Forces Of Fortune

Forces of Fortune:

The Rise Of The New Muslim Middle Class And What It Will Mean For Our World.

Author:

Vali Nasr

Publisher:

Free Press New York

Year of publication: 2009 Vali Nasr’s Forces of Fortune appears timely and analytical. Nasr’s analysis focuses on the Muslim world from a new vantage point: its middle class and their business pursuits. So Forces of Fortune represents a major shift from previous studies in produced in recent times. This is particularly true of studies in the Post-9/11 era on the Muslim world, and especially the Middle East where earlier emphasis had been placed on conflict and political turmoil. In Forces of Fortune, however, the author “reveals that there is a vital but unseen rising force in the Islamic world - a new business minded middle class that is building a vibrant new Muslim world economy that holds the key to winning the cold war against Iran and extremists” (from the description of the book on the front flap). Nasr takes us from the Iranian revolution to present day Iran, as well as beyond to other places, such as Pakistan, the Arab world and the entire region of Middle East, to emphasize the fact that it is business and capitalism that will become the governing forces of these regions, and not the political

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conflicts, religious inclinations or social turmoil, as the case has been made for the past several decades. So, according to the author’s arguments, there is what we may call a paradigm shift in the dynamics of the Muslim world and the movers and shakers of this shift are driven not by political ideologies of governments, nor religious fervor of revolutionaries (read fundamentalists), but, rather, they are propelled by the commerce of an emerging Middle class. Nasr’s text is written in simple, easy-to-understand English yet is inclusive of the politics and the history of this complex region, thus providing a depth of insight into the highly complicated and controversial dynamics of the Islamic world. The author reports the ground realities about the emerging business minded Middle class and its commerce as a tool for social change. The perspective of the book is clearly Western, and specifically American, as it often addresses US and Western policymakers, suggesting how best they can employ new policies to deal with countries like Iran, UAE and the whole of the Middle East. The primary intended audience, therefore, are the American and Western governments, particularly the foreign policymakers and key players in the formation of economic policy. The book presents commerce as an alternative to deal with the menace of extremism, particularly of the type emanating from and supported by Iran. The author believes that by supporting the new business minded middle class, the US and its allies can have a more effective intervention in the Middle East and other Muslim regions while governing its own foreign policy. 2

Nasr cautions that "We will do ourselves a disservice if we think of our future with the Muslim world only in terms of today’s conflict. These conflicts are serious, and we must prevail in them but we should also recognize that that there are other forces at work in the Muslim world and that they too deserve our attention - they may ultimately matter more to us” (p. 2). One of the strengths of the book is its stress on learning new lessons from the past. This is particularly impressive because it draws such lessons from past political decisions and the results these decisions produced, juxtaposing them with new hopes that would arise if decisions were altered. Nasr then focuses on new possibilities that lay ahead and are within then realm of feasibility. Forces of Fortune thus directly refers to changes in US foreign policy. An example as explained in the book is that of past and present Iran-US relations. Nasr notes that, for most of the past three decades, this relationship has been frozen in stalemate, characterized by no diplomatic relations but also no direct confrontations. Post 9/11, however, things appear to have changed. The Bush administration, the author believes, attacked Iraq in the hope that it would not only affect Iraq but also have a direct impact on Iran. This impact, however, did not materialize. To the contrary, the results were the opposite of those intended. In the words of Vali Nasr, “they (referring to Cheney and Rumsfeld of the Bush administration) believed the toppling of Saddam Hussein and the rise of reasonably stable democratic new Iraq next door to Iran would stir Iranians 3

