Gbc Essay Sample

Essay Topic: "Describe h~alisation

is impacting on China's resource

acquisitions in Sudan."

Subject:

Global Business Context

Author:

Andrew J. Hook

Student Number:

S3253096

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of globalisation on Su~

along with the effects of

heavy Chinese investment in Sudan's resources sector. The changing extent of Chinese involvement in Sudan, and more widely Africa, are discussed, along with the reasons for this: future resource supply for China; diplomatic imperatives (such as Taiwan and supporters wit~

the UN); and, providing a long-term export market for Chinese goods

and service,( Some further geopolitical implications Sudan and Africa are discussed, and Hofstede's cul~l

Oftl+ role that China is playing in dimensions are used to analyse

China's approach to Sudanese resource investment. Risk-avoidance and long-term orientation were identified as key dimensions in this analysis. /'

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Introduction

To the global community, Sudan is commonly linked with the current humanitarian crisis in Darfur, a region in the west of Sudan, which started in 2003, and continues to this day. Organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have been vocal regarding the human rights abuses in DarfuLd

the involve~

government (Amnesty International, 2009). The Unites Stat~ "nation that supports terrorism", and ~

the Sudanese declared Sudan a

banned US companies from operating in areas

in Sudan (US Department of State, 2008). /'

As part of this crisis, China is often singled out for criticism for maintaining good relations, ongoin~de

and arms supply to th~udanese

government (Sudan Divestment

Taskforce, 2007; Amnesty International, 2009). Indeed, film director Steven Spielberg raised Darfur as the reason for a high-profile rejection for assisting the Beijing 2008 Olympics (Washington Post, 20080nd

actress Mia Farrow has been notable in -:

/'

publicising the Chinese involvement in Darfur (Guler, 2009; Straits Times, 2007).

The economic, political, social and cultural implications of the situation in Sudan provide an excellent case~y

into how the process of globalisation is affecting developing

nations in Africa. It also incorporates other themes, such as the global role of developing ./

superpowers and shifts in the geopolitical landscape from the 20th century to the 21 st.

The discussion will examine the extent of Chinese current and future involvement in Sudan and why this is occurring, implications on the geopolitical landscape globally and also on how cultmal differences may impact-on decisio~proaclresiJetwe-en'-----------Sudan, China and the West.

,,/

Globalisation

Globalisation has been defined as "the shift towards a more ~grated

and interdependent

world economy" (Hill, Cronk, and Wickramasekera, 2008). Alternatively, Nayyar (2006)

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A J Hook, s3253096

discusses globalisation as being either a process of integration with the world economy, or a strategic attempt to integrate with the world economy. /"

In this discussion of globalisation, it is helpful to assess the Sudan-Chinese relationship in the terms of elements of globalisation, such as m~s

-

and production, and in terms of

-

the drivers of globalisation - trade and investment barriers, technological change and demo graphics iHill et al, 2008). ~he consequences of globalisation in terms of the impact on Sudanese jobs, incomes and quality of life are very pertinent in the context of the civil war between the north and south of Sudan, the ceasefire in 2005 and coexisting /'

/'

governments until 2011, and for the crisis in Darfur (CIA World Factbook, 2004, 2008).

One other background issue that complicates the discussion around China and globalisation is that China does not operate as a Western-style dem~acy

where business

operates in quasi-independence of the government (Woetzel, 2008). China's history and politics means that most large businesses are currently, or have recently been, 'stateowned enterprises' (SOEs) (Woetzel, 2008~he

implication is that business is often

inseparable from state-driven imperatives, and hence investment by business along globalisation lines is also governmental investment.~he

economic neo-liberalist

overtones of free markets and globalisation apply in limited and non-standard ways when discussing Chinese involvement in globalisation (Mohan and Power, 2008)./

In a similar vein, the lack of a free market and emergi~pportunities investment, such as an infant sharemark~IMF,

for private

2009), observer status with the World

Trade Organisation (WTO) (WTO, 2009), and the beginning concepts of widely held plivate oWllelship oflalld (MOOle;-ze~O

make-Sudan's expelielIc·p-e~w
globalisation different from the Western economies. /

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To What Extent has Sudan Embraced Globalisation?

