Fed And States

ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism STATES / FEDERALISM – ENDI 2008 states / federalism – endi 2008..........................................................................................................................1 =====federalism=====...................................................................................................................................3 1nc – federalism disad......................................................................................................................................3 1nc – federalism disad......................................................................................................................................4 -----uniqueness-----...........................................................................................................................................6 federalism high.................................................................................................................................................6 federalism high.................................................................................................................................................7 federalism high – globally................................................................................................................................8 -----links-----.....................................................................................................................................................9 link – renewables..............................................................................................................................................9 link – renewables............................................................................................................................................10 link – environmental regulation......................................................................................................................11 link – federal subsidization of state programs................................................................................................12 link helper – snowball.....................................................................................................................................13 link helper – zero sum.....................................................................................................................................15 generic federal action links.............................................................................................................................17 -----impacts-----...............................................................................................................................................18 US federalism modeled...................................................................................................................................18 impact – war...................................................................................................................................................19 impact – economy...........................................................................................................................................20 impact – trade.................................................................................................................................................21 impact – democracy........................................................................................................................................22 ext – fism key to democracy...........................................................................................................................23 impact – genocide...........................................................................................................................................24 impact – genocide...........................................................................................................................................25 impact – secessionism.....................................................................................................................................26 ext – fism solves secession.............................................................................................................................27 ext – fism solves secession.............................................................................................................................28 impact – russia................................................................................................................................................29 impact – iraq...................................................................................................................................................31 impact – iraq...................................................................................................................................................32 impact – indonesia..........................................................................................................................................33 impact – south asia..........................................................................................................................................35 =====states cp=====....................................................................................................................................36 1nc – states counterplan..................................................................................................................................36 states solve – general helpers..........................................................................................................................37 states solve – energy policy............................................................................................................................38 states solve – energy policy............................................................................................................................39 states solve – energy policy............................................................................................................................40 states solve – have experience........................................................................................................................41 states solve – solar power...............................................................................................................................42 states solve – wind power...............................................................................................................................43 a2: race to the bottom.....................................................................................................................................44 states solve – rps.............................................................................................................................................45 Federal Modeling 2NC...................................................................................................................................46 Solvency – General.........................................................................................................................................47 Solvency – Soft Power....................................................................................................................................48 A2: States = Racist..........................................................................................................................................49 -----permutation-----........................................................................................................................................50 A2: Perm – Do Both.......................................................................................................................................50 -----Politics NB-----........................................................................................................................................51 politics net benefit...........................................................................................................................................51 -----theory-----.................................................................................................................................................52

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism 2nc – 50 state fiat............................................................................................................................................52 2nc – 50 state fiat............................................................................................................................................54 =====LOPEZ CP=====...............................................................................................................................55 lopez cp 1nc....................................................................................................................................................55 lopez cp 1nc....................................................................................................................................................57 lopez cp 1nc....................................................................................................................................................58 court can devolve............................................................................................................................................59 federalism net benefit.....................................................................................................................................60 A2: rollback....................................................................................................................................................61 A2: uniformity................................................................................................................................................62 A2: heg da.......................................................................................................................................................63 A2: precedent da’s..........................................................................................................................................64 A2: no test case...............................................................................................................................................65 A2: Perm – Do Both.......................................................................................................................................66 A2: perm – do the cp......................................................................................................................................67 2nc – lopez fiat................................................................................................................................................68 =====aff=====.............................................................................................................................................69 -----federalism-----..........................................................................................................................................69 uniqueness – federal incentives now..............................................................................................................69 uniqueness – federal control now...................................................................................................................70 general no link................................................................................................................................................71 no threshold....................................................................................................................................................72 not zero sum....................................................................................................................................................73 US federalism not modeled............................................................................................................................74 lopez cp hurts federalism – 2ac......................................................................................................................75 federalism bad – ethnic conflict......................................................................................................................76 federalism bad – indonesia.............................................................................................................................77 federalism bad – indonesia.............................................................................................................................78 A2: iraq impact...............................................................................................................................................80 A2: russia impact............................................................................................................................................81 -----states-----..................................................................................................................................................82 2ac – states cp.................................................................................................................................................82 2ac – states cp.................................................................................................................................................83 ext – investment climate.................................................................................................................................84 2ac – lopez cp.................................................................................................................................................85 2ac – lopez cp.................................................................................................................................................86 ext – congress rollback...................................................................................................................................88 ext – executive rollback..................................................................................................................................90 ext – variance..................................................................................................................................................91 A2: federal modeling......................................................................................................................................92 A2: states best – general.................................................................................................................................93 Terrorism DA – 2AC......................................................................................................................................94

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism =====FEDERALISM=====

1NC – FEDERALISM DISAD COURT RULINGS HAVE BROADLY UPHELD FEDERALISM -- PROTECTING STATE POWERS IS KEY Bradley W. Joondeph, Associate Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law, “The Deregulatory Valence of Justice O’Connor’s Federalism,” Houston Law Review, Fall, 2007 (44 Hous. L. Rev. 507) This much is not news: the Rehnquist Court reshaped the constitutional rules governing the respective roles of the national government and the states in our federal republic. 14 The Court [*512] articulated a new and arguably narrower standard for evaluating whether a federal statute falls within Congress's commerce power. 15 It developed a fairly restrictive understanding of the breadth of Congress's legislative authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring that such legislation be [*513] "congruent and proportional" to the constitutional violations that Congress seeks to remedy or prevent. 16 It minted the so-called "anticommandeering" principle, which prohibits Congress from directing the states to enact or implement particular regulation. 17 It held that Congress cannot use its Article I powers to enact legislation subjecting the states to suits for damages, 18 overruling the relatively recent precedent of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas. 19 Further, the Court extended this principle of sovereign immunity to suits brought in any court, whether state or federal, 20 as well as to adjudicative proceedings before federal administrative agencies. 21 Some have argued that, despite the considerable [*514] attention these decisions have drawn, their practical effects have actually been quite modest. 22 For instance, the Court's Commerce Clause decisions affect only a small spectrum of activity that Congress might otherwise regulate - activity that is noncommercial, noneconomic, and purely intrastate. 23 Its sovereign immunity decisions leave open a host of alternative means for enforcing federal law against state governments, most notably suits for injunctions under Ex Parte Young. 24 Its anticommandeering decisions prohibit a form of legislation that Congress had employed only rarely and for which there are typically a number of effective substitutes. 25 Perhaps most significantly, the Rehnquist Court did nothing to trim Congress's authority under the Spending Clause, leaving Congress the ability to circumvent most of these constraints by enacting conditional spending legislation aimed at the states. 26 Still, even if the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions did not constitute a "federalism revolution," they seem to have done something. It is now clear, as it was not before 1995, that there are judicially enforceable limits on Congress's commerce power, particularly with respect to activities that have historically been regulated by the states. 27 Congress's capacity to enact legislation to enforce the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment has been narrowed, such that any legislative effort to enforce a constitutional right or to protect a class of citizens that the Court has not deemed deserving of heightened judicial scrutiny is [*515] virtually per se invalid. 28 And, because Congress can abrogate the sovereign immunity of states only through legislation enacted under the Reconstruction Amendments, 29 Congress has lost an important means for enforcing federal law against the states. These consequences are not trivial. Moreover, if the Rehnquist Court did not move the law in revolutionary directions itself, it may nonetheless have laid the groundwork for a future Court to do so. As others have noted, the newly constituted Roberts Court could use the Rehnquist Court's precedents to disrupt some long-settled constitutional understandings. 30 It could hold that landmark environmental legislation, such as the Endangered Species Act or the Clean Water Act, is beyond Congress's commerce power, at least in many of its applications, because the regulated activity is not sufficiently connected to interstate commerce. 31 It could conclude that the anticommandeering decisions have effectively undermined Garcia and hold that Congress cannot use its commerce power to regulate certain functions of state governments. 32 It could hold that the disparate impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are unconstitutional as applied to state governments, at least with respect to private suits for damages, because they are not "congruent and proportional" to any purported constitutional violations. 33 [*516] Conceivably, though much less likely, it could hold that most federal antidiscrimination legislation is beyond Congress's commerce power because the regulated activity of discrimination - whether based on race, gender, religion, age, or disability - is not "economic" or "commercial" in nature. 34

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism 1NC – FEDERALISM DISAD RENEWABLE ENERGY IS A STATE ISSUE -- FEDERAL INCENTIVES ARE AN ENCROACHMENT Steven Ferrey, Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School, “Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States’ Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause,” New York University Environmental Law Journal, 2004 (12 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 507) States can segment the market to promote renewable energy. FERC expressly acknowledged a state's ability to promulgate regulations favoring particular generation technologies over others, in holding that a "state may choose to require a utility to construct generation capacity of a preferred technology or to purchase power from the supplier of a particular type of resource." 537 FERC suggests that the mechanism to do this may be for "a state [to] account for environmental costs of all fuel sources including an all source determination of avoided cost." 538 This provides a means, as long as the price paid is not more than the general market or administratively set price. While states may not violate federal law, they retain jurisdiction to structure the resource composition of the power supply market.

This undermines the U.S. balance of federalism Lack ‘95 (James, Senator – New York, Serial No. J-104-31, 7-11, p. 11) Every year Congress considers bills, federal agencies consider rules, and international agencies consider cases that would supplant state statutory or common law. Adverse decisions may result not only in nullifying state laws and court decisions, but also in narrowing the range of issues that legislatures may address. The threat is the steady, incremental, year-by-year erosion of the jurisdiction of state legislatures.

D. Impact is global war --- U.S. federalism is modeled worldwide, solving conflict Calabresi ‘95 (Steven G., Assistant Prof – Northwestern U., Michigan Law Review, Lexis) First, the rules of constitutional federalism should be enforced because federalism is a good thing, and it is the best and most important structural feature of the U.S. Constitution. Second, the political branches cannot be relied upon to enforce constitutional federalism, notwithstanding the contrary writings of Professor Jesse Choper. Third, the Supreme Court is institutionally competent to enforce constitutional federalism. Fourth, the Court is at least as qualified to act in this area as it is in the Fourteenth Amendment area. And, fifth, the doctrine of stare [*831] decisis does not pose a barrier to the creation of any new, prospectively applicable Commerce Clause case law. The conventional wisdom is that Lopez is nothing more than a flash in the pan. 232 Elite opinion holds that the future of American constitutional law will involve the continuing elaboration of the Court's national codes on matters like abortion regulation, pornography, rules on holiday displays, and rules on how the states should conduct their own criminal investigations and trials. Public choice theory suggests many reasons why it is likely that the Court will continue to pick on the states and give Congress a free ride. But, it would be a very good thing for this country if the Court decided to surprise us and continued on its way down the Lopez path. Those of us who comment on the Court's work, whether in the law reviews or in the newspapers, should encourage the Court to follow the path on which it has now embarked. The country and the world would be a better place if it did. We have seen that a desire for both international and devolutionary federalism has swept across the world in recent years. To a significant extent, this is due to global fascination with and emulation of our own American federalism success story. The global trend toward federalism is an enormously positive development that greatly increases the likelihood of future peace, free trade, economic growth, respect for social and cultural diversity, and protection of individual human rights. It depends for its success on the willingness of sovereign nations to strike federalism deals in the belief that those deals will be kept. 233 The U.S. Supreme Court can do its part to encourage the future striking of such deals by enforcing vigorously our own American federalism deal. Lopez could be a first step in that

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism process, if only the Justices and the legal academy would wake up to the importance of what is at stake.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism -----UNIQUENESS-----

FEDERALISM HIGH FEDERALISM STRONG NOW -- STATES RIGHTS ARE BEING PROTECTED Patrick M. Garry, Associate Professor, University of South Dakota School of Law, “The Constitutional Lynchpin of Liberty in an Age of New Federalism,” Brandeis Law Journal, Spring, 2007 (45 Brandeis L.J. 469) With the constitutional inadequacies of substantive due process being continually debated over the past four decades, the recent federalism revolution waged by the Rehnquist Court may have revealed an alternative constitutional approach to the protection of individual liberties. After having largely ignored federalism concerns since the late 1930s, the Supreme Court in the mid-1990s began to stall or even reverse the constitutional drift of power from the states to the federal government that began six decades earlier. This new federalism has attempted to resuscitate the role of the states in the constitutional system by reviving certain federalism doctrines abandoned during the constitutional revolution of the New Deal.

FEDERALISM WIDELY PROTECTED ACROSS THE BOARD NOW Patrick M. Garry, Associate Professor, University of South Dakota School of Law, “The Constitutional Lynchpin of Liberty in an Age of New Federalism,” Brandeis Law Journal, Spring, 2007 (45 Brandeis L.J. 469) Although the Rehnquist Court's revival of federalism was initially opposed by various groups arguing that social problems should be addressed primarily by a strong centralized federal government, recent indications suggest that even these groups are embracing federalism as a source of political freedom. 66 As demonstrated by the 2004 presidential election, there are substantial contrasts between the different states and regions of the nation. "Red" states differ from "blue" states in their attitudes toward the public role of religion, environmental and immigration policies, and the construction and operation of public educational systems. Consequently, the more sovereignty each state possesses, the more it can respond to the diverse needs and interests of its residents. Recognizing this reality, many political liberals, even though steeped in the nationalism of the New Deal and Great Society, have begun pursuing a federalism strategy with respect to a number of policy and legal issues. 67 The opposition to President Bush's No Child Left Behind education bill has focused largely on federalism concerns, 68 as has liberal opposition to federal attempts to prohibit states from permitting assisted suicide or the [*480] medical use of marijuana. 69 The traditionally more liberal members of the Court waved the flag of federalism in their objection to the decision in Bush v. Gore. 70 But perhaps the most dramatic liberal embrace of federalism principles has occurred in connection with the political battle over the legal recognition of same-sex marriages. 71 Unable to pass national legislation supporting their cause, gay-rights organizations have turned to the states. They obtained a ruling from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declaring a state constitutional right to same- sex marriage, and in San Francisco, the mayor ordered city officials to perform gay weddings. 72 In addition, gay-rights activists lobbied the Vermont legislature to enact a civil-unions law. 73 On the other side of the issue, on November 2, 2004, eleven states passed constitutional referendums banning same-sex marriage. 74 But as one liberal gay-rights activist argued, "The best chance of averting a culture war is to localize the issue by leaving it to the states, letting them go their own way at their own speed." 75 According to another supporter of gay marriage, "The whole point of federalism is that different states can have different policies on matters of burning controversy-and that this is O.K." 76 Thus, despite their general criticism of the Court's federalism revival, many liberals have come to embrace state autonomy when it comes to issues on which they cannot prevail at the national level. Another instance of liberal embrace of federalism principles occurred in connection with the Terri Schiavo controversy. While the Republican congressional [*481] leadership sought to obtain federal judicial or congressional reversal of a state court's order that Ms. Schiavo's feeding tube be removed, many liberal Democrats argued that the matter was one of state jurisdiction and that the federal government should not intervene. 77 Indeed, when Congress passed legislation requiring the federal courts to take a fresh look at the case, many liberals cried a violation of federalism. 78

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism FEDERALISM HIGH Federalism is strong now --- the Courts are restoring state power Garry ‘06 (Patrick M., Associate Prof – U. South Dakota School of Law, Seton Hall Law Review, Lexis) The revival of federalism has become a defining theme of the modern Court. Commentators have described the Court's decisions as sparking a "federalism revolution." This so-called revolution comes after a long dormancy. From the late 1930s to the early 1990s, [*852] constitutional provisions related to federalism were largely ignored. However, under the leadership of the late Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court has attempted to revive the constitutional role and authority of the states. Through a wide array of cases employing both the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, the Court has stalled or even reversed the constitutional drift of power from the states to the federal government that began in the 1930s. This "new federalism" has attempted to resuscitate the role of the states in the constitutional system, as well as revive certain federalism doctrines that were abandoned during the New Deal. Just as a frustration with the ineffectual response of the states to the Great Depression caused regulators and constitutional lawyers to favor a dramatic expansion of the national government during the 1930s, a frustration with and suspicion of large, centralized government and its inflexible bureaucracies has helped fuel the current drift toward empowering smaller, localized governments. But in addition to this size-of-government concern, there is another side of federalism - the individual liberty side. In the view of the constitutional Framers, a vibrant federalism would help ensure individual liberty by limiting and monitoring the power of the federal government to infringe on the liberties of its citizens.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism FEDERALISM HIGH – GLOBALLY Federalism is strong worldwide Mallat ‘03 (Chilibi, PhD – U London, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Winter, Lexis) In its European dimension, federalism has been on the march since the Treaty of Rome. In its "Third world" dimension, federalism is inevitably the shape of things to come within and between countries in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, South America, and the luckier parts of Africa and the former Soviet Union. Examples of federalism abound, of course, from Malaysia to Nigeria. Where it is absent, as in the Middle East, it carries much promise. In the same way a decent future for Iraq or Turkey can only be federal within each country's borders, the emerging shape of Arab-Israeli peace must consider, for long-term success, federalism's hard-to-adopt central features of freedom of movement for business and labor

Worldwide federalism is growing Calabresi ‘95 (Steven G., Assistant Prof – Northwestern U., Michigan Law Review, Lexis) The prevailing wisdom is that the Supreme Court should abstain from enforcing constitutional limits on federal power for reasons of judicial competence and because the Court should spend essentially all its political capital enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment against the states instead. This view is wrong. First, the rules of constitutional federalism should be enforced because federalism is a good thing, and it is the best and most important structural feature of the U.S. Constitution. Second, the political branches cannot be relied upon to enforce constitutional federalism, notwithstanding the contrary writings of Professor Jesse Choper. Third, the Supreme Court is institutionally competent to enforce constitutional federalism. Fourth, the Court is at least as qualified to act in this area as it is in the Fourteenth Amendment area. And, fifth, the doctrine of stare [*831] decisis does not pose a barrier to the creation of any new, prospectively applicable Commerce Clause case law. The conventional wisdom is that Lopez is nothing more than a flash in the pan. 232 Elite opinion holds that the future of American constitutional law will involve the continuing elaboration of the Court's national codes on matters like abortion regulation, pornography, rules on holiday displays, and rules on how the states should conduct their own criminal investigations and trials. Public choice theory suggests many reasons why it is likely that the Court will continue to pick on the states and give Congress a free ride. But, it would be a very good thing for this country if the Court decided to surprise us and continued on its way down the Lopez path. Those of us who comment on the Court's work, whether in the law reviews or in the newspapers, should encourage the Court to follow the path on which it has now embarked. The country and the world would be a better place if it did. We have seen that a desire for both international and devolutionary federalism has swept across the world in recent years. To a significant extent, this is due to global fascination with and emulation of our own American federalism success story. The global trend toward federalism is an enormously positive development that greatly increases the likelihood of future peace, free trade, economic growth, respect for social and cultural diversity, and protection of individual human rights. It depends for its success on the willingness of sovereign nations to strike federalism deals in the belief that those deals will be kept. 233 The U.S. Supreme Court can do its part to encourage the future striking of such deals by enforcing vigorously our own American federalism deal. Lopez could be a first step in that process, if only the Justices and the legal academy would wake up to the importance of what is at stake.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism -----LINKS-----

