Fundamentalism

HOW FAR CAN THE KASHMIR CONFLICT 19892009 BE ATTRIBUTED TO 'FUNDAMENTALIST' RELIGIOUS EMPOWERMENT?

By Gurtej Singh

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Strategic Studies at School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington.

June 2009

Abstract The Kashmir conflict 1989-2009 is a representation of ‘fundamentalist’ religious empowerment. This conflict is not a stand-alone phenomenon. The origins of this South Asian conflict could be traced back to the fundamentalist Hindutva mindset that preceded the two-nation theory of Pakistan and subsequent Islamisation by decades, especially the way Hindu institutions were protected and flourished during the colonial period. This study develops a framework of understanding how India and Pakistan are constantly perched on the precipice of war since 1947, caught in “a paired-minority conflict”, engaging occasionally in the battleground but increasingly in games of stealth and intelligence. Indian strategic culture does not accept the legitimacy of Pakistan while the latter is entangled in the mindset of strategic inferiority and displaying a lack of professionalism. The nuclear tests of 1998 transformed India into a winner and an emerging power, whereas Pakistan is on the verge of a collapse and struggling for foreign aid. This study develops an argument on how this fundamentalist conflict gradually progressed to an insurgency in Kashmir with implications beyond South Asia.

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Acknowledgements There are many people I need to thank for their contribution to this dissertation. They have all contributed in their own way, making me see the bigger picture while I spent my formative years in Punjab in the 1970s and 1980s and later when work took me to Kashmir in the 1990s.

My dissertation supervisor Professor Jim Veitch deserves much credit for inspiring me to marry my life experiences with academic training in strategic studies. During this process, Professor Veitch shared his extensive expertise on conflict and religion, particularly in South East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East, in counter terrorism, intelligence, transnational crime and religion, and diplomacy. I am also thankful to Negar Partow who as a course lecturer for some of the strategic studies papers enhanced my knowledge about Islamisation, the Middle East and terrorism. The library staff of the university deserves all the praise for helping me whenever I faced a problem with referencing software or with interloan requests for books

Finally, I would like to thank those who have kept me sane while I wrote this dissertation. My wife, Amarjit Kaur, who has been wonderful and supportive and my children who gave me a quiet space to write. My colleagues at work; Michael Flett, Foreman Foto, and Stephen Collins who accommodated me all the while, when I would take a day off at short notice for research purposes. Stephen deserves a special mention as he not only took a keen interest in various events related to this dissertation but also read the draft for me and offered valuable suggestions. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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It is a standard academic convention to state that while these people have provided help and information, all faults are my own. The facts presented in this dissertation are, to the best of my knowledge, indeed the truth and properly referenced. Any mistakes are regretted and accidental.

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Table of contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................ ii Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................iii Table of contents ............................................................................................................. v Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Statement of the problem and research question .............................................. 5 1.2 Purpose and significance of the study ................................................................. 9 1.3 Structure of this study ......................................................................................... 10 1.4 Methodology ........................................................................................................ 12 Chapter 2: Revivalism ................................................................................................... 14 2.1 Fundamentalism .................................................................................................. 14 2.2 Hindutva .............................................................................................................. 16 2.2.1 Hindutva as an ideology............................................................................... 17 2.2.2 Origin of Hindutva ....................................................................................... 19 2.2.3 Hindutva on the front .................................................................................. 23 2.3 Two-nation theory and Islamic fundamentalism ............................................ 25 2.3.1 Background .................................................................................................... 27 2.3.2 Birth of Pakistan ........................................................................................... 28 2.3.3 End of a secular era ...................................................................................... 31 2.3.4 Islamisation ................................................................................................... 34 2.3.5 Conceptual analysis...................................................................................... 37 Chapter 3: Paired-minority conflict ............................................................................ 40 3.1 Strategic oversight ............................................................................................... 45 3.2 Staying ahead ....................................................................................................... 47 3.3 Enticing Pakistan ................................................................................................. 50 3.3.1 The Kargil war ............................................................................................... 50 3.3.2 Ganga hijacking ............................................................................................ 51 3.3.3 Operation Topac ........................................................................................... 53 3.3.4 Track Two Diplomacy .................................................................................. 55 3.4 Punjab conundrum ............................................................................................. 57 3.5 Indian federalism ................................................................................................ 65 Chapter 4: Kashmir and the strategic issues .............................................................. 71 4.1 Genesis of the current phase of insurgency ...................................................... 71 4.2 Between the lines ................................................................................................ 74 4.3 Strategic cultures of India and Pakistan ........................................................... 78 4.4 Kashmir: Nuclear flashpoint .............................................................................. 83 Chapter 5: Conclusion and strategic implications .................................................... 87 5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 87 5.2 Findings ................................................................................................................ 88 5.3 Strategic implications ......................................................................................... 90 Bibliography................................................................................................................... 94

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Chapter 1: Introduction Kashmir is widely known as a disputed region since 1947 when India became independent while Muslim majority areas of India were carved out as Pakistan— East Pakistan and West Pakistan.1 However, during the two wars between India and Pakistan in 1947-8 and 1965 over Kashmir, Kashmiris did not participate in the wars as a populace. Kashmiris rather, were responsible for “unravelling a carefully knit Pakistani strategy of infiltration” that aimed at capturing the Indian Kashmir in 1965.2

The 1947-8 war, as mentioned before, ended up in the formation of a cease-fire line in Kashmir dividing it between India and Pakistan on 1 January 1949.3 After the cease-fire, a United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan was stationed in the divided Kashmir on both sides of the cease-fire line.4 Another India-Pakistan war in 1971 ended with the birth of Bangladesh—a separate country—from what was previously known as East Pakistan. India and Pakistan have remained actively hostile since 1971 and at least on four occasions they were on the brink of yet another war.5 According to Chari and others, these four occasions included: India’s “Brasstacks” military manoeuvres (1986-87), the Kashmir insurgency (1990), Kargil (1999), and border confrontation (2001-02). It is however, not clear why they chose to omit the Siachen Glacier event that 1

Sumit Ganguly, The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003), Alastair Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir, 1947-1966 (London,: Routledge & K. Paul, 1966), Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999). 2 Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (Cambridge; New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 3. 3 Robert Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and Its Resolution (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 61-62. 4 For details about this Observer Group, visit: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmogip/index.html 5 P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007). See Chapter 1. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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occurred in 1984 from this list, despite the fact Chari and others cover this event covered in detail in the second chapter of their book.

After the 1971 war, India, enjoying a dominant position, entered into a bilateral agreement with Pakistan in 1972, settling all the disputes, including Kashmir. Named after the Indian hill station of Simla, where the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers met, the Simla Agreement was approached by India as an end to the UN resolution on Kashmir, whereas Pakistan considered this agreement a supplement to the ongoing efforts for resolving the disputes. Nevertheless, the Simla Agreement was successful in pushing Kashmir out of international attention for some time.6

Subsequently, in Pakistan during the 1980s, the army dictator General Zia-ul-Haq started his Islamisation campaign in an effort to legitimise his rule rather than anything else.7 Fuller adds that the Zia regime was a watershed event for the Islamisation of Pakistani politics. He spells out some additional developments supporting this change brought around by Zia that include; tacit public support for making Pakistan an Islamic state; the need to show a different face of Islam from what was earlier introduced by Bhutto in the 1970s; nine political parties that campaigned against Bhutto in the past adopted “Order of the Prophet, as the basis for future Pakistani policy”; global Islamic movement affecting Pakistan; Zia’s personal pursuit of an Islamist ideology; and the use of Islam for legitimising

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———, Perception, Politics, and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2003), pp. 41-42. 7 Graham E. Fuller, "Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan: Its Character and Prospects", no. Rand/R3964-USDP (1991)., pp. 8-12 MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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Zia’s regime while shaping Pakistani foreign policy on Afghanistan inter alia confrontation with the erstwhile Soviet Union.8

On the other hand, the 1980s were also a defining moment in Indian politics. During the 1980s, a Hindu nationalist movement emerged as a powerful phenomenon that totally changed the religious and political scenario in India. This movement was led by “the militant organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)”.9 Hindu nationalism can be traced back to the eighteenth-century Hindu revivalism that was also closely linked to India’s freedom moment.10 Malik and Vajpeyi state that the current version of Hindu nationalism gained currency when it was adopted by “India's Westernized middle classes” asserting the preponderance of Hindu cultural traditions as the national mainstream.11 Ollapally identifies Hindu nationalism as Hindutva, which became a formidable force in the 1980s at the cost of secularism in India, eclipsing “Nehruvian” secularism.12 Ollapally identifies the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as the champion of Hindutva, which espouses the Savarkar and Golwalkar branding of India as a land of Hindus. Chapter two discusses the concept of Hindutva in detail.

Compared to the Hindu and Islamic religious movements in India and in Pakistan, the insurgency in Kashmir surfaced as late as in 1989. This is despite the

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Graham E. Fuller, Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan, p. 9 Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 3. 10 Yogendra K. Malik and Dhirendra K. Vajpeyi, "The Rise of Hindu Militancy: India's Secular Democracy at Risk," Asian Survey 29, no. 3 (1989): pp. 311-12. 11 ibid.: p. 313. 12 Deepa Mary Ollapally, The Politics of Extremism in South Asia (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 48. 9

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fact that Kashmir remained a disputed region since 1947, as mentioned before. Nonetheless, this insurgency has added a new strategic perspective to the India Pakistan conflict due to Kashmir’s proximity to Afghanistan, central Asian states and China.13 Harshe claims that Kashmir has become a conduit for the flow of drugs, arms, and cross-border terrorism. He further claims that events in Kashmir have implications for the wider region around it—beyond India and Pakistan. On the other hand, while elaborating the trend of the spread of religious fundamentalism for his clash of civilisations theory, Huntington visualises that Kashmir and the military balance in South Asia will perpetuate the India Pakistan conflict, paving the way for a clash of Hindu and Muslim fundamentalism.14 Huntington further states that with the end of the Cold War, the world order has changed, where many countries are discovering new friends and foes, where armament and territories are adding to the already rising number of conflicts.

Swami has gone to the extent of calling this Kashmiri insurgency a “nuclear jihad”.15 He elaborates that with the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan, the chances of using the nuclear option in order to bring an end to the otherwise endless war in Kashmir have increased, which has now taken this conflict to a disastrous level. In the same way, the Kashmir dispute in its current status has also been termed as the nuclear flash point of South Asia with a likely

13

Rajen Harshe, "India-Pakistan Conflict over Kashmir: Peace through Development Cooperation," South Asian Survey 12, no. 1 (2005): p. 52. 14 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York; London: Free, 2002), p. 127. 15 Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004, 1st ed. (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 172. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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scenario of a nuclear war becoming a reality.16 The nuclear factor has wider implications and it has actually increased the chances of a war between India and Pakistan where a nuclear deterrence has “no reliable antidote to the Kashmir dispute”.17 Wirsing asserts that the India Pakistan conflict is not Kashmir dependent, while the latter is being used as a pretext.

Since 1989, Kashmir has lost more than 30,000 lives while the economy has suffered a great deal.18 Burki adds that with a slow economic growth rate, Kashmir is now one of the poorest states of India. Kashmir’s two areas of commerce—handicrafts and tourism—have badly suffered during the past decades.

1.1 Statement of the problem and research question In the July-August 2003 issue of the Atlantic, ten Rand analysts identified ten international-security developments that were not getting the attention they deserved.19 Among them, according to Rollie Lal of Rand, is the commitment to secularism that India has emphasised since its independence in 1947, which is under threat from an aggressive brand of Hindu nationalism that equates Indian national identity with Hindu religious identity. This factor of Hindu nationalism is totally absent from literature on the Kashmir conflict.

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http://www.cdi.org/adm/1214/index.html and Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 1st ed., Culture and Religion in International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 71. 17 Robert Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age (ME Sharpe, 2003), p. 8. 18 S. J. Burki, Kashmir: A Problem in Search of a Solution (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2007), p. 5. 19 http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200307/rand MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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During a panel discussion of South Asian experts on Navnita Chadha Behera’s book, Demystifying Kashmir on 25 January 2007, Ashley Tellis pointed to a “psychological status quo” while discussing the relationship between India and Pakistan.20 What does this status quo mean and why it is psychological? Tellis did not go into the historical aspect of this status quo as it was beyond the scope of the 25 January 2007 discussion. However, for the purpose of this study, Tellis’ remark points to and stimulates a link to religious empowerment that is already being debated as identity-politics from the perspective of reinventing religious identities of various ethnicities in India.21

In addition to identity-politics, Pakistan is deeply rooted in an Indian frame of mind, which Cohen terms as “Indian insecurity” while he discusses generations and traditions.22 Cohen’s coined term “a paired-minority conflict”, which deliberates on perceptions of identity, gradually flows on to the unsettled dispute of Kashmir. Cohen states that minority in this context does not necessarily mean small numbers but a feeling of being threatened. In spite of a decisive war between India and Pakistan in 1971, relations between India and Pakistan did not improve. The background situation kept on changing with the ever evolving thinking, response and actions of political leadership, both in India and Pakistan— especially the role of Pakistani army dictators.

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http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2007/0125india/20070125.pdf Bidyut Chakrabarty, Communal Identity in India: Its Construction and Articulation in the Twentieth Century (New Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 22 Stephen P. Cohen, "India, Pakistan and Kashmir," Journal of Strategic Studies 25, no. 4 (2002): pp. 3233. 21

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Map 1. Jammu and Kashmir Area.23

The Kashmir dispute has existed since 1947, but local peace in Kashmir was never a matter of concern until 1989. This leads us to a question of whether Kashmir is the cause of the India Pakistan conflict or if it is a symptom of this conflict.

23

http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/kashmir.pdf

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Researchers like Wirsing are convinced—as mentioned before—that Kashmir is not the reason for the India Pakistan conflict. As such, there is a need to understand this phenomenon with a constructivist theory lens. This theory puts emphasis on norms, rules, identities and institutions “for actors with a given identity”.24 Not to mention, some researchers have also examined the Kashmir dispute from a realist and revisionist perspective.25 Discussing from a realist point of view, Frey is unable to pinpoint if Indian nuclear tests were actually a reaction to the growing power of China. Frey also mentions the Indian nuclear tests were a strategic loss in relation to Pakistan, as India would never be able to win a nuclear war with Pakistan. Meanwhile, Mitra looks at India Pakistan relations to all intents and purposes as a Hindu-Muslim conflict emphasising democratisation when he constructs his case against the standard “structural realist” perception of India.26 But Mitra stops short of making it clear if this democratisation would ultimately lead to self-determination for Kashmiris and other ethnicities of India or not.

Apparently, Cohen’s term “paired-minority conflict” sits well within the sphere of the India Pakistan conflict and will be tested as a theory with a constructivist lens in this study. Therefore, the research question is:

How far can the Kashmir conflict 1989-2009 be attributed to 'fundamentalist' religious empowerment?

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Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," in Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), p. 251. 25 K. Frey, "State Interests and Symbolism in India's Nuclear Build-Up", Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics, http://archiv, ub. uni-heidelberg. de/volltextserver/volltexte/2003/4104/pdf/hpsacp8. pdf (2002). 26 S. K. Mitra, "War and Peace in South Asia: A Revisionist View of India-Pakistan Relations", Contemporary South Asia 10, no. 3 (2001): p. 363. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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1.2 Purpose and significance of the study The goal of this study is to explore whether or not Kashmir is a deadlock in the India Pakistan conflict. Secondly, is the violence in other parts of India attributable to Kashmir? In the case of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, Bruce Hoffman clearly found the Mumbai attacks “of a completely different magnitude and intensity”.27 Even Christine Fair was sceptical about the pattern of Mumbai attacks, “Did you see any suicide bombers? And there are no fingerprints of Lashkar. They don’t do hostage-taking and they don’t do grenades”.28 However, in her 11 March 2009 testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, United States House of Representatives, Fair remarked, “November 2008 attack bares many hallmarks of previous LeT attacks……….. Like previous LeT attacks in Mumbai and elsewhere, this assault involved exclusively soft targets with little or no defenses”.29 LeT or Lashkar-e-Taiba is a terrorist outfit that has lost 1,106 of its cadres in Kashmir.30 As such, it is important to position Kashmir within the larger India Pakistan conflict where a researcher like Kaye believes that the Islamic view of seeing conflict as a jihad is “energizing an already-growing Hindu nationalist movement in India”.31 Kaye states that the peace efforts in the last 60 years have not been able to extract India and Pakistan out of the Kashmir dispute. Noticeably, Kaye’s observation is limited to the last 60 years and Kaye has not tried to explore what happened before that. Whereas

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http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20308 http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/lets_not_jump_the_gun.php? 29 Christine Fair, "Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 Lashkar-E-Taiba (Let) Attack Upon Several Targets in the Indian Mega-City of Mumbai," RAND CT320 (2009): p. 12. 30 Navnita Chadha Behera, Demystifying Kashmir (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), p. 161. 31 Dalia Dassa Kaye, Talking to the Enemy: Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Security Research Division, 2007), p. 76. 28

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there is a need to examine the period before 1947 to better understand the conflict. Therefore, in order to study "How far can the Kashmir conflict 1989-2009 be attributed to 'fundamentalist' religious empowerment?" this study will go beyond the period mentioned before for a strategic investigation, otherwise this study will be reduced to a mere symptomatic counterterrorism study focussing on the tactics of terrorists and the operational response of the authorities. Terrorists are, of course, a nuisance but “they hardly pose threats to the fabric of a society or the security of the state”.32 Therefore, this strategic investigation will be done with a view to finding the cause of the problem, the growth of fundamentalism and understanding the strategic implications of this conflict in the longer run.

