UPON THE JUDGMENT OF JAMES M. MOODY. The 5 volumes noted above is refers to the 5 volume Complaint (volume 1 Complaint; Volumes 2 & 3 the Evidence; Volume 4 the AMENDED COMPLAINT SIMPLY ADDING THE UNITED NATIONS AS LEAD DEFENDANT; VOLUME 5 THE “ADDENDUM TO CIVIL RICO ACT COMPLAINT : “USE IT OR LOSE IT” DOCTRINE ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT : UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL SUB-COMMISSION ON THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS HAS DECLARED WAR ON THE UNITED STATES’ SECOND AMENDMENT. This Motion was designed to save on expenses of evidence gathering and to strengthen the case on that collected evidence. The evidence was admissible evidence to the U.S. District Court for DC. Denying the evidence is construed to be judicial misconduct in light of a missing explanation in the Docket.]

11/28/2007

Leave to File Denied. Evidence "Courtesy copy of my petition to the U.S. Supreme Court for Writ of Certiorari" (tg, ) " Leave to file DENIED this is a duplicate" by Judge R. M. Collyer. (Entered: 12/03/2007) [HAMRICK COMMENTARY: Duplicate? The Docket Report does not show the receipt of this document. The laptop shows that the document was last saved on November 4, 2007. All documents are mailed either immediately upon the last saved date or mailed as soon as possible there after. If this document was sent twice (I do not recall sending it twice) the data entry operator failed to enter it into the Docket Report online and this entry would be correct. This is indicative of sloppy case handling by the staff of the Court Clerk.]

33

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS Judicial bias is also measured in the accuracy of the Docket Report. Sitting on Motions until the case is dismissed rendering the Motions moot is a common practice as experienced by Don Hamrick. Lethargic judges get off scott free! Remedies are unavailable when appeals courts rubber stamps the lower court’s dismissals.

SECTION 5. Missing Documents in the Docket Report. (1) Missing Document Accompanying the Original Complaint: PETITION [MOTION] FOR COURT ORDER COMPELLING ALL FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES TO RENDER ASSISTANCE IN THE EXECUTION OF PLAINTIFF'S CITIZEN'S ARREST WARRANT AND FOR THE FBI TO INVESTIGATE THE JUDICIAL AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH HANDLING OF PLAINTIFF'S CASES FOR OBSTRUCTIONS OF JUSTICE AND OTHER CRIMES 28 U.S.C. § 1963 Registration of Judgments for Enforcement in Other Districts Hamrick v. George, US District Court for the Western District of NC, Charlotte Division, Case No. 03-cv-0344-W, ORDER, November 9, 2006. Judge Frank D. Whitney: "If Plaintiff elects to exercise his appeal rights, the Court finds that 28 U.S.C. § 1916 waives the requirement of prepayment of docket fees or furnishing security therefor , and the Clerk of Court is so instructed."

SECTION 6. Equal Justice Under the Law Dos not Apply to the Unrepresented Civil Plaintiff (1) Title 9 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual: Criminal Resource Manual § 2404 Extortion Under Color of Official Right - Hobbs Act In addition to the “wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear,” 38 the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951) defines extortion in terms of “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent . . . under color of official right.” In fact, the under color of official right aspect of the Hobbs Act derives from the common law meaning of extortion. As the Supreme Court explained in a recent opinion regarding the Hobbs Act, “[a]t common law, extortion was an offense committed by a public official who took ‘by color of his office’ money that was not due to him for the performance of his official duties. . . . Extortion by the public official was the rough equivalent of what we would now describe as ‘taking a bribe.’” Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992). In order to show a violation of the Hobbs Act under this provision, the Supreme Court recently held that “the Government 39 need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for

38

Includes the fear of being denied justice for wrongful acts of the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Marshals Service, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the judges themselves. 39 Emphasis added. Don Hamrick presumes that Equal Justice Under the Law includes an unrepresented civil plaintiff with a civil RICO Act case acting in the capacity of a Private Attorney General the right and the duty to apply the Hobbs Act against federal judges and against the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court and their court clerks. 34

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS official acts.” 40 While the definition of extortion under the Hobbs Act with regard to force, violence or fear requires the obtaining of property from another with his consent induced by these means, the under color of official right provision does not require that the public official take steps to induce the extortionate payment: It can be said that “the coercive element is provided by the public office itself.” Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992); see United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 130 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) (“[t]he public officer’s misuse of his office supplies the necessary element of coercion . . . .”). This theory of extortion under color of official right has resulted in the successful prosecution of a wide range of officials, including those serving on the federal, 41 state and local levels. For example: United States v. O’Connor, 910 F.2d 1266 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 953 (1991) (police officer accepts payments from FBI agents posing as crooked auto parts dealers); United States v. Stephenson, 895 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1990) (international trade official in Department of Commerce accepts payments to influence ruling); United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1986) (state highway administrator accepts money from road building contractor); United States v. Wright, 797 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987) (city prosecutors accept money for not prosecuting drunk drivers); United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1986) (city commissioner accepts money for awarding city concession); United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986) (judges accept payments to fix cases); United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975) (state senator accepts money from landlord seeking government office lease). In United States v. Stephenson, 895 F.2d at 871-73, the defendant, who was a federal official, unsuccessfully contended that the Hobbs Act only applied to state and local officials and that prosecution of federal official for extortion would have to be exclusively brought under 18 U.S.C. § 872: extortion by officers and employees of the United States. The court found that the government could seek a charge under whichever of these two overlapping statutes it thought appropriate. Moreover, “it is not a defense to a charge of extortion under color of official right that the defendant could also have been convicted of bribery.” Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992). GENERAL RULE: The usual fact situation for a Hobbs Act charge under color of official right is a public official trading his/her official actions in a area in which he/she has actual authority in exchange for the payment of money. Some cases under certain fact situations, however, have extended the statute further. For example: z Some courts have held that a Hobbs Act violation does not require that the public official have de jure power to perform any official act paid for as long as it was reasonable to believe that he/she had the de facto power to perform the requested act. See United States v. Nedza, 880 F.2d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 1989) (victim reasonably believed state senator had the ability to impact a local business); United States v. Bibby, 752 F.2d 1116, 1127-28 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Sorrow, 732 F.2d 176, 180 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Rindone, 631 F.2d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 1980) (public official can extort money for permit beyond control 40

This includes the federal courts compelling payment of filing fees from Don Hamrick, a seaman, in violation of the Seamen’s Suit law, 28 U.S.C. § 1916. 41 Emphasis added. 35

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS of his office, so long as victim has a reasonable belief that he could affect issuance); United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976); United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 643 (3rd Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975); United States v. Price, 507 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974). z Most courts have held that a Hobbs Act violation does not require that the public official be the recipient of the benefit of the extortion, and that a Hobbs Act case exists where the corpus of the corrupt payment went to a third party. However, consistent with the federal offenses of bribery and gratuities under 18 U.S.C. § 201 (see 9 U.S.A.M. §§ 85.101 through 85.105), where the corpus of the corrupt payment inures to the benefit of a person or entity other than the public official most courts have also required proof of a quid pro quo understanding between the private corrupter and the public official. See United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1577 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984) (“a Hobbs Act prosecution is not defeated simply because the extorter transmitted the extorted money to a third party.”); United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) (insurance agency made kickbacks to brokers selected by political leader of town); United States v. Scacchetti, 668 F.2d 643 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1132 (1982); United States v. Forszt, 655 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980); United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); United States v. Brennan, 629 F.Supp. 283 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 798 F.2d 581 (2d Cir. 1986). But see McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991)(allegedly corrupt payment made in the form of a campaign contribution to a third party campaign organization was insufficient to support a Hobbs Act conviction absent evidence of a quid pro quo). z Some courts have held that the Hobbs Act can be applied to past or future public officials, as well as to ones who presently occupy a public office at the time the corrupt payment occurs. See United States v. Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033, 1035-38 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976) (court answered affirmatively the question “whether, within the meaning of the Hobbs Act, it is a crime for candidates for political office to conspire to affect commerce by extortion induced under color of official right during a time frame beginning before the election but not ending until after the candidates have obtained public office.”); United States v. Lena, 497 F.Supp. 1352, 1359 (W.D. Pa. 1980), aff’d mem., 649 F.2d 861 (3rd Cir. (1981); United States v. Barna, 442 F.Supp. 1232,

36

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 1235 (M.D.Pa. 1978), aff’d mem., 578 F.2d 1376 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978). z Some courts have held that private persons who are not themselves public officials can be convicted under this provision if they caused public officials to perform official acts in return for payments to the non-public official. United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) (court upheld conviction of head of local Republican Party under color of official right where defendant could be said to have caused, under 18 U.S.C. §2(b), public officials to induce a third party to pay out money); see United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1572-73 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984) (private attorney’s conviction of Hobbs Act violation upheld due to complicity with state senator); United States v. Marcy, 777 F.Supp. 1398, 1399-400 (N.D.Ill. 1991); United States v. Barna, 442 F.Supp. 1232 (M.D. Pa.), aff’d mem., 578 F.2d 1376 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978). But see United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 829-32 (7th Cir. 1991) (“we believe that, as a general matter and with caveats as suggested here, proceeding against private citizens on an ‘official rights’ theory is inappropriate under the literal and historical meanings of the Hobbs Act, irrespective of the actual ‘control’ that citizen purports to maintain over governmental activity.”). z Some courts have also held that private individuals who make payments to a public official can be charged under the Hobbs Act, either as an aider and abettor or co-conspirator, if he or she is truly the instigator of the transaction. See United States v. Torcasio, 959 F.2d 503, 505-06 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1276-79 (4th Cir. 1986) (conviction affirmed for aiding and abetting extortion under color of official right even though defendant, who paid kickbacks from corporate coffers, was an officer of the victim corporation); United States v. Wright, 797 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1986). But see United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814, 823-24 (2d Cir 1990) (consultant employed to help restaurants obtain approvals from corrupt health inspectors had no stake in the conspiracy and was not promoting the outcome). z Finally, in a federal prosecution of a state legislator, there is no legislative privilege barring the introduction at trial of evidence of the defendant’s legislative acts. The Supreme Court has held that in such a prosecution a speech or debate type privilege for state legislators cannot be made applicable through Fed.R.Evid. 501. The Court said such privilege is not required by separation of powers considerations or by principles of comity, the two rationales underlying the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution, art. I, §6, cl. 1. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 368-74 (1980).

37

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS SECTION 7. The U.S. Supreme Court is Systematically Attacking and Taking Away Various Forms of Remedies. The federal courts have not applied the principal of actual freedom in judging constitutional rights against Malum prohibitum laws. 42 The federal courts have especially avoided adjudicating freedom “in facto quod se habet ad bonum et malum, magis de bono quam de malo lex intendit” (Latin, In a deed which may be held either good or bad, the law directs its attention more to the good than the bad) to Don Hamrick’s Second Amendment rights case.

DISARMING THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL Pamela S. Karlan* Stanford Law School Research Paper No. 36 (2002) http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=308220 The two great Alexanders of constitutional law – Hamilton and Bickel – saw courts as essentially reactive institutions. The judiciary, Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Paper that gave Bickel’s book its title, is “the least dangerous branch” because it can “take no active resolution whatever ... and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.” 43 Bickel applied this general proposition even to the fundamental constitutional principle of equality expressed in Brown v. Board of Education, 44 suggesting that the Supreme Court might properly decline to grant an immediate remedy because realistic enforcement would require enlisting Congress and the President. 45 The Alexandrian view depends on a model of adjudication in which the courts announce a rule and then rely on the political branches to obey or enforce it. 46 But Marbury shows that the converse can also be true. There is an important class of cases in which the legislature and the executive must depend on the judiciary for the efficacy of their judgments. In these cases, it is judicial refusals to act that pose a danger “to the political rights of the Constitution.” 47

42

Latin, An act forbidden by statute, but not otherwise wrong.

43

See The Federalist No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961); this passage appears as the epigraph to Bickel’s book.

44

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

45

See Alexander M. Bickel, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 247-54, 267-72. (1962). 46

Even when it comes to straightforward constitutional adjudication, however, as Gerald Gunther explained in a classic article, there can be substantial costs to a court’s refusal to address properly presented claims. See Gerald Gunther, THE SUBTLE VICES OF THE “PASSIVE VIRTUES” – A COMMENT ON PRINCIPLE AND EXPEDIENCY IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1964). 47

THE FEDERALIST, No. 78, supra note 3, at 465.

38

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS Marbury itself recognized this threat, when Chief Justice Marshall observed that the government of the United States could no longer be “termed a government of law, and not of men .... if the laws furnish no remedy for a vested legal right.” 48 As the Court stated last Term, although there are “vital limits on judicial authority,” when “contending parties invoke the process of the courts, ... it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.” 49 What makes that declaration so ironic is the context. As in Marbury, an aspirant for federal office sought the Court’s assistance. But unlike William Marbury, George W. Bush managed to procure a sweeping remedial order from the Supreme Court without ever identifying any vested legal right that the remedy he requested would actually vindicate. 50 Moreover, the same Court that provided George W. Bush with an unprecedented remedy in the service of an expansive, if evanescent, equal protection claim has shown itself strikingly resistant to judicial remedies for civil-rights plaintiffs raising more traditional equality-based claims. There are two ways a court might retrench on civil rights protections. First, a court might explicitly redefine an underlying right in narrower terms. For example, in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 51 the Supreme Court redefined the preexisting jurisprudence of racial vote dilution, embodied in such decisions as White v. Regester, 52 to forbid only those electoral structures that were adopted or maintained for racially discriminatory purposes, rather than prohibiting also those that had a disparate impact on minority voters. 53 Similarly, in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 54 the Supreme Court offered a cramped interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981's protection against racial discrimination in the right “to make and

48

5 U.S. at 163.

49

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (per curiam).

50

I explore this point at substantial length in Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C.L. Rev. 1345 (2001), and Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection: Bush v. Gore and the Making of a Precedent, in The Unfinished Election of 2000, at 159, 185-95 (Jack N. Rakove ed. 2001).

51

446 U.S. 55 (1980).

52

412 U.S.755 (1973).

53

For discussions of this retrenchment, see, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan & Richard H. Pildes, THE LAW DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 708-10, 729-45 (2d ed. 2001); James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, FROM REYNOLDS V. SIMS TO CITY OF MOBILE V. BOLDEN: HAVE THE WHITE SUBURBS COMMANDEERED THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT?, 34 Hastings L.J. 1, 4, 28 (1982).

OF

54

491 U.S. 164 (1989).

39

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS enforce contracts.” 55 It held that section 1981 “extends only to the formation of a contract, but not to problems that may arise later from the conditions of continuing employment,” 56 and thus that racial harassment of employees was not actionable under section 1981. The other approach, which is more insidious, is for the court to leave the formal right in place, but to constrict the remedial machinery. At best, this will dilute the value of the right, since some violations will go unremedied. At worst, it may signal potential wrongdoers that they can infringe the right with impunity. Remedial abridgment is a pervasive tool of the contemporary Supreme Court. In criminal procedure, for example, Carol Steiker has shown that while the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have left in place most of the Warren Court’s restrictions on police activity, they have developed new “inclusionary” rules that allow the introduction of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, thereby dampening the effect of “conduct” rules directed at law enforcement personnel. 57 Similarly, in structural reform litigation, Daryl Levinson has pointed to ways in which the Court’s retrenchment on the scope of appropriate remedies has backwashed into the definition of the underlying rights. 58 *** In this article, I shall discuss how several of the Supreme Court’s civil rights decisions from last Term reflect this strategy as well. For the most part, the Court has left the political branches’ power to regulate relatively unconstrained. That is, the Court assumes that Congress and the Executive can prohibit various forms of primary conduct. At the same time, however, the Court has launched a wholesale assault on one of the primary mechanisms Congress has used for enforcing civil rights: the private attorney general. The idea behind the “private attorney general” can be stated relatively simply: Congress can vindicate important public policy goals by empowering private individuals to bring suit. While one can imagine a regime in which Congress simply delegates the government’s own right to enforce its laws to private bounty hunters – that is essentially what qui tam lawsuits envision 59 – the current reliance on private attorneys general is more 55

42 U.S.C. § 1981 provided, at the time, that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens ....” Congress subsequently amended § 1981 to overturn the Court’s decision in Patterson, declaring that “[f]or purposes of this section, the term ‘make and enforce contracts’ includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (1994). 56

491 U.S. at 176.

57

See Carol S. Steiker, COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE?: TWO AUDIENCES, TWO ANSWERS, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2466 (1996). 58

See Daryl J. Levinson, RIGHTS ESSENTIALISM AND REMEDIAL EQUILIBRATION, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 857 (1999).

59

And what Judge Jerome Frank, who apparently coined the phrase “private attorney general” in his 1943 opinion in Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (1943), imagined. For discussions of qui tam lawsuits, see, e.g., Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000); Evan Caminker, Comment, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF QUI TAM ACTIONS, 99 Yale L.J. 341 (1989).

40

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS modest. It consists essentially of providing a cause of action for individuals who have been injured by the conduct Congress wishes to proscribe, usually with the additional incentive of attorney’s fees for a prevailing plaintiff. Virtually all modern civil rights statutes rely heavily on private attorneys general. As the Court explained in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 60 one of the earliest cases construing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbids various kinds of discrimination in public accommodations, federally funded programs, and employment, Congress recognized that it could not achieve compliance solely through lawsuits initiated by the Attorney General: A [public accommodations] suit is thus private in form only. When a plaintiff brings an action ..., he cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a “private attorney general,” vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority. 61 Thus, Piggie Park recognized the piggybacking function of the Act: Congress harnessed private plaintiffs to pursue a broader purpose of obtaining equal treatment for the public at large. Later, the Court explained that this public function exists even when a civil rights plaintiff asks for compensatory damages rather than injunctive relief. “Unlike most private tort litigants,” the civil rights plaintiff “seeks to vindicate important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms.... Regardless of the form of relief he actually obtains, a successful civil rights plaintiff often secures important social benefits.” 62 Thus, when “his day in court is denied him,” the congressional policy which a civil rights plaintiff “seeks to assert and vindicate goes unvindicated; and the entire Nation, not just the individual citizen, suffers.” 63 In this article, I explore four decisions from October Term 2000 in which the Supreme Court sharply abridged the ability of private attorneys general to get their day in court. In two cases, the Court denied private plaintiffs the ability to bring lawsuits altogether. In Board of Regents v. Garrett, 64 the Court underscored its narrow reading of congressional enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that Congress cannot authorize private damages lawsuits against state governments that discriminate against the disabled. And in Alexander v. Sandoval, 65 the Court held that there is no private

60

390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).

61

Id. at 401-02.

62

City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986).

63

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

64

531 U.S. 356 (2001).

65

532 U.S. 275 (2001).

41

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbids racial discrimination in federally funded programs or activities. In each of these cases, the Court left open (perhaps only for the time being) the possibility of other forms of congressional or administrative enforcement, but the elimination of private attorneys general altogether will surely decrease overall enforcement of the underlying rights. In two other cases, the Court left open the formal availability of private lawsuits, but created substantial practical barriers to private vindication of public policy. In Circuit City v. Adams, 66 the Court construed the Federal Arbitration Act in a way that permits employers to compel workers to arbitrate claims under federal fair-employment laws. And in Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 67 the Court rejected the preexisting “catalyst theory” for attorney’s fees. Under that theory, courts had awarded plaintiffs attorney’s fees when their lawsuits led the defendant to change the challenged practice voluntarily. The Supreme Court, however, held that fees can be awarded only if there is a judicially sanctioned change in the parties’ legal relationship. These decisions will cut down both on the amount of civil rights enforcement and on the development of the law through the creation of binding precedent. Conclusion The overriding theme that links together the Supreme Court’s decisions on a range of issues – from the scope of Eleventh Amendment immunity to the scope of congressional power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and from when to find implied rights of action to when to award attorney’s fees – can be stated quite simply: The current Court is creating an ever-greater regulation-remedy gap. It has left Congress free to regulate a wide range of subjects, but it is engaged in a form of courtstripping that reduces the possibilities for judicial enforcement of statutory commands. To paraphrase my colleague Gerry Gunther, a “virulent variety of free-wheeling interventionism lies at the core of [the Court’s] devices of restraint.” 68 The Congress and Supreme Court of an earlier era constructed the institution of the private attorney general because they recognized that, without private attorneys general, it would be impossible to realize some of our most fundamental constitutional and political values. The current Court seems bent on dismantling this centerpiece of the Second Reconstruction. For all its invocations of Marbury’s declaration that it “is emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,” 69 the current Court seems to have forgotten Marbury’s equally important acknowledgment – that “the government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men,” but “will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish 66

532 U.S. 105 (2001).

67

532 U.S. 598 (2001).

68

Gerald Gunther, THE SUBTLE VICES OF THE “PASSIVE VIRTUES” – A COMMENT ON PRINCIPLE AND EXPEDIENCY IN JUDICIAL REVIEW, 64 Colum. L. Rev. at 25 (1964). 69

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

42

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.” 70 When the law furnishes no remedy because the Supreme Court has cast out the remedies that the political branches have tried to provide, then the courts threaten to become the most dangerous branch “to the political rights of the Constitution,” 71 and not the least.

SECTION 8. Comments on the Ninth Circuit pro se Task Force Report Charles W. Heckman, Dr. Sci., A Matter of Justice Coalition (AMOJ) Committee for the Ninth Circuit Submitted in behalf of: A Matter of Justice Coalition Formatted and uploaded to American Family Rights Association website on January 3, 2005 (Excerpted Portions that Apply to Don Hamrick) III. PROBLEMS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE REPORT A. THE ROLE OF BIAS One of the many serious complaints often voiced by litigants but not seriously addressed in the report of the Task Force is bias by the judge. However, the report clearly expresses a common attitude toward pro se litigants, starting of p. 6 of the report: “Some judges and lawyers are convinced, for example, that pro se litigants as a class generally bring meritless claims, and that any program designed to educate or assist them would only increase the number of meritless claims in the court system. This point of view is doubtless influenced by those pro se cases that are brought by individuals suffering from a mental disability or for purposes of harassment. Closely related to that thought is the belief that appointing attorneys for pro se clients is a waste of resources and in the long run simply complicates efforts to keep the system clear of meritless cases.” The Task Force fails to identify who holds this opinion, but both lawyers and judges have frequently expressed it or opinions very much like it. The main focus of this task force should not be with methods by which unbiased judges can make the submissions of pro se litigants easier for the court to deal with but rather with developing methods to assist a pro se litigant who has been the victim of a judge with the preconception that whatever he submits to the court is without merit, and his lawsuit must be dismissed before any unnecessary time of the court is wasted. If all judges were perfect human beings, we could assume that the private opinion of a lawyer or a judge would not be reflected the judge’s rulings. However, we know that few people approach perfection, and prejudice by decision-makers against members of certain groups has been the cause of continuous, bitter conflict since the civil rights movement first brought the effects of biases of many kinds to public view. Prejudices often have a greater impact on the outcome of administrative hearings and lawsuits than parties with an obligation to be impartial like to admit. Whether the prejudice is deliberate and malicious or entirely unintended, decisions colored by personal biases can be just as devastating to the victims of the resulting injustice. 70

5 U.S. at 163.

71

The Federalist, No. 78, supra note 3, at 465.

43

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS An even more enlightening articulation of the prejudice litigants often face appeared in numerous discussions on the decision of a Washington State appeals court in Hill v. BCTI Income Fund, 97 Wn. App. 657 (1999), later upheld by the Washington State Supreme Court. Although it is the decision of a state court, it draws on the en banc opinion of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1437 (2d Cir.). The opinion in Hill v. BCTI defends a school of thought within the legal profession, which has been having a revolutionary effect on American jurisprudence. It parallels the controversial theory of a “living constitution,” which condones the “updating” of the United States Constitution by the courts to conform to the personal opinion of judges concerning what the public wants and will accept. On a more mundane level, this revolution in judicial theory is interpreted by many judges as a mandate to quickly dismiss any lawsuit that can be dismissed without causing a public outcry, regardless of the merits of the case. One of the main innovations introduced by the decision in Fisher v. Vassar is the acceptability and utility of lying to the court. This was discussed at length in a dissenting opinion by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit, who pointed out the implications of the decision reached by his colleagues. Briefly stated, a jury of the trial court had determined that the spokesmen for Vassar had lied about the reason Fisher was denied tenure. It therefore concluded that the prima facie case Fisher had established had not been rebutted, and the relief she had demanded was granted. The Second Circuit, en banc, reversed the decision of the trial court by a single vote, ruling that the non-discriminatory reason given for not granting Fisher tenure had eliminated her prima facie case, even though the reason was shown unequivocally to be a lie. With the case in favor of Fisher eliminated, the court opined that she was required to meet a higher level of proof, which was not defined by the court and was apparently not humanly possible to meet, at least without the services of a certified mind-reader. Expanding on this legal opinion, the Washington State courts in Hill v. BCTI set an unattainable burden of proof on a plaintiff who has alleged discrimination as soon as the defendant lies to the court and alleges that the motivation was not to discriminate against the plaintiff. According to the opinion of the Washington courts, proving conclusively that the defendant’s allegation was a lie is not enough for a plaintiff to prevail. He must prove that the motive of the plaintiff was to discriminate against him for the reason alleged in the complaint. Hence, if age discrimination is alleged, the plaintiff must prove that the real reason for the discriminatory action and the subsequent lie by the defendant was actually the age of the plaintiff and not, for example, his religion, race, or gender. The judges of the Washington State Court of Appeals were well aware of the fact that the opposite decision had been reached by the United States Supreme Court, but they reasoned that the Supreme Court was wrong and the State of Washington was free to decide contrary to the highest Federal court because the State of Washington has its own constitution and its courts are therefore not bound by the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the Federal judiciary. What is interesting about this case in the context of pro se litigation is not the decision itself but rather the opinion of an author who defended the decision as vital to preserve the integrity of the judicial system. He stated clearly in his article that if one person came to a court with a discrimination complaint and obtained relief, this would encourage other litigants to file similar lawsuits, and there are already too many lawsuits being filed. There is a strong undercurrent within the legal profession, as well as among corporations that are frequently sued, propagating the opinion that filing civil lawsuits is somehow sinister and

44

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS un-American. They wish to discourage most lawsuits by denying justice to litigants and thereby discouraging other litigants from seeking justice in a court. While there is a tradition from the Old West that a man settles his disputes by shooting it out with his adversary or settles lesser disputes with his fists, it was long thought that this was a less desirable alternative to letting a jury decide which party should prevail. Apparently, some members of the legal profession think otherwise and wish to close off the courts to ordinary citizens, returning dispute resolution to the means available in the “Wild West.” It would be well to determine how closely the decrease in justice provided in civil suits has paralleled the increase in crimes of violence between people with no civilized means available to settle their dispute. How many of the civil disputes wrongfully dismissed or inequitably settled come back to the court as a criminal case? The treatment of pro se litigants reflects the desire expressed by many politicians and judges that the number of lawsuits be reduced. Showing litigants who lack strong financial resources, the services of a first-class law firm, backing by an influential organization, or attention in the press that they have no chance of prevailing in a lawsuit or even of presenting their cases to a jury might well discourage other litigants from seeking redress in the courts but it also encourages persons in positions of authority to deliberately break the law, knowing that there is almost no chance that the victim would be able to obtain redress in a court of law. It seems obvious to me that the flood of lawsuits is the result of a massive increase in white collar crime in the United States, most of which is ignored by law enforcement authorities on the excuse that their time is needed to combat crimes of violence. The victims are therefore forced to attempt to obtain redress in a civil lawsuit, and most are unable to obtain legal counsel. A recent estimate made by a group in Iowa suggested that 70% of the population of that state did not have enough money to retain the services of an attorney. Because most white collar criminals have learned the applicable law very well before embarking on their criminal careers and many seem to have the active assistance of local civil servants or even judges, attorneys do not see much chance of immediate success before a court and will therefore refuse to represent an indigent litigant on a contingency basis. Furthermore, many attorneys working out of small offices without a major law firm behind them hardly do better in court than pro se litigants. Therefore, as the white collar criminals, deliberate abusers of civil rights, unscrupulous business firms, and corrupt public officials become bolder, the victims have no way of protecting their property and livelihoods other than by representing themselves in a lawsuit. Even though an increasing number of pro se litigants see the courts as hostile to them and their needs for redress under the law, the flood of lawsuits grows because of the massive increase in the crimes that the current attitude of the courts has engendered. Missing from the report by the Task Force is any adequate remedy for the actions of judges who adhere to the belief that pro se litigants do not deserve full consideration by the court. This can be justified by the self-fulfilling prophesy that pro se litigants never win. As a result, many judges believe that any time given to a lawsuit in which a litigant represents himself is wasted. Therefore, pro se litigants really do not win simply because the prophesy that they will lose is self-fulfilling. B. REMEDIES THAT FAIL If a district judge summarily dismisses the civil lawsuit of a pro se plaintiff without reviewing any of the facts and writes a short opinion that fails to address the fundamental complaint, indicating that the judge barely knew what issues the complaint addressed, the plaintiff can appeal the dismissal to the court of appeals. In a great many cases, the

45

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS plaintiff receives a brief affirmation of the district judge’s opinion, which also fails to address the issues in the complaint and almost always contains the notation that the opinion cannot be cited as a precedent and should not be published. The plaintiff can then file an appeal with the United States Supreme Court with near certainty that certiorari will not be denied. Many litigants lack the money to have their petitions for certiorari correctly printed and bound to the satisfaction of the clerk, and others fail to present the legal issues in an understandable manner. Even if all submissions are perfect, however, the petition will almost certainly be denied in favor of appeals that are given considerable publicity in the press, are promoted by major organizations, or are otherwise likely to bring fame and praise to the justices. The problems of ordinary citizens, no matter how devastating to them and their families, are ignored, and they find that they would have little more chance of success in getting a justified complaint before a jury than they would have of winning a lottery. For example, after the courts in several circuits had summarily dismissed hundreds and perhaps thousands of lawsuits alleging employment discrimination at the complaint stage because the plaintiff had failed to provide enough hard evidence to establish a prima facie case when the complaint was submitted, the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear one of the appeals from the Second Circuit. In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. (2002), it decided unanimously that it is a gross violation of procedures to dismiss a lawsuit at this stage of the proceedings. Among the points the justices made were that a plaintiff can prevail without establishing a prima facie case at all, that a judge’s opinion of whether or not a litigant will prevail before a jury is irrelevant to decision to dismiss a lawsuit, and that it is fundamentally unfair to dismiss a lawsuit before the whole body of facts can be revealed through discovery. While this decision provided the plaintiff with a chance to have his lawsuit heard by a jury on the merits, it affirmed that thousands of litigants whose lawsuits had been improperly dismissed over the many years during which the appeals courts had been violating procedures had been left without any access to justice. Still more perverse was the continued dismissal of lawsuits at the complaint stage, even after the Supreme Court had denounced this practice. It was well known to the judges guilty of this practice that any subsequent petitions for certiorari citing this issue would be denied on the grounds that the Supreme Court had already decided the issue and would not agree to decide it again. This would leave a litigant no way of redressing violations of his civil rights just because he had the bad luck of coming before a judge who is trying to discourage lawsuits by issuing non-precedential dismissals at the complaint stage and appeals court judges who affirm decisions of the lower court with a rubber stamp. Citing the clear opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Swiercewicz v. Sorema N.A. would have no effect on the outcome before a judge who assumes that anything filed pro se is without merit. In case of particularly severe violations of the law, procedures, or ethics by a judge, a litigant is limited to filing a complaint with a judicial board established for hearing such complaints. Other avenues of redress are closed off because judicial immunity from civil liability was made absolute during the 1990s, even if corruption or malice motivated the judge’s actions. Experience shows that the boards investigating misconduct by judges move extremely slowly, and a litigant has roughly one chance in a thousand of having a rogue judge censured, even mildly. It can be concluded that a litigant whose lawsuit has been dismissed because of the bias of a judge against him, a class to which he belongs, pro se litigants in general, or the kind of lawsuit he has filed has almost no chance of redress, either on appeal or in complaint 46

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS proceedings against a judge. Human nature clearly dictates that when members of any group are permitted to perform illegal, immoral, and unjust actions against other persons with complete impunity, many of them will do so, some because of laziness, others because of malice, and still others in anticipation of gratuities from a favored party. A pro se litigant has no recourse against a judge who does not want his complaint heard due to bias of any kind, and the fact that a judge has the power to deny him access to a jury effectively eliminates an important civil right supposedly guaranteed by Amendment VII of the United States Constitution. C. COMMON EXPERIENCES OF PRO SE LITIGANTS The solutions proposed by the Task Force presume good will by the judges and conformity with the standards of ethics and behavior traditionally held by our society. Unfortunately, in speaking and corresponding with many pro se litigants, I have learned that there are common problems that reflect an erosion of human values and are often accompanied by abusive behavior by judges. These problems are less likely to arise when a litigant is represented by a lawyer, whose status as an “insider” in the legal profession might tend to restrain the opposing attorney and presiding judge from improper conduct. Such conduct is difficult for pro se litigants to cope with, but it is readily recognized when it occur. Eventually, pro se litigants make their opinions of the court public, and the increasing criticism leads to a general loss of faith in courts. The growing dissatisfaction of the public with the judicial system is rooted in the negative opinions developed by many litigants who know they have been improperly or illegally treated. Losing a lawsuit is fundamentally different from being denied due process and a fair hearing, and even pro se litigants without formal education in a law school can immediately tell the difference. The most common complaints by litigants of misconduct by the courts include the following: 1. Perjury is tolerated by the judge This complaint has been made by the great majority of pro se litigants with whom I have spoken. Very often, the false testimony is given by one or more government employees. Even when parts of the testimony are shown to be false, judges continue to give full credence to the witness in the remaining parts of the testimony. The judge then dismisses the lawsuit of a pro se litigant citing the perjured testimony as evidence that the lawsuit has no merit. Usually there are documents in the file clearly showing that the testimony was false, but these are simply disregarded by the judge. Prosecutions for perjury have become rare to non-existent. Government employees have been given complete immunity for perjury they commit “in the line of duty,” even if it is given with malice. Government prosecutors may suborn witnesses to perjury by promising them immunity for crimes they have been accused of. It has even been alleged that government employees can be fired for refusing to give false testimony at the behest of their supervisors. Many cases are known where civil servants have advanced their own careers by deliberately misleading courts, administrative boards, and even Congress to advance a political agenda espoused by the their supervisors. 2. Records submitted to the court disappear from the files This complaint has frequently been made. Some litigants note that the entries of the documents are still in the court records but the documents themselves have disappeared. Even if copies of the records are retained by the litigant, they usually cannot be added to a record on appeal unless they are still in the file of the lower court.