LINK – RENEWABLES FEDERAL INTRUSION INTO RENEWABLE ENERGY SNOWBALLS AND UNDERMINES FEDERALISM Becky Norton Dunlop, Vice President of External Relations at the Heritage Foundation, Speech Given at Regent University, November 17, 1994 (http://www.heritage.org/press/Regent_Univ.cfm) The federal government’s appetite is voracious…for dollars…for power…for bigger federal government. Regard for states is lacking. Regard for the Tenth Amendment is nil. Yet, having observed the current status, I recall President Reagan’s hypothesis that the Twenty-first century will be the century of the States. And I am optimistic. In Virginia, we look upon our challenge for the remainder of the Allen administration as Virginia’s Federalist challenge. And, indeed, Virginia’s Federalist challenge is America’s Federalist challenge. We must understand what federalism is and why it is important. The genius of the American experiment is that our Constitution is a charter of government the central proposition of which is that the people must be protected from government. As George Washington said in his farewell address, “Government is like fire. It can be a helpful servant or a fearful master.” And today, as never before, we are suffering under the ravages of a fearful master. The principle of Federalism is woven into every thread of the fabric of the Constitution, and is summed up in the 10th Amendment: “The Powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.” My area of natural resources is in the very vortex of this issue. You might even say we are a magnet for unfunded federal mandates and bureaucratic red tape. So now, I would like outline the five principles that guide public policy-making in my secretariat. It will become very clear to you how some of these principles relate to or are dependent on Federalism. Principle One: People are Virginia’s greatest natural resource. The enhancement of our natural resources is dependent on the good stewardship of the citizens of this Commonwealth. Clean air and clean water are not to be taken for granted. They must be treated with the respect and care that their inherent value requires. Most Virginians appreciate that fact, and are inclined to do their part in caring for our vast natural resources. In government, it is our role to see that regulatory structures empower good stewards of our environment and the practice of sound conservation methods, as well as promote innovation and advance science. Principle Two: Personnel is Policy. It has an obvious tie to the first principle. Governor Allen and I place a high value on the contributions of individuals inside government as well as private citizens. We are working hard to make the best use of the diverse talents of the dedicated professionals in our natural resource agencies; in our colleges and universities; and in the private sector. Groups and individuals have an important contribution to make in the process of finding the best solutions to our problems. I always cherish the opportunity to hear the advice and expertise that thoughtful, solution oriented individuals and groups have to offer. Those individuals closest to the problem are the best equipped to deal with it. Principle Three: A growing economy and a healthy environment are mutually dependent. Without economic growth and technological advancement, there are insufficient resources to meet both the increasing demand of the public for goods and the requirements of environmental stewardship. The Governor and I formulate public policy on the basis of this principle. Private property rights and responsibilities, the incentives of the marketplace, and the free enterprise system offer the greatest new prospects for improving the environment. Principle Four: Renewable natural resources are inherently dynamic, resilient, and responsive to conservation management. The science of conservation management allows us to improve the quality and condition of our natural resources. Sound science must be the basis of our decision making in the domain of natural resource policy. Principle Five: Excessive government regulations are injurious to the environment. People and states have a responsibility to collaborate and challenge excessive and injurious regulations. We must devise ways to ensure that advancement of the arts and sciences of natural resource management are not thwarted by the burden of government regulation. You may have noted a Federalist theme in several of these principles. As I mentioned previously, my area of

Natural Resources is at the very vortex of the struggle that defines the issue of Federalism. For example, the interpretation of Clean Air Act provisions is galvanizing the states to stand up against federal dictates. The lawful acts of Congress require that the states undertake deeds to accomplish reductions in air pollution. Agencies of the federal government -contrary to the principles of Federalism- are insisting that we impose what we in Virginia believe to be wrongheaded mandates on our people and local governments. Many of you may be following the on-going struggle between EPA and the Commonwealth or one of the other states that are struggling with the proposed enhanced inspection and maintenance program. This issue is not about the relative merits of clean air. I also want an improvement in air quality. What this, and many other issues are really about, is the Liberty of states and the liberty of the people.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism LINK – RENEWABLES RENEWABLE ENERGY IS A STATE RESPONSIBILITY Laura Gebert, “A Survey of Selected Government-Sponsored Energy Plans and Recommendations for Florida’s Future Energy Policy,” Barry Law Review, Spring, 2007 (8 Barry L. Rev. 149) Air pollution in the form of particulate matter has been linked to significant health problems, including premature death and respiratory problems. 36 One source of particulate matter is electric power generation by fossil fuel-based power plants. 37 The problems associated with particulate matter seem to disproportionately affect the elderly, children, and individuals suffering from asthma, heart, or lung disease. 38 Under the Clean Air Act of 1990, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is required to examine the available scientific data and then to set appropriate standards for the allowable emission of fine particulate matter. 39 The states, not the federal government, have the responsibility to implement plans that meet the standards set by the EPA. 40 Since fossil fuel-based power plants are a source of particulate matter, the partial substitution of clean renewable energy -- such as solar or wind -- for power generated by coal, oil, or natural gas would lead to a reduction in particulate matter generated by the traditional fossil-based power plant. 41 Therefore, increased use of clean renewable energy could provide a method of complying with EPA standards regarding fine particulate matter.

STATES HAVE JURISDICTION FOR IMPLEMENTING RENEWABLES INCENTIVES Steven Ferry, Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law School in Boston, “Renewable Orphans: Adopting Legal Renewable Standards at the State Level,” The Electricity Journal, March 2006 ScienceDirect More than a dozen states have established renewable energy subsidy programs funded by system benefit charges that over this decade should raise approximately $3.4 billion.3 Between 1998 and 2012, approximately $3.5 billion will be collected by the original 14 states with renewable energy funds.4 More than half the amount collected – at least $135 million per year – comes from just California.5 The funding levels range from $0.07/MWh in Wisconsin up to almost $0.6/MWh in Massachusetts.6 The funds are disbursed as either investments, grants, other subsidies, or R&D grants by the funding agency. Most only provide assistance to new projects, and not existing renewable projects. Normalizing all incentives to a five-year production incentive equivalent utilizing a 10 percent discount rate, states have subsidized largescale renewable energy projects in a range of 0.1–7¢/kWh.7 Wind power has been a major beneficiary of these subsidies. The subsidy level in California, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island ranges from 0.59 to 1.95¢/kWh for wind and hydroelectric projects, and from 0.11 to 0.57¢/kWh for landfill gas projects.8 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission suggested that states have jurisdiction to implement the charge.9 It is also very important to note that a system benefit charge can be avoided, in spite of its “nonbypassable” feature. The customer could bypass the distribution system altogether by moving out of the service territory of the local distribution company, selling or reorganizing its assets, or generating electricity on-site for its own purposes.10 The legal problem, addressed in more detail below, is that after taxing interstate power some of the trust fund schemes explicitly restrict the subsidy to in-state projects.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism LINK – ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IS A TRADITIONAL STATE POWER Steven Ferrey, Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School, “Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States’ Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause,” New York University Environmental Law Journal, 2004 (12 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 507) Environmental protection is a traditional local power, and many of the federal environmental statutes set federal minima, with express license to local authorities to regulate more [*611] stringently. 573 "[A] federal decision to forgo regulation in a given area may imply an authoritative federal determination that the area is best left unregulated, and in that event would have as much pre-emptive force as a decision to regulate." 574 Even where there is no evident congressional intent to federally occupy a field, the conflict principle requires that a court strike inconsistent state or local law. 575 State regulation is not allowed to veto the regulatory scheme of a superior level of government. 576 Correspondingly, courts hold that where state and federal laws complement each other, there is no preemption. 577

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism LINK – FEDERAL SUBSIDIZATION OF STATE PROGRAMS FEDERAL SUBSIDIZATION OF STATE PROGRAMS UNDERMINES THE FEDERAL BALANCE OF POWER AND DISCOURAGES STATE INNOVATION Ilya, Assistant Professor at George Mason University School of Law, 02 (Somin, Jan, “Closing the Pandora's box of federalism: The case for judicial restriction of federal subsidies to state governments”, Georgetown Law Journal, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3805/is_200201/ai_n9064334/pg_2) This Article begins the process of closing the gap in the existing literature on federal subsidies. It does so by laying out the case for the proposition that federal grants to states, including those that are noncoercive, seriously undermine federalism values. It further argues in favor of judicial intervention to constrain them, both because of constitutional considerations and because the legislative and executive branches have no incentive to address the problem adequately. To the contrary, both state and federal legislators have strong incentives to support grant programs. Like Pandora's box, the pork barrel trough of federal subsidies is enormously tempting, highly destructive of important values, and difficult to close once opened. Part I of this Article explains how federal subsidization of the states subverts key federalism values of diversity, vertical competition, and horizontal competition. In so doing, I borrow from models of competitive federalism developed by economists and political scientists. I also address the standard arguments in favor of federal subsidization-controlling interstate externalities and ensuring redistribution. Both are considerably weaker than their advocates suppose and neither can justify the virtually unlimited federal power to subsidize states that exists today.

FEDERAL SUBSIDIZATION OF STATE PROGRAMS UNDERMINES FEDERALISM Ilya, Assistant Professor at George Mason University School of Law, 02 (Somin, Jan, “Closing the Pandora's box of federalism: The case for judicial restriction of federal subsidies to state governments”, Georgetown Law Journal, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3805/is_200201/ai_n9064334/pg_2) Federal subsidization of state governments undermines three of the most important advantages of a federal system of government relative to a unitary oneresponsiveness to diverse local preferences, horizontal competition between states, and vertical competition between states and the federal government.13 1. Responsiveness to Diverse Local Preferences Responsiveness to diverse local preferences is perhaps the oldest and bestknown rationale for federalism, receiving an endorsement even from the Supreme Court. 14 To the extent that local majorities in different states have divergent preferences from each other, a federal system can ensure a higher degree of citizen satisfaction than a unitary one that would require a single fix for all.15 If, for example, some state-level majorities prefer a policy of high taxes and high levels of government services while others prefer low taxes and low service levels, they can each be accommodated by their respective state governments. A unitary government with a one-size-fits-all policy will, by contrast, likely leave a larger proportion of the population dissatisfied with the resulting package of policies. The ability of federalism to accommodate diverse preferences can ease racial, ethnic, and ideological conflicts by allowing each of the opposing groups to control policy in its own region. 16

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism LINK HELPER – SNOWBALL Expansion of federal power is a slippery slope --- each violation key Johnson ‘01 (Virginia H., JD Candidate, Cardoza Law Review, November, Lexis) Although the Lue court agreed that the "plainly adapted" 139 standard was the appropriate test to be applied to the Hostage Taking Act, it found that, contrary to appellant's interpretation, the Act was "plainly adapted" to the Convention, in that "it tracks the language of the Convention in all material respects." 140 [*380] Specifically, the court found that the Act satisfied the means-ends relationship required by the prevailing view of the Necessary and Proper Clause because the statutory language did not stray too far, if at all, from the terms of the treaty, thus insulating the legislation from appellant's Necessary and Proper Clause attack. 141 Based on the judiciary's long-standing treatment of the Necessary and Proper Clause as conferring upon Congress broad implementation powers, 142 it is not surprising that the Lue court premised its opinion on the presumptive validity of treaty-implementing legislation. 143 However, what this analysis fails to take into account is the slippery slope toward a limitless treaty power that could ultimately result in the over-expansion of federal power, especially in the area of human rights. 144 The reasoning employed in Lue therefore provides a useful example of the typical but flawed understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in that the Lue court simply assumed "necessary" and "proper" to be interchangeable constitutional requirements. 145

Small decisions are the greatest threat to federalism Lebow ‘97 (Cynthia C., Associate Dir – RAND, U. Tennessee Law Review, Spring, Lexis) n162 See Southland, 465 U.S. at 21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting Rehnquist, C.J., joining opinion of O'Connor, J.); FERC, 456 U.S. at 775 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting Rehnquist, C.J., joining in opinion of O'Connor, J.). Justice Powell filed his own partial dissent in FERC that also deserves mention. FERC, 456 U.S. at 771 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Lauding the "appeal" and "wisdom" of Justice O'Connor's dissent, Powell stated that PURPA "intrusively requires [states] to make a place on their administrative agenda for consideration and potential adoption of federally proposed standards.'" Id. at 771, 775 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). While finding that precedents of the Court supported the constitutionality of the substantive provisions of PURPA "on this facial attack," Powell also evoked principles of federalism to warn against the encroachment of federal authority into state affairs: But I know of no other attempt by the Federal Government to supplant state-prescribed procedures that in part define the nature of their administrative agencies. If Congress may do this, presumably it has the power to pre-empt state-court rules of civil procedure and judicial review in classes of cases found to affect commerce. This would be the type of gradual encroachment hypothesized by Professor Tribe: "Of course, no one expects Congress to obliterate the states, at least in one fell swoop. If there is any danger, it lies in the tyranny of small decisions in the prospect that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell." Id. at 774-75 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 302 (1978)). Despite his warning, Justice Powell could probably never have envisioned the degree to which Congress would attempt to preempt state court procedures with respect to tort and product liability actions, areas so traditionally anchored in state common law.

Every violation of federalism is magnified ---- eventually leading to a collapse

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism LINK HELPER – ZERO SUM Federal and state powers are zero-sum --- they trade off Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy ‘2K (Spring, Lexis) The new term actually gives us a new perspective on the enumerated powers. No power granted to Congress think of the Commerce Clause - may be so construed as to preempt entirely the states' power over the people. I employ the phrase "power over the people" for two reasons. First, this phrase emphasizes that the reserved powers of the states must somehow reflect general sovereign powers, which are powers over people. 60 The "States qua States" cases preserve the states' power over some people - those who are state employees. A state that may resist commandeering so as to retain only the power to exist in name possesses no meaningful powers. Second, I refer to the states' power over "people" because the Court has overlooked "the people" in its arguments over the Tenth Amendment, and "the people's" rights are also reserved. The Tenth Amendment expresses a triangular relationship among the federal government, state governments, and the people. Although the context for Tenth Amendment litigation has involved disputes between states and the federal government, residual state authority also inures to the benefit of "the people." In any contest between Congress and the [*566] states, a decision that favors expanded federal powers necessarily disfavors the states and the people. When Justice Souter wrote in Alden that "the commerce power is no longer thought to be circumscribed," 61 he meant, implicitly, that the people have reserved no powers over commerce or anything affecting it.

Federal exercise of power reduces state power John Yoo, law professor, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, 1997, p. 1352. It is important to note that Justice Kennedy did not differentiate between laws that regulated states qua states and those that regulated private parties in areas that might be thought to lie within state power. Following Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, Justice Kennedy's concurrence treated the exercise of any federal power as a diminution of the power of the states and hence a reduction of state sovereignty

Expansion of federal power reduces states’ rights Lee ‘96 (Rex, Fmr Solicitor General, Brigham Young U. Law Review, p. 369) Thus, though the state circle of power is larger than that of the federal government, federal power is supreme and preempts state power within the area covered by the smaller circle. If the circle of federal power is expanded, as shown by the broken line, the nonpreempted portion of the state’s power circle – and therefore the effective area in which the states may govern – is correspondingly diminished.

Increasing federal control crushes federalism

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism GENERIC FEDERAL ACTION LINKS Federal preemption undermines states’ rights Young ‘04 (Ernest, Prof Law – U Texas, Texas Law Review, November, Lexis) Second, limiting preemption seeks to address certain process defects that may render the national political process less protective of state autonomy. Professor Hoke has argued that the sort of concentrated interest groups that often seek preemption of state regulation have certain organizational advantages at the federal level that offset state representation. More fundamentally, I have already emphasized the extent to which widespread preemption threatens the state autonomy necessary to maintain a viable system of political checks on central power. Limits on preemption thus address problems that undermine the self-enforcing character of the system.

Every instance of preemption risks federalism Lack ‘95 (James, Senator – New York, Hearing Before Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 711, p. 11) Inordinate reliance upon the central government for problem-solving feeds the misconception that uniformity for uniformity’s sake alone is a concept that justifies preemption. However, in a federal system strong reasons compel acceptance of diversity among states. Our federalism anticipates diversity; our unity does not anticipated uniformity. By definition, every preemptive law diminishes other expressions of self-government and should be approved only where compelling need and broad consensus exist. While proponents of preemption may claim expected benefits, these must be balanced against the potential loss of accountability, innovation, and responsiveness.

Federal action undermines federalism

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism -----IMPACTS-----

US FEDERALISM MODELED U.S. constitutional federalism is modeled internationally Calebresi ‘95 [Stephen, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1983, Yale, “Reflections on United States v. Lopez: "A GOVERNMENT OF LIMITED AND ENUMERATED POWERS": IN DEFENSE OF UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ,” 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, Michigan Law Review, December, 1995] At the same time, U.S.-style constitutional federalism has become the order of the day in an extraordinarily large number of [*760] very important countries, some of which once might have been thought of as pure nation-states. Thus, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Austria, the Russian Federation, Spain, India, and Nigeria all have decentralized power by adopting constitutions that are significantly more federalist than the ones they replaced. n25 Many other nations that had been influenced long ago by American federalism have chosen to retain and formalize their federal structures. Thus, the federalist constitutions of Australia, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, for example, all are basically alive and well today. As one surveys the world in 1995, American-style federalism of some kind or another is everywhere triumphant, while the forces of nationalism, although still dangerous, seem to be contained or in retreat. The few remaining highly centralized democratic nation-states like Great Britain, n26 France, and Italy all face serious secessionist or devolutionary crises. n27 Other highly centralized nation-states, like China, also seem ripe for a federalist, as well as a democratic, change. Even many existing federal and confederal entities seem to face serious pressure to devolve power further than they have done so far: thus, Russia, Spain, Canada, and Belgium all have very serious devolutionary or secessionist movements of some kind. Indeed, secessionist pressure has been so great that some federal structures recently have collapsed under its weight, as has happened in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Union. All of this still could be threatened, of course, by a resurgence of nationalism in Russia or elsewhere, but the long-term antinationalist trend seems fairly secure. There is no serious intellectual support for nationalism anywhere in the world today, whereas everywhere people seem interested in exploring new transnational [*761] and devolutionary federal forms. n28 The democratic revolution that was launched in Philadelphia in 1776 has won, and now it seems that democrats everywhere join Madison in "cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of federalists." n29

The U.S. is a global federalist model Mallat ‘03 (Chilibi, PhD – U London, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Winter, Lexis) Laurence Tribe, in Constitutional Choices, summarized what he calls the underlying political ideas of the American system into a list of six categories: representative republicanism, federalism, separation of powers, equality before the law, individual autonomy and procedural fairness. America has shared many of these traits with other democracies for a long time, but two constitutional features stand out on a world level as typically American -- federalism and the Supreme Court. The American people deserve credit for both inventions which brought new dimensions to democracy and the rule of law for the rest of the planet. Perhaps America does not know it, but the world has been a consistently better place wherever her two home-grown intellectual products have found anchor.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism IMPACT – WAR Federalism solves war Calabresi ‘95 (Steven G., Assistant Prof – Northwestern U., Michigan Law Review, Lexis) Small state federalism is a big part of what keeps the peace in countries like the United States and Switzerland. It is a big part of the reason why we do not have a Bosnia or a Northern Ireland or a Basque country or a Chechnya or a Corsica or a Quebec problem. 51 American federalism in the end is not a trivial matter or a quaint historical anachronism. American-style federalism is a thriving and vital institutional arrangement - partly planned by the Framers, partly the accident of history - and it prevents violence and war. It prevents religious warfare, it prevents secessionist warfare, and it prevents racial warfare. It is part of the reason why democratic majoritarianism in the United States has not produced violence or secession for 130 years, unlike the situation for example, in England, France, Germany, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, or Spain. There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that is more important or that has done more to promote peace, prosperity, and freedom than the federal structure of that great document. There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that shouldabsorb more completely the attention of the U.S. Supreme Court.

Federalism promotes consolidation which reduces the risk of war Calebresi ‘95 [Stephen, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1983, Yale, “Reflections on United States v. Lopez: "A GOVERNMENT OF LIMITED AND ENUMERATED POWERS": IN DEFENSE OF UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ,” 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, Michigan Law Review, December, 1995] Internationalist Federalism: Preventing War, Promoting Free Trade, and Exploiting Economies of Scale. So far, I have focused on the advantages of American-style small-state federalism in defusing centrifugal devolutionary tendencies, alleviating majority tyranny, and accentuating crosscutting social cleavages. But what about the advantages of international federalism; what are the advantages of consolidating states into larger federal entities, as happened in North America in 1787 or in Europe in 1957? A first and obvious advantage is that consolidation reduces the threat of war. Because war usually occurs when two or more states compete for land or other resources, a reduction in the number of states also will reduce the likelihood of war. This result is especially true if the reduction in the number of states eliminates land boundaries between states that are hard to police, generate friction and border disputes, and that may require large standing armies to defend. In a brilliant article, Professor Akhil Amar has noted the importance of this point to both to the Framers of our Constitution and to President Abraham Lincoln. n52 Professor Amar shows that they believed a Union of States was essential in North America because otherwise the existence of land boundaries would lead here - as it had in Europe - to the creation of standing armies and ultimately to war. n53 The Framers accepted the old British notion that it was Britain's island situation that had kept her free of war and, importantly, free of a standing army that could be used to oppress the liberties of the people in a way that the British navy never could.