1.3 Structure of this study In addition to this introductory chapter, this study will have four more chapters. Chapter two will provide the key facts and an historical view on the emergence of religious revivalist movements in India under the British Raj, with the subsequent development of a two-nation theory that led to Indian independence and the birth of Pakistan on the basis of religion in 1947. Gradually this discussion will flow into the post-1947 period. This assessment will help in understanding whether the aforementioned religious revivalist movements were akin to fundamentalism. Going back to the British Raj is important, as Hindu revivalism started in the eighteenth century as mentioned before on page three. This enquiry is important, as the current identity-politics debates in India, as mentioned before, are claiming that different religious identities were 32

Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Continuity of International Politics," in Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order, ed. Ken Booth and Timothy Dunne (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 349. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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unnaturally reinvented under colonial rule. Blaming colonialism for the reinvention of identities is very much contestable as available literature points to a post-1947 radicalisation of Hinduism, which is trying to re-write history.33

The thrust of chapter three will be on Cohen’s “paired-minority conflict” and an assessment of events by sequencing them with a constructivist lens. This chapter will first discuss the strategic oversight and how various events unfolded after the 1971 India Pakistan war. While introducing intelligence related issues, the chapter will also discuss the militancy era of Punjab—often mentioned as a forerunner of insurgency in Kashmir. Finally, aspects of Indian federalism will be discussed in this chapter to understand the centre-state relation in India.

Chapter four will examine the strategic aspects of the rise of Kashmir insurgency in 1989 and how the military exercises of India and Pakistan affected it. In order to see the bigger picture, strategic cultures of India and Pakistan will also be discussed. Finally, this chapter will look at the 1998 nuclear tests and their impact on the Kashmir issue. This chapter will also explore whether the nuclear stand-off in the region is linked to an aggressive brand of Hindu nationalism or whether it is a defence against the nuclear aspirations of Pakistan. On the whole, this chapter will examine the evidence and generalisations to provide alternative

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The literature for a detailed discussion will include: Dipesh Chakrabarty et al., From the Colonial to the Postcolonial: India and Pakistan in Transition (New Delhi ; New York [N.Y.]: Oxford University Press, 2007), Vasudha Dalmia, The Nationalization of Hindu Traditions: Bharatendu Harishchandra and Nineteenth-Century Banaras (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India, Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe Jaffrelot, The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), David E. Ludden, Making India Hindu: Religion, Community, and the Politics of Democracy in India, 2nd ed. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), John Zavos, The Emergence of Hindu Nationalism in India (Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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explanations for the thrust areas: identity and religious empowerment and paired-minority conflict.

The current identity-politics in India and the historical involvement of the army in the governance of Pakistan have strengthened “orthodoxy and dogmatism” for a “heightened nationalism, unity and consensus” by artificially inventing enemy images.34 India and Pakistan want more than what was decided for them in 1947. A majority Hindu Indian frame of mind still does not accept the two-nation theory within South Asia while Pakistan wants to champion the cause of Muslims of South Asia. A paired-minority conflict mind-set in this situation artificially invents enemy images for whipping up religious empowerment. A disputed area like Kashmir becomes a natural choice as a conflict arena for India and Pakistan.

The fifth and final chapter will present the findings and implications of the India Pakistan conflict over Kashmir and suggest recommendations for long term peace in the region.

1.4 Methodology This study will test Stephen Cohen’s term “paired-minority conflict” with a constructivist lens as mentioned before. The two main traditions of international politics are realism, which begins and ends everything with a state and its interaction—war and use of force—with other states while the second tradition, liberalism, projects various states working with each other in harmony.35

34

Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), p. 25. Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 5th ed. (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2005), p. 5. 35

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However, there are certain situations which are difficult to understand with either of the two traditions mentioned before. Constructivism gained currency after the end of the Cold War when the traditional realism and liberalism theories failed to explain its abrupt end.36 Similarly, it is also difficult to explain with the help of traditional theories, how solid the alliance made by some former Soviet states with Western countries is on the basis of democracy and free economy.37 For a dispute like Kashmir, it is important to decide whether it is a territorial issue or a positional issue where India is looking at maintaining hegemony in South Asia.38 Nye suggests that constructivism is able to fill this empty space but he considers constructivism more an approach rather than a theory.39 According to Chatterjee, constructivists are able to explicate conflicts at all levels.40 In view of the methodology discussion so far, this study will remain research question driven (as mentioned in section 1.1). Constructivism will only be employed to augment the discussion as and when required.

36

Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 4. 37 Virginia Q. Tilley, "The Role of State in Ethnic Conflict: A Constructivist Reassessment," in Constructivism and Comparative Politics, ed. Daniel M. Green (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), p. 167. 38 Michael P. Colaresi, Karen A. Rasler, and William R. Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and Conflict Escalation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 171. 39 Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, p. 8. 40 Shibashis Chatterjee, "Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia: A Constructivist Reading", South Asian Survey 12, no. 1 (2005): p. 87. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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Chapter 2: Revivalism This chapter will focus on the literature that discusses the growth of fundamentalism in South Asia. This chapter will start by exploring the religious revivalism movement during the British Raj and the continuation of such a movement in post-1947 India and Pakistan. This chapter will also examine why religious revivalism that took place during the British Raj continued to flourish later on. This chapter will also explore how this dispute made India and Pakistan fight wars, how it became part of the cause in the rise of insurgency in Kashmir and the subsequent nuclear stalemate. This chapter will emphasise direct quotes in order to bring forth the essence for putting things in a proper perspective.

2.1 Fundamentalism The dictionary meaning of fundamentalism is as follows:

1.

A usually religious movement or point of view characterized by a return to fundamental principles, by rigid adherence to those principles, and often by intolerance of other views and opposition to secularism.

2. a. Fundamentalism: An organised, militant Evangelical movement originating in the United States in the late 19th and early 20th century in opposition to Protestant Liberalism and secularism, insisting on the inerrancy of Scripture. b. Adherence to the theology of this movement.41

This study will focus on part one of the above definition as part two is beyond the scope of this study. Part two of the definition that deals with the Evangelical movement is not comparable—for the purpose of this study—to the context of fundamentalism in South Asia.42

41

http://education.yahoo.com/reference/dictionary/entry/fundamentalism ―fundamentalism.‖ Encyclopædia Britannica. 2009. Encyclopædia Britannica Online Library Edition. 31 March 2009 . 42

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Altemeyer and Hunsberger define religious fundamentalism as an idea that “there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of evil which must be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity.”43

Similarly, fundamentalism “is one of the most significant political phenomena of our time. Since the Iranian Revolution, purported fundamentalist movements have risen to the highest levels of power in five countries—in Iran in 1979, in the Sudan in 1993, in Turkey, Afghanistan, and India in 1996, and in India again in 1998 and 1999. There have been even more frequent penetrations by fundamentalist movements into the parliaments, assemblies, and political parties of such countries as Jordan, Israel, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and the United States”.44 Almond and others have pointed out that fundamentalism rose three times during the 1990s in India. They have also explored the origins of fundamentalism in India, which will be discussed in the other sections of this chapter.

Nevertheless, Emerson and Hartman propound that it is modernisation and secularism that have paved the way for fundamentalism. 45 They discuss Max

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B. Altemeyer and B. Hunsberger, "Authoritarianism, Religious Fundamentalism, Quest, and Prejudice," International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 2, no. 2 (1992): p. 118. 44 Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 1. 45 M. O. Emerson and D. Hartman, "The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism," Annual Review of Sociology 32 (2006): pp. 127-30. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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Weber’s premise that secularisation gradually transforms into demystification where the role that religion plays in the lives of people and organisations would be reduced to the minimum. In this situation, religion would be individualised and become redundant where people and societies would operate without a reference to religion. Evaluating this secularisation theory, Emerson and Hartman observe that the demystification process actually sowed the seeds for remystification thereby refusing to accept the process of demystification. This remystification is fundamentalism degenerating into confusion, chaos and catastrophe when mixed with violence, Emerson and Hartman conclude.

2.2 Hindutva During the 1980s, the Hindu nationalist movement emerged as a powerful phenomenon that totally changed the religious and political scenario in India. This movement was led by “the militant organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)”.46 This was not a spontaneous development. In post-1947 India, Hindutva oriented researchers are revisiting the British Raj period with a view to present an alternative view of Indian history. Reasons for such a development become evident from tabulated information provided by Huntington where territory under Hindu civilisation grew from 54,000 square miles in 1920 to 1,316,000 square miles in 1971.47

46 47

Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India, p. 3. See Table 4.1 in Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 84.

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2.2.1 Hindutva as an ideology

Hindu right wing leaders have always asserted Indian identity as a common organic culture and India as a unitary state.48 Behera cites a book, We, or the Nationhood Defined, written in 1938 by Golwalkar to underline what is meant by Hindutva: [T]he non-Hindu people in Hindustan must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and revere Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but the glorification of the Hindu nation, i.e. they must not only give up their attitude of intolerance and ingratitude towards this land and its age-long traditions, but must also cultivate the positive attitude of love and devotion instead; in one word they must cease to be foreigners or [they] may stay in the country wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment, not even citizen's rights.49

The scope of Golwalkar’s writings is not limited to Hindu nation alone. His view point on Germany is equally alarming: To keep up the purity of the Race and its culture, Germany shocked the world by her purging the country of the Semitic Races—the Jews. Race pride at its highest has been manifested here. Germany has also shown how well nigh impossible it is for Races and cultures, having differences going to the root, to be assimiliated [sic] into one united whole, a good lesson for us in Hindusthan to learn and profit by.50

Exploring the origins of the Hindutva, Behera states that “Hindu Nationalism was first articulated in V.D. Savarkar's 1923 book, Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?” that put forward the idea of nationality, race, and civilisation as “three pillars” of it.51 While discussing communities belonging to other religions, Savarkar has an ambivalent stance about Muslims of Kashmiri origin and from other parts of

48

Navnita Chadha Behera, "Kashmir: A Testing Ground," South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 25, no. 3 (2002): p. 344. 49 ibid. 50 Nandini Sundar, "Teaching to Hate: The Hindu Right‘s Pedagogical Program," in Revolution and Pedagogy :Interdisciplinary and Transnational Perspectives on Educational Foundations, ed. E. Thomas Ewing (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 201. 51 Behera, "Kashmir: A Testing Ground," p. 343. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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India and for Christians of South India.52 Savarkar states that although by following the caste system in their lives, those Muslims and Christians prove they have Hindu blood running in their veins but still they couldn’t be called Hindus because of their lack of love for the common fatherland. For Savarkar, Muslims and Christians are also placed outside his pillar—as mentioned before—of race. The Hindu civilisation, as claimed by Savarkar, predated Egyptian and Bablylonian times and was established when Aryans started settling on the banks of the river Indus. Savarkar is not sure about the origin of Aryans.53

The term Aryan did not recently originate in India with the spread of the East India Company’s Oriental education, as it is claimed by many.54 According to Ballantyne, Aryanism is an integral part of Indian Vedic literature where the Rig Veda composed around 1500 BC points to Aryans as pastoral tribes from Central Asia who came down to settle in northern India and identified themselves as Arya, meaning noble. He adds that gradual Arya settlement and conflict with indigenous population further marked out the religious, political, and cultural lines. Despite this conflict and differences, statements are still made in the literature which claims that India has remained undefeated throughout the ages.55 LP Singh claims that only parts of India faced the onslaught in the past, when it was invaded by foreigners; and since Indians collectively never fought the

52

Essentials of Hindutva by V.D. Savarkar, p. 33. This electronic book (original version claimed to have been written sometime in 1921-22) is available for download from: http://www.savarkar.org/content/pdfs/en/essentials_of_hindutva.v001.pdf 53 ibid., p. 4. 54 Tony Ballantyne, Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 4-6. 55 L P Singh, "Learning the Lessons of History," in Securing India's Future in the New Millennium, ed. Brahma Chellaney (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1999), p. 4. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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invaders together, India was never defeated. The next sub-section further explores similar supremacist claims.

2.2.2 Origin of Hindutva Hindutva did not simply begin in the 1920s with the arrival of the likes of Savarkar as differences amongst the adherents of the various religions in India are well archived. Gyandera Pandey contrasts colonialist and nationalist viewpoints wherein he claims that communalism in India is age-old while nationalists call it a “problem of recent origins,” which is a handiwork of “elite” colonialists and natives.56 Pandey attempts to distance himself from the Oriental view of the communalism of the Europeans by claiming that there was historically no conspicuous tension amongst people of different religions in India. To drive home his point about an impeccable India, Pandey quotes an American newspaper correspondent: Twenty-five centuries ago before Babylon was struggling with Nineveh for supremacy, before Rome was founded by Romulus, or Tyre was planting her colonies; before Greece had contended with Persia, or Cyrus had added luster to the Persian Monarchy, Bénares had risen to greatness, if not glory. And even now when most or all of these cities are obliterated by the ravages of time or sunk in the dust of ages, her temple and stately shrines remain, and it would be little less than a shame to Britain if those ancient relics should fall by the ruthless hand of the modern vandal and the utilitarian. An American correspondent in a Chicago paper, June 1891 cited in Navayuga, 18 June 1891, in Report on Native Newspapers (hereafter RNP), Bengal 1891, week ending 27 June 1891, p.674.57

Pandey does not divulge his viewpoint on the Mughal (Muslim) rulers of India before the arrival of the East India Company. The “vandalism” he points to would mean that all the temples and shrines probably remained intact during the Mughal period before the arrival of the British. If this is the case, then why did

56

Gyanendra Pandey and American Council of Learned Societies., The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India (Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 11. 57 ibid., p. 23. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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Hindu mobs destroy Babri mosque in Ayodhaya on 6 December 1992, which was claimed to have been built on the birthplace temple of Rama during the Mughal period? Rama is an important god of Hindu mythology and it is a bit surprising how this American correspondent could have missed out such a significant event. On the other hand, by claiming a hierarchical distinction, Pandey is trying to establish an overarching hegemony of the Hindu spiritual centre Banaras.58

Pandey claims that “colonialists historiography” not only limited the scope of Indian history by narrowing it down as a section of Oriental history but also started recording Hindu-Muslim riots in an effort to substantiate their claims about communalism.59 Pandey presents a table on page 25 of his book that starts with 1809 Banaras riots, which destroyed 50 mosques. Pandey devotes the remaining chapter of his book to the events of 1809. He provides another table on pages 30-31 with conflicting accounts of the 1809 riots. He is successful in finding a few errors about the location of a mosque and a temple within a common precinct but could not refute the account of even a single riot. Conversely, if the British started recording riots then chances are there that riots started only when the British rule brought an end to the Mughal rule with the result that Hindus felt empowered enough to challenge Muslims in their daily lives.

Elaborating the cow protection factor, Pandey adds that Hindu crowds would confiscate cows from Muslims and would also get an undertaking from Muslims

58

For a discussion on hierarchical distinction, see: Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations (Armonk, N. Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), pp. 33-34. 59 Pandey and American Council of Learned Societies, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India, p. 21. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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to not sacrifice cows in future.60 This cow protection was enforced with support from colonial officials. This development clearly shows that colonialism empowered the Hindus where they started going to the extreme of interfering with the practice of other religions. There is no example available if followers of other religions during the colonial rule ever tried to stop Hindu practices. This is a clear sign that cow protection gradually grew and became established in British India. A similar claim comes from another researcher. According to Freitag, the cow protection movement was a late nineteenth century phenomenon that flourished in British India.61

This is an important observation, especially when, before the arrival of the East India Company in India, there was a common maxim amongst the Hindus where they would refer to Mughal rule as “Ishwaro va Dillishwro va” (The emperor of Delhi is as great as God).62 Under those circumstances how could the Hindus have rioted against the people who were of the same religion as the rulers? Therefore, if the British started recording the instances of riots, the latter occurred only when the Hindus felt empowered enough under the British rule to challenge followers of other religions. Dalmia elaborates how Hindu traditions in Banaras were created out of the blue by the kings of Banaras during the transition period between the Mughal and the British rule.63

60

ibid., p. 165. S. Freitag, "Contesting in Public: Colonial Legacies and Contemporary Communalism," in Making India Hindu: Religion, Community, and the Politics of Democracy in India, ed. David E. Ludden (2005), pp. 216-19. 62 Gokul Chand Narang, Transformation of Sikhism, 4th ed. (New Delhi,: New Book Society of India, 1956), p. 98. 63 Dalmia, The Nationalization of Hindu Traditions: Bharatendu Harishchandra and Nineteenth-Century Banaras, pp. 64-94. 61

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Similarly, the current political state of affairs of India is a rear-view mirror presentation of how the political thought and policy evolved during the past couple of centuries: Under the British brand of imperialism—indirect rule—the Hindu intellectual elites were encouraged to codify and render coherent their complex and variegated Hindu cultural heritage and to view it as a world religion on the same level with Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Temples, other cultural centres, and monuments were made subject to the protection of the state, and temple officials and priests acquired a quasi-bureaucratic status.64

This clearly shows that Hindutva is not a new or elite phenomenon that emerged during the 1980s. It was always there and surfaced at appropriate times as mentioned before. Even in the post-1947 India, political leaders never accepted the division of the country. Khan quotes the first President of India, Rajendra Prasad declaring that, “I have not lost faith in an undivided India, I believe no man can divide what God has created as one”.65 After Indian independence, the thought of Pakistan merging with India sooner than later was not limited to the first Indian President alone, as mentioned before. Bhartiya Jan Sangh (BJS), a predecessor of RSS, included the merger of Pakistan with India in its manifesto during the 1952 elections. However, BJS could never pose a serious political challenge. Apparently, when a decisive victory for India during the 1971 war with Pakistan could not satisfy the aspirations of RSS, despite carving out a new nation out of Pakistan, Hindutva woke from slumber.