In terms of the elements of globalisation, Sudan has been slowly opening its markets -:

since its independence in 1956. The older (prior to 1980) bilateral trade agreements have been with predominantly Eu

an countries, such as Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland 7 and France (UNCTAD, 2006). Later bilateral treaties have focused on the Arab world

and other Islamic countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, along with other major economies such as India and China, with the majority of these signed in the last decade /'

(UNCT AD, 2006). However, the US has not signed any agreements with Sudan, and has designated Sudan as a "state sponsor for terrorism", along with legislation to divest assets frojP--Companiesoperating in certain areas of Sudan (D.S. Department of State, 2008).

Sudan is currently classed as a World Trade Organisation (WTO) observer, which comp~e

observer country to commence accession proceedings after five years (WTO;

2009). Sudan commenced the proceedings in 1994, and has been working through the -:

process since (WTO, 2009). Sudan is also a member of various agreements and forums, such as a partnership agreement between;he European Union and Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group States (UNCTAD, 2006), Arab and Islamic agreements regarding ,/'

investment and capital (UNCTAD, 2006), and the China-Africa Cooperation Forum /'

(CACF) (Shinn, 200-r;Bahgat, 2007). Bahgat (2007) also notes that 'Sudan has also been invited to OPEC meetings as an observer since 2001 illustrating its emergent status as an oil exporter'
has increased

by around 11% and a similar level is projected for 2008 (IMF, 2007). ,/'

In terms of Adam Smith's "invisible hand" concepts (Hill et al, 2008), Sudan's strengths with respect to production are around oil, and some minerals (CIA World Factbook, 2008r,;ithough_~~~ific~~t

investment has been_~nd \V~~_b_e require~ t~~ccess !hese

assets .../'The current stated oil reserves are 6.6 billion barrels of oil as of 2006 (Bahgat,

/

./

2007; CIA World Factbook, 2008). Bahgat (2007) also notes that the quality of the oil, »:

and access, is generally good, with oil reserves being land-based. Transportation and

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A J Hook, 83253096

access to international

markets from a logistical basis is also attractive'LFrom

point of view, Sudan's government

has imported significant

80% of its oil revenues in the early 2000's for purchasing ,/

.

major supplier (Sudan Divestment

Taskforce,

also invested in weapons manufacture, weapons manufacture

Implementation

of technological

levels of arms, using about

arms, and China has been a /'

2007; Washington

Post, 2004).

and has claimed self-sufficiency

(Sudan Divestment

Taskforce,

improvements

labour force still focused in agriculture,

a military

2007).

Sudan has

in small to large

/

has been slow in Sudan, with 80% of the

and low labour force participation

in

/

manufacturing

(CIA World Factbook, 2008).

such as mobile phone penetration telephones

Indicators of modern communications,

and internet use are comparatively

for 41 million inhabitants,

high, at 7.5 million

and internet access is estimated at 1.5 million users /'

respectively telephony

(CIA World Factbook, 2008). and television

stations (although

Older technological

are at much lower levels - at 345,000/in

1997 figures) (CIA World Factbook, 2008).

has jumped the traditional

infrastructure

lines and 3 television

This suggests that Sudan

directly to a sophisticated

although cellular networks are concentrated 2008)./There

devices such as fixed-line

communications

grid,

on the major cities (CIA World Factbook,

is also concern that the technological

skills-transfer

between Chinese FDI

or Chinese nationals to the Sudanese is not being pursued to any large degree (Sudan -:

Divestment

Taskforce,

2007), despite overall African commitments

made by China

(Shinn, 2007). /'

Although

globalisation

processes within Sudan are at a comparatively

de~elo.pe~ countries, it is wo.rth noting ~~::e -------cgrhlOrrlD~a:tthl'::s~a·trorrmovelllents

(HIll et aI, 20

nationals taking the high-paying Sudan Divestment cO~I?!rcial

Taskforce,

secto~_in Sud~n

(Large, 2008(

Operating

r~s

2007).