Federalism prevents war and violence Calabresi ‘95 (Steven G., Assistant Prof – Northwestern U., Michigan Law Review, Lexis) Some of the best arguments for centripetal international federalism, then, resemble some of the best arguments for centrifugal devolutionary federalism: in both cases - and for differing reasons - federalism helps prevent bloodshed and war. It is no wonder, then, that we live in an age of federalism at both the international and subnational level. Under the right circumstances, federalism can help to promote peace, prosperity, and happiness. It can alleviate the threat of majority tyranny - which is the central flaw of democracy. In some situations, it can reduce the visibility of dangerous social fault lines, thereby preventing bloodshed and violence. This necessarily brief comparative, historical, and empirical survey of the world's experience with federalism amply demonstrates the benefits at least of American-style small-state federalism. In light of this evidence, the United States would be foolish indeed to abandon its federal system. [*774]

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism IMPACT – ECONOMY Federalism is key economic consolidation which is vital for economic growth Calebresi ‘95 [Stephen, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1983, Yale, “Reflections on United States v. Lopez: "A GOVERNMENT OF LIMITED AND ENUMERATED POWERS": IN DEFENSE OF UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ,” 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, Michigan Law Review, December, 1995] A third related advantage is that international federations can undertake a host of governmental activities in which there are significant economies of scale. This is one reason why federations can provide better for the common defense than can their constituent parts. Intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered aircraft [*772] carriers and submarines, and B-2 stealth bombers tend to be expensive. Economies of scale make it cheaper for fifty states to produce one set of these items than it would be for fifty states to try to produce fifty sets. This is true even without factoring in the North American regional tensions that would be created if this continent had to endure the presence of fifty nuclear minipowers, assuming that each small state could afford to own at least one Hiroshima-sized nuclear bomb. Important governmental economies of scale obtain in other areas, as well, however, going well beyond national defense. For example, there are important economies of scale to the governmental provision of space programs, scientific and biomedical research programs, the creation of transportation infrastructure, and even the running of some kinds of income and wealth redistribution programs.

Growth is key to prevent a US-China war Mead ‘04 [Walter Russell, – Senior Fellow at Council on Foreign Relations, “America's STICKY Power,” Foreign Policy, Mar/Apr, Proquest] Similarly, in the last 60 years, as foreigners have acquired a greater value in the United States-government and private bonds, direct and portfolio private investments-more and more of them have acquired an interest in maintaining the strength of the U.S.-led system. A collapse of the U.S. economy and the ruin of the dollar would do more than dent the prosperity of the United States. Without their best customer, countries including China and Japan would fall into depressions. The financial strength of every country would be severely shaken should the United States collapse. Under those circumstances, debt becomes a strength, not a weakness, and other countries fear to break with the United States because they need its market and own its securities. Of course, pressed too far, a large national debt can turn from a source of strength to a crippling liability, and the United States must continue to justify other countries' faith by maintaining its long-term record of meeting its financial obligations. But, like Samson in the temple of the Philistines, a collapsing U.S. economy would inflict enormous, unacceptable damage on the rest of the world. That is sticky power with a vengeance. The United States' global economic might is therefore not simply, to use Nye's formulations, hard power that compels others or soft power that attracts the rest of the world. Certainly, the U.S. economic system provides the United States with the prosperity needed to underwrite its security strategy, but it also encourages other countries to accept U.S. leadership. U.S. economic might is sticky power. How will sticky power help the United States address today's challenges? One pressing need is to ensure that Iraq's econome reconstruction integrates the nation more firmly in the global economy. Countries with open economies develop powerful trade-oriented businesses; the leaders of these businesses can promote economic policies that respect property rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Such leaders also lobby governments to avoid the isolation that characterized Iraq and Libya under economic sanctions. And looking beyond Iraq, the allure of access to Western capital and global markets is one of the few forces protecting the rule of law from even further erosion in Russia. China's rise to global prominence will offer a key test case for sticky power. As China develops economically, it should gain wealth that could support a military rivaling that of the United States; China is also gaining political influence in the world. Some analysts in both China and the United States believe that the laws of history mean that Chinese power will someday clash with the reigning U.S. power. Sticky power offers a way out. China benefits from participating in the U.S. economic system and integrating itself into the global economy. Between 1970 and 2003, China's gross domestic product grew from an estimated $106 billion to more than $1.3 trillion. By 2003, an estimated $450 billion of foreign money had flowed into the Chinese economy. Moreover, China is becoming increasingly dependent on both imports and exports to keep its economy (and its military machine) going. Hostilities between the United States and China would cripple China's industry, and cut off

supplies of oil and other key commodities. Sticky power works both ways, though. If China cannot afford war with the United States, the United States will have an increasingly hard time breaking off commercial relations with China. In an era of weapons of mass destruction, this mutual dependence is probably good for both sides. Sticky power did not prevent World War I, but economic interdependence runs deeper now; as a result, the "inevitable" U.S.-Chinese conflict is less likely to occur.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism IMPACT – TRADE Federalism is key to establish bonds that create free trade Calebresi ‘95 [Stephen, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1983, Yale, “Reflections on United States v. Lopez: "A GOVERNMENT OF LIMITED AND ENUMERATED POWERS": IN DEFENSE OF UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ,” 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, Michigan Law Review, December, 1995] A fourth and vital advantage to international federations is that they can promote the free movement of goods and labor both among the components of the federation by reducing internal transaction costs and internationally by providing a unified front that reduces the costs of collective action when bargaining with other federations and nations. This reduces the barriers to an enormous range of utility-maximizing transactions thereby producing an enormous increase in social wealth. Many federations have been formed in part for this reason, including the United States, the European Union, and the British Commonwealth, as well as all the trade-specific "federations" like the GATT and NAFTA.

Free trade is key to avert nuclear annihilation Copley News Service ‘99 [Dec 1, LN] For decades, many children in America and other countries went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war. The specter of nuclear winter freezing the life out of planet Earth seemed very real. Activists protesting the World Trade Organization's meeting in Seattle apparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that nations join together in groups like the WTO not just to further their own prosperity, but also to forestall conflict with other nations. In a way, our planet has traded in the threat of a worldwide nuclear war for the benefit of cooperative global economics. Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy themselves to be in the mold of nuclear disarmament or anti-Vietnam War protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're special-interest activists, whether the cause is environmental, labor or paranoia about global government. Actually, most of the demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike yesterday's peace activists, such as Beatle John Lennon or philosopher Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament movement, both of whom urged people and nations to work together rather than strive against each other. These and other war protesters would probably approve of 135 WTO nations sitting down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have been settled by bullets and bombs. As long as nations are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other countries, they have a major disincentive to wage war. That's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so important. As exports to the United States and the rest of the world feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for the goods we produce, the threat of hostility diminishes. Many anti-trade protesters in Seattle claim that only multinational corporations benefit from global trade, and that it's the everyday wage earners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First of all, it's not the military-industrial complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies that make high-tech goods. And those companies provide a growing number of jobs for Americans. In San Diego, many people have good jobs at Qualcomm, Solar Turbines and other companies for whom overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 people who work at Boeing would lose their livelihoods without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross domestic product. That's a lot of jobs for everyday workers. Growing global prosperity has helped counter the specter of nuclear winter. Nations of the world are learning to live and work together, like the singers of anti-war songs once imagined. Those who care about world peace shouldn't be protesting world trade. They should be celebrating it.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism IMPACT – DEMOCRACY FEDERALISM KEY TO GLOBAL DEMOCRACY Robin Wright, a contributing correspondent of The Washington Quarterly, covers the patterns of democratization and other global issues for the Los Angeles Times, Washington Quarterly, Summer, 1997 The most dynamic political trend promoting democracy worldwide in the 1990s is devolution, the transfer of power beyond capitals and traditional elites in ways that are in turn redefining democracy's scope and application. It is now the frontline of democratization in Latin America, Central Europe, Africa, and Asia. The most radical experiment in Latin America is Bolivia's new "popular participation" program, which is devolving power and resources long concentrated in three urban centers to 311 municipalities. The project effectively expedites democracy. Towns and villages no longer have to appeal to regional or national authorities for everything from electricity to school desks. The goal is for communities to provide services and handle problems according to local needs and priorities as a check against the abuse of power at the national level. Before the transition to democracy began in the 1980s, Bolivia witnessed 189 coups in 162 years. For the first time, popular participation has included the country's majority -- the 65 percent indigenous population that has long been excluded by descendants of Spanish colonials. Many of Bolivia's Aymara and Quechua Indians, whose civilizations date back millennia, are getting their first taste of modern power. In Africa, Mali's first democratic government contends decentralization works because it forces engagement. The West African state, which is twice the size of Texas, has shifted control of key administrative and financial functions, including education, health, and development, to more than 500 rural and urban communities. Each locality fixes tax rates and allocates revenues. To allow local direction and limit corruption, each area also negotiates directly with foreign aid groups. Devolution also helps block democracy's undoing by dispersing power beyond the reach of armies or strongmen -- a recent problem among Mali's neighbors. Democratic progress in Niger and Gambia has been reversed by military intervention, while Nigeria's army stepped in to void results of the oil-rich state's first democratic elections. Former dictators have won democratic elections in Benin and Burkino Faso. And irregularities have marred elections in Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, and Equatorial Guinea. Devolution can also provide a mechanism to ease ethnic or sectarian disparities. Ethiopia boasts one of Africa's most radical experiments in devolution in an attempt to prevent further dismemberment. Differences among its 80 ethnic groups -- which use a dozen major languages and three alphabets -have spawned a host of conflicts during both monarchial and communist rule. (Eritrea broke away in 1993.) As part of its still-tentative transition to democracy, Ethiopia has introduced a new constitution that divides 55 million people into nine ethnic-based states. It also bestows major powers of selfadministration and even the right to secede. The motive for transferring power is not always altruistic. Devolution often also represents an attempt to transfer the onus of solutions beyond central governments no longer able to provide services or answers. In reaction to the strong centralization of communism, democratic Poland is moving in the opposite direction as the state devolves power to gaminas, local communities of various sizes run by councils now locally elected. Warsaw has several gaminas, whereas a rural gamina may include several villages. Among all the units of government, gaminas now have the highest public support. n15 In 1996, the state began to transfer control of education to gaminas, which are now allocated about 10 percent of national revenues. Gaminas also collect local taxes, although income varies widely depending on local resources. But the combination of local and state funds is often insufficient to pay for schools and other services the federal government once provided. As a result, some communities have actually appealed to Warsaw to reassume responsibility for schools. Devolution is also not without basic conceptual problems. In many places, shortcomings include poorly educated or inexperienced new officials, including some who can barely read or who know virtually nothing about budgets and managing a municipality. Initial projects have often been flashy rather than thoughtful infrastructure schemes. Local areas are also not immune to corruption, which in Bolivia led to installation of "vigilance committees" to oversee its mayors. Yet as in many places, the government in La Paz contends devolution is still the best mechanism for both the initial democratization process and subsequent stabilization.

Devolution shares problems as well as power. It introduces a wider array of players to shoulder the burdens as well as to have a stake in the outcome. And by embracing men and women in the most remote rural corners of countries, devolution also prevents or defuses the flashpoints behind competition and strife.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism EXT – FISM KEY TO DEMOCRACY FEDERALISM ENHANCES THE LEGITIMACY OF DEMOCRACY Larry Diamond, Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institute, Presented to the Conference on Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization, February 12, 2004 (http://www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/Decentralize_Power021204.htm) Second, federalism or devolution of power is adopted as a means of sharing power among lots of different political parties, which may or may not have some basis in ethnic or regional ties. If democracy is to survive, it cannot be a winner-take-all system, particularly not one in which one party is always going to win, and thus take all. When some governing responsibilities and resources are devolved to lower levels of authority, and when there are a lot of different provinces and municipalities whose governments will be chosen through elections, parties and groups that cannot win control of the central government may win the opportunity to exercise power in some of the lower-level governments This increases their confidence in and commitment to the political system, and the sense among citizens generally that the system is fair and inclusive. If groups with strong bases of support in the country are completely and indefinitely excluded from any share of political power at any level, they are likely to question and even challenge the legitimacy of the system. Third, democracy has swept throughout the world as a basic value and framework of governance over the post three decades. And decentralization is increasingly coming to be seen as a fundamental democratic principle. It is not enough for people simply to be able to choose their national leaders in periodic, free, and fair elections. In countries of moderate to large size, a good democracy requires that people be able to elect their own local leaders and representatives, and that these local governments have some real power to respond to the needs of the people. In short, decentralization is increasingly being demanded from below, through pressure from the grassroots, and is embraced for its potential to enhance the depth and legitimacy of democracy.

FEDERALISM IS TO ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION Larry Diamond, Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Developing Democracy, 1999 p. 159 Centralized government may or may not be more efficient, but it is intrinsically less democratic. Only if political power over certain issues and government functions is devolved to lower levels of authority that are democratically elected can government be truly responsive, representative, and accountable. The more ethnically heterogeneous the state, and the larger its size demographically and territorially, the more this is true. In the largest and most ethnically complex states, only the multiple levels and embedded arrangements of federalism are likely to provide the conditions for a liberal, peaceful, and stable democracy.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism IMPACT – GENOCIDE U.S. FEDERALISM IS MODELED AND PREVENTS GLOBAL GENOCIDES Norm Ornstein, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, Jan / Feb, 1992 p. 24 In the final analysis, nations and regions will hold together or come together in the modern world if their economic interests demand it. Even then, the potential for self-destruction, atomization, substantial bloodshed, even all-out war, is very great. A common interest in economic advancement provides the incentive to try to find structural solutions to political and social problems. But it is a delicate matter to find structures that can allay primal fears of genocide, legitimize emerging national identities, and divide up economic and political powers and goodies in a fashion that will be seen as fair to everybody. It is here that creative federalism can play its role. The United States may be able to at least point the way. Our innovations in decentralized federal arrangements as well as our experience in sorting out powers and rights between Washington and the states could well be adapted to many troubled situations elsewhere today.

THE IMPACT IS DEMOCIDE RJ Rummel, Prof of Political Science at University of Hawaii, “Democracy, Power, and Democide” 1997 (http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.CHAP17.HTM) Where the political elite can command all, where they can act arbitrarily, where they can kill as they so whim, they are most likely to commit democide. Where the elite are checked by countervailing power, where they are restrained and held to account for their actions, where they must answer to the very people they might murder, they are least likely to commit democide. That is power kills; absolute power kills absolutely. This is the underlying principle. There is thus a continuum here. At one end is liberal democracy, a type of regime in which through an open and competitive system of electing the major power-holders and otherwise holding accountable other political elite, through the freedom of speech and organization, and through the existence of multiple and overlapping power pyramids (religious institutions, the media, corporations, etc.), power is most restrained. At the other end are totalitarian regimes in which the powerholders exercise absolute power over all social groups and institutions, in which there are no independent power pyramids. The broad alternative to these two types is the authoritarian regime. Power is centralized and perhaps dictatorial, and no competition for political power is allowed, but independent social institutions (such as churches and businesses) exist and provide some restraint on the political elite.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism IMPACT – GENOCIDE THAT OUTWEIGHS EVERYTHING RJ Rummel, Prof of Political Science at University of Hawaii, “War Isn’t This Century’s Biggest Killer” 1997 (http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/WSJ.ART.HTM) Our century is noted for its absolute and bloody wars. World War I saw nine-million people killed in battle, an incredi ble record that was far surpassed within a few decades by the 15 million battle deaths of World War II. Even the number killed in twentieth century revolutions and civil wars have set historical records. In total, this century's battle killed in all its international and domestic wars, revolutions, and violent conflicts is so far about 35,654,000. Yet, even more unbelievable than these vast numbers killed in war during the lifetime of some still living, and largely unknown, is this shocking fact. This century's total killed by absolutist governments already far exceeds that for all wars, domestic and international. Indeed, this number already approximates the number that might be killed in a nuclear war. Table 1 provides the relevant totals and classifies these by type of government (following Freedom House's definitions) and war. By government killed is meant any direct or indirect killing by government officials, or government acquiescence in the killing by others, of more than 1,000 people, except execution for what are conventionally considered criminal acts (murder, rape, spying, treason, and the like). This killing is apart from the pursuit of any ongoing military action or campaign, or as part of any conflict event. For example, the Jews that Hitler slaughtered during World War II would be counted, since their merciless and systematic killing was unrelated to and actually conflicted with Hitler's pursuit of the war. The totals in the Table are based on a nation-by-nation assessment and are absolute minimal figures that may under estimate the true total by ten percent or more. Moreover, these figures do not even include the 1921-1922 and 1958-1961 famines in the Soviet Union and China causing about 4 million and 27 million dead, respectably. The former famine was mainly due to the imposition of a command agricultural economy, forced requisitions of food by the Soviets, and the liquidation campaigns of the Cheka; the latter was wholly caused by Mao's agriculturally destructive Great Leap Forward and collectivization. However, Table 1 does include the Soviet government's planned and administered starvation of the Ukraine begun in 1932 as a way of breaking peasant opposition to collectivization and destroying Ukrainian nationalism. As many as ten million may have been starved to death or succumbed to famine related diseases; I estimate eight million died. Had these people all been shot, the Soviet government's moral responsibility could be no greater. The Table lists 831 thousand people killed by free -- democratic -- governments, which should startle most readers. This figure involves the French massacres in Algeria before and during the Algerian war (36,000 killed, at a minimum), and those killed by the Soviets after being forcibly repatriated to them by the Allied Democracies during and after World War II. It is outrageous that in line with and even often surpassing in zeal the letter of the Yalta Agreement signed by Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt, the Allied Democracies, particularly Great Britain and the United States, turned over to Soviet authorities more than 2,250,000 Soviet citizens, prisoners of war, and Russian exiles (who were not Soviet citizens) found in the Allied zones of occupation in Europe. Most of these people were terrified of the consequences of repatriation and refused to cooperate in their repatriation; often whole families preferred suicide. Of those the Allied Democracies repatriation, an estimated 795,000 were executed, or died in slave-labor camps or in transit to them. If a government is to be held responsible for those prisoners who die in freight cars or in their camps from privation, surely those democratic governments that turned helpless people over to totalitarian rulers with foreknowledge of their peril, also should be held responsible. Concerning now the overall mortality statistics shown in the table, it is sad that hundreds of thousands of people can be killed by governments with hardly an international murmur, while a war killing several thousand people can cause an immediate world outcry and global reaction. Simply contrast the international focus on the relatively minor Falkland Islands War of Britain and Argentina with the widescale lack of interest in Burundi's killing or acquiescence in such killing of about 100,000 Hutu in 1972, of Indonesia slaughtering a likely 600,000 "communists" in 1965, and of Pakistan, in an initially well planned massacre, eventually killing from one to three million Bengalis in 1971. A most noteworthy and still sensitive example of this double standard is the Vietnam War. The international community was outraged at the American attempt to militarily prevent North Vietnam from taking over South Vietnam and ultimately Laos and Cambodia. "Stop the killing" was the cry, and eventually, the pressure of foreign and domestic opposition forced an American withdrawal. The overall number killed in the Vietnam War on all sides was about 1,216,000 people. With the United States subsequently refusing them even modest military aid, South Vietnam was militarily defeated by the North and completely swallowed; and Cambodia was taken over by the communist Khmer Rouge, who in trying to recreate a primitive communist agricultural society slaughtered from one to three million Cambodians. If we take a middle two-million as the best estimate, then in four years the government of this small nation of seven million alone killed 64 percent more people than died in the ten-year Vietnam War. Overall, the best estimate of those killed after the Vietnam War by the victorious communists in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia is 2,270,000. Now totaling almost twice as many as died in the Vietnam War, this communist killing still continues. To view this double standard from another perspective, both World Wars cost twenty-four million battle deaths. But from 1918 to 1953, the Soviet government executed, slaughtered, starved, beat or tortured to death, or otherwise killed 39,500,000 of its own people (my best estimate among figures ranging from a minimum of twenty million killed by Stalin to a total over the whole communist period of eighty-three million). For China under Mao Tse-tung, the communist government eliminated, as an average figure between estimates, 45,000,000 Chinese. The number killed for just these two nations is about 84,500,000 human beings, or a lethality of 252 percent more than both World Wars together. Yet, have the world community and intellectuals generally shown anything like the same horror, the same outrage, the same out pouring of anti-killing literature, over these Soviet and Chinese megakillings as has been directed at the much less deadly World Wars? As can be seen from Table 1, communist governments are overall almost four times more lethal to their citizens than non-communist ones, and in per capita terms nearly twice as lethal (even considering the huge populations of the USSR and China). However, as large as the per capita killed is for communist governments, it is nearly the same as for other non-free governments. This is due to the massacres and widescale killing in the very small country of East Timor, where since 1975 Indonesia has eliminated (aside from the guerrilla war and associated violence) an estimated 100 thousand Timorese out of a population of 600 thousand. Omitting this country alone would reduce the average killed by noncommunist, nonfree governments to 397 per 10,000, or significantly less than the 477 per 10,000 for communist countries. In any case, we can still see from the table that the more freedom in a nation, the fewer people killed by government. Freedom acts to brake the use of a governing elite's power over life and death to pursue their policies and ensure their rule. This principle appeared to be violated in two aforementioned special cases. One was the French government carrying out mass killing in the colony of Algeria, where compared to Frenchmen the Algerians were second class citizens, without the right to vote in French elections. In the other case the Allied Democracies acted during and just after wartime, under strict secrecy, to turn over foreigners to a communist government. These foreigners, of course, had no rights as citizens that would protect them in the democracies. In no case have I found a democratic government carrying out massacres, genocide, and mass executions of its own citizens; nor have I found a case where such a government's policies have knowingly and directly resulted in the large scale deaths of its people though privation, torture, beatings, and the like. Absolutism is not only many times deadlier than war, but itself is the major factor causing war and other forms of violent conflict. It is a major cause of militarism. Indeed, absolutism, not war, is mankind's deadliest