Ludden states that Hindutva or Hindu nationalism promotes a Hindu majoritarianism and cultural nationalism, which includes more than one

64

Almond, Appleby, and Sivan, Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World, p. 174. Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan (New Haven [Conn.]; London: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 95. 65

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community. This type of nationalism clearly tries to assimilate and absorb everyone into this majoritarianism. Ludden adds that within thirty five years of Indian independence, communalism became a major issue.66 Leading this Hindutva in India is the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP).67 The BJP originates from the BJS, founded in 1951 by Shyama Prasad Mookerjee. BJS was then considered the political wing of the RSS. It was the BJS that had in its political manifesto in 1952, as mentioned before, a concept of Akhand Bharat (Undivided India) that looked at reclaiming Pakistan. Behera propounds that in the post-1947 India, the Hindu right forced the religious minorities of India to “owe allegiance to Hindu symbols” as, for the Hindu right, those symbols reflected the Indian identity.68

2.2.3 Hindutva on the front Mookherjee was jailed in Kashmir in 1953 by the then Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Mookherjee soon died in custody and BJS never seriously challenged the power of Indian National Congress, the only well-structured political party since India's independence. However, political leaders like Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Lal Krishna Advani were nurtured within the realm of BJS, with a low profile. When Indira Gandhi imposed a state of emergency in 1975, postponing elections and making contested use of major centre government powers granted to her by the Constitution, the BJS joined a coalition of parties in active protest. In the 1977 elections, the BJS merged with the new Janata Party, a unified opposition party. A mixture of socialists, regionalists, and former Congressmen, the Janata Party was united in its opposition to the Emergency and Indira Gandhi. The Janata Party defeated Indira Gandhi's Congress Party in a 66

Ludden, Making India Hindu: Religion, Community, and the Politics of Democracy in India, pp. 15-16. Hansen and Jaffrelot, The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India, pp. 7-8. 68 Behera, "Kashmir: A Testing Ground," p. 344. 67

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landslide victory and formed a government under Morarji Desai's leadership. Vajpayee, the most senior BJS leader, became Minister for External Affairs, while Lal Krishna Advani became the Minister for Information and Broadcasting. The Janata Party government lasted for only two years, and following its collapse, Indira Gandhi's Congress came back to power. With the collapse of the Janata Party, the merged cadre from the BJS re-organised themselves under the banner of BJP.

In conclusion, Hindu nationalism has successfully “recruited and subsumed religious sentiments and public rituals into a larger discourse of national culture (Bhartiya culture) and the Hindu nation, Hindu rashtra”.69 This phenomenon is capable of keeping India fundamentally Hindu as a civilisation claiming linkages going back thousands of years, Hansen adds.

BJP gained a momentum with an undercurrent of the 1980s that brought with it the expansion of coloured television and the telecast of Hindu epics—Ramayana and Mahabharata. The power of television penetrated the religious message right into the lounges and bedrooms of the masses.70 Whereas currently, the RSS is looking at social change through education by infiltrating India’s National Curriculum Framework for School Education aiming at “indoctrination, hierarchy, and exclusion”.71

69

Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India, p. 10. V. L. Farmer, "Mass Media: Images, Mobilization, and Communalism," Making India Hindu: Religion, Community, and the Politics of Democracy in India (2005): p. 100. 71 Sundar, "Teaching to Hate: The Hindu Right‘s Pedagogical Program," p. 211. 70

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2.3 Two-nation theory and Islamic fundamentalism Pakistan as a 60 year old country is still searching for a national identity. Since its birth in 1947, Pakistan has grappled with factors like ethnic uniqueness, religious identity, and fledgling democracy.72 The complexity of Pakistani identity becomes evident with the statement of Pashtun leader Wali Khan who claimed in the mid1980s that he had been a Pashtun for 4,000 years, a Muslim for 1,400 years, and a Pakistani for 40 years.73 Some researchers, like Talbot and Ernst, state that birth as a country for Pakistan was hardly a remarkable thing due to the upheavals that Pakistan suffered in the later part of the twentieth century.

Pakistan was not created as a country with one geographical entity. When created, Pakistan had two distinct East and West regions. East Pakistan was a Bengali majority area that could never come to terms with West Pakistan in spite of having Islam in common.74 East Pakistan ultimately emerged as an independent Bangladesh in 1971 that brought an end to the bitter chapter of relations between two Muslim majority regions of Pakistan where Bengali Muslims were distinctly proud of their regional and lingual identity. Bangladesh is now a closed chapter of Pakistan history, treated differently by Indian and Pakistani historians, as Bangladesh was a result of the 1971 war between India and Pakistan. The war ended when Pakistan troops surrendered to a combined force

72

Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (London: C. Hurst, 1998), p. 1. Carl W. Ernst, "Local Cultural Nationalism as Anti-Fundamentalist Strategy in Pakistan," Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 16 (1996), www.unc.edu/~cernst/articles/AITZAZ.DOC. This fact has also been highlighted by Ian Talbot on page 1 in his book mentioned before. 74 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: Fifty Years of Nationhood, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), p. 11. 73

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of Indian Army and Bengali separatist organisation Mukti Bahini.75 It is clear that the concept of nationalism for East Pakistan was different from that for West Pakistan when the dictionary meaning of nationalism is as follows: “extreme pride in the history, culture and successes, etc. of one's nation; loyalty to one's nation; patriotism”.76

Talbot adds that Punjabi domination of Pakistan has always distanced the Pashtuns away from the common identity of Pakistan.77 Apart from Pashtuns and Punjabis, there are large Sindhi and Baluch ethnic groups in Pakistan in addition to tribal groups located close to Afghanistan’s border. One of the main premises that run in the writings of both Ernst and Talbot is an effort by Pakistan to link itself to great civilisations of the bygone eras of history—to confront India as a nation—and still come up with a strong Islamic identity. An argument is offered by the proponents of Islamic identity that in its absence, Pakistan is not left with a reason to exist separately from India.

It was the consequence of the 1971 war that Pakistan rulers like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq tried to strengthen an Islamic identity of the country, albeit with a variation, as Bhutto was a Sindhi feudal whereas Zia-ul-Haq was an army General of Punjabi background. However, neither was able to foster an all inclusive Islamic identity of Pakistan during their respective regimes. Talbot explores this aspect further and comes up with an elucidation based on three key points: “the tendency to regard all dissent as a law and order rather than political issue; the manipulation and repression of popular forces by successive 75

Shahid Javed Burki, p. xvii. The Chambers Dictionary, New 9th ed. (Edinburgh: Chambers, 2003). 77 Ian Talbot, pp. 14-15. 76

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authoritarian regimes; and the uneven relationship between the Punjab and other regions in the conduct of national affairs”.78 This is the nub of Pakistani identity and, how it oscillates between nationalism and religious fundamentalism, is discussed in the next sections.

2.3.1 Background Pakistan is located in an area that goes back long into the chapters of history. Ernst describes it as the Indus Basin that is distinct from the Indian subcontinent and Arab terrain. He adds that inhabitants of this region look to their Central Asian links and descent rather than accepting any Indian or Arab influence.79 The Indus Valley civilisation is one of the oldest in the world, which dates back at least 5,000 years, spread over much of what is currently Pakistan. During the years 3,000 to 2,000 BC, remnants of Indus Valley culture amalgamated with the migrating Indo-Aryan peoples. This region underwent consecutive invasions in later centuries from the Persians, Greeks, Scythians, Arabs (who brought Islam), Afghans, and Turks. The Mughal Empire of Mongol and Central Asian mix ruled this area in the 16th and 17th centuries. The British dominated the region next, in the 18th century, before the independence of India and birth of Pakistan in 1947. The rivalries between India and Pakistan have not ended and are currently teetering on the testing of nuclear weapons, with Kashmir now dominating the centre stage.80

78

Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, p. 1. Ernst, "Local Cultural Nationalism as Anti-Fundamentalist Strategy in Pakistan." 80 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html 79

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2.3.2 Birth of Pakistan Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the campaigner for and the first Governor General of Pakistan was a man of secular ideology. As a leader of the Muslim League, Jinnah wanted a state where Muslims could flourish politically, socially, and economically.81 During the course of his political activities, Jinnah realised that the Congress Party was conceited and looked down at minorities.82 During the early 1930s it was the haughty attitude of Mohandas Gandhi that led Jinnah to give up politics for a while, Blinkenberg adds. However, at the start of the 1940s Jinnah came up with an idea of two countries when he emphasised that Hindus and Muslims were two different identities that would never stay together. His proposal was to safeguard the interests of Muslims who would otherwise be discriminated against and would never flourish in a Hindu dominated country. This was formally adopted as a resolution and passed by the Muslim League. Yasmin Khan quotes a letter of a 23 year-old Muslim bachelor, having completed a law and a Masters degree, who was still without a proper job because of the discrimination that he faced. This man was supporting his joint family with the money left behind by his dead father and was soon going to run out of money if he were unable to find a job.83

Khan further adds that even as the partition of India became a reality, the majority of the politicians were of the opinion that India and Pakistan would merge to become a single country again.84 Although Khan has not delved into

81

Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, pp. 5-6. Lars Blinkenberg, India-Pakistan. The History of Unsolved Conflicts, Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Instituts Skrifter, 4 (Kobenhavn,: Munksgaard, 1972), p. 36. 83 Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan, p. 101. 84 Yasmin Khan, p. 95. 82

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more details on this point, this type of hegemonic framework of mind spells out the fears of minorities living in India, especially when the literature clearly shows that India never existed as a single country with reference to the continuous migrations and attacks on the inhabitants of the Indus Basin.

Correspondingly, the idea of Pakistan was not a half-baked decision either. As early as 1930, Muhammad Iqbal generated the idea of a separate state for Muslims in the area we have described as the Indus Basin. His rationale was two-fold: first, he wanted to give the Muslims a sense of responsibility where otherwise they were being wasted in the country they were living in. Secondly, he wanted Muslims to get rid of the Arab style Islam and bring the masses closer to the true spirit of Islam.85 What is evident from the view of Iqbal is that he was for a Muslim majority state ruled by Muslims rather than an Islamic state.

On the other hand, Jamaat-i Islami leader Sayyid Mawdudi was against the idea of a Muslim country within the wider perspective of Umma. He, however, changed his tone and opted to settle in the newly created Pakistan. He arrived in the Lahore refugee camp in a truck from Delhi and lived in poor conditions before he fully grasped the acute situation and gave a call to Jamaat-i Islami cadres to volunteer for relief work that included burying unclaimed dead bodies.86

On the political front, things did not develop ideally in Pakistan. Jinnah died in September 1948 and the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan was 85

Nasim A. Jawed, Islam's Political Culture: Religion and Politics in Pre-divided Pakistan, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), pp. 55-56. 86 Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan, p. 176, Ernst, "Local Cultural Nationalism as Anti-Fundamentalist Strategy in Pakistan." MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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assassinated in October 1951. This short period of time in Pakistan history is notable for political dismissals by Jinnah, as the latter would not merely remain a constitutional head of the State and rather sought a direct political control over the country.87 Talbot’s inference is supported by Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr that after Jinnah even the tribal leaders and feudal lords were able to override the Muslim League and brought down constituent assemblies that clearly reflected Pakistan as a politically weak nation.88

The fragile political system in Pakistan, Nasr adds, could not survive the nexus of military, bureaucracy, and feudal lords and eventually crumbled in 1958 when General Ayub Khan declared martial law in the country and vowed to correct the anomalies that crippled the country since its birth. Ayub went one step further and, supported by the President of Pakistan Iskander Mirza, he informed the then US ambassador in Pakistan that dictatorship was the best system for ruling Pakistan.89 Ayub assumed the position of Prime Minister and a young Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was picked up for the post of Commerce Minister. The charm of AyubMirza duo was short-lived as Ayub set his eyes on the post of President, Talbot adds. Charges were laid against Mirza that he was planning a counter-coup to oust Ayub. A delegation of three army Generals summoned Mirza in his dressinggown and wanted him to leave Pakistan immediately. Mirza was given less than an hour to pack as he, accompanied by his Iranian wife Khanum Naheed, had to buy tickets to London and travel documents from their own pocket. Soon

87

Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, pp. 125-39. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power, Religion and Global Politics (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 57-65. 89 Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, p. 146-47. 88

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afterwards, Ayub became the President and he abolished the post of Prime Minister.

It is evident from these developments in Pakistan’s history that democracy could never fully develop in Pakistan. The constituent assemblies were dismissed and individual politicians were toppled at whim. The nexus of army, bureaucrats and feudal lords were gaining more control of the country and yet there was no proud nationalistic Pakistan spirit, which is evident from the way Mirza was deposed as President and exiled in his dressing-gown.

2.3.3 End of a secular era The Ayub regime from 1958 to 1969 was not without an incident. On one hand Ayub was obliterating all types of democratic institutions while on the other hand he also wanted Pakistan to progress economically.90 His economic initiative brought haphazard industrial development which increased ethnic tensions as some areas made gains while others remained deprived. The process of crushing democratic institutions finally targeted Jamaat-i Islami in 1963 when Sayyid Mawdudi was jailed.91

The first major set-back for Ayub came with the 1965 war with India.92 This war ended in a stalemate after the Tashkent Declaration where the leaders of Pakistan and India met due to the Soviet Union intervention. Pakistan, though, did not lose this war and also successfully repulsed many Indian army advances, yet the

90

Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power, pp. 74-77. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-I Islami of Pakistan, Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 41-42. 92 Burki, Pakistan: Fifty Years of Nationhood, p. 33. 91

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Indian air attacks on the industrial belt of Pakistan had a devastating effect on the economy of the country. Zulfiqar Bhutto was the first person to criticise Ayub on having agreed to the Tashkent Declaration. The problem was compounded by the deteriorating health of Ayub that took him to the US for an open-heart surgery in 1966. By this time the political atmosphere in Pakistan was charged and there were all types of political activities going on.93 There were demands for an Islamic state by the Jamaat-i Islami while left-wing politicians were demanding social justice, and Bengali and Sindhis were unyielding on the issue of autonomy, Nasr adds.

During this period, in the background, Jamaat-i Islami was able to improve its network and was growing stronger.94 What Mawdudi failed to realise during this time was that members of Jamaat-i Islami were getting politicised and the organisation was on the drift of transforming into a political party from a purely religious group. As a result, according to Nasr, Mawdudi faced revolt from within the Jammat on a number of occasions where his religious oriented ideas were challenged by Jamaat members demanding a volatile political action. Mawdudi was ultimately out-classed from the Jamaat in 1972 where, by this time, Jamaat had become a formidable challenge in Pakistan politics.

In the meantime, the year 1969 brought a regime change in Pakistan when General Yahya Khan took the charge of martial law administrator from Ayub. By this time the existence of Pakistan as a nation was already threatened to the hilt, Nasr states. Left-wing political elements demanding social justice were

93 94

Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power, p. 74. ———, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-I Islami of Pakistan, p. 43.

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dominating the political circles by challenging the martial law regime.95 Likewise, Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan was unabated. This enabled Yahya to use Islam as an instrument that could ensure the survival of Pakistan. Yahya did not realise that whipping up the Islamic theme would indirectly benefit Jamaat. Annoyed at the ascent of Jamaat, even the feudal chiefs in Pakistan came up with an idea of establishing their own political party: Tehrik-i-Istiqlal.96 Tehrik was established to counter the Jamaat that was rapidly gaining ultra-right ground. At one stage of this tug-of-war between Jamaat and Tehrik, the army became the neutral manipulator. But with the ultra-right becoming stronger in the ranks of the army, Tehrik was soon pushed into oblivion, Ahmed concludes.

Confident of his Islamic strategy, Yahya held general elections in December 1970. 97

The election results were clearly demarcated. East Pakistan Awami League won

the majority and Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) was a distant second. Jamaat did not get more than five per cent of the votes. Awami League, Talbot states, was all set to form the government that would also rule West Pakistan. At this stage, Bhutto joined Yahya in denying Awami League a chance of forming the government. Yahya was baffled at the results as he was assured of hung election results where he would be able to play the power brokering role among the political parties while still maintaining his dominant position as martial law administrator. According to Talbot, efforts to resolve this political situation were not successful. Neither the Awami League nor Yahya were ready to move an inch towards resolving the situation. As a result, the Bengali uprising in East Pakistan 95

———, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power, p. 75. Aijaz Ahmed, "Democracy and Dictatorship," in Pakistan, the Roots of Dictatorship: The Political Economy of a Praetorian State, ed. Hassan Nawaz Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (London and Totowa, NJ): Zed Press, 1983), pp. 120-23. 97 Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, pp. 195-213. 96

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gained momentum and after the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, East Pakistan seceded from West Pakistan to emerge as an independent Bangladesh. Talbot discloses that during the brief two-week 1971 war between India and Pakistan, the latter lost half of its navy, a third of its army, and a quarter of its air force. Indian cease-fire terms saw a surrender of 93,000 Pakistani troops in Dhaka. This defeat made Yahya too frail to continue in office. There was widespread resentment in Pakistan and unrest among the junior officers of the army. Talbot adds that Bhutto, who was at the United Nations, was called back to take over the reins from Yahya as the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan.