.

t"'I

1

""~1

T"'"

m sucan ~1ne cconorms

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•

is similar sentime~t to o~her anti- . -ats-are-concemed

Dumping of Chinese goods into a nascent

is gener~ing

caJls ~o~J~rotectio~ for lo~~!_~u~~nese in~EstrL

in unstable and developing

t

,

wlth-ehines=e'--f1f7o""~.m--......--------

and taking small business roles (Large, 2008;

there have been recent attacks, kidnappings •

lower level than

countries also presents risk, and

and murders committed

on Chinese nationals

""'AAO/

LUU~7.

Page 5 of 16

A J Hook, s3253096

Extent of Trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Sudan

Total foreign direct investment (FDI) in Sudan has increased substantially in the years 1995-2009. In the years 1985-1995, the FDI inward flows were an average ofUS$8 million, with FDI stock increasing at around the US$l 00 million mark (UNCTAD, World ,/'

/'

Investment Report, 2004 and 2008). As of2007, FDI inward flows had increased to US$2.4 billion (with 2006 even higher, at US$3.5 billion), and FDI stock at US$13.8 billion (UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2004 and 2008)~

Chinese investment in Sudan has grown significantly in the last decade, from less than 1% of African FDI investment to over 22% of Chinese FDI in Africa (UNCTAD, 2001). China and Sudan established diplomatic ties in 1959 (Chinese Government Official ->

Portal, 2009), and China established a bilateral trade agreement in 1997 with Sudan .> (UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2004).

In 2008, bilateral trade was standing at US$8.2 billion (Chinese Government Official Portal, 2009), although many sources point out that published figures are difficult to verify and may include other forms of inter-country fmancial instruments (UNCTAD, 200~um

et al 20090upporting

this, Lum et al. (2009)~ficallY

note that: 'many

PRC (People's Republic of China) economic investments abroad can be counted as aid rather than foreign direct investment because they are secured by official bilateral agreements, do not impose real financial risks upon the PRC companies involved, or do /

»>:

not result in Chinese ownership of foreign assets". Kaplinsky and Morris (2009) describe a typical process whereby the Chinese EXIM bank provides a low-cost line of credit to ~~~~~~-A-frican-states,

Chinese films terrderfot the business, with-successfn-I--ten:derers~ha~vt1linn·go--~~~~~~

funds transferred within Chin>and the payment for the loans being a drawdown on

/

commodity exports to China. Hence external transparency of this process is very low.

Sudanese tariff barriers and duties are being reported under WTO guidelines (WTO, 2008), with highest levels of tariffs being on agricultural goods, and lower levels of manufactured goods (WTO, 2009(iocal

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production of agricultural goods uses around

Page 6 of 16

A J Hook, s3253096

80% of the labour force, and manufactured goods around 7% of the labour force (CIA -:

World Factbook, 2008), suggesting that the existing tariff approach is designed to protect local agricultural enterprise and encourage importing of manufactured goods.

Why is China investing in Sudan?

Original Chinese investments in Africa can be viewed as "third-world solidarity" in terms of political ties with the decolonisation of Africa and the Cold War, demonstrated by the Bandung Conference of Non-aligned nations in 1955 (Kaplinsky and Morris, 200~

More recent reasons for investment in Africa were around state-owned enterprises (SOEs) investing in resources and infrastructure, which is now being followed by more private-sector ent~ses,

often building on the services needed for the SOEs (Kaplinsky

and Morris, 2009). The main areas of foreign direct investment from China in Sudan are in oil, minerals and some sm~usiness

supporting Chinese investments in Sudan

(Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009). Shinn (2007)~0

suggests while the current imperatives

are resources-driven and diplomatic, the Chinese leadership has also identified Africa as a long-term prospect for exports and investment outside of resources. US Congressional hearings regarding current Chinese investment strategies in Africa suggest that investment is driven mainly by resource39'Pply and diplomatic imperatives (Lum, Fischer, Gomez-Granger, Leland, 2009).