scourge of all.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism IMPACT – SECESSIONISM FEDERALISM SOLVES GLOBAL SECESSIONISM CONFLICTS Nicholas Kittrie, Edwin Moores Scholar at American University Law School, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions: New Perspectives Quarterly, 1996 p. 57 The unrest is created by the unfilled promises, aspirations and demands - just or unjust, reasonable and otherwise. Countries that fail to deal justly with past deprivations and present expectations will become embroiled in unrest, internal strife and wars of secession. Governments and states that are unsuccessful in accommodating or resolving their people's growing demands for greater autonomy and justice will be swept away. It is the fear of this eventuality that has led such a well-seasoned historian as John Lukacs to warn against the prospects of "new feudalism" and "new barbaric chieftains." Successful countries will inevitably be the ones capable of transforming themselves into more representative and flexible pluralistic composites. Unless they carry out this transformation, China and India, the world's last great multi-ethnic empires (and to a lesser degree also the new Russian Federation), might go the way of the earlier Soviet conglomerate. Principles and processes of governance that recognize the globe's growing pluralistic realities are essential. If states are to avoid divisiveness and turmoil they must base their political order on greater tolerance for diversity and incorporate new types of federalism or consociationalism - a great variety of informal and voluntary forms of association - that enhance local autonomy and communal empowerment. The future requires the replacement of monolithic political and socioeconomic dogmas (and their accompanying centralized systems of governance) with a maximization of locally determined and pluralistic priorities and institutions. Governmental decision-making processes and procedures must maximize people's perceptions of empowerment and participation in authority. ABSOLUTE OR PLURAL? ( It is in this light that we must view and assess the growing worldwide confrontation between the forces of religious-political fundamentalism and the forces of pluralistic democracy. The first camp (in places like the Vatican, Iran, Algeria or Israel's Mea Shearim) admittedly proclaims and adheres to the absolute primacy of some never-changing scriptural or ideological truth, be it Catholic, Islamic or Jewish law. The second camp (however diverse and disparate) places its reliance on a democratically derived and constantly modifiable social compact. The deepening conflict between these two dramatically opposite approaches to the formulation and structuring of political legitimacy is now threatening to replace the earlier Cold War as a major axis of global conflict.

THE IMPACT IS GLOBAL WARS AND DISEASE

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism EXT – FISM SOLVES SECESSION FEDERALISM CREATES THE BEST MIDDLE GROUND THAT PRESERVES NATIONAL UNITY Edward Rubin, Professor of Law at UC Berkeley, Georgia State University Law Review, 1997 p. 1031 Federalism, therefore, becomes an issue only when the challenge to the existing order is raised by identifiable sub-groups within the polity. If a polity is composed, in its entirety, of recognizable sub-groups, a crisis of legitimacy may cause that polity to break into its component parts, as the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia did. If the recognizable sub-groups represent a minority, if one sub-group dominates the society or controls the government, or if there are differing views among the groups, there may well be a conflict

between those favoring secession and those favoring the continued unity of the state. The usual way to resolve such a conflict is war, and wars of secession are among the most vicious in the lugubrious history of human conflict. The majority or dominant group is likely to think that the rebelling group will ultimately be more tractable if there are fewer of them, perhaps a great many fewer, while the rebelling groups is likely to become more desperate to secede the more they realize that if secession fails, they will be ruled out by those who are so assiduously trying to reduce their numbers. Federalism, in essence, is a

political alternative to secession. It is a way to compromise between those favoring a unified state and those favoring the dissolution of the state or the separation of some portion of that state. Its essential principle, as defined above, is that sub-units of the state possess certain claims of right against the central government.

FEDERALISM PROMOTES LOCAL AUTONOMY Larry Diamond, Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institute and leading badass on Democracy Questions, Developing Democracy, 1999 p. 152 Federalism serves a valuable role in strengthening democracy by institutionalizing decentralization and thus preserving the autonomy of regional and local governments. But it has other benefits as well, including its ability to provide better representation to minority groups and its potential to stimulate economic growth. Democracy does not guarantee representation to national communities in a multinational state. Majority rule may permanently shut minorities out of power at the center if cleavages are ascribed by birth or otherwise unmalleable. In such circumstances of politically mobilized ethnic consciousness, a unitary state is liable to leave minority ethnic groups feeling powerless, excluded, alienated, and insecure. Perceiving no stake in a political system that does not seem to recognize their worth and legitimacy as a group, they are prone to look to secession as the only alternative. Federalism may hold such a state together. It is a positive alternative to the violence and bloodshed that typically accompany attempts at secession in multiethnic societies and to the repression and discrimination that may victimize newly creates minorities in a state formed from secession. Federalism can reconcile nationalism and democracy in a multiethnic state by giving territorially concentrated minorities authority over matters of local concern, security in the use of their language, culture, and religion, and protection from the discretion of national leaders or the sentiments of the national majority. When intergroup conflict is severe, federalism can alleviate and contain it through Donald Horowitz’s five famous conflict-reducing mechanisms:

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism EXT – FISM SOLVES SECESSION FEDERALISM GIVES MINORITY GROUPS A ROLE IN NATIONAL POLITICS Dawn Brancati, Visiting Scholar at the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton, “Design Over Conflict” 2003 (http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~brancati/Brancati_introduction.pdf) Above all, decentralization is thought to reduce ethnic conflict and secession by giving certain ethnic and regional group more influence on politics through sub-national legislatures. Often, ethnic and regional groups have little impact on policy at the national level because they constitute a small proportion of a country’s population. This may not be the case at the subnational level, however. If ethnic groups are regionally concentrated (e.g., Quebec’s French Canadians or Corsica’s Italians), decentralization affords them an opportunity to control their own political, social and economic affairs.

FEDERALISM SOLVES PROBLEMS THAT PRODUCE IMPETUS FOR SECESSION Dawn Brancati, Visiting Scholar at the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton, “Design Over Conflict” 2003 (http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~brancati/Brancati_introduction.pdf) Having access to and influence on politics at the sub-national level enables groups to redress the concerns that drive them to fight with other groups and to seek independence from national governments in the first place. If the cause of ethnic conflict is physical insecurity, decentralization can prevent conflict by giving groups control over their own police forces. And, if secessionism results from a feeling of economic disadvantage, decentralization can reduce secessionism by allowing groups to decide how money is spent within their regions. But, decentralization, even when it has extended real powers to sub-national governments, has failed to reduce conflict and secessionism in some countries, giving rise to a number of critiques of the system.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism IMPACT – RUSSIA Russian federalism is critical to prevent state disintegration and WMD proliferation Hahn ‘03 (Gordon M., Visiting Research Scholor – Stanford U, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 11, Issue 3, Summer) Where did Russia's federal state come from, where has it been, where is it going, and why does it matter beyond a small circle of Russia specialists? Taking the last question first, the success or failure of Russia's transformation into a stable market democracy will determine the degree of stability throughout Eurasia. For such a large multinational state, successful political and economic development depends on building an efficient democratic federal system. Indeed, one of the main institutional factors leading to the demise of the Soviet partocratic regime and state was the considerably noninstitutionalized status of the RSFSR (Russian Republic) in the Soviet Union's pseudofederal, national-territorial administrative structure. Only a democratic federal system can hold together and effectively manage Russia's vast territory, the awkward administrative structure inherited from the failed USSR, and hundreds of divergent ethnic, linguistic, and religious interests. Dissolution or even any further weakening of Russia's federal state could have dire consequences for Russian national and international security by weakening control over its means of mass destruction.

Nuclear war David ‘99 (Steven R., Prof PoliSci – Johns Hopkins U., Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, Lexis) If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism Russian civil war.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism IMPACT – IRAQ Iraq models American federalism Hulsman ‘03 [John, Ph.D., Research Fellow in European Affairs, The Heritage Foundation, “Forging a Durable Post-War Political Settlement in Iraq,” http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/bg1632.cfm] A good political model for such a successful post-war Iraqi federation already exists--the so-called Great Compromise of 1787 that enabled the creation of America's constitutional arrangement among the states. In Iraq's case, this type of system would give each of the country's three major sub-groups equal representation in an upper house of the legislature in order to protect each group's interests at the national level. These political outcomes--an Iraq that can control its own political destiny and that does not threaten that of its neighbors--are critical if an Iraqi settlement is to be judged a success.

Failure of Iraqi federalism leads to civil war and government fallout Somin ‘06 [Ilya, Assistant Professor at George Mason University School of Law, “Iraqi Federalism II - Answering Three Common Objections:,” http://volokh.com/posts/1147298127.shtml]

Critics of decentralized federalism often claim that it will lead to partition. Some, like Cordesman in his NY Times piece, do not even seem to distinguish between the two. It is in fact the fear of a dominant central government dominated by one's enemies that leads to pressure for partition. Implementation of a strong form of federalism would dampen these fears, though probably not completely eliminate them. Realistically, the Kurds will not accept a highly centralized government of any kind (and I don't blame them). The Sunnis will not accept one dominated by the Shia, as is likely to be case if the government continues to be democratically elected (the Shiites are 60% of the population). By removing the threat of nation-wide domination by one group, decentralized federalism will reduce pressures for partition rather than increase it. This is especially likely in light of the fact that partition would leave all three major Iraqi groups vulnerable to the depradations of Iraq's unscrupulous and rapacious neighbors. Federalism is a way to capture the main benefits of partition, while mitigating its dangers. Decentralized federalism is not a panacea for Iraq's many problems, but it does have important advantages over the alternatives of centralization, partition, and civil war.

That causes violent Middle East conflict Detroit News ‘02 (9-22, Lexis) Ousting Saddam Hussein might have more far-reaching consequences than most people imagine. The possible splintering of Iraq as a result of U.S. military action might radically destabilize the Middle East. Such an outcome would do nothing to promote American national interests. Iraq is divided into three parts: the Shiite south, the Sunni center and the Kurdish north. These three constituent parts were soldered together after World War I. Historically, they possessed little in common. During most of the last 75 years, they have been held together only through the heavy hand of the Sunni center. Hussein is very much in that Sunni dictatorial tradition. Of course, what he has done to Kuwait, and to his own people, is abominable. Nevertheless, one may argue that without the "rigor" imposed from Baghdad, Iraq might dissolve, briefly, into three independent statelets. But such statelets would probably not be independent for long. Much

larger and more powerful neighbors would likely gobble each of them up soon enough. A fragmented Iraq would introduce radical instability into the Middle East political system. Upheavals would probably metastasize, with unpredictable results. None would foster American national interests.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism IMPACT – IRAQ Middle East conflict escalates to a global nuclear war Steinbach ‘02 (John, Center for Research on Globalization, 3-3, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html) Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining

momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long

been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle

East conflict could trigger a world

conflagration." (44)

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism IMPACT – INDONESIA Federalism is critical to prevent Indonesian disintegration Dibb ‘01 (Paul, Head Asian Studies – Australian National University, Orbis, 9-22, Lexis) It is important for Australians to appreciate that Indonesia

is going through a traumatic period. The smoothly functioning democratic process that is taken for granted in Australia has yet to be established in Indonesia. . . . The recent tragic events in East Timor have been played out against a background of this great national effort to form a new government to bring Indonesia into the family of democratic nations. It is important that Australians understand that the institutions they have built up over 100 years of nationhood--a democratic electoral process; a strong and independent judiciary; a free and reasonably responsible press; a largely noncorrupt and highly competent civil service; and a decentralised system of government in which strong States counterbalance the strength, of the national government--are things we Indonesians aspire to and are just beginning to enjoy. [4] The turmoil wracking their vast neighbor has made many Australians appreciate their own institutions more keenly, not least the oftmaligned federal system that imposes eight provincial administrations along with the national government on a country of barely 20 million people.

Above all else, it is the lack of an effective federal system that will ultimately be to blame should Indonesia disintegrate.

Indonesian instability causes escalating regional war that collapses U.S. leadership and the global economy Menon ‘01 (Rajan, Prof International Relations – Lehigh U., The National Interest, June, Lexis) Indonesia may survive the combined assault of an ailing economy, deepening separatism, and a failing state. Such an outcome is certainly desirable, but it is not likely. American leaders must therefore brace for the possibility that Indonesia

could still collapse in chaos and disintegrate in violence.

Alternatively, the current instability could continue until economic recovery and political compromise give rise to a country of a rather different shape and size. With Wahid gone and Megawati in place, this is now somewhat more likely. Even the loss of Aceh and West Papua need not spell national disintegration; without such provinces Indonesia would still retain the critical mass to endure as a state. The second of these denouements is preferable to the first, but both will

create strong shock waves. Indonesia's size and location are the reasons why. The three major straits that slice through it are pivotal passages for the global economy. Malacca is by far the most important, particularly for energy shipments. Some 450 vessels and about 10 million barrels of oil pass through daily, and East Asian demand, driven by China, is expected to rise from 12 million barrels a day in 2000 to over 20 million barrels in twenty years. Japan, China, Taiwan

and South Korea would suffer severely and soon if fallout from turmoil in Aceh (at its northern end) or Riau (at its southern end) blocked this passage. Its narrowness, 1.5 miles in the Phillips Channel in the Singapore Strait, and ten miles between Singapore and the Riau archipelago, adds to the danger. The Lombok Strait, which ships use to sail to northeast Asia through the Strait of Makasar between Borneo and Sulawesi, is next in importance, although it handles a far smaller volume of traffic than Malacca and is of negligible importance for energy shipments. The Lombok-Makasar route is, however, a critical corridor for Australia's coal and iron ore exports to northeast Asia and for manufactured exports moving south from there. It is also the most likely detour were Malacca rendered impassable or hazardous. By comparison, Sunda is a minor shipping channel; the consequences of its closure would be minimal for transcontinental trade. Rerouting Malacca traffic through Lombok would strain the capacity of the world's merchant fleet, increase transportation costs, and create severe bottlenecks. The problems would be even worse if all three straits were unusable and ships had to transit northeast Asia by skirting Australia's northern coast. Market signals would eventually add other carrying capacity but the question is how quickly and smoothly the adjustment occurs, and what the economic and political consequences would be in the meantime. The

ramifications of blocked or delayed maritime traffic, or even just panic over the possibility, would spread speedily throughout globalization's many circuits. Insurance rates would rise; coverage may even be denied if underwriters deem the risks excessive. The effects of obstructed energy, machinery and manufactured goods would register in capital markets, short-term investors would be scared off, and the flow of much-needed foreign direct investment into a region still convalescing from the blows of 1997 would slow. Piracy in the seas around Indonesia would also worsen if the Jakarta government either ceased functioning or were so busy holding the country together that it could not police its waters. The hijacking of ships has increased since Indonesia's upheavals began. There were 113 incidents in its waters in 1999 compared to 60 the year before, and between January and March of 2001 alone, pirates attacked ships in Indonesian waters 29 times and on nine occasions in the Malacca Strait. The vessels victimized near Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia included several oil tankers and ships carrying aluminum and palm oil. The three countries began to coordinate operations against the menace in 1992, and in 2000 Japan proposed that its coast guard join the effort along with China and South Korea. Yet how serious piracy becomes, and how effective any joint solution is, depends primarily on the extent of Indonesia's stability. Refugee flows will also accelerate if Indonesia starts to break apart. The refugee population of one million already within its borders will soar, dragging the economy down further and aggravating communal violence. Refugees could also be driven beyond Indonesia into neighboring countries that are neither prepared to receive them nor able to bear the burden of caring for them. Malaysia, which lies across the water from Aceh, has already seen rising illegal immigration from Indonesia, and its officials worry about the social tensions that could result. The refugee problem also figures prominently in Australian and Singaporean discussions of Indonesia. Indonesia's neighbors have other worries, as well, as they watch this wobbly behemoth. For Malaysia, one is that the Malaysian Islamic Party, already powerful in northern Malaysia, could receive a fillip were militant Islam to become more significant in Indonesia's politics as a result of the turmoil-or were it to dominate its successor states. Thailand and the Philippines, which have breakaway Islamist groups in their southern regions, fear that Indonesia's collapse could produce an undesirable demonstration effect. Papua New Guinea, which borders West Papua, could be swamped by refugees and also face an older problem: incursions from the Indonesian military in hot pursuit of Papuan guerrillas. Singapore and Malaysia have invested in pipelines carrying energy from Riau and from Indonesia's Natuna gas fields (located in the South China Sea between peninsular Malaysia and Sarawak) and are watching nervously. ASEAN, whose economic and political clout has fallen short of members' hopes, will be reduced to a salon if Indonesia, its keystone, crumbles.