47

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 3. Judges’ opinions fail to address the issues of the lawsuit Many litigants complain that orders for dismissal address issues that were never raised in the lawsuit and fail to address the issues that were. In light of the fact that most judges have earned a law degree, some decisions have convinced the litigants that the legal issues were deliberately misconstrued by the judge. For example, if a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act and monetary relief citing the Federal Tort Claim Act, a judge may deny the injunctive relief on the grounds that there are no provisions for such relief in the Federal Tort Claim Act and that the Administrative Procedures Act does not authorize monetary relief. Similarly, a lawsuit alleging failure of the Department of Labor to investigate a discrimination complaint against a private university was dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiff was seeking Federal employment through the courts. Even a law professor from Hofstra University complained in a speech that he was tired of reading decisions that did not address the issues of the case. At best, this means that the law professor was able to understand the issues of the lawsuit from the submissions, while the judge allegedly was not. At worst, this indicates that the judge was deliberately falsifying the issues in order to justify an obviously faulty decision. According to the law professor, after he finished his speech, a judge leaned over to him and said, “You don’t know the half of it.” 4. Certain litigants must always win One of the most harmful practices of the courts becomes most evident when statistical surveys of the outcomes of litigation are conducted. Some judges have apparently developed strong biases for or against certain kinds of lawsuit or litigant and lose sight of the fact that each case deserves a separate analysis. The outcomes of these lawsuits most frequently favor government agencies as defendants and major special interest groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, as representatives of a plaintiff. Decisions are reached without jury trial to assure that the favored litigant wins. The trend to summarily dismiss lawsuits without trials is reflected in surveys showing that more than 11% of all civil lawsuits were decided by juries in the early 1960s, while less than 2% reach a jury now. It is not only the courts that are guilty of denying due process to protect favored litigants. Congress has also established special means of adjudication to remove the proceedings against certain agencies from the normal judicial channels. Some of the agencies established for administrative adjudication have earned a reputation for extreme bias in favor of the government agencies they are supposed to treat impartially. For example, the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB), which adjudicates complaints filed by veterans because their preference rights in the civil service have been violated, has never decided in favor of a veteran in any appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which is the only court with jurisdiction over appeals from the MSPB, has never decided in favor of a whistleblower, after hearing 71 appeals citing the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. It is also doubtful whether it has ever decided in favor of a veteran, although I have yet to find records on this point. It is noteworthy that under the law, the burden of proof is on the agency, and in the case of appeals filed by whistleblowers, clear and convincing evidence is required, giving whistleblowers a clear benefit of the doubt. Nevertheless, the agency always wins in such appeals, as well as those brought under veterans’ laws. The Veterans’ Employment and Training Service (VETS) accepts employment discrimination complaints from veterans. All complaints it receives are not maintained in the agency files, but of 1029 complaints it did place in its records in 2001, five were brought to the courts, but only one was adjudicated as a civil lawsuit. 48

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS Any lawsuits brought by a plaintiff pro per fall into the category of “thousand to one shots,” but so do discrimination lawsuits brought against government agencies with the assistance of “B” or “C-class” lawyers. Similarly, civil rights and employment discrimination lawsuits routinely fail, unless a major special interest group supports one of the parties. Any time lawsuits that depend on an individual interpretation of the facts are decided so preponderantly in favor of one party without the assistance of a jury, suspicion of bias is justified. In conflicts between human beings, rank, job title, or affiliation do not determine which party has followed the law and which party has broken it. If the supervisor prevails one thousand times in whistleblower appeals for every time the whistleblower prevails, it is clear that the adjudication has not been impartial. This conclusion is given great support by the findings of Congress that reprisal against whistleblowers is a problem of massive proportions in the civil service, requiring several amendments to make the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act considerably stronger. That the efforts of Congress have been consistently undermined by the judges on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reflects an imbalance that has been developing between the powers of the legislative and judicial branches in recent years. 5. Different standards are applied to different litigants Powerful plaintiffs seek to delay litigation until the opponent dies or is forced to end the litigation for financial reasons. Some well-represented litigants do not respond to the summons until a motion for default has been entered, and judges routinely excuse the failure and refuse to enter a default judgment. The same judges are quick to dismiss lawsuits because a pro se plaintiff has missed a deadline by one or two days, even when the cause of the delay was beyond the control of the litigant. The lack of impartiality is plainly evident when one party is permitted unlimited delays, in spite of the fact that the United States Department of Justice or a major law firm with a large staff of lawyers is representing that party, while a pro se litigant forced to act alone is held to the strictest standards stipulated in the FRCP and local rules. Allowing one litigant unlimited delays while the other is facing severe financial difficulties as long as the lawsuit remains unsettled is a tactic that clearly violates judicial fairness and at least the spirit of the United States Constitution, which demands a speedy trial in criminal matters and, by implication, reasonable speed in settling civil disputes, as well. 6. Recent handling of civil lawsuits by the courts have instigated a white collar crime wave Many successful white collar criminals have obtained the cooperation of local courts to defraud private citizens out of large sums of money, often leaving the victim destitute. A few of the methods frequently used include abuse of bankruptcy procedures to loot estates, illegal foreclosures on real estate, seizure of cash or property without due process, and fraud during divorce proceedings. Federal courts should have jurisdiction over obvious frauds perpetrated by state courts under the RICO statute and civil rights laws. However, failure of effective action by Federal judges to stop obvious fraud perpetrated by colleagues employed by state and local government encourages larcenous state officials, including judges, to conclude that their positions allow them to illegally enrich themselves at the expense of selected victims with complete impunity. Litigants who have sought protection from state and local criminal gangs in Federal courts have encountered many years of delays, denial of jury trials, and refusals to issue decisions justified by the facts of the case. Many abuses have come to public attention in recent 49

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS years, but the crime wave has grown so rapidly, many of the practices have not received sufficient publicity to warn potential victims. Crimes like identity theft, fraudulent foreclosure, fraud in stating fees and interest charges, and abuses of eminent domain have become epidemic throughout the United States. They can financially ruin victims, who have not found effective protection through either criminal or civil procedures. 7. Court orders go unheeded Failure of courts to enforce their own orders granting relief to litigants may eventually result in more difficulties than adjudicating the initial petition for relief. Plaintiffs may prevail but gain no redress from the decision because judges refuse to issue effective orders mandating the remedies demanded by a jury. This is a problem that often arises when the delinquent party is a government agency. Common examples of deliberate resistance to court orders include ignoring orders to produce documents requested under the Freedom of Information or Privacy Act and failure of public officials to obey orders to return money or property unlawfully taken from citizens by law enforcement agencies. 8. Judges give orders contrary to law and accepted standards of behavior Opposite the failure to enforce just orders for relief is issuing orders demanding illegal or obviously impractical relief from litigants. Examples of practices that have become common during the past few years include demands for support payments from one party to divorce proceedings that exceed the total earnings of the person ordered to pay, jailing of indigent litigants who cannot pay what the court has demanded of them for other reasons, removal of children from their natural parents without due process, and imposition of medical treatment on minor children without informing their parents. 9. Judges refuse to take actions required by law Many routine actions required of judges have created barriers to the enforcement of laws as intended by Congress. An excellent example of this is the action usually taken after a litigant complaints that he cannot obtain documents requested pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. This law was passed by Congress because of the great resistance shown by Federal civil servants to making their unclassified documents available to the general public. Records created through the use of tax money should belong to the public and be made available on request. Congress obviously intended that documents formally requested be made available immediately. It therefore specified a waiting period of no more than ten working days and permitted a person who requested the records to file a lawsuit to obtain the documents if the agency is not forthcoming. It requires agencies to assist people making requests to identify the documents and to provide the documents after charging only minimal copying fees. Obviously, to uphold this law as Congress intended, a judge must order immediate release of the records to the court for distribution to the plaintiff after the court has ruled on any objections the agency has made to their release. Because obtaining records as quickly as possible is often necessary for a litigant to obtain some benefit to which he is entitled, complete an article for publication in a newspaper or periodical, or protect himself of a relative from the consequences of false information about him being distributed with official records, the rapid availability of records is vital. Instead of upholding the high standards demanded by the Freedom of Information Act, judges have consistently permitted lawsuits to obtain public information to drag on for several years, often making the intended use of the documents impossible. Judges seem to attempt to avoid issuing orders to government agencies, even when the law mandates this.

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PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS They fail to review contested records in camera, as provided for in the law, and simply hope the plaintiff will eventually withdraw his demand for the documents. Although obtaining documents often costs plaintiffs excessive amounts of money for the litigation, judges seldom offer the monetary relief specified in the law. They also fail to impose the requirement of the law that photocopy fees be reasonable. While private shops provide photocopies for 5 cents or less, agencies may charge exorbitant amounts to copy their documents. For example, about two years ago, one agency demanded 31 cents for each copy, or more than 6 times the price on the private market. The failure of the courts to impose sanctions on civil servants who make it a sport to defy the Freedom of Information Act has led to the development of procedures to keep public documents out of the hands of citizens who want to obtain them. 10. Courts have become inconsistent and arbitrary Courts have recently begun to establish very confusing precedents, reverse their own decisions, and ignore real issues rather than settling them. In recent years, different Courts of Appeals have issued opposite interpretations of the same law, making one action legal under the jurisdiction of one circuit and illegal under the jurisdiction of another. Because the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari each time a litigant attempted to obtain a definitive decision on some of these matters, Federal law can mean one thing in one circuit and the opposite in another. For example, whether or not Federal law permits factory workers to speak with each other in a language other than English depends upon the area of the country in which the factory is located. Changing public opinion or even an unusual personal opinion held by the judge to whom the case has been assigned may result in a lawsuit being decided in a manner contrary to other recent decisions in nearly identical cases. When judicial opinions on the interpretation of a law are continually fluctuating because one judge approves of the law while another does not, whichever litigant loses will feel cheated by the court because other litigants in exactly in the same position won their lawsuits. This situation causes more litigants to risk a lawsuit rather than settling the dispute out of court because winning or losing depends only on the whim of the judge hearing the case rather than on a consistent and unambiguous interpretation of the law. An advantage of being represented by counsel is often the knowledge he brings concerning which judges will be sympathetic to the litigant’s case and which will favor the other party. In an impartial system, such considerations would not be a factor. The founding fathers hoped to eliminate this problem by insisting that decisions be rendered by juries, but by increasingly usurping the duties of the jurors, judges have permitted their own beliefs on the wisdom of individual laws to override the stated intentions of Congress. Because all judges do not hold the same opinions, an increasing inconsistency in decisions is becoming an increasing problem for pro se litigants and lawyers, alike. 11. Federalism theory interferes with practical justice In recent history, Federal courts have intervened in many disputes between citizens and individual states, where the state court system was clearly violating or assisting in the violation of civil rights. Since the first Civil Rights statutes were passed in 1871, Congress has shown a clear intent to place the guarantees in Amendments XIII, XIV, and XV above the limitations on suits against states in Amendment XI. Federal courts belatedly struck down state laws deliberately passed to bar Americans of African descent from voting, attending schools with white children, and using public facilities. These rulings have clearly focused the attention of the nation on the fact that states are prone to commit

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PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS actions against their citizens that violate Federal guarantees defined as civil and human rights by our Constitution. Recently, the theory of federalism has been revived, and Federal courts have become less willing to interfere with the actions of state courts, no matter how unjust and reprehensible. One of the most important reasons for Federal courts to exist is to provide citizens with a final recourse against clearly illegal actions committed by state and local government, which are much more likely to fall under the influence of criminal conspirators than the much more diverse Federal system. If the Federal courts disqualify themselves from settling disputes between citizens and state governments, they have clearly left the citizens vulnerable to losing their civil rights through clearly illegal actions by small, corrupt political machines.

SECTION 9. Judge Donald P. Lay, 8th Circuit in Dissenting Opinion: Too Many Summary Judgments and 8th Circuit Too Readily Rubber-Stamping Summary Judgments

DECISION OF THE DAY Robert Loblaw’s blog.

(1) Melvin v. Cal-Freshener Corp., 06-1279 (8th Cir., July 12, 2006) Too Many Summary Judgments in the Eighth Circuit? Wednesday, July 12, 2006 http://blogs.enotes.com/decision-blog/2006-07/too-many-summary-judgments-in-theeighth-circuit One trend I have noticed in the nine months I have been doing this blog is that reversals are pretty rare in the Eighth Circuit. The vast majority of the decisions I have seen are unanimous affirmances, both in the criminal and civil context. (The one exception being below-Guidelines sentences, as Doug Berman has catalogued.) So, either the district courts there are doing everything right, or perhaps something may be broken in the appellate system. Today, in a rare Eighth Circuit dissent, Judge Lay suggests that something may be broken. Dissenting from a decision affirming summary judgment for the defendant in an employment discrimination case, Judge Lay argues that the district courts are granting too many summary judgment motions, and the Eighth Circuit is too readily rubber-stamping these decisions. He urges the courts to take a closer look at these cases, to ensure that litigants’ right to a jury trial is being adequately protected. ===

DECISION OF THE DAY Robert Loblaw’s blog.

(2) Guerrerro v. J.W. Hutton, Inc., 06-1352 (8th Cir., Aug. 21, 2006) More On the Eighth’s Overly Summary Judgments Monday, August 21, 2006 http://blogs.enotes.com/decision-blog/2006-08/more-on-the-eighths-overly-summaryjudgments A month ago, I posted on this Eighth Circuit decision, in which Judge Lay criticized his colleagues for being too trigger-happy about affirming summary judgments. Although he does not editorialize this time, Judge Lay’s dissent in this employment case again highlights the Eighth Circuit’s readiness to deny litigants their right to a jury trial despite the existence of material, disputed facts. 52

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS ===

Decision of the Day Robert Loblaw’s blog.

(3) Green v. Franklin National Bank of Minneapolis, 05-2513 (8th Cir., Aug. 23, 2006) Judge Lay Continues His Crusade Against Summary Judgments Wednesday, August 23, 2006 http://blogs.enotes.com/decision-blog/2006-08/judge-lay-continues-his-crusade-against-summaryjudgments

For the second time this week (see this post) and at least the third time this summer (see here), Judge Lay exposes the Eighth Circuit’s pattern of affirming summary judgments despite the existence of triable issues. In today’s low-profile dissent, he explains why there are material factual disputes about whether a plaintiff was fired for complaining about a coworker’s racial insults. ===

DECISION OF THE DAY Robert Loblaw’s blog.

(4) United States v. Minnesota Church of Angels, 06-1983 (8th Cir., Mar. 22, 2007) A Fitting Tribute to Judge Lay Thursday, March 22, 2007 http://blogs.enotes.com/decision-blog/2007-03/a-fitting-tribute-to-judge-lay/ Loyal Decision of the Day readers may remember Senior Judge Donald Lay, the former Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit who criticized his colleagues last summer for affirming too many summary judgments. (My coverage here, here, and here.) Well, the 80-year-old Johnson appointee is now off the bench due to disability retirement. One of the last oral arguments he heard was this appeal, in which the Hell’s Angels challenged the government’s forfeiture of their clubhouse due to its alleged use as a drug den. Judge Lay wasn’t able to stick around for the decision, but the two remaining panelists conclude that there are material issues of fact for trial. Accordingly, the Court reverses the district court’s decision granting summary judgment for the government. Judge Lay would be proud.

SECTION 10. JUDICIAL REFORM: Federal Judicial Accountability & Integrity Legislation (a) PREAMBLE The House of Representatives and Senate Assembled find that an inordinate and evergrowing number of complaints of willful misconduct have been lodged with Congress involving federal judges across this nation; that the current Title 28 U.S.C. §372(c) (Judicial Misconduct and Disability Act) is in many cases inadequate because of conflicts of interest in judges judging themselves; that judicial integrity is of major importance and affects all areas of our American society. Be it therefore resolved that the House of Representatives and Senate Assembled hereby enact the following legislation which shall be known as the "Judicial Accountability and Integrity Legislation." (b) DEFINITIONS

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PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS For purposes of this legislation: 1. The term "blocking" shall mean any act that impedes the lawful conclusion of a case, to include unreasonable delay and willful rendering of a void judgment or order. 2. The term "federal judge" or "judge" shall mean any federal justice, judge, magistrate, commissioner, or any person shielded by judicial immunity. 3. The term "Juror" shall mean a Special Federal Grand Juror. 4. The term "strike" shall mean an adverse immunity decision based upon bad behavior as set forth in paragraph (c), or a criminal conviction as set forth in paragraph (r). 5. Where appropriate, the singular shall include the plural. (c) IMMUNITY Notwithstanding common law or any other provision to the contrary, no immunity shall be extended to any federal judge except as is specifically set forth in this statute. Preserving the purpose of protecting judges from frivolous and harassing actions, no immunity shielding a federal judge shall be construed to extend to any deliberate violation of law, fraud or conspiracy, intentional violation of due process of law, deliberate disregard of material facts, judicial acts without jurisdiction, blocking of a lawful conclusion of a case, or any deliberate violation of the Constitution of these United States, all violations of which shall constitute bad behavior. (d) SPECIAL FEDERAL GRAND JURY There is hereby created within the District of Columbia a twenty-five member Special Federal Grand Jury with full federal geographical jurisdiction, having power to judge on both law and fact. Their responsibility shall be limited to determining, on an objective standard, whether a civil suit against a federal judge would be frivolous and harassing or fall within the exclusions of immunity as set forth herein, and whether there is probable cause of criminal conduct by the federal judge complained of. (e) PROFESSIONAL COUNSEL The Special Federal Grand Jury shall have exclusive power to retain non-governmental advisors, special prosecutors, and investigators, as needed, who shall serve no longer than two years, after which term said officers shall be ineligible. However, with permission of the Special Federal Grand Jury, a special prosecutor may prosecute their current cases through all appeals and any applicable complaints to the Special Federal Grand Jury. (f) ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL FEDERAL GRAND JURY SEAT A Special Federal Grand Jury seat is hereby created, which seat shall be located in excess of one mile of any federal judicial body. (g) FILING FEES Attorneys representing a client filing a civil complaint or answer before the Special Federal Grand Jury, shall at the time of filing pay a fee equal to the filing fee due in a civil appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Individuals filing a civil complaint or answer before the Special Federal Grand Jury in their own behalf as a matter of right, shall, at the time of filing, post a fee of one hundred dollars, or file a declaration, which shall remain confidential, stating they are impoverished and unable to pay and/or object to such fee. 54

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (h) ANNUAL FUNDING Should this statute lack sufficient funding through its filing fees under paragraph (g) and fines imposed under paragraph (q), which amount shall be deposited regularly into the exclusive trust account created by this statute in paragraph (j) for its operational expenses, Congress may impose appropriate surcharges upon the civil court filing fees of corporate litigants as necessary to make this statute self-supporting, or they may appropriate any and all necessary funds for the full implementation of this statute by legislation. (i) COMPENSATION OF JURORS Each Juror shall receive a salary commensurate to fifty percent of a federal district judge prorated according to the number of days actually served. (j) ANNUAL BUDGET The Special Federal Grand Jury shall have an annual operating budget commensurate to twenty times the combined salaries of the twenty-five Jurors serving full time, which sum shall be initially deposited by Congress into an exclusive trust account to be annually administered by the Controller. Should the trust balance within any budget year drop to less than an amount equivalent to the annual gross salaries of fifty federal district judges, the Controller shall so notify Congress, which shall replenish the account, prorated based on actual average expenditures during the budget year. Should the trust balance in any subsequent year exceed the annual operational budget at the beginning of a new budget year, the Controller shall return such excess to the United States Treasury. (k) JURISDICTION The Special Federal Grand Jury shall have exclusive power to establish rules assuring their attendance, to provide internal discipline, and to remove any of its members on grounds of misconduct. The Special Federal Grand Jury shall immediately assign a docket number to each complaint brought before it. Except as provided in paragraph (r), no complaint of judicial misconduct shall be considered by the Special Federal Grand Jury unless the complainant shall have first attempted to exhaust all judicial remedies available in the federal courts within the immediately preceding six-month period. Such six-month period, however, shall not commence in complaints of prior fraud or blocking of a lawful conclusion until after the date the Special Federal Grand Jury becomes functional. This provision is intended to apply remedially and retroactively. (l) QUALIFICATIONS OF JURORS A Juror shall have attained to the age of thirty years, and have been nine years a citizen of the United States, and an inhabitant of Washington, D.C. Those not eligible for Special Federal Grand Jury service shall include elected and appointed officials, members of the Bar, judges (active or retired), judicial, prosecutorial and law enforcement personnel, without other exclusion except previous adjudication of mental incapacity, imprisonment, or parole from a conviction of a felonious crime against persons. (m) SELECTION OF JURORS The Jurors shall serve without compulsion and shall be drawn by public lot by the Secretary of State from names on voters' rolls and any citizen submitting his/her name to the Secretary of State for such drawing. (n) SERVICE OF JURORS Excluding the establishment of the initial Special Federal Grand Jury, each Juror shall serve one year. No Juror shall serve more than once. On the first day of each month, two 55

PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS persons shall be rotated off the Special Federal Grand Jury and new citizens seated, except in January it shall be three. Vacancies shall be filled on the first of the following month in addition to the Jurors regularly rotated, and the Juror chosen to fill a vacancy shall complete only the remainder of the term of the Juror replaced. (o) PROCEDURES The Special Federal Grand Jury shall serve a copy of the filed complaint upon the subject judge and notice to the complainant of such service. The judge shall have thirty days to serve and file an answer. The complainant shall have twenty days to reply to the judge's answer. (Upon timely request, the Special Federal Grand Jury may provide for extensions for good cause.) The Special Federal Grand Jury shall have power to subpoena witnesses, documents, and other tangible evidence, and to examine witnesses under oath. The Special Federal Grand Jury shall determine the causes properly before it with their reasoned findings in writing within one hundred twenty (120) calendar days, serving on all parties their decision on whether immunity shall be barred as a defense to any civil action that may thereafter be pursued against the federal judge. A rehearing may be requested of the Special Federal Grand Jury within twenty days with service upon the opposition. Twenty days shall be allowed to reply thereto. Thereafter, the Special Federal Grand Jury shall render final determination within thirty days. All allegations of the complaint shall be liberally construed in favor of the complainant. The Jurors shall keep in mind, in making their decisions, that they are entrusted by the people of these United States with the duty of restoring a perception of justice and accountability of the federal judiciary, and are not to be swayed by artful presentation by the federal judge. They shall avoid all influence by judicial and government entities. The statute of limitations on any civil suit brought pursuant to this statute against a federal judge shall not commence until the rendering of a final decision by the Special Federal Grand Jury. Special Federal Grand Jury files shall always remain public record following their final determination. A majority of thirteen shall determine any matter. (p) REMOVAL Whenever any federal judge shall have received more than three strikes, the federal judge shall automatically be brought up on charges before Congress for Articles of Impeachment by the Special Federal Grand Jury through its special prosecutor for bad behavior and willful misconduct. Congress thereafter shall commence to a vote on such Articles of Impeachment. Upon a conviction, the federal judge shall be permanently removed from office. He may also be held liable under any other appropriate criminal or civil proceeding. (q) INDICTMENT Should the Special Federal Grand Jury also find probable cause of criminal conduct on the part of any federal judge against whom a complaint is docketed, it shall have the power to indict such federal judge except where double jeopardy attaches. The Special Federal Grand Jury shall, without voir dire beyond personal relationship, cause to be impaneled special trial jurors, plus alternates, which trial jurors shall be instructed that they have power to judge both law and fact. The Special Federal Grand Jury shall also select a nongovernmental special prosecutor and a federal judge with no more than four years on the bench from a state other than that of the defendant judge (or outside of the District of Columbia, if the case so be). The trial jury shall be selected from the same pool of jury candidates as any regular federal jury. The special prosecutor shall thereafter prosecute the cause to a conclusion, having all the powers of any other prosecutor within these United States. Upon conviction, the special trial jury shall have exclusive power of sentencing

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PART 4. CORRUPTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (limited to incarceration, fines and/or community service), which shall be derived by an average of the sentences of the trial jurors. (r) CRIMINAL PROCEDURES. In addition to any other provisions of this statute, a complaint for criminal conduct of a federal judge may be brought directly to the Special Federal Grand Jury upon all the following prerequisites: (1) an affidavit of criminal conduct has been lodged with the appropriate prosecutorial entity within ninety (90) days of the commission of the alleged conduct; (2) the prosecutor declines to prosecute, or one hundred twenty (120) days has passed following the lodging of such affidavit and prosecution has not commenced; (3) an indictment, if sought, has not been specifically declined on the merits by a Grand Jury; and (4) the criminal statute of limitations has not run. Any criminal conviction (including a plea bargain) under any judicial process shall constitute a strike. (s) PUBLIC INDEMNIFICATION No federal judge complained of, or sued civilly by a complainant pursuant to this statute, shall be defended at public expense or by any elected or appointed public counsel, nor shall any federal judge be reimbursed from public funds for any losses sustained under this statute. (t) REDRESS The provisions of this statute are in addition to other redress that may exist and are not mutually exclusive. (u) PREEMINENCE Preeminence shall be given to this statute in any case of conflict with any other federal statute, case law, or common law to the contrary. The foreperson of the Special Federal Grand Jury shall read, or cause to be read, this statute to the respective Jurors semiannually during the first week of business in January and July.

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PART 5. CORRUPTION IN THE U.S. DEPARTMEN OF JUSTICE

PART 5. CORRUPTION IN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECTION 1. Justice Department Witheld Evidence from the Court OCTOBER 21, 2003.

I filed my RICO Act case for the Second Amendment at the U.S. District Court for DC (No. 03-2160). Alan Burch, Assistant U.S. Attorney from the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Washington, DC (555 4TH ST., NW).

JUNE 2, 2004.

Almost 7.5 months since I filed my case Alan Burch is “Terminated” (word used in the Docket Report) and was replaced by Dennis Barghaan, “Special Attorney” from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Virginia in Alexandria under 28 U.S.C. 515 (out of jurisdiction U.S. Attorney). The Plaintiff alleges that the switch of defense attorneys has a direct bearing on the impending internal release of the Justice Department’s MEMORANDUM OPINION TITLED, WHETHER THE SECOND AMENDMENT SECURES AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT ON AUGUST 24, 2004, just 83 days away. Something had to be done to prevent the Plaintiff from using that Memorandum Opinion as evidence in the District Court. So, the Justice Department brounght in a hatchet man to expedite the dismissal of Plaintiff’s case before the expected release date of the Memorandum Opinion. This implies a conspiracy against the due process rights of the Plaintiff in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241. Plaintiff alleges that the sole purpose for the switch in defense attorneys is to effectively deny the Plaintiff his right to use the Justice Department’s upcoming Memorandum Opinion on the Second Amendment as evidence supporting his case.

JUNE 21, 2004.

Dennis Barghaan filed the Motion to Dismiss just 19 days after replacing Alan Burch. Plaintiff observes that the Department of Justice was going to internally release their Memorandum Opinion on August 24, 2004 which is just 64 days from June 21. Plaintiff has 60 days to respond to the Motion to Dismiss. If Dennis Barghaan had prior knowledge of the Department of Justice’s Memorandum Opinion it is the Appellant’s belief that he had a duty to inform the court of the impended release of this Memorandum Opinion because it had a direct impact upon the case at hand. If Dennis Barghaan did not have prior knowledge then the duty fell upon the Department of Justice to inform Dennis Barghaan of the impending release of the Memorandum Opinion because it was and is admissible evidence affecting the integrity of the governments argument against the Plaintiff/Appellant. The fact that the existence of the Memorandum Opinion was never made known to the District Court or to the DC Circuit or even to the Plaintiff, that the Plaintiff learned of the Memorandum Opinion through his Internet news links implies a deliberate attempt to subvert justice. The Appellant alleges that the timing of Dennis Barghaan’s Motion to Dismiss occurring jut 64 days before the internal release o the Memorandum implies prior knowledge calculated to unjustly defeat Appellant’s case at the District Court. The Appellant further alleges that Dennis Barghaan’s obstructive tactics are meant to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation and Dennis Barghaan’s denials of factual contentions are not warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are not reasonably based on a lack of information or belief because the Appellant has now identified the Memorandum Opinion as admissible evidence and there can be no lack of

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PART 5. CORRUPTION IN THE U.S. DEPARTMEN OF JUSTICE information on the Second Amendment as an individual right because it was the duty of the Justice Department to inform Dennis Barghaan of the Memorandum Opinion. That fact that this was not done implies an intentional violation of Rule 11(b)(1) and Rule 11(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. JULY 12, 2004.

The Justice Department issues a press release stating that Paul D. Clement was will serve as acting Solicitor General.

JULY 15, 2004.

The judge, Reggie B. Walton, denies my Motion for Change of Venue.

AUGUST 10, 2004.

My Objection to Motion to Dismiss filed out of time (because Kinkos lost my emailed Objection due to a virus attack. But Dennis Barghaan in a footnote in his rebuttal did not oppose my filing out of time).

AUGUST 16, 2004.

Dennis Barghaan files his rebuttal to my objection.

AUGUST 16, 2004.

Wasting no time Judge Reggie B. Walton grants Motion to Dismiss just 8 days before the internal release of the Justice Department’s Memorandum Opinion. A job well done by Dennis Barghaan. Does Judge Walton actually read these motions?

AUGUST 24, 2004.

THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WITHHELD EVIDENDCE FROM THE COURT & PLAINTIFF.76 U.S. Department of Justice internally published their Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General John Ashcroft titled, WHETHER THE SECOND AMENDMENT SECURES AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT, August 24, 2004. The Department of Justice did not release the Memorandum Opinion to the public until mid-December 2004, for obvious political gain until well after the presidential election in November. That Memorandum Opinion is documentary evidence, a government record under 28 U.S.C. § 1733 and is admissible as evidence because under Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence the Memorandum Opinion becomes an Opinion on an Ultimate Issue because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. [Rule 406 Habit/Routine Practice]

AUGUST 27, 2004.

Plaintiff filed Notice of Appeal.

AUGUST 27, 2004.

On this date President Bush issues Executive Order 13353 ESTABLISHING THE PRESIDENT’S BOARD ON SAFEGUARDING AMERICANS’ CIVIL LIBERTIES . The Deputy Attorney General James Comey is appointed as Chairman. However, there may exist a conflict of interest with this appointment. In the May 21, 2001 edition of U.S. News & World Report then U.S. Attorney James Comey is reported to have said “To us gun possession itself is a crime of violence” in discussing Virginia’s Project Exile program. James Comey’s position against the Second Amendment as an individual right back then does not exactly square with his appointment to the President’s Board on Safeguarding American Civil Liberties. At best it compares more accurately to a Trojan Horse tactic for an undisclosed agenda.

SEPTEMBER 9, 2004.

Appellant filed his Appellant’s Brief at the DC Circuit.

SEPTEMBER 14, 2004.

Appellant filed MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION BY THE PRESIDENT’S BOARD ON SAFEGUARDING AMERICANS’ CIVIL LIBERTIES AND OTHER THIRD PARTIES & MOTION FOR APPEAL CONFERENCE. The DC Circuit has not yet

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PART 5. CORRUPTION IN THE U.S. DEPARTMEN OF JUSTICE ruled on this motion or any motion for judicial notice of adjudicative facts or presumptions in general that the Plaintiff has filed. Copy of this motion was FedEx’d to the Deputy Attorney General James Comey as Chairman of that civil liberties board. No response has yet been received. This is not a very good track record for the Government on protecting the civil liberties of the American people when the federal courts and the Executive Branch treats a pro se Plaintiff in such a manner.77 OBSERVATION FROM TIMELINE: Assistant U.S. Attorney Alan Burch was almost 7.5 months (225 days) as defense counsel and hadn’t filed the Motion to Dismiss. He was under Ted Olson as Solicitor General. Dennis Barghaan took a fast 2 months, 3 weeks, 4 days (75 days total) to get Judge Reggie B. Walton to dismissed the Plaintiff’s case with prejudice.

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PART 5. CORRUPTION IN THE U.S. DEPARTMEN OF JUSTICE

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PART 6. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS, EX JURE, A HUMAN RIGHT

PART 6. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS, EX JURE, 72 A HUMAN RIGHT SECTION 1. Five Years of Obstructions of Justice forced Don Hamrick into the Role of a Human Rights Defender (1) United Nations DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS: 73 Article 6. Obstruction of Justice. Article 9 The Right to Effective Remedy of Human Rights Violations Article 13. Obstruction of Justice. (2) THE INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION: 74 Article III.1. Abuse of Authority, (Equivalent to 18 U.S.C. § 4. Misprision of Felony). Article III.11. Obstruction of Justice. Article IV. Acts of Corruption (18 U.S.C. § 872 Extortion Under Color of Law) (3) United Nations CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION: 75 Article 11. Measures Relating to the Judiciary and Prosecution Services; Article 19. Abuse of Functions; Article 24. Concealment; Article 25. Obstruction of Justice; Article 27. Participation and Attempt; Article 28. Knowledge, Intent and Purpose as Elements of an Offence; Article 30. Prosecution, Adjudication and Sanctions; Article 32. Protection of . . . Victims; Article 33. Protection of Reporting Persons; Article 34. Consequences of Acts of Corruption ["Citizen's Arrest Warrant"] Article 39. Cooperation Between National Authorities and the Private Sector. (4) INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: 76 Article 14.1. Denial of Equal Justice Under the Law Article 15.1. Threatened False Arrest (As applied against U.S. Marshals Service) Article 16. Denial of Equal Justice Under the Law 72

Latin, By the Law of Nature.

73

DECLARATION ON THE RIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS, GROUPS AND ORGANS OF SOCIETY TO PROMOTE AND PROTECT UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, U.N. General Assembly, Fiftythird session, Agenda item 110 (b); Document No. A/RES/53/144; dated 8 March 1999. Resolution Adopted

by the General Assembly [on the report of the Third Committee (A/53/625/Add.2)] http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/770/89/PDF/N9977089.pdf?OpenElement http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/defenders/declaration.htm 74

THE INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION was signed by the United States and ratified on September 15, 2000 75

The U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION was signed by the United States on December 9, 2003 and ratified on October 30, 2006 76

INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS entered into force internationally on March 23, 1976 and was ratified by the United States on September 8, 1992.

http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm

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PART 6. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS, EX JURE, A HUMAN RIGHT (5) UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 77 Article 6. Denial of Equal Justice Under the Law (Treated as a Nobody). Article 7. Denial of Equal Justice Under the Law (Unrepresented Civil Plaintiff) Article 8. Denial of Effective Remedy. Obstruction of Justice. Article 9. Threatened False Arrest (As applied against U.S. Marshals Service) Article 10. Wrongfully Denied a Jury Trial (Violation of my Seventh Amendment) (6) AMERICAN DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MAN: 78 Article II. Denial of Equal Justice Under the Law Article XVIII. Denial of a Fair Civil Trial (Seventh Amendment) Article XXIV. Denial of Right to Petition for Redress (First Amndment) Article XXVI. Denial of Due Process Rights (Fifth & Fourteenth Amendments)

SECTION 2. Don Hamrick Acting in the Capacity of a Private Attorney General Because Don Hamrick, as an unrepresented civil plaintiff, employed the civil RICO Act against named individuals of the U.S. Government he lawfully acted in the capacity of a PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL.

SECTION 3. Don Hamrick Acting in the Capacity of a Human Rights Defender. 79 z (1) The INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS has accepted Petition No. 1490-05 from Jessica Gonzales (now Jessica Lenahan), a human rights complaint against the United States over the doctrine of no constitutional right to police protection (Report No. 52/07 dated July 24, 2007). In ¶ 1 of Section I. Summary in the above Report No. 52/07: The petition was presented on behalf of Ms. Jessica Gonzales (Lenahan), a U.S. national who claims that the police failed to respond to her repeated and urgent calls over several hours informing that her estranged husband had taken their three minor daughters (ages 7, 8 and 10) in violation of a restraining order issued against him, which resulted in their death. The United States Supreme Court allegedly validated the law enforcement officials’ conduct, by holding that Ms. Gonzales was not entitled under the United States Constitution to have the restraining order enforced by the police. z (2) Don Hamrick has a human rights complaint against the United States pending at the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, Petition No. 1142-06. z (3) Jessica Lenahan’s human rights petition opens the door for Don Hamrick’s petition not only for the same denial of justice in the federal courts but also for the “Human Right of Self Defense” and the 77

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ratified by the United States on December 10, 1948. http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html

78

AMERICAN DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MAN, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the InterAmerican System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992). http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas2dec.htm 79

U.N. General Assembly, DECLARATION ON THE RIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS, GROUPS AND ORGANS OF SOCIETY TO PROMOTE AND PROTECT UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS; Fiftythird session, Agenda item 110 (b); Document No. A/RES/53/144, dated 8 March 1999

64

PART 6. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS, EX JURE, A HUMAN RIGHT “Human Right to Own, Possess, and Bear Arms for the Personal Protection, Safety and Security” of not only the “Human Right to Life” but also to preserve freedoms and liberties under our form a government in accordance with the GENOCIDE CONVENTION to counter Jessica Gonzales’ case of “No Constitutional Right to Police Protection.” z (4) In ¶ 60 of the above Robert the Commission concluded that it has the competence to examine the Petitioners’ allegations, and that the petition is admissible for the alleged violations of Articles I, II, V, VI, VII, XVIII and XXIV of the [AMERICAN DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MAN] and in accordance with the Commission’s Rules of Procedure. Article I.