into revolt and sufficiently unnerve the country’s clerical rulers to provide that opening. The bitter irony was that when American troops showed up in Iraq, the grip of the Iran’s ruling clerics was strengthened” (p.3). In light of this development, the author observes that Iran became more powerful and its power could be seen in its anti-American campaign, which was now manifested in an article of faith not only in Iran but in most of the Muslim world. Additionally the author sees Iran’s strength in other developments such as Iran’s increased support to terrorism through funds, training and weaponry, and also in its seeking increased power and status by building its nuclear program. The author further observes that the US, by attacking Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, and by toppling Saddam Hussein and uprooting Baathism in Iraq, has fortified Iran’s power to its east and west, thus giving an unprecedented position of power to Iran in the gulf region. However, Nasr also notes that despite these powers that Iran has gained in recent times, they have not been sufficient to change regional dynamics with such hard political powers. Nasr quotes the examples of India, Brazil, and China as countries that have emerged as new powers in the region, not because of their nuclear assets or military grandeur but due to their performance in economic reforms. In this context, the author sheds new light on Iran’s position. Nasr classifies Iran as an isolated economy and believes that its “hard power is not its most effective means to greater influence” (p. 6). 4

What does make Iran influential, the author points out, is its trade ties in central Asia, the Persian gulf, western Afghanistan, and southern Iraq where it does business in agricultural products, electricity, natural gas and manufactured goods. Such trade ties are more powerful to Iran than its strategic and military ties with Hezbollah or its longstanding alliance with Syria. From these comparisons the author intends to suggest that the menace of Iran cannot be corrected by looking to its strategic ties and political alliances, but rather by calculating its economic strengths and trade ties within and outside the region. In yet another stark comparison, the author observes that Iran’s GDP is about the same as that of Massachusetts. Its spending on its military is less than 6 billion dollars which is less than one third of similar spending by Saudi Arabia and is close to half of Turkey’s or Israel’s military spending. With this comparison the author raises a key question: How can a country with an economy the size of Massachusetts and the lowest military expenditure in its neighborhood take on the US and claim great power status? According to Nasr’s book, Iran may think that its nuclear capability will help it to take on US might and in fact, as the author notes, the US obsession with Iran’s nuclear ambitions in the last few years has only convinced Iran that it really will.

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To counter this belief, the author goes back to its example of India, comparing it Pakistan, saying that both acquired nuclear power at almost the same time, yet it is India which today is poised to hold the greatest power status. This, the author concludes, is due to India’s economic growth and not its nuclear assets. So in essence the author argues that the US and the West should also work towards building trade and commerce relations with the emerging business middle class in order to, one hand weaken Iran or at least control its power, and on the other hand strengthen its relationship with the Muslim world by forging economic alliances in the Muslim regions. emphasizing this point, the author again cautions the West by saying that “the West must remain vigilant against fundamentalism, but that must stop western policymakers and publics from seeing the ‘whole picture’ in the Middle East, and the vital truth of the region is that the fundamentalist strain of Islam is not practiced by the vast majority of the population and is not on the rise” (p.10). In order to show evidence that the Muslim world and particularly the Middle East is a site of thriving economies and not the turmoil of conflict, the author maps the business dynamics of the region. Describing the examples of Lebanese banks with higher interest rates and less financial threats, Beirut’s electronic markets and fashionable home furnishing shops clubbed with Tehran’s shopping malls, some 280 television channels, and high per capita use of internet and social media websites even by the clerics. More examples include war-torn Afghanistan with 8 million mobile phones in use, and when 6

considering Pakistan this number increased to 78 million in the same year, 2008, up from a mere 750,000 in 2001. Nasr expands this list of examples to cover Dubai, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain to emphasize the new capitalism and economic growth funded by new consumers of halal food, whose demands are constantly increasing, banking services and financial services which are fueled by new interests of the new middle class which looks for profit through pious ways. Such pursuits of business piety, the author observes, in terms of Islamic banking and sharia-compliant investments which are mushrooming across the region. The notion of piety in entrepreneurial pursuits is therefore the very engine that is driving the middle class in particular and the Muslim world in general. The linkage of piety and business is not only path breaking but is also thought provoking. It is understandable that the Islamic Revolution, the effects of which were far beyond the territory of Iran and then later the war on terror, which was viewed by most Muslims as war on Islam, not only gave rise to a sense of fear within the Muslim demography, this fear was also soon manifested into an article of faith. The result was seen in increased Islamic practice and adherence to Islamic vales within the Muslim community across the world, and now, as shown by the thorough research of Nasr’s book, with the new economic Muslim middle class and its offering of new Islamic, sharia-compliant goods and services, this new form of economy backs a new 7