Neither is it clear how Japan, China and Australia would react to various scenarios in Indonesia. Few convergent interests unite them, and history has done much to divide them. This augurs ill for cooperation on economic assistance, refugee relief, piracy, or peacekeeping to stem Indonesia's unraveling or to deal with the consequences if that proves impossible. Indeed, anarchy in Indonesia

could start a scramble among these states that is driven more by fear, uncertainty and worstcase thinking than by the opportunistic pursuit of advantage. A process leading to sponsorship of competitive proxy proto-statelets that rise from Indonesia's wreckage is an extreme scenario, but cannot be ruled out. Beyond the general tendency of states divided by suspicion to jockey for position when uncertainty or opportunity prevails, there are other specific motives for intervention. China could be drawn into the fray if Indonesia's seven-million-strong Chinese population, which has often been a scapegoat in times of trouble, were to be victimized. Beijing's increasing concern for secure energy supplies since becoming a net importer in 1993 has already made it more assertive in the South China Sea, and could provide another motive. Given Indonesia's uncertain future, Chinese maps depicting Beijing's jurisdiction over Indonesia's Natuna gas fields are a worrisome portent, particularly for Malaysia and Singapore, who envision energy pipelines from this site. Japan would move cautiously if Indonesia begins to resemble a lost cause, but it depends on Indonesia's straits and owns most of the ships that ply them. Tokyo cannot remain utterly passive if Indonesia's crisis disrupts the Japanese economy, or if others states assert their interests in ways that could do so. Indonesia's importance for Australia goes beyond the significance of the Lombok-Makasar passage. In a region being shaped by China's growing power, Indonesia, by virtue of its location and size, is central to Australian national security. Its collapse would lay waste to much of Australia's strategic planning. The consequences of Indonesia's breakup would affect American interests, as well. American energy and raw materials companies (Exxon-Mobil, Texaco, Chevron, Newmont Mining, Conoco and Freeport-McMoRan, among others) operate in Indonesia, particularly in Aceh, Riau, and West Papua, and many of the ships that traverse the Strait of Malacca are American-owned. The United States is also a major trader and investor in East Asia and is to some degree hostage to its fate, especially now that the American economy is

if Indonesia fractures, worst-case thinking and preemptive action among its neighbors could upset regional equilibrium and undermine the American strategic canopy in East Asia. The United States has a network of bases and alliances and 100,000 military personnel in the region, and is slowing. Moreover,

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism considered the guarantor of stability by most states-a status it will forfeit if it stands aside as Indonesia falls apart. America's competitors will scrutinize its actions to gauge its resolve and acumen. So will its friends and allies-Australia, Japan, Singapore, Thailand and South Korea-each of whom would be hurt by Indonesia's collapse.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism IMPACT – SOUTH ASIA Indian federalism is critical to end the Kashmir conflict The Hindu ‘01 (7-14, Lexis) It is unfortunate that the BJP has never really understood Indian federalism except as a means to grab power and public attention for itself and its allies. The BJP's stance on abolishing Article 370 which confers a special status on Kashmir reveals its malunderstanding of India's federal structure. Again, the Nagaland ceasefire which has exercised Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam shows an inability to recognise the distinctness of each State. Indian federalism is quite unique - even more so than the Chinese's after Hong Kong and Macao joined their Union. What is at issue in the Indo-Pakistan talks is Indian federalism. India is as, if not more, varied as Europe. But, India has chosen federalism as its vehicle for pulling the subcontinent together. Pakistan and some of the Kashmiri groups are threatening the "balkanisation" of Kashmir. This is not an idle threat. We have witnessed a balkanisation process in the former Yugoslovia regions. A similar gameplan is being pushed for Kashmir by Pakistan and its contrived allies. If this is accepted for Kashmir, it will apply to other regions to put the very concept of India at risk. India's stance at these talks has to be founded on the twin principles of secularism and federalism. The BJP seems to understand both imperfectly. To each group and part of India, India offers autonomy, its sense of uniqueness, democracy, the rule of law and a sensitive and equitable federalism. The fundamental principle is Delhi does not rule India. India rules India. This is the key which unlocks the secret of Indian democracy and governance.

The impact is extinction Fai ‘01 (Ghulam Nabi, Executive Director, Kashmiri American Council, Washington Times, 7-8) The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe.

____ Federalism is critical to Indian stability --- tilting too much causes conflict Bagchi ‘03 (Amaresh, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, Publius, Fall) Relations between state and national governments are difficult everywhere, and in India the Center has to tread with caution, following clear rules and acting transparently. Fortunately, federalism allows for flexibility and adaptation. Maintaining an appropriate balance between the Center and the states in a federation is, to quote Buchanan again, "like keeping a satellite in place, with centrifugal and centripetal forces keeping each other in check". (51) The game is surely worth the candle especially where, as in India, the stakes are large. It may not be an exaggeration to say that the stability of India as a nation depends critically on the strength of its federal structure. Any weakening of that structure could be disastrous for the subcontinent, if not for the world.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism =====STATES CP=====

1NC – STATES COUNTERPLAN Text --- The 50 United States State Governments and relevant U.S. territories should ______________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ _______________. Contention 1 --- Competes based on disads linked to Federal Government action. Contention 2 --- Solvency STATES SOLVE -- BEST SUITED FOR RENEWABLES PROMOTING RENEWABLES AND THEY ENCOURAGE FEDERAL MODELING Dr. Harlan L. Watson, Senior Climate Negotiator and Special Representative and Head of the U.S. Delegation to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, “Statement to the Second Meeting of the Plenary,” 12-4-2003 (http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/2003/26894.htm) Finally, I would like to highlight the efforts being made by State and local governments in the United States to address climate change. Geographically, the United States encompasses vast and diverse climatic zones representative of all major regions of the world -- polar, temperate, semi-tropical, and tropical -- with different heating, cooling, and transportation needs and with different energy endowments. Such diversity allows our State and local governments to act as laboratories where new and creative ideas and methods can be applied and shared with others and inform federal policy -- a truly bottom-up approach to addressing global climate change. At the State level, 40 of our 50 States have prepared GHG inventories, 27 States have completed climate change action plans, and 8 States have adopted voluntary GHG emissions goals. In addition, 13 States have adopted “Renewable Portfolio Standards” requiring electricity generators to gradually increase the portion of electricity produced from renewable resources such as wind, biomass, geothermal, and solar energy. And, at the local level, more than 140 local governments participating in the Cities for Climate Protection Campaign are developing cost-effective GHG reduction plans, setting goals, and reducing GHG emissions.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism STATES SOLVE – GENERAL HELPERS FEDERAL INCENTIVES ARE SUBJECT TO POLITICAL WHIMS IN CONGRESS WHICH DISCOURAGES COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT -- STATES BETTER Jay Rosser, Mesa Power Company, “Mesa Power Places World's Largest Single-Site Wind Turbine Purchase Order,” PR Newswire, 5-15-2008 lexis "We have had a great response to this project," Pickens said. "We are making Pampa the wind capital of the world. It's clear that landowners and local officials understand the economic benefits that this renewable energy can bring not only to landowners who are involved with the project, but also in revitalizing an area that has struggled in recent years." Pickens envisions that large scale renewable energy projects like his Pampa Wind Project will permit the United States to become less dependent on foreign oil. Large scale renewable energy projects such as this are difficult to execute because they rely upon the Federal Production Tax Credit, which provides incentives for development of renewable energy. However, large scale renewable energy projects require commitments years in advance, while Congress has only extended the Production Tax Credit one or two years at a time.

Varying energy needs and resource abilities demand a stateled solution Taplin Professor at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California 08 (Jon, Feb 26, “Alternative Energy & New Federalism”, Jon Taplin’s Blog, http://jtaplin.wordpress.com/2008/02/26/alternative-energy-newfederalism/) One of the interesting observations I’ve had over the past few weeks is that no matter where on the political spectrum our readers are, they all believe we have to get off our oil addiction. Some of you have sent me some very cool articles on alternative energy and it now appears that both solar and wind could contribute a lot more to our power needs at a reasonable price. And in keeping with my belief that the solutions to our innovation puzzle will be regional, its obvious that every part of the country has different needs and capabilities. There is no Centralized,Top-down solution to moving away from OPEC. But as the Scientific American states, the potential for these clean energy solutions is vast.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism STATES SOLVE – ENERGY POLICY STATES SOLVE -- BETTER SUITED THAN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AT INCENTIVIZING RENEWABLES Carolyn Kaplan, Esq, Counsel in the office of the law firm of Nixon Peabody LLP (Mass), “Congress, the Courts, and the Army Corps: Siting the First Offshore Wind Farm in the United States,” Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2004 (31 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 177) While members of Congress may disagree whether to enact a national RPS, over twenty-five percent of the states have established their own. 54 A state mandated RPS creates an immediate demand for renewable energy and helps to establish a marketplace by ensuring a steady increase of installed capacity. In doing so, state-based RPSs are thought to be one of the most important factors driving the development of new renewable energy sources in the United States, and are essential for the industry's long-term stability. 55 RPS requirements vary widely from state to state. 56 [*188] In addition to RPSs, a number of states provide other incentives designed to spur the generation of renewable energy, including wind power, and to help renewable energy compete with traditional fossil fuels. 57 Examples include tax credits and exemptions, rebates, grants, loans, green-labeling requirements, green power purchasing programs, and tradable renewable certificates, in the form of green tags or renewable energy credits. 58

STATES SOLVE -- EFFECTIVELY INCENTIVIZE RENEWABLES McKinstry and Peterson ‘07 (Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Maurice K. Goddard Professor of Forestry and Environmental Resources Conservation, Pennsylvania State University, Thomas D. Peterson, Senior Research Associate at the Penn State Department of Geography and Adjunct Professor at the Dickinson-Penn State Law School, “The Implications of the New "Old" Federalism in Climate-Change Legislation: How to Function in a Global Marketplace When States Take the Lead,” Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal, 2007 20 Pac. McGeorge Global Bus. & Dev. L.J. 61)

The emergence of a new wave of state-led innovation is no more evident than in the area of climate change. An ever growing number of states have developed comprehensive programs to reduce their emissions of GHGs to achieve ambitious targets believed necessary to prevent "dangerous anthropogenic climate change." 6 These programs include a wide array of actions related to energy efficiency and conservation, renewable energy, transportation and land use efficiency, waste reduction and recycling, industrial process improvements, and forestry and agriculture conservation. In each of these action areas, state GHG reduction measures have employed a range of voluntary and mandatory implementation mechanisms, including: traditional codes and standards, new market based systems, funding mechanisms and incentives, technical assistance, negotiated agreements, disclosure and reporting, pilots and demos, and information and education. States with comprehensive climate action plans gather a portfolio of policies under a statewide target and reporting system, often accompanied by a registry to ensure recognition for early actions reducing emissions.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism STATES SOLVE – ENERGY POLICY STATES SOLVE RENEWABLE DEVELOPMENT -- PRIMARY INNOVATORS Steven Ferry, Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law School in Boston, “Renewable Orphans: Adopting Legal Renewable Standards at the State Level,” The Electricity Journal, March 2006 ScienceDirect The 2005 federal energy legislation did not move forward aggressively with regard to renewable energy resources. The void is filled by the states. Eighteen states, including every large state except Florida, have restructured and deregulated their retail electric power sectors. The so-called “renewable resource portfolio standard” is adopted in 22 of the states and the District of Columbia, and the renewable energy system benefit charge/trust fund (subsidy) is in place in 16 of the states and the District of Columbia, with additional states set to jump in. In the absence of federal energy legislation meaningfully addressing renewables beyond tax credits, these state programs become the foundation of U.S. global warming and renewable energy policy. These state polices drive American renewable energy policy into the 21st century.

STATES SOLVE ENERGY POLICY -- COMPARATIVELY MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT David Brakke, Ph.D., Dean of the College of Science and Mathematics at James Madison University, “Federalism,” Association of Women in Science Magazine, Vol 30, No 1, 2001 (http://csm.jmu.edu/brakke/Asset/Publications/AWIS_columns/Federalism_/federalism_.html) California is constructing new facilities, considering re-regulation, and will need to expand the power grid, but the near term crisis is real. The federal and state government are negotiating to solve the short-term supply/price problem. To make matters more complicated, the price of electricity and natural gas may vary dramatically within California and the price of natural gas increases from Arizona to California. Further, if California requires more power, what of its agreements to deliver power to other western states when they need it most? Who will arbitrate such disputes about access to electric power? You might ask - why didn't the federal government intervene sooner in the California's energy crisis? First, one has to consider where the authority lies. Typically, federal and state governments regulate utilities, with retail prices set by the state. The authority under which Congress could contemplate other action is unclear (national security, perhaps?) For the most part, the federal government has allowed the states to manage their own natural resources, except, to some extent, on federal lands. Single states, for example, can block a particular plan submitted by the National Marine Fisheries Service even if four or five other states might agree. Our concept of federalism has never evolved sufficiently to handle regional issues that involve a number of states or deal with sustainable resources. Given the intensity of the electric power crisis in California, its population size, and the implications for other western states, perhaps this can be a test case. Obtaining cooperation from a reticent state is difficult if not impossible. In this case, all parties will have to avoid constructing a solution that is in the best interest of any single state, particularly California. For members of Congress to look for a federal solution is interesting in itself. While some might seek federal solutions to resource management, we may also have to consider that the federal government is not well-organized to address certain problems. Its own agencies may have multiple and conflicting charges in management, policy and research. Not only might various branches of a single agency have little contact with each other, but also, and perhaps more importantly, communication between agencies is limited. Agencies have growing responsibilities through piecemeal legislative action over time, which are defended by turf battles during appropriation hearings. New program initiatives become ways to fund existing programs through repackaging. Little consideration has been given to the best ways to organize and manage for sustainable resource management overall.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism STATES SOLVE – ENERGY POLICY STATES SOLVE -- COMPARATIVELY BETTER THAN FEDERAL ACTION ON RENEWABLE ENERGY Neal Peirce, “Energy Federalism -- Has Its Time Come,” Stateline.org, 2-14-2006 (http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=136&languageId=1&contentId=88768) WASHINGTON – States are starting to come to the nation’s rescue, passing a range of energy-saving measures to counteract official Washington’s myopia on the perils of global warming and our overwhelming dependence on foreign oil. That’s the message from the state PIRGs – public interest research groups active in 30 states. They make a strong case that notwithstanding President Bush’s newfound recognition of America's “addiction to oil,” it’s in states that the most hopeful, scientifically sound energy-saving programs are taking shape. If the Bush administration is serious about moving in a new direction on energy, say the critics, there are breakthrough state strategies it can support and emulate. First, push a strong switch to such renewable energy sources as wind, solar, biomass, geothermal and other “clean” energy alternatives. By 2017, the renewable energy requirements that 20 states and the District of Columbia have already passed will save enough fossil fuel to provide electricity for 20 million homes. The Western Governors’ Association has set a goal of 30,000 megawatts of new clean energy in its region by 2015 from such sources as renewables and advanced natural-gas technologies. California has leapt to national leadership on solar energy in particular with Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger’s initiatives to reach “a million solar roofs” by 2017, the $3 billion cost covered by a modest surcharge on energy bills. The second and, advocates say, fastest and cheapest way to save energy: higher efficiency standards on machines and appliances. Frustrated by tortuously slow federal action, 10 states have set more stringent standards. Massachusetts recently led the nation with tough new efficiency standards for furnaces and boilers. If the U.S. followed suit, say the PIRGs, we’d save $4.5 billion and 1 percent of today’s natural gas consumption. Third potential: major cuts in greenhouse gas emissions from power plants. Led by New York’s Gov. George Pataki, eight Northeastern states (Maine to Maryland, Massachusetts excepted) have adopted a cap on carbon releases into the atmosphere, allowing for trading to find the least-cost ways to reduce emissions. Schwarzenegger has set a goal to cut California’s emissions to less than 2000 levels in the next five years. Oregon and Washington are moving in the same direction. Govs. Janet Napolitano (Arizona) and Bill Richardson (N.M.) have agreed to a parallel regional accord. Fourth: “clean cars” through significant reductions in carbon dioxide from auto tailpipe emissions. Ten states – California, Oregon, Washington, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Vermont and Maine – have recently gone well beyond existing federal requirements on this issue. Although automakers continue to fight the tougher requirements, the 10 states have such a huge cumulative population that their new rules are likely to remove the pollution created by 500-megawatt coal-fired plants in a year, or the national global warming emissions from all but 47 of the world’s countries today. A fifth approach: action to promote such promising fuels as ethanol and biodiesel, which are almost totally pollution-free, as substitutes for oil. State and federal deadlines to switch government fleets to biofuels would be a significant start. One reason: about $8.50 is the real price of a gallon of gasoline if one counts the costs we bear to defend the flow of Persian Gulf oil, to purchase other supplies of crude overseas, and the impact of periodic “oil shocks” to our economy, according to the National Defense Council Foundation, a conservative non-profit. Sixth: expand energy-saving light rail systems for metro regions through many more “new starts” than the federal government has so far authorized, combined with bold initiatives (also favored by many states, with Washington foot-dragging) to expand passenger and freight rail service across the country. Seventh: “green” building – every measure from improved materials and insulation to basic design and siting as a way to reduce energy demand in homes, office buildings, schools and stores. The challenge is immense: buildings account for about half of U.S. global warming emissions, and we’re adding 5 billion square feet to our existing stock each year. Federal incentives and new state regulations can help the U.S. architecture and building industry do a quick about-turn to “green” as the norm, not the exception. Why have these agendas become so critical? A two-word answer: global warming. In New Jersey, people are worried their famed shoreline will be engulfed. In Colorado, it is drought in agriculture and disappearing snows for a ski economy. Internationally, reports suggest the world may be approaching an irreversible global warming ``tipping point'' with incalculable damage to environments and economies. Americans have begun to understand the threat. State governments have started to act. With federal action already long overdue, it seems that the states for now

must be our key innovators. It's heartening that more and more of them are starting to work collectively on key energy issues. We have, in fact, little time to waste.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism STATES SOLVE – HAVE EXPERIENCE States have experience with energy regulations -- leading more than the federal government Vogel and Toffel 03 (David Vogel Professor at the Haas School of Business at UC Berkeley, Michael Toffel September, “Environmental Federalism in the European Union and the United States” http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/globus/activities/conference/papers/vogel.pdf.)

In the US, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions remain largely unregulated by the federal government. In the 1990s, the Clinton administration participated in the United Nations effort to establish a treaty governing GHG emissions. While the US signed the Kyoto Protocol, it was never submitted to the Senate for ratification. Soon after the Bush administration took office it declared it would not support the Kyoto Protocol. Also refusing to propose any regulations for carbon emissions, it instead chose to encourage industry to adopt voluntary targets, through its Global Climate Change Initiative. Legislation to amend the Clean Air Act to encompass carbon emissions has been submitted in Congress, but has yet to be voted upon. The Congress has also persistently voted down proposals to strengthen fuel economy standards. The lack of federal regulation has created a policy vacuum which a number of states have filled. While “some significant legislation to reduce greenhouse gases was enacted during the late 1990s, such as Oregon’s pioneering 1997 law that established CO2 standards for new electrical power plants...[state] efforts to contain involvement on climate change have been supplanted in more recent years with an unprecedented period of activity and innovation”. The US EPA has catalogued over 700 state policies to reduce green house gas (GHG) emissions. 65 Two recent reports describe various state-level initiatives that address climate change, either directly or indirectly. 66 “New legislation and executive orders expressly intended to reduce greenhouse gases have been approved in approximately onethird of the states since January 2000, and many new legislative proposals are moving ahead in a large number of states.”

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism STATES SOLVE – SOLAR POWER STATES INCENTIVES FOR SOLAR POWER SOLVE Solon Economou, “Endless oil supply: A myth or a reality?” Providence Journal-Bulletin (Rhode Island) May 16, 2008 lexis We all know where we are heading for true, clean, renewable and inexhaustible energy: the wind and the sun. We won t be rid of so-called fossil fuels for a generation or more, but we certainly do not need to increase or maintain our reliance on them. Even if the myth of endless oil proves to be reality, it won t matter. Technologically, we are already there with wind and solar energy. We just need to have the powers that be, both federal and state, give the right push with credits and incentives to usher in a new energy age.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism STATES SOLVE – WIND POWER STATES INCENTIVES FOR WIND POWER SOLVE Solon Economou, “Endless oil supply: A myth or a reality?” Providence Journal-Bulletin (Rhode Island) May 16, 2008 lexis We all know where we are heading for true, clean, renewable and inexhaustible energy: the wind and the sun. We won t be rid of so-called fossil fuels for a generation or more, but we certainly do not need to increase or maintain our reliance on them. Even if the myth of endless oil proves to be reality, it won t matter. Technologically, we are already there with wind and solar energy. We just need to have the powers that be, both federal and state, give the right push with credits and incentives to usher in a new energy age.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism A2: RACE TO THE BOTTOM Race to the bottom empirically denied Vogel and Toffel 03 (David Vogel Professor at the Haas School of Business at UC Berkeley, Michael Toffel September, “Environmental Federalism in the European Union and the United States” http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/globus/activities/conference/papers/vogel.pdf.)