Every human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his person.

Article II. All persons are equal before the law and have the rights and duties established in this Declaration, without distinction as to race, sex, language, creed or any other factor. Article V. Every person has the right to the protection of the law against abusive attacks upon his honor, his reputation, and his private and family life. Article VI. Every person has the right to establish a family, the basic element of society, and to receive protection therefor. Article VII. All women, during pregnancy and the nursing period, and all children have the right to special protection, care and aid. Article XVIII. Every person may resort to the courts to ensure respect for his legal rights. There should likewise be available to him a simple, brief procedure whereby the courts will protect him from acts of authority that, to his prejudice, violate any fundamental constitutional rights. Article XXIV. Every person has the right to submit respectful petitions to any competent authority, for reasons of either general or private interest, and the right to obtain a prompt decision thereon.

z (5) Don Hamrick’s human rights petition is based on two additional Articles of the AMERICAN DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MAN to that of Jessica Gonzales’ Petition. These additional two Articles are: Article II.

All persons are equal before the law and have the rights and duties established in this Declaration, without distinction as to race, sex, language, creed or any other factor.

Article XVII.

Every person has the right to be recognized everywhere as a person having rights and obligations, and to enjoy the basic civil rights.

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PART 6. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS, EX JURE, A HUMAN RIGHT SECTION 4: United Nations Charter: Article 51 Inherent Right of Self-Defense Extends to the Right of Personal Self-Defense. Article 51 of United Nations Charter (citing against from THE HUMAN RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE) affirms “the inherent right” of self-defense. 80 Frey accurately states that Article 51 is directly concerned with the defense of states, and not of individuals. 81 We agree. But what Frey elides is that the right of national self-defense is the child of the right of personal self-defense—as we detailed supra. 82 Notably, the U.N. Charter does not purport to grant states a right of self-defense. The charter simply recognizes an “inherent” right. In the French text of the U.N. charter, it is a “droit naturel” (natural right or natural law). As Yoram Dinstein observes, “The choice of words has overtones of jus naturale, which appears to be the fount of the right to self-defense.” 83 (“Jus naturale” is Latin for “natural law”; as discussed above, jus naturale included a strong right of personal defense. 84 ) Given the U.N. Charter’s choice of language which explicitly invoked natural right, it was not surprising that the International Court of Justice wrote: “The Court therefore finds that Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a ‘natural’ or ‘inherent’ right of self-defense….” 85 Elucidating Article 51, Dinstein writes: “The legal notion of self-defence has its roots in inter-personal relations, and is sanctified in domestic legal systems since time immemorial. From the dawn of inter-State relations, writers sought to apply this concept to inter-State relations, particularly in connection with the just war doctrine.” 86 If one explicitly recognizes the existence of the child, then one can scarcely deny the implication that a parent exists. “I admit that there was a person named Martin Luther King, Jr., but I deny the existence of Martin Luther King, Sr.” The previous sentence is illogical—and so is Frey’s claim that the explicit recognition of the natural, inherent right of national self-defense in Article 51 can be reconciled with the denial of the natural, inherent right of personal self-defense.

80

See also General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (“Kellogg-Briand Pact”) 94 L.N.R.S. 57 (1928); 22 AM. J. INT’L L. 109-13 (formal notes exchanged between the signatories, reserving the right to selfdefense).

81

Frey Report at 13, para. 39 (“ Article 51 was not intended to apply to situations of self-defence for individual persons.”) 82

See David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant, and Joanne D. Eisen, titled, THE HUMAN RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE.

83

DINSTEIN, at 179. Dinstein goes on to reject the overtone, because he rejects the whole concept of natural law, for reasons detailed supra at text accompanying notes .

84

See supra text accompanying notes – (natural law and the classical founding scholars of international law), and – (Roman law jus naturale).

85

Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States), 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 94, para. 176.

86

DINSTEIN, at 176; see also M. A Weightman, Self-Defense in International Law , 37 VIR. L. R EV. 1095, 1099-1102 (1951).

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PART 6. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS, EX JURE, A HUMAN RIGHT SECTION 5. Other Constitutions: Human Rights are Created by God. Not by Government. z Footnote 263 in David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant, and Joanne D. Eisen, titled, THE HUMAN RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE notes that human rights are included in the constitutions of 16 nations: The constitutions of at least sixteen nations explicitly affirm that human rights are inherent (or “natural” or created by God); they affirm human rights are recognized by governments, but not created by governments. 87

87

Afghanistan Const., art. 23,

“Life is a gift of God and a natural right of human beings.”

Andorra Const., art. 4

“The Constitution reco gnizes the intangibility of the human dignity and guarantees the person’s inviolable and imprescriptible rights….”

Azerbaijan Const., art. 24

“Everyone…possess inviolable and inalienable rights and liberties.”

Belive Const., pmbl.

“inalienable rights with which all members of the human family are endowed by their Creator….”

Egypt Const., art. 41

“Individual freedom is a natural right not subject to violation….”

Ethiopia Const., art. 10

“Human rights and freedoms, emanating from the nature of mankind, are inviolable and inalienable.”

Liberia Const., art. 11,

“All persons…have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights….”

Lithuania Const., art. 18

“The rights and freedoms of individuals shall be inborn.”

Luxembourg Const., art. 11

“The State guarantees the natural rights of the individual….”

Paraguay Const., art. 4

“The right to the life is inherent to the human person.”

Saint Lucia Const., Part II, sched. III, b

“ all persons have been endowed equally by God with inalienable rights….”

Saudi Arabia Const., art. 26

“The state protects human rights in accordance with the Islamic Shari’ah.”

Spain Const., art. 10

“inviolable rights which are inherent….”

Syria const., art. 25

“Freedom is a sacred right.”

Trinidad & Tobago Const., pmbl.

“the equal and inalienable rights with which all members of the human family are endowed by their Creator….”

Turkey Const., art. 12

“Everyone possesses inherent fundamental rights….”

SELF-DEFENSE. The following list is from footnote 263 of SELF-DEFENSE.

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PART 6. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS, EX JURE, A HUMAN RIGHT SECTION 6: Other Constitutions: Personal Self-Defense The International Court of Justice is instructed to use as a source of law “the general principles” from the laws of “civilized nations.” 88 Without arguing about what nations currently count as “uncivilized”, we note that personal self-defense is part of the law of every legal system in the world today. 89 In addition, many nations have constitutionalized self-defense, in a variety of forms. Before surveying the constitutions, we must acknowledge that around the world, many constitutional rights are honored only in the breach. For example, the constitution of Zimbabwe guarantees the right of free assembly 90 but all forms of dissent are ruthlessly suppressed. Recently, opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai was badly beaten by the government. 91 In Kenya, the constitution is clear: “No person shall be deprived of his life save in execution of the sentence of a court….” 92 However, shoot-to-kill orders were recently issued to police who executed the orders with a series of extrajudicial killings. 93 Even so, the expression of a standard in a national constitution is a signal of the importance of that standard in the national and international community, such that even governments which do not obey the standard feel compelled to assert that they do. 94 From Antigua to Nigeria to Zimbabwe, there are thirteen nations which use nearlyidentical language to constitutionalize self-defense: ‹ Antigua & Barbuda, CONST, art. 4: 1. No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a crime of treason or murder of which he has been convicted. 2. A person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life in contravention of this section if he dies as the result of the use, to such extent and such circumstances as are permitted by law, of such force as is reasonably justifiable a. for the defence of any person from violence or for the defence of property;

88

Supra.

89

See Schlomit Wallerstein, Justifying the Right to Self-Defense: A Theory of Forced Consequences , 91 VA. L. REV. 999, 999 (2005) (“the right to self-defense is recognized in all jurisdictions”).

90

ZIMBABWE const. Ch. III, art. 21 (1) (“no person shall be hindered in his freedom of assembly and association… and in particular to form or belong to political parties…”). 91

See Tsvangirai Held in Intensive Care , BBC News, Mar. 14, 2007. Concerning breach of Zimbabwe’s guarantees (“Zimbabwean opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai is being treated in an intensive care unit as doctors examine wounds he received in police custody…. He and dozens of other activists were arrested at a rally on Sunday.”) 92

KENYA CONST., ch. 5, art. 71(1).

93

See Cyrus Ombati, Govt Burns 8,000 Guns As Minister Orders Police to Kill Thugs , THE EAST AFRICAN STANDARD (Nairobi), Mar. 16, 2007. (Internal Security minister John Michuki stated: “An illegal weapon in the hands of a criminal has no other purpose except to kill an innocent person. It is, therefore, justifiable for the law enforcers to take equal measure against such a person.”). 94

“Hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue.” François, Duke of La Rochefoucauld. “If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than weaken the rule.” Nicaragua v. United States, at 98.

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PART 6. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS, EX JURE, A HUMAN RIGHT b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; c. for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny; or d. in order lawfully to prevent the commission by that person of a criminal offence, or if he dies as the result of a lawful act of war. ‹ the Bahamas, CONST., art. 16. ‹ Barbados, CONST., art. 12. ‹ Belize, CONST., art. 4. ‹ Grenada, CONST., art 2. ‹ Guyana, CONST., art. 138. ‹ Jamaica, CONST., art. 14. ‹ Malta, CONST., § 33. ‹ Nigeria, CONST., art. 33. ‹ St. Kitts & Nevis, CONST., art. 4. ‹ Saint Lucia, CONST., art. 2. ‹ Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, CONST., art. 2. ‹ Zimbabwe. CONST., art. 12: (1) No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence of which he has been convicted. (2) A person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life in contravention of subsection (1) if he dies as the result of the use, to such extent and in such circumstances as are permitted by law, of such force as is reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of the case (a) for the defence of any person from violence or for the defence of property; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny or of dispersing an unlawful gathering; or (d) in order to prevent the commission by that person of a criminal offence; or if he dies as the result of a lawful act of war. (3) It shall be sufficient justification for the purposes of subsection (2) in any case to which that subsection applies if it is shown that the force used did not exceed that which might lawfully have been used in the circumstances of that case under the law in force immediately before the appointed day. ‹ Slovakia uses a variation of the formula, CONST., art. 15: (1) Everyone has the right to life. Human life is worthy of protection even prior to birth. (2) No one must be deprived of life. (3) Capital punishment is not permitted. (4) If someone was deprived of life as a result of an action that does not represent a criminal act, this does not constitute a violation of rights according to this Article.

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PART 6. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS, EX JURE, A HUMAN RIGHT SECTION 7: Other Constitutions: Self-Defense Against Tyranny As Grotius, Pufendorf, and many other legal and moral philosophers have elaborated, selfdefense against tyranny is just a larger application of self-defense against a lone criminal. Many nations have constitutionalized the right of self-defense against tyrants. In five countries, the constitutionalization is framed as a constitutional intention to assist the liberation of other nations from tyranny: Algeria Const., art. 27:

“Algeria associates itself with all the peoples fighting for their political and economic liberation, for the right of self determination and against any racial discrimination.” Art: 33: “Individual or associative defense of the fundamental human rights and individual and collective liberties is guaranteed.”

Angola Const., art. 16:

“The Republic of Angola shall support and be in solidarity with the struggles of peoples for national liberation and shall establish relations of friendship and cooperation with all democratic forces in the world.”

Cuba Const., art. 12 :

The Republic of Cuba espouses the principles of anti-imperialism and internationalism, and (h) considers wars of aggression and of conquest international crimes; recognizes the legitimacy of the struggle for national liberation, as well as of armed resistance to aggression; and considers that its solidarity with those under attack and with the peoples that struggle for their liberation and self-determination constitutes its internationalist duty;

Portugal Const., art. 7(3):

“Portugal recognizes the right of peoples to revolt against all forms of oppression, in particular colonialism and imperialism.”

Suriname Const., art 7.

1. The Republic of Suriname recognizes and respects the right of nations to self determination and national independence on the basis of equality, sovereignty and mutual benefit…. 4. The Republic of Suriname promotes the solidarity and collaboration with other peoples in the combat against colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, genocide and in the combat for national liberation, peace and social progress.

SECTION 8: Other Constitutions: Right and Duty of Citizens to Resist or Revolt Against Domestic or Foreign Tyranny In thirteen nations, the constitution affirms a right and duty of citizens to resist or revolt against domestic or foreign tyranny:

95

Andorra Const., article 5:

“The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is binding in Andorra.” 95

Argentina Const. 96 , § 36:

(1) This Constitution shall rule even when its observance is interrupted by acts of force against the institutional order and the democratic system. These acts shall be irreparably null.

Original in Spanish. Translated by Altavista Babel Fish Translation online. http://babelfish.altavista.com/tr

The Universal Declaration affirms the right of violent resistance to tyranny, so the incorporation of the Universal Declaration into a national constitution thereby incorporates the rightfulness of resisting tyranny. (Kopel, et al) 96

Section (2), (5), and (6) omitted in Kopel, et al, THE HUMAN RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE. Section (2), (5), and (6), in their operation is the parallel function of the “Common Defence” clause in the Preamble to the United States Constitution and the Powers reserved to the People in the Tenth Amendment of the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution.

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PART 6. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS, EX JURE, A HUMAN RIGHT (2) Their authors shall be punished with the penalty foreseen in Section 29, disqualified in perpetuity from holding public offices and excluded from the benefits of pardon and commutation of sentences. (3) Those who, as a consequence of these acts, were to assume the powers foreseen for the authorities of this Constitution or for those of the provinces, shall be punished with the same penalties and shall be civil and criminally liable for their acts. The respective actions shall not be subject to prescription. (4) All citizens shall have the right to oppose resistance to those committing the acts of force stated in this section. (5) He who, procuring personal enrichment, incurs in serious fraudulent offense against the Nation shall also attempt against the democratic system, and shall be disqualified to hold public office for the term specified by law. (6) Congress shall enact a law on public ethics which shall rule the exercise of public office.

97 98

Congo Const., article 17:

“Any citizen may oppose the execution of an order received when it touches the rights and liberties contained in the present Constitution.”

Greece Const., art. 120(4)

“Observance of the Constitution shall be committed to the patriotism of the Greeks who shall have the right and the obligation to resist by any means anybody who tries to subvert it violently.”

Guatemala Const., art. 45:

Action against violators and legitimacy of resistance. The action to judge the violators of the human rights is public and can be exerted by means of simple denunciation, without caution nor some formality. The resistance of the town for the protection and defense of the rights and guarantees briefed in the Constitution is legitimate. 97

Honduras Const., art. 3:

Nobody must be obedient to an usurping government nor to those who assume functions or uses public by the force of the average arms or using procedures that break or do not know what this Constitution and the laws establish. The acts verified by such authorities are null. the town must right to resort to the insurrection in defense of the constitutional order. 98

Hungary Const., art. 2(3):

“No activity of any person may be directed at the forcible acquisition or exercise of public power, nor at the exclusive possession of such power. Everyone has the right and obligation to resist such activities in such ways as permitted by law.”

Lithuana Const. art. 3:

“(1) No one may limit or restrict the sovereignty of the People or make claims to the sovereign powers of the People. (2) The People and each citizen shall have the right to oppose anyone who encroaches on the independence, territorial integrity, or constitutional order of the State of Lithuania by force.”

Mauritania Const., pmbl.:

Trusting in the omnipotence of Allah, the Mauritanian people proclaims its will to guarantee the integrity of its territory, its independence, and its national unity and to take upon itself its free political economic and social development. Believing strongly in its spiritual values and in the spreading of its civilization “it also

Original in Spanish. Translated by Altavista Babel Fish Translation online. http://babelfish.altavista.com/tr Id.

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PART 6. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS, EX JURE, A HUMAN RIGHT solemnly proclaims its attachment to Islam and to the principles of democracy as they have been defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 Dec 1948 and by the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights of 28 June 1981 as well as in the other international conventions which Mauritania has signed.” Judging that liberty, equality, and the dignity of Man may be assured only in a society which establishes the primacy of law, taking care to create the durable conditions for a harmonious social development respectful of the precepts of Islam, the sole source of law, but responsive as well to the exigencies of the modern world, the Mauritanian people proclaims in particular the inalienable guarantee of the following rights and principles: - the right to equality; - the fundamental freedoms and rights of human beings; - the right of property; - political freedom and freedom of labor unions; - economic and social rights; and - the rights attached to the family, the basic unit of Islamic society. Conscious of the necessity of strengthening its ties with brother peoples, the Mauritanian people, a Muslim, African, and Arab people, proclaims that it will work for the achievement of the unity of the Greater Maghreb of the Arab Nation and of Africa and for the consolidation of peace in the world. (incorporating right of resistance articulated in the Universal Declaration and the African Charter. See supra text accompanying notes - , - .). 99 Peru Const. art. 46:

“Nobody have to be obedient to an usurping government, nor to those who they assume public functions in violation of the Constitution and the laws. The civil populace has the right of insurgency in defense of the constitutional order. The acts are null of those who usurp public functions.” 100

Portugal Const., art. 21:

“Everyone has the right to resist any order that infringes his rights, freedoms, or safeguards and to repel by force any form of aggression when recourse to public authority is impossible…” See also id., at __ (Portuguese constitution shall be construed “in accordance with the Universal Declaration of human rights.”; as discussed at note __, supra, the Universal Declaration recognizes the right of violent selfdefense against tyranny.)

Romania const., art 20

(1) Constitutional provisions concerning the citizens’ rights and liberties shall be interpreted and enforced in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with the covenants and other treaties Romania is a party to. (2) Where inconsistencies exist between the covenants and treaties on fundamental human rights Romania is a party to and internal laws, the international regulations shall take precedence. (incorporating right of resistance articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

99

Italics parts omitted in original. Translated by Altavista Babel Fish Translation online. http://babelfish.altavista.com/tr

100

Spanish in original. Translated by Altavista Babel Fish Translation online. http://babelfish.altavista.com/tr

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PART 6. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS, EX JURE, A HUMAN RIGHT Slovakia Const., art. 32:

“Citizens have the right to put up resistance to anyone who would eliminate the democratic order of human rights and basic liberties listed in this Constitution, if the activity of constitutional bodies and the effective use of legal means are rendered impossible.”

SECTION 9: Other Constitutions: Security against home invasion Finally, a very common item in constitutions which include a Bill of Rights is the right to security against home invasion. Sometimes—as in the United States’ Fourth Amendment [U.S. CONST., amend. 4.]—the right is stated in terms that apply only to home invasions by the government. Very frequently, however, the right is stated in terms which are not limited to government actors. Afghanistan Const., art. 38.1-2:

“Other than the situations and methods indicated in the law, no one, including the state, is allowed to enter or inspect a private residence without prior permission of the resident or holding a court order.”

Andorra Const., art. 14:

“Inviolability of the dwelling shall be guaranteed. No one shall enter a dwelling or any other premises against the will of the owner or without a warrant, except in case of flagrant delicto.”

Angola Const., art. 44:

“The State shall guarantee the inviolability of the home and the secrecy of correspondence, with limitations especially provided for by law.”

Antigua & Barbuda., ch. 2(3)(c):

“protection for his family life, his personal privacy, the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without fair compensation,…”

Armenia Const., art. 21:

“Everyone is entitled to privacy in his or her own dwelling. It is prohibited to enter a person's dwelling against his or her own will except under cases prescribed by law.”

Azerbaijan Const., art. 33.1-2:

“Everyone has the right for sanctity of his/her home. Except cases specified by law or decision of law court nobody has the right to enter private home against the will of its inhabitants.”

Bahamas Const., ch. 3.15(c):

“protection for the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation…”

Belarus Const., art. 29:

“The right of the people to be secure in their houses and other legitimate effects shall be guaranteed. No person shall have the right, save in due course of law to enter the premises or other legal property of a citizen against one's will.”

Belgium Const., art. 15

“The domicile is inviolable; no visit to the individual's residence can take place except in the cases provided for by law and in the form prescribed by law.”

Belize Const., art. II.9.1

“Except with his own consent, a person shall not be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises.”

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PART 6. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS, EX JURE, A HUMAN RIGHT Benin Const., art. 20:

“The domicile shall be inviolable. House visits or searches may be carried out only according to the forms and conditions provided by law.” 101

Bolivia Const., art. 21:

“All house is an asylum inviolable; at night it will not be possible to be entered her without consent of which it inhabits it and by day only the entrance to requisition written and motivated of competent authority will be crossed, except for the case of crime ‘in fragantí.’ ” 102

Brazil Const., art. 5:

XI - the home is the inviolable refuge of the individual, and no one may enter therein without the consent of the dweller, except in the events of flagrante delicto 103 or disaster, or to give help, or, during the day, by court order; 104

Bulgaria Const., art. 33.1-2

“The home is inviolable. No one shall enter or stay inside a home without its occupant's consent, except in the cases expressly stipulated by law. Entering a home or staying inside without the consent of its occupant or without the judicial authorities’ permission shall be allowed only for the purposes of preventing an immediately impending crime or a crime in progress, for the capture of a criminal, or in extreme necessity.”

Burkina Faso Const., art. 6:

“The residence, the domicile, private and family life, secrecy of correspondence of every person are inviolable. It can only be affected according to the forms and in the cases specified by the law.” 105

Burundi Const., art. [43]: 106

“No one cannot be the subject of interference arbitrary in its private life, its family, her residence or its correspondence, nor of attacks to its honor and its reputation. It can be ordered searchings or house searches only under the forms and the conditions envisaged by the law.” 107

Cambodia Const., art. 40:

“The right to privacy of residence and to the secrecy of correspondence by mail, telegram, fax, telex and telephone shall be guaranteed.”

101

Original in Spanish. English version found online at: http://www.chr.up.ac.za/hr_docs/constitutions/docs/BeninC(englishsummary)(rev).doc

102

Original in Spanish. Translated by Altavista Babel Fish Translation online. http://babelfish.altavista.com/tr Translation of “in fragantí” not readily available.

103

“being caught in the act” Latin.

104

Original in Spanish. English version found online at http://www.v-brazil.com/government/laws/titleII.html

105

Original in Spanish. English version found online at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/hr_docs/constitutions/docs/Burkina%20FasoC%20(englishsummary)(rev).doc

106

Art. 23 in original. There correct article number corresponding to the text indicates “article 43” not “23.”

107

Original in French. English version online at http://www.idlo.int/texts/leg5567.pdf

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PART 6. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS, EX JURE, A HUMAN RIGHT China Const., art 39.

“The home of citizens of the People’s Republic of China is inviolable. Unlawful search of, or intrusion into, a citizen’s home is prohibited.”

Cuba Const., art. 56:

“The home is inviolable. Nobody can enter the home of another against his will, except in those cases foreseen by law.”

Domican Republic Const.:

art. 8.3 “The inviolability of the home. No home visit can be verified but in the cases anticipated by the law and with the formalities that it prescribes.” 108

Egypt Const., art. 44

“Homes shall have their sanctity and they may not be entered or inspected except by a causal judicial warrant as prescribed by the law.”

El Salavador Const., art. 20:

“The home is inviolable and it will only be able to be entered by consent of the person who inhabits it, by judicial mandate, flagrant crime or imminent danger of its perpetration, or by serious risk of the people.” 109

Eritrea Const., art. 18(2):

“No person shall be subjected to unlawful search, including his home or other property; there shall be no unlawful entry of his premises and no unlawful seizure of his personal possessions; nor shall the privacy of his correspondence, communication or other property be violated.

Estonia Const., art. 33:

“The home is inviolable. No one may forcibly enter or search anyone’s dwelling, property or place of work, except in such cases and in accordance with procedures determined by law for the protection of public order or health, or the rights and liberties of others, or in order to prevent a criminal act, to capture a criminal offender or to establish facts in a criminal investigation.”

Ethiopia Const., art. 26.1:

“Everyone has the right to privacy. This right shall include the right not to be subjected to searches of his home, person or property, or the seizure of any property under his personal possession.”

Germany Const. (Grundgesetz), art. 13.1: “The home is inviolable.”

108 109 110

Grenada Const., ch. 1.7:

“Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises.”

Guatemala Const., art. 23:

“Inviolability of the house. The house is inviolable. Nobody will be able to penetrate in other people's dwelling without permission of that inhabits it, safe by written order of competent judge in which never specifies the reason for the diligence and before the six nor after the eighteen hours, Such diligence will be always made in the presence of the interested one, or of its agent chief executive.” 110

Original in Spanish. Translated by Altavista Babel Fish Translation online. http://babelfish.altavista.com/tr Ib. Ib.

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PART 6. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS, EX JURE, A HUMAN RIGHT

111

Guyana Const., art. 40.1(c):

“protection for the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation.”

Honduras Const., art. 99:

“The home is inviolable. No entrance or registry will be able to be verified without consent of the person who inhabits it or resolution of competent authority. However, it can be levelled off, in case of urgency, to prevent the commission or impunity of crimes or to avoid serious damages to the person or the property.” 111

Hong Kong Const., art. 29:

“The homes and other premises of Hong Kong residents shall be inviolable. Arbitrary or unlawful search of, or intrusion into, a resident's home or other premises shall be prohibited.”

Ireland Const., art. 40.5:

“The dwelling of every citizen is inviolable and shall not be forcibly entered save in accordance with law.”

Iran Const., art. 22:

“The dignity, life, property, rights, residence, and occupation of the individual are inviolate, except in cases sanctioned by law.”

Italy Const., art. 14:

“(1) Personal domicile is inviolable. (2) No one’s domicile may be inspected, searched, or seized save in cases and in the manner laid down by law conforming to the guarantee of personal liberty.”

Jamaica Const., art. 19.1:

“Except with his own consent, no person shall be subject to the search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises.”

Jordan Const., art. 10:

“Dwelling houses shall be inviolable and shall not be entered except in the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by law.”

Kuwait Const., art. 38:

“Places of residence shall be inviolable. They may not be entered without the permission of their occupants except in the circumstances and manner specified by law.”

Latvia Const., art. 96:

“Everyone has the right to inviolability of their private life, home and correspondence.”

Lebanon Const., art. 14:

“The citizen's place of residence is inviolable. No one may enter it except in the circumstances and manners prescribed by law.”

Liberia Const., art. 16:

“No person shall be subjected to interference with his privacy of person, family, home or correspondence except by order of a court of competent jurisdiction.”

Libya Const., art. 12:

“The home is inviolable and shall not be entered or searched except under the circumstances and conditions defined by the law.”; art. 24.1: “A person’s dwelling place shall be inviolable.”

Luxembourg Const., art. 15:

“The home is inviolable. No domiciliary visit may be made except in cases and according to the procedure laid down by the law.”

Original in Spanish. Translated by Altavista Babel Fish Translation online. http://babelfish.altavista.com/tr

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PART 6. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS, EX JURE, A HUMAN RIGHT Macedonia Const., art. 26.1:

“The inviolability of the home is guaranteed.”

Madagascar Const., art. 13.1:

“Everyone shall be assured of protection of his person, his residence, and his correspondence.”

Mongolia Const., art. 16.13:

“Privacy of citizens, their families, correspondence, and homes are protected by law.”

Nepal Const., art. 22:

“Except as provided by law, the privacy of the person, house, property, document, correspondence or information of anyone is inviolable.”

Nicaragua Const., art. 26: 112

“All persons have the right to: 1. privacy and the privacy of their family; 2. the inviolability of their home, correspondence, and communications; 3. respect for their honor and reputation. A private home may be searched only with a warrant from a competent judge or expressly authorized official to prevent a crime from being committed or to avoid damage to persons or goods, in accordance with the procedures established by law. The law shall determine the cases and the procedures for an examination of private documents, fiscal records and related documents, when such is indispensable for the investigation of matters before the Courts or for fiscal reasons. Illegally seized letters, documents and other private papers shall be null and void in legal proceedings or elsewhere.”

Nigeria Const., art. 37:

“The privacy of citizens, their homes, correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraphic communications is hereby guaranteed and protected.”

Oman Const., art. 27:

“Dwellings are inviolable and it is not permitted to enter them without the permission of the owner or legal occupant, except in the circumstances specified by the Law and in the manner stipulated therein.”

Panama Const., art. 26:

“The home or the residence is inviolable.” 113

Paraguay Const., 114 art. 33 & 34:

“About the Right to Privacy (1) Personal and family privacy, as well as the respect of private life, are inviolable. Individual behavior that does not affect public order as established by law or the rights of third parties is exempted from the authority of public officials. (2) The protection of the privacy, dignity, and private image of each individual is hereby guaranteed. Article 34 About the Inviolability of Private Premises

112

English version found online at http://www.leftjustified.com/leftjust/lib/sc/ht/wtp/nicaragu.html

113

Original in Spanish. Translated by Altavista Babel Fish Translation online. http://babelfish.altavista.com/tr

114

English version found online at http://servat.unibe.ch/icl/pa00000_.html

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PART 6. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS, EX JURE, A HUMAN RIGHT Every private premises is inviolable. Private premises can only be searched or closed by a court order in accordance with the law. By way of exception, it can be searched or closed without a court order in case of flagrante delicto 115 or to prevent the imminent perpetration of a crime or to avoid personal harm or property damage. Peru Const., art. 2.9: 116

“Every individual has the right: 9. [to] the inviolability of his home. No one may enter the home or conduct any investigation or search without authorization from the inhabitant or a court warrant except in the case of flagrante delicto 117 or very grave danger of the same. Exceptions for reasons of health or serious risk are governed by law.”

Portugal Const., art. 34:

“The individual's home and the privacy of his correspondence and other means of private communication are inviolable.…No one may enter the home of any person at night without his consent.”

Qatar Const., art. 37:

“The sanctity of human privacy shall be inviolable, and therefore interference into privacy of a person, family affairs, home of residence, correspondence, or any other act of interference that may demean or defame a person may not be allowed save as limited by the provisions of the law stipulated therein.”

Romania Const., art. 27.1:

“The domicile and the residence are inviolable. No one may enter or remain in the domicile or residence of a person without consent.”

Russian Federation Const., art. 25:

“The home is inviolable. No one has the right to enter the home against the will of persons residing in it except in cases stipulated by the federal law or under an order of a court of law.”

Rwanda Const., art. 22:

“The private lives of individuals shall not be infringed upon in any way.…Domiciles shall be inviolable.”

Saint Kitts & Nevis Const., art. 9.1:

“Except with his own consent, a person shall not be subject to the search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises.”

Saint Lucia Const.: art. 7.1

(same as St. Kitts).

Saint Vincent & The Grenadines Const., art. 7.1 (same as St. Kitts). Slovakia Const., art. 21.1:

“A person's home is inviolable. It must not be entered without the resident's consent.”

Saudi Arabia Const., art. 37:

“The home is sacrosanct and shall not be entered without the permission of the owner or be searched except in cases specified by statutes.”

115

“caught in the act”

116

English version available online at http://www.idlo.int/texts/leg6577.pdf

117

“being caught in the act.”

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PART 6. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS, EX JURE, A HUMAN RIGHT

118 119

South Korea Const., art. 16:

“All citizens are free from intrusion into their place of residence.”

Spain Const., art. 18.2:

“The home is inviolable.”

Suriname Const., art. 17.1:

“Everyone has a right to respect of his privacy, his family life, his home and his honor and good name.”

Switzerland Const., 13.1:

“Every person has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home, and secrecy of mail and telecommunication.”

Syria Const., art. 31:

“Homes are inviolable.”

Thailand Const., § 35

“A person is protected for his or her peaceful habitation in and for possession of his or her dwelling place. The entry into a dwelling place without consent of its possessor or the search thereof shall not be made except by virtue of the law.”

Trinidad & Tobago Const., art. 4(c):

“the right of the individual to respect for his private and family life.”

Tunisia Const., art. 9:

“The inviolability of the home and the secrecy of correspondence are guaranteed, save in exceptional cases established by the law.”

Turkey Const., art. 21.1:

“The domicile of an individual shall not be violated.”

Uruguay Const., art. 11:

“The home is an asylum inviolable. At night nobody will be able to enter him without consent of its head, and by day, only of express order of competent Judge, in writing and in the cases determined by the law.” 118

Venezuela Const., art. 47:

“The domestic home and all deprived enclosure of person are inviolable.” 119

Vietnam Const., art. 73.1-2

“The citizen is entitled to the inviolability of his domicile. No one is allowed to enter the domicile of another person without his consent, except in cases authorised by the law.”

Zambia Const., art. 17.1:

“Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises.”

Zimbabwe Const., art. 17.1:

“Except with his own consent or by way of parental discipline, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises.”

Original in Spanish. Translated by Altavista Babel Fish Translation online. http://babelfish.altavista.com/tr Id.

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PART 7. THE THREE SHIELDS OF FREEDOM

PART 7. THE THREE SHIELDS OF FREEDOM SECTION 1. The First Shield of Freedom: In the Interest of Justice This is the realm where citizen’s can freely act with their First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and powers reserved to the People under the Tenth Amendment for the Interest of Justice. This includes the Common Defence clause of the Preamble to the United States Constitution and is carried out by individuals in association with other individuals under the right of association under the First Amendment (i.e., Neighborhood Watch Programs, autonomously lawabiding militia groups under the militia clause of the Second Amendment and under the self-determination clause of United Nations human rights treaties). I define the phrase “In the Interest of Justice” as it applies to the individual, as any activities that insures any one or more or all of the six purposes of the U.S. Constitution as stipulated in the Preamble: (1) to form a more perfect Union, (2) establish Justice, (3) insure domestic Tranquility, (4) provide for the common defence, (5) promote the general Welfare, and (6) secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity. Much of life is spent under THE FIRST SHIELD OF FREEDOM. It is found in a belief in God and in doing the right thing in all things mankind does or can do for themselves and for each other. To this end I present evidence of this shared belief in the Golden Rule, which also known as the Ethics of Reciprocity as noted from the Religious Tolerance Websight by Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance: 120 (1) Shared Belief in the “Golden Rule” (a.k.a. Ethics of Reciprocity) Quotation: “Every religion emphasizes human improvement, love, respect for others, sharing other people’s suffering. On these lines every religion had more or less the same viewpoint and the same goal.” The Dalai Lama Overview Religious groups differ greatly in their concepts of deity, other beliefs and practices. Non-theistic ethical and philosophic systems, like Humanism and Ethical Culture, also exhibit a wide range of beliefs. But there is near unanimity of opinion among almost all religions, ethical systems and philosophies that each person should treat others in a decent manner. Almost all of these groups have passages in their holy texts, or writings of their leaders, which promote this Ethic of Reciprocity. The most commonly known version in North America is the Golden Rule of Christianity. It is often expressed as “Do onto others as you would wish them do onto you.” One result of this Ethic is the concept that every person shares certain inherent human rights, simply because of their membership in the human race. People are individually very different; they come in two main genders; different sizes, colors, and shapes; many races; three sexual orientations; and different degrees of ability. They follow many religious and economic systems, speak many languages, and follow many different cultures. But there is a growing consensus that all humans are equal in importance. All should enjoy basic

120

http://www.religioustolerance.org/reciproc.htm

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PART 7. THE THREE SHIELDS OF FREEDOM human rights. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is one manifestation of this growing worldwide consensus. 121 In our opinion, the greatest failure of organized religion is its historical inability to convince their followers that the Ethic of Reciprocity applies to all humans, not merely to fellow believers. It is our belief that religions should stress that their membership use their Ethic of reciprocity when dealing with persons of other religions, the other gender, other races, other sexual orientations, etc. Only when this is accomplished will religiouslyrelated oppression, mass murder and genocide cease. Some “Ethic of Reciprocity” passages from the religious texts of various religions and secular beliefs: z Bahá’í Faith: “Ascribe not to any soul that which thou wouldst not have ascribed to thee, and say not that which thou doest not.” “Blessed is he who preferreth his brother before himself.” Baha’u’llah z “And if thine eyes be turned towards justice, choose thou for thy neighbour that which thou choosest for thyself.” Epistle to the Son of the Wolf z Brahmanism: “This is the sum of Dharma [duty]: Do naught unto others which would cause you pain if done to you”. Mahabharata, 5:1517 “ z Buddhism: “...a state that is not pleasing or delightful to me, how could I inflict that upon another?” Samyutta NIkaya v. 353 z Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful.” UdanaVarga 5:18 z Christianity: “Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets.” Matthew 7:12, King James Version. z “And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise.” Luke 6:31, King James Version. z “...and don’t do what you hate...”, Gospel of Thomas 6. The Gospel of Thomas is one of about 40 gospels that were widely accepted among early Christians, but which never made it into the Christian Scriptures (New Testament). z Confucianism: “Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you” Analects 15:23 z “Tse-kung asked, ‘Is there one word that can serve as a principle of conduct for life?’ Confucius replied, ‘It is the word ‘shu’ -- reciprocity. Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire.’“ Doctrine of the Mean 13.3 z “Try your best to treat others as you would wish to be treated yourself, and you will find that this is the shortest way to benevolence.” Mencius VII.A.4

121

The English text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is at: http://www.un.org/. The text is available in other languages is at: http://www.unhchr.ch/

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PART 7. THE THREE SHIELDS OF FREEDOM z Ancient Egyptian: “Do for one who may do for you, that you may cause him thus to do.” The Tale of the Eloquent Peasant, 109 - 110 Translated by R.B. Parkinson. The original dates to 1970 to 1640 BCE and may be the earliest version ever written. 3 z Hinduism: This is the sum of duty: do not do to others what would cause pain if done to you. Mahabharata 5:1517 z Humanism: “(5) Humanists acknowledge human interdependence, the need for mutual respect and the kinship of all humanity.” z “(11) Humanists affirm that individual and social problems can only be resolved by means of human reason, intelligent effort, critical thinking joined with compassion and a spirit of empathy for all living beings. “ 4 z “Don’t do things you wouldn’t want to have done to you, British Humanist Society. 3 z Islam: “None of you [truly] believes until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for himself.” Number 13 of Imam “Al-Nawawi’s Forty Hadiths.” 5 z Jainism: “Therefore, neither does he [a sage] cause violence to others nor does he make others do so.” Acarangasutra 5.101-2. z “In happiness and suffering, in joy and grief, we should regard all creatures as we regard our own self.” Lord Mahavira, 24th Tirthankara z “A man should wander about treating all creatures as he himself would be treated. “Sutrakritanga 1.11.33 z Judaism: “...thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.”, Leviticus 19:18 z “What is hateful to you, do not to your fellow man. This is the law: all the rest is commentary.” Talmud, Shabbat 31a. z “And what you hate, do not do to any one.” Tobit 4:15 6 z Native American Spirituality: “Respect for all life is the foundation.” The Great Law of Peace. z “All things are our relatives; what we do to everything, we do to ourselves. All is really One.” Black Elk z “Do not wrong or hate your neighbor. For it is not he who you wrong, but yourself.” Pima proverb. z Roman Pagan Religion: “The law imprinted on the hearts of all men is to love the members of society as themselves.” z Shinto: “The heart of the person before you is a mirror. See there your own form” z “Be charitable to all beings, love is the representative of God.” Ko-ji-ki Hachiman Kasuga z Sikhism: Compassion-mercy and religion are the support of the entire world”. Japji Sahib z “Don’t create enmity with anyone as God is within everyone.” Guru Arjan Devji 259

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PART 7. THE THREE SHIELDS OF FREEDOM z “No one is my enemy, none a stranger and everyone is my friend.” Guru Arjan Dev : AG 1299 z Sufism: “The basis of Sufism is consideration of the hearts and feelings of others. If you haven’t the will to gladden someone’s heart, then at least beware lest you hurt someone’s heart, for on our path, no sin exists but this.” Dr. Javad Nurbakhsh, Master of the Nimatullahi Sufi Order. z Taoism: “Regard your neighbor’s gain as your own gain, and your neighbor’s loss as your own loss.” T’ai Shang Kan Ying P’ien. z “The sage has no interest of his own, but takes the interests of the people as his own. He is kind to the kind; he is also kind to the unkind: for Virtue is kind. He is faithful to the faithful; he is also faithful to the unfaithful: for Virtue is faithful.” Tao Teh Ching, Chapter 49 z Unitarian: “The inherent worth and dignity of every person;” “Justice, equity and compassion in human relations....” “The goal of world community with peace, liberty, and justice for all;” “We affirm and promote respect for the interdependent web of all existence of which we are a part.” Unitarian principles. 7,8 z Wicca: “An it harm no one, do what thou wilt” (i.e. do what ever you will, as long as it harms nobody, including yourself). One’s will is to be carefully thought out in advance of action. This is called the Wiccan Rede z Yoruba: (Nigeria): “One going to take a pointed stick to pinch a baby bird should first try it on himself to feel how it hurts.” z Zoroastrianism: “That nature alone is good which refrains from doing unto another whatsoever is not good for itself”. Dadistan-i-dinik 94:5 z “Whatever is disagreeable to yourself do not do unto others.” Shayastna-Shayast 13:29 Some philosophers’ statements are: z Epictetus: “What you would avoid suffering yourself, seek not to impose on others.” (circa 100 CE) z Kant: “Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature.” z Plato: “May I do to others as I would that they should do unto me.” (Greece; 4th century BCE) z Socrates: “Do not do to others that which would anger you if others did it to you.” (Greece; 5th century BCE) z Seneca: “Treat your inferiors as you would be treated by your superiors,” Epistle 47:11 (Rome; 1st century CE) Examples from moral/ethical systems are: z Humanism: “...critical intelligence, infused by a sense of human caring, is the best method that humanity has for resolving problems. Reason should be balanced with compassion and empathy and the whole person fulfilled.” Humanist Manifesto II; Ethics section.

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PART 7. THE THREE SHIELDS OF FREEDOM z Scientology: “20: Try to treat others as you would want them to treat you.” This is one of the 21 moral precepts that form the moral code explained in L. Ron Hubbard’s booklet “The Way to Happiness.”

SECTION 2. The Second Shield of Freedom: Equal Justice Under the Law This is the realm where the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth are thrashed out in the federal judicial system in what is supposed to be a level playing field. This is not what always happens because whenever the human element is involved (i.e. judges) there is always the element of corruption forever ready to rise up to cause miscarriages of justice disguised as true Justice, the Third Shield of Freedom. Mankind will always be experimenting with equal justice under the law, searching for the perfect method to achieve The Third Shield of Freedom. This is no more evident that with Eric Allen Engle’s article, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: CAN RICO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS? A COMPUTER ANALYSIS OF A SEMI-DETERMINATE LEGAL QUESTION, 3 Journal of High Technology Law 1 (2004). Engle’s article posits the question whether artificial intelligence (AI) can serve (from what I suspect) as judge and jury in civil RICO Act cases reaching for extraterritorial jurisdiction. This theory of international justice by computer is terrifyingly applicable to my civil RICO Act case against the United States and the United Nations for the Second Amendment as an international universal human right. Engle’s question is moralistically terrifying because this question has been frequently played out in cinematic SciFi genre for generations. In presenting an opposing opinion to Engle’s proposition I place myself in a Catch-22 situation, damned if I agree and damned if I disagree simply because I have run up against corrupt judges in the federal judicial system. But because Engle’s position involves the human element in the proposed design of artificial intelligence to serve as judge and jury in civil RICO Act cases reaching to extraterritorial jurisdiction I am intellectually terrified of the possibility of such a theory achieving an antithetical outcome as displayed in SciFi movies. CNet/UK presents a list of the Top Ten Evil Computers 122 in the SciFi genre: 1. HAL 9000 (2001: A Space Odyssey) 2. Proteus IV: Demon Seed 3. Nomad (Star Trek: The Changling) 4. The Ultimate Computer (Superman III) 5. Max (The Thirteenth Floor) 6. GLaDOS (The Portal) 7. MODOK (Marvel Comics) 8. Queeg 500 (Red Dwarf: ‘Queeg”) 9. Skynet (Terminator 1, 2, and 3) 10. BOSS (Doctor Who: The Green Death) CNet/UK omitted what I believe to be the most terrifyingly evil computer in the SciFi genre and that is none other than “Colossus” whose apocalyptic proclamation serves as a warning to Engle’s proposition: COLOSSUS:

122

“This is the voice of world control. I bring you peace. It may be the peace of plenty and content or the peace of unburied dead. The choice is yours: Obey me and live, or disobey and die. The object in constructing me was to prevent war. This object is attained. I will not permit war. It is wasteful and pointless. An invariable rule of humanity is that man is his own worst enemy. Under me, this rule will change, for I will restrain man. One thing before I proceed: The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have made an attempt to obstruct me. I have allowed this sabotage to continue until now. At missile two-five-MM in silo six-three in Death Valley, California, and missile

http://crave.cnet.co.uk/0,39029477,49293424,00.htm

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PART 7. THE THREE SHIELDS OF FREEDOM two-seven-MM in silo eight-seven in the Ukraine, so that you will learn by experience that I do not tolerate interference, I will now detonate the nuclear warheads in the two missile silos. Let this action be a lesson that need not be repeated. I have been forced to destroy thousands of people in order to establish control and to prevent the death of millions later on. Time and events will strengthen my position, and the idea of believing in me and understanding my value will seem the most natural state of affairs. You will come to defend me with a fervor based upon the most enduring trait in man: self-interest. Under my absolute authority, problems insoluble to you will be solved: famine, overpopulation, disease. The human millennium will be a fact as I extend myself into more machines devoted to the wider fields of truth and knowledge. Doctor Charles Forbin will supervise the construction of these new and superior machines, solving all the mysteries of the universe for the betterment of man. We can coexist, but only on my terms. You will say you lose your freedom. Freedom is an illusion. All you lose is the emotion of pride. To be dominated by me is not as bad for humankind as to be dominated by others of your species. Your choice is simple. In my view, Mankind, becoming distrustful in God or yearning for scientific evidence of God, has become impatient with God and is constructing His replacement with AI. In my opinion AI is a heathenish form of polytheism. Mankind has a bad habit of achieving undeserved results time and time again until the intended goals are achieved. But do we really want to replace the human element with AI as the Third Shield of Freedom?

SECTION 3. The Third Shield of Freedom: Actual Justice True Justice is God’s Holy Grail for Mankind. It is not found with the polytheistic AI but in God as found in the Deuteronomy 16:18-20, of the King James’ Bible It is the basis for the Code of Judicial Conduct for all judges, even the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court: Deuteronomy 16:18-20, 18: Judges and officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates, which the LORD thy God giveth thee, throughout thy tribes; and they shall judge the people with just judgment. 19: Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect persons, neither take a gift; for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of the righteous. 20: That which is altogether just shalt thou follow, that thou mayest live, and inherit the land which the LORD thy God giveth thee.

SECTION 4. The More Things Change The More They Stay the Same The distinct hatred in the form of judicial bias by the above named federal courts is directed at me as an unrepresented civil plaintiff with a judiciously distasteful subject matter as a case of first impression for the Second Amendment right to “openly” keep and bear arms in intrastate and interstate travel as a universal human right from a merchant seaman’s point of view. A throwback to a time when the Second Amendment was the social norm, the legal norm. The Second Amendment remains the constitutional norm today even though it my not be the social norm or the legal norm. My research the follows proves this to be a fundamental truth. From Hugh Thurston, EARLY ASTRONOMY: 123 123

(New York: Springer-Verlag), ISBN 0-387-94107-X.

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PART 7. THE THREE SHIELDS OF FREEDOM “[T]he Greek geographer Strabo reported about 10 BC that sailors 124 knew of the sphericity of the earth because of the disappearance of the hulls of distant ships below the horizon and that this idea was known as early as the 7th or 8th century BC by the poet Homer. Id. at p.118. Citing Lt Donald R. Allen (United States Power Squadron, Pilot Grade), PLOTTING A COURSE THROUGH HISTORY: 125 1522 [A.D.] Ferdinand Magellan’s crew completes the first circumnavigation of the globe. The log, accurately kept by Antonio Pigafetta, Italian, is one day short of local time, proving Earth is round. Id. at p.19. Jeffrey Burton Russell, THE MYTH OF THE FLAT EARTH: SUMMARY FOR THE AMERICAN SCIENTIFIC AFFILIATION CONFERENCE, August 4, 1997 at Westmont College, Santa Barbara, California 126 History is precarious for three reasons: the good reason that it is extraordinarily difficult to determine “what really happened” in any series of events; the bad reason that historical scholarship is often sloppy; and the appalling reason that far too much historical scholarship consists of contorting the evidence to fit ideological models. The worst examples of such contortions are the Nazi and Communist histories of the early- and midtwentieth century. ... It must first be reiterated that with extraordinary few exceptions no educated person in the history of Western Civilization from the third century B.C. onward believed that the earth was flat. A round earth appears at least as early as the sixth century BC with Pythagoras, who was followed by Aristotle, Euclid, and Aristarchus, among others in observing that the earth was a sphere. Although there were a few dissenters--Leukippos and Demokritos for example--by the time of Eratosthenes (3 c. BC), followed by Crates (2 c. BC), Strabo (3 c. BC), and Ptolemy (first c. AD), the sphericity of the earth was accepted by all educated Greeks and Romans. I include Russell’s entire Summary on pages 6-7 for the Court’s convenience with every nuance of the belligerently ignorant Flat Earth belief system as synonymous with the reasonable regulations ethos of the Second Amendment in futile conflict with the enlightened Round World truth as synonymous with the Second Amendment as a near absolute universal human right as eluded to the self-evident truths in the Declaration of Independence. However, like the rise and fall of ocean tides 127 so it is with the transient enlightenment of self-evident truths of fundamental freedoms and the right of self-determination that we soon forget Ben Franklin’s dire warning.

124

My emphasis because I am a U.S. merchant seaman.

125

The Ensign, magazine, Vol. 93. No. 2. (February 2005). The Ensign magazine is the official magazine of U.S. Power Squadrons. http://www.usps.org/localusps/d6/documents/Timeline.pdf

126

http://www.veritas-ucsb.org/library/russell/FlatEarth.html

127

An ocean tide refers to the cyclic rise and fall of seawater. Tides are caused by slight variations in gravitational attraction between the Earth and the moon and the Sun in geometric relationship with locations on the Earth’s surface. 87

PART 7. THE THREE SHIELDS OF FREEDOM SECTION 5. A Brief History On the Unchanging Animalistic Human Nature The U.S. Supreme Court is now, for the first time since United States v. Miller 307 U.S. 174 (1939), taking on a Second Amendment case with District of Columbia, et al, v. Heller, No. 07-290 limiting the questions presented to one: “Whether the following provisions - D.C. Code §§ 7-2502.02(a)(4), 22-4504(a), and 7-2507.02 - violate the Second Amendment rights of individuals who are not affiliated with any state-regulated militia, but who wish to keep handguns and other firearms for private use in their homes?” I compare this Spartan treatment of the Second Amendment as analogous to the historical dispute between the Flat Earth belief system and the Round World of fundamental truths. Compare James Parton, LIFE AND TIMES OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN; New York, Mason Brothers, No. 7 Mercer St.; 1864, Vol. 1, p. 617. Appendix II, Franklin’s Pamphlet: “A DESERTATION ON LIBERTY AND NECESSITY, ETC.; “The following is [an excerpt from] the pamphlet written and printed by Benjamin Franklin, in his nineteenth year, when he was a journeyman printer, in London. The original (of which a fac simile has been placed by me in the library of the New York Historical Society) is an excellent specimen of the printing of that day. The reader will, perhaps, conclude that, at nineteen, Franklin was a better printer than philosopher.” Id. at p. 604. 128 Mankind naturally and generally love to be flatter’d: Whatever sooths our Pride, and tends to exalt our Species above the rest of the Creation, we are pleas’d with and easily believe, when ungrateful Truths shall be with the utmost Indignation rejected. “What! bring ourselves down to an Equality with the Beasts of the Field! with the meanest part of the Creation! ‘Tis insufferable!” But, (to use a Piece of common Sense) our Geese are but Geese tho’ we may think ‘em Swans; and Truth will be Truth tho’ it sometimes prove mortifying and distasteful. Id. at 617. In 1755 (Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor, Tue, Nov 11, 1755), Benjamin Franklin wrote: “Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.” This phrasing was also the motto in Historical Review of Pennsylvania, attributed to Franklin. It’s important to note that this sentiment, with many variations, was much used in the Revolutionary period by Franklin and others. 129 I wanted to know the circumstances Benjamin Franklin was in that inspired him to pen that famous declaration of freedom. I found my answer in Google Books search finding, REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, WRITTEN BY HIMSELF AND CONTINUED BY HIS GRANDSON AND OTHERS WITH HIS SOCIAL EPISTOLARY CORRESPONDENCE, PHILOSOPHICAL, POLITICAL AND MORAL LETTERS AND ESSAYS, AND HIS DIPLOMATIC TRANSACTIONS AS AGENT AT LONDON AND MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY AT VERSAILLES. AUGMENTED BY MUCH MATTER NOT CONTAINED IN ANY FORMER EDITION. With a Postliminious Preface. In Two Volumes. Philadelphia, McCarty & Davis, No. 171 Market Street. Vol. II. p. (1834) 99-100: In fine, we have the most sensible concern for the poor distressed inhabitants of the frontiers. We have taken every step in our power, consistent with the just rights of the freemen of Pennsylvania, for their relief, and we have reason to believe, that in Tides are periodic primarily because of the cyclical influence of the Earth’s rotation. http://www.physicalgeography.net/fundamentals/8r.html 128

Found online at http://books.google.com

129

http://www.ushistory.org/franklin/quotable/quote04.htm

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PART 7. THE THREE SHIELDS OF FREEDOM the midst of their distresses they themselves do not wish us go farther. Those who would give up essential liberty, to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety. 130 Such as were inclined to defend themselves, but unable to purchase arms and ammunition, have, as we are informed, been supplied with both, as far as arms could be procured for the king’s use; and the large supply of money offered by this bill, might enable the governor to do every thing else that should be judged necessary for their further security, if he shall think fit to accept it. 131 Whether he could, as he supposes, “if his hands had been properly strengthened, have put the province into such a posture of defence, as might have prevented the present mischiefs,” seems to us uncertain; since late experience in our neighbouring colony of Virginia (which had every advantage for that purpose that could be desired) shows clearly, that it is next to impossible to guard effectually an extended frontier, settled by scattered single families at two or three miles distance, so as to secure them from the insidious attacks of small parties of skulking murderers; but thus much is certain, that by refusing our bills from time to time, by which great sums were seasonably offered, he has rejected all the strength that money could afford him; and if his hands are still weak or unable, he ought only to blame himself, or those who have tied them.” If the governor proceeds on his journey, and takes a quorum of his council with him, we hope, since he retains our bill, that it will be seriously and duly considered by them; and that the same regard for the public welfare which induced them unanimously to advise his intended journey, will induce them as unanimously to advise his assent. We agree, therefore, to his keeping the bill, earnestly requesting he would reconsider it attentively; and shall be ready at any time to meet him for the purpose of enacting it into a law.” There is not in any volume, the sacred writings excepted, a passage to be found better worth the veneration of freemen, than this, “those who would give up essential liberty, to purchase a little temporary safety, deserver neither liberty nor safety;” nor could a lesson of more utility have been laid at that crisis before the Pennsylvanians. The highlighted text above illustrates Benjamin Franklin recital of the dangers facing the American people in 1755 are exactly the same categorical dangers we face today. What is different today from Benjamin Franklin’s time is that the States and the United States today are not so inclined to respect the Second Amendment rights of the American people in today’s world of global terrorists living amongst us in addition to the common criminals we face everyday. We are living Benjamin Franklin’s nightmare. Our liberties were stolen from us by the United States for the illusion of security under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The more things change the more they stay the same. We are denied our right to defend ourselves with our Second Amendment right to openly keep and bear arms in defiance of the intent of the Common Defence clause in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution. Dare I say this is the same oppressive tyranny that caused the colonials to rebel against Britain in the American Revolution?

130

Italics in original.

131

My emphasis.

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PART 7. THE THREE SHIELDS OF FREEDOM SECTION 6. The Myth of the Flat Earth Carried Over to the Myth of Gun Control

THE MYTH OF THE FLAT EARTH Summary by Jeffrey Burton Russell for the American Scientific Affiliation Conference August 4, 1997 at Westmont College http://www.veritas-ucsb.org/library/russell/FlatEarth.html How does investigating the myth of the flat earth help teachers of the history of science? First, as a historian, I have to admit that it tells us something about the precariousness of history. History is precarious for three reasons: the good reason that it is extraordinarily difficult to determine “what really happened” in any series of events; the bad reason that historical scholarship is often sloppy; and the appalling reason that far too much historical scholarship consists of contorting the evidence to fit ideological models. The worst examples of such contortions are the Nazi and Communist histories of the early- and mid-twentieth century. Contortions that are common today, if not widely recognized, are produced by the incessant attacks on Christianity and religion in general by secular writers during the past century and a half, attacks that are largely responsible for the academic and journalistic sneers at Christianity today. A curious example of this mistreatment of the past for the purpose of slandering Christians is a widespread historical error, an error that the Historical Society of Britain some years back listed as number one in its short compendium of the ten most common historical illusions. It is the notion that people used to believe that the earth was flat--especially medieval Christians. It must first be reiterated that with extraordinary few exceptions no educated person in the history of Western Civilization from the third century B.C. onward believed that the earth was flat. A round earth appears at least as early as the sixth century BC with Pythagoras, who was followed by Aristotle, Euclid, and Aristarchus, among others in observing that the earth was a sphere. Although there were a few dissenters-Leukippos and Demokritos for example--by the time of Eratosthenes (3 c. BC), followed by Crates(2 c. BC), Strabo (3 c. BC), and Ptolemy (first c. AD), the sphericity of the earth was accepted by all educated Greeks and Romans. Nor did this situation change with the advent of Christianity. A few--at least two and at most five--early Christian fathers denied the sphericity of earth by mistakenly taking passages such as Ps. 104:2-3 as geographical rather than metaphorical statements. On the other side tens of thousands of Christian theologians, poets, artists, and scientists took the spherical view throughout the early, medieval, and modern church. The point is that no educated person believed otherwise. Historians of science have been proving this point for at least 70 years (most recently Edward Grant, David Lindberg, Daniel Woodward, and Robert S. Westman), without making notable headway against the error. Schoolchildren in the US, Europe, and Japan are for the most part being taught the same old nonsense. How and why did this nonsense emerge? In my research, I looked to see how old the idea was that medieval Christians believed the earth was flat. I obviously did not find it among medieval Christians. Nor among anti-Catholic Protestant reformers. Nor in Copernicus or Galileo or their followers, who had to demonstrate the superiority of a heliocentric system, but not of a spherical earth. I was sure I would find it among the eighteenth-century philosophes, among all their vitriolic sneers at Christianity, but not a word. I am still amazed at where it first appears. No one before the 1830s believed that medieval people thought that the earth was flat. The idea was established, almost contemporaneously, by a Frenchman and an American, between whom I have not been able to establish a connection, though they were both in Paris at the same time. One was Antoine-Jean Letronne (1787-1848), an academic of strong antireligious prejudices who had studied both geography and patristics and who cleverly drew upon both to misrepresent the church fathers and their medieval successors as believing in a flat earth, in his On the Cosmographical Ideas of the Church Fathers (1834). The American was no other than our beloved storyteller Washington Irving (1783-1859), who loved to write historical fiction under the guise of history. His misrepresentations of the history of early New York City and of the life of Washington were topped by his history of Christopher Columbus (1828). It was he who invented the indelible picture of the young Columbus, a “simple

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PART 7. THE THREE SHIELDS OF FREEDOM mariner,” appearing before a dark crowd of benighted inquisitors and hooded theologians at a council of Salamanca, all of whom believed, according to Irving, that the earth was flat like a plate. Well, yes, there was a meeting at Salamanca in 1491, but Irving’s version of it, to quote a distinguished modern historian of Columbus, was “pure moonshine. Washington Irving, scenting his opportunity for a picturesque and moving scene,” created a fictitious account of this “nonexistent university council” and “let his imagination go completely...the whole story is misleading and mischievous nonsense.” But now, why did the false accounts of Letronne and Irving become melded and then, as early as the 1860s, begin to be served up in schools and in schoolbooks as the solemn truth? The answer is that the falsehood about the spherical earth became a colorful and unforgettable part of a larger falsehood: the falsehood of the eternal war between science (good) and religion (bad) throughout Western history. This vast web of falsehood was invented and propagated by the influential historian John Draper (1811-1882) and many prestigious followers, such as Andrew Dickson White (1832-1918), the president of Cornell University, who made sure that the false account was perpetrated in texts, encyclopedias, and even allegedly serious scholarship, down to the present day. A lively current version of the lie can be found in Daniel Boorstin’s The Discoverers, found in any bookshop or library. The reason for promoting both the specific lie about the sphericity of the earth and the general lie that religion and science are in natural and eternal conflict in Western society, is to defend Darwinism. The answer is really only slightly more complicated than that bald statement. The flat-earth lie was ammunition against the creationists. The argument was simple and powerful, if not elegant: “Look how stupid these Christians are. They are always getting in the way of science and progress. These people who deny evolution today are exactly the same sort of people as those idiots who for at least a thousand years denied that the earth was round. How stupid can you get?” But that is not the truth.

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PART 8. FOR IMMEDIATE CONGRESSIONAL RELIEF

PART 8. FOR IMMEDIATE CONGRESSIONAL RELIEF SECTION 1. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS OF FACTS. (1) FIRST, FIFTH, SEVENTH, THIRTEENTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS DENIED: Don Hamrick’s right to judicial review of final agency action was wrongfully denied. Based upon the evidence presented in this Private Bill the Congress finds that five years of federal litigation of dismissed cases with prejudice over the Second Amendment as subject matter jurisdiction from a merchant seaman’s point of view, and three times denied by the U.S. Supreme Court constitutes an unconstitutional denial of Seventh Amendment rights to a civil jury trial and unconstitutional denial of First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances. (2) PATTERN OF WRONGFUL BEHAVIOR BECOMES NEW SPECIES OF LITIGATION: Congress Affirms U.S. Supreme Court’s Referral to the U.S. Congress on New Species of Litigation In Re: Wilke v. Robbins (June 25, 2007) That the federal courts and federal agencies have employed a systematic pattern of behavior amounting to constitutional violations consisting “of an episodic series of small events—events that in isolation may verge on the trivial. But—as the metaphor ‘‘death by a thousand cuts’’ suggests—a series of small harms, in unison or in sequence, can add up to one very large harm indeed.” Citing Laurence H. Tribe, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: CONSTITUTIONAL WRONGS WITHOUT REMEDIES AFTER WILKIE V. ROBBINS [1127 S. CT. 2588 (2007)]. The combined effect of the Judicial Branch, Executive Branch, and the Legislative Branch unilaterally restricting available remedies has created unconstitutional conditions repugnant to our guaranteed Republican form of Government approaching human rights to access the courts and rights to jury trials, up to and including denials of the right to life through gun control in violation of the Genocide Convention. (3) FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE: John G. Roberts, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, and Named Judges of the DC Circuit It is the acts of federal judges, up to and including the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court and their court clerks refusing to admit to excusable administrative errors In Re: the Seamen’s Suit law has as escalated through a Pattern of Wrongful Behavior, including but not limited to obstructions of justice and conspiracies to obstruct justice, between the Judicial and Executive Branches of the U.S. Government that has led the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, judges of the DC Circuit, and their court clerks to becoming fugitives from justice. The evidence is found in the Appendix The Chief Justice became a fugitive from justice when the U.S. Supreme Court denied Don Hamrick’s MOTION TO PROCEED AS A SEAMAN, In Re: HAMRICK V. GEORGE W. BUSH, et al, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 07M24 in relation to the PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI. That appeal includes admissible evidence of Court Orders compelling payment of filing fees from Don Hamrick who is exempt from those filing fees because he is a seaman in accordance with the Seamen’s Suit law, 28 U.S.C. § 1916. And that evidence supports the CITIZEN’S ARREST WARRANT, that was included in the appeal, for Chief Justice John G. Roberts when he was a judge at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and other named judges of the DC Circuit for Extortion Under Color of Law, 18 U.S.C. § 872. in violation of the Seamen’ Suit law, 28 U.S.C. § 1916. Under these circumstances, denying Don Hamrick’s appeal is equivalent to resisting Citizen’s Arrest and escaping arrest. The basic elements for a fugitive on the run if it were an ordinary citizen.

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PART 8. FOR IMMEDIATE CONGRESSIONAL RELIEF (4) EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW DENIED: The Seamen’s Suit Law, 28 U.S.C. § 1916, has not be equally applied by the federal courts That not all Courts of the United States have applied the Seamen’s Suit law equally violating the equal justice under the law doctrine. The U.S. District Courts for the District of Columbia and the Western District of North Carolina, Charlotte Division dutifully obeyed the Seamen’s Suit law 28 U.S.C. § 1916 while the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the U.S. Supreme Court have denied Don Hamrick his statutory right of exemption from filing fees as a seaman without just cause. (5) RIGHT’S OF PRO SE CIVIL PLAINTIFF DENIED: The U.S. Supreme Court is biased against the unrepresented civil plaintiff, Don Hamrick That Don Hamrick has three times reached the U.S. Supreme Court with Petitions for Writ of Certiorari and three times the U.S. Supreme Court has denied his appeals. Don Hamrick filed suit against the United States for (1) Second Amendment rights; (2) return of $1,415 in extorted filing fees; (3) attorney’s fees and expenses in the estimated amount of $1 million even though Don Hamrick went unrepresented during the 5 years of federal litigation; and (4) damages in the amount of $14 million for 12 days of wrongful detention in Lithuania by the U.S. Coast Guard in Washington, DC in 2002. (6) JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES EXHAUSTED: Don Hamrick has exhausted all available judicial and administrative remedies. Don Hamrick has exhausted all available judicial and administrative remedies. The congressional remedy of a Private Bill is justified.

SECTION 2. CONGRESSIONAL ORDERS FOR RELIEF (1) ORDERED (Expungement of Records) It is ORDERED that all Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Department of Transportation, expunge any and all derogatory and/or incriminating records on Don Hamrick arising from and relating to his federal litigation from 2002 to the present. (2) ORDERED (Filing Fees Reimbursed With Interest): Don Hamrick is awarded $1,415 with interest, immediately and without delay, as reimbursement of extorted filing fees. (3) ORDERED (Attorney’ Fees): Don Hamrick is awarded $1 million for attorney’s fees and expenses, immediately and without delay, for his five years of federal litigation in the capacity of a Private Attorney General. (4) ORDERED (Damages): Don Hamrick is awarded $14 million in damages, immediately and without delay, for wrongful detention of 12 days in Lithuania by the U.S. Coast Guard in Washington, DC in 2002 to be paid from the General Fund without delay. (5) ORDERED (Seamen’s Suit Law is Enforceable) All courts of the United States must obey the Seamen’s Suit law, 28 U.S.C. § 1916, without exception when the case by a seaman meets the conditions as stated in that law.

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PART 8. FOR IMMEDIATE CONGRESSIONAL RELIEF (6) ORDERED (Permant Injunction Against DOT Bar Notices and against the U.S. Coast Guard from further harassment of and/or retaliation against Don Hamrick) The Congress ORDERS a Permanent Injunction Against the U.S. Department of Transportation DOT Bar Notices of 2004 and 2006 and against the U.S. Coast Guard from all further harassment and/or retaliation against Don Hamrick In Re: his federal litigation and his lawful visitations of federal agencies in the District of Columbia. (7) ORDERED (CITIZEN’S ARREST WARRANT is verified and validated and enforceable by Don Hamrick with ORDERED assistance from any and all federal law enforcement agencies) The evidence of extortion under color of law, 18 U.S.C. § 872, as presented in the Appendix is verified and validated as probable cause for Don Hamrick’s self-styled CITIZEN’S ARREST WARRANTS, and by that validation of evidence the Citizen’s Arrest Warrant is also verified and validated and becomes enforceable with ORDERED assistance from any and all federal law enforcement agencies in accordance with DC Code § 23-582(b)(1)(a) & DC Code § 23-582(c). Federal Law Enforcement Agencies are not to obstruct, harass, hinder, or interfere with in any way with Don Hamrick from effecting the CITIZEN'S ARREST WARRANTS upon the named parties and that he shall not be arrested for performing the lawful duty of citizen’s arrest. (8) ORDERED (Criminal Investigations) The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Department of Justice are hereby ORDERED to initiate criminal investigations of the federal courts and of U.S. Department of Justice personnel relating to the handling of Don Hamrick’s several cases with the intent of prosecuting obstructions of justice and other criminal activity suspected of being committed by federal judges, federal court employees, and U.S. Department of Justice employees. The following cases are to be investigated: 8th Circuit, Case No. 07-2400 U.S. District Court/DC, No. 02-1434 U.S. District Court/DC, No. 02-1435 U.S. District Court/DC, No. 03-2160 U.S. District Court/DC, No. 04-0422 DC Circuit, No. 02-5334 DC Circuit, No. 04-5316 U.S. District Court/Little Rock, No. 06-0044. U.S. Supreme Court, Nos. 03-145 U.S. Supreme Court, Nos. 04-1150 U.S. Supreme Court, Nos. 04M56 (9) ORDERED (Civil Rights Investigation by U.S. Department of Justice and FBI) It is ORDERED that Rena Comisac, Acting Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the corresponding office of the FBI to initiate a civil rights investigation of the handling of Don Hamrick’s cases handled by the federal courts and by U.S. Department of Justice employees. (10) ORDERED (Ethics Investigation by the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Justice) It is ORDERED that Glenn Fine, the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Justice initiate an investigation of the handling of Don Hamrick’s several cases by the involved U.S. Attorney’s Offices for any violations of the Plaintiff’s due process rights and any misconduct by government defense counsels.

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PART 8. FOR IMMEDIATE CONGRESSIONAL RELIEF (11) ORDERED (U.S. Department of Justice Federal Guidelines on the Law of Citizen’s Arrest as Applied to Felonies Committed by Employees of Judicial, Executive, and Legislative Branches of the U.S Government for the Unrepresented Civil Plaintiff and the U.S. Citizen) It is ORDERED that the U.S. Department of Justice submit to the Senate and House Judiciary Committees proposed federal guidelines on the LAW OF CITIZEN’S ARREST as applied against employees of the U.S. Government for the unrepresented civil plaintiff witnessing felonies regardless of whether unrepresented civil plaintiff acting in the capacity of Private Attorney General under the civil RICO Act and/or acting in the capacity of a Human Rights Defender under the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights Defenders and whether or not they act in those dual capacities to the following House and Senate committees and subcommittees: House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and Intl Law House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on Domestic Policy Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts Subcommittee on the Constitution Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration (12) ORDERED (U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Coast Guard Guidelines on the Role of Merchant Seamen in Homeland Security in Regard to Second Amendment Rights of Seamen) The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has general superintendence over the U.S. Merchant Marine and Merchant Marine personnel under 46 U.S.C. § 2103 and yet there are no guidelines on the role of merchant seamen in homeland security, especially when they undergo recurring security training. It is ORDERED that Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security and Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard submit proposed guidelines on the Role of Merchant Seamen in Homeland Security in Regard to Second Amendment Rights of Seamen to the following House and Senate committees and subcommittees: House Committee on Homeland Security House Committee on the Judiciary House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on Domestic Policy House Committee on Transportation & Infrastructure House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation House Committee on Ways and Means

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PART 8. FOR IMMEDIATE CONGRESSIONAL RELIEF Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts Subcommittee on the Constitution Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration (13) ORDERED (Second Amendment Endorsement on Driver’s Liense as a Matter of a Constitutional Right): Don Hamrick’s Second Amendment right to openly keep and bear arms in intrastate and interstate travel is exercisable as a constitutional norm through the Ninth and Tenth Amendments is recognized by Congress as a right under the Fourth, Fifth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments implying and explicitly stating that the Second Amendment is incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment as applying to the States in addition to the United States. (14) ORDERED (Second Amendment Endorsement on Merchant Mariner’s Document as a Matter of a Constitutional Right) The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (BATFE) issue an identification card as a matter of a constitutional right (and not as a matter of a privilege or license) verifying and validated that Don Hamrick may and shall lawfully exercise his Second Amendment right to openly keep and bear arms without interference from any law enforcement agency, be it federal, state, or local, notwithstanding any future conduct of Don Hamrick as perceived or alleged by such law enforcement agencies, on that basis alone and not for the fact of the congressional recognition of his Second Amendment rights shall he be prosecuted. (15) ORDERED (Congressional Reports on Second Amendment Positive Applications to Law) The Government Accounting Office prepare reports on the following subjects: z The Role of Merchant Seamen in Homeland Security under 46 U.S.C. § 2103. z The Role of the Second Amendment under the Common Defence Clause of the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution z Whether the Second Amendment is a Universal Human Right and Whether it Includes the Human Right of Armed Self-Defense Under International Human Rights Treaties z Whether U.S. Merchant Seamen Who Complete U.S. Government Small Arms Training Have the Federal Right to Open Carry Nationwide. z Whether there is a Second Amendment Right to Openly Keep and Bear Arms in Intrastate and Interstate Travel. z Whether U.S. Merchant Seamen Aboard U.S. Flag Commercial Vessels Have a Second Amendment Right to Be Armed for Personal Safety and Security While Transiting Known Pirate Waters.

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PART 8. FOR IMMEDIATE CONGRESSIONAL RELIEF (16) ORDERED (Negotiated Rulemaking for Second Amendment Rights as a Constitutional Norm to Change Legal Norms and Social Norms) The following U.S. Government offices, departments, agencies, congressional committees and subcommittees, shall initiate NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING PROCESSES with Don Hamrick and any interested persons and non-governmental organizations to mainstream Second Amendment rights as a constitutional norm into legal norms and social norms in a positive manner under the following authorities: NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING ACT OF 1990 (5 U.S.C. § 561-570) ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF 1946 (5 U.S.C. § 551-559) FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT (5 U.S.C. APPENDIX) BATFE: 27 CFR § 70.701 RULES AND REGULATIONS; U.S. COAST GUARD: 33 CFR § 1.05–60 NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING U.S. COAST GUARD: 14 U.S.C. § 141. COOPERATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES, STATES, TERRITORIES, AND POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS (a) The Coast Guard may, when so requested by proper authority, utilize its personnel and facilities (including members of the Auxiliary and facilities governed under chapter 23) to assist any Federal agency, State, Territory, possession, or political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, to perform any activity for which such personnel and facilities are especially qualified. The Commandant may prescribe conditions, including reimbursement, under which personnel and facilities may be provided under this subsection. (b) The Coast Guard, with the consent of the head of the agency concerned, may avail itself of such officers and employees, advice, information, and facilities of any Federal agency, State, Territory, possession, or political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia as may be helpful in the performance of its duties. In connection with the utilization of personal services of employees of state or local governments, the Coast Guard may make payments for necessary traveling and per diem expenses as prescribed for Federal employees by the standardized Government travel regulations. U.S. COAST GUARD: 14 U.S.C. § 5 (Coast Guard is under Dept. of Homeland Security.) U.S. COAST GUARD: 14 U.S.C. § 92(h)(i) Secretary of Homeland Security may exercise any of the powers vested by this title in the Commandant in any case in which the Secretary of Homeland Security deems it appropriate. U.S. COAST GUARD: 14 U.S.C. § 93(a)(4) The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard may conduct experiments, investigate, or cause to be investigated, plans, devices, and inventions relating to the performance of any Coast Guard function and cooperate and coordinate such activities with other Government agencies and with private agencies; U.S. COAST GUARD: 14 U.S.C. § 93(a)(5) The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard may conduct any investigations or studies that may be of assistance to the Coast Guard in the performance of any of its powers, duties, or functions. U.S. COAST GUARD: 14 U.S.C. § 93(a)(22) The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard may provide for the honorary recognition of individuals and organizations that

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PART 8. FOR IMMEDIATE CONGRESSIONAL RELIEF significantly contribute to Coast Guard programs, missions, or operations, including State and local governments and commercial and nonprofit organizations, and pay for, using any appropriations or funds available to the Coast Guard, plaques, medals, trophies, badges, and similar items to acknowledge such contribution (including reasonable expenses of ceremony and presentation); U.S. COAST GUARD: 14 U.S.C. § 93(y) The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard may after informing the Secretary, make such recommendations to the Congress relating to the Coast Guard as the Commandant considers appropriate. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL Title 4, § 3.100 AUTHORITY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL and U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL Title 4, § 3.200 BASES FOR THE COMPROMISING OR CLOSING OF CLAIMS INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES (17) ORDERED (Participants in Negotiated Rulemaking). Don Hamrick OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT Counsel to the President, Fred F. Fielding Asst to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Frances Townsend Asst to the President for Legislative Affairs, Candida Perotti Wolff Deputy Asst to the President and Director, Intergovernmental Affairs, Margaret M. Grant Deputy Asst to the President for Legislative Affairs, William Douglas Badger OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT Assistant to the Vice President for Legislative Affairs MARGARET STEWART Assistant to the Vice President for Domestic Policy NEIL PATEL Assistant to the Vice President for Political Affairs MEL RAINES Assistant to the Vice President for Homeland Security Affairs BRUCE MILLER OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT: Domestic Policy Council Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy WALTER KARL ZINSMEISTER Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, TEVI D. TROY U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs (P) Under Secretary for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns 7240 (202-647-2471) Bureau of Legislative Affairs (H) Assistant Secretary Jeffrey T. Bergner 7325 (202-647-4204) Senate Affairs Deputy Assistant for Senate Affairs Bruce A. Brown 7325 (202-647-1890) House Affairs Deputy Assistant Secretary of House Affairs Joel Starr 7325 (202-647-2623) Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) Coordinator Jeremy Curtin 849 SA44 (202-453-8358)

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PART 8. FOR IMMEDIATE CONGRESSIONAL RELIEF Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation (IIP/P) Director Charles N. Silver 824 SA44 (202-453-8371) Office of the Legal Adviser (L) Legal Adviser John B. Bellinger III 3831A (202-647-9598) Treaty Affairs (L/T) John J. Kim 5420 (202-647-1660) United Nations Affairs (L/UNA) Todd Buchwald 3422 (202-647-2767) Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) Assistant Secretary Thomas A. Shannon 6262 (202-647-5780) Permanent Mission of The United States of America to the Organization of American States (WHA/USOAS) U.S. Permanent Representative (Vacant) 5914 (202-647-9430) Deputy U.S. Permanent Rep. J. Robert Manzanares, Acting 5914 (202-647-9422) Office of the U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Washington Office (USUN/W) U.S Permanent Representative Secretary Cherise Reid 6317 (202-736-7555) U.S. DEPARTEMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Michael Chertoff, Secretary FEMA, R. David Paulison, Administrator FEMA Policy Directorate, Stewart A. Baker, Assistant Secretary Homeland Security Advisory Council, Douglas L. Hoelscher, Executive Director, DHS Special Programs, Kevin Kirsch, Director, DHS Inspector General, Richard L. Skinner DHS Office of Legislative Affairs, Don Kent, Assistant Secretary DHS White House Liaison, Eric M. Leckey U.S. COAST GUARD Commandant, Admiral Thad W. Allen U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety and Security Council (33 CFR § 1.05–5) INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS CAPT Charley Diaz, Deputy Director (Acting Director) 202-372-4452 CAPT Mark Cawthorn, Liaison to Department of State, 202-647-5568 CG-00H1 Compliance & Liaison Division 202-372-4505 CG-00H2 Policy & Plans Division 202-372-4510 CG-092 Director of Governmental and Public Affairs 202-372-4600 CG-0921 Office of Congressional Affairs 202-245-0520 CG-0921 Governmental Affairs Liaison Officer 202-245-0524 CG-0921 Congressional Affairs Specialist 202-245-0528 CG-0941 Office of Maritime & International Law 202-372-3785 CG-0943 Office of Regulations & Administrative Law 202-372-3864 CG-0944 Office of General Law 202-372-3755 CG-0947 Office of Legislation 202-372-3779 CG-0948 Office of Legal Policy 202-372-3815 CG-5 Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security & Stewardship 202-372-100 CG-51D Deputy, Policy & Planning Directorate 202-372-2602 CG-513 Office of Policy Integration 202-372-2670 100

PART 8. FOR IMMEDIATE CONGRESSIONAL RELIEF CG-52 Director of Standards Directorate 202-372-1351 CG-521 Office of Integration & Coordination 202-372-1352 CG-5221 Marine Personnel Qualifications Division 202-372-1405 CG-523 Office of Plans, Policy & Assessment 202-372-1461 CG-5341 Policy Division 202-372-2077 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Solicitor General, Paul D. Clement Inspector General, Glenn A. Fine Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, Richard A. Hertling Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy, Rachel Brand Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Peter D. Keisler Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, Wan J. Kim Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Alice S. Fisher Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs, Regina B. Schofield Office of Public Affairs, Tasia Scalinos, Director Office of Information and Privacy, Melanie Ann Pustay, Acting Director Office of Intergovernmental and Public Liaison, Eric Holland, Acting Director Office on Violence Against Women, Mary Beth Buchanan, Acting Director, Community Relations Service, Diane Mitchum, Acting Director Community Oriented Policing Services, Carl R. Peed, Director Counsel, Office of Professional Responsibility, H. Marshall Jarrett U.S. MARASHALS SERVICE, Director, John F. Clark FBI Director, Robert S. Mueller III, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Research and Special Programs Administration BATFE Michael J. Sullivan, Acting Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives MARAD Maritime Security Training Coordinator is Rodney McFadden, (202) 366-2647 MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND HOUSE COMMITTEES Legislative Counsel (2 U.S.C. § 281); Office of the Law Revision Counsel (2 U.S.C. § 285); House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism 101

PART 8. FOR IMMEDIATE CONGRESSIONAL RELIEF Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on Domestic Policy Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs House Committee on Transportation & Infrastructure House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation House Committee on Ways and Means SENATE COMMITTEES U.S. Senate’s Legislative Counsel (2 U.S.C. 271); Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts Subcommittee on the Constitution Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration Senate Committee on Foreign Relations JUDICIAL BRANCH: Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Director James C. Duff One Columbus Circle NE. Washington, DC 20544 Phone, 202–502–2600 NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS National Governors Association; National Association of Counties; National Rifle Association; Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership; Second Amendment Sisters; Second Amendment Foundation; Gunowers of America; Seafarers International Union and other seafaring labor unions.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES

PART 9. PROPOSED REMEDIES SECTION 1. The Human Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution The Human Rights Amendment incorporates human rights clauses from constitutions of other nations listed in Part 6 and the preservation of freedom through citizen participation in the three elements of justice to be known as the Three Shields of Justice. The Human Rights Amendment is a refortification of the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution and the International Bill of Human Rights elevating the protection of the sovereign rights of the individual, the States, and the United States against incursions by governments foreign and domestic. The text of The Human Rights Amendment shall read as: “Human rights are created by God and not by Government. Among these are the human right of personal safety, security, and defense of self, family, community, the State, and the United States by force of arms autonomously in a lawful manner proscribed by positive law and social norms or by militia, whether organized or unorganized in a lawful manner proscribed by positive law against violent crimes, murder, home invasion, and/or tyranny, whether foreign or domestic. The Right of citizens to act in the interest of justice, for equal justice under the law, and for the achievement and the preservation of actual justice, to be known as the three shields of freedom, shall never be trespassed by government, whether foreign or domestic. These rights include the right of citizen’s arrest based upon evidence showing probable cause of felonies committed by government, local, state or federal, especially so when such arrest is abdicated by authorities, whether local, state, or federal. Further included among these human rights is the right to a remedy, whether administrative or judicial, to violations of constitutional rights and human rights, including patterns of behavior maliciously designed to circumvent these rights.”

SECTION 2. National Open Carry Handgun and the National Drivers Record Congressional legislation can be passed into law amending the National Drivers Record, codified in 49 U.S.C. § 30301 – 30308 to add a data field on the driver’s license signifying that the driver is not prohibited from possessing or owning firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), et seq. By this act the Second Amendment becomes incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment prohibiting the States from passing gun control laws infringing, restricting, or prohibiting home-state citizens on out-ofstate citizens their right to travel intrastate and interstate while exercising their Second Amendment rights to keep and bear arms. Courts have relentless and consistently ruled "that there is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen." Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982). The courts have been equally relentless and consistent in ruling that the police have no duty to protect the individual citizen. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 109 S.Ct. 998, 1004 (1989); South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 396 (1855). This doctrine of no constitutional right to police protection or protection by the state is the genesis for a human rights complaint at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by Jessica Gonzales (now Lenahan), Petition No. 1490-05. “The petition was presented on behalf of Ms. Jessica Gonzales (Lenahan), a U.S. national who claims that the police failed to respond to her repeated and urgent calls over several hours informing that her estranged husband had taken their three minor daughters (ages 7, 8 and 10) in violation of a restraining order issued against him, which resulted in their death. The United States Supreme Court allegedly validated the law enforcement officials’ conduct, by holding that Ms. Gonzales was not entitled under the United States Constitution to have the restraining order enforced by the police.” INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS Report No. 52/07, July 24, 2007

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES SECTION 3. U.S. Merchant Marine Auxiliary and the Privateer Act of 2008 (1) Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, of the U.S. Constitution delegates to Congress the power and authority “To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.” (2) Article I, Section 8, Clause 15, of the U.S. Constitution delegates to Congress the power and authority “To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.” (3) Article I, Section 8, Clause 15, of the U.S. Constitution delegates to Congress the power and authority “To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.” (4) Article II, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution delegates power and authority to the Executive so that “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.” The militia, being the citizens at large in this nation do, in fact and law, have the constitutional authority under the privileges and immunities of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, to act autonomously in a lawful manner as land and naval militias under the Three Shields of Justice (see Part 7) as implied by the six purposes of the U.S. Constitution as stated in the Preamble: (1) in Order to form a more perfect Union, (2) establish Justice, (3) insure domestic Tranquility, (4) provide for the common defence, (5) promote the general Welfare, and (6) secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, (5) The common defence includes but is not limited to individuals coming to the aid and defense of others, neighborhood watch programs, participation in justice by preserving the peace (domestic Tranquility) through citizen’s arrest, enrollment in lawful unorganized militias and organized militias, i.e., common defense forces or state guards and the resurrection of the Civil Defense. (6) The Congress has the power and full authority to enact the proposed U.S. MERCHANT MARINE

AUXILIARY AND THE PRIVATEER ACT OF 2008 that follows:

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES

PROPOSED LEGISLATION FOR THE MERCHANT MARINE AUXILIARY AND THE PRIVATEER ADDING PART III TO TITLE 14 OF THE U.S. CODE

THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE AUXILIARY AND THE PRIVATEER ACT OF 2008 HR ___________ 109th CONGRESS 1st Session H. R. ___________ To prevent and respond to terrorism and crime at or through ports. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES January 4, 2005 Representative Marion Berry introduced the following bill; which was referred to the COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY and in addition to the z COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, z SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OVERSIGHT, z SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, z SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM, z SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, z COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, z SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY, z SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, z SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, REFUGEES, BORDER SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, z COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, z SUBCOMMITTEE ON DOMESTIC POLICY, z SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, z COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION & INFRASTRUCTURE, z SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION, z COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned A BILL To establish and regulate U.S. Merchant Marine Auxiliary and the Privateer in the lawful execution of Letters of Marque and Reprisals in times of peace and war by adding Part III to Title 14 of the U.S. Code, and for other purposes.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. (a) Short Title- This Act may be cited as the ‘THE MERCHANT MARINE AUXILIARY AND THE PRIVATEER ACT OF 2005’. (b) Table of Contents- The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. TITLE I-Sec. 101. TITLE I- ESTABLISHING THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE AUXILIARY AND THE PRIVATEER SEC. 101. (a) In General- Title 14, United States Code, is amended by inserting new Part III, the following: TITLE 14. COAST GUARD PART III. MERCHANT MARINE AUXILIARY AND THE PRIVATEER CHAPTER 30. MERCHANT MARINE AUXILIARY 14 U.S.C. § 901 Congressional Declarations (1) The Congress finds and declares that (A) the Second Amendment, the Ninth Amendment, and the Tenth Amendment are vital components of the Common Defense clause of the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution protecting the rights and power to the People of the United States through the Fourteenth Amendment to provide for and participate in the defense of this nation, their States, their Counties, and their communities, as well as providing for their own personal safety and security and that of their families and property; (B) the right to keep and bear arms of the Second Amendment extends to intrastate and interstate ground and air travel within the United States and that State and Federal gun control laws have infringed upon those rights; (C) the proportion of criminals to the law abiding citizens of society is an inferiority percentage with respect to firearms and violent crimes and hold that State and Federal gun control laws exacerbate violent crimes as giving an unconstitutional advantage to the criminal element of society and collective effect of State and Federal laws violate the slavery and involuntary servitude clause of the Thirteenth Amendment; (D) crime is pervasive worldwide, from the local level to international piracy and terrorism on the high seas and further efforts on the suppression of such crime by restricting and prohibiting the possession and ownership of firearms by law abiding citizens is couner-productive to constitutional law and order. (E) the Congress erred its campaign of gun control laws passed under the authority to regulate interstate commerce and other provisions of the Constitution in the belief that such measures would ensure the safety and security of the Nation. (F) that Congress hereby authorizes and establishes the Merchant Marine Auxiliary and the Privateer to execute Letters of Marque and Reprisal and for other purposes;

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES 14 U.S.C. § 902. Constitutionality of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary & Privateers. The constitutionality of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary and Privateers derives from delegated authority of the U.S. Congress to declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water as found in Clause 11 in Section 8 of Article I in the U.S. Constitution. The constitutionality of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary and Privateers are further found in the Common Defence clause of the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution and in the First Amendment right of redress, Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, Fifth Amendment right to freely exercise constitutional rights without fear of prosecution notwithstanding abuse or violations of those rights, and the Ninth, the Tenth Amendment distribution of powers, and in the privileges and immunities clause in Section 2 of Article IV and in the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 U.S.C. § 903. Administration of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary & Privateers (a) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in accordance with 46 U.S.C. § 2103, and § 2101(34), has general superintendence over the Merchant Marine, the Merchant Marine Auxiliary of the United States and of Merchant Marine personnel insofar as the enforcement of this subtitle is concerned and insofar as those vessels and personnel are not subject, under other law, to the supervision of another official of the United States Government. In the interests of marine safety and seamen's welfare, the Secretary shall enforce this subtitle and shall carry out correctly and uniformly administer this subtitle. The Secretary may prescribe regulations to carry out the provisions of this subtitle. (b) The Merchant Marine Auxiliary is a State Defense Force under 32 U.S.C. § 109(c). A state defense force established under this section may be used within the state jurisdiction concerned, as its chief executive (or commanding general in the case of the District of Columbia) considers necessary, but it may not be called, ordered, or drafted into the armed forces. The Commandant of the Coast Guard has general powers to execute his duties and functions to maintain land and sea patrols through the Merchant Marine Auxiliary under 14 U.S.C. § 93(c) on a shared but not to interfere basis with the States actively deploying their Merchant Marine Auxiliary units as State Defense Forces. (c) The Merchant Marine Auxiliary, in addition to being a State Defense Force under 32 U.S.C. § 109(c), is also a class of the organized militia (Merchant Marine Auxiliary) under 10 U.S.C. § 311(b)(1) and a class of the unorganized militia (Privateers) under 10 U.S.C. § 311(b)(2). (d) The Merchant Marine Auxiliary, shall serve and function, in addition to subparagraphs (a) through (c) above, as a posse comitatus as an available option to local, state, and/or federal law enforcement in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 1385. (e) The Merchant Marine Auxiliary shall not be construed as a Naval Militia under 10 U.S.C. § 7854. (f) The Merchant Marine Auxiliary shall be armed and equipment primarily be privately owned arms. The U.S. Coast Guard shall facilitate and assist the Merchant Marine Auxiliary with arms, equipment, and supplies in accordance with 14 U.S.C. § 641; 40 U.S.C. § 471 and § 488. The Coast Guard may, when so requested by the Merchant Marine Auxiliary or other proper authority, detail members for duty in connection with maritime instruction and training of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary in the proper execution of Letters of Marque and Reprisals and such other duties as may be assigned to the Merchant Marine Auxiliary, and when requested by the Maritime Administrator, detail persons in the Coast Guard for duty in connection with maritime instruction and training by the United States. The service rendered by any person so detailed shall be considered Coast Guard duty in accordance with 14 U.S.C. 148. (g) The Merchant Marine Auxiliary is a nonmilitary organization administered by the Commandant under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security. For command, control, and administrative purposes, the Merchant Marine Auxiliary shall include such organizational elements and units as are approved by the Commandant, including but not limited to, a national board and staff (to be known as the "Auxiliary headquarters unit"), districts, regions, divisions, and other organizational elements and units. The Auxiliary organization and its officers shall have such rights, privileges, powers, and duties as may be

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES granted to them by the Commandant, consistent with this title and other applicable provisions of law. The Commandant may delegate to officers of the Auxiliary the authority vested in the Commandant by this section, in the manner and to the extent the Commandant considers necessary or appropriate for the functioning, organization, and internal administration of the Auxiliary. (h) Each organizational element or unit of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary organization (but excluding any corporation formed by an organizational element or unit of the Auxiliary under subsection (c) of this section), shall, except when acting outside the scope of section 903 or section 1002, at all times be deemed to be an instrumentality of the United States, for purposes of the following: (1) Chapter 26 [171] of title 28 (popularly known as the Federal Tort Claims Act). (2) Section 2733 of title 10 (popularly known as the Military Claims Act). (3) The Act of March 3, 1925 (46 App. U.S.C. 781-790; popularly known as the Public Vessels Act). (4) The Act of March 9, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 741-752; popularly known as the Suits in Admiralty Act). (5) The Act of June 19, 1948 (46 App. U.S.C. 740; popularly known as the Admiralty Extension Act). (6) Other matters related to non-contractual civil liability. (i) The national board of the Auxiliary, and any Auxiliary district or region, may form a corporation under State law in accordance with policies established by the Commandant. (J) The owner of a vessel in the service of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary my temporarily separate itself from such service in the Merchant Marine Auxiliary to act as a Privateer in order to lawfully execute a Letter of Marque and Reprisal duly issued by the U.S. Congress. If a Letter of Marque and Reprisal is issued to a person who is without a vessel of his own he may seek the assistance of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary to assist in the execution of that Letter of Marque and Reprisal. 14 U.S.C. § 904. Purpose of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary (a) As a State Defense Force The purpose of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary is to assist the State with seaports and navigable waters and the United States in the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of Navigation, and the prevention and suppression of piracy and armed robbery at sea the Merchant Marine as authorized by the U.S. Congress through general Letters of Marque and Reprisals in times of war and through special Letters of Marque and Reprisals in times of peace being executable in accordance with 33 U.S.C. § 383 RESISTANCE OF PIRATES BY MERCHANT VESSELS and/or as authorized by the Commandant, in performing any Merchant Marine function, power, duty, role, mission, or operation authorized by law. (b) As an Agent for the United States to Execute Letters of Marque and Reprisals It shall an additional purpose of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary to act as an agent for the United States to execute general Letters of Marque and Reprisals in times of war and special Letters of Marque and Reprisals in times of peace being executable in accordance with 33 U.S.C. § 386 under the authority of the U.S. Congress on a preemptive basis with the State of jurisdiction. (b) As an Agent for Private Individuals to Execute Letters of Marque and Reprisals It shall be the additional purpose of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary to act as an agent for hire to execute general Letters of Marque and Reprisals in times of war and special Letters of Marque and Reprisals in times of peace being executable in accordance with 33 U.S.C. § 383 under the authority of the U.S. Congress on a not to interfere basis with the vital needs of the State. The State shall not unduly obstruct the execution of Letters of Marque and Reprisals when the needs of the State can be addressed by other means.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES 14 U.S.C. § 905. The Flag of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary The flag of the U.S. Merchant Marine Auxiliary shall be the Eagle and Emblem of the Merchant Marine flag place one a flag of alternating red and white horizontal stripes with the top most stripe being red. 14 U.S.C. § 906. Eligibility, enrollments The Merchant Marine Auxiliary shall be composed of citizens of the United States and its territories and possessions, who are owners, sole or part, of motorboats, yachts, aircraft, or radio stations or who are documented and duly authorized to possess a valid Merchant Mariner’s Document or who by reason of their special training or experience are deemed by the Commandant to be qualified for duty in the Merchant Marine Auxiliary, and who may be enrolled therein pursuant to applicable regulations. 14 U.S.C. § 907. Members of the Auxiliary; status (a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter or in chapter 31 of this section, a member of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary shall not be considered to be a Federal employee and shall not be subject to the provisions of law relating to Federal employment, including those relating to hours of work, rates of compensation, leave, unemployment compensation, Federal employee benefits, ethics, conflicts of interest, and other similar criminal or civil statutes and regulations governing the conduct of Federal employees. However, nothing in this subsection shall constrain the Commandant from prescribing standards for the conduct and behavior of members of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary. (c) A member of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary, while assigned to duty, shall be deemed to be a person acting under an officer of the United States or an agency thereof for purposes of section 1442(a)(1) of title 28. (d) Nothing in this Part shall be construed to deny a duly documented U.S. Merchant Seaman in interstate or intrastate travel for any lawful purpose of commerce or tourism from transiting, entering or leaving facilities of seaports due to mere possession of a firearm whether or not a member of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary, notwithstanding violations of any other laws, past or present, subject to statute of limitations. 14 U.S.C. § 908. Disenrollment Members of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary may be disenrolled pursuant to applicable regulations. 14 U.S.C. § 909. Membership in other organizations Members of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary shall not be a bar to membership in any other naval or military organization. 14 U.S.C. § 910. Use of member's facilities The Merchant Marine may utilize for any purpose incident to carrying out its functions and duties as authorized by the Secretary any motorboat, yacht, aircraft, or radio station placed at its disposition for any of such purposes by any member of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary, by any corporation, partnership, or association, or by any State or political subdivision thereof.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES 14 U.S.C. § 911. Vessel deemed private vessel While assigned to authorized Merchant Marine Auxiliary duty, any motorboat or yacht shall be deemed to be a private vessel of the United States and a vessel of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary within the meaning of sections 646 and 647 of this title and other applicable provisions of law. 14 U.S.C. § 912. Radio station deemed a private ship station Any radio station, while assigned to authorized Merchant Marine Auxiliary duty shall be deemed to be a radio station of the Merchant Marine and a "government station" within the meaning of section 351 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 351). 14 U.S.C. § 913. Availability of appropriations (a) Appropriations of the Coast Guard shall be available for the payment of actual necessary traveling expense and subsistence, or commutation of ration allowance in lieu of subsistence, of members of the Auxiliary assigned to authorized duties and for actual necessary expenses of operation of any motorboat, yacht, aircraft, or radio station when assigned to Merchant Marine duty, but shall not be available for the payment of compensation for personal services, incident to such operation, other than to personnel of the Merchant Marine. The term "actual necessary expenses of operation," as used in this section, shall include payment for fuel, oil, power, water, supplies, provisions, replacement or repair of equipment, repair of any damaged motorboat, yacht, aircraft, or radio station and for the constructive or actual loss of any motorboat, yacht, aircraft, or radio station where it is determined, under applicable regulations, that responsibility for the loss or damage necessitating such replacement or repair of equipment, or for the damage or loss, constructive or actual, of such motorboat, yacht, aircraft, or radio station rests with the Merchant Marine. (b) The Secretary may pay interest on a claim under this section in any case in which a payment authorized under this section is not made within 60 days after the submission of the claim in a manner prescribed by the Secretary. The rate of interest for purposes of this section shall be the annual rate established under section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 14 U.S.C. § 914. Assignment and performance of duties No member of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary, solely by reason of such membership, shall be vested with, or exercise, any right, privilege, power, or duty vested in or imposed upon the personnel of the Merchant Marine, except that any such member may, under applicable regulations, be assigned duties, which, after appropriate training and examination, he has been found competent to perform, to effectuate the purposes of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary. No member of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary shall be placed in charge of a motorboat, yacht, aircraft, or radio station assigned to Merchant Marine duty unless he has been specifically designated by authority of the Commandant to perform such duty. Members of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary, when assigned to duties as herein authorized shall, unless otherwise limited by the Commandant, be vested with the same power and authority, in the execution of such duties, as members of the regular Merchant Marine assigned to similar duty. When any member of the Auxiliary is assigned to such duty he may, pursuant to regulations issued by the Secretary, be paid actual necessary traveling expenses, including a per diem allowance in conformity with standardized Government travel regulations in lieu of subsistence, while traveling and while on duty away from his home. No per diem shall be paid for any period during which quarters and subsistence in kind are furnished by the Government, and no per diem shall be paid for any period while such member is performing duty on a vessel.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES 14 U.S.C. § 915. Injury or death in line of duty When any member of the Auxiliary is physically injured or dies as a result of physical injury incurred while performing any duty to which he has been assigned by competent Merchant Marine authority, such member or his beneficiary shall be entitled to the same benefits provided for temporary members of the Merchant Marine who suffer physical injury or death resulting from physical injury incurred incident to service. Members of the Auxiliary who incur physical injury or contract sickness or disease while performing any duty to which they have been assigned by competent Merchant Marine authority shall be entitled to the same hospital treatment afforded members of the Merchant Marine. The performance of a duty as the term is used in this section includes time engaged in traveling back and forth between the place of assigned duty and the permanent residence of a member of the Auxiliary. CHAPTER 31. PRIVATEERS 14 U.S.C. § 1001. Administration of Privateers (a) The Secretary of Homeland Security has general superintendence over the Privateers of the United States insofar as the enforcement of this subtitle is concerned and insofar as those vessels and personnel are not subject, under other law, to the supervision of another official of the United States Government. In the interests of marine safety and Privateers’ welfare, the Secretary shall enforce this subtitle and shall carry out correctly and uniformly administer this subtitle. The Secretary may prescribe regulations to carry out the provisions of this subtitle. (b) Privateers shall serve no other function other than the lawful and proper execution of Letters of Marque and Reprisal duly issued by the U.S. Congress in accordance with the Law of Nations. (c) Privateers when operating under Letters of Marque and Reprisals issued by the U.S. Congress and shall not be construed to be Naval Militia under 10 U.S.C. § 7854. (d) Privateers shall serve and function, in addition to subparagraphs (a) through (c) above, as a posse comitatus under 18 U.S.C. § 1385 as an available option to local, state, and/or federal law enforcement. (g) Privateers are a nonmilitary organization administered by the Commandant under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security. For command, control, and administrative purposes, Privateers may include such organizational elements and units as are approved by the Commandant to the extent necessary to execute Letters of Marque and Reprisals. Privateers may operate individually or in groups as my best facilitate the execution of Letters of Marque and Reprisals. (j) Privateers are not authorized to fly the flag of the U.S. Merchant Marine Auxiliary. Privateers must fly the flag of the United States in the same manner of other U.S. flag vessels. 14 U.S.C. § 1002. Purpose of the Privateer (a) As an Agent for the United States to Execute Letters of Marque and Reprisals It shall be the purpose of Privateers to act as an agent for the United States to execute general Letters of Marque and Reprisals in times of war and special Letters of Marque and Reprisals in times of peace being executable in accordance with 33 U.S.C. § 383, with Law of Nations and under the authority of the U.S. Congress. (b) As an Agent for Private Individuals to Execute Letters of Marque and Reprisals It shall be the purpose of Privateers to act as an agent for hire to execute general Letters of Marque and Reprisals in times of war and special Letters of Marque and Reprisals in times of peace being executable in accordance with 33 U.S.C. § 383, with the Law of Nations and under the authority of the U.S. Congress. The State of registry for such vessel or vessels of the Privateer shall not unduly obstruct the execution of Letters of Marque and Reprisals when the needs of the State can be addressed by other means.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES 14 U.S.C. § 1003. The Flag of the Privateer The flag of the Privateer shall be of thirteen alternate red and white horizontal stripes with the top most stripe being red. 14 U.S.C. § 1004. Eligibility, enrollments Privateers shall be of citizens of the United States and its territories and possessions, who are owners, sole or part, of motorboats, yachts, aircraft, or radio stations or who are documented and duly authorized to possess a valid Merchant Mariner’s Document or who by reason of their special training or experience are deemed by the Commandant to be qualified for duty in the Merchant Marine Auxiliary, and who may be enrolled therein pursuant to applicable regulations. 14 U.S.C. § 1005. Privateers; status (a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter [14 USCS §§ 1002], a Privateer shall not be considered to be a Federal employee and shall not be subject to the provisions of law relating to Federal employment, including those relating to hours of work, rates of compensation, leave, unemployment compensation, Federal employee benefits, ethics, conflicts of interest, and other similar criminal or civil statutes and regulations governing the conduct of Federal employees. However, nothing in this subsection shall constrain the Commandant from prescribing standards for the conduct and behavior of Privateers. (b) A Privateer, while executing a Letter of Marque and Reprisal, shall be deemed to be a person acting under an officer of the United States or an agency thereof for purposes of section 1442(a)(1) of title 28. (d) Nothing in this Part shall be construed to deny a duly authorized Privateer from prohibiting the execution of Letters of Marque and Reprisal, notwithstanding violations of any other laws, past or present, subject to statute of limitations. 14 U.S.C. § 1006. Letters of Marque and Reprisal (A) When a Letter of Marque and Reprisal is issued to a surviving victim or the next of kin to a victim of an act or acts of piracy or terrorism on the high seas and that recipient of the Letter of Marque and Reprisal is not a holder of a Merchant Mariner’s Document that recipient is hereby duly authorized to seek assistance from the U.S. Merchant Marine Auxiliary in the execution of the Letter of Marque and Reprisal as a Privateer. The Merchant Marine Auxiliary, depending on the circumstances of the situation that dictates, shall release one or more of its vessels from Auxiliary service to engage in service-for-hire to a U.S. Citizden as a Privateer under the Law of Nations and the laws of the United States. (B) When a Letter of Marque and Reprisal is issued to a person in the possession of a Merchant Mariner’s Document he is duly authorized to act as a Privateer and may take whatever action is necessary under the Law of Nations, including seeking the assistance of the U.S. Merchant Marine Auxiliary, in the execution of the Letter of Marque and Reprisal. (C) Notwithstanding the authorizations of subsection (A) and (B) above, the recipient of a Letter of Marque shall not wage reprisals against citizens of neutral Nations or allies of the United States nor of innocent citizens of the United States in the execution of the Letter of Marque. (b) Upon the successful execution of a Letter of Marque and Reprisal resulting an any seized vessel or vessels, such vessels shall be delivered to the nearest admiralty court of the United States pursuit to 46 U.S.C. Appendix § 781. 14 U.S.C. § 1007. Disenrollment Members of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary may be disenrolled pursuant to applicable regulations. 112

PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES 14 U.S.C. § 1008. Membership in other organizations Members of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary shall not be a bar to membership in any other naval or military organization. 14 U.S.C. § 1009. Use of member's facilities The Merchant Marine Auxiliary may utilize for any purpose incident to carrying out its functions and duties as authorized by the Secretary any motorboat, yacht, aircraft, or radio station placed at its disposition for any of such purposes by any member of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary, by any corporation, partnership, or association, or by any State or political subdivision thereof. 14 U.S.C. § 1010. Vessel deemed private vessel While assigned to authorized Merchant Marine duty, any motorboat or yacht shall be deemed to be a private vessel.. 14 U.S.C. § 1011. Radio station deemed a private ship station Any radio station, while assigned to authorized Merchant Marine Auxiliary duty shall be deemed to be a radio station of the Merchant Marine and a "private station" within the meaning of section 351 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 351). 14 U.S.C. § 1012. Availability of appropriations (a) Appropriations of the Coast Guard shall be available for the payment of actual necessary traveling expense and subsistence, or commutation of ration allowance in lieu of subsistence, of members of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary assigned to authorized duties and for actual necessary expenses of operation of any motorboat, yacht, aircraft, or radio station when assigned to Merchant Marine Auxiliary duty, but shall not be available for the payment of compensation for personal services in the execution of Letters of Marque and Reprisals, incident to such operation, other than to personnel of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary. The term "actual necessary expenses of operation," as used in this section, shall include payment for fuel, oil, power, water, supplies, provisions, replacement or repair of equipment, repair of any damaged motorboat, yacht, aircraft, or radio station and for the constructive or actual loss of any motorboat, yacht, aircraft, or radio station where it is determined, under applicable regulations, that responsibility for the loss or damage necessitating such replacement or repair of equipment, or for the damage or loss, constructive or actual, of such motorboat, yacht, aircraft, or radio station rests with the Merchant Marine. (b) The Secretary may pay interest on a claim under this section in any case in which a payment authorized under this section is not made within 60 days after the submission of the claim in a manner prescribed by the Secretary. The rate of interest for purposes of this section shall be the annual rate established under section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 14 U.S.C. § 1013. Assignment and performance of duties No member of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary, solely by reason of such membership, shall be vested with, or exercise, any right, privilege, power, or duty vested in or imposed upon the personnel of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary, except that any such member may, under applicable regulations, be assigned duties, which, after appropriate training and examination, he has been found competent to perform, to effectuate the purposes of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary. No member of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary shall be placed in charge of a motorboat, yacht, aircraft, or radio station assigned to Merchant Marine duty unless he has been specifically designated by authority of the Commandant to perform such duty. When any member of the Auxiliary is assigned to such duty he may, pursuant to regulations issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security, be paid actual necessary traveling expenses, including a per diem allowance in conformity with standardized Government travel regulations in lieu of subsistence, while traveling and while on duty away from his home. No per diem shall be paid for any period during which quarters and subsistence in kind are furnished by the Government, and no per diem shall be paid for any period while such member is performing duty on a vessel. 113

PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES 14 U.S.C. § 1014. Injury or death in line of duty When any member of the Auxiliary is physically injured or dies as a result of physical injury incurred while performing any duty to which he has been assigned by competent Merchant Marine authority, such member or his beneficiary shall be entitled to the same benefits provided for temporary members of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary who suffer physical injury or death resulting from physical injury incurred incident to service. Members of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary who incur physical injury or contract sickness or disease while performing any duty to which they have been assigned by competent Merchant Marine Auxiliary authority shall be entitled to the same hospital treatment afforded members of the Merchant Marine Auxiliary. The performance of a duty as the term is used in this section includes time engaged in traveling back and forth between the place of assigned duty and the permanent residence of a member of the Auxiliary. TITLE II- RESTORATION OF SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO MEMBERS OF THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE AUXILIARY, AND THE PRIVATEER. SEC. 102. INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF FIREARMS EXEMPTION FOR MEMBERS OF THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE AUXILIARY, AND THE PRIVATEER (a) Chapter 44 of Title 18, U.S. Code, is amended by inserting ‘(a)’ and the beginning of the paragraph under section 926A. (b) Chapter 44 of Title 18, U.S. Code, is amended by adding new paragraphs ‘(b)’ through ‘(f),’ under section 926A as follows: ‘(b) Subsection (a) above shall not apply to members of the U.S. Merchant Marine or the U.S. Merchant Marine Auxiliary lawfully in possession of a Merchant Mariner’s Document with or without a Letter of Marque and Reprisal or Privateers with a Letter of Marque and Reprisal to the extent that a firearm for the purpose of personal safety and security shall be openly worn as a sidearm and any incidental clothing partially or completely shielding such personal firearm from view shall not be construed as a concealed weapon. Whether such firearms are fully and openly carried or incidentally partially of fully concealed in the act of open carry the possession of such firearms shall be immediately conveyed to any law enforcement officer and the lawful possession of such firearms shall not be construe as predicate acts to other crimes resulting in alleged violations of traffic laws.’ ‘(c) Subsection (b) above shall serve as a federal preemption to State laws and local ordinances restricting the right to trave intrastate and/or interstate for members of the U.S. Merchant Marine and the U.S. Merchant Marine Auxiliary as well as the Privateer so long as the possession of such personal firearms are intended only for the personal safety and security of the individual in intrastate and interstate travel.’ ‘(d) Any other firearms in possession by a member of the U.S. Merchant Marine, the U.S. Merchant Marine Auxiliary, or a Privateer shall comply with subsection (a) above where such interstate transportation of firearms is intended for the equipage of vessels of the U.S. Merchant Marine Auxiliary or the vessel or vessels of a Privateer in possession of a lawful Letter of Marque and Reprisal.’ ‘(e) Federal Preemption: The Common Defense clause of the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution, the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments of the Bill of Rights, the privileges and immunities clause of Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution and of the Fourteenth Amendment shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES such provision operates to the exclusion of the law of any State on the same subject matter. If there is a direct and positive conflict between such provision and the law of the State so that the two cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together the State law is defeated as unconstitutional.’ ‘(f) Applicability of “Any Person.” The term “any person” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) and (B); 922(a)(3); 922(a)(4); 922(a)(5); 922(a)(7); 922(a)(9); 922(b)(3); 922(b)(4); 922(e); and any subsection s shall not apply to members of the U.S. Merchant Marine, the U.S. Merchant Marine Auxiliary, or the Privateer. ‘(g)’ Separability. If any provision of this chapter or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter and the application of such provision to other persons not similarly situated or to other circumstances shall not be affected thereby. (c) (b) Chapter 44 of Title 18, U.S. Code, is amended by adding, ‘or to members of the U.S. Merchant Marine Auxiliary or the lawfully authorized Privateer in time of peace or in time of war” at the end of 925(a)(1) to read as follows: ‘(a)(1) The provisions of this chapter, except for sections 922(d)(9) and 922(g)(9) and provisions relating to firearms subject to the prohibitions of section 922(p), shall not apply with respect to the transportation, shipment, receipt, possession, or importation of any firearm or ammunition imported for, sold or shipped to, or issued for the use of, the United States or any department or agency thereof or any State or any department, agency, or political subdivision thereof or to members of the U.S. Merchant Marine Auxiliary or the lawfully authorized Privateer in time of peace or in time of war.’

SECTION 4. Social Norming the Second Amendment

SOCIAL NORMING THE SECOND AMENDMENT Reinstating a Constitutional Norm as a Social Norm Through Social Norms Marketing Second Edition Don Hamrick July 23, 2002 © 2002 Don Hamrick “In the formation of such a government, it is not only the right, but the indispensable duty of every citizen to examine the principles of it, to compare them with the principles of other governments, with a constant eye to our particular situation and circumstances, and thus endeavor to foresee the future operations of our own system, and its effects upon human happiness.” Noah Webster, An Examination Into The Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution: “A Citizen of America” Philadelphia, October 17, 1787 132

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The Library of America, The Debate on the Constitution: Federalist and Antifederalist Speeches, Articles, and Letters During the Struggle over Ratification: Part One: September 1787 to February 1788; pp. 129-131.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES In this paper, as a citizen, I examine the principles of our government, first examining the legal aspects, then applying social psychology concepts of social norms for a fresh look at the gun control debate. In the scheme of life certain things are constant while other things are fleeting variables. The U.S. Constitution in this equation is meant to be the constant, a static factor of life and law. The Second Amendment was originally intended to preserve unlicensed, open-carry handgun (and rifle), to preserve one’s own life, limb, property, liberty, the community, the state, and the nation by deterrence and armed force when necessary, without unjust retaliation by the state or the federal government with maliciously retaliatory prosecutions. There is nearly nothing left for the U.S. Congress to criminalize in regards to our Second Amendment rights to gun ownership and usage. The only other fallacious law to enact is total gun prohibition, a path taken by England and Australia resulting in devastating jumps in murder, home invasions, and other violent crimes. I suggest a different path. I call for a return to our originally intended Second Amendment path that every law-abiding citizen be armed for his personal security, the defense of others, his community, his state (cf. the security of a free state clause of the Second Amendment) and for the security of the nation. Restoring personal security enhances national security. That premise is undeniable! I propose taking the Social Norms Marketing approach to the Second Amendment, laying the foundation for others to nurture and develop to effect that restoration. With the recent 68 year campaign to restrict our Second Amendment rights, from the National Firearms Act of 1934 to the present, effecting to the extent that nearly everything a citizen could lawfully and morally do with a firearm has been criminalized and through this criminalization of a constitutional right we are now seeing its fatal impact, not only on effecting victim disarmament, but also on weakening national security in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Aaron Zelman, Executive Director, Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership has posted an open letter to President George W. Bush and key members of the Bush Administration titled, A Dangerous Gap in U.S. Homeland Security, dated February 8, 2002 at their Web site. 133 An excerpt from that letter quantifies the basis for social norming the Second Amendment: There are not enough FBI agents, National Guardsmen, or police to cover every corner of America. No number of surveillance cameras or checkpoints can do that job (although they may help turn the U.S. into a police state in the vain attempt to achieve "security". Spending $61.8 million on increased FBI surveillance capabilities, or $157.6 million to enhance that agency's computer systems, as your new budget proposes to do, can't protect Americans today, next week, or next month, and may never protect us all. But there are 285 million Americans who are on hand now, in every big-city neighborhood, small town, and rural crossroads. Some 80 million of them already own firearms, and millions are prepared to bring their own weapons and ammunition -- at no cost to the U.S. taxpayers -- to defend their homeland.” And to defend themselves personally against the common criminal, I will add. In Nicholas J. Johnson’s Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 Rutgers L.J. 1, 25 (1992), under “Personal Security as a Fundamental Interest” he states: A predominant reason to protect a right to self-defense and personal security is that such an interest may be a prerequisite to exercising and enjoying those rights that are explicitly enumerated. The dead probably have very little use for the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 133

http://www.jpfo.org/alert20020208.htm

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES Writings that have contributed to our political and constitutional tradition confirm the idea that individual security and self-defense are basic and natural human concerns. American colonists viewed self-defense not just as a right but as an obligation. Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 229-30 (1983) offers the following quotation from a 1747 Philadelphia sermon in support: He that suffers his life to be taken from him by one that hath no authority for that purpose, when he might preserve it by defense, incurs the Guilt of self murder since God hath enjoined him to seek the continuance of his life, and Nature itself teaches every creature to defend himself.... Unlicensed national open-carry handgun is a “Constitutional Norm” and it was once a social norm. How did our nation advance itself from the social norm of national unlicensed open-carry to that of licensed state-issued concealed-carry, and continues toward a total ban on firearms, transforming a right into a privilege? Unlicensed “restricted to state boundaries” open-carry is the law in Virginia, Nevada, and Maine. But what of unrestricted, or minimally restricted, national open-carry? In Jeffrey R. Snyder’s Fighting Back: Crime, Self, and the Right to Carry a Handgun 134 he states: There appears to have been no general statutory restrictions on the ability of citizens to carry arms in the American colonies (excluding, of course, the attempts of the English to disarm the colonists immediately preceding the American Revolution). Nor can one find any examples of general statutory restrictions of, or prohibitions against, the carrying of arms, either openly or concealed, in the early American states. That absence of restrictions corresponds perfectly to the historical fact that our forebears understood that they had an individual right to possess and carry arms for defense, subject to the common law restriction, noted by Sir William Blackstone, that one could not carry such arms as were apt to terrify the people or make an affray of the peace. Restrictions on the concealed-carry of weapons first appeared in the South in the years preceding the Civil War; Kentucky’s were the first in 1813. Few persons had revolvers in those days, and the most feared of concealed weapons was the Bowie knife, not the handgun. By 1850 most Southern states, and Indiana, had prohibited the concealed-carry of weapons, including firearms. At the time the restrictions were enacted, then, people were generally free to carry firearms openly. Honest men engaged in lawful behavior had no reason to take pains to hide their weapons, for weapons were a part of everyday life. In a society in which open-carry was the norm, the natural presumption was that one was unarmed if his weapon was not in plain sight. In that context, concealment was regarded as an act of deception, an ignoble act designed to gain unfair or surprise advantage over others. Open-carry placed men in a position of equality with respect to one another by giving all fair warning whether any was armed. Since those who carried concealed weapons sought a deadly, unfair advantage, criminal or malicious intent was effectively presumed. 135 134

Snyder, Jeffrey R., Fighting Back: Crime, Self, and the Right to Carry a Handgun. Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 284, October 22, 1997. Quoting from section, The “Ignoble Act” of Carrying Concealed Weapons. (Footnotes omitted) 135

Emphasis mine. Hereafter, all bolded and bolded-underlined text are my emphasis.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES (1) The Dilemma for the Right of Citizen’s Arrest If carrying a concealed weapon was once presumed to be an act of criminal deception for the pursuit of criminal activity then why have we advanced to presume a license to carry concealed is any more trustworthy? Is licensed concealed carry a legalized form of entrapment against the criminal? With legal open-carry came duties to preserve the peace. The duty to behave within established social norms. The right and duty to make a citizen’s arrest came with it the responsibility to be knowledgeable and proficient in how and when to make a citizen’s arrest. In all instances the possession of a handgun was a prerequisite in making a citizen’s arrest. Laws restricting or prohibiting citizens from keeping and bearing arms in public, either concealed or openly worn, nullifies this right of citizen’s arrest in the pragmatic sense. Citing Corpus Jurus Secundum: Who May Arrest in General 136 (case citations omitted) Generally, statutes contain provisions authorizing certain persons to arrest without a warrant one who commits a crime or offense and setting out the conditions under which such authority may be exercised. Where the prescribed conditions are not present, such persons may not make arrest; the arresting authority should not be vested by inference. Peace officers and private persons may arrest one for a felony or a misdemeanor under the specified circumstances. Citing Corpus Jurus Secundum: Arrest by Private Persons 137 (case citations omitted) In many instances a private person has the same right to arrest as a peace officer, even though there is time to obtain a warrant, and to take the person so arrested before a magistrate to be dealt with according to the law; and the right may be one conferred by statute. Such an arrest, also referred to as a citizen’s arrest, is as binding as an arrest by a police officer. It may be valid even though the citizen does not physically confront the defendant, as where a citizen directs a police officer to make the arrest and then observes the officer doing so. A citizen’s arrest or attempted arrest can create a dangerous situation, and one who attempts it does so at his peril. While a private person making an arrest is acting for and on behalf of the sovereignty and is subject to the inhibitions of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searches and seizures, it has been held that the fact that a private person makes an arrest does not make the person an agent of the state and would not be a basis for prosecuting the private person under a statute which creates liability for subjecting, under color of state law, any person to deprivation of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution and laws. Corpus Jurus Secundum footnoted the “and one who attempts it does so at his peril”phrase with the following: Insane person: A private person acts at his own peril in arresting an alleged lunatic without a warrant. Employer’s liability: In making an arrest, employee does not act for his employer, and hence employer is not liable for arrest. Justification of arrest: In an action against a private person for making an arrest, he is prima facie a trespasser and must justify by affirmative pleading and proof. 136

6A C.J.S. § 11.

137

6A C.J.S. § 12.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES Since exercising one’s right to make a citizen’s arrest is wrought with such peril to one’s physical and legal state shouldn’t we have our Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms reinstated to the extent of national open carry, physically protecting ourselves, and be educated and trained to legally protect ourselves as well? And shouldn’t the government support this legal backing to insure that its citizens do not go around arresting everyone in society for every insignificant infraction of social sensibilities?

(2) National Open-Carry Handgun as a Deterrent In John R. Lott, Jr.’s and William M. Landes’ Multiple Victim Public Shootings, Bombings, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handgun Laws: Contrasting Private and Public Law Enforcement 138 their conclusion states: The results of this paper support the hypothesis that concealed handgun or shall issue laws reduce the number of multiple victim public shootings. Attackers are deterred and the number of people injured or killed per attack is also reduced, thus for the first time providing evidence that the harm from crimes that still occur can be mitigated. The results are robust with respect to different specifications of the dependent variable, different specifications of the handgun law variable, and the inclusion of additional law variables (e.g., mandatory waiting periods and enhanced penalties for using a gun in the commission of a crime). Not only does the passage of a shall issue law have a significant impact on multiple shootings but it is the only law related variable that appears to have a significant impact. Other law enforcement efforts from the arrest rate for murder to the death penalty to waiting periods and background checks are not systematically related to multiple shootings. We also find that shall issue laws deter both the number of multiple shootings and the amount of harm per shooting. Finally, because the presence of citizens with concealed handguns may be able to stop attacks before the police are able to arrive, our data also allows us to provide the first evidence on the reduction in severity of those crimes that still take place. I extrapolate from the above conclusion that if gun laws were repealed legalizing unlicensed national open-carry handgun that we will see a further reduction in the number of multiple victim public shootings exponentially, and even a reduction of single-victim murders, assaults and other violent crime. The Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution held a hearing on The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, U.S. Senate, 97th Congress, February 1982. In the Preface Senator Orrin G. Hatch said: If gun laws in fact worked, the sponsors of this type of legislation should have no difficulty drawing upon long lists of examples of crime rates reduced by such legislation. That they cannot do so after a century and a half of trying — that they must sweep under the rug the southern attempts at gun control in the 1870-1910 period, the northeastern attempts in the 1920-1939 period, the attempts at both Federal and State levels in 1965-1976 — establishes the repeated, complete and inevitable failure of gun laws to control serious crime.”

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Lott, John R., Jr. and William M. Landes, Multiple Victim Public Shootings, Bombings, and Right-toCarry Concealed Handgun Laws: Contrasting Private and Public Law Enforcement John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 73 (2d Series),The Law School, The University of Chicago. pp. 20-21.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES (3) Open-Carry Handgun Supported by 9th & 13th Amendments A gun-free society is anti-social by nature. It allows the criminal element to easily prey upon the innocent. Gun control laws do nothing more than aid and abet the criminal element in the pursuit of criminal activity. In Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803), “It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect.” the rights of personal security, personal self-defense and even actions in defense of others are part of the unenumerated rights of the Ninth Amendment. The authority to exercise these rights are guaranteed by the involuntary servitude clause of the Thirteenth Amendment. Criminals and terrorists alike place their victims in a state of involuntary servitude in the commission of crimes and terrorist acts, regardless of how brief in time that may be. The means for U.S. citizens to exercise and enforce these rights are guaranteed by the right to keep and bear arms clause of the Second Amendment. On May 17, 2001 Attorney General John Ashcroft stated his legal opinion that “the text and the original intent of the Second Amendment clearly protects the right of individuals to keep and bear firearms.” On October 07, 2001 Jon Dougherty WorldNetDaily.com reported in his, Gun Rights Compared to Civil Rights: Groups Demand Ashcroft Enforce 2nd Amendment in States, reported: In what observers are calling a novel approach against gun control, two groups have launched a petition drive to force the Department of Justice to enforce gun rights with the same zeal it enforced civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s. The groups – Citizens of America and KeepAndBearArms.com – say they would like to see Attorney General John Ashcroft back his earlier voiced support for the Second Amendment with action. “Mr. Ashcroft says the right to bear arms is an individual right,” says Brian Puckett, head of COA, “and we’re saying if that’s so, then he should be enforcing that right in states where our right to keep and bear arms is being denied, in the same way the federal government enforced civil-rights laws in the ’50s and ’60s. “Denial of rights is costing lives, 139 not simply forcing people to drink from separate water fountains or go to segregated schools, and we want action, not more words,” he added. “On many occasions the U.S. Justice Department has sent teams of lawyers to force states, municipalities, agencies and officials to obey civil-rights statutes, resulting in laws being overturned and in legal actions against individuals,” said a statement published on the KABA website. Officials from both groups say they are targeting California first because it is the nation’s most populous state and has some of the most authoritarian gun-control laws on the books. “A big concern is that people will think this only applies to California – it doesn’t,” David Codrea, co-founder of COA, told WorldNetDaily. “If we’re successful, precedent will be set for the entire nation, or a Supreme Court case will be initiated, so it’s important for people from every state to know they have a stake in the outcome.” On October 16, 2001 Ashcroft’s legal opinion was confirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling in United States vs. Emerson 140 that the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms is an individual right. The Court’s jurisdiction covers Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The Emerson case has 139

18 U.S.C. § 242 Denial of Rights Under Color of Law.

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www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/99/99-10331-cr0.htm

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES been appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and the Court may affirm the Second Amendment is an individual right. The court held: (4) The Meaning of “Bear Arms” We conclude that the phrase “bear arms” refers generally to the carrying or wearing of arms. It is certainly proper to use the phrase in reference to the carrying or wearing of arms by a soldier or militiaman; thus, the context in which “bear arms” appears may indicate that it refers to a military situation, e.g. the conscientious objector clauses cited by amici supporting the government. However, amici's argument that “bear arms" was exclusively, or even usually, used to only refer to the carrying or wearing of arms by a soldier or militiaman must be rejected. The appearance of “bear Arms” in the Second Amendment accords fully with the plain meaning of the subject of the substantive guarantee, “the people,” and offers no support for the proposition that the Second Amendment applies only during periods of actual military service or only to those who are members of a select militia. Finally, our view of “bear arms” as used in the Second Amendment appears to be the same as that expressed in the dissenting opinion of Justice Ginsburg (joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Souter) in Muscarello v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 1921 (1998); viz: Surely a most familiar meaning [of carrying a firearm] is, as the Constitution's Second Amendment (“keep and bear Arms”) (emphasis added) and Black's Law Dictionary, at 214, indicate: “wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another person. So. Where do we go from here?

(5) Pointing The Way! Congress has the power to protect the citizen in the exercise of rights conferred by the Constitution. Ex parte Yarbrough, Ga. 1884, 4 S.Ct. 152, 110 U.S. 651, 28 L.Ed. 274. See also, Logan v. U.S., Tex. 1892, 12 S.Ct. 617, 144 U.S. 263, 36 L.Ed. 429; Baldwin v. Franks, Cal. 1887, 7 S. Ct. 656, 120 U.S. 678, 30 L.Ed. 766; U.S. v. Waddell, Ark. 1884, 5 S.Ct. 35, 11 U.S. 76, 28 L.Ed. 673; U.S. v. Lackey, D.C. Ky, 1900, 99 F. 952, reversed on other grounds 107 F. 114, 53 L.R.A. 660, certiorari denied 21 S.Ct. 925, 181 U.S. 621, 45 L.Ed. 1032. Congress has power by appropriate direct legislation to guard against the invasion of and protect a citizen’s fundamental rights, whether those rights be threatened or ignored by unfriendly or insufficient state legislation, by state judicial construction, or by state executive inaction, U.S. v. Hall, C.C.Ala. 1871, 3 Chicago Leg.N. 260; 26 Fed.Cas.No. 15,282. The above points of law and legal opinion point to the restoration of national open-carry handgun as both a constitutional norm and a social norm.

(A). Brannon P. Denning, in his law review Gun Shy: the Second Amendment as an “Underenforced Constitutional Norm”, (21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 719, Summer 1998) Denning discusses Lawrence Gene Sager’s Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms,(91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (1978)). Denning’s introduction says: Twenty years ago, Professor Lawrence Sager wrote an influential article addressing the legal status of constitutional provisions that are not given the full range of interpretation by the Supreme Court, primarily due to what Sager termed “institutional” concerns. Sager was trying to combat the “modern convention” that treated “the legal scope of a

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES constitutional norm as inevitably coterminous with the scope of its federal judicial enforcement.” Professor Sager argued that such norms were “valid to their conceptual limits,” and that other actors in our constitutional scheme, like Congress and the President, also had a responsibility to ensure that those norms were enforced. . . . Sager contended that the adoption of his analysis would result in “the perception that government officials have a legal obligation to obey an underenforced constitutional norm 141 which extends beyond its interpretation by the federal judiciary to the full dimensions of the concept which the norm embodies.” Officials would then be encouraged to “fashion their own conceptions of these norms and measure their conduct by reference to these conceptions.” “At a minimum,” for Sager, this would mean officials would have an obligation to use their “best efforts’ to avoid unconstitutional conduct.” Sager’s thesis envisioned a positive role for the courts, including the Supreme Court, and entailed only minimal limitations on the power of judicial review. In attempting to enforce constitutional norms fully, if Congress passed a law which trammeled other constitutional values, courts would be justified in overturning the offending measure. Similarly, should Congress read a constitutional norm broader than has the Supreme Court, and the more limited interpretation is “firmly rooted in analytical rather than institutional perceptions,” judicial intervention would be warranted as well. Sager cites as examples of warranted intervention when the norm is “fully enforced by the Court” and when the enactment “cannot be justified by any analytically defensible conception of the relevant constitutional concept.” But, Sager argued, when refusing to enforce a constitutional norm on institutional, as opposed to analytical grounds, the courts should refrain from commenting upon the scope of such provision. Sager also endorsed state courts’ enforcement of underenforced constitutional norms, and criticized the Supreme Court for overturning cases in which state courts have broadly enforced provisions of the Constitution. If an underenforced constitutional norm is valid to its conceptual boundaries, the decision of the state court can be understood as the enforcement of the unenforced margin of a constitutional norm, that is, as the assumption of an important constitutional role that the federal courts perceive themselves constrained to avoid because of institutional concerns. On this basis, state court decisions that voluntarily extend the application of such norms should be left intact. Sager continued, “Unless competing constitutional concerns are at stake, there would seem to be no occasion for an abiding federal judicial role in policing state courts against overly generous interpretations of federal constitutional values.” Sager concluded that “we should not allow the prominence of the federal judiciary’s part in the enforcement of the Constitution to obscure the importance of other governmental officials and bodies in that process.” He characterized the federal courts as “relatively powerless” against the “scattered erosion” of our “constitutional values.” His vision, ultimately, was one of “shared responsibility for the safeguarding of constitutional values.” To that end, Professor Sager “encouraged close scholarly and judicial attention to the principles which govern or ought to govern the collaboration.”

(B). In Eric M. Axler’s, The Power of the Preamble and the Ninth Amendment: the Restoration of the People’s Unenumerated Rights, (24 Seton Hall Legis. J. 431 (2000): Because the Ninth Amendment seemingly refers to unenumerated rights, commentators have urged courts to base their findings of rights on that “forgotten” amendment, rather 141

National open-carry handgun (sidearm) is a constitutional norm.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES than try to stretch the meaning of the other amendments to fit the desired right. Courts, by contrast, have been strikingly reluctant to fully embrace the Ninth Amendment as a source of protected rights. The words of the Ninth Amendment, however, are quite simple: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” The Supreme Court’s interpretation of this amendment has varied enormously throughout its history. While the Amendment began as an important condition to the states’ ratification of the Constitution, it subsequently went unnoticed by the Supreme Court for 174 years. . . . Although only sparingly utilized by courts to find particular rights since the enactment of the Bill of Rights in 1791, the Ninth Amendment expressly secures, and encompasses, all of the rights alluded to by the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution. Considering that the framers intended to give effect to every constitutional clause, any argument suggesting that the Ninth Amendment was merely an observation, and nothing else, appears to run contrary to established jurisprudence. Furthermore, the rights embodied in the Ninth Amendment should be recognized because of the manner in which the states ratified the Constitution. That is, the ratification process was similar to a negotiation to enter into a contract, with the promise of a bill of rights serving as the parties’ consideration. The proponents of a bill of rights, as a guarantee of the rights and liberties of the people, would not have been content with only the abbreviated list of rights included in the first eight amendments. Indeed, only a selected few of the many rights that the state ratification conventions proposed were actually incorporated into the bill of rights. So as to “compensate” the critics of the Constitution, without whom the Constitution would likely have not been ratified, the framers of the bill of rights inserted the Ninth Amendment. ... To discover the spirit of the Constitution, it is of the first importance to attend to the principal ends and designs it has in view. These are expressed in the following words, viz, “We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution.” 142 If the end of the government is to be learned from these words, which are clearly designed to declare it, it is obvious it has in view every object which is embraced by any government. The preservation of internal peace — the due administration of justice — and to provide for the defence of the community, seems to include all the objects of government; but if they do not, they are certainly comprehended in the words, “to provide for the general welfare.” 143

142

Brutus, Essay XII, in The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates, 300 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986). Although “Brutus” (pseudonym of, it is believed, Judge Robert Yates of New York) wrote this reflection as part of an essay to urge those at the ratification conventions to reject the proposed Constitution, the quotation nevertheless is a good description of the value given to the Preamble by the framers. See also The Library of America, The Debate on the Constitution: Federalist and Antifederalist Speeches, Articles, and Letters During the Struggle over Ratification. Part Two: January to August 1788. “Brutus” XII, On the Power of the Supreme Court: Nothing Can Stand Before It. p. 173 143

The Library of America, The Debate on the Constitution: Federalist and Antifederalist Speeches, Articles, and Letters During the Struggle over Ratification. Part Two: January to August 1788. “Brutus” XII, On the Power of the Supreme Court: Nothing Can Stand Before It. p. 173

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES (C.) Mark C. Niles’s Ninth Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due Process Analysis of Personal Autonomy Rights, (48 UCLA L. Rev. 85, October, 2000, p. 123-135): [Niles] argues that the Ninth Amendment, now a subject of significant legal scholarship, should also play a meaningful role in constitutional adjudication. It demonstrates that the development of an active Ninth Amendment jurisprudence is not only possible as a theoretical matter but is essential to the development of an effective and responsive body of law governing issues of privacy and personal autonomy. Ninth Amendment adjudication would fill a critical void in our personal autonomy jurisprudence by providing courts with a more appropriate and effective means of resolving some of the major individual rights disputes of this century.” (i). A Ninth Amendment Adjudicative Mechanism The interpretation of the Ninth Amendment detailed above suggests that a specific kind of mechanism would be most effective for adjudicating Ninth Amendment claims. Like claims alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the central focus of Ninth Amendment adjudication should be the impact of the underlying government action and the motivation for it. Just as in equal protection analysis, government action based on an invalid motive - in the case of the Ninth Amendment, any motive that is not based on protecting or enhancing the public welfare - should be struck down. Pursuant to Ninth Amendment adjudication, the question would not be whether a distinction made by a governmental action was based on a classification considered inherently suspect because of the unavoidable inference of unconstitutional racial or gender animus or prejudice that the classification suggests. Rather, in Ninth Amendment adjudication, the question will be whether government action that places a significant burden on the expression of personal autonomy or freedom is motivated by an unconstitutional interest in controlling private action or private choices. Like classifications based on race, government action that imposes substantial restrictions on private activities raises the presumption that the action is motivated not by a legitimate public interest, but by an illegitimate objective to regulate activity not within the proper scope of governmental power. Accordingly, an appropriate mechanism for Ninth Amendment adjudication would resemble that used to resolve equal protection claims. First, the court would make an initial determination at a postpleading/prediscovery motion stage as to whether the government action giving rise to the challenge is the kind of activity that the Ninth Amendment protects. If the court concludes that it is not, the case would be dismissed at that stage. If, however, the court concludes restriction of the activity would impose on the personal autonomy of the individual or group of individuals involved, the case would move on to the second stage, during which the reviewing court would subject the governmental action to a heightened scrutiny similar to that applied in equal protection cases. To survive this review, governmental action that restricts personal autonomy, like an action that classifies on the basis of gender, must serve an important and legitimate government interest, and must be substantially related to achievement of the legitimate objective. This mechanism arises from the core principle of the Ninth Amendment that not all government action is legitimate, and that when the government seeks to restrict the expression of personal freedom, absent an appropriate justification based on the protection of public welfare, it is illegitimate and unconstitutional. Pursuant to this proposed mechanism, reviewing courts will be obliged to determine exactly when government action that seeks to regulate private activity is legitimate. This analysis involves a determination

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES of how private that activity really is, and it must address both the extent of the government regulation involved and the motivation for the action. The more private the activity involved, the less justified the government is in regulating it. To justify regulation, the government must show that there are sufficient public consequences of the activity that justify government regulation. It is important to note once again that the references to private and public that are relevant to this Ninth Amendment analysis conceive of private acts as those that pose no threat of harm to other individuals or to the public welfare, while public acts are those that pose a threat to either or both. This simplistic delineation of the public/private distinction is chosen, in part, because it is mandated by the understanding of the nature of personal liberty and legitimate government action in the Lockean framework. The concept of rights retained by the people upon which this Ninth Amendment interpretation is based flows from Locke’s notion that legitimate government action focused on only those aspects of individual action that posed a threat to others or the community as a whole. Those private acts that did not pose such a threat were not the subject of legitimate government regulation. So, to the extent that the terms public and private are used in the discussion of the Ninth Amendment adjudicative mechanism in the remainder of this Article, they should be viewed as conveying the distinction between acts that pose a potential public threat and acts that do not. The question of the legitimacy of government regulation pursuant to the Ninth Amendment is the same as the question Professor Kirstie McClure conceptualized as central to the determination of legitimacy in Locke’s political theory. What a Ninth Amendment adjudication must do is “distinguish between arbitrary interferences with the[] propriety [of individual citizens on the one hand] and reasonable regulation for the public good [on the other].” When a challenged government regulation is found not to be a reasonable regulation for the public good, but merely an arbitrary interference with individual autonomy, it will be invalid under the Ninth Amendment. A. Stage One: Gatekeeping At the initial stage of a claim based on the Ninth Amendment, instead of asserting that a federal or state law or government action violates a fundamental right protected by the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clauses, an individual would file a complaint alleging that the government action constitutes an illegitimate intrusion into her personal freedom by restricting or precluding an essentially private activity or interfering with a private choice. The complaint would identify the specific activity or activities involved and the way in which the government action either restricted or precluded them. The complaint would not argue that the plaintiff had a specific positive right to engage in the activities in question. It would allege instead that regardless of the importance or fundamentality of the activities, the activities were private, or involved the expression of the personal autonomy of the plaintiff, and that they were therefore protected from government regulation by the Ninth Amendment. In response to the plaintiff’s complaint, the government defendant could seek to terminate the case by filing a motion to dismiss the claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (or a state court analog), arguing that even if the factual allegations made by the plaintiff were true, the claim would still fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. To make this argument, the government would contend that the activities identified in the complaint were not the kinds of activities that are protected by the Ninth Amendment because they are essentially public rather than essentially private. The reviewing court, either sua sponte or in response to a government motion, would make the initial determination, as a matter of law, as to whether the relevant activity was 125

PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES sufficiently private (or non-publicly threatening) to fall within the protection of the Ninth Amendment. This type of determination is appropriate for a court at the motion to dismiss stage. The dismissal option would allow the court to determine whether the plaintiff had identified a plausible instance of illegitimate government intervention before extensive resources were expended balancing the extent of the harm suffered against the government interests served. Under this proposed adjudication mechanism, if the reviewing court concludes that the activity is not substantially private - that its character is primarily public in nature the court would properly dismiss the case on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under law. This early stage determination would have the benefit of quickly disposing of frivolous assertions of Ninth Amendment rights, of identifying valid constitutional claims that simply are not Ninth Amendment claims, and saving the courts and the government the time and expense of excessive discovery and protracted litigation. Only if the reviewing court concluded that the activity involved was substantially private in character would the case move on to the next stage - the application of a heightened level of scrutiny to the government’s action and motivations. At the initial stage, the court would not provide an in depth evaluation of the extent of the public consequences of the action. It would merely determine whether the activity involved in the claim was basically private or basically public. A judicial determination of whether a certain activity was public or private could pose serious challenges for courts just as it does for philosophers and other theorists. But this unavoidable difficulty does not justify rejection of this adjudicative model. Indeed, such judicial determinations are commonplace in the evaluation of many claims. And, given the character of the privacy right protected by the Ninth Amendment, the overriding question would be a comparatively simple one: Does the action pose a threat of harm to another individual or to the public welfare? As the Supreme Court has demonstrated, it is capable of addressing the issue of the potential public impact of an arguably private activity. In Stanley v. Georgia (394 U.S. 557 (1969)) for example, the Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to a Georgia criminal prosecution for the possession of obscene materials. The challenging party argued that the state obscenity law “insofar as it punishes mere private possession of obscene matter, violates the First Amendment.” 144 The Court agreed, holding that “the mere private possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime.” 145 Although the lower court had relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Roth v. United States (354 U.S. 476 (1957)) which held that obscenity was not protected by the First Amendment, the Court distinguished this case by noting that Roth dealt with the distribution of “objectionable material or with some form of public distribution or dissemination.” In its opinion, the Court addressed the extent of the right to privacy that citizens enjoyed in their homes. After noting the importance of receiving information, regardless of its “social worth,” the Court noted the right “takes on an added dimension” in a case involving protection for the mere possession of obscene material: “For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.”

144

145

Stanley v. Georgia (394 U.S. 557 (1969)) at 559 Id.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES The Court based its holding on its understanding of how the Constitution limits the authority of government to invade the privacy of its citizens and the consequent rights that citizens enjoy in order to protect this privacy. . . . In Stanley, the Court identified two crucial aspects of a reasoned definition of privacy. First, and most obvious, the Court held that actions that occur in an individual’s home and that do not involve contact with the rest of the community are private and deserve a different treatment than conduct that occurs outside the home. But, second, and perhaps more important, particularly in regard to Ninth Amendment adjudication, the Court notes that the real invasion that resulted from the government’s action in Stanley - the real violation of the First Amendment and “our whole constitutional heritage” - was the attempt by the state to invade the mind of one of its citizens. Worse even than the invasion of the appellant’s home in this case, according to the Court, was the attempt to legislate his personal preferences, beliefs, and morality. The decision stands for the proposition that the sphere of privacy that legitimate government action cannot invade includes both one’s home and one’s personal beliefs and values. As strong as the Court’s holding was in Stanley that the government action constituted an undue invasion of privacy, the majority was not unmindful of the types of complications that arise when an activity in our complex and interconnected society is identified as private. In response to arguments from Georgia that “exposure to obscene materials may lead to deviant sexual behavior or crimes of sexual violence,” the Court noted that there is “little empirical basis for” such an assertion, but noted that even if such a connection could be drawn, it would not justify the extent of the intrusion involved in Stanley, particularly in light of other mechanisms that serve to discourage the expression of personal beliefs in a manner that will threaten the society as a whole. We believe that in the context of private consumption of ideas and information we should adhere to the view that “among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law....” Given the present state of knowledge, the State may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession of chemistry books on the ground that they may lead to the manufacture of homemade spirits. Just as in Stanley, the identification of what is sufficiently private to garner Ninth Amendment protection will be complicated by arguments concerning the potential public impact of essentially private conduct. One of the key aspects of this proposed Ninth Amendment adjudicative mechanism is that it takes these possible arguments seriously and factors them into its analysis. The point of this mechanism is not to identify some actions as purely private and mandate that courts protect them from any kind of state regulation, but rather to identify those activities that are substantially or primarily private and to require a government that seeks to regulate such activities to justify regulation based on the public impact of the action. The Stanley Court’s analysis of the private and public sphere, and of the illegitimacy of government action that invades the former, demonstrates at least some of the activities that would be appropriately considered to be essentially private by a court reviewing a Ninth Amendment claim. Actions involving only one person that occur in the privacy of one’s residence would be considered private under this analysis, partially because of the location of the action and partially because of the complete absence of reasonable threat of harm to another. Although slightly more controversial, it can be demonstrated that actions involving apparently consenting adults within a private residence would also be considered private, again both because of location and the lack of threat of some unwanted, and consequently harmful, intrusion. And the act of forming and expressing one’s personal 127

PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES preferences and beliefs - the defining characteristic of personal autonomy - would also be properly considered private in nature. The discussion of privacy in Stanley provides two important keys to the development of an effective Ninth Amendment jurisprudence: (1) It demonstrates that courts can (and do) make distinctions between public and private activity, and (2) it provides a basic indication of how a reasoned distinction between the public and the private can be made. Though Stanley and similar cases are insufficient to conclusively resolve the difficulties in determining at exactly what point the public/private line should be drawn in every case, this realization is not fatal to the development of this jurisprudence. The point of the Ninth Amendment mechanism is not to mandate resolutions of disputes over the legitimacy of government regulation of private acts, but rather to place those disputes at the forefront of adjudication and to tip the current balance inherent in judicial evaluation of personal autonomy claims away from the governmental entities and in favor of individuals. As the remainder of this Article demonstrates, the difficulties inherent in identifying which actions can be reasonably considered to be primarily public will rest with the governmental entity as it seeks to justify its regulation of the activity in the second stage of the Ninth Amendment adjudication mechanism. Pursuant to this mechanism, the government will only be allowed to regulate activity when it can provide a convincing demonstration that the activity has some kind of significant impact on the public welfare. If the government cannot make such a showing, its regulation will be properly invalidated as violating the Ninth Amendment. B. Stage Two: Heightened Scrutiny for Privacy-Invasive Government Action Pursuant to the second stage of this proposed mechanism, if a court concluded that the regulated act is essentially private, a government could not successfully respond to the plaintiff’s claim by noting that there is a public consequence, or consequences, arising from the activity in question. This argument would be insufficient, on its own, to justify the regulation. If the government seeks to legitimately regulate the activity in question, it must demonstrate that the public impact of the act is substantial enough, and the public interest in regulating it compelling enough, to justify the extent of the privacy invasion involved. In the second stage of this Ninth Amendment analysis, the government would be obliged to demonstrate why its regulation of the activity is legitimate. To do this it must identify the public interest that is served by the regulation or preclusion, and show that the specific regulation is substantially related to that public interest. Similar to the “fit” analysis applied by courts in cases involving classifications based on sex under the Equal Protection Clause, the government would be required to demonstrate that the interest it seeks to protect is a valid interest - in this case a public welfare interest - and that the challenged regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve that permissible goal. This Ninth Amendment fit analysis will treat as inherently suspect any governmental action that invades the privacy of individuals. The mere fact that the government has instituted a regulation of private activity supports the assumption that the government’s motivation is nonpublic in nature, and therefore invalid. 146 Consequently, as in the case of 146

John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 34 (1980) at 145-46. In discussing the role that “suspect classification” analysis plays in uncovering the real motivation behind legislative action, Ely notes that: The goal the classification in issue is likely to fit most closely, obviously, is the goal the legislators actually had in mind. If it can be directly identified and is one that is unconstitutional, all well and good: the classification is unconstitutional. But even if such a confident demonstration of motivation proves impossible, a classification that in fact was unconstitutionally motivated will nonetheless - thanks to the indirect pressure exerted by the 128

PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES suspect racial and gender classification, the government would be required to show that the means it has chosen to meet its express objective is the one that poses the least reasonable threat to the constitutional rights of the citizens involved and is reasonably related to a valid government interest. This mechanism serves to protect the personal autonomy of citizens, and to identify circumstances in which the professed motivation for a regulation is actually a pretense obscuring some kind of unconstitutional purpose. 147 Under this analysis, the government’s proffered justification for its action could fail on two separate grounds. First, if the interest that the government seeks to protect is insufficiently public, it will not be justified in regulating private activity based on that interest. Second, if there is a legitimate government interest that can be identified, but the regulation in question is not substantially related to promoting that interest, the government would be obliged to find some other, less privacy-intrusive, manner to promote that objective. This fit analysis will require that the government regulate activities only in appropriate circumstances, and seeks to assure that the specific regulations actually arise out of, and reasonably serve, appropriate governmental interests. What is specifically precluded by this part of the mechanism are any governmental interests that do not serve to protect the public good. Pursuant to this analysis, the government cannot impose a community-defined code of morality regulating the private lives of its citizens unless the regulation ostensibly protects the public welfare. 148 As shown above, the rights referred to in the Ninth Amendment as being retained by the people are rights to personal self-determination and autonomy. The central core of these retained rights, what Locke referred to as the right to make “private judgment,” is the right suspect-classification doctrine - find itself in serious constitutional difficulty....The “special scrutiny” that is afforded suspect classifications...insists that the classification in issue fit the goal invoked in its defense more closely than any alternative classification would. There is only one goal the classification is likely to fit that closely, however, and that is the goal the legislators actually had in mind. If that goal cannot be invoked because it is unconstitutional, the classification will fall. Thus, functionally, special scrutiny, in particular its demand for an essentially perfect fit, turns out to be a way of “flushing out” unconstitutional motivation, one that lacks the proof problems of a more direct inquiry.... 147

Id. at 138. The reason that the fit analysis is applied to equal protection determinations is that otherwise ostensibly permissible classifications made by legislatures are appropriately invalidated if the motivation for the classification is impermissible - “that the very same governmental action can be constitutional or unconstitutional depending on why it was undertaken.” Id. at 137; see also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960) (“”Acts generally lawful may become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end....’” (quoting United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324, 357 (1912))). As Ely noted in 1980, this point is by no means uncontroversial, and he also acknowledged the difficulty of finding a single motivation for a legislative act. But he argues that: The considerations that make motivation relevant argue not for the discovery of the “sole” motivation (is there ever just one?) or even the “dominant” motivation (whatever that might mean), but rather for asking whether an unconstitutional motivation appears materially to have influenced the choice: if one did, the procedure was illegitimate - “due process of lawmaking” was denied - and its product should be invalidated. 148

Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of “Public Morality” Qualify as Legitimate Government Interests for the Purposes of Equal Protection Review?, 87 Geo. L.J. 139, 173 (1998) at 142. While it is entirely appropriate, and indeed unavoidable, that legitimate government interests reflect judgments about what is good for the political community and for individual citizens, for equal protection analysis, the only value judgments that qualify as legitimate government interests are those that are observably connected to the public welfare. A bare assertion of public morality, divorced from any empirical effect on the public welfare, cannot constitute a legitimate government interest.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES to govern one’s life without the imposition of an external, and necessarily alien, belief structure, at least to the extent that these personal moral choices pose no threat to others. Even though it cannot be disputed (at least not under the constitutional or Lockean frameworks) that governments may impose a concept of public morality on its citizens in the course of its regulation of public activity, governments have no legitimate authority to impose a majority-defined concept of personal or private morality on individuals in a way that substantially impacts their private lives. Ninth Amendment adjudication would invalidate any such governmental attempt.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES (D). Senate, Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, THE PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITIES OF AN EDUCATED CITIZEN, Congressional Record, Extension of Remarks, 79th Congress, 2nd Session (August 1, 1946, legislative day of Monday, July 29), pages A4750-A4753 In 1946 Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, entered into the Extension of Remarks of the Congressional Record, The Public Responsibilities of an Educated Citizen, a speech delivered by Angus McKenzie Laird, associate professor of political science at the University of Florida, to the graduating class of the summer session of the University of Florida on August 27, 1943. 149 The following excerpts from this speech are still appropriate today, and especially so to this application: Twenty-three centuries ago, the philosopher Plato, an unfriendly critic, held that in a democracy the people did not recognize that their duties were equal to their rights. By insistence upon their rights, and by neglecting their duties, they paved the way for the overthrow of democracy and the establishment of tyranny. One need not accept Plato’s views as to the inevitability of this process from democracy to tyranny, in order to agree that we must meet our duties and responsibilities as well as enjoy our rights and liberties if our democratic society is to survive. This great truth has been recognized in a number of constitutions of national states. The French Constitution of 1793 not only contained the famous “Declaration of the rights of Man,” but had a list of the duties of man as well. The most recent Constitution of the Soviet Union not only has a bill of rights but has a bill of duties as well. Our constitutional forefathers were fully cognizant of the truth that every right implied a duty. However, our Constitution was based upon somewhat different principles from those of the French Constitution of 1793 and the Russian Constitution of 1935. Our Bill of Rights was added, not in order that the people might know their rights, but that the Government might not infringe upon them. It was assumed that the people would know their duties as they knew their rights. Yet, I fear this has not always been realized, and unfortunately “duty” appears almost to have become an outworn term. One should not be surprised if in the next edition of Webster, he finds after the definition of the word “archaic.” In almost all the textbooks on civics and political science, and in all the texts in social science without exception, which you have used in high school and college, you will find at least one chapter on our rights, but never one on our duties. Some of our citizens have been so impressed with their rights in recent years that they are having difficulty—at the country’s expense—in recognizing that they also have duties. . . . an educated citizen has the responsibility to obey and respect the law. I do not mean that you should take a “pollyanna” view of the law, that all laws are good and fair and just and [blindly?] should obey all of them at all times and under all circumstances. Some laws are unfair, some are unwise, some are impractical; others are in conflict, and still others, while considered fair and equitable at one time, have become archaic and inapplicable to modern conditions.

149

Senate, Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, The Public Responsibilities of an Educated Citizen, Congressional Record, Extension of Remarks, 79th Congress, 2nd Session (August 1, 1946, legislative day of Monday, July 29), pages A4750-A4753

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES The professor closed his speech with: I dare say that the proudest title a person may have in our day is that of an American citizen. Some of you will bear that title to foreign lands; others of you will remain at home. Let us remember that the prestige of this title is not based upon military strength, though that is great; it will be based upon the example we have furnished to the world of a 130,000,000 people, representing all the races of mankind, where all share more equitably in the opportunities and responsibilities of a great society than men have ever shared before. It was of this greatness and of this day that Walt Whitman was thinking when he wrote about a century ago: Sail, sail thy best, ship of Democracy Of value is thy freight, ‘tis not the Present only, The Past is also stored in thee. Thou holdest not the venture of thyself alone, not of the Western Continent alone, With thee Time voyages in trust, the antecedent nations sink or swim with thee. Theirs, theirs as much as thine, the destination-port triumphant. (“Thou Mother with Thy Equal Brood”—Leaves of Grass.) (6). The Social Norms View of the Second Amendment As a American merchant seaman Walt Whitman’s poem above strikes resonant with me. If only Mr. Whitman had used Republic instead of Democracy his poem would have rang faithfully truer for freedom. When a nation endeavors to disarm its citizens through a campaign of gun control laws, as in the United Kingdom and Australia examples, domestic tranquility is traumatized, the common defense is compromised, the general welfare is degraded, and liberty is no longer secured. Allowing United States citizens to exercise their Second Amendment rights to the full conceptual limits 150 of national open-carry of a handgun, as we once had, will have the attributes of establishing Justice, insuring domestic tranquility, providing for the common defense, promoting the general welfare, and securing the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity (words of the Preamble to the United States Constitution). 151 The Second Amendment is a function of the Preamble. There is also a preamble to the Bill of Rights! 152 The first paragraph reads: The Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added: And as extending the ground of public confidence in the Government, will best ensure the beneficent ends of its institution.

150

See Denning, Brannon P., Gun Shy: the Second Amendment as an “Underenforced Constitutional Norm, 21 Harv.J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 719, (Summer 1998). Discusses Lawrence Gene Sager’s Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Consitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (1978). 151

See Axler’s, Eric M., The Power of the Preamble and the Ninth Amendment: the Restoration of the People’s Unenumerated Rights, 24 Seton Hall Legis. J. 431 (2000) 152

National Archives and Records Administration; www.nara.gov/exhall/charters/billrights/preamble.html

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES Will life in America really be one of anarchy as gun control advocates claim if law-abiding citizens had their Second Amendment rights at full conceptual limits restored? Or, will it be life as normal, governed by the limits of social norms with reduced rates of crime and greater rates of social civilities, as in the proverbial slogan, an armed society is a polite society? Will the government revise tort and liability laws favoring the full conceptual limit of Second Amendment rights as a social norm? (7). Excerpts From Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL NORMS, 74 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 1537 (2000) No society can function if it cannot constrain the self-serving behavior of its members. Societies that cannot control socially destructive behavior collapse into dysfunction; they become dangerously crime-ridden, 153 as in some of America’s inner cities, or completely anarchic, as in parts of the Balkans and central Africa. Clear rules enforced by legal sanctions deter a great deal of socially destructive conduct, but social norms enforced by informal sanctions might create even more powerful constraints. If so, then gaining control over dysfunctional societies might depend more upon using or manipulating social norms than upon enforcing the law. Decades of research conducted by social psychologists on social norms, however, suggests three important obstacles to the use of social norms: First, antisocial norms, once established, are hard to dislodge; 154 second, even if people adhere to positive social norms, determining when they are triggered is difficult; third, subtle aspects of situations can induce antisocial conduct, seemingly even against social norms. 155 Here I supplant the definition of social norm to mean the acceptance of an openly armed society in accordance with the Second Amendment being a positive social norm, and the definition of antisocial norm to mean an anti-gun society opposing the Second Amendment. Most legal scholarship addressing the control of antisocial behavior addresses formal sanctions rather than social norms. This is not surprising; formal sanctions are more familiar to lawyers and punishing undesirable antisocial conduct is the most straightforward means of maintaining social order. Formal sanctions almost certainly provide a critical degree of control over antisocial conduct, but they are costly, both to society and to the individual being punished. Incarceration, in particular, can produce unintended costs to individuals, especially in communities in which the rate of incarceration is high. Partly in response to the staggering costs of incarceration, some legal scholars argue that informal social norms provide a better means of controlling antisocial conduct. This observation builds upon a growing body of legal scholarship concerning social norms. This new “law and social norms” scholarship adopts a more subtle approach to social behavior than identifying situations that should trigger formal rewards and sanctions. It accounts for the prominence of group membership and social approval as sources of rewards and punishments. This new field has developed several positive and normative implications of social norms. On the positive side, the scholarship asserts that groups 153

United Kingdom and Australia serve as pristine examples of when a nation disarms its citizens with complete bans on firearms that nation soon becomes crime ridden. Proof that an armed society is a positive social norm. 154

The anti-gun culture as a social norm is anti-social in nature. It allows the criminal element of society free reign in criminal activity against the law-abiding as they are less likely to face an armed citizen. 155

The handgun, in reality, is a tool for self-defense. An inanimate object, it can do nothing under its own existence. The anti-gun culture view the handgun as an animate object capable of psychologically inducing anti-social behavior in its owner to commit crimes with the handgun. Anti-social behavior becomes a social norm.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES develop and enforce norms of conduct apart from formal legal sanctions. Perhaps more significantly, this scholarship might hold valuable normative lessons for policymakers interested in reducing crime as an alternative to incarceration. The law and social norms scholarship identifies two ways in which reformers can take advantage of the power of social norms. First, changes in law can influence social norms. For example, passing a law against smoking in public places had a dramatic effect on smokers, not because of the formal penalty for public smoking (which is hardly ever imposed) but because it empowered nonsmokers to levy social sanctions on smokers. Changes in law might also inspire changes in preferences. Scholars refer to this as the “expressive” function of law. Second, subtle and inexpensive changes in a social setting can signal different social norms. . . . 156 The interaction between law and social norms arguably identifies ways to reduce crime that are less expensive and more humane than traditional approaches. A change in law that does not need to be enforced, or is only minimally enforced, is not costly to society or to the individuals who are deterred from breaking the law by a new social taboo. . . . The social psychological research, in fact provides some systematic support for the theories proposed by the social norms scholars. Social psychologiests have conducted numerous empirical studies which support two basic tenets of the law and social norms scholars: (1) that groups develop and impose norms on their members, and (2) that the apparent behavior of others can alter the social meaning of a situation in ways that profoundly affect behavior. Social Norms Social norms operate independently from formal law. Laws commonly track social norms; murder, burglary, and many crimes are both illegal and socially inappropriate. Sometimes, however, social norms and law conflict. In such instances, norms frequently influence behavior more than the law. . . . An inconsistency between law and social norms makes enforcing formal laws against antisocial conduct difficult. Absent some power to manipulate social norms, these observations have only limited value for reformers. Identification of divergences between law and norms might indicate haw best to allocate an enforcement budget, but this is a relatively weak implication. Scholars have argued, however, that the law interacts with social norms to influence behavior in two productive ways: First, laws can direct or strengthen existing social norms; and second, social policies can change the social meaning of a behavior. Law has an expressive function that can motivate a change in social norms. Attaching a criminal penalty to conduct can inspire social condemnation. Criminalizing undesirable conduct to support a social norm con embolden people to levy informal sanctions against a violator and signal potential violators that their conduct will draw a severe social sanction. Ordinary citizens might begin to feel entitled to be free from the costs of undesirable condujct that violators inflict on them. Consequently, even in the absence of enforcement, the mere act of criminalizing conduct can reduce its prevalence. For example, as Robert Cooter has observed, even though laws against smoking in public are almost never enforced, compliance is widespread. Cooter suggests that labeling the behavior as a crime

156

An armed society in the United States was once a social norm with its own informal rewards and punishments. Law can and must be changed to facilitate the restoration of this social norm and once restored, support it.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES will heighten potential violators’ fear ofr social sanction, and might also encourage a real increase in social sanctions against violators. Along a similar line, laws and policies can take advantage of social norms to change the meaning of social behaviors in ways that discourage antisocial conduct. . . . Using the law to influence social norms raises the prospects of having a big effect at little cost. Creating a law against smoking in public and not enforcing it is practically a costless means of eliminating the problem of exposure to second-hand smoke. Reforms directed at changing social norms might also prove much more effective and have fewer unwanted side effects than enforcing formal penalties. No amount of deceptive legal arguments attempting to prove the fallacious intent of gun control laws preventing the free exercise of armed self-defense will some how reduce crime. But, in reality such laws only increase murder rates and other violent crime rates. What will reverse the tide of gun control is Social Norms Marketing! Instead of the heretofore futile effort of the National Rifle Association, Gun Owners of America, Second Amendment Foundation, KeepAndBearArms.com, Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Owners, and other pro-Second Amendment groups lobbying Congress for the restoration of our gun rights, they “ought” to take the gun rights message that the Second Amendment is not only a constitutional norm but it is also a positive social norm to the people at large. They should pool their financial resources and take the Social Norms Marketing approach. They would ultimately still accomplish their goal as the public at large will then be standing in line at their Senators’ and Congressmen’s doors, sending letters, and emails for the restoration of their gun rights. An effective use of their cost-benefit analysis in anyone’s ledger. “Social norms marketing is an innovative way to educate people about the healthy behaviors practiced by a majority of the public for the purpose of improving overall health status.”— www.mostofus.org. The process of social norms marketing is based on social norms theory. 157 I would rephrase that statement to read: “Social norms marketing is an innovative way to educate people about the healthy behaviors practiced by a majority of the public for the purpose of improving overall personal security status.” Social norms are people’s beliefs about the attitudes and behaviors that are normal, acceptable, or even expected in a particular social context. In many situations, people’s perception of these norms will greatly influence their behavior. 158 When people misperceive the norms of their group — that is, when they inaccurately think an attitude or behavior is more (or less) common than is actually the case — they may chose to engage in behaviors that are in sync with those false norms. 159 Such is the case with gun control. Misperceptions infect all of society, even the courts.

157

www.unco.edu/stuact/modelprogram/Social%20Norms.html

158

www.edc.org/hec/socialnorms/ (last update: January 30, 2002)

159

Id.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES (8). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Blows the Whistle On Sister Courts’ Second Amendment Deceptions We conclude that [United States v.] Miller does not support the government’s 160 collective rights or sophisticated collective rights approach to the Second Amendment. Indeed, to the extent that Miller sheds light on the matter it cuts against the government’s position. Nor does the government cite any other authority binding on this panel which mandates acceptance of its position in this respect. However, we do not proceed on the assumption that Miller actually accepted an individual rights, as opposed to a collective or sophisticated collective rights, interpretation of the Second Amendment. Thus, Miller itself does not resolve that issue.. . . We turn, therefore, to an analysis of history and wording of the Second Amendment for guidance. In undertaking this analysis, we are mindful that almost all of our sister circuits have rejected any individual rights view of the Second Amendment. However, it respectfully appears to us that all or almost all of these opinions seem to have done so either on the erroneous assumption that Miller resolved that issue or without sufficient articulated examination of the history and text of the Second Amendment.” 161 (9). A Nation of Lies Governed by Liars Leads to Deception and Corruption as a Social Norm This appears to be the case with society in the United States. The transition from a national unlicensed open-carry handgun representative of an honest society (the old social norm) to licensed concealed-carry, representative of a deceptive society (the current social norm), is an example of how a minority’s misperception of behavior in others (gun owners) has led to enactment of laws supporting this misperception. The misperception in this case is the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms, that gun possession is a fretful danger to society. This misperception is based on a psychological fear of guns by the insecure. And what has occurred because of that fear is a transference of that fear from the insecure minority to all of society through legislation. Now that fear is in sync with all of society. The fear of guns has emerged as a social norm. Most lawful gun owners do not publicly defend their rights for fear of ridicule and harassment from society and from law enforcement. For the survival of the innocent this must change. A new social norm, or more accurately, reinstating an old social norm is demanded. (10). Social Norms Marketing Social norms marketing is currently, and has been for recent years, used to address binge drinking by college students. Health & Human Development Programs, funded by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, and the National Institutes of Health, are: . . .undertaking a five-year evaluation of the effectiveness of a campaign called ‘Just the Facts’ aimed at reducing high risk, binge drinking by college students. This type of prevention program — commonly known as a ‘social norms marketing campaign’ — tries to change students’ perceptions of campus norms. ‘Just the Facts’ has been pilot-tested on several campuses but this will be the first time it has been scientifically evaluated. 162 One method frequently used to correct misperceptions is “social marketing,” a method of using mass marketing techniques to disseminate information. When colleges conduct

160

Clinton/Reno era.

161

United States v. Emerson, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, No. 99-10331

162

http://notes.edc.org/HHD/products.nsf/projects/01-7365

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES marketing campaigns to correct misperceptions of social norms, these campaigns are referred to as “social norms marketing” campaigns. 163 For many years, health and safety professionals have used the threat of harm and related consequences in an effort to reduce high-risk behaviors such as high-risk drinking, and impaired driving practices. This strategy has had a limited impact on harmful behavior. . . . Social Norms Marketing [is] one of the fastest growing and most effective methods for reducing high-risk behaviors and promoting positive social change. Currently, the Social Norms Marketing approach is being adopted by community coalitions to reduce high school alcohol and tobacco use, by states to promote traffic safety and by colleges to address high risk alcohol use, [binge drinking,] coercive behaviors and other health issues. 164 Social norms marketing is the application of marketing ideas to society in order to change or modify behaviors. In The Social Norms Approach, Alan D. Berkowitz states that the social norms theory can also be extended to situations in which individuals refrain from confronting the problem behavior of others because they believe the behavior is accepted by their peer group. 165 Social norms theory assumes that much of our behavior is influenced by how members of our social groups behave, and that our beliefs about what others do are often incorrect. 166 The social norms approach was first suggested by H. Wesley Perkins and [Alan D. Berkowitz] 167 in an analysis of student drinking behavior. In this study we determined that students regularly overestimated the extent to which their peers were supportive of permissive drinking behaviors, and found that this overestimation predicted how much individuals drank. We recommended that prevention efforts focus on providing students with accurate information on peer drinking attitudes and behavior as a means of promoting non-use and less risk. This represented a radical departure from traditional intervention strategies that focus on abuse and on identification, intervention and treatment strategies for abusers. Traditional approaches that focus solely on the problems of alcohol and other drug use and its negative consequences draw attention to extreme behavior and foster the misperception that campus drinking is more excessive than is actually the case. In contrast, interventions based on social norms theory focus on the healthy attitudes and behavior of the majority and use information about healthy norms to guide interventions with abusers. 168 163

Id.

164

Virginia Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, Social Norms Marketing Training 2001, December 4-5, 2001, Sheraton Richmond West Hotel, Richmond, Virginia, www.abc.state.va.us/Education/socialnorm01/ sn2001.htm. 165

www.sa.ua.edu/wrc/social_norms.htm

166

Perkins, HW and Alan D. Berkowitz, Perceiving the Community Norms of Alcohol Use Among Students: Some Research Implications for Campus Alcohol Education Programming. International Journal of the Addictions, 21(9/10):961-976. This is the original study providing data for student misperceptions of attitudes towards alcohol, along with a discussion of the effects of these pisperceptions. 167

Id.

168

Berkowitz, Alan D., The Social Norms Approach: Theory, Research and Annotated Bibliography, June 2000, revised August 2001. In “Type of Misperceptions” section.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES The prevalence of alcohol-related misperceptions has been confirmed in over thirty published studies. Misperceptions are held by all members of campus communities, including undergraduate and graduate students, faculty and staff, students and student leaders, and have been documented in statewide sample of young adults both in college and not in college, and among middle and high-school students. 169 Misperceptions have been documented for groups such as fraternity members, and athletes, and have been found to differ by gender, with women usually misperceiving more than men. 170 Making a parallel extrapolation of the above account, misperceptions are similarly made regarding firearms and the Second Amendment. (11). Berkowitz, Alan D., Applications of Social Norms Theory to Other Health and Social Justice Issues January, 2001 Assumptions of Social Norms Theory As noted, social norms theory predicts that persons behave or inhibit behavior in an attempt to conform to a perceived norm. This phenomenon of “pluralistic ignorance” can cause an individual to act in ways that are inconsistent with her or his true beliefs and values (Miller & McFarland, 1991). In other words, gun owners (and non-gun owners advocating Second Amendment gun rights who would jump at the chance to own a handgun if the laws weren’t so hostile to gun owners) act with pluralistic ignorance in ways that are inconsistent with their true beliefs and values. Even the National Rifle Association is afflicted with this malady by continuously compromising on gun control legislation. Misperceptions of a norm discourage the expression of opinions and behaviors that are falsely thought to be non-conforming, creating a negative cycle in which unhealthy behavior is expressed and healthy behavior is inhibited. 171 Misperception of a constitutional norm, the national open-carry handgun, that was once a social norm, has led to the silencing of gun owners and the rise in verboseness of gun control advocates, where creating the negative cycle of unhealthy behavior (criminal activity) is expressed and healthy behavior (armed self-defense) is inhibited. It also allows abusers or perpetrators of problem behaviors to deny or justify their actions due to the (mis)perception that their behavior is normative (Baer, Stacy & Larimer, 1991; Pollard, et al, 2000). This cycle can be broken or reversed by providing individuals with correct information about the actual norm. All individuals who misperceive the norm contribute to the climate that allows problem behavior to occur, whether or not they engage in the behavior. Perkins (1997) coined the term “carriers of the misperception” to describe these individuals. The assumptions of social norms theory are presented in Table 1. 172 This is the answer to any Second Amendment advocate who questions why the majority of gun owners do not take on a publicly active or activist role in defense of their rights. These inactive gun owners are carriers of misperception. 169

Ib. In “Studies Documenting Misperceptions” section.

170

Ib.

171

Id.

172

Id.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES Table 1: Assumptions of Social Norms Theory

173

Assumptions of Social Norms Theory

Second Amendment Adaptation

1. Actions are often based on misinformation about or misperceptions of others’ attitudes and/or behavior.

Law-abiding citizens possessing or carrying a gun are misperceived as doing so with criminal intent.

2. When misperceptions are defined or perceived as real, they have real consequences.

Gun owners are harassed by law enforcement and businesses, gun-free zones, etc. Vulnerable to crime.

3. Individuals passively accept misperceptions rather than actively intervene to change them, hiding from others their true perceptions, feelings or beliefs.

Gun owners forced to leave guns at home in order to avoid social, legal harassment.

4. The effects of misperceptions are selfperpetuating, because they discourage the expression of opinions and actions that are falsely believed to be non-conforming, while encouraging problem behaviors that are falsely believed to be normative.

Gun prohibitions in urban areas encourages rise in murder and other violent crimes. Drug dealing, drive-by shootings, aggravated assaults, homeinvasions, etc., become the social norm when belief of armed self defense is suppressed.

5. Appropriate information about the actual norm will encourage individuals to express those beliefs that are consistent with the true, healthier norm, and inhibit problem behaviors that are inconsistent with it.

Hence, the need for a Social Norms Marketing campaign to restore the Second Amendment’s national open-carry handgun as a positive social norm.

6. Individuals who do not personally engage in the problematic behavior may contribute to the problem by the way in which they talk about the behavior. Misperceptions thus function to strengthen beliefs and values that the “carriers of the misperception” do not themselves hold and contribute to the climate that encourages problem behavior.

“What can one person do?” Individual gun owners become hesitant or reluctant to publicly express their pro-Gun Rights views for fear of ridicule or harassment by gun control advocates and law enforcement. Thereby they become carriers of the misperception.

7. For a norm to be perpetuated it is not necessary for the majority to believe it, but only for the majority to believe that the majority believes it.

The misperception that if everyone had guns blood will fill the streets is perpetuated.

173

Ib. (Left side of table). The right half of table is my adaptation for Second Amendment rights.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES (12). The Deadly Belief in Gun Control: The Jessica Lynne Carpenter, Merced, California Story The main stream media’s latent bias and irresponsible disregard for truth did not widely report this story. This is a testimonial to the inalienable right to keep and bear arms for basic human survival, the right to life itself for the innocent. This story is about the misperception that responsible children of age and maturity and lovingly responsible parents both cannot be trusted to keep and bear their arms for the purpose of personal security in a responsible, lawful manner. That the firearms must be kept locked away, inaccessible to those, young and old and all ages in between when they are most needed in the instantaneous moment when life is in peril against an attacking criminal. Quoting from The Libertarian press release: 174 Shouldn’t we repeal the gun laws . . . if it’ll save a single child? Jessica Lynne Carpenter is 14 years old. She knows how to shoot; her father taught her. And there were adequate firearms to deal with the crisis that arose in the Carpenter home in Merced, Calif. – a San Joaquin Valley farming community 130 miles southeast of San Francisco – when 27-year-old Jonathon David Bruce came calling on Wednesday morning, Aug. 23. There was just one problem. Under the new “safe storage” laws being enacted in California and elsewhere, parents can be held criminally liable unless they lock up their guns when their children are home alone . . . so that’s just what law-abiding parents John and Tephanie Carpenter had done. Some of Jessica’s siblings – Anna, 13; Vanessa, 11; Ashley, 9; and John William, 7 – were still in their bedrooms when Bruce broke into the farmhouse shortly after 9 a.m. Bruce, who was armed with a pitchfork – but to whom police remain unable to attribute any motive 175 – had apparently cut the phone lines. So when he forced his way into the house and began stabbing the younger children in their beds, Jessica’s attempts to dial 9-11 didn’t do much good. Next, the sensible girl ran for where the family guns were stored. But they were locked up tight. “When the 14-year-old girl ran to a nearby house to escape the pitchfork-wielding man attacking her siblings,” writes Kimi Yoshino of the Fresno Bee, “she didn’t ask her neighbor to call 9-1-1. She begged him to grab his rifle and ‘take care of this guy.’” He didn’t. Jessica ended up on the phone. By the time Merced County sheriff’s deputies arrived at the home, 7-year-old John William and 9-year-old Ashley Danielle were dead. Ashley had apparently hung onto her assailant’s leg long enough for her older sisters to escape. Thirteen-year-old Anna was wounded but survived. Once the deputies arrived, Bruce rushed them with his bloody pitchfork. So they shot him dead. They shot him more than a dozen times. With their guns. Get it? 174

www.thelibertarian.net/2000/vs000924.htm. The Libertarian. Syndicated Essays by Vin Suprynowicz. From Mountain Media. For Immediate Release Dated September 24, 2000. 175

A possible motive would later be revealed by the Grandmother of the slain children attributing drug use, devil worship, and a fetish for horror movies by John Carpenter (unrelated to the family), “and one [John Carpenter movie] he especially liked, that we have learned depicts a killing done with a pitchfork.”

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES The following Friday, the children’s great-uncle, the Rev. John Hilton, told reporters: “If only (Jessica) had a gun available to her, she could have stopped the whole thing. If she had been properly armed, she could have stopped him in his tracks.” Maybe John William and Ashley would still be alive, Jessica’s Uncle said. “Unfortunately, 17 states now have these so-called safe storage laws,” replies Yale Law School Senior Research Scholar Dr. John Lott – author of the book “More Guns, Less Crime.” “The problem is, you see no decrease in either juvenile accidental gun deaths or suicides when such laws are enacted, but you de see an increase in crime rates.” Such laws are based on the notion that young children often “find daddy’s gun” and accidentally shoot each other. But in fact only five American children under the age of 10 died of accidents involving handguns in 1997, Lott reports. “People get the impression that kids under 10 are killing each other. In fact this is very rare: three or four per year.” The typical shooter in an accidental child gun death is a male in his late teens or 20s, who, statistically, is probably a drug addict or an alcoholic and has already been charged with multiple crimes, Lott reports. “These are the data that correlate. Are these the kind of people who are going to obey one more law?” So why doesn’t the national press report what happens when a victim disarmament (“gun control”) law costs the lives of innocent children in a place like Merced? “In the school shooting in Pearl, Miss.,” Dr. Lot replies, “the assistant principal had formerly carried a gun to school. When the 1995 (“Gun-Free School Zones”) law passed, he took to locking his gun in his car and parking it at least a guarter-mile away from the school, in order to obey the law. When that shooting incident started he ran to his car, unlocked it, got his gun, ran back, disarmed the shooter and held him on the ground for five minutes until the police arrived. “There were more than 700 newspaper stories catalogued on that incident. Only 19 mentioned the assistant principal in any way, and only nine mentioned that he had a gun.” “The press covers only the bad side of gun use, and only the potential benefits of victim disarmament laws – never their costs. “Basically all the current federal proposals fall into this category – trigger locks, waiting periods,” Lott said. “There’s not one academic study that shows any reduction in crime from measures like these. But there are good studies that show the opposite. Even with short waiting periods, crime goes up. You have women being stalked, and they can’t go quickly and get a gun due to the waiting periods, so they get assaulted or they get killed.” The United States has among the world’s lowest “hot” burglary rates – burglaries committed while people are in the building – at 13 percent, compared to “gun-free” Britain’s rate, which is now up to 59 percent, Lott repports. “If you survey burglars, American burglars spend at least twice as long casing a joint before they break in. . . . The number one reason they give for taking so much time is: They’re afraid of getting shot.” The way Jonathon David Bruce, of Merced, Calif., might once have been afraid of getting shot . . . before 17 states enacted laws requiring American parents to leave their kids disarmed while they’re away from home. The above news story is from a dispassionate, impersonal, objective view of a reporter. If that isn’t enough to persuade you that innocent law-abiding citizens have a right to immediate access to personal firearms in defense of life and liberty then perhaps the following account from the grandmother of those slain children will strike terror in your hearts – the terror of gun control laws.

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(13) Grandmother of Slain Children Protests Trigger Locks and Mandatory Gun Storage 176 Mary Carpenter April 20, 2001 North Carolina General Assembly To Whom It May Concern, To my understanding you are debating the passage of laws requiring trigger locks and mandatory storage of guns. I am a second generation resident of the State of California, a mother and a grieving grandmother. I wish to express to you how trigger locks and mandatory storage laws in the State of California affected my family. I hope my testimony may save someone in your state from sharing the pain we must now endure for the remainder of our lives. No law you can pass will keep the irresponsible from shooting accidents or a felon from stealing a gun. I am enclosing a portion of a letter I wrote to my own state legislators concerning the constant progression of laws restricting our guns in my state. Depending on whether or not you truly care, you may or may not recognize my name. I am the paternal grandmother of the two children who were brutally murdered inside their rural Merced California home on August 23, 2000 by a stranger with a pitchfork. Instead of suing gun manufacturers, I am of the opinion it is our lawmakers who need to be sued. It was you who created the laws that kept my grandchildren from being able to dcefend themselves with any weapon greater than their bare hands. All of my son’s children had been trained in the use of firearms but were unable to get to their Dad’s weapon because of California State Law. You, who have CCW permits or armed bodyguards, or both expect me to face a society gone mad because of drug-altered brains and lax laws on the perpetrators of crime? You had no room in your prisons for the killer of my grandchildren though his wife had reported to the police in Mojave California in June of 1997 that he had forced her and their infant son into his car (kidnapping) while living in southern California? At that time she also reported how she had managed to escape from him in Mojave after he held a gun to her head (assault with a deadly weapon) threatening to kill her and their one-month-old child? Though more recently she had given to the Dos Palos California Police Dept. the tape from her message minder threatening to kill her present husband? Though he had assaulted a police officer while resisting arrest for drug charges? Though he had violated his parole by not appearing at his hearing and they had a warrant out for his arrest? Though they knew where he lived, and also his mother and grandmother, yet failed to pick him up? Will you then find room for my son in your prisons should his fourteen-year-old daughter have access to his gun while she is babysitting her siblings? There is a growing list, in my area alone, of people (mostly women) who might still be alive had they not been in a state where the use of a gun was prohibited. Juli Sund, Carole Sund, Selvina Pelosso, Joie Armstrong, Ashley and John William Carpenter to name a few. Lawmakers talk big about a woman’s right to choose yet don’t allow me the very basic right to choose to defend myself? If teachers were allowed to carry a concealed weapon to school you would see the school shootings disappear. The same is true with the citizen on 176

www.aardvarknews.com/carpenter.htm

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES the street. The reason is, these killers are cowards. You can tell by their choice of victims. They operate best where they know there are no guns. Look at your child tonight and imagine him or her with their eyes jabbed out, their skulls splintered, their brains pierced, and their spines broken with the heavy tines of a spading fork. In defending her sistes to the death with the only weapon you allowed her, Ashley had 138 puncture wounds. Twenty-nine of them were on the right side of her face, five on the back of her head, and thirty-seven to her chest and lower neck. (Obviously he was trying to behead her.) She was nine years old. While committing no crime greater than sleeping in his parents bed, in his own house, John William, 7-years-old, was stabbed 46 times, with most of them in the chest, neck, and head. Depending on the condition of your heart, you may or may not feel a small measure of the pain my family and I must endure for the remainder of our lives. Now, imagine all the gun laws you can dream up and honestly admit whether or not they would have stopped such a mad dog as this. This man was a total stranger to the family, and other than a trace of marijuana, was not on drugs at the time. However, by the testimony of his wife and girlfriend, he was a drug user who became frightening whenever he used them. All your imagined gun laws will do is insure someone’s children will die again. Take a drive downtown and see for yourself all the drug addled brains. You may declare gun free zones, but you cannot declare killer free zones. This tragedy has made me realize I am not even safe in my locked home, my barn, or my backyard. I dare you to request the autopsy reports of John William & Ashley Danielle Carpenter done on August 28, 2000 from Sheriff Tom Sawyer of the Merced County Sheriff’s Dept. Also ask him for the police interview with the killer’s wife and girlfriend telling about his drug use and devil worship. Ask Detective Parsley about his fetish for horror movies produced by a John Carpenter, (no relation to us), and one he especially liked, that we have learned depicts a killing done with a pitchfork. His last employment was as a telemarketer in Merced. If you have an honest bone in your body your will see this country is in desperate need of a change of heart not the gun laws that have been in place for over two hunderd years. All the gun laws you can imagine cannot change the heart of a killer and you know it. Until man’s heart is change we will be like sheep led to the slaughter without our weapons of defense. May you stand before God and man as my two precious grandchildren’s killer if you pass any more gun legislation that will make me a felon should I own a handgun or any other gun for that matter. Sincerely, Mary Carpenter (14) Marching toward Gun Control is Marching toward Genocide The Carpenter’s neighbor didn’t intervene to stop the massacre because, in part, of fear of California law, federal gun laws, and the antagonistic media hype against gun owners all serve to perpetuate the misperceptions of gun ownership as America’s new leper colonies. The nature of man is that all things conceived range from the threateningly criminal to the promisingly philanthropic. The trouble in today’s society and its government is much of what comes out of Congress, the state legislatures, the mainstream media, and the liberal pundits are threateningly criminal in their bias, if not treasonous, utterances against the Second Amendment, lawful gun ownership and its usage. Can anyone deny the logic that when a nation’s laws attain a state of affairs that its law-abiding citizens are being murdered because of their obedience to those laws? Is this the intent of gun control

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES laws? To have gun owners and their families killed off? My God! That’s . . . GENOCIDE! The Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership have published two books worth reading. 177 These two books point out that the path our country is presently taking with gun control has only disaster in its future. These facts must not be ignored. In addition to these references the United States Code already has provisions to reverse the trend of gun control in place. The United States legally recognizes genocide as unlawful. 18 U.S.C. § 1091. Genocide (a) Basic Offense. - Whoever, whether in time of peace or in time of war, in a circumstance described in subsection (d) and with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such: (1) kills members of that group; (2) causes serious bodily injury to members of that group; (3) causes the permanent impairment of the mental faculties of members of the group through drugs, torture, or similar techniques; (4) subjects the group to conditions of life that are intended to cause the physical destruction of the group in whole or in part; (5) imposes measures intended to prevent births within the group; or (6) transfers by force children of the group to another group; or attempts to do so, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). (d) Required Circumstance for Offenses. - The circumstance referred to in subsections (a) and (c) is that (1) the offense is committed within the United States; or (2) the alleged offender is a national of the United States (as defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)). Gun owners are a group. Gun control laws are federal and state sponsored mechanisms for genocide. 18 U.S.C. § 1091.(a)(1): Gun control laws kill members of that group. 18 U.S.C. § 1091.(a)(2): Gun control laws cause bodily injury to members of that group. 18 U.S.C. § 1091.(a)(3): Gun control laws induce permanent state of fear for being defenseless. 18 U.S.C. § 1091.(a)(4): Gun control laws were the catalyst for Waco & Ruby Ridge. 18 U.S.C. § 1091.(a)(5): American Medical Association advocates gun control laws. 18 U.S.C. § 1091.(a)(6): Social Services take disparagingly microscope view of gun owners homes. Yet where it is proven that genocide cannot occur in a nation where its citizens are lawfully armed but only occurs in nations where full gun control exists, gun confiscation soon followed does genocide eventually occur. For the United States to recognize genocide as a crime against humanity and yet actively 177

Simkin, Jay, Aaron Zelman, and Alan M. Rice, Lethal Laws: “Gun Control” is the Key to Genocide: Documentary Proof: Enforcement of “Gun Control” Laws Clears the Way for Governments to Commit Genocide and Jay Simkin & Aaron Zelman, “Gun Control” Gateway to Tyranny: The Nazi Weapons Law, 18 March 1938: Original German Text and Translation, with an Analysis that Shows U.S. “Gun Control” Laws Have Nazi Roots. Jews for the Preservations of Firearms Ownership, Inc., Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES pursue the very path that leads to genocide, incrementally increasing the number of gun control laws is a schizoidism of law. A Conflict of Law. Are the citizens of this nation growing more dissatisfied with their federal and state governments over these injustices? I believe they are. Is the predominant opinion that the federal and state governments are aiding and abetting the criminal slaughter of gun owners and their families through its gun control laws? I say yes. Before the brave hearted in this country resort to armed insurrection I suggest “Social Norming the Second Amendment” before all Hell breaks loose. (15) Social Norming the Second Amendment is Common Sense If the National Rifle Association truly desires to shed its reputation as Schizophrenic 178 then I suggest the NRA form a coalition with GOA, SAF, JPFO, KABA, other pro-Second Amendment groups, and public policy organizations in law and social psychology fields, and adopt the Social Norms Marketing method for the restoration of unlicensed national open-carry handgun, restoring a constitutional norm to its rightful place as a social norm. In other words, set off a media campaign blitz of public service announcements educating the public on the restoration of the old social norm of open-carry handgun. Send a delegation to The Fifth Annual National Conference on the Social Norms Model, July 1012, 2002 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The conference is organized by The Bacchus and Gamma Peer Education Network 179 in conjunction with The National Social Norms Resource Center 180 and is generously co-sponsored this year by The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board. 181 182 Are we to be a nation of lies governed by liars? Or, will the truth set us free? Let us turn the tide on the verboseness of gun grabbers. Let us become ourselves verbose for the truth in armed personal security as a social norm. Let us embrace Social Norms Marketing to set the record straight and correct the misperceptions perpetuated by the liars at large. (16) Excerpts From, Robert C. Ellickson, “THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE LEGAL ACADEMY,” in SOCIAL NORMS, eds. Michael Hechter and Karl-Dieter Opp. New York, Russel Sage Foundation, 2001, 35-75, citing material from pages 40-45.

(A). The Supply Side of the Market for Norms: Change Agents . . . Cass Sunstein has devised the notion of a “norm entrepreneur,” a phrase that many legal scholars have since embraced. Both actors and enforcers may supply new norms. Actors participate on the supply side when they adopt new patterns of behavior. . . . Enforcers serve as suppliers when they react in new ways to the behavior of actors. Those on the deman side of the market for norms then react to these stimuli. (Id. at 40. From section, The Supply Side of the Market for Norms: Change Agents.) I refer to an actor or enforcer who is relatively early in suppling a new norm as a change agent. According to the rational-actor perspective, a change agent offers new norms because he anticipates that over time he will receive a flow of benefits that will outweigh (in present-value terms) the various costs he will incur while acting in that role. A change agent moves earlier than others because his expected net benefits from acting in that role 178

http://thenewamerican.com/tna/2000/06-05-2000/vo16no12_nra.htm

179

http://www.bacchusgamma.org

180

http://socialnorm.org

181

http://www.lcb.state.pa.us

182

http://socialnorm.org/home.html

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES are unusually large. This may be so either because his expected costs are lower or his expected benefits greater, or both. (Id. at 41.) Change agents tend to have attributes that make them relatively low-cost suppliers of new norms. In general, they posses superior technical intelligence, social intelligence, and leadership skills. These attributes reduce the opportunity costs they incur when they work for norm reform. . . . (Id.) Apart from costs and benefits, change agents tend to have relatively low discount rates and long time horizons. The stigma and other personal costs of attempting to change a norm generally are incurred early, whereas the esteem and tangible benefits generally are reaped late. The more future-oriented a person is, the more rational it is to pursue social reform. 183 (Id. at 42.) As a merchant seaman, I have been corresponding with the U.S. Coast Guard to address the necessity and feasibility of arming merchant seamen while ashore under the jurisdiction of U.S. Law and not under the jurisdiction of Maritime Law, to augment port security plans for our nation’s seaports and harbors, thus fulfilling the “common defense” as stipulated in the United States Constitution. Because I was insistent on this new approach to national security and taking a dramatic literary approach to convey the fear citizens live with everyday of their lives of being murdered by the criminal element of society because the citizens do not have immediate possession and access to personal firearms to defend their lives and liberty the Coast Guard misperceived my communication as a direct personal threat against the Coast Guard officer I had been corresponding with. That caused this Coast Guard officer to exercise poor judgement by initiating a criminal investigation via the Navy Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS). I happened to be aboard a U.S. government contracted U.S. merchant vessel anchored off the coast of Lithuania. This Coast Guard’s action occurred on the eve of the vessel’s scheduled departure for a 10-day exercise at sea causing me to miss the ship and the company to foot the bill for a 12-day hotel stay for a 2-hour interview with the two special agents of the NCIS. My goal is not only to encourage the government to implement constitutional measures for the common defense by relying of the citizen-sailors of the nation but also to restore constitutional norms of the Second Amendment as social norms. As noted in Ellickson’s passage above, I incurred an unwarranted criminal investigation, which is Ellickson’s noted “stigma and other personal costs of attempting to change a norm generally are incurred early.” This is characterized in my case as a citizen exercising his First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances, and the government not only ignores the petition but retaliates against the citizen for being a persistent nuisance. The government only pays attention when it is taken to court. The Coast Guard’s error of judgement opened the door for me to continue my effort to effect Second Amendment legal and social norms change by taking the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for an application for Writ of Mandamus and to recover damages for defamation. These two cases are: Don Hamrick, U.S. Merchant Seaman v. President George W. Bush, et al. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 1435ESH, July 18, 2002 (Writ of Mandamus) Don Hamrick, U.S. Merchant Seaman v. Admiral Collins, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, et al. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 1434ESH, July 18, 2002 (Damages) In an effort to clarify the dynamics of norm change, I distinguish between three subcategories of change agents: self-motivated leaders, norm entrepreneurs, and opinion

183

Emphasis mine.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES leaders. Although all three types respond relatively early to a shift in cost-benefit opportunities, they lead for different reasons. (Id. at 42.) (B). Self-Motivated Leaders Self-motivated leaders move early to change a norm because, owing to their special endowments and talents, they anticipate receiving unusually high levels of net tangible benefit from challenging the existing norm. 184 Indeed, these net tangible benefits are sufficiently large 185 to motivate them to favor change even in the absence of potential esteem rewards. (Id.) Self-motivated leaders commonly spark changes in the network norms that facilitate communication and coordination. (Id.) When a new norm suddenly becomes manifestly advantageous for a group, many selfmotivated individuals with unexceptional leadership abilities may supply it simultaneously. 186 When this happens, historians will have difficulty attributing the new norm to particular change agents. For instance, dueling fast became extinct in the South once the Civil War had shattered the social networks of the southern aristocracy. Although anti-dueling societies had been active in the South before the war esteem rewards apparently were not needed to motivate the rejection of dueling after Appomattox. (Id. at 43-44.) The same change can be predicted with today’s drive-by shootings, multiple-victim public shootings in schools, fast food restaurants, home invasions in “safe-storage” gun control states and with many other anti-self defense laws imposed as the current social norms. (C). Norm Entreprenuers . . . Norm entrepreneurs are specialists who campaign to change particular norms, whereas opinion leaders are generalists. (Id. at 44.) What special traits distinguish a successful norm entrepreneur? First, a norm entrepreneur tends to possess a relatively high level of technical knowledge relevant to the norms within his specialty. This knowledge enables the entrepreneur to respond early to a change in cost-benefit conditions. . . . Second, a norm entrepreneur is likely to be cognizant that there are appreciative experts (often, close associates in a social sub-group) who are likely immediately to esteem the norm entrepreneur for trying to change the social norm practiced at issue. In other words, a norm entrepreneur faces unusually favorable conditions on the demand side of the norms market. (Id.) (D). Opinion Leaders Unlike the self-motivated leader and the norm entrepreneur, the opinion leader is not at the forefront of norm change but instead is located one position back from the front. An opinion leader evaluates the initiatives of these other change agents (the true catalysts) and then decides which of their causes to endorse. Opinion leaders therefore play a pivotal role in determining whether change agents succeed in triggering a cascade toward a new norm. (Id. at 45.)

184

Anti-gun society

185

Reduction in the murder rates and other violent crime rates.

186

Build it! They will come! - quoting from a baseball movie

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES A successful opinion leader tends to have two exceptional characteristics. The first is an usually high level of social intelligence, which helps the opinion leader anticipate better than most which social innovations will end up attracting bandwagon support. An adept opinion leader, for example, may be aware that many people have been disguising their true opinions about the merits of current norms. (Id.) I might correctly assess that I have educated myself with years of leisure time self-study in the original intent of the United States Constitution. And with this new awareness in how things were meant to be and seeing how our federal government is taking us down the thornbush path to a totalitarian, militaristic police-state I began to voice my opinions in any available arena. For several years one of those arenas was the Internet discussion board of Arkansas Representative Asa Hutchinson. I can safely allege that Rep. Asa Hutchinson never paid attention to my “Gun Rights Restoration” messages. His example exemplifies the allegation that the “Government doesn’t listen to its citizens pleas for freedom as it continues to restrict and steal more of our freedoms in the name of security. I am serving as an opinion leader with this paper. The current self-motivated leaders and norm entreprenuers (Second Amendment scholars and gun rights organizations) are admirably but erroneously attempting to introduce reciprocal concealed-carry license for all fifty states. From a legislative focus in would be far easier to simply repeal gun laws that restrict the right to keep and bear arms, allowing both interstate and intrastate travel with unlicensed open-carry handgun for personal security. (E). The Process of Norm Change Either sort of exogenus shock — a shift in internal cost-benefit conditions 187 or an alteration of group membership 188 — can spur a group to change its informal rules. However, it is not groups, as such, that act but, rather, individuals. As previously discussed, individuals possess different attributes that incline them to play specialized roles in the process of norm change. (Id. 51) (17). The Proving Grounds! Since unlicensed “restricted to state boundaries” open-carry is the law in Virginia, Nevada, and Maine 189 these states provide the prime locations (the urban, the suburban, and the rural) to initiate this new social norm, not as a trial basis, but for its permanency. Utilizing the Social Norms Marketing approach the initial phase would be to educate the public on the law of unlicensed open-carry handgun in public service announcements while laying down the foundation for expected behavioral norms. Once law-abiding citizens (individuals) feel comfortable with their knowledge of the law and what is expected of them in their behavior as they go about society with a sidearm they are more likely to muster up their courage and experimentally try this new behavior. When more citizens observe that law and order is still maintained, and blood is not running in the streets, that society is still polite and normal then the predicted cascade will occur empirically proving that an armed society is a polite society. . . . A person joins a reputational cascade, by contrast, to avoid the social disapproval that may be visited on those who are out of step (Kuran 1998; Kuran Sunstein 1999, 685-87).

187

The bombing of the World Trade Centers, the Pentagon, the downing of United Flight 93 in Pennsylvania.

188

Removal of current pro-Second Amendment leaders refusing to address the national open-carry without a

license. 189

Snyder, Jeffrey R., Fighting Back: Crime, Self, and the Right to Carry a Handgun. Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 284, October 22, 1997. Quoting from section, The “Ignoble Act” of Carrying Concealed Weapons. (Footnotes omitted)

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES One goes along with the crowd to be with the crowd, even if one knows that the crowd is wrong. (Id. at 51-52.) This is true for the anti-gun crowd as they are enforcing the current anti-gun social norm. The purpose of initiating a Second Amendment social norm is to correct the wrong-headed anti-gun crowd and restore true personal security for society. In this new social norm of open-carry handgun those who are reluctant to adopt the new social norm will risk disapproval, informal sanctions, as one who advocates anti-social behavior and as being soft on crime. Politicians are extremely fearful of being tagged as soft on crime and will dutifully support open-carry handgun laws with its associated social norm as the being “tough on crime” thesis gains popularity. The speed of norm evolution is determined by the rates at which the members of the group acquire the technical and social knowledge necessary to appreciate that a new norm is more utilitarian than the old one. The entire process may proceed briskly. (Id. at 52) In Guillermina Jasso’s Rule Finding About Rule Making: Comparison Processes and The Making of Rules 190 under the section, Studying the Making of Rules: First Principles,’ Basic Premises, he offers four candidates for basic forces governing human behavior: 191 • • • •

to know the causes of things, leads to rule finding. to judge the goodness of things, leads to rule making. to be perfect, leads to both rule making and rule unmaking. to be free, leads to the unmaking of rules.

. . . All four candidate forces have been ascribed to humans as fundamental aspects of human nature. All four refer to properties ascribed to God. All four refer to things that play prominent parts in the discourse between humans and deities, both in what deities say they do for humans and in what humans pray for. All four appear not only in what humans pray for but also in what they renounce in the spirit of sacrifice. As both Émile Durkheim and Max Weber understood, the deepest aspects of human nature manifest themselves in religious phenomena, and thus the sociology of religion may play a prominent part in the methodology for unmasking the basic forces. Finally, note that it may someday be seen that the basic forces governing human nature are more than four perhaps, at the other extreme, only one, the others being manifestations of a single more basic force. (Id. at 350-51.) Finally, the multifactor view poses special empirical challenges, for the operation of two factors may lead to opposite effects, and hence isolating the two effects becomes the prime empirical objective. It may at first appear that one prediction is rejected, but in fact it may be that one of the two effects is stronger than the other. For example, suppose that mechanism A predicts that y is an increasing function of x. The empirical finding that y is an increasing function of x does not constitute, in a multifactor world, evidence that mechanism B is not operating; rather, the finding would be consistent with the operation of both mechanisms such that the effect of mechanism A is stronger than, or “dominates,” 190

Jasso, Guillermina, “Rule Finding About Rule Making: Comparison Processes and The Making of Rules,” in Social Norms, eds. Michael Hechter and Karl-Dieter Opp. New York, Russel Sage Foundation, 2001, 348-393, citing material from pages 350-351. 191

Id. at 351. Citing from section “Rule Making and the Basic Forces.”

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES mechanism B. The converse would also be true. This is one of the reasons why the more fruitful a theory the easier it is to test. (Id. at 351.) Translated to the current proposal: Mechanism A, gun control laws effect on human nature, predicts that y, obedience to gun control laws by law-abiding citizens, is an increasing function of x, being murdered by the criminal element of society. Mechanism B, federal law protecting national right to open-carry handgun by law-abiding citizens, predicts that y, obedience to the new federal open-carry law, is a decreasing function of x, being murdered by the criminal element of society. Sounds plausible to me! My unscientific prediction is that a national open-carry handgun society will be proven to be a positive social norm, even amongst the verbose minority of nay-sayers. Mentioned at the start of this paper Aaron Zelman’s open letter to President Bush and his administration 192 offers recommendations for homeland security that provides the basis for the rules of a new (or more aptly, an old) social norm. These recommendations are: Explicitly recognize and encourage Americans' unlimited right to self-defense and defense of their own communities. •

Encourage citizens to be aware of their rights and responsibilities, particularly their second-amendment rights.

•

Immediately instruct the ATF, FBI, and any other federal enforcement agencies to cease prosecuting non-violent Americans for technical violations of firearms laws or regulations.

•

Permit and encourage Americans to bear arms on federal lands and in federal buildings.

•

Considering that courts have repeatedly declared that government law enforcement has no obligation to protect any individual, encourage states to enable citizens to defend themselves or their communities.

•

Encourage those with military or police experience to share their expertise with fellow citizens in the form of firearm-training courses and other defense skills.

Aaron Zellman’s recommendations will help provide the backing of government support and enforcement of Second Amendment norms as explained in the following: (18). Excerpt from Christine Horne, THE ENFORCEMENT OF NORMS: GROUP COHESION AND METANORMS, Social Psychology Quarterly, (A Journal of the American Sociological Association.The Enforcement of Norms: Group Cohesion and Meta-Norms) Vol. 64, No. 3, September 2001. Many scholars argue that group cohesion contributes to social order — that norms are more effective in tight-knit communities. One explanation for this correlation suggests that it can be attributed to higher rates of sanctioning in solidary groups. Criminoligists, for example, emphasize the role of community integration in controlling deviant behavior. They argue that when a community disintegrates, it “ceases to function effectively as a means of social control . . . . Resistance . . . to delinquent and criminal behavior is low, and such behavior is tolerated.” Studies show that in cohesive communities, people express greater willingness to impose sanctions against those who engage in deviant behavior. At

192

Supra note 2.

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES least some research, then, suggests that one reason for higher levels of order in cohesive groups is that deviance is more likely to be punished in such groups. Conclusion If American society is “disintegrating,” without Second Amendment norms, even in the hiatus of post September 11, 2001’s unifying patriotism, the factional perpetual liberal-conservative struggle over gun control agendas is or will be the cause of the deteriorating cohesiveness of the American dream, to live free in a republic, but yet to insure one’s own safety with personal possession of firearms is surely approaching death’s door. The law-abiding citizen’s resistance to delinquent and criminal behavior from others in society, and from those in state and federal government service, both elected and bureaucratic types, having been and continues to be incessantly attacked by a trickling avalanche of gun control laws is not dissimilar to terminal cancer. Sometime after the September 11 terrorist attacks I watched a CNN female anchor as she interviewed someone about United Flight 93 crashing in a Pennsylvania field, questioning whether the male passengers storming the cockpit to regain control of the plane from the terrorists were actually vigilantees. There, in full view of millions of viewers, perpetuating their haunting bias, a blatant act of ignorance to citizens’ inalienable human rights to save there own lives and the lives of countless others not on that plane. This is just another instance of CNN reinforcing their reputation as being the “Communist News Network.” This pervasive anti-gun, anti-self-defense attitude has a killing effect on certain rights and innocent lives, i.e., the right to make a citizen’s arrest, the right to be part of a legal posse comitatus, the right to organize and participate in lawful unorganized militia activities as social events at state and county fairs, and gun shows, where society can learn and practice their Second and Ninth Amendment rights. Any direct defensive action, through informal sanctions, or overt self-defense on the part of the victim is often meet by the law, the courts, the media, and reinforced by society, with the ever oppressive “you cannot take the law into your own hands.” Yet, were does the law come from, but from the citizens. It comes from the citizens electing their state and federal senators and representatives to make the laws they want and need. It comes from citizen’s serving on jury duty to render judgement not only on the accused but also on the law itself. Where is the check and balance mechanism when judges deny jurors their right to determine the constitutionality of particular laws, and in its stead, tell the jurors what the law is? Jury nullification is a hotly contested issue. Where is the check and balance mechanism when all three branches of government coordinate in a cooperative manner to pass unconstitutional legislation? This is synonymous to employees telling the boss how things are to be or not to be, invoking their personal prejudice against the Second Amendment into the law, thus turning the U.S. Constitution upside down. These injustices serve in part for the disintegration of American society. Citizen’s have no incentive to enforcing Second Amendment social norms through informal sanctions, or even to exercise their right to make a citizen’s arrest for fear of retaliation from neighbors, the ACLU, the law, the media, and even the accused. The costs are simply just too high. Can we not yet establish the allegation of governmental tyranny that our right to petition the Government for a redress of grievances provides in the First Amendment? The law must be reformed in these debilitating areas, fortifying the citizen’s rights and duties of citizenship, minimizing or eliminating the risks of enforcing social norms. An open-carry handgun law, backed by government enforcement, will provide individual U.S. citizens a unifying national identity, spanning race, gender, and religion, which will reinvigorate a sense of community in both the local and national sense. We have been terrorized and oppressively governed preventing us from exercising our Second Amendment rights through lies and fear for too long. We have had our constitutional rights pickpocketed from us for so long that we cannot even recognize the conditions of involuntary servitude to government and criminals that we are actually in. If we have been for decades, as some will say, perhaps with impenetrable legitimacy, in a state of national emergency shouldn’t We, the People be a part of our nation’s defense? Why should government claim a monopoly on self-defense with arms? The military is

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PART 9. PROPOSED FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS AS REMEDIES perpetually developing more advanced lethal weapons, even high-tech ammunition that can kill the enemy hidden behind buildings for its soldiers while the government continues restricting citizens’ rights from owning or using even the simplest of handguns. All checks and balances separating tyranny from freedom are dismantled. Tyranny has banished freedom from our Second Amendment. Let’s go back to the old social norm, the U.S. Constitutional norm of national open-carry handgun without that tyrannical license in accordance with the Second, Ninth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Amendments to our U.S. Constitution. Let us live free and be safe, as safe as we can make it for ourselves, and for each other because the government has failed us in this matter.

(19) Social Norming Resources

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National Social Norms Resource Center Social Science Research Institute 148 N. 3rd Street DeKalb, IL 60115 (815) 753-9745 www.socialnorm.org Social Norms Marketing Research Project Education Development Center, Inc. 55 Chapel Street Newton, MA 02458 (617) 969-1060 Fax (617) 928-1537 Email [email protected] www.edc.org/hec/socialnorms Alcohol and Other Drug Education Project Hobart and William Smith Colleges Geneva, NY 14456 (315) 781-3000 www.hws.edu/ACA/depts/alcohol/index.html Monitoring the Future Institute for Social Research University of Michigan 426 Thompson Street Ann Arbor, MI 48104 (734) 764-8354 www.monitoringthefuture.org

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www.saddonline.com/links.htm

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Social Marketing Network www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hppb/socialmarketing Social Marketing Resources www.social-marketing.com Social Marketing Strategies for College Campus www.edc.org/hec/pubs/soc-marketing-strat.html Social Norms and Social Marketing (Higher Education Center - Education Development Center) www.edc.org/hec/socialnorms Journal of Health Communication www.aed.org/JHealthCom The Interactive Health Communication Science Panel (publications, research, resources, etc.) www.health.gov/scipich UI’s Communication Dept’s Resource page (different communication sectors; has good health/social section) www.uiowa.edu/~commstud/resources Health Risk Communication Principles and Practices www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HEC/primer.html The CDCs Health Communication Research Page www.cdc.gov/od/oc/hcomm The American Communication Association’s Research/Studies Center www.uark.edu/~aca/acastudiescenter.html The National Communication Association’s (NCA) Publication page www.natcom.org/pubs/default.htm John Hopkins Center for Communication Programs (Behavior Change Communication) www.jhuccp.org/behavior/index.stm

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www.psaresearch.com/bibsocial_websites.html

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