Garcia Vs Pajaro

Garcia vs Pajaro Date: July 5, 2002 Petitioner: Sebastian Garcia Respondents: Juanito Pajaro and the City of Dagupan Ponente: Panganiban Facts: Sebastian Garcia is an employee at the City Treasurer’s Office, Dagupan City. He was ordered suspended by City Treasurer Juanito Pajaro and directed the withholding of his salary because of the Formal Charge filed against him. However, Pajaro continued reporting for work because he did not honor the suspension order as the City Treasurer acted as the complainant and that there was no complaint against him from the Office of the City Mayor. Juanito Pajaro, the City Treasurer of Dagupan City, claimed that Garcia has been rating unsatisfactory in his performance for several semesters, which is the reason why he was formally charged. Garcia was preventively suspended for ninety days since the charge is a major offense. An investigation was scheduled but Garcia failed to appear and testify. Garcia also did not answer the subpoena. So, Pajaro proceeded with an ex parte investigation. The Bureau of Local Government Finance favorably approved the suspension. This was affirmed by the Regional Director. “ Affirming the RTC Decision, the CA held that private respondent was vested with legal power and authority to institute disciplinary action against subordinate officers and employees. The appellate court further held that the requisites of administrative due process had been fully observed by Pajaro while investigating petitioner. But despite being informed of the charges against him and being given the opportunity to be heard in a formal investigation, petitioner chose not to answer those charges. Issue: WON the City Treasurer has disciplinary powers over the petitioner Held: Ratio: At the outset, it should be pointed out that under the old and the present Local Government Codes, appointive officers and employees of local government units are covered by the Civil Service Law; and such rules, regulations and other issuances duly promulgated pursuant thereto, unless otherwise specified. Moreover, the investigation and the adjudication of administrative complaints against appointive local officials and employees, as well as their suspension and removal, shall be in accordance with the Civil Service Law and rules and other pertinent laws. The Administrative Code of 1987, -- specifically Book V on the civil service -- is the primary law governing appointive officials and employees in the government. They may be removed or dismissed summarily “(1) [w]hen the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2) [w]hen the respondent is a recidivist x x x; and (3) [w]hen the respondent is notoriously undesirable.” Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; due process in the administrative context cannot be fully equated with that in the strict judicial sense. The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987 to heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and cities. On the other hand, the power to commence administrative proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee is granted by Section 34 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the said Administrative Code to the secretary of a department, the head of office of equivalent rank, the head of a local government unit, the chief of an agency, the regional director or a person with a sworn written complaint.

Further, the city treasurer may institute, motu propio, disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee. Local Administrative Regulations (LAR) No. 285, which was issued by the Ministry of Finance on March 27, 1985, authorized the minister (now secretary) of finance, the regional director, and head of a local treasury or an assessment office to start administrative disciplinary action against officers or employees subordinate to them. In the case at bar, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority referred to in Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987. The term “agency” refers to any of the various units of the government including a department, a bureau, an office, an instrumentality, a government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein. Respondent Pajaro, as the city treasurer, was the head of the Office of the Treasurer; while petitioner, a senior revenue collector, was an officer under him. Thus, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority who could investigate petitioner and issue a preventive suspension order against him. Petitioner’s contention that it is only the city mayor who may discipline him is not persuasive. Section 455 (b-1-x) of the 1991 Local Government Code states that the city mayor “may cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any official or employee of the city.” This rule is not incongruent with the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code, which authorizes the heads of agencies to discipline subordinate employees. Likewise, the old Local Government Code does not vest in city mayors the sole power to discipline and to institute criminal or administrative actions against any officers or employees under their jurisdiction. In fact, there is no provision under the present Local Government Code expressly rescinding the authority of the Department of Finance to exercise disciplinary authority over its employees. By the same token, there is nothing that prohibits the city treasurer from filing a complaint against petitioner. As a corollary, the power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. In the present case, Pajaro was authorized to issue the assailed Preventive Suspension Order against petitioner, because the latter was charged with gross neglect of duty, refusal to perform official duties and functions, and insubordination -- grounds that allowed the issuance of such Order, as provided by Section 51 of the 1987 Administrative Code. Clearly, the city treasurer acted within the scope of his power when he commenced the investigation and issued the assailed Order. Issue: WON Garcia was denied due process Held: No Ratio: In an administrative proceeding, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. Such process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation in an oral argument, but also -- and perhaps even many times more creditably and practicably -- through pleadings. So long as the parties are given the opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of an action or a ruling. In the case at bar, the administrative proceedings were conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in the 1987 Administrative Code and other pertinent laws. First, petitioner was furnished a copy of the May 30, 1990 formal charge against him. Second, Pajaro requested the approval of the Order of Preventive Suspension in his June 1, 1990 letter addressed to the Bureau of Local Government Finance regional director, who approved the Order in the First Indorsement dated June 4, 1990. Third, a subpoena dated July 31, 1990 was issued to petitioner ordering him to testify during an investigation on

August 15, 1990. However, he admittedly refused to attend the investigation; thus, it was conducted ex parte. Fourth, the Department of Finance affirmed Respondent Pajaro’s findings in its August 1, 1991 Decision,. We need only to reiterate that parties who choose not to avail themselves of the opportunity to answer charges against them cannot complain of a denial of due process. Petitioner’s refusal to attend the scheduled hearings, despite due notice, was at his own peril. He therefore cannot validly claim that his right to due process was violated. As to petitioner’s claim for damages, the extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. There was no such showing in the present case.