We conclude with two general observations about the dynamics of environmental policy in the federal systems of the US and the EU. On one hand, the continued efforts of both states in the US and member states in the EU to strengthen a broad range of environmental regulations suggest that fears of a regulatory race to the bottom may be misplaced. Clearly, concerns that strong regulations will make domestic producers vulnerable to competition from products produced in political jurisdictions with less stringent standards have not prevented many states on both sides of the Atlantic from enacting many relatively stringent and ambitious environmental standards. But on the other hand, the impact of such state policies remains limited, in part because not all states will chose to adopt or vigorously enforce relatively stringent standards. Thus in the long run, there is no substitute for centralized standards; they represent the most important mechanism of policy diffusion.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism STATES SOLVE – RPS STATES SOLVE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS -- THEY ARE THE PRIMARY LEADERS Steven Ferry, Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law School in Boston, “Renewable Orphans: Adopting Legal Renewable Standards at the State Level,” The Electricity Journal, March 2006 ScienceDirect The trend has been for states – 22 to date – to adopt renewable portfolio standards. A resource portfolio requirement requires certain electricity sellers and/or buyers to maintain a predetermined percentage of designated clean resources in their wholesale supply mix. Portfolio standards set a requirement, and challenge market participants to satisfy it in any, and the most efficient, manner possible. By contract, trust funds create a discretionary gift program. This latter process will cause renewable projects to conform themselves to funding criteria, rather than to take the initiative to operate most efficiently. Political raiding of trust fund cash flows also is possible and withdrawing trust funds for general budget purposes has occurred already in Massachusetts. Portfolio standards are flexible in that certain technologies can be included in the renewables definition, or certain subgroups of technologies can be targeted for inclusion at distinct levels. The standard allows market competition to decide how best to achieve these standards. The standards become self-enforcing as a condition of retail licensure. Excess credits can be tradable; noncompliant retailers can purchase surplus credits from those who overachieve the standard. Resource portfolio requirements can be applied under any wholesale or retail competition, without placing any entities at a disadvantage.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism FEDERAL MODELING 2NC Zero solvency deficit --- state action gets modeled federally Golden ‘99 (Dylan, JD Candidate – UCLA Law, UCLA Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Lexis) Individual states vary widely in their fossil fuel consumption and in the amount of carbon dioxide they release into the atmosphere. California emits as much carbon dioxide as all of Scandinavia combined. 46 Texas is the seventh largest carbon dioxide producer. 47 Some states emit a globally negligible amount of carbon dioxide. Some conservative interests may therefore oppose the CCTI on the grounds that it involves a further expansion of federal power into an area which is properly under the jurisdiction of states. Those who believe firmly in strong state governments are similar to the "Greens" (discussed below) in that the "rent", in this case the penalty, at stake in the CCTI is non-economic. [*188] This group does have some justification for their position. Attempted state action involving manipulating markets, generally through the tax system, in the name of the environment tells us a great deal about how various stakeholders - such as business entities, environmental interest groups, and political groups - might respond to federal or international action. 48 State legislatures also provide a forum to raise issues and change perceptions. 49 State environmental policy frequently influences Congress. 50 State action increases the feasibility of federal action because: familiarity aids the political process, legislators understand the politics in terms of income, consumption and their regional interests, administrative agencies know how to [*189] administrate and may estimate impacts, interest groups know where they stand, and practical experience can guide legislative drafting. 51 Such grassroots action may also stimulate support among the populous by encouraging people to take personal responsibility for the environment. 52 Action at the state level may also spur more informed federal action, which in turn could spur international action. State-federal agreements are possible on the carbon tax issue and the commerce clause does not prohibit joint or unilateral action. 53 Energy taxes have already been implemented jointly in the case of gasoline taxes. 54

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism SOLVENCY – GENERAL State laws solve best via experimentation and competition Calabresi ‘95 (Steven G., Assistant Prof – Northwestern U., Michigan Law Review, Lexis) c. Experimentation. The possibility of competition among jurisdictions creates incentives for each jurisdiction to provide bundles of goods that will maximize utility for a majority of the voters in that jurisdiction. These bundles will not be the same, of course, because we have stipulated already that jurisdictional tastes and preferences differ, and, therefore, jurisdictional utility curves differ as well. Many jurisdictions will seek to maximize utility by trying to gain the tax dollars of residents and industry from other states. Some jurisdictions conceivably might put less emphasis on this particular goal so as to maintain a higher quality of lifefor current residents. In any event, the possibility of competition will lead inexorably to experimentation and product differentiation. 72 In a competitive situation, state governments, as competing sellers of bundles of public goods, must strive constantly to improve the desirability of their bundle lest they lose out. The end result is an incentive for state governments to experiment and improve. This is the point of Justice Brandeis's famous statement that:

States are best --- accountability Calabresi ‘95 (Steven G., Assistant Prof – Northwestern U., Michigan Law Review, Lexis) d. Improved Quality of Governmental Decisionmaking and Administration. Decentralized governments make better decisions than centralized ones for reasons additional to the whip they feel from competition. Decentralization ensures that "those responsible for choosing a given social policy are made aware of the costs of that policy." 74 This helps ensure a more informed weighing of costs and benefits than often occurs at the national level where taxpayers often may be less cognizant of the social costs of particular legislation.

State costs are lower, increasing enforcement Calabresi ‘95 (Steven G., Assistant Prof – Northwestern U., Michigan Law Review, Lexis) In addition and just as importantly, governmental agency costs often may be lower at the state level than at the national level be- [*778] cause monitoring costs may be lower where fewer programs, employees, and amounts of tax revenue are involved. The smaller size of the state governmental jurisdictions thus makes it far easier for citizens to exercise a greater and more effective degree of control over their government officials. For this reason, it often makes sense to lodge dangerous and intrusive police powers over crime and over controversial social issues in the states where government officials may be monitored more easily by the citizenry. Conversely, state governments also may find that they are able to enforce criminal laws and regulations of social mores less coercively than the national government because of the lower costs and greater ease of monitoring citizen behavior in a smaller jurisdiction. Indeed, ideally small jurisdictional size will lead to less populous state legislative districts, thus producing a greater congruence between the mores of the legislators and of the people than can exist in a continental-sized national republic that necessarily must have enormously large legislative districts and other units of representation. The greater congruence of mores between citizens and representatives in state governments in turn may produce greater civic mindedness and community spirit at the state level. This might ameliorate the highly corrosive decline of public spiritedness at the national level that has occurred as a result of the current perception that there exists a discongruence of mores between members of Congress and the public. 75

76

77

78

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism SOLVENCY – SOFT POWER States solves soft power better --- decentralization enhances the signal of U.S. commitments abroad Goldsmith ‘97 (Jack, Associate Prof – U Chicago, Virginia Law Review, November, Lexis) This analysis casts doubt on the widely held view that the states have no legitimate interest in the regulation of foreign relations. Many who hold this view are misled by the label "foreign relations," which is invariably associated with traditional foreign relations issues and thus with exclusive federal control. But the issues implicated by the federal common law of foreign relations - state common and criminal law, choice of law, procedural law, nondiscriminatory international economic activities, and state human rights activities - differ significantly from traditional foreign relations matters. Concurrent authority over these nontraditional foreign relations matters are much less likely to undermine the United States' ability to participate in international affairs, and much less likely to harm the national foreign relations interest. And, in contrast to state activities in traditional foreign relations contexts, many affirmative benefits accrue from the decentralization of these new foreign relations functions. For example, nontraditional state foreign relations activities such as international trade activity and involvement in the international human rights movement assist both the U.S. government and third parties. 248 Subnational foreign relations initiatives increased awareness about the United States' economic policies against oppressive regimes in South Africa and Myanmar. 249 [*1678] Similarly, the State and Commerce Departments approve of the manifold state international economic activities presumably because they find that decentralization of these activities serves U.S. interests more effectively than centralized federal control. 250

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism A2: STATES = RACIST Double-bind --- either there’s no link because the only action the CP takes is the plan and that isn’t racist or this links to the Aff too because they enact the same plan ---- there’s no way the states could spin it in a racist manner Non-unique ---- their evidence is just descriptive of the status quo ---- state policies occur extremely frequently, so racism is already entrenched now Claims of state racism are a myth ---- Courts will block Timothy Zizk, William and Mary Law Review, Oct 2004 v46 i1 p213(131) Statehood as the new personhood: the discovery of fundamental "states' rights". Perhaps it was not institutional incompetence or necessity that led the Garcia Court to purport to leave the federalism area, and that has led the Court more generally to avoid, at least until recently, an expansive rights regime for states. Perhaps, as Baker and Young contend, individual rights like abortion and sexual privacy are simply "normatively more attractive than states' rights." After all, the phrase "states' rights," for many, conjures a host of negative associations, including, for some, virulent racism. It is possible, therefore, that the Court, and many scholars as well, have been "read[ing] particular values out of the Constitution simply because popular opinion at a given point in history finds them normatively unattractive." This proposition cannot, of course, be tested empirically. There may indeed have been some residual judicial ill will toward "states' rights" due to its association with bad actors, both public and private, in our nation's past. It seems unlikely, however, that in 1985, when Garcia was decided, the Court rested its decision to curtail fundamental "states' rights" federalism on these sorts of negative associations. It probably gives too little credit to the Court, and to scholars, to suggest that modes of judicial enforcement or scholarly support are based primarily upon "changing normative preferences" or mere popularity. Even if one is not willing to give judges and scholars such credit, it is surely a stretch to paint the "states' rights" of National League of Cities with the same brush as the old "states' rights" of segregationists. The "states' rights" of what might be considered the modern era--freedom from federal wages and hours regulations, for example--are hardly the sort that invoke segregationist ghosts.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism -----PERMUTATION-----

A2: PERM – DO BOTH Links to politics because it includes proactive federal action Permutation tanks solvency Joseph F. Zimmerman, Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York at Albany, 2001 PUBLIUS, Spring, p 16) Examining this list, it becomes apparent that different institutional features of the federal structure are more or less important for securing these different values. Some of the values - diversity, competition, and experimentalism - appear to depend significantly on the existence of many states pursuing unique regulatory agendas. If all of the states pursued identical regulatory strategies, or were prevented from instituting meaningful agendas altogether, these values, as a logical matter, could not be promoted. Obviously there would be no regulatory diversity, because all of the states would structure the lives of their citizens in the same way. Moreover, this uniformity would prevent state competition and experimentation: people would have no incentive to "vote with their feet" if each state provided the same package of public goods, and experimentation by definition requires that different states attempt different solutions to the same social problems.

Links to the federalism disad ---- exclusivity of state power is key Gardbaum ‘97 (Stephen, Associate Prof – Northwestern U., Texas Law Review, March, Lexis) [*796] Despite their diametrically opposed conclusions, however, a fundamental premise is shared by both sides in this long-standing debate -- a premise that characterizes almost all analyses of American federalism. This shared premise is that the existence of areas of exclusive state power is a necessary condition of constitutional federalism: in order for federalism to operate as a principle of constitutional law, there must in practice (and not merely in rhetoric or national myth) be areas of regulatory authority reserved exclusively to the states -- areas in which Congress cannot regulate. Given this shared premise, the debate has focused on whether or not such areas currently exist constitutionally speaking, and its content consists largely of arguments for and against various proposed textual bases for them. Leading candidates over the years have included the Commerce Clause, 6 the Tenth Amendment, 7 and the Guarantee Clause. 8

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism -----POLITICS NB-----

POLITICS NET BENEFIT The President can’t take credit for state action Danielson ‘95 (Michael, Prof PoliSci @ Princeton, Regulating Regional Power Systems, p. 57)

State action is below the political radar

Court action avoids the link CSM ‘97 (Christian Science Monitor, 6-25, Lexis) Today this holds true even more. In one sense, the reason is obvious: With divided government and partisan sniping in Washington, when politicians must create a TV image and constantly raise funds, the scholarly-looking justices seem a refreshing alternative. They come out in black robes from behind red silk curtains, and everyone stands. They ask incisive questions. They

disappear. It looks like competence personified. And there's some truth to it. The members of the court don't need to campaign for office every few years. They were selected for life. They don't need speech writers or have to check the polls. The current justices, unlike earlier courts, generally write their own opinions. They are free to dissent, and their rulings are not tied to interest-group pressure. Moreover, as an institution, the court is uniquely constituted. It is not one targetable political persona, as is a single chief executive. Yet it is smaller than a Congress of 535 people. Congress is covered by TV four times as much as the court is. The White House is covered eight times as much, says Lee Epstein of Washington University in St. Louis. The court stands out now because it is not part of Washington's political swamp. The carefully cultivated aloofness of the Supreme Court is, in the Washington scene, almost countercultural in nature. The court's warts don't show. "People don't see the court infighting; it seems more harmonious and less political," says one court-watcher. "With Congress and the White House, we see the blood-letting on the street." Importantly, say scholars, current justices benefit from courageous stands the court took in cases like Brown school desegregation, and the Roe abortion-rights case - when the majority was fragile and the justices felt under great pressure. Those decisions are a main reason the court image is so buffed today. Justices Don't Have to

Wade in Washington Swamp

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism -----THEORY-----

2NC – 50 STATE FIAT DEFENSE 1NC evidence proves states can do the plan, proving its both a necessary test of the Aff and predictable Reciprocal --A) The Aff uses the federal government, which has thousands of actors B) They fiat state and local enforcement --- and if not, the plan would be rolled back No abuse --- the counterplan fiats all state in unison, which is functionally 1 actor Federal key warrants check --- they’re easy to find and beat the counterplan regardless of how many actors it fiats Reject the argument, not the team OFFENSE Increases Aff ground --- they can read multiple disads to state action Increases education --- allows debate about many state governments and local politics

STATES CP IS A KEY TEST IN THE CONTEXT OF ENERGY POLICY -- KEY FOR POLICYMAKING AND EDUCATION David Brakke, Ph.D., Dean of the College of Science and Mathematics at James Madison University, “Federalism,” Association of Women in Science Magazine, Vol 30, No 1, 2001 (http://csm.jmu.edu/brakke/Asset/Publications/AWIS_columns/Federalism_/federalism_.html) As we approach the 250th anniversary of the birth of James Madison, father of the U.S. Constitution, it is fitting to discuss federalism in relation to science, policy, and resource management in the 21st Century. Madison was a brilliant man of ideas and ideals, and federalism is sound in principle. However, it can be a messy construct in practice, and particularly difficult to balance with state's rights. This is especially apparent in applications to energy policy and sustainable resource management. Issues of federalism and state's rights are central to the ability of science to inform environmental decisions at the regional and national level.

Key to test the phrase “federal government” in the resolution, which is a central issue Columbia Encyclopedia ‘01 (http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/f/federalg.asp) FEDERAL GOVERNMENT [federal government] or federation, government of a union of states in which sovereignty is divided between a central authority and component state authorities. A federation differs from a confederation in that the central power acts directly upon individuals as well as upon states, thus creating the problem of dual allegiance. Substantial power over matters affecting the people as a whole, such as external affairs, commerce, coinage, and the maintenance of military forces, are usually granted to the central government. Nevertheless, retention of jurisdiction over local affairs by states is compatible with the federal system and makes allowance for local feelings. The chief political problem of a federal system of government is

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism likely to be the allocation of sovereignty, because the need for unity among the federating states may conflict with their desire for autonomy.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism 2NC – 50 STATE FIAT Checks topic explosion --- the States counterplan forces “Federal Key warrants” to exist before many Affs become popular, acting as a topicality-like limit on research Best policy option justifies ---- it’s the most real world standard, which is educational Its real world – the NCCUSL proves Pryor ‘01 (C. Scott, Associate Prof – Regent U. School of Law, American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review, Spring) n7 NCCUSL is a national organization of practicing lawyers, judges, law professors, and others appointed by the governors of each of the states. NCCUSL drafts uniform laws in various fields and then proposes them to the various state legislatures for adoption. See Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 586 (1998) (describing problem of "capture" in drafting process); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 651 (1995) (stating that problems stemming from reliance on "illinformed generalists" and influence of interest groups may be unavoidable for any official organization whose goal is to foster uniformity of state laws).

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism =====LOPEZ CP=====

LOPEZ CP 1NC Text --- In an appropriate test case, the United States Supreme Court should issue a narrow ruling that federal authority over _______________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ________ commandeers the states’ legislative functions in violation of the 10th and 11th Amendments. The Supreme Court should devolve authority of this narrow ruling to the State Governments and United States Territories. The 50 States and relevant U.S. territories should __________[Insert Plan]_______________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ________ ______________________________________________________________________________ _______. Contention 1 --- Competes based on disads linked to Federal Government action. Contention 2 --- Solves The Court can make this ruling and devolve power to the states --- it won’t be rolled back Miller ‘98 (Mark A., Attorney at Law – Baker Botts LLP, Cleveland State Law Review, Lexis) The history of the Tenth Amendment is an appropriate starting point in the development of substantive federalism. For a long period of time, the Tenth Amendment operated as nothing more than a plain statement of the obvious that afforded little protection to the states. 249 In the aftermath of Garcia, state sovereignty was left to the political processes. 250 Tenth Amendment power was reborn in New York v. United States when the Court held that Congress could not commandeer the states' legislative function. 251 This protection is decreed no matter how strong the federal interest in the legislation may be. 252 Protections over state sovereignty were expanded again in the 1996 Term when the Court invalidated certain portions of the Brady Act. 253 According to Printz, Congress cannot force the states' executive branches to enact federal regulatory programs regardless of the federal interest involved. 254 Whenever the structural framework of dual sovereignty is compromised, the Tenth Amendment steps in to prevent a usurpation of federalism. 255 Printz and New York held that Congress was incapable of commanding the states to take a course of action that it could not undertake directly. 256 But what happens if Congress breaches the Tenth Amendment through an Article I power like the Spending Clause? Do the Court's enunciated protections extend to Article I? These are the questions that the theory of substantive federalism answers. The restraint on Article I began, to large extent, in Garcia when Justice O'Connor predicted that the Commerce power would be affirmatively limited [*191] by state autonomy. 257 The door was further opened in New York when the plenary nature of the Commerce Clause was labeled as "subversive" to the interests of state sovereignty. 258 United States v. Lopez put the first nail in the coffin when it struck down an exercise of the Commerce power as going so far as to approach a "police power of the sort retained by the States." 259 The Commerce Clause, in other words, authorizes control over interstate commerce, but does not authorize regulation of the states. 260 Seminole Tribe, however, lends the greatest support to the substantive federalism theory. The Eleventh Amendment -- a core guardian of state sovereign interests 261 -- withstands any attempt by Congress to pierce the shield of federalism with Article I. 262 Similar to the Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment once provided little protection to the states when Congress flexed its Article I muscle. 263 Along with the strengthening of the Eleventh Amendment, New York and Printz add to the growth of federalism and the devolution of unrestricted congressional power. The same 5-4 majority 264 has written the opinions in New York, Lopez, Seminole Tribe, and Printz, and it is only a matter of time before the rationale in Seminole Tribe is extended to the Tenth Amendment as a limit on the Spending Clause. 265 Substantive federalism presents the argument that the Tenth Amendment will be used in much the same manner as the Eleventh Amendment was used in Seminole Tribe. If a core principle of state sovereignty will be encroached upon by an Article I power, the

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism Tenth Amendment prohibits the intrusion. 266 On the other side of the coin, Congress must look to the Tenth Amendment and ask whether its proposed legislation will impinge upon principles of federalism. If substantive federalism can operate to

block congressional action under the Commerce Clause, then it can also curtail the Spending power. 267

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism LOPEZ CP 1NC STATES SOLVE -- BEST SUITED FOR RENEWABLES PROMOTING RENEWABLES AND THEY ENCOURAGE FEDERAL MODELING Dr. Harlan L. Watson, Senior Climate Negotiator and Special Representative and Head of the U.S. Delegation to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, “Statement to the Second Meeting of the Plenary,” 12-4-2003 (http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/2003/26894.htm) Finally, I would like to highlight the efforts being made by State and local governments in the United States to address climate change. Geographically, the United States encompasses vast and diverse climatic zones representative of all major regions of the world -- polar, temperate, semi-tropical, and tropical -- with different heating, cooling, and transportation needs and with different energy endowments. Such diversity allows our State and local governments to act as laboratories where new and creative ideas and methods can be applied and shared with others and inform federal policy -- a truly bottom-up approach to addressing global climate change. At the State level, 40 of our 50 States have prepared GHG inventories, 27 States have completed climate change action plans, and 8 States have adopted voluntary GHG emissions goals. In addition, 13 States have adopted “Renewable Portfolio Standards” requiring electricity generators to gradually increase the portion of electricity produced from renewable resources such as wind, biomass, geothermal, and solar energy. And, at the local level, more than 140 local governments participating in the Cities for Climate Protection Campaign are developing cost-effective GHG reduction plans, setting goals, and reducing GHG emissions.

Extending the Lopez precedent is critical to send strong signal encouraging federalism worldwide --- this solves global war and promotes economic growth Calabresi ‘95 (Steven G., Assistant Prof – Northwestern U., Michigan Law Review, Lexis) The prevailing wisdom is that the Supreme Court should abstain from enforcing constitutional limits on federal power for reasons of judicial competence and because the Court should spend essentially all its political capital enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment against the states instead. This view is wrong. First, the rules of constitutional federalism should be enforced because federalism is a good thing, and it is the best and most important structural feature of the U.S. Constitution. Second, the political branches cannot be relied upon to enforce constitutional federalism, notwithstanding the contrary writings of Professor Jesse Choper. Third, the Supreme Court is institutionally competent to enforce constitutional federalism. Fourth, the Court is at least as qualified to act in this area as it is in the Fourteenth Amendment area. And, fifth, the doctrine of stare [*831] decisis does not pose a barrier to the creation of any new, prospectively applicable Commerce Clause case law. The conventional wisdom is that Lopez is nothing more than a flash in the pan. 232 Elite opinion holds that the future of American constitutional law will involve the continuing elaboration of the Court's national codes on matters like abortion regulation, pornography, rules on holiday displays, and rules on how the states should conduct their own criminal investigations and trials. Public choice theory suggests many reasons why it is likely that the Court will continue to pick on the states and give Congress a free ride. But, it would be a very good thing for this country if the Court decided to surprise us and continued on its way down the Lopez path. Those of us who comment on the Court's work, whether in the law reviews or in the newspapers, should encourage the Court to follow the path on which it has now embarked. The country and the world would be a better place if it did. We have seen that a desire for both international and devolutionary federalism has swept across the world in recent years. To a significant extent, this is due to global fascination with and emulation of our own American federalism success story. The global trend toward federalism is an enormously positive development that greatly increases the likelihood of future peace, free trade, economic growth, respect for social and cultural diversity, and protection of individual human rights. It depends for its success on the willingness of sovereign nations to strike federalism deals in the belief that those deals will be kept. 233 The U.S. Supreme Court can do its part to encourage the future striking of such deals by enforcing vigorously our own American federalism deal. Lopez could be a first step in that process, if only the Justices and the legal academy would wake up to the importance of what is at stake.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism LOPEZ CP 1NC Economic stagnation causes global nuclear war Mead ‘92 (Walter Russell, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, New Perspectives Quarterly, Summer, p. 30) The failure to develop an international system to hedge against the possibility of worldwide depression- will open their eyes to their folly. Hundreds of millions-billions-of people around the world have pinned their hopes on the international market economy. They and their leaders have embraced market principles-and drawn closer to the West-because they believe that our system can work for them. But what if it can't? What if the global economy stagnates, or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor. Russia. China. India-these countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the 1930's.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism COURT CAN DEVOLVE Supreme Court can devolve authority to the states David M. Sprick, Doctoral Candidate & Lecturer in the Department of Political Science @ UMKC, Capital University Law Review, 1999 (27 Cap. U.L. Rev. 529) Federalism is “a constitutional principle involving a distinctive territorial division of powers, usually a special approach to representation within the national government, and mechanisms both legal and political [*530] to settle interlevel disputes.” 3 Others have described federalism as that which “as a matter of law centers on the division of authority between the federal and the state governments,” 4 or as the “dispersion of political power,” 5 or “a system of authority constitutionally apportioned between central and regional governments.” 6 The Constitution sets forth the boundaries of federalism with the enumeration of Congress’ powers in Article I, Section 8; the undefined powers implied by the Necessary and Proper Clause; 7 the General Welfare Clause; 8 the Supremacy Clause; 9 and the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of powers to the states “or to the people.” 10 By defining to whom powers not delegated are reserved, the Tenth Amendment provides “an express federalism marker” and interrelates the amendment with constitutional and political federalism. 11 The Tenth Amendment states, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 12 This amendment has been the rallying cry for devolutionists in the political branches concerned with excessive federal power. Moreover, the Tenth Amendment’s reemergence in constitutional decisions has not gone unnoticed by Supreme Court watchers. The Court seems to be reestablishing itself as the “umpire of federalism,” 13 a role it all but abdicated in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 14 when it told the states they could find better constitutional protection from the “procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system.” 15 [*531] In a series of recent casesU.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 16 United States v. Lopez, 17 and Printz v. United States 18 -the Court reversed its thinking in Garcia and is umpiring the federal system once again. More importantly, the Court appears to be divided over both the meaning of the Tenth Amendment and the first principles of American federalism. “The Justices’ opposing. asymmetrical positions [on federal power] can be discerned by juxtaposing Term Limits with United States v. Lopez.” 19 It is possible to add the recent Printz decision to such an analysis because the same factions within the Court, with respect to federalism, formed to limit federal power once again.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism FEDERALISM NET BENEFIT The Lopez precedent is critical to reinvigorate federalism Calabresi ‘95 (Steven G., Assistant Prof – Northwestern U., Michigan Law Review, Lexis) The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Lopez 2 marks a revolutionary and long overdue revival of the doctrine that the federal government is one of limited and enumerated powers. After being "asleep at the constitutional switch" for more than fifty years, the Court's decision to invalidate an Act of Congress on the ground that it exceeded the commerce power must be recognized as an extraordinary event. Even if Lopez produces no progeny and is soon overruled, the opinion has shattered forever the notion that, after fifty years of Commerce Clause precedent, we can never go back to the days of limited national power. The Lopez Court has shown us that we can go back, if we want to, so long as: 1) we can figure out a workable theory of the limits on the federal commerce power; 2) we can agree on the propriety of vigorous judicial review in federalism cases; and 3) we can take proper account of the important reliance interests that have accrued around certain key precedents decided in the past half century. 3

Extending the Lopez precedent restores federalism Calabresi ‘95 (Steven G., Assistant Prof – Northwestern U., Michigan Law Review, Lexis) The very real danger is that the Supreme Court will end up conferring legitimacy on congressional and presidential usurpations of state power that might be resisted more vigorously in the absence of federal judicial review. The advantages of constitutional federalism will not be obtainable if the Court hands down decisions like Lopez only once every ten years. National judicial umpiring of federalism boundaries will be useful only if the courts invalidate usurpations with some frequency, thus justifying the public confidence that the judiciary really is doing its duty in this category of cases.

The counterplan is a symbolic victory for federalism Ernest Young, Law Professor, University of Texas, TEXAS LAW REVIEW, November 2004, pp. 135-6 The structure of the Court's current Commerce Clause doctrine bears this conclusion out. The Court has conceded that the national economy has become integrated to the extent that there is no meaningful distinction between intra-and inter-state commerce; rather, there is just "commerce." And the Court has also eschewed any effort to compartmentalize the various forms of economic activity, as it once sought to distinguish between "commerce" and "manufacturing" or "agriculture." Now all of these things are "commerce"; that term, the Court has made clear, comprehends all "economic activity." Nonetheless, it is important to maintain some enforceable limit on the Commerce Clause. Precisely because these cases are so high profile, they play an important symbolic role. As I have already suggested, they may serve an important process function of reminding Congress to consider the limits of its powers when it acts. At the same time, limits on the Commerce Clause are closely linked to the states' autonomy; those limits, after all, preserve a zone of regulatory authority that Congress may not preempt. This is true even though the particular statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison were not preemptive - that is, they did not forbid parallel state legislation on the same subjects. If Congress were to attempt to supplant state autonomy to make regulatory decisions over physicianassisted suicide or gay marriage, for example, Lopez and Morrison would likely offer the most promising basis for challenging such legislation.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism A2: ROLLBACK Fiat ensures no rollback from any branch. Its justified – A) Reciprocal – legislation can be over turned by Congress, the Court, or not signed by the President – our fiat is no different and is key to fair ground. B) Ground – durable fiat ensures the Aff doesn’t lose solvency on backlash and ensures negative disad ground. C) Education – it’s the only way to debate about what could happen instead of what happens now This jacks the Aff – if the plan is inherent, it’d get rolled back too and you should vote negative on presumption. Congress won’t rollback state action --- even when controversial Goldsmith ‘97 (Jack, Associate Prof – U Chicago, Virginia Law Review, November, Lexis) The rise in subnational foreign relations activity tells us little, of course, about the activity's normative desirability. But we should also avoid the automatic assumption that this development is normatively undesirable. This is especially true because the federal political branches have made clear that, in contrast to traditional foreign relations activities which largely have been federalized through statute and treaty, they do not always, or even usually, prefer federal regulation of these new foreign relations issues. The recent increase in state and local involvement in such issues "has occasioned little reaction from Congress or the Executive." 232 And when the political branches do react, they often choose to protect state interests over foreign relations interests when the two appear to clash. A good example is the United States' recent ratification of a variety of international human rights treaties. 233 These treaties create numerous potential [*1675] conflicts with state law. 234 In the face of international pressure, the President and Senate have consistently attached reservations, understandings, and declarations to these treaties to ensure that they do not preempt or affect inconsistent state law. 235 Similarly, California's worldwide unitary tax on multinational corporations has provoked enormous diplomatic controversy with our closest trading partners since the 1980s. 236 The President negotiated a treaty that would have preempted this law, but the Senate withheld its consent. 237 And in the face of substantial pressure from foreign governments, Congress consistently failed to enact legislation preempting the unitary tax. 238

Even if there’s preemption, it doesn’t take out solvency Goldsmith ‘97 (Jack, Associate Prof – U Chicago, Virginia Law Review, November, Lexis) Even when the political branches enact preemptive federal foreign relations law, they often do so in a manner that reflects the interests of the states and minimizes intrusion on their prerogatives. When Congress codified the international law standards for determinations of foreign sovereign immunity, it ensured that otherwise-applicable state law would continue to govern the merits of such suits. 239 Similarly, in federal implementing legislation for the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), "political sensitiv- [*1676] ity to state sensibilities were [sic] reflected in several ways." 240 Most significantly, the legislation "precluded the agreements from having any direct effect, and indeed required an action by the United States Government for the purpose of striking down a state law." 241 In addition, the federal government has actively cooperated with and supported the unilateral state economic activities described above. 242 The overtly political international activities of states, such as nuclear-free ordinances and state divestment movements, are more controversial. For example, Congress by statute overruled several governors' resistance to allowing the participation of national guard troops in Central American military activities in the mid1980s. 243 But Congress declined to preempt the most notorious recent state foreign relations activity - state sanctions against South Africa - when it enacted the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 244 and Massachusetts's recent sanctions against Myanmar 245 soon led to similar sanctions by the federal government. 246

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism A2: UNIFORMITY Fiat solves --- all 50 states act at once and establish the same law --it’d be uniform. Links to the Aff ---

Federal law isn’t uniform either

Goldsmith ‘97 (Jack, Associate Prof – U Chicago, Virginia Law Review, November, Lexis) There is thus good reason to believe that an asymmetry in likely political branch responses privileges judicial mistakes in creating a federal common law of foreign relations. The doctrine also suffers from other serious problems. Its standard-like inquiries suggest that its promise of uniformity in federal foreign relations law is illusory. There is every reason to expect that judges who lack training and expertise in foreign relations will reach different conclusions about the foreign relations consequences of particular state acts. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that most of the federal common law of foreign relations is made by the relatively decentralized lower federal and state courts. Casual empiricism confirms the prediction of nonuniformity. The many cases in which judges federalize an issue under a foreign relations rubric are matched by many similar cases in which judges, because they view the foreign relations effects of applying state law differently, decide to apply state law. [*1695] This means that both the source and the content of the law are uncertain in these cases - hardly the good the federal common law of foreign relations is thought to serve. 307

No impact --- lack of uniformity doesn’t affect solvency Calabresi ‘95 (Steven G., Assistant Prof – Northwestern U., Michigan Law Review, Lexis) a. Responsiveness to Local Tastes and Conditions. The opening argument for state power is that social tastes and preferences differ, that those differences correlate significantly with geography, and that social utility can be maximized if governmental units are small enough and powerful enough so that local laws can be adapted to local conditions, something the national government, with its uniform lawmaking power, is largely unable to do. Consider here the following example offered by Professor McConnell: Assume that there are only two states, with equal populations of 100 each. Assume further that 70 percent of State A, and only 40 percent of State B, wish to outlaw smoking in public buildings. The others are opposed. If the decision is made on a national basis by a majority rule, 110 people will be pleased, and 90 displeased. If a separate decision is made by majorities in each state, 130 will be pleased, and only 70 displeased. The level of satisfaction will be still greater if some smokers in State A decide to move to State B, and some anti-smokers in State B decide to move to State A. As McConnell's example shows, federalism can produce, at least in some admittedly abstract situations, a net gain in social utility. This lends credence to the argument made above that federalism sometimes can alleviate the problem of raw majority rule, the key problem generated by democratic government. 66

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism A2: HEG DA State involvement in foreign affairs is non-unique --A) High now Goldsmith ‘97 (Jack, Associate Prof – U Chicago, Virginia Law Review, November, Lexis) Third, as foreign relations has expanded to include formerly domestic concerns, the participants in foreign relations have changed. National governments do not enjoy a monopoly over the conduct of foreign relations as conceived in modern times. Throughout the world, subnational units like the U.S. states have joined international organizations, multinational corporations, and other non-national actors in the conduct and regulation of international affairs. This in part reflects the fact that our conception of foreign affairs has changed to include many [*1674] matters under the traditional control of subnational units. But it also reflects the more active role that subnational units (and other non-national actors) have taken in transnational political and economic affairs. As international markets and means of communication have expanded, subnational units have become increasingly aware of, affected by, and in contact with foreign elements. To the extent that central governments are unable or unwilling to redress local needs and interests, state and local governments have been doing so unilaterally in both the economic and political realms. 228

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B) Its increasing Goldsmith ‘97 (Jack, Associate Prof – U Chicago, Virginia Law Review, November, Lexis) In short, foreign relations is no longer "a distinct issue area: it is about "something' and that "something' has come to embrace [*1677] an increasingly large number of issues once assumed to be the preserve of domestic politics." Foreign relations includes many matters traditionally regulated by states. States are increasingly engaged in activities that were formerly the sole responsibility of the federal government. The political branches do not always (or even usually) prefer national foreign relations interests over state interests, or uniform federal regulation to non-uniform state law regulation of an issue, even if the issue provokes complaints from foreign governments. 247

The ‘one-voice’ argument is dumb Goldsmith ‘97 (Jack, Associate Prof – U Chicago, Virginia Law Review, November, Lexis) In this light, the oft-stated but little-analyzed notion that state activity prevents the federal government from speaking with "one voice" in foreign relations makes little sense. The federal government itself rarely speaks with one voice in foreign relations. 286 Foreign relations law is replete with struggles between the statute-makers, the treaty-makers, the President, and sometimes the courts, for control of the federal foreign relations voice. 287 As Edward Corwin correctly noted, the Constitution's [*1689] allocation of foreign relations power among the political branches is an "invitation to struggle" for control of the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. 288 The Constitution does not purport to limit activity that affects foreign affairs to a single person or voice; at best, it provides a mechanism for final authoritative decisionmaking in foreign relations. 289 In addition, it is difficult to see how state activities could ever prevent the federal government from exercising its foreign relations powers. The federal political branches always retain the power to preempt state law or activity. 290 Any argument that federal preemption is not always available assumes a breakdown in the federal political process of precisely the sort that I have just questioned.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism A2: PRECEDENT DA’S Fiat solves --- our counterplan has the Court devolve in a “narrow ruling” that won’t create precedent

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism A2: NO TEST CASE Fiat solves --- the counterplan requires the court to rule, regardless of a case. Precedent exists --- the court could just extend Lopez The court can always find a case David Adamany, Professor @ Wayne State, The American Courts: A Critical Assessment, 1990 p.9 Since Congress adopted the Judges Bill of 1925, most cases on the appellate and miscellaneous dockets have been by writ of certiorari — a request for the justices to hear cases that they may, but are not required, to hear. Under Supreme Court Rule 17, which gives broad categories of cases that the Court may hear, at least four justices must agree to hear a case before it is considered by the Court. Some cases on the appellate docket have been “appeals by right,” certain cases involving the constitutionality of state or federal laws or state constitutional provisions. By law, the Court was required to hear these cases; but the justices developed broad discretion by rejecting cases that failed to pose a substantial federal question as defined by the justices. In 1988, Congress revised the law virtually to eliminate appeals by right, thus giving the justices almost complete choice about what cases to decide. With more than 5.000 cases pending annually, the Supreme Court can almost always find a case to raise any policy issue that the justices wish to decide. Chief Justice Earl Warren apparently asked his law clerks to fmd a case on the Court’s docket that would allow the justices to overrule a previous decision holding that there was no right for the poor to have an attorney in every criminal trial. The clerks found such a case, and the Court used it to announce a new constitutional rule guaranteeing the right to counsel (Danelski and Danelski 1989, 508). The Court has sometimes gone to great lengths to find the issue it wants to decide. In the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio (367 U.S. 617 [1961]), the Court held that illegally seized evidence could not be used in state criminal trials. But the dissenting justices accused the majority of “reaching out” to find that issue in the brief of amicus curiae, because the jurisdictional statements, briefs, and oral arguments of the parties had all been devoted to First Amendment free speech issues. Where the Court cannot find an issue on its docket, it may order parties to argue an issue that the justices want to consider. Over the strong objection of four justices that the majority was raising “a question not presented” by the parties, five justices ordered the parties in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (485 U.S. 617 [1988]) to rearue the case to determine whether the Court’s 1976 interpretation of a federal civil rights statute should be reconsidered and changed. The majority pointed out four previous cases within the past twenty years when the Court had also ordered reargument to determine whether an earlier decision should be reconsidered and changed.

The court doesn’t need a test case

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism A2: PERM – DO BOTH Links to politics because it includes proactive federal action Severs the guaranteed nature of the plan because the counterplan rules the plan illegal. Severance is a voting issue because it destroys all negative ground. Intrinsic --- the perm results in inter-branch cooperation which is in neither the plan nor the counterplan. This is a voting issue because it allows the Aff to add anything to the plan to get out of our best arguments. Links to the federalism disad ---- exclusivity of state power is key Gardbaum ‘97 (Stephen, Associate Prof – Northwestern U., Texas Law Review, March, Lexis) [*796] Despite their diametrically opposed conclusions, however, a fundamental premise is shared by both sides in this long-standing debate -- a premise that characterizes almost all analyses of American federalism. This shared premise is that the existence of areas of exclusive state power is a necessary condition of constitutional federalism: in order for federalism to operate as a principle of constitutional law, there must in practice (and not merely in rhetoric or national myth) be areas of regulatory authority reserved exclusively to the states -- areas in which Congress cannot regulate. Given this shared premise, the debate has focused on whether or not such areas currently exist constitutionally speaking, and its content consists largely of arguments for and against various proposed textual bases for them. Leading candidates over the years have included the Commerce Clause, 6 the Tenth Amendment, 7 and the Guarantee Clause. 8

The permutation causes inefficiency, taking out solvency

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism A2: PERM – DO THE CP Severance --A) The counterplan rules jurisdiction for the plan illegal, severing guaranteed enforcement of the plan. B) Voting issue because severance allows the Aff to shift out of all Neg ground. Not topical --- the states implement the plan, violating the phrase “Federal Government” which means at a national level. Wholly nontopical permutations are a voting issue because they prove that the Aff has shifted from the 1AC. The counterplan is mutually exclusive Weinburg ‘95 (Louise, Professor Jurisprudence – U Texas, Brigham Young University Law Review, Lexis) In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 40 an [*745] important 1984 case, the Supreme Court placed certain state-law claims within the truly exclusive jurisdiction of state courts. The Court found constitutional authority in the Eleventh Amendment to hold that state-law claims for injunctive relief against local officials may not be heard by federal courts in their pendent jurisdiction over federal civil-rights claims. Pennhurst blocks federal court orders restraining state officials from violating state law. Pennhurst thus devolves upon the states an exclusive jurisdiction over all injunction suits against local authorities when pleaded as a matter of state law.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism 2NC – LOPEZ FIAT DEFENSE 1NC Miller evidence proves speaks of the exact process of the counterplan, proving its both a necessary test of the Aff and predictable Reciprocal --A) The Aff uses the federal government, which has thousands of actors B) They fiat state and local enforcement --- and if not, the plan would be rolled back Reject the argument, not the team Err Neg --- the Aff has structural advantages like 1st and last speech and the ability to choose their plan OFFENSE Increases Aff ground --- they can impact turn the Supreme Court or state action Crucial to force genuine “Federal key” warrants --- States counterplans alone allow the Aff to manipulate current jurisdiction to avoid this --- and, that’s important for education Columbia Encyclopedia ‘01 (http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/f/federalg.asp) FEDERAL GOVERNMENT [federal government] or federation, government of a union of states in which sovereignty is divided between a central authority and component state authorities. A federation differs from a confederation in that the central power acts directly upon individuals as well as upon states, thus creating the problem of dual allegiance. Substantial power over matters affecting the people as a whole, such as external affairs, commerce, coinage, and the maintenance of military forces, are usually granted to the central government. Nevertheless, retention of jurisdiction over local affairs by states is compatible with the federal system and makes allowance for local feelings. The chief political problem of a federal system of government is likely to be the allocation of sovereignty, because the need for unity among the federating states may conflict with their desire for autonomy.

Checks topic explosion --- the Lopez counterplan forces “Federal Key warrants” to exist before many Affs become popular, acting as a topicality-like limit on research Critical thinking --- the most advanced strategies involve using different agents and carving logical net-benefits Best policy option justifies ---- it’s the most real world standard, which is educational

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism =====AFF===== -----FEDERALISM----UNIQUENESS – FEDERAL INCENTIVES NOW FEDERAL INCENTIVES FOR WIND NOW Space Daily, “US Wind Industry Installs 1,400 MW In First Quarter In 2008,” 5-14-2008 lexis With the fate of a key federal incentive in the balance, the U.S. wind energy industry continued new installations at a breakneck pace in the first quarter of 2008, putting 1,400 megawatts (MW) or approximately $3 billion worth of new generating capacity in place, the American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) said in it's quarterly market report. "These new wind power plants-enough to serve the equivalent of 400,000 homes--coupled with investment in 17 new manufacturing facilities over the past year and a quarter show that - with consistent policy support - America's wind industry can deliver the goods in terms of clean energy and new clean technology jobs," commented AWEA Executive Director Randall Swisher.

STATE AND FEDERAL INCENTIVES FOR SOLAR POWER NOW Elizabeth Suh, “German pair see an off-green ethos,” The Oregonian (Portland, Oregon) May 8, 2008 lexis In the United States, federal legislators enacted an income tax credit for solar energy projects in 2005 and are considering extending the credit. In Oregon, legislators recently increased the tax credit for renewable energy companies and created a requirement that utilities in Oregon must obtain 25 percent of their electricity from renewable sources by 2025.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism UNIQUENESS – FEDERAL CONTROL NOW Non-unique – the federal government controls all aspects of environmental regulation Vogel and Toffel 03 (David Vogel Professor at the Haas School of Business at UC Berkeley, Michael Toffel September, “Environmental Federalism in the European Union and the United States” http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/globus/activities/conference/papers/vogel.pdf.)

In both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) responsibility for the making of environmental policy is divided between federal and EU institutions on one hand, and local institutions on the other. The former is comprised of the EU and the American federal government while the latter consist of state and local governments in the US, and member states and sub-national authorities in Europe. (For ease of presentation, we will at times refer to both of the former as central authorities and both of the latter as states.) Historically, environmental rules and regulations were primarily made at the state or local level on both sides of the Atlantic. However the emergence of the contemporary environmental movement during the late 1960s and early 1970s led to greater centralization of environmental policymaking in both the US and Europe. In the US, this change occurred relatively rapidly. By the mid 1970s, federal standards had been established for virtually all forms of air and water pollution. By the end of the decade, federal regulations governed the protection of endangered species, drinking water quality, pesticide approval, the disposal of hazardous wastes, surface mining and forest management, among other policy areas. The federalization of American environmental policy was strongly supported by pressures from environmental activists, who believed that federal regulation was more likely to be effective than at the state level.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism GENERAL NO LINK FEDERAL RENEWABLES POLICY CAN COEXIST WITH STATE POLICY -DOES NOT VIOLATE FEDERALISM Thomas D. Peterson, Adjunct Professor of Climate Studies, Pennsylvania State University, “The Evolution of State Climate Change Policy in the United States: Lessons Learned and New Directions,” Widener Law Journal, 2004 (14 Widener L.J. 81) Assuming that federal law is coming, the role of states versus the federal government needs to be constructively resolved. 197 One default would be the framework of the Clean Air Act in which states and the federal government allocate and share jurisdiction through the selective delegation and reservation of power. 198 The structure of state implementation plans is not unlike the structure of current state (or international) climate plans. One can imagine a scenario in which a segment of United States emitters is covered by national mechanisms (such as a cap and trade program) and the remainder by traditional state air quality plans. 199 A number of ancillary laws may also be addressed to deal with transportation funding, forestry and agriculture, energy efficiency and renewable energy, and other GHG sectors and issues that do not fall cleanly within the four corners of a national climate change law. The experience of states in crafting multi-agency plans may be instructive.

Not all federal restriction of state power violates federalism --specificity is key Tuskey ‘05 (John, Associate Prof – Regent U. School of Law, Capitol University Law Review, Fall, Lexis) As to the first question-where and how federalism is embodied in the Constitution-the Constitution accomplishes the division of power between the federal and state governments by empowering the federal government to exercise only those powers delegated to it in the Constitution. The Constitution establishes the federal government's three branches and sets forth the powers each branch may exercise. Implicit in this is the idea that the federal government may exercise only those powers the Constitution sets forth (or those powers fairly implied from the powers set forth). All other governmental power rests with the states or the people. The Tenth Amendment makes explicit what constitutional structure implies: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." It follows that Congress violates federalism limits when it acts outside its constitutionally delegated powers. If Congress enacts a statute that is within its power to enact, even if that statute somehow restricts state action, Congress has not violated the principle of federalism. However, if that statute is not within Congress's power to enact, Congress has violated the principle of federalism by restricting state action without constitutional [*155] authority or by usurping a power that belongs to the states or people under the Constitution. 7

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism NO THRESHOLD No risk of encroachment that’s substantial enough to alter federalism Young ‘03 (Ernest, Prof Law – U Texas, Texas Law Review, May, Lexis) One of the privileges of being a junior faculty member is that senior colleagues often feel obligated to read one's rough drafts. On many occasions when I have written about federalism - from a stance considerably more sympathetic to the States than Judge Noonan's - my colleagues have responded with the following comment: "Relax. The States retain vast reserves of autonomy and authority over any number of important areas. It will be a long time, if ever, before the national government can expand its authority far enough to really endanger the federal balance. Don't make it sound like you think the sky is falling."

Courts will check any snowball Robert F. Nagel, Law Professor, University of Colorado, 2001 (ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, March, p. 53) In what appears to be an ambitious campaign to enhance the role of the states in the federal system, the Supreme Court has recently issued a series of rulings that limit the power of the national government. Some of these decisions, which set boundaries to Congress's power to regulate commerce and to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, establish areas that are subject (at least in theory) only to state regulation. Others protect the autonomy of state governments by restricting congressional authority to expose state governments to suit in either state or federal courts and to "commandeer" state institutions for national regulatory purposes. Taken together, these decisions seem to reflect a judgment--held by a slight majority of the justices--that the dramatic expansion of the national government during the twentieth century has put in jeopardy fundamental principles of constitutional structure.

Federalism is resilient

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism NOT ZERO SUM States and Federal power aren’t zero sum --- concurrent regulation is the norm Schapiro ‘06 (Robert, Prof Law – Emory, Fordham Law Review, March, Lexis) The jurisprudence of Justice John Paul Stevens advances a strong vision of national unity. Like Justice Wiley Rutledge, for whom he clerked, Justice Stevens understands the United States Constitution as a document fundamentally designed to promote and preserve the union. The primary role of federal courts is to vindicate constitutional values, including the value of national unity. These background principles of unity provide the context for Justice Stevens's conception of federalism. In his thirty-five years on the bench, Justice Stevens has elaborated a robust theory of federalism. His theory, however, contrasts sharply with the dualist federalism that became the regnant model of the Rehnquist Court. Dual federalism, the idea that the national government and the states enjoy exclusive and nonoverlapping spheres of authority, does not describe the actual operation of government in the United States today. On the contrary, the overlap of national and state activities is ubiquitous. In areas ranging from narcotics trafficking n1 to securities trading to education, concurrent federal and state regulation is the norm. With the recent wave of national crises, including the War on Terrorism and Hurricane Katrina, the growth of state and national power and the resulting overlap in authority, seems likely to increase. Even in the more rarified atmosphere of the United States Supreme Court, the normative project of fully dividing state from federal power has little support. Since the advent of the New Deal Court in 1937, the Court no longer seeks to maintain strict boundaries between state and federal realms. On the present Court, only Justice Clarence Thomas has shown any inclination to return to the pre-New Deal conceptions of dual sovereignty.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism US FEDERALISM NOT MODELED U.S. federalism isn’t modeled abroad Newsweek ‘06 [1/31, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6857387/site/newsweek/] AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: Once upon a time, the U.S. Constitution was a revolutionary document, full of epochal innovations—free elections, judicial review, checks and balances, federalism and, perhaps most important, a Bill of Rights. In the 19th and 20th centuries, countries around the world copied the document, not least in Latin America. So did Germany and Japan after World War II. Today? When nations write a new constitution, as dozens have in the past two decades, they seldom look to the American model. When the soviets withdrew from Central Europe, U.S. constitutional experts rushed in. They got a polite hearing, and were sent home. Jiri Pehe, adviser to former president Vaclav Havel, recalls the Czechs' firm decision to adopt a European-style parliamentary system with strict limits on campaigning. "For Europeans, money talks too much in American democracy. It's very prone to certain kinds of corruption, or at least influence from powerful lobbies," he says. "Europeans would not want to follow that route." They also sought to limit the dominance of television, unlike in American campaigns where, Pehe says, "TV debates and photogenic looks govern election victories." So it is elsewhere. After American planes and bombs freed the country, Kosovo opted for a European constitution. Drafting a post-apartheid constitution, South Africa rejected American-style federalism in favor of a German model, which leaders deemed appropriate for the social-welfare state they hoped to construct. Now fledgling African democracies look to South Africa as their inspiration, says John Stremlau, a former U.S. State Department official who currently heads the international relations department at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg: "We can't rely on the Americans." The new democracies are looking for a constitution written in modern times and reflecting their progressive concerns about racial and social equality, he explains. "To borrow Lincoln's phrase, South Africa is now Africa's 'last great hope'."

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism LOPEZ CP HURTS FEDERALISM – 2AC The counterplan tanks federalism by over-delegating federal powers to the states Calabresi ‘01 (Stephen G. Prof Law @ Northwestern, Annals of the American Academy of Political And Social Science, v574, March, p. 33) I fully agree that the Court ought to approach enforcement of the commerce clause and Section 5 power with restraint and that only in cases of egregious overreaching should acts of Congress be struck down. Congressional efforts to enforce the commerce power or Section 5 deserve to be given the benefit of the doubt both because of Congress’s greater information about the real world and because Congress is a coequal interpreter of the Constitution to the Supreme Court. But giving Congress the benefit of the doubt does not mean rubber-stamping everything that Congress has tried to do, as happened from 1937 to 1995. Sometimes in extreme cases, it is valuable for the Court to remind Congress of the constitutional values of federalism, and this is what I think happened in Lopez, City of Boerne, and Morrison. In each of these cases, Congress was attempting novel federalism solutions to problems that a majority of the states seemed to be handling very well. It was accordingly appropriate for the Court to slow Congress down by forcing it to take a second look at what it had in haste done in each of these areas (Calabresi 1995).

Sudden court extension of Lopez triggers a social backlash that undermines federalism Calabresi ‘95 (Steven G., Assistant Prof – Northwestern U., Michigan Law Review, Lexis) First, I do not think the federal courts can ignore the powerful reliance interests that have grown up around the statutes enacted during and after the New Deal in reliance on a broader understanding of the Commerce Clause. Congress itself can repeal statutes for federalism reasons, as it is now doing, without worrying about considerations of precedent. The legislative process is such that new laws can be phased in over a period of many years thus accommodating reliance interests quite readily. The judicial process is much more rigid, however, and sudden mass overrulings would cause social disruption that the Court could do little to soften. The likeliest social reaction, in my view, to a sudden judicial abrogation of the New Deal would be a constitutional amendment formalizing the currently flawed case law understandings of the scope of congressional power. This result wrongly would upset the public while setting back if not destroying the cause of federalism. I therefore think it would be a grave mistake for the Court to overrule abruptly key New Deal precedents, many of which even may be defensible under the functional theory of federalism set out in Part I.

Enforcing Lopez won’t restore federalism Mouton ‘99 (H. Geoffrey, Prof Law, Minnesota Law Review, April, Lexis) Despite the Court's apparent nostalgia for a dramatically smaller national government, no judicially enforced federalism doctrine is going to undo the last quarter of the nation's history. And while cases like New York, Lopez, and Printz may on occasion stimulate important debate, such as the examination of federal criminal law that has followed Lopez, they will never have more than the most marginal relevance to the allocation decisions that matter most. Those who truly believe in the instrumental values of federalism should therefore focus not on persuading courts to undo congressional "mistakes," but rather on promoting wise institutional choice in the political process.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism FEDERALISM BAD – ETHNIC CONFLICT International federalism causes global ethnic conflicts Lake and Rothchild ‘97 (David and Donald, Political Scientists, The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, p. 212) Although regional autonomy and federalism have been used as safeguards, they have had, in some instances, unintended consequences that have actually increased conflict. Despite efforts to decentralize power in South African and Ethiopia, the fiscal dominance of the political center has tended to undercut the significance of regional authorities. Moreover, efforts to delineate boundaries have increased conflict between ethno-regional identity groups. In contemporary Russia, the arbitrary way in which internal boundaries divide ethnic people has been a major source of tensions. In Ethiopia, the regional boundaries set up by the government appear to favor Tigray and the Afars, at the expense of the formerly dominant Amhara and the Somali Isaks in the Awash Valley.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism FEDERALISM BAD – INDONESIA Federalism leads to Indonesian fragmentation Asia Week ‘2K ( 8-4, http://www.pathfinder.com/asiaweek/magazine/2000/0804/is.asianwars_sb1.html) One problem is that federalism is seen as a panacea for all woes, regardless of the idiosyncrasies of each state. It has not been particularly effective, for example, in subduing separatist movements in Canada or Nigeria. In Asia, Indonesia, the Phil-ippines and Sri Lanka are all discussing federal possibilities. But it is wrong to simply assume that anything that worked in the West will work in Asia. Here's why: Indonesia: Although the country was established as a federation of 15 autonomous states in November 1949, this structure was abandoned less than a year later in favor of a highly centralized system. The fear was that a federal organization would facilitate disintegration and weaken the identity of the people as Indonesians. The Regional Autonomy Bill, which could take effect at the beginning of 2001, promises more power and government funds to the provinces. But will mere autonomy satisfy the Acehnese, who have demanded freedom for years? Maluku declared independence in 1950, only to be taken back forcibly by the military. A form of federalism may be enough for the Malukus, where bloodshed is recent, but it may not be possible. Opponents claim it is against the Constitution. Philippines: To deal with war and development problems in Mindanao, the Senate is examining federalism as a means to resolve provincial disparities. The proposal by policial scientist Jose Abueva envisages a twostage transformation from the decentralized unitary system to a federal system by 2010. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front, however, wants a separate nation, not autonomy. Compromise is needed. Sri Lanka: Previous attempts at devolution, notably in the 1980s, failed mainly because there was no clear delineation of powers to be devolved. Unanimous agreement from Tamil parties also was absent. Last month the Tamil Tigers refused to address a government devolution plan unless Tamil self-determination was examined first. Secession, it seems, is non-negotiable. Present models of federalism presuppose a transparent democratic framework, a strong and independent judiciary to resolve jurisdiction disputes, and parties willing to bargain without resorting to violence. The fear in such countries as Indonesia is that federalism will simply foster increased regionalism, causing more enmity. If it is to work, a purely Asian solution must be devised — one not based on experiences in North America and Europe, but on the more complex and violent conflicts of former colonies.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism FEDERALISM BAD – INDONESIA Indonesian collapses destroys hegemony and the economy Menon ‘01 (Rajan, Prof International Relations – Lehigh U., The National Interest, June, Lexis) Indonesia may survive the combined assault of an ailing economy, deepening separatism, and a failing state. Such an outcome is certainly desirable, but it is not likely. American leaders must therefore brace for the possibility that Indonesia could still collapse in chaos and disintegrate in violence. Alternatively, the current instability could continue until economic recovery and political compromise give rise to a country of a rather different shape and size. With Wahid gone and Megawati in place, this is now somewhat more likely. Even the loss of Aceh and West Papua need not spell national disintegration; without such provinces Indonesia would still retain the critical mass to endure as a state. The second of these denouements is preferable to the first, but both will create strong shock waves. Indonesia's size and location are the reasons why. The three major straits that slice through it are pivotal passages for the global economy. Malacca is by far the most important, particularly for energy shipments. Some 450 vessels and about 10 million barrels of oil pass through daily, and East Asian demand, driven by China, is expected to rise from 12 million barrels a day in 2000 to over 20 million barrels in twenty years. Japan, China, Taiwan and South Korea would suffer severely and soon if fallout from turmoil in Aceh (at its northern end) or Riau (at its southern end) blocked this passage. Its narrowness, 1.5 miles in the Phillips Channel in the Singapore Strait, and ten miles between Singapore and the Riau archipelago, adds to the danger. The Lombok Strait, which ships use to sail to northeast Asia through the Strait of Makasar between Borneo and Sulawesi, is next in importance, although it handles a far smaller volume of traffic than Malacca and is of negligible importance for energy shipments. The Lombok-Makasar route is, however, a critical corridor for Australia's coal and iron ore exports to northeast Asia and for manufactured exports moving south from there. It is also the most likely detour were Malacca rendered impassable or hazardous. By comparison, Sunda is a minor shipping channel; the consequences of its closure would be minimal for transcontinental trade. Rerouting Malacca traffic through Lombok would strain the capacity of the world's merchant fleet, increase transportation costs, and create severe bottlenecks. The problems would be even worse if all three straits were unusable and ships had to transit northeast Asia by skirting Australia's northern coast. Market signals would eventually add other carrying capacity but the question is how quickly and smoothly the adjustment occurs, and what the economic and political consequences would be in the meantime. The ramifications of blocked or delayed

maritime traffic, or even just panic over the possibility, would spread speedily throughout globalization's many circuits. Insurance rates would rise; coverage may even be denied if underwriters deem the risks excessive. The effects of obstructed energy, machinery and manufactured goods would register in capital markets, short-term investors would be scared off, and the flow of much-needed foreign direct investment into a region still convalescing from the blows of 1997 would slow. Piracy in the seas around Indonesia would also worsen if the Jakarta government either ceased functioning or were so busy holding the country together that it could not police its waters. The hijacking of ships has increased since Indonesia's upheavals began. There were 113 incidents in its waters in 1999 compared to 60 the year before, and between January and March of 2001 alone, pirates attacked ships in Indonesian waters 29 times and on nine occasions in the Malacca Strait. The vessels victimized near Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia included several oil tankers and ships carrying aluminum and palm oil. The three countries began to coordinate operations against the menace in 1992, and in 2000 Japan proposed that its coast guard join the effort along with China and South Korea. Yet how serious piracy becomes, and how effