Frivaldo_vs_comelec.docx

BAI MONADIN S. SINSUAT ADMIN AND ELECTION LAW

APRIL 1, 2019 ATTY. SAHARA ALIA SILONGAN

FRIVALDO vs COMELEC & RAUL LEE G.R. No. 120295 (June 28, 1996) PANGANIBAN, J. Facts: Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January 1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Comelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo‘s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on 20 January 1983. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was ―merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator‘s agents abroad. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within 10 days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the OEC. Issue: Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo’s repatriation is valid. Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the curative nature of Presidential Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application to run for governor. The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise. He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed governor of Sorsogon. Where the evidence of the lack of Filipino citizenship of a provincial official was discovered only 8 months after his proclamation, the quo warranto case should be allowed even if it was filed more than 10 days after his proclamation.

Mercado v. Manzano G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999 MENDOZA, J. Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioners filed for respondent’s disqualification for election alleging that respondent is a dual citizen, and under the Local Government Code, dual citizens cannot run for public office. Respondent is a son of both Filipinos but was born in the U.S which follows the principle of jus soli, hence, considered an American citizen as well. COMELEC allowed Manzano to run because he was considered natural-born because of the virtue that he is a son of both Filipino citizens but petitioners assail this. Issue: Whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor. Ruling: Yes. The Court first defined dual citizenship and compared it to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship arises when a person whose parents are citizens of a state that follows jus sanguinis and was born in a state that follows jus soli, hence, resulting to a concurrent application of different two laws or more. On the other hand, dual allegiance is a situation where a person simultaneously owes loyalty to two or more states. Private respondent Manzano was qualified to run for the position of vice mayor of Makati. The COMELEC en banc held that Manzano acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship since he did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States. It is an undisputed fact that when Manzano attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Thus, in this case, Respondent, though dual citizen, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy tantamount to his election of Phil. citizenship – meaning he forswears allegiance to the other country and thereby terminating their status as dual. The Court stressed that participating in the election is an express renunciation of American citizenship.

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC, et al. GR Nos. 221697, GR No. 221698-700, March 8,2016 Perez, J.: Facts: In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005. Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition, who then eventually demice on February 3,2005; finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005. On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport. Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC. Issue: Whether or not as a foundling, Poe is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. Ruling: Yes. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may be considered a natural-born Filipino. It ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines as there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings as they are already impliedly so recognized. There are also no provisions in the Constitution with intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings as the three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. Foundlings are citizens under international law as this is supported by some treaties, adhering to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is found. It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the Philippines during the period claimed. Natural-born citizenship can be reacquired even if it had been once lost.

MEYNARDO SABILI v. COMELEC, GR No. 193261, Apr 24, 2012 SERENO, J. Facts: When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Private respondent Florencio Librea filed a Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification. He alleged that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. In order to prove his compliance with the residency requirement, petitioner presented as evidence his barangay certificate. The COMELEC in disqualifying the petitioner did not consider the Certification issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade. COMELEC brushed it aside on the ground that the said Certification was not sworn to before a notary public and, hence, cannot be relied on. Subsequently, petitioner presented another, substantially identical, Certification from the said Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain, save for the fact that it had now been sworn to before a notary public. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials. Ruling: As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been established, including when the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to intervene and correct the COMELEC's error. As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion. In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction. In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES v. CA GR Nos. 217126-27, Nov 10, 2015 PERLAS-BERNABE, J. Facts: Binay, Jr. was charged with administrative and criminal cases in connection with the allegation that he is involved in anomalous activities attending the procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati. Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable since Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati and Chases III to V transpired during his frst term. His re-election as mayor for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic. The Ombudsman issued an order placing Binay, et al. under preventive suspension. The CA granted Binay’s prayer for TRO. Under the Condonation Doctrine, which applies only to administrative cases, (1) the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct; (2)an elective officials re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor and (3) courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officer. Issue: Whether the CA’s directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.’s petition for contempt was improper or illegal. Ruling: The SC abandoned the condonation doctrine, but ruled that the CA did not act in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the WPI, as it did so based on good case law, considering that the abandonment is prospective in nature. In abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC emphasized that this was a jurisprudential creation that originated in the 1959 Pascual case, which was decided under the 1935 Constitution. It is notable that there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, and the SC resorted to American authorities. The SC stated what appears the sole basis for the condonation doctrine in Pascual. However, the condonation doctrine should be abandoned. There is no constitutional or statutory basis to support it. The continued application of the condonation doctrine is simply inconsistent and impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that public office is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense.

TOMAS DE GUZMAN vs. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF LA UNION and JUAN T. LUCERO G.R. No. L-24721 November 3, 1925 VILLAMOR, J. Facts: Tomas De Guzman filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court seeking to compel the Board of Canvassers of La Union to annul the votes counted in favor of Juan Lucero and to declare him as the duly elected governor La Union based on the fact that the certificate of candidacy filed by Lucero was not made under oath in violation of Sec 404 of Election Law. Lucero filed a motion to dismiss the petition on 3 ground namely: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction on the subject matter of the complaint; (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the members of the board of canvassers and (3) the petition failed to state a cause of action. Issue: Whether or not the failure of Lucero in filing his certificate of candidacy under oath was fatal to his proclamation as the duly elected governor of La Union. Ruling: No. The seeming irregularity in the filing of Lucero’s certificate of candidacy does not invalidate his election for the fundamental reason that after it was proven by the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero had obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality consisting in that his certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to. In the case of Gardiner vs. Romulo, it was held that the provisions of the Election Law declaring that a certain irregularity in an election procedure is fatal to the validity of the ballot or of the returns, or when the purpose and spirit of the law would be plainly defeated by a substantial departure from the prescribed method, are mandatory. When the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be fatal and such departure has been due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of him who was obligated to observe it, and such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices or for the intimidation of voters, and it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression of the popular will, the law will be held directory and such departure will be considered a harmless irregularity. Hence, even if the legal provision in question is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would have been fatal to the recognition of the status of Juan T. Lucero as candidate but because the people have already expressed their will honestly, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that Lucero who was certified by the provincial secretary to be a legal candidate for the office of provincial governor has not sworn to his certificate of candidacy. The election of a candidate cannot be annulled because of formal defects in his certificate, such as, lack of oath.

EMMANUEL SINACA vs. MIGUEL MULA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 135691. September 27, 1999 DAVIDE, JR., C.J Facts: In the May 1998 elections, petitioner Emmanuel Sinica was a substitute candidate for the mayoral post of the Matugas Wing after their original candidate, Teodoro Sinica, Jr., was disqualified for being convicted of bigamy. He was proclaimed winner after the canvassing. (Matugas Wing was a faction in the LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD party, as well as the Barbers Wing. Each faction has separate candidates for the mayoral post in the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte.) Respondent Mula (who got Sinica, Jr. disqualified) filed a disqualification case against Emmanuel Sinica before the COMELEC. He alleged that said substitution was invalid because: a) Sinica was not member of the LAKAS party when he was nominated as a substitute; and b) it lacks approval of Sen. Barbers as a joint signatory of the substitution. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the disqualification case. However, when respondent Mula filed a Motion for Reconsideration, COMELEC en banc set aside the resolution of the Second Division and disqualified EMMANUEL asserting that the substitution violated the provisions of Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Election Code that the substitute must belong to the same political party as the substituted candidate. Emmanuel D. Sinaca was not valid because he was an independent candidate for councilor prior to his nomination as substitute candidate in place of the withdrawing candidate who was a Lakas party member. Issue: Whether or not the substitution of Emmanuel Sinaca was against the provisions of Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. Ruling: No. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a substitute candidate should be a person belonging to and certified by the same political party as the candidate to be replaced. Petitioner Emmanuel Sinaca, an independent candidate, had first withdrawn his certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan Member before he joined the LAKAS party and nominated by the LAKAS MATUGAS Wing as the substitute candidate. He had filed his certificate of candidacy and his certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty candidate signed by Gov. Matugas with his written acceptance of the party’s nomination. Therefore, he is a bona fide LAKAS member. There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute which requires as a condition precedent that a substitute candidate must have been a member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he can be nominated as such. Hence, the nomination of a substitute candidate who won cannot be annulled on the ground that it lacked the signature of one of the authorized signatures. An independent candidate who joined the party of a disqualified candidate may be nominated as his substitute even if he joined the party only after the disqualification.

JOEL G. MIRANDA vs. ANTONIO M. ABAYA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 136351. July 28, 1999 MELO, J. Facts: Jose "Pempe" Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998 elections. Private respondent Abaya filed a Petition to deny due Course to and or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy The petition was granted by Comelec and they further ruled to disqualify Jose "Pempe" Miranda. On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, petitioner Joel Miranda filed his COC for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for his father, Jose "Pempe" Miranda during the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner and private respondent filed for the mayoralty seat, with petitioner garnering 44,554 votes, 1,333 more votes than private respondent who got only 45, 663 votes. Private respondent filed a Petition to declare null and void Substitution with Prayer for Issuance of writ of Preliminary Injunction and or TRO. He prayed for the nullification of petitioner’s COC for being void ab initio because the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda, whom petitioner was supposed to substitute, had already been cancelled and denied due course. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner, who was beyond the deadline for filing a COC be qualified to substitute a candidate whose COC was cancelled and denied. Ruling: No. The majority noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation or one’s intent to defraud is of little consequence in the determination of whether one’s CoC should be deemed cancelled or not, as it is enough that the person’s declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be false. Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a candidate for all intents and purposes, a person whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed not to have been a candidate at all, as his cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio. And considering that Section 77 of the OEC requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take place, as well as the precept that a person without a valid CoC is not considered as a candidate at all, it necessarily follows that a person whose CoC has been denied due course to and/or cancelled cannot be validly substituted. It is equally revelatory that Section 77 enumerates the instances where substitution is permissible and noticeably, while death, withdrawal or disqualification for any cause of an official candidate of a registered political party are included as valid basis for substitution, material misrepresentation cases are not included. Substitution is not allowed if the certificate of the candidate to be substituted was cancelled, because he was running for the fourth consecutive term.

EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vs HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN G.R. No. 150605. December 10, 2002 PUNO, J. Facts: Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. A petition for disqualification was filed against Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he used the equipment and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him. At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still pending so Codilla’s name remained in the list of candidates and was voted for. In fact, he garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation as winner was suspended by order of the Comelec. After hearing of his disqualification case, he was found guilty and ordered disqualified. Codilla’s votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected Representative and subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and also sought the annulment of Locsin’s proclamation. Issue: Whether or not respondent’s proclamation was valid. Ruling: The respondent’s proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner had not yet been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the disqualification of the petitioner was null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not represent the electorate’s choice. Since the validity of respondent’s proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before the Comelec and that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order disqualifying petitioner had become final. Thus Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending finality. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail since respondent’s eligibility was not the issue.