These events from 1958 to 1971, as mentioned before, highlight how the nexus of army, feudal, and bureaucrats completely crushed the fledgling democracy in Pakistan. This oligarchy regime fanned Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan while the West Pakistan ethnicities were yet to embrace Pakistani nationalistic pride with Sindh demanding more autonomy while Pashtuns and Baluch maintained their tribal pride. The Islamic strategy of Yayha failed to curb the Bengali uprising while pushing Jamaat to gain a strong position within the echelons of the army. Although Yahya was replaced by a politician (Bhutto), it was significant to observe further developments in Pakistan army having the seeds of Islamisation had already been sown within its echelons.

2.3.4 Islamisation Within few days of Bhutto’s rule, a number of army generals were removed and junior officers were promoted. Bhutto could not keep himself aloof from the

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army as he was keen on settling his political rivalries with the help of the army. It was during 1973-77 that Bhutto used the army to ruthlessly crush the tribal aspirations of Pashtuns and Baluchs.98 The Afghan king Zahir Shah and the subsequent Afghan government of Sardar Muhammad Daud was also a troublemaker element in this tribal rivalry that made the role of the army all the more important, Talbot adds. It was during this period that Bhutto hand-picked Zia-ul-Haq and made him Chief of Army Staff. According to Talbot, there were other reasons for Bhutto to actively engage the army. He was on the re-building course after the severe loss of Pakistan during the 1971 war with India. This initiative of Bhutto, according to Talbot, was to keep the new leadership of the army engaged in political pursuits.

The hand-picked General Zia was not without Islamic colours.99 Zia was a Jamaat sympathiser and was immensely impressed with the writings of Mawdudi. As soon as Zia became the Chief of Army Staff, he used his official position to promote circulation of Jamaat literature among the officers and ranks of the army, adds Nasr. Not happy at this development, Bhutto was powerless to take any further action. With the subsequent growing tribal unrest, in July 1977, Zia ordered the army to arrest the tribal and political leaders including Bhutto, Nasr reveals.

After assuming power, Zia planned to undo the populism of Bhutto and his Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).100 Two events in the neighbourhood of Pakistan brought Zia to global prominence. According to Talbot, one was removal of the 98

Talbot, Pakistan: A modern history, pp. 222-27. Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power, p. 97. 100 Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, p. 246. 99

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Shah of Iran and the second was the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. These two events left no option for the US but to embrace Zia as its frontline collaborator. Before these two events, Zia was not able to progress with his political and economic reforms.101 To fight communism in Afghanistan there could have been no better tool than Islam. According to Nasr, during this crucial period not only the US aid grew from $900 million a year during 1976-79 to $4.1 billion during 1987-93 but also the labour remittance from Gulf countries back to Pakistan grew from an average $365 million a year in 1975 to $2.4 billion a year in 1988. This economic flow was enough to generate a feel good factor for Islam in Pakistan.

During this period, Zia was also keen to bring around a permanent and lasting political change in Pakistan. Zia was aware of the power of army, bureaucrats, and the feudal lords, Nasr adds. The only dimension that he could add was to challenge the feudal lords who were the stronghold of the PPP. Zia, in the early 1980s, was able to motivate Nawaz Sharif, a business tycoon to join the Muslim League and pursue active politics. This Nawaz Sharif ultimately became Prime Minister of Pakistan in the 1990s. This way Zia was successful in pitting industrial families against the feudal families, Nasr elaborates.

Similarly, there was a conflict that indirectly gave impetus to Islamisation in Pakistan. After the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, the Shia community in Pakistan became active and well organised. It was also during this period that the Islamic push in Pakistan brought Sunni Islam to the fore. Thus a clash of ideology was all but natural. Inspired by the Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran, the Pakistani Shia community refused to pay zakat. Researchers like Talbot and Nasr have discussed 101

Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power, p. 132.

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this development in detail. A strong Shia procession brought Islamabad, capital of Pakistan to a halt. Zia gave in and exempted the Shia community from paying zakat.102 This Shia victory alerted the Sunnis to be more vigilant with their own institutions and to also match the enthusiasm of the Shias. Subsequently, a lot of aid was given to Sunni institutions so that they were not overwhelmed by the Shias.

Later on, Pakistan acted as the launching pad for the jihad (religious war) against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. This aspect maintained the Islamic momentum taking place in Pakistan. A full discussion of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is beyond the scope of this study.

2.3.5 Conceptual analysis So far we have discussed the origin and the formative years of Pakistan as a nation. It was promoted by leaders who had a secular view but were fearful about the economic, political and social growth of Muslims in a Hindu majority India. They did not visualise Pakistan becoming an Islamic state in the later years. We have also come across several reasons that led to this transformation. Pakistan is still experimenting with nationhood since its inception. The Indian leaders were also keen to see Pakistan merging back into India as discussed in sub-section 2.3.2.

On the other hand, Pakistan came into existence with a stronger feudal system than democracy. On top of that, Pakistan inherited two strong institutions from 102

Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, pp. 270-71. Also see Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power, pp. 147-48. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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colonial rulers: army and bureaucracy. Without a clear national Pakistani identity, democracy in Pakistan was no match for the nexus of feudal system, army and bureaucracy. Compared to West Pakistan and its tribal and other vicissitudes, erstwhile East Pakistan enjoyed Bengali lingual and cultural homogeneity that ultimately seceded from Pakistan, in spite of a common religion.

It is clear that Pakistan has not learnt anything from the ethnic lesson of East Pakistan. For all the problems in Pakistan throughout the 1970s and today, Islamisation is being projected as the panacea whereas the reality is otherwise. During the discussion we have seen how economic factors and control over economic factors make nationalism the first casualty. This leads to confusing nationality with religious fundamentalism. With the example of Pakistan we have seen that in the absence of a clear national pride it is relatively easy to fall prey to religious fundamentalism.

However, Adeel Khan comes up with an explanation of nationalism that he examines in the context of Pakistan.103 According to Adeel Khan, only the mobile and modernised sections of a society are concerned with their national and ethnic identity. During this course, such sections of society gain economic privileges. Khan claims that it is the threat to economic privilege that translates into regional, religious or ethnic threats and conflicts. He further elaborates that nationalist movements are culture based rather than class based. If we change class with Islam and culture with any of the regions: Punjab, Sindh, Baluch or

103

Adeel Khan, Politics of Identity: Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan (Thousand Oaks, Calif.; New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 38-40. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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Pashtun, in the Pakistan context, we understand how difficult it would be to sum up a Pakistani identity that would also smudge their link to the Indus Valley civilisation era.

In conclusion we can say that literature on the Islamisation of Pakistan draws a clear line between nationalism and religious fundamentalism. Religion cannot be the sole foundation of nationalism; otherwise East Pakistan would have never seceded from West Pakistan with Islam as a common religion of the two. Similarly, within Pakistan, fissures have developed due to their differences as Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluchas, and Pashtuns despite the fact that they are all Muslims. Accordingly, in the case of Pakistan, religious fundamentalism is trying to forge a spirit of nationalism which is yet to accomplish anything. Conversely, in India, as discussed in the previous section, nationalism and religious fundamentalism are not mutually exclusive in the realm of BJP.

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Chapter 3: Paired-minority conflict This chapter will enlarge upon Cohen’s term of a paired-minority conflict as postulated in Chapter 1. Cohen discusses this aspect in detail when he looks at “the origins of war and the conditions for peace in South Asia”.104 Cohen proposes two assumptions about the conflict in South Asia. One assumption deals with the origins of conflict where Cohen adds that Indians and Pakistanis generally proffer the conflict as a corollary of British policy of divide and rule.105 Cohen’s second assumption explores condition for peace. Here again he explains that Indians and Pakistanis have numerous theories providing details of the conflict. Cohen asks why peace is so elusive when there is such an abundance of theories and ideas about the conflict on both sides of the India Pakistan border.

For a better understanding of wars, Cohen is inspired by the Einstein-Freud Correspondence (1931-1932). 106 However, Cohen does not discuss this correspondence in detail. In this correspondence, Einstein asks Freud if there is a possibility of controlling the human mind in such a way where hatred and destruction for other human beings is completely avoided. Freud replies that under the primitive conditions, violence was the only way out where one of those involved was either dead or was left in such a condition where a renewal of violence would not be possible. While commenting on modern conditions, although Freud expounds a long treatise about human development and other

104

Stephen P. Cohen, "South Asia: The Origins of War and the Conditions for Peace," South Asian Survey 4, no. 1 (1997): p. 25. 105 ibid, see n. 3: pp. 44-5. 106 ibid, see n. 1: p. 44. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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improvements made over the centuries yet he is unable to totally rule out the possibility of violence and destruction.107

In order to pinpoint to the nub of this predominance of destruction and violence, Cohen enumerates what he calls “three theoretical puzzles” about the India Pakistan conflict.108 He states that the India Pakistan conflict is moving against the tide especially when peace is becoming a reality to other regional conflicts around the globe. More so, Cohen finds the trends in whole South Asia to be different from other regions of the world—without actually identifying any regions that he is comparing South Asia with. Secondly, Cohen is puzzled at the democratic status of India and Pakistan where a similar simmering conflict between the two democracies is not noticeable elsewhere in the world. Thirdly, he is amazed why two liberalised economies are more concentrated on pursuing the conflict instead of making a progress on the path of economic development. While looking for an answer to the aforementioned three puzzles, Cohen cites Sumit Ganguly’s “model based on irredentism” where Ganguly asserts that such conflicts are difficult to resolve.109

Cohen does not find a fault with Ganguly’s model, but Cohen is convinced that if this model based on irredentism is accepted as such, then there would be no end to India Pakistan conflict. Kashmir as a territory was never a settled issue between India and Pakistan ever since 1947. Unless both these countries come to

107

Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg, The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, Weimar and Now (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 25-34. 108 Cohen, "South Asia: The Origins of War and the Conditions for Peace," pp. 25-26. 109 Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: The Indo-Pakistani Conflicts since 1947, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). Cited in Stephen P. Cohen, South Asia: The Origins of War and the Conditions for Peace: p. 26. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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an agreement on Kashmir, theory of irredentism would keep India and Pakistan perpetually engaged over Kashmir. This is the reason, which makes Ganguly’s model incomplete, Cohen claims. He adds that South Asian neighbours are caught in a situation of paired-minority where each finds itself as weak, vulnerable, defenceless, and exposed regardless of the size of its population or geographical area. This process puts such nations in a continuous chase for justice while developing hatred for each other. Pakistan feels threatened from India’s size and population whereas the situation for India becomes complex by looking at the alliances that Pakistan could manage, especially with the Western nations and China. In addition, Cohen states, India is looking at regaining past glories while guided by its Kautilya statecraft theory where anyone sharing borders with you is an antagonist. In this situation of distrust, making a progress towards peaceful resolution becomes difficult as a sign of accommodation and agreement would translate into weakness and surrender, Cohen adds.

By normalising relations with Pakistan, India will reap benefits.110 But Cohen observes that in spite of recent multiple events taking place in Pakistan like coup, war, summit, and Afghanistan war support, India has not come to terms with the reality. Rather India is pursuing its old strategy of encircling Pakistan by improving relations with the Afghanistan government and the US This domination strategy of India will increase distrust with Pakistan. Cohen’s observation is also supported by other researchers.111 Evans states that improved diplomatic relations with the US are not being translated into progress on Kashmir by India. Rather, India is likely to take a stance of teaching Pakistan a 110 111

Cohen, "India, Pakistan and Kashmir," p. 57. A. Evans, "Reducing Tension Is Not Enough," The Washington Quarterly 24, no. 2 (2001): p. 189.

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lesson. Evans concludes such a stance would not help India gain a justifiable position in Kashmir.

The discussion so far is complemented by Weber, who claims that in international relations, constructivists ‘make’ their own world not necessarily able to ‘make’ what they aspire for.112 Weber further explains that the context of events and the institutions in such a political sphere are conditioned to follow a set path under given situations that may also link to the past. This historical behaviour, Weber concludes, is decisive groundwork for political ends.

Meanwhile, researchers on the Indian side lament that Pakistan’s attitude is not helping relations to improve with India.113 Bahadur asserts that the army, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and jihadis in Pakistan will not improve their relations with India as they have not realised yet that Pakistan cannot take away Kashmir from India through a proxy war. Bahadur blames the Pakistani army as a roadblock on the path of peace. He adds that recent democratic governments in Pakistan would keep the army aloof by denying the army any control over policy matters whereas Pakistan army and ISI would not tolerate negation of their position of decision makers with regards to Pakistani relations with India and this power struggle would hardly contribute towards improving relations. Correspondingly, Pakistan has always believed that it cannot bring the Kashmir

112

Martin Weber, "Constructivism and Critical Theory," in Introduction to International Relations: Australian Perspectives, ed. Richard Devetak, Anthony Burke, and Jim George (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 97-98. 113 Kalim Bahadur, "India-Pakistan Relations: Road Map to Nowhere?," South Asian Survey 10, no. 2 (2003): p. 255. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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dispute to an end without attaining arms superiority over India.114 Vasquez states that such a stance also affected India in a comparable manner. He adds that in 1965 just the thought of matching the Indian defence forces after skirmishes in Rann of Kutch area, made Ayub Khan attack India with a hope of having an advantageous position at the negotiations table, when required later on. This posture of imposing an upper-hand on each other has remained an integral part of the India Pakistan conflict.

Conversely, Pakistan has developed new thoughts on Kashmir.115 Hussain claims that the Pakistani stance on Kashmir changed the day Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf met All Parties Hurriyat Conference leaders in New Delhi on 14 July 2001. Hussain quotes Noorani to state that Musharraf told Hurriyat leaders “we all should be ready for some accommodation”.116 Hussain further points to Musharraf’s four-point proposal repeated at India Today Conclave 2004 via satellite from Islamabad on 13 March 2004: 1.

Centrality of the Kashmir dispute should be accepted by India and Pakistan. 2. Talks should commence to resolve the dispute. 3. All solutions not acceptable to any of the three parties are to be taken off the table. 4. The most feasible and acceptable option be chosen.117

Apart from Musharraf’s initiative, Hussain states there are other factors too that prompted a change in Pakistani stance on Kashmir. These factors include; India 114

John A. Vasquez, "India-Pakistan Conflict in Light of General Theories of War, Rivalry and Deterrence " in The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, ed. T. V. Paul (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 70-71. 115 Syed Rifaat Hussain, "Pakistan's Changing Outlook on Kashmir," South Asian Survey 14, no. 2 (2007): pp. 196-97. 116 Noorani, A.G. 2001. ‗Summits, from 1995 to 2001‘, Frontline 18 (16), 4–17 August, accessed from http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl18160990.htm cited in Syed Rifaat Hussain, ―Pakistan's Changing Outlook on Kashmir‖. 117 Hussain, "Pakistan's Changing Outlook on Kashmir," p. 197. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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activating world opinion against Pakistan, US pressure on Pakistan for improving relations with India, pressure for maintaining peace in general after acquiring nuclear capability, and finally change in Pakistani jihad strategy that focussed on Kashmir once Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan.

Clearly, these two researchers from India and Pakistan fall into Cohen’s pairedminority conflict theory. As it is evident in the preceding paragraphs, Bahadur claims that Pakistan has not changed its stance on Kashmir whereas Hussain has presented a total change in Pakistan’s approach on its Kashmir policy. It is difficult to decide who out of these two is positioned on firm ground while making such claims. Constructivism looks at events in three ways. 118 Guzzini states it is a level of understanding of the action, the level of observation, and level of understanding the relation between the two. Guzzini puts his level of observation through double hermeneutics to understand the action. He gives the example of red lights at a crossing that would have different meanings for different actors affected by the control mechanism of red lights. Unless individual actors are properly situated, the understanding of the relationship between the action and your observation would not be complete.119 Accordingly, the various sections of this chapter will bring forth different events and control mechanisms for a better view of actions and observations.

3.1 Strategic oversight The literature discussed so far in this study does project some levels of understanding that may include Kashmir is less a cause of India Pakistan conflict 118

S. Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations," European Journal of International Relations 6, no. 2 (2000): p. 156. 119 ibid.: 160-63. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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and more an effect of it. Secondly, Kashmir enjoyed freedom for the first time in centuries when Abdullah wanted to have a new constitution for his new Kashmir. Accordingly, hereafter this study will revisit the post 1971 events that took place with reference to India Pakistan conflict. Was the 1971 war that broke Pakistan into two a conclusive event? Physically and politically it may be conclusive but not strategically as the closing outcome of a war is never considered to be final. 120 According to Clausewitz, a defeated side will always look for opportunities in the future for an appropriate political situation and time to avenge the previous outcome of the war. However, Clausewitz does not mention a future course of action for the victorious side. If the outcome of war is not final for the defeated side, it cannot be final for the winners either as the latter would know that the defeated side would plan a comeback later. Clausewitz adds that in the realm of strategy “there is no such thing as victory”.121 Strategically, on the other hand, success means utilising victory as a future advantage by maintaining surprise.

This standpoint is supported by Sun Tzu.122 According to Sun Tzu, a smart fighting side will always impose itself on the enemy side. Therefore the smart side regardless of its recent victories would always stay ahead in the battlefield. Sun Tzu adds that staying ahead by maintaining secrecy would always frustrate the opponent side. This could be a situation where you may even opt not to fight while pulling the enemy into rigmarole. Sun Tzu suggests that maintaining invisibility will lead to divisions in the enemy side where you are at liberty to start decimating the weaker divisions first, as a limited action. Sun Tzu equates such

120

Carl von Clausewitz et al., On War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 19. ibid., pp. 162-63. 122 Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 2002), pp. 58-63. 121

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tactics to the fluidity of water that adapts to and changes with decimation of the enemy sides. This strategy of engaging a part of the enemy side is discussed in detail by Clausewitz.123 This engagement could be offensive or defensive that neutralises to the minimum, if not completely, the contradictions of and incompatibility between human nature and war, Clausewitz recommends. Liddell Hart also considered limited war to be the greatest input into the strategic thought process.124 Larson elaborates it is not defeat of the enemy that is important but devastating the enemy in such a way that it is left with no moral and physical will to strike back. The discussion so far makes it quite clear that in the scenario of India Pakistan conflict, strategic thought would guide India to remain pro-active and stay ahead by enticing Pakistan into the dilemma of limited war. The available literature indicates that the presence of nuclear weapons enforces a limited war option, as a nuclear war is much more devastating than conventional warfare.125 Nuclear aspirations and limited war do not necessarily translate into armed conflict and are often fought stealthily as games of intelligence.

3.2 Staying ahead On 18 May 1974, India exploded a 12-kiloton plutonium bomb at Pokhran codenamed as “Smiling Buddha”.126 According to Diehl and Moltz, India’s Bhabha

123

Clausewitz et al., On War, pp. 248-65. Robert H. Larson, "B. H. Liddell Hart: Apostle of Limited War," Military Affairs 44, no. 2 (1980): p. 71. 125 For a detailed discussion on this aspect see Bernard Brodie and Rand Corporation., Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ,: Princeton University Press, 1959), Seymour J. Deitchman, Limited War and American Defense Policy; Building and Using Military Power in a World at War, 2d , rev. ed. (Cambridge,: MIT. Press, 1969), Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, [1st ] ed. (New York,: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper, 1957). 126 Sarah J. Diehl and James Clay Moltz, Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation : A Reference Handbook, 2nd ed., Contemporary World Issues (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2007), pp. 123-24. 124

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Atomic Research Centre made this bomb on a Canadian supplied reactor and a US supplied heavy water moderator. India claimed this explosion was a purely peaceful experiment and in no way violated the international nuclear regimes. Chellany reveals that even as Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told the Indian Parliament in 1972 about the likely nuclear explosions to be carried out in future, to bring economic benefit to India, US intelligence could not develop further information about it.127 Chellany claims that India’s nuclear programme is “one of the world’s oldest” as Nehru who set up India’s Atomic Energy Commission in 1948 wanted “all the basic materials” and was aware of the nuclear power’s “strategic nature”.128 Chellany also puts forward various other aspects revolving around Pokhran nuclear tests. He attributes this test to India’s insecurity, which evolved after its 1962 defeat in a war with China, and the Pakistan attempt to carry out the likes of secret Operation Gibraltar in 1965. But Chellany is not justified in making this claim where situations are not comparable. While India lost war the with China, the case was not so with Pakistan as not only Operation Gibraltar failed, it also could not start a Kashmiri uprising in India (see Chapter 1). Moreover, claims were initially made claiming that the Pokhran explosions were peaceful experiments for economic benefits without referring to feelings of insecurity. Nevertheless, a justification for developing a nuclear bomb specifically against China cannot hold ground, as literature points to limited war in a nuclear situation, and India has never engaged China in a limited war since 1962. On the other hand, Chinese aggression is more associated with Mao, who wanted to

127

Brahma Chellaney, ed., Nuclear-Deterrent Posture, Securing India's Future in the New Millennium (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1999), pp. 158-63. 128 ibid., p. 158. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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open more battlefronts, which was the hallmark of his Cultural Revolution.129 Therefore, the 1962 war was based on multiple factors and discussing them in detail is beyond the scope of this study.

Chellany, further adds two reasons that stopped India from carrying out further nuclear explosions.130 He states one reason was a meeting between Indira Gandhi and Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in New Delhi soon after the explosion while the second reason was a lack of missile capacity. The missile argument is on thin ice as Chellany himself mentions that India ultimately developed a missile capability in 1994 yet it took India another four years to carry out more nuclear explosions at Pokharn in 1998. One aspect is quite clear, that Indian nuclear ambitions are not at all aimed at China but Pakistan inter alia pursuit of the Sun Tzu doctrine, as mentioned before, to keep disputes in the loop of a never ending process while the enemy is devastated. Masood puts forward his argument stating that India would always walk away from any peace negotiations at the first opportunity.131 He adds, when in 2006, India and Pakistan were to go through the fourth round of talks; India blamed Pakistan for the July 2006 terrorist attack on a Mumbai train and suspended the dialogue. Masood claims Pakistan wants to cooperate and engage in a peace process which is not reciprocated by India, as the latter, with its emerging economic status, was able to influence the powerful countries of the world.

129

Matthew J. Flynn, First Strike: Preemptive War in Modern History (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 174. 130 Chellaney, ed., Nuclear-Deterrent Posture, 160-61. 131 Talat Masood, "Pakistan‘s Kashmir Policy," China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4, no. 4 (2006): pp. 46-47. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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3.3 Enticing Pakistan 3.3.1 The Kargil war The Kargil war of 1999 has been widely covered in the literature. However, Kargil incursions were proposed many times before, especially during the regime of Zia ul-Haq.132 Abbas discloses that a Kargil operation was suggested to Zia twice, to be rejected on both occasions, while Zia asked convincing counter questions about the value of this type of operation, no answers were made available. A similar proposal was also made to Benazir Bhutto without success in 1989 and 1996.133 Abbas adds that for a third time, a suggestion for a Kargil operation was recommended by Lieutenant General Mohammed Aziz Khan who was himself a Kashmiri. What is perplexing here is why a Kashmiri mind would recommend something that could, at the most, block a road connection to Leh, which is otherwise also connected by an alternative route through the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh, while Leh is also served by two Indian Air Force facilities in Leh and Thoise. Abbas further reveals that the Kargil operational preparation was also a best kept secret where many from the Pakistani Cabinet and the army senior officials were not fully aware of the logistics and other requirements for the Kargil operation.134 It is surprising why nobody is questioning the real intent behind the Kargil operation, regardless of the fact it was suggested by a Kashmiri, especially when the sentiment in Indian Kashmir itself was that the Kargil was not their war.135

132

Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror (Armonk, NY; London: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), pp. 169-75. 133 S. Paul Kapur, "Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia," International Security 33, no. 2 (2008): p. 75. 134 Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror, p. 172. 135 Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003). See the last endnote to Chapter 1 of this book on page 272 where attention is drawn to a MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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Noticeably, when Operation Gibraltar, aimed directly at Kashmir valley, could not bear fruit, how could the Kargil operation, outside the parameters of the Kashmir valley and outside the thinking of Kashmiris like Jaleel, be an original Kashmiri or Pakistani strategy, or was it walking into an enticement? There is another observation, which is relevant here. Kapur quotes Jalil Jilani, a former director-general for South Asia in Pakistan’s ministry of foreign affairs, claiming that Siachen Glacier was the main factor for the Kargil war.136 However, Abbas’ argument as mentioned before does not mention Siachen as a major factor when this plan was proposed to Zia.

3.3.2 Ganga hijacking Walking into a trap is not a new phenomenon for Pakistan. Earlier in 1971, the hijacking of an Indian plane named Ganga to Lahore in Pakistan led to the severing of air-links within Pakistan—East and West.137 No wonder, Ahmed called the then Pakistani leadership mediocre, drunks and paper tigers that fell into the trap of an Indian organised, as claimed, hijacking of a plane. Another researcher, Schofield also discusses this incident where she states that, initially, Pakistan was euphoric over this incident, only to realise later that this was the work of Indian intelligence agencies.138

book section titled ―It Was Not Our War‖ by Muzamil Jaleel in Sankarshan Thakur et al., Guns and Yellow Roses: Essays on Kargil War. 136 Kapur, "Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia," p. 76. 137 Akbar S. Ahmed, Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 262. 138 Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War, p. 116. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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Similarly, Widmalm states that a Pakistani Commission of Inquiry found in April 1971 that Pakistan had no role in the hijacking of the plane which, essentially, was a handiwork of Indian intelligence agencies as the benefit of cutting air-links between East and West Pakistan was exploited by India as a part of its grand strategy of supporting a “separatist movement in East Pakistan”.139 The researchers mentioned so far who covered the Ganga hijacking have dealt with the topic only briefly. However, Praveen Swami, in his recent book has devoted a substantial section to covering the Ganga hijacking.140 Swami first gives an account of the incident and then carefully picks up words like “conspiracy theory” to counter any fingers pointed at Indian intelligence. In his account, he does mention some instances that are coincidental to him but offers no explanation for those incidents that include meeting of Hashim Qureshi with Maqbool Butt. Maqbool Butt was a leader of the Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front (NLF) and Qureshi was a Kashmiri who went to Peshawar in Pakistan for arranging the marriage of his sister. Swami also mentions the “spectacular” escape of Maqbool Butt from a Kashmir jail but does not go into detail to find out how this “spectacular” jailbreak took place.

The rise of NLF was also spectacular, which is covered in detail separately by Swami in his book. NLF was formed on the pattern of the Algerian Front de Liberation Nationale to “compete with the official jihad being run by Pakistan’s covert services or risk marginalization”.141 With the emergence of NLF in Kashmir, the local Plebiscite Front lost ground. Swami also reveals that NLF not 139

Sten Widmalm, Kashmir in Comparative Perspective: Democracy and Violent Separatism in India (London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), p. 53. 140 Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004, pp. 112-18. 141 ibid., p. 107. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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only recruited bureaucrats in its cadre from the Pakistan side of Kashmir but also developed differences with the Plebiscite Front that still existed on the Pakistan side of Kashmir. The first casualty of NLF consolidation was loss of an organisation that raised its voice for a plebiscite in Kashmir.

3.3.3 Operation Topac The Indian Defence Review (IDR) website reproduced an article in November 2007 which was originally published in its July 1989 print edition titled “OP TOPAC”.142 Editor of IDR claims this article “anticipated” Pakistani plans for Kashmir in 1989 that deteriorated the situation in Kashmir in the subsequent years. The editor also suggests that New Delhi did not take notice of this article. According to the article, a three-phased Operation Topac was conceived by Zia in April 1988. It also claims that during Phase I, support would also be sought from Sikh extremists—an aspect that will be discussed separately, later in this chapter. This article also claims that Operation Topac was a comprehensive plan, which included a “Plan-X” prepared in response to Indian Brasstacks exercise, which was shared with India by an intelligence agency of a third country.

Conversely, Noorani’s book review of Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru for the February 2007 issue of Frontline magazine of India reveals that Operation Topac, which was used as evidence by Indian writers in general for proving Pakistan’s involvement in Kashmir, was accepted as an anomaly by at least one writer—K Subrahmanyam.143 Noorani adds that plans about Kashmir were not new and Nehru knew of similar plans back in 1957 when one pamphlet written by a 142 143

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/2007/11/op-topac-the-kashmir-imbroglio.html http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2404/stories/20070309001207800.htm

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Pakistani army officer claimed that India would not concede an inch of its soil and as such instead of military action in Kashmir, sabotage inside Kashmir valley would impact on India a great deal. How effective Pakistan’s sabotage action in Kashmir would be is evident from the fact that even a full-fledged Operation Gibraltar failed to stir a thing in Kashmir in 1965, as mentioned before.

Operation Topac has also been discussed by other writers.144 Schofield suggests Pakistan’s involvement in the early days of militancy in Kashmir was exaggerated by the Indian government itself.145 She adds that the existence of Operation Topac was always denied by Pakistani officials claiming it was an armchair exercise of the Indian intelligence agency—Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Schofield concludes this fact has also been subsequently acknowledged by Subrahmanyam.

Schofield wrote her book in 1999, which raises a question why IDR chose to reprint Operation Topac article in November 2007. In general, it was a period after the Indian negotiations for a nuclear pact with the US were finalised in August 2007 waiting for an approval from the US Congress and clearance from the Nuclear Suppliers Group of countries.146

144

Lowell Dittmer, South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War, Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age. 145 Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War, p. 141. 146 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6919552.stm MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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3.3.4 Track Two Diplomacy

When the normal communication channels through diplomats falls short of its objectives, rival countries sometimes engage in a process of dialogue through other channels to overcome this limitation.147 Kaye states the other channels include foundations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academics, and governments of other countries—Western, in the instance of the Middle East and South Asia. During the 1990s, a lot of track two activities took place between India and Pakistan including: Neemrana, Balusa, Kashmir Study Group, Shanghai Process, Stimson Center, CSIS Nuclear Risk Reduction Project, Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratories, and Confidence and Cooperation in South Asian Waters Project.148 Kaye propounds that track two diplomacy has not delivered the indicators of success, but is convinced this process facilitated dialogue at the least, where a military to military dialogue is capable of achieving results, as Indian and Pakistani armies share a similar organisational culture heritage to the British army.149

This organisational culture heritage claim is a bit far-fetched, as Stephen Cohen is not convinced about the aptitude of Indian army generals, an observation he made during a talk at International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada on 9 April 2009.150 Cohen states that such generals want America to take away the nuclear capability of Pakistan, in which case India would annihilate Pakistan, settling all disputes once and for all. 147

Kaye, Talking to the Enemy: Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia, p. 1. ibid., pp. 89-90. 149 ibid., p. 118. 150 http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2009/0409_pakistan_cohen.aspx?p=1 148

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Another track two initiative is the Livingston Plan of the Kashmir Study Group, as listed before, finalised in consultation with both Indians and Pakistanis.151 This plan seeking more autonomy for Kashmir is named after the Livingston farmhouse of Farooq Kathwari, founder and chairman of the Kashmir Study Group.152 Abbas adds that the then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee proposed this plan to Pakistani representative Niaz Naik in early 1999 when the latter wanted Indian views on the Chenab option for a solution to the Kashmir problem. Abbas further adds that the Chenab option was not rejected by Vajpayee, while Wirsing too is of a similar opinion that Indians took the Chenab option seriously.153

While the meetings between India and Pakistan were becoming friendlier, Pakistani army generals were not too positive about this approach.154 One such event was Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore on the inaugural bus service between Lahore and Delhi. Iype states General Parvez Musharraf and other service chiefs not only declined to attend the official meetings but also refused to salute the visiting prime minister of an “enemy nation”. Musharraf later revived the old Kargil plan,155 which derailed the peace process built upon track two diplomacy.

Without going into the details of the Kargil war discussed before, it is pertinent to mention here that Musharraf, who did not want to attend meetings with and 151

http://www.kashmirstudygroup.net/awayforward/proposal.html Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror, p. 169. 153 Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age, pp. 25-30. 154 George Iype, "Pak Military Chiefs Boycott Wagah Welcome," http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/feb/20bus2.htm. For more details about Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee‘s Lahore bus visit and Lahore declaration see http://www.usip.org/library/pa/ip/ip_lahore19990221.html 155 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), p. 476. 152

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had no intentions of saluting the prime minister of an “enemy nation”, was travelling through the streets of New Delhi two years later, visiting his ancestral home as a part of the Agra summit in July 2001.156 The Hindu newspaper of India later reported, citing Brahma Challaney’s comments on Indian Zee TV, that Musharraf was also involved in training “Sikh terrorists for subversive activities in Punjab”.157 The next section discusses the insurgency in Punjab during the 1980s in brief.

3.4 Punjab conundrum During the partition of India, the state of Punjab was also divided into two with two thirds of its area allocated to Pakistan and one third remaining with India. The three main communities of the undivided Punjab were Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. With Muslims having crossed over to the Pakistani side in 1947, Hindu leadership of Punjab was adamant on not accepting Punjabi language as the state language and wanted Hindi to be promulgated instead, which subsequently led to Sikh agitation and the reorganisation of—an even smaller—Indian Punjab in 1966.158 Historically, Punjabi Muslims have preferred Urdu, Punjabi Hindus favoured Hindi and Punjabi Sikhs opted for Punjabi.159 To explore the reasons for this division is beyond the scope of this study. However, this section will discuss the militancy in Indian Punjab that started in the late 1970s.

156

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1430367.stm A. Umakantha Sarma, "The Agra Summit & Thereafter " http://www.hindu.com/2001/07/31/stories/13310611.htm. Also see http://www.hindu.com/2001/01/05/stories/05052523.htm 158 J. S. Grewal, The Sikhs of the Punjab, The New Cambridge History of India (Cambridge [England]; New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1999). See Chapter 9: Towards the ‗Punjabi Province‘ 159 Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2005), p. 326. Also see Ayesha Jalal, Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850 (New York: Routlege, 2000), p. 103. 157

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Militancy in Punjab, as it is understood, started in 1978 when the political leadership moved from moderates to “religious zealots” like Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale (JSB hereafter).160 Arora adds that JSB became prominent after the 1978 Nirankari killings and JSB was subsequently supported by the Congress (I) party of India. The then Chief Minister of Punjab, Darbara Singh and India’s Union Home Minister Giani Zail Singh, Arora discloses, both nurtured JSB through their contacts. Darbara Singh used a rival Akali party leader Sukhjinder Singh while Giani maintained a connection through Santokh Singh, President of the managing committee of Sikh shrines in New Delhi. According to Arora, with this arrangement, Congress (I) was able to make inroads into the traditionally Sikh-supported Akali Dal party. The information revealed by Arora about the official patronage to JSB is corroborated by another researcher who states JSB was “initially encouraged by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to weaken the Akali Dal, the Sikh political party that posed a threat to her Congress (I) party”.161 Gradually, with growing influence, JSB established himself inside the Darbar Sahib Complex in Amritsar. Darbar Sahib, also known as the Golden Temple, is an important shrine of the Sikhs. Amritsar city was founded by the fourth Sikh Guru Ram Das, hence Darbar Sahib Amritsar has a unique status for Sikhs. As such, Darbar Sahib Amritsar is the centre of Sikh political activities.

These political machinations led to an unusual event in June 1984 when “Punjab was cut off from the rest of the country” and the Indian army carried out a full-

160

Subhash Chander Arora, Strategies to Combat Terrorism: A Study of Punjab (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1999), p. 134-35. 161 Anne Noronha Dos Santos, Military Intervention and Secession in South Asia: The Cases of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, and Punjab, PSI Reports (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2007), p. 96. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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fledged attack on Darbar Sahib, codenamed Operation Blue Star, killing a large number of pilgrims “with their hands tied at their backs with their own turbans”.162 JSB was also killed in this attack. Leading up to Operation Blue Star, Indira Gandhi had maintained a contact with JSB through the President of the Punjab Congress party Raghunandan Lal Bhatia.163 Tully and Jacob state this contact was further maintained through Amrik Singh, a confidant of JSB. Tully and Jacob add that Bhatia would always send his car to Darbar Sahib to fetch Amrik Singh when required. This practice elevated the status of JSB, thus avoiding a direct confrontation between the local authorities and JSB. After Operation Blue Star, the Government of India (GOI) published a White Paper on the Punjab Agitation.164 Gurharpal Singh states this White Paper attributed the problem in Punjab to the secessionist nature of the movement (demanding Khalistan, a separate state for the Sikhs) that eclipsed the Akali Dal’s political demands agitation. He further adds that the White Paper, without naming a country, blamed external forces which wanted India to be dismembered and it was claimed that since this challenge was beyond the control of normal state agencies, the army was called in. The White Paper stopped just short of calling the moderate Akali Dal leaders as secessionists, which further outraged the Sikhs.165 Tully, who was BBC’s India correspondent at the time, adds the White Paper was not only rejected by the Sikhs but also by the journalists who did not buy the justification for Operation Blue Star. Rejection of the White Paper led to further spin doctoring by the GOI who blamed Pakistan and,

162

Grewal, The Sikhs of the Punjab, PP. 226-27. Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi's Last Battle (New Delhi: Rupa & Co, 1985), p. 118. 164 Gurharpal Singh, Ethnic Conflict in India: A Case-Study of Punjab (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 115. 165 Tully and Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi's Last Battle, pp. 209-10. 163

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occasionally, the CIA and Britain for the problem in Punjab, Tully and Jacob add. The White Paper listed only 57 Chinese rifles as foreign weapons among the cache of weapons. However, Tully and Jacob state that by this time India’s Congress (I) party had come up with its own pamphlet “Conspiracy Exposed” that increased the number of foreign weapons recovered during Operation Blue Star to include “Chinese-made AK-47 gas-operated assault rifles capable of firing 600 rounds a minute at a range of 300 metres; the Chinese made RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launchers capable of penetrating armour up to a thickness of 320 mm; the German G-2 automatic rifles generally used by NATO countries; Israelimanufactured bullet-proof vests; anti-tank weapons of Pakistani origin”.166

On the other hand, after Operation Blue Star, Lieutenant-General Sunderji (General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command of India at that time) told Tully that it was a “failure of intelligence”, as the army did not have enough information about the Darbar Sahib complex, something that a junior army officer also shared with Tully’s fellow journalist Jacob.167 This information surprised Tully as the GOI had issued statements in the past on not sending the army into the Darbar Sahib complex while commandoes were doing exercises for this operation at the Special Frontier Forces Himalayan base, Chakrata.168 Tully elaborates there was no restriction on movement in and out of the Darbar Sahib complex and intelligence operatives could have moved around unrestricted for collecting information.169

166

ibid., p. 209. ibid., p. 186. 168 ibid., p. 118. 169 ibid., p. 186. 167

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These political machinations of the GOI did not end in 1984, as the problem of Punjab continued. In the following years through to Operation Black Thunder at Darbar Sahib in 1988, a nephew of JSB, Jasbir Singh Rode, was used as an asset by the government for interfering in Sikh affairs.170 Sarab Jit Singh reveals that, not being able to stand up to such manipulations, the Inspector General of Border (Punjab) Chaman Lal, an upright officer, managed to get himself transferred out of there. Rode was subsequently used for Operation Black Thunder;171 which not only served the political interests of the government but also provided the planners with a text-book style operation that reversed the mismanagement of Operation Blue Star on one hand while setting an example for the future use of such an operation under similar conditions. This was a time when police officers and bureaucrats of Punjab were also having a tug-of-war between themselves over pay, perks and prominence.172

The origin of the tragic events of 1984 could be traced back to the time of Indian independence, as the promises made by Gandhi and Nehru were never fulfilled.173 Kaur states the Sikhs were continuously ignored during the reorganisation of Indian states in the 1950s as the Indian government was in no mood to accord Punjabi language its due status. She adds that Indira Gandhi arbitrarily created a stalemate of settling the Punjab capital city transfer issue by awarding the cotton belt of Punjab to the neighbouring state of Haryana. During the reorganisation of Punjab, the latter was ignored for its riparian share in the water sources from the 170

Sarab Jit Singh, Operation Black Thunder: An Eyewitness Account of Terrorism in Punjab (New Delhi; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 122-32. Also see pp. 187-96. 171 Joyce J. M. Pettigrew, The Sikhs of the Punjab: Unheard Voices of State and Guerrilla Violence, Politics in Contemporary Asia (London; Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1995), p. 83. 172 Julio Ribeiro, Bullet for Bullet: My Life as a Police Officer (New Delhi: Penguin, 1998), pp. 288-90. 173 Harminder Kaur, Blue Star over Amritsar: The Real Story of June 1984 (New Delhi: Corporate Vision, 2006), pp. 114-18. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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area that it lost, while the adjoining states were given full access to the water sources of Punjab.174 Conversely, there are authors like Khushwant Singh who maintain that Punjab always got more than it asked for while the generosity of the Indian government was always reciprocated with cries of “discrimination and injustice”.175

It was for these reasons embittered Sikhs resorted to political agitations in Independent India and a strategy for controlling Sikh institutes through ploys like JSB is quite obvious. The main Sikh demands were presented as the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, covering political, economic and social issues. Many authors have presented the Anandpur Sahib Resolution either as an appendix to or as a full chapter of their books.176 However, none of these authors could point to even a single word in the Resolution that was secessionist in nature. Therefore, what could have been the gains for Pakistan and other “foreign powers” as alleged if the demands of Sikhs were met instead by the Indian government? The system of governance in India and the centre-state relations, which will be discussed later in this chapter, would put into perspective the demands for political autonomy in India—one of the thrust areas of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. On the other hand, there is also a need to understand why demands for political autonomy in India that are not even secessionist in nature, are repugnant to the Indian government.

174

Pritam Singh, Political Economy of the Punjab: An Insider's Account (New Delhi: MD Publications, 1997), p. 37. 175 Khushwant Singh, My Bleeding Punjab (New Delhi: UBS Publishers Distributors, 1992), pp. 38-39. 176 Arora, Strategies to Combat Terrorism: A Study of Punjab, Dos Santos, Military Intervention and Secession in South Asia: The Cases of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, and Punjab, Kaur, Blue Star over Amritsar: The Real Story of June 1984. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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Jagjit Singh Chauhan who raised the bogey of Khalistan was actually sacked from Akali Dal earlier and many Akali Dal leaders feared that the “theory of Khalistan” was “engineered by the government” to destabilise Akali Dal. 177 According to Pannun, the main thrust of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution was for autonomy and not for a separate Sikh state named Khalistan.

For many readers in the Western world, it could be hard to understand the nuances of autonomy and human rights in South Asia. One example could be the Bill of Rights, whose principles are virtually non-existent in the Indian constitution.178 Without actually giving the definition of who is a Hindu, Indian constitution has lumped persons of Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religions with Hindus. “The year 1984 taught the Sikh community a valuable lesson—they exist within India at the sufferance of the majority”. 179 Grewal articulates that the widows of the 1984 pogroms in New Delhi—after the assassination of Indira Gandhi—are still waiting for justice more than 23 years and nine inquiry commissions later. Some authors call this pogrom a genocide, where Sikhs were systematically identified, disarmed, targeted and killed.180

One aspect of Operation Blue Star that has not been widely discussed in the literature is the destruction and confiscation of the Darbar Sahib Library books.181 Whereas, Dhillon, citing some news reports, claims that 13,000 books and rare

177

Diljit Singh Pannun, Cannon Unto Canon: The Sikh Psyche: An Analytical Study, 1st ed. (Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 2006), p. 122. 178 http://www.sikhspectrum.com/052007/constitution.htm 179 Jyoti Grewal, Betrayed by the State: The Anti-Sikh Pogrom of 1984 (New Delhi: Penguin, 2007), p. 216. 180 Manoj Mitta and H. S. Phoolka, When a Tree Shook Delhi: The 1984 Carnage and Its Aftermath (New Delhi: Lotus Collection, an imprint of Roli Books, 2007), pp. 25-30. See also pp. 211-14. 181 http://www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20030607/windows/note.htm MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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manuscripts were removed from the library shelves and burnt by the army, while more books were dumped in 150 gunny bags that were taken away by the army.182 In the words of Knuth, “The systematic destruction of books and libraries illustrates the reality that barbarism and the threat of civilization’s breakdown cannot be consigned to history books—a realization that only compounds the trauma for contemporary societies”.183

Similarly, another unique aspect of the Punjab problem that has not been discussed widely in the literature is the crime statistics.184 According to Johal, by the mid 1980s in Punjab, due to “clubbing of news,” all types of murders were ascribed to terrorism related killings. Johal compared the annual murder figures of 1985 in the border districts of Amritsar and Gurdaspur with the figures of 1977. This figure increased from 258 to 287. Johal adds that in 1977 while most of the murders were related to blood feuds, farming related feuds, armed robberies and love triangles whereas by 1985 all murders were categorised as terrorism related crimes. It is not possible that feuds and love triangles simply vanished from the society. Johal’s conference paper is not a comprehensive study of crime statistics, nevertheless, this aspect of crime statistics warrants future research where it needs to be explored further to determine how the classification of crime metamorphoses into a convenient all encompassing account of terrorism related crimes.

182

K. S. Dhillon, Identity and Survival: Sikh Militancy in India, 1978-1993 (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2006), p. 195. 183 Rebecca Knuth, Libricide: The Regime-Sponsored Destruction of Books and Libraries in the Twentieth Century (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003), p. 3. 184 Navjit Johal, "Punjabi Journalism and Punjab Problem," in Seventh Punjabi Vikas Conference (Punjabi University, Patiala: 1988). MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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3.5 Indian federalism In many post-colonial countries there is a struggle between contesting identities, where one dominant identity would project its own identity as the true nationalistic identity while trying to subordinate other identities.185 Sathyamurthy calls it a conflict of fusion and fission where, in the case of Pakistan, this conflict led to an independent Bangladesh. In the independent India, Sathyamurthy elaborates, one instance of this conflict is Hindi language imperialism where the Sikh demand for Punjabi language was totally ignored.186 When Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, her first priority was to deny autonomous powers to the states, which otherwise is a hallmark of the federal system, Sathyamurthy adds.

In the independent India, there were not many who were positive about the survival of democracy in India.187 Mathur adds that commentators like Harrison were not even hopeful about the survival of India as a nation.188 Mathur explains that India has survived as a nation but not without being coercive and by increasing violence in the country. Mathur defines coercion as dominating and suppressing challenges to state authority, which does not come without eroding the base of legitimacy of any authority. Although he further adds that all states exist by balancing coercion and legitimacy, but in view of the previous discussion, it is clear that India’s perennial tilt is towards coercion without any legislative

185

T. V. Sathyamurthy, "Indian Nationalism and the 'National Question'," Millennium - Journal of International Studies 14, no. 2 (1985): p. 172. 186 ibid.: p. 180. 187 Kuldeep Mathur, "The State and the Use of Coercive Power in India," Asian Survey 32, no. 4 (1992): p. 337. 188 Selig S. Harrison, India: The Most Dangerous Decades (Madras: OUP, 1960). Cited in Mathur, "The State and the Use of Coercive Power in India." MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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relief. This point is corroborated by Mathur himself later on when he says that while the Indian constitution was being finalised, “ensuring of individual rights and their implications were not considered seriously”.189 Mathur also acknowledges that civil liberties in India are not only violated often, but also, civil liberty activists have repeatedly pointed to the undemocratic aspects of the Indian constitution.

The imbalance of power between the central government of India and its states is being manipulated as a power tool despite the federal political structure in India.190 Datta traces a demand for reviewing the Indian federal structure to the 1967 manifesto of the Communist Party of India (Marxist). This manifesto claimed, according to Datta, Congress government was denying autonomy to the states by turning India into a unitary state and by undermining its federal structure. The party also demanded changes to be made to the Indian constitution for structuring it on federal principals and also replacing the reference to India as a Union with the words Federation. Datta adds that in the name of economic liberalisation of India since 1991, all the discussions about federalism have been done away with. After the economic liberalisation, the states are rather busy in using remnants of federal structures for securing foreign direct investment.191

189

Mathur, "The State and the Use of Coercive Power in India," p. 340. Polly Datta, "The Issue of Discrimination in Indian Federalism in the Post-1977 Politics of West Bengal," Comparative Studies of South Asia Africa and the Middle East 25, no. 2 (2005): p. 450. 191 Kripa Sridharan, "Federalism and Foreign Relations: The Nascent Role of the Indian States," Asian Studies Review 27, no. 4 (2003): pp. 474-75. 190

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Article 370 of the Indian constitution that gives special status to Jammu and Kashmir is not to be confused with asymmetrical federalism, a concept is being discussed in Canada and Spain.192 According to Tillin, Article 370 was introduced in the constitution due to the special circumstances of the time and was never accepted as a permanent article. Tillin’s argument is not convincing, as it is only the BJP, pushing the agenda of Hindutva, which wants Article 370 of the Indian constitution, giving special status to Jammu and Kashmir, to be scrapped.

A government system that could override the state government could still be called a federal system, claims Rajashekara, naming it prefectorial federal system.193 To argue his point, Rajashekra enumerates various features of Indian constitution where India as a Union is indestructible, while the shape of the states of India could be changed or completely wiped-off from the map. At any given time, central government can dismiss the elected government of the state by replacing it with a governor who is always there as a nominee of the centre. This governor, when not in power, could still delay the approval of bills passed by state legislature if so desired by the central government. Articles 249 and 249 of the Indian constitution give the central government power to interfere in the state legislature proceedings at will so that a bill is delayed indefinitely. Article 254 (1) empowers the centre to pre-empt and stall any state proceedings. Articles 256 and 257 make the states compliant to the centre, a feature which is unprecedented in the federal structure, adds Rajashekara. Article 355 empowers the centre to bring in armed forces even as the armed forces were not requested 192

L. Tillin, "United in Diversity? Asymmetry in Indian Federalism," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 37, no. 1 (2006): pp. 52-55. 193 H. M. Rajashekara, "The Nature of Indian Federalism: A Critique," Asian Survey 37, no. 3 (1997): 246-51. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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by the state. Articles 352, 356 and 360 facilitate turning a federal system into a unitary one at will. Under article 312, the centre can employ people and appoint them to various states. The centre has full authority over state high courts. States can retain only 33 per cent of the taxes collected while the centre gets 67 per cent of all taxes but corporation tax. Despite this disparity, states cannot raise loans independently and have to channel everything through the centre. The Financial Commission established under article 280 of the constitution is not binding on the centre while the National Planning Commission of the Prime Minister’s office, with no constitutional authority, controls all the financial institutions. Finally, Rajashekara states that under article 368, states have no role in constitutional amendments and the sole role in this regard is with the centre. Rajashekara states that although under pressure from the state governments, the centre appointed the Sarkaria Commission in 1983 to review the Indian federal system, but the Commission did not come up with substantive suggestions for improvements and all recommendations were ignored by the centre. What Guha presented as unequal relationships between domination and subordination in colonial India based on factors like coercion, persuasion, collaboration and resistance is equally applicable in modern India.194

In conclusion, this chapter has discussed how India is caught in a paired-minority conflict, both externally and domestically. Externally, India has been playing games of intelligence since 1947, in general, and since 1971, in particular. Pakistan has always walked into the traps of Indian manoeuvrings as is evident from the Kargil war, the Ganga hijacking, Operation Topac and track two diplomacy. 194

Ranajit Guha, Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 20-21. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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Domestically, India hauled the Punjab state over the cinders of intelligence games before an abrupt end to the militancy in 1993. The game of controlling religious institutions and the “theory of Khalistan” was imposed on Sikhs. Naive Sikhs who believed that JSB was a messiah and the “theory of Khalistan” is real are caught in the paired-minority conflict too. Clearly, India has drubbed its adversaries both in its neighbourhood and at home.195 When Maloy Krishna Dhar, a former Joint Director of India’s Intelligence Bureau wrote the book “Open Secrets”. He did not call it an autobiography but “the first open confession of an intelligence operative”.196 One would not expect big revelations from this book but there is a fair insight available as to how the Indian intelligence agencies operate and how they manage buy-ins from Pakistan and the Sikhs, in this particular instance, while these agencies are also expert in playing around with RSS. Nonetheless, the intelligence games and events discussed in this chapter do indicate a slow but tamed progress was made before the eruption of insurgency in Kashmir in 1989.

On the strategic side, Clausewitz recommends that to make your adversaries defenceless you have to overcome their physical and psychological capacity to resist.197 Measuring your opponent’s physical capabilities, Echevarria explains Clausewitz’s premise further, is feasible through intelligence but to fathom your

195

Some works of literature have not been discussed in this chapter due to unavailability of crossreferences. One such aspect is ―Operation Chanakya‖ where Indian intelligence agencies infiltrated the Kashmir insurgency groups. Further research is needed on pro-India armed groups in Kashmir and internecine killings in pro-Kashmir groups. However, an article pointing to ―Operation Chanakya‖ can be accessed at: http://www.defencejournal.com/feb-mar99/raw-at-war.htm Secondly, this chapter also precluded citing a book for obvious reasons: Zuhair Kashmeri and Brian McAndrew, Soft Target: The Real Story Behind the Air India Disaster, 2nd ed. (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 2005). 196 Maloy Krishna Dhar, Open Secrets: India's Intelligence Unveiled (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2005), p. 7. 197 Antulio Joseph Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford [England]; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 65. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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opponent’s psychological capabilities you have to put them in a never-ending loop. This chapter has highlighted how India is winning the game of intelligence by thrusting Pakistan (externally) and the Sikhs (internally) through a neverending loop where Pakistan is inching towards a failed state and Sikhs have learnt to “exist within India at the sufferance of the majority”, as mentioned before.198 All the while, the constitution of India is a weapon of mass dominance for the central government for keeping state governments under its boot as the democracy is reduced to coercion.

198

Due to the scope of this chapter, reference to a failed state would be limited to this web page: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4964934.stm MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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Chapter 4: Kashmir and the strategic issues This chapter will discuss the Kashmir conflict and explore the level of understanding of the action, the level of observation, and the level of understanding of the relation between the two as it has been done in the previous chapter. It is also pertinent to discuss the impact of religious revivalism (Chapter two) on India and Pakistan before exploring the Kashmir conflict for a better perspective.

4.1 Genesis of the current phase of insurgency The year 1989 was witness to a rising violence in Kashmir that saw bombs exploding, security forces ambushed, police stations attacked and incidents of acid-throwing on the faces of young girls.199 On 8 December 1989, with the kidnapping of Rubiya Sayeed, daughter of the then Home Minister of India by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and her subsequent release when the government of India ceded to kidnappers’ demands, Kashmir witnessed the emergence of a variety of insurgent groups that crumpled the local administration.200

Before this incident, India and Pakistan’s prime ministers and their foreign office staff would always discuss Punjab during their meetings but Kashmir was never on the agenda.201 This observation was made by the former US Ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley, at a confidence-building project meeting organised by

199

Turkkaya Ataov, Kashmir and Neighbours: Tale, Terror, Truce (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 12730. 200 Sumit Ganguly, "Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay," International Security 21, no. 2 (1996): p. 76. 201 M. Krepon, M. Faruqee, and HLS. Center, Conflict Prevention and Confidence-Building Measures in South Asia: The 1990 Crisis (Henry L. Stimson Center, 1994), p. 5. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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the Henry L. Stimson Center on 16 February 1994. Ambassador Oakley goes to the extent of claiming that Indian intelligence agencies were unaware of what was fomenting in Kashmir while the aforementioned meetings always discussed the neighbouring state Punjab.

Was Kashmir really ignored as claimed by Ambassador Oakley or was it simply too big an issue for meetings that discussed Punjab? Kashmir was considered to be a solution in sight with India and Pakistan having a bilateral approach as a part of the Simla process.202 This is the first explanation that Chari and others give while explaining the Kashmir crisis. They claim that Pakistan became active over the Kashmir issue due to the ennui emanating from the Simla process. The second explanation, according to Chari and others, was the rising social and economic aspirations that were dawning on Kashmiris in the wake of the spread of education aided by the growth of communication technology. The third explanation they give is about mismanagement of Kashmir and interference in Kashmiri politics since 1947. A posture that Chari and others acknowledge as a too soft stance of India on Kashmir by some Indians with an uncompromising attitude. They further add that while these explanations offer a variety of reasons, such explanations are still not conclusive as they look for other combinations that come up with different accounts of events including, but not limited to, the effects of the Cold War. But it is their concluding remark that says it all:

The Kashmiris themselves, exemplified by Sheikh Abdullah, have often tried to play off the two countries against each other in order to ensure autonomy; a

202

Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Perception, Politics, and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990, pp. 57-60. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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strategy that backfired for the sheikh when he was kept in custody almost continuously for over twenty years.203

This remark is not out of place as Hari Singh, the ruler of Kashmir in 1947 did not join either India or Pakistan during partition. However, when he decided to join India, the document of accession contained two clauses that insisted Srinagar would retain the status of being a sovereign state.204 Akbar cites both the clauses wherein it is clear that clause 7 does not accept the Constitution of India and clause 8 maintains Hari Singh as the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir. Akbar adds that Both Hari Singh and Sheikh Abdullah while agreeing to the terms and references of accession, Hari Singh wanted the maintenance of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution Act of 1939, whereas Abdullah wanted a “modern constitution for his New Kashmir”.

When the Indian constitution was being finalised, the two clauses mentioned before were incorporated into it and became Article 370. There was no opposition to Article 370 even as no other erstwhile princely state of India was accorded the status similar to that given to Jammu and Kashmir. There was no opposition to Article 370, which was also endorsed by politicians in 1949, including Shyama Prasad Mookerjee. However, it was the Mookerjee volte-face when he launched Jan Sangha in 1951 which caused the special status accorded to Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370 to become one of his targets, Akbar propounds.

203

ibid., p. 64. M. J. Akbar, Kashmir, Behind the Vale (New Delhi: Roli, 2002). See chapter 16 for a detailed discussion on this aspect: pp. 135-55. 204

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On the other hand, there was no reason for Kashmiris in 1947 to start an uprising.205 According to Blinkenberg, 1947 was an epoch making year when Kashmiris finally saw the end of the centuries old vicious rule of Afghans, Sikhs and Dogras, in that order, to be replaced by a Kashmiri leader who was one of them. Kashmiris heaved a sigh of relief when they got their own Muslim leader Sheikh Abdullah.

Raza claims that with the death of Sheikh Abdullah on 8 September 1982 the stage was set for an insurgency in Kashmir.206 He adds that Abdullah was instrumental in developing a unique Kashmiri identity and his death put a damper on it. Other researchers also believe that the Kashmiri insurgency is a complex factor with an indigenous religious identity factor attached to it.207 Similarly, Blank observes that Sufi Islam, practised by Kashmiris, generates an identity of Kashmiriyat, which has a “unique cultural sensibility shared by the region’s Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and even some Buddhists”.208 However, during 1990 the majority of Hindus in the Kashmir valley known as Kashmiri Pandits left Kashmir for other parts of India and became internally displaced persons (IDP). Currently, the number of IDP Kashmiri Pandits is 300,000.209

4.2 Between the lines Operation Brasstacks of 1986-87 precipitated a crisis in November 1986 that lasted three months.210 Chari and others add that Operation Brasstacks did not

205

Blinkenberg, India-Pakistan. The History of Unsolved Conflicts, p. 420. M. Maroof Raza, Wars and No Peace over Kashmir (New Delhi: Lancer, 1996), p. 68. 207 Behera, Demystifying Kashmir, p. 145. 208 J. Blank, "Kashmir: Fundamentalism Takes Root," Foreign Affairs 78, no. 6 (1999): p. 41. 209 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/IN.html 210 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia, p. 39. 206

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end in war but was able to hasten the India Pakistan nuclear programmes. However, Swami has a different take on Operation Brasstacks and states this pure military exercise began in July 1986 when India mobilised 160,000 troops.211 Swami, nonetheless, suggests that Pakistan had already realised this offensive was to draw Pakistan’s attention from something elsewhere. Regardless of the views of authors mentioned before, Pakistan would not have walked into this trap during the regime of Zia as “war was the last thing General Zia wanted”.212 Tully and Jacob maintain Zia did not want to give India a pretext to attack Pakistan. It was for these reasons, they add, Zia never supported the Sikhs. Rather Zia maintained a pro-active peace initiative that frustrated warmongering efforts of its adversaries, if there were any, Tully and Jacob conclude.

Meanwhile, citing Ravi Rikhye, Chari and others reveal that Brasstacks was indeed a “deception and misdirection” plan to lure Pakistan.213 They add that with this plan, India was looking at gaining several advantages like dismembering Sindh from Pakistan, destroying Pakistan’s nuclear programme, improving India’s nuclear position in the Saichen Glacier, rearranging the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir and wiping out terrorist training camps in Pakistan. They conclude that it was the nervousness of Indian political leaders that failed to take advantage of the aim of Operation Brasstacks.

This situation was nearly repeated in 1989 when in response to troop movements in India due to the situation of Punjab and Kashmir, Pakistan launched the Zarb211

Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004, pp. 151-52. Tully and Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi's Last Battle, p. 212. 213 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia, p. 46. 212

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i-Momin military exercise.214 They add that the new Chief of Army Staff in Pakistan, General Mirza Aslam Beg was quite ambitious to achieve something remarkable. The situation deteriorated as Pakistani troops did not return to barracks after the exercise and with the Indian response both armies were within striking range of each other for quite a while. This stand-off came to end, according to Swami, after the India visit of the US National Security Advisor, Robert Gates in May 1990.215 Gates made it clear to India, Swami adds, even if India wins a war against Pakistan, the eventual cost of victory could be overwhelming.

The observation made by Tully and Jacob is corroborated by the fact that General Sunderji later revealed it “was India’s last chance to defeat Pakistan by conventional arms before the latter acquired a nuclear deterrent”.216 Brasstacks was a manoeuvre that deployed enough of India’s strike force within fifty miles of its border with Pakistan in such a way that it halved the time required for mobilisation of its troops during an impending war to a week.217

Apparently, nuclear deterrence wasn’t the only reason in Sunderji’s mind as he was commanding the Indian army when it was going through the throes of reorganisation.218 The nuclear deterrence would have reduced the eminence of armoured regiments. But the terrain, regardless of the nuclear deterrent, would

214

———, Perception, Politics, and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990, pp. 80-95. Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004, p. 174. 216 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia, p. 67. 217 Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), p. 93. 218 Sunil Dasgupta, "The Indian Army and the Problem of Military Change," in Security and South Asia: Ideas, Institutions and Initiatives, ed. Swarna Rajagopalan (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 102-06. 215

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still direct India to maintain such regiments at huge cost, even as the capabilities of armoured regiments and their tanks had not been tested since the 1971 war. Dasgupta adds this was not the only reason plaguing the reorganisation of the Indian army. He states that recruitment for the Indian army is facing a real challenge, with a severe shortage of junior officers due to reasons of caste and class. Also the army is getting older, not for professional reasons, but for those seeking eligibility for a better pension with a longer service. Dasgupta suggests the upper-class officers of the Indian army are uncomfortable socialising with lower-class or lower-caste soldiers if they become officers. Traditional practices make it harder for the Indian army to change rules overnight. There are professional reasons too that pose a big challenge for the Indian army. The Indian army has “suffered from an identity crisis from doing dual service in constabulary and external defence functions”.219 Dasgupta reveals twelve out of nineteen army campaigns during the period 1947-1998 were internal-security related. The inference this researcher draws from the subsequent discussion of Dasgupta is that regular civil-army engagements made the politicians keep army in such a posture that civil and political supremacy in the country is never challenged by the army even if it is at the cost of ignoring officer material for recruitment purposes.

On the other hand, the Pakistan army is not getting accolades either. Although the Pakistan army will maintain a commanding role in developing national identity, it is failing to attract persons from affluent families and from those who

219

ibid., p. 88.

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are placed in the higher echelons of the society like its Indian counterpart.220 Cohen is not impressed with the professionalism of the Pakistan army due to the weaknesses it exhibited during the Kargil war, where in addition to its weak technological base, it failed to muster well-coordinated joint services operations. Cohen suggests the acquisition of nuclear capability will not mask the strategic inferiority of Pakistan that could only be overcome by gaining knowledge and wisdom while reaching a par with India’s strategic dominance.

4.3 Strategic cultures of India and Pakistan In March 1982, a three-day seminar on India’s strategic environment was organised in New Delhi where India’s top politicians, academics and service officers deliberated on various issues.221 It is not clear whether the participants were clear about what is meant by strategic environment. Bajpai states religious fundamentalism, even if it becomes a problem in future, is of no relevance as “it is always there, just beneath the top layers of consciousness”.222 Paying tributes to Gandhi’s unrelenting struggle, Bajpai states it is erroneous to call Gandhi a pacifist, which could not be farther from truth as “Gandhi preferred violence to cowardice”.223 On the issue of threat from Pakistan, Bajapi adds, five discussion areas were identified during the seminar: ideological threat, conventional nuclear military threat, intervention threat, threat of diplomatic containment, and threats arising out of internal stabilities. The seminar focussed more on scenarios

220

Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 1st pbk. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), pp. 97-130. 221 U. S. Bajpai et al., India's Security: The Politico-Strategic Environment, 1st ed. ([New Delhi]: Lancers Publishers, 1983), p. 1. 222 ibid., p. 37. 223 ibid., p. 61. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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about what Pakistan could potentially do without linking them to what actually was happening out there.

It was not until recently that we came across serious study about India’s strategic culture.224 Jones has tabulated this culture on philosophical and mythological foundations and has extensively drawn linkages to Hindu epics calling it Omniscient Patrician Culture where India wants its traditional and civilisational aspects respected. Jones clearly outlines that the shapers of Indian strategic culture are politicians, bureaucrats, notable academics, think tanks, the press and not the army officers. While on the other hand, Kanti Bajpai (different from U S Bajpai discussed before) considers three paradigms: Nehruvianism, Neoliberalism, and Hyperrealism.225 Borrowing from Johnston, Bajpai is looking at answers for three questions: 1. What is the role of war in international relations? 2. What is the nature of the adversary and the threats it poses? 3. What is the utility of the force?226 Bajpai’s general discussion settles the questions by summing up Nehruvianism for peace and talks, Neoliberalism for trade and economic interaction, and Hyperrealism for a permanent solution by means of war. Nevertheless, Bajpai focuses further on Pakistan next and revisits all three paradigms again. Elaborating Nehruvianism, Bajpai states that a state based on Islamic ideology and having differences with India cannot survive. Citing Nehruvian scholars like 224

Kanti Bajpai, "Indian Strategic Culture and the Problem of Pakistan," in Security and South Asia: Ideas, Institutions and Initiatives, ed. Swarna Rajagopalan (London: Routledge, 2006), R. W. Jones, "India‘s Strategic Culture," Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, http://www.dtra.mil/documents/asco/publications/comparitive_strategic_cultures_curriculum/case%20stu dies/India%20(Jones)%20final%2031%20Oct.pdf. 225 Bajpai, "Indian Strategic Culture and the Problem of Pakistan," pp. 54-79. 226 ibid., p. 60. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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Dhar and Khan, Bajpai state that according to Nehruvian view, Pakistan is the result of an invalid two-nation theory therefore it lacks the ideals of a nation. However, Nehruvians recommend efforts should be made to restrain the support to Pakistan from other external supporters and Pakistan should be engaged in talks directly or through international institutions. Explaining the Neoliberal approach to Pakistan, Bajpai adds that Neoliberals. while not discounting the role of international institutions, want a flexible approach during discussions. Secondly, Neoliberals are not averse to the presence of other powers in the mediation role, which is rather pragmatic and paves the way for stronger economic ties. Finally, citing hyperrealist scholars like Chellany and Karnad, Bajpai states that hyperrealists do not believe in talks and negotiations, as the only solution to the Pakistan problem, according to them, is an all-out war. According to Bajpai, hyperrealists contemplate total surrender by or collapse of Pakistan. Hyperrealists, according to Bajpai, also want India to equip itself for ultimate challenges that would later come from China and the US. Identifying the actual Indian approach to Pakistan, Bajpai says that traditionally Nehruvians dominated the Indian strategic culture in the past, while this approach has shifted to neoliberals and hyperrealists after the end of the cold war. Bajpai, while enumerating the shortcomings like threats, coercion, and regular troop manoeuvrings of neoliberal and hyperrealist paradigms wants to choose the traditional way of Nehruvianism for finding everlasting peace with Pakistan. However, it is not understood when Nehruvians do not accept the legitimacy of Pakistan in the first place, no matter how many sessions of talks they hold with Pakistan they would always end in a stalemate.

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On the other hand, Pakistan’s strategic culture has the insecurity of a newly created state ingrained into it, which is still trying to establish its identity. 227 Having a war with India, Rizvi adds, is a part of Pakistan’s strategic culture where Pakistan is also aware of the economic constraints of a prolonged war. Rizvi states that by creating “nuclear ambiguity”, Pakistan was keeping an equal pressure on India by declaring a capability for making a bomb while not making one.228 When India carried out nuclear explosions in May 1998, Pakistan lost the edge, which this ambiguity had created, Rizvi adds. But by carrying out reactive nuclear explosions, although Pakistan matched the Indian threat, especially the war in Kashmir, Pakistan still supports a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons and does not support the “no first use” policy of India, which disadvantages small countries like Pakistan, Rizvi says. Islam is also a part of Pakistan’s strategic culture, according to Rizvi, which dates back to the British period when Muslim rights were threatened due to the numerical majority of Hindus.

Lavoy agrees with Rizvi that Pakistan’s strategic culture is based on insecurity.229 Lavoy adds that the Kashmir dispute is the main component of Pakistan’s strategic culture and Pakistan calling it the Kashmir insurgency freedom movement and India calling it insurgency state-sponsored terrorism are both correct in their own right. He further suggests both countries have a hard-line approach on Kashmir and talks so far are an effort in futility. Lavoy is afraid that

227

Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan's Strategic Culture," in South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances, ed. M. R. Chambers (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2002), pp. 308-09. 228 ibid., p. 318. 229 Peter R. Lavoy, "Pakistan‘s Strategic Culture," Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, http://www.dtra.mil/documents/asco/publications/comparitive_strategic_cultures_curriculum/case%20stu dies/Pakistan%20(Lavoy)%20final%202%20Nov%2006.pdf. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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the Kashmir conflict could become a nuclear flashpoint. He adds that although Pakistan is ready to involve a third party for any talks on Kashmir. India is adamant on not having a third party. India also wants Kashmiri insurgents to give up violence first so that talks could be held on condition of staying within the context of integrity of India. In contrast, Lavoy also offers that Pakistan is involved in the process of strategic myth making, developing myth makers, and carrying out the process of legitimising and institutionalising the myths. To argue his point Lavoy gives the example of nuclear weapons where the strategic myth making is about nuclear security and nuclear influence. Nuclear ambiguity, as discussed before, actually fits well into Lavoy’s framework. Similarly, fighting the Taliban will put Pakistan through the strategic myth process.

Conversely, Khan presents a succinct view of the strategic choices of Pakistan.230 He outlines two choice making areas. Pakistan is not going to join a bandwagon that undermines its sovereignty. While Pakistan is fully aware of India’s emerging status, it would not be reduced to a “West Bangladesh”. Secondly, citing Cohen, Khan compares the similar circumstances, which Pakistan shares with Israel— persecution, powerful enemies, hostile neighbours, similar strategic policies and similar circumstances for developing nuclear weapons. The second choice mentioned by Khan clearly counters Lavoy’s argument about myth making for nuclear security and nuclear influence.

230

Feroz Hassan Khan, "Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan," Strategic Insights IV, no. 10 (2005). http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Oct/khan2Oct05.asp MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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4.4 Kashmir: Nuclear flashpoint In the South Asian region, Kashmir and nuclear weapons are the two “inextricably and irretrievably bound together” issues.231 As the insurgency started gaining momentum in Kashmir in 1990, according to Ganguly and Hagerty, there emerged a possibility of a likely nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan. They claim that during 1990s the Kashmir issues metamorphosed the conflict between the two neighbours. They cite the then Indian Prime Minister VP Singh claiming India would reciprocate if Pakistan were to position nuclear weapons. However, Ganguly and Hagerty do not point to a Pakistani nuclear provocation in their discussion before citing Singh. Their discussion revolves around Kashmir and the mention of a “thousand-year war” that Benazir Bhutto, the then Pakistan Prime Minister promised.232 Clearly, a thousand-year war could not be nuclear in nature. Therefore, it is quite evident here that India played the nuclear card in 1990 to warn Pakistan for keeping its hands off Kashmir. Nevertheless, Ganguly and Hagerty later add that while the US ambassador in Pakistan never observed a nuclear ambition, the US ambassador in Delhi was already hearing about a likely explosion in the spring of 1990.233 In their subsequent discussion, Ganguly and Hagerty remain inconclusive, citing conflicting reports about the 1990 crisis whether Pakistan already possessed a nuclear warhead or whether this crisis was a catalyst for developing a nuclear weapon by Pakistan.

231

Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons, p. 82. 232 ibid., p. 92. 233 ibid., pp. 98-99. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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Ten years after the 1998 India Pakistan nuclear tests, researchers examine the events that unfolded after the tests and the related stability issue in South Asia.234 But nobody has tried to explore why India initiated the tests. Although, Ganguly mentions Brasstacks and 1990 crisis but he does not offer a fresh insight. On the other hand, Ganguly and Hagerty attribute the 1998 nuclear tests to India’s “nuclear aspirations and domestic political compulsions”.235 However, while narrowing down their argument, Ganguly and Hagerty shift the political onus on India’s Bharatiya Janata Party alone while mentioning the factor of the China threat to India and comparing China to India from a historical, civilisational, colonial, and emergent economic aspirations viewpoint. However, discussing India’s nuclear parity with China is misplaced in view of the limited war theory, as India and China never engaged in limited war before or after the Indian nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998 (also discussed in chapter 3).

Conversely, India’s hegemonic aspirations were unleashed in the early 1980s with Soviet assistance, massive borrowings and a chase for seats on international councils.236 Munro adds that by the mid-1980s, India realised that in spite of having a high growth defence budget and huge arms imports, it was mostly ignored on the world stage. This prompted India towards military adventurism, which was not limited to Siachen and rather took the Indian military down south into Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Munro further states that India, at the same

234

Sumit Ganguly, "Nuclear Stability in South Asia," International Security 33, no. 2 (2008), Kapur, "Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia." 235 Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons, p. 117. For details see Chapter 6: Out of the Closet, pp. 116-42. 236 Ross H. Munro, "The Loser: India in the Nineties," The National Interest, no. n32 (1993), http://find.galegroup.com.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/itx/start.do?prodId=ITOF MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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time, was also busy organising Festivals of India across the capitals of various countries. Munro observes that by 1993 India was not getting the due returns for its efforts and even the morale of Indian army was at the lowest ebb with its humiliating retreat from Sri Lanka. Munro further compares India with China where India is unable to match “China's superior record in such basics as literacy, nutrition, and rural development”. Subsequently, Munro also mentions the growing Chinese influence in South-east Asia and China developing its relations with Iran. Munro concludes emphasising that India should be forced into denuclearisation with a bleak future outline for India. It is here where Munro goes wrong.

Munro is unable to fathom the ascendance of China and other factors that would be an eventual challenge to the US.237 It would be under these circumstances that India, looking for one stroke capable of getting the attention it wanted, projected it as a potential and compatibly armed rival of China, able to extend ramifications westwards while liberalising its economy. This one stroke initiated the nuclear tests in 1998. The nuclear tests enhanced “India’s prestige and status”.238 Cohen states there will be keen interest to watch India’s crisis management capacity and its ability to get hold of a seat on a council as a spinoff of the nuclear tests. With the gradual economic development of India, Cohen projects “India might be able to develop and deploy a theatre missile defense against another nuclear power”.239 Visualising its growing importance in non-Western world, Cohen sees

237

For a detailed discussion on factors in favour of India and India‘s geo-strategic position, see Sandy Gordon, "South Asia after the Cold War: Winners and Losers," Asian Survey 35, no. 10 (1995), Pervez Hoodbhoy, "Myth-Building: The "Islamic" Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 49, no. 5 (1993). 238 Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 304. 239 ibid., p. 305. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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India as counter-measure against a “threatening or expansionist China”, should a situation so warrant while recommending a “qualified” US support for India’s candidacy for the United Nations Security Council.240

In conclusion, this chapter has discussed the insurgency in Kashmir when it started in 1989 and the factors that led to it while enumerating the peculiarity of Article 370 of the Indian constitution and accession of Kashmir. Operation Brasstacks, which was the deception plan of India, was not able to yield the desired results while Pakistan’s ambitious Zarb-i-Momin was rather exploited by India for moving more troops into Kashmir and Punjab. Strategic cultures of India and Pakistan are clearly caught in a paired-minority conflict where Indians do not accept the two-nation theory while Pakistan is mostly involved in myth making for security and influence as a reactive measure. Finally, although Kashmir is the nuclear flashpoint of South Asia, India gained a strategic advantage from the nuclear tests it carried out in 1998, giving it a wider role in the affairs of South Asia and improving its position as a future counter measure against China.

240

ibid., p. 311.

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Chapter 5: Conclusion and strategic implications 5.1 Introduction “There is no instance in the history of a state becoming wealthy without military power or security”.241 To argue his point, Chellany offers the example of colonialism and claims that spending on military power is no waste of money. Chellany also points to the fact that economic prosperity is also linked to an independent nuclear arsenal and he wants India to become more assertive in global affairs.242 India, in the recent past, has undergone an adjustment of its position in the global hierarchy of states.243 Looking historically at India, Cohen states, India will be measured against its reputational power, its economic and military power, and as a rising and emerging power capable of throwing up many surprises. However, India’s global ambitions are seriously affected by the domestic and regional challenges that it faces.

On the other hand, Pakistan, projected as a “next major middle-income country” twenty five years ago, is dangerously moving towards becoming a failed state in the current environment.244 Compared to India’s economic and military emergence as mentioned before, Cohen finds that Pakistan is mired with a booming birth rate, no scope for economic development and a failed education system. Cohen adds that drifting away from the ideal Pakistan visualised by its

241

Brahma Chellaney, "Challenges to India's National Security in the New Millenium," in Securing India's Future in the New Millennium, ed. Brahma Chellaney and Centre for Policy Research (New Delhi India) (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1999), p. 531. 242 See http://www.hindu.com/2004/12/19/stories/2004121907600100.htm 243 Cohen, India: Emerging Power, p. 25. 244 ———, The Idea of Pakistan, p. 296. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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founders, the present dissimilitude in Pakistan today is only temporarily masked by opposing India on various fronts.

In contrast, peacemaking in Kashmir remains intangible due to the “vested interests in continued bloodshed”.245 Krepon explains that with no stakeholder willing to accept compromise, the progress on Kashmir crawls back to square one, politically. What Krepon hoped from the Bush administration in 2001 for peacemaking in the region is still relevant for Obama today.

Kashmir is such a knotted issue for India and Pakistan that despite having fought wars and having organised numerous meetings for a resolution of this issue, Ganguly questions if it will potentially stop India’s rise.246

5.2 Findings The massive demonstrations and hoisting of Pakistani flags inside the Kashmir valley on India’s Republic Day on 26 January 1990 gave a clear indication that the longstanding Kashmir dispute increased the chances of yet another India Pakistan war.247 The origins of this war could be traced back to the fundamentalist Hindutva mindset that preceded the two-nation theory by decades, especially the way Hindu institutions were protected and flourished during the colonial period. It is unique that the civilisational superiority, which is claimed by the proponents of Hindutva that the Indus Valley civilisation was

245

Michael Krepon, "A Ray of Hope," The Washington Quarterly 24, no. 2 (2001): p. 175. Sumit Ganguly, "Will Kashmir Stop India's Rise," Foreign Affairs 85, no. 4 (2006). See also: Arundhati Roy‘s article on Kashmir at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/22/kashmir.india 247 Iftikhar H. Malik, "The Kashmir Dispute: A Cul-De-Sac in Indo-Pakistan Relations?," in Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 310. 246

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spread over much of what is currently Pakistan. However, Islamisation has brought such a paradigm shift in the Pakistani psyche that they are unable to think outside the square of enmity with India with no recollection of or a desire to link with Indus Valley civilisation.

On the other hand, India has checkmated Pakistan by staying ahead in the games of intelligence since 1947, be it the Ganga hijacking, Operation Topac, Track Two diplomacy, or the Kargil war. Domestically, India has been able to scuttle the demands for a true federal structure and in the case of Punjab; it pro-actively launched the strategy of coercion for controlling the religious institutions of the Sikhs and to teach them a lesson that reminded them that their existence is on sufferance of the majority.

India’s strategic culture does not accept the legitimacy of Pakistan while the latter’s strategic culture is more into myth making. To consider the question whether Kashmir is the cause or consequence of the India Pakistan conflict is fallacious as Kashmir predates Pakistan. This issue becomes complex especially when the Pakistani mindset does not connect with the civilisation which India is proud of. This aspect is beyond the scope of this study and warrants further research.

Nuclear power transformed a loser India of 1993 into a winner and an emerging power whereas Pakistan is a tamed follower on the verge of a collapse. Swami who concludes that the Kashmir conflict is a “nuclear jihad” is totally misplaced in his observation, as available literature clearly indicates that Pakistan is meekly MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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buying peace from a stronger India. This is corroborated by the fact that after Operation Brasstacks when Jordan’s Crown Prince Hassan mediated between India and Pakistan, the latter compliantly handed over the Sikh soldiers who sought refuge in Pakistan after the mutiny which followed Operation Blue Star.248 Commanding a hegemonic control domestically while rubbing shoulders with China internationally, India is now looking for global alliances and seats on councils while on the contrary, it is near impossible for Pakistan to survive without foreign aid. In view of the above, it is evident that India and Pakistan, trapped in a paired-minority conflict while aggravating the Kashmir issue, are unable to resolve it bilaterally as fundamentalist Hindutva and Islamisation have hit a dead end there.

5.3 Strategic implications To consider the Kashmir dispute within the ambit of the India Pakistan conflict will be myopic as literature has pointed to its fallout beyond the region. Outside the South Asian region, the hyperrealists in India are clearly looking at China.249 While, in the long run, these hyperrealists see a strategic challenge emanating from the US too.250 Mention of Kashmir then by Barack Obama as a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination was widely criticised in India.251 Raja Mohan finds Obama’s argument simple where the US accomplishment in Afghanistan is linked to Pakistan and the latter is further linked to India through Kashmir. Raja Mohan further advises the US administration that instead of

248

Praveen Swami, "Open Doors " Frontline 21, no. 13 (2004), http://www.flonnet.com/fl2113/stories/20040702003503400.htm. 249 Chellaney, "Challenges to India's National Security in the New Millenium," p. 541. 250 Bajpai, "Indian Strategic Culture and the Problem of Pakistan." 251 C. Raja Mohan, "How Obama Can Get South Asia Right," The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2009): p. 175. MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh

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focussing on India it should ask Pakistan to mend its ways based on the bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan. He is not shy of further suggesting a powerful role for India to play in Afghanistan. It is hard to understand the logic of Raja Mohan’s advice when Nehruvian negotiators do not recognise the twonation theory while hyperrealists want Pakistan to collapse. How then, is the latter going to gain anything out of negotiations. Raja Mohan finds Obama’s argument simple, yet his advice obliterates the links of Obama’s argument. On the other hand, a weaker Pakistan will set hurdles for a US success in Afghanistan, including a strategic disadvantage in dealing with the Central Asian “-stan” states. Further discussion on this aspect is beyond the scope of this study.

Indian strategy that looks into the future is evident from an example given by Schofield, where she quotes Gautam Sen who, while speaking at a seminar in London, dismissed redrawing the India Pakistan boundaries as an effort in futility.252 Sen claims that the Kashmir dispute would automatically be resolved in fifty years as India would be so strong by then all such challenges would cease to exist. Sen’s argument is not different from the hegemonic Indian strategic culture that considers whole of South Asia as “one” and “natural” paving the way for Indian dominance.253 Sathasivam takes a microscopic look at all types of doctrines and policies of the India Pakistan conflict but stops short of clearly outlining a suggestion for resolution. Similarly, Koithara offers a long treatise on creating peace in Kashmir but does not offer a solution.254

252

Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War, p. 236. For a detailed study of this aspect, see: Kanishkan Sathasivam, Uneasy Neighbors: India, Pakistan, and US Foreign Policy, US Foreign Policy and Conflict in the Islamic World (Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 142-49. 254 Verghese Koithara, Crafting Peace in Kashmir: Through a Realist Lens (New Delhi, India; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2004), pp. 265-97. 253

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Schofield offers theoretical scenarios for a future where all such scenarios are unworkable within the standpoints of India and Pakistan.255 A similar set of scenarios is available on the BBC web site as an enhanced visual representation.256 The seven scenarios on the BBC web site are namely; the status quo, Kashmir joins Pakistan, Kashmir joins India, Independent Kashmir, a smaller independent Kashmir, Independent Kashmir Valley, and the Chenab formula. These seven scenarios on the BBC web site are discussed with their merits and demerits. There is also the model-based approach of Wirsing which is not very different from the scenarios mentioned before.257 However, what makes Wirsing stand out is his recommendation for US involvement in Kashmir and his suggestions on how to break the India Pakistan deadlock. Developing his argument, Wirsing states how the US position on Kashmir during the years has moved from support for a Kashmiri plebiscite to support for a bilateral agreement between India and Pakistan. Wirsing, however, in his argument, still maintains the importance of a plebiscite. In addition, he further outlines in detail four focus areas, a three-pronged strategy, and objectives for a bilateral solution. But his outline would work only if bilateral talks between India and Pakistan are ever going to be successful.

Conversely, this study has clearly established that India Pakistan bilateral talks are not capable of reaching a resolution. Therefore, the only solution to the Kashmir problem is an internationally supervised plebiscite, which comes from

255

Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War, pp. 232-36. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/south_asia/03/kashmir_future/html/default.stm 257 Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and Its Resolution, pp. 21733. 256

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the mandate of the extant presence of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). The existence of UNMOGIP for 60 years is a clear indication that India and Pakistan are unable to settle their disputes bilaterally. As such, it is the responsibility of the international community to save the ordinary citizens from the hassles of enduring the clashes between pro-authority and anti-authority terrorists and their internecine killings and also saving ordinary human beings from the trauma of living in the theatre of games of intelligence.

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