form of emerging consumerism. The keys players of this economy are the Muslims across the world and the keys consumers are the same Muslims who form one fifth of the world’s population. This argument has come across very strongly in the book and is supported by empirical studies of the national economies and ethnographic studies. In addition to arguing in favour of the emerging capitalism in the Muslim world, the author has also proved a very strong historical analysis of events to prove how and why the old secularism failed to achieve what the new capitalism in the Muslim word is achieving. Taking the examples of Atatürk of Turkey and Reza Shah Khan of prerevolutionary Iran, the author recalls the history of reforms by these leaders and how they failed to create stable and viable states. Nasr observes that “Atatürk and Reza Shah Khan propelled their countries to modernity, and they brought great advances, but the state driven style of development they pioneered also led to great problems” (p.85) The author goes on to explain that “overreliance on top-down economic decision-making led to patronage states rather than robust capitalist economies” (p.85) Additionally the book takes into account the amount of corruption and mismanagement that such states brought as result of which only one class of elite became wealthy while few economic incentives went to the majority of the masses.

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Nasr’s book is an excellent observation and comparison in the content of the new emerging middle class that is representative of the Muslim demographics of today and not just an elite segment of the population. In sharp contrast to this secularism and its leaders was the Islamic Revolution spearheaded by Khomeini. The book explains this phenomenon with deep insight and analysis, which provides a unique picture of the revolution which was predominantly supported by merchants, shopkeepers and traders. Providing an insightful dynamics of the revolution, the author informs us of “the alliance of the secular and the religious, the once Kemalist but now disaffected middle class and the pious lower class masses that made the revolution. The decisive factor was the willingness of so many of those in the middle class to put their hatred of the monarchy above the longstanding social divide that separated them from the religious lower class” (p.119). With this reading of the demography the author goes on to shed light on a fascinating irony that was at the very core of the Islamic Revolution. This becomes clear as the author explains “the irony was that although the Iranian Revolution could never have happened without the secular middle class, as it gained steam, the middle class could not retain control; in the end they stood no chance against the rising tide of Khomeini’s lower class supporters and they would pay the high price for their ill conceived alliance. Blinded by their hatred of the Pahlavis, they acted against their own interests, and with the

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Pahlavis gone, Khomeini and his followers would make short work of their plans for themselves in the new government” (p.119). Such an analysis of the middle class of the revolution that acted against its own interests and its juxtaposition with the new emerging middle class of today’s Iran and the whole of Muslim world makes this text an important text both for the policymakers, governments and economists as well as students of Middle Eastern affairs. But the historical analysis of the text makes it no less interesting and relevant to students and lovers of the modern history of the Muslim world. Another aspect of the book looks at the dynamics of fundamentalism but does so from an economic perspective. The author arguers that fundamentalism has increased most in times of economic, political and social depression. Whenever and wherever the general conditions of economics have shown improvement, with better jobs and prospects of economic development, the terrorism and its activities have lost ground. On the contrary, the author observes, “the less commerce there is among the lower classes, and poorer the society, the more appeal the revolutionaries will exert” (p.168). The evidence of this argument is provided in the text with examples of extremist groups in Egypt and Pakistan. In yet another fascinating aspect the author makes a refreshingly hopeful observation. Calling them “the prophets of change”, (p.176) the author looks at the new era of the Muslim world and writes, “With the allure of the state, 10

both secular and Islamic, having lost all its luster the Muslim world is embracing something altogether different: pluralism”(p.176). The actors of this pluralism, the author believes, are the new brand of “bloggers, rappers, fashion designers, televangelists, human rights activists and self styled Islamic gurus and thinkers of all stripes” (p.176).

This band of pluralists is

“secularist in their mix but this is by and large an Islamic resurgence which celebrates piety while rejecting violence and extremism” (p.176).

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