-: As an oil consumer, China became a net importer of oil in 1993 (Bahgat, 2007). As of 2006, China b7e -------A(BR-ahgat;-2007).

the third-largest global importer of oil, behind the US and Japan China's demandis-projected

to inclease fr~.6

million barrets-perday

in 2003 to 15 million barrels per day in 2030 (Bahgat, 2007). A~2007, 60% of Sudan's oil is supplied directly to China (Hanson, 2008; Bah~ ____ ~ _~

around)9%2007), with

~_udan_m~king~p_Cl~ound1.~~ ofChina'.s ~jJimport~.f!lCl!?-~at~29Q}).__ ._

With the increased stability in the south of Sud/,

_

__ _.

China is actively looking for further

investment opportunities (The Monitor, 2008). China has suppiied the Government of

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South Sudan with a $300 million loan, and in response, the South Sudanese have toured China and made reassurances that China's oil investments were secure according to the provisions of the peace agreement between north and south (Large, 2008).' Proven oil reserves have been increasing over the last decade,.> suggesting that further oil reserves are available with increased exploration (Bahgat, 2007). Geopolitical Landscape Although Western firms, such as Chevron, Total, and Arakis, were first into Sudan in the 1980s, stability and political differences have meant that China was the only major /

country to invest in Sudan from the 1990s onward (Guler, 2009; UNCTAD Country ->

Profile, 2006). During the 1990s China has adhered to a foreign policy around Deng's

/

"24-character strategy" (Klein-Ahlbrandt and Small, 2008), being:

"Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities /d

I

{,

bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership. " -: Lum et al (2009) also note "only four of 48 sub-Saharan African countries ... still maintain official relations with Taiwan". In a similar fashion, Sudan reciprocates: "Sudan fully supports the Chinese government's measures to deal with the [Uygur Autonomous Region] incident" (Chinese Government Official Portal, 2009)(

While China has historically pursued an attitude of political non-interference with nation -:

states (Large, 2008), the US has had a mo~ctive

foreign policy, through sanctions, by

direct missile attack in 1998 (Large, 2008), by freezing overseas assets of certain high--------rI

anking-Sud-anese go'VeInment-figuIes, and Iegards the cUIIentPresident-onft'-SSnurldalaIn-l,--iO"lnn't':'IaITI----El-Bashir, as a war criminal (US Department of State, 2008). /' ~

Klein-Ahlbrandt and Small (2008) discuss the changing approach over the last two or three years of the Chinese government to international relations. China's pressure on the Sudanese government to accept a joint African Union - United Nations peacekeeping

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force in Darfur was an example of how China appears to be taking a more lead role in global challenges (People's Daily Online, 2007)~owever,

they point out that:

"China's shifting diplomacy reflects not afundamental change in its values, but a new perception of national interests ...Beijing is not subordinating its economic aims to other goals; it is simply devising more sophisticated means to secure them. "

Sudan can also be considered along with Angola, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Chad as formi~ with contiguous borders.

corridor of oil-supplying and mineral-bearing countries,

Angola also supplies 20% of China's oil imports, and has

recently been admitted as a member of OPEC (Bahgat, 2007fchina

is in a process of

setting up "Strategic Economic Zones" (SEZ's) in Africa to allow mineral resources to be moved from point of extraction to China vi~r-es

Salaam in Tanzania, rather than via

sea-routes from West Africa (Davies, 2008). Similarly, Chinese companies are building a US$1.15 billion railway connection from Khartoum to Port Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 2007~

The China-Africa Cooperation Forum (CACF), where Chinese and African leaders meet every three years to discuss improving economic relations, has provided a counterpoint to US and European interests and influence (Shinn, 2007). China has also initiated other related cultural and develoP/t

aid, and paralleling the US Peace Corps with "youth

volunteers" (Lum et al, 2009). \

From an African point of view, Sudan is one of a large number of countries that are starting down the road to mOle--mudenrpol~at-systems

and-capitalist economies

/'

(Moore, 2001; Bigsten and Durevall, 2003). The issues of foreign debt (IMF, 2007) and continued involvement by former colonial powers, along with underdeveloped resou~, have been argued by many authors to be a state of arrested development (Moore, 2001; -------- -- --Z-------~ -------'>:':---- - -Bigsten and Durevall, 2003; Sandbrook and Romano, 2004).

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Moore (2001) concludes that the" ... the imposition of neoliberalism, in the absence of geostrategically grounded alternatives means that the hurdles on the road to modernity are nearly insurmountable."~gsten

and Durevall (2003) are more optimistic, but agree

that because the idea of a "country" or a "state" has been imposed by others, rather than _ ~ developed; the loyalty of citizens is to other groups rather than the stat6urther,

the

method by which elites retain power in African countries is to support their supporters, ,.----

and the fragility of power thus limits the policy options available to them (Bigsten and Durevall, 2003; M~e,

2001)./

Cultural Implications

An analysis of cultural differences might provide some insight into the relationship between China and Sudan, and also the way in which China and the West are dealing with the issues of Darfur and more broadly, the strains of developing economies in Africa.

/

Notwithstanding th/ments (McSweeney, ~),

around the validity of Hofstede's work on cultural norms

the examination of differences and similarities in Hofstede's indices

(Hofstede, 2009; Hill et al, 2008) between East African/Arab World, China and the Western Nations - US and Australia as examples - may provide a way to view this

..

situation.

~

/' Hofstede (2009) does not provide information regarding Sudan, however the composition of Sudan could reasonably be seen as a composite of the "Arab World" and of "East /

Africa". The composition of Sudan's ethnic group-s-rs-preumnirnrntlybtacXi5-2%)and Arab (39%), and religious groupings are split between Sunni Muslim 70% (in north), Christian 5% (mostly in south and Khartoum), and indigenous beliefs 25% (CIA World -~~

Factbook, 2008):rhe ~official languages are Arabic and English, with a program of -~~---~--_. ~ --------.-~----~------~---~--~. "Arabization" in process (CIA World Factbook, 2008). Based on this information, it is .

reasonable to assume that the cultural factors are similar to "The Arab World", and especially when the ruling groups are Islamic Arabs.

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/

A J Hook, 83253096

Hofstede's Dimensions

140

120

100

I!lArabWorld 80

••

IIAustralia Cl East Africa •• CChina •.

iO

• United States

40

20

PDI

IDV

MAS

UAI

LTO

Category

Legend: PDI:Power Distance Index - IDV:Individualism - MAS:Masculinity - UAI: Uncertainty Avoidance Index - LTO: Long-term Orientation

-: Figure 1: Hofstede's Dimensions for Selected Countries (Hofstede, 2009)

Referring to Figure 1, it can be seen that there are parallels between China and "Sudan" (as an East Africa/Arab World combination), and also some significant differences:-The power distance index is high in both Sudan and China, but low in the Western countries, / and likewise individualism is 10

·n Sudan nd China, but high in the Western countries.

Interestingly, China is very diffe! ent ~ deals with uncertainty and risk, an

the other comparison countries when it the very noticeable tendency for long-term

I ./

onentation,

/

/

Guler (2009) and Klein-Ahlbrandt and Small (2008) suggest that the US Government's __ ~____ ..

,n212rQach_C.'lb~_dire~ta12pI.PJ!gh".1...dJl..riugJh~BJJ£.hJl.dministration tp...J2arfuJ,.Ill1d_en...gllgiug_ »:

with China over the region, was not particularly successful. The direct approach to ~

influencing China relies on convincing China to use its influence to force the Sudanese government to prevent the spread of conflict in the south and also in Darfur (Lum et al,

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~. 2009;!gein-Ahlb~t

.> ~ and Small, 2008; Richardson, 2007; Sudan Divestment Taskforce,

2007; Guler, 2009): The current ceasefire agreement with the rebels in the south is holding, but a separate conflict on the western border in Darfur is continuing (CIA World

»:

Factbook, 2008). However, as m~ned

previously, Klein-Ahlbrandt and Small (2008)------

and Christensen and Swan (2008), amongst many other commentators have noted a recent change in China's stance over the last few year~

Considering Hofstede's indices on risk aversion and long-term orientation, the previous Chinese approach to Sudan, and the recent change, appear to be wholly consistent: /~

China's aims of long-term supply of oil and resources (Bahgat, 2007), and maintaining .. ...

pressure on governments to, ~instance,

maintain diplomatic embargoes on Taiwan

(Christens en and Swan, 2008) have probably achieved the majority of its aims with the North Sudanese government:The

application of the US's ban on companies investing in ~

Sudan presents a market opportunity for China (Shinn, 2007), and this approach could be argued to be encouraging China's investment in Sudan (Chinese Governmental Website Portal, 2009r.-However, the change from China being a minor regional power, where previously risk was managed by providing economic ~ngthening

of an undemocratic

military regime (Sudan Divestment Taskforce, 2007; Amnesty International, 200~

to a

superpower moving to protecting growing assets and infrastructure in Sudan, and Africa in general, require a modification to the previous Chinese foreign policy approach /

./

(Mohan and Power, 2008; Klein-Ahlbrandt and Small, 2008). -:

Davies (2008) points out that significant strategic Chinese investment in Africa, including Sudan, is being used to provide resource transportation and supply chain infrastructure on ~

a "grand scale". This is an exceHent example-oftrow China's Iisk-averse-cuhure-~ long-term orientation is influencing how China operates, and deals with other cultures. Even ~ ________ .

long-standing principle of strong support of existing states (Mohan and Power,

.__30~8)~!?;!in~t th~ pre~
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»>

A J Hook, s3253096

Conclusion

In a submission to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on African Affairs in 2008, Thomas J. Christensen commented:

"In general, we see China's growing activity on the continent as a potentially positive force for economic development there, which is a goal we share ...policy differences should come as no surprise given the two countries very different demographic and economic conditions, histories and political systems. "

The nascent state of many African states, including Sudan, suggests that globalisation, as championed by the WTO and developed nations, has a different meaning in Africa:"The involvement of China as a source of economic stability and continuing demand, and also its respect for existing geopolitical states, suggests that there is an opportunity to develop a new model for developing African nations. ,/

Underlying the concept of globalisation however, Moore (200sr:eflects

that:

"Globalisation literature ... is devoted largely to the advanced capitalist portion of the global political economy, where all the indices of product integration, shrinking distance, and the advance of the "informationalisation mode of production" are on the increase ... Globalisation is different in Africa. There the birth of capitalism and modernity is starting all over again. "

China is using its bilateI al tlade agl eements amt-i:ntematiol1atlyunpuputarapprmrch~o achieve its own resource supply and diplomatic ends:' The poor humanitarian outcomes in many African states, and China's potential influence on these same states, suggests ____!~at an e_nga~ementvvith Chi~a,~d~ressin~!~e ~nder!yin!treason~ior

China's resource

acquisitions and investments, may provide a constructive and perhaps more long-term I-r-..>

approach for the West to achieve.Jheir own diplomatic goals, and provide better outcomes for the Sudanese people.

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/

References

Report 2009. Human Rights in Republic o(Sudan, Amnesty International, www.amnesty.org, Accessed 11th September 2009.

Bahgat G., Africa's Oil: potential and implications. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC Review pg 91-104, March 2007.

Chinese Government's Official Website Portal, China pledges to work with Sudan to expand co-op in all fields. 15th July 2009, Accessed 8th September 2009

Christensen T. and Swan J.,

u.s. Relations

With the People's Republic o(China, Statement Before the

Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Department of State, June 2008.

CIA World Factbook, 2004, www.cia.gov, Accessed 11th September 2009

CIA World Factbook, 2008. www.cia.gov, Accessed 11thSeptember 2009

Davies M., China's Developmental Model Comes to Africa, Review of African Political Economy, 35:115, 134-137. The Economist, There be dragons, 6th November 2008, www.economist.com.

Accessed 8th September

2009.

Guler C., Sudan: China is the key, ISN Security Watch, Center for Security Studies, 2009.

Hanson S., China, Africa and Oil, Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, June 2008.

Hill C., Cronk T. and Wickramasekera R., Global Business Today: an Asia Pacific Perspective, McGraw-Hill, 2008. Hofstede Cultural Dimensions, http://www.geert-hofstede.com.

Accessed 8th September, 2009.

IMF Country Report No. 07/343, Sudan: 2007 Article IV Consultation and Staff-Monitored Program, International Monetary Fund October 2007.

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Kleine-Ahlbrandt S. and Small A., China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy Foreign Affairs, 00157120, JanlFeb2008, Vol. 87, Issue 1

Kaplinsky R and Morris M, Chinese FDI in Sub Saharan Africa: Engaging with Large Dragons. European Journal o(Developmental

Research Special Issue, Vol. 24, No.l, 2009

Large D., China and the Contradictions o( 'Non-interference' in Sudan, Review of African Political Economy,35:115,93-106,2008.

Lum T., Fischer H., Gomez-Granger J. and Leland A. China's Foreign Aid Activities in Africa. Latin America. and Southeast Asia. February 2009. Congressional Research Service, R40361

McSweeney B.,HofStede 's model o(national cultural differences and their consequences:A triumph o( (aith - a failure o(analysis

Human Relations 2002; 55; 89.

Mohan G and Power M, New African Choices? The Politics o(Chinese Engagement, Review of African Political Economy, 35:115, 23-42, 2008.

th

The Monitor, China BeefS Up Presence in Sudan, 27 August 2008, www.sudan.net. Accessed 8th September 2009.

Moore D., Neoliberal globalism and the triple crisis o( 'modernisation' in Africa: Zimbabwe. the Democratic Republic o(Congo and South Africa, Third World Quarterly, Vol 22, No 6, pp 909-929, 2001.

Nayyar, D., Globalisation.

history and development: a tale o(two centuries, Cambridge Journal of

Economics 2006, 30, l37-159.

People's Daily Online, China's arms sales to Sudan are limited: Envoy, www.peopledaily.com.cn. ----------]T:u7lI"'"'y---.20U7.

6th

Accessed 8th September 2009.

Richardson M., China-Sudan Ties: Bei;ing walks a tightrope, Institute of South East Asian Studies, May 2007.

Sandbrook R. and Romano D., Globalisation. extremism and violence in poor countries, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25 No. 6 pp 1007-1030,2004.

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Sudan: Country Pages - World Tariff Profiles, WTO website, www.wto.org, Accessed 10th September 2009.

Sudan Divestment Taskforce;PetroChina, www.sudandivestment.org,

CNPC, and Sudan: Perpetuating Genocide, Accessed September 8th 2009.

Shinn D., An Opportunistic Ally: China's increasing involvement in Africa. Harvard International Review, Summer 2007. Sudan Tribune, China wins $1.15 bIn Sudan Railways Construction Contract, 5thMarch 2007. http://www.sudantribune.comlspip.php?articie205S0.

Accessed 11thSeptember 2009.

Thompkins G, Chinese Influence in Sudan is Subtle, Complicated, 29th July 200S, www.npr.org, Accessed SthSeptember 2009.

UNCTAD Country Fact Sheet: Sudan, World Investment Report, 2004. www.unctad.org, Accessed Sth September 2009 UNCTAD Country Fact Sheet: Sudan, World Investment Report, 200S. www.unctad.org,AccessedSth September 2009

The Washington Post, China Invests Heavily in Sudan's Oil Industry, 23rd December 2004, www.washingtonpost.com.

Accessed SthSeptember 2009.

Woetzel J., Reassessing China's state-owned enterprises, The McKinsey Quarterly, July 200S.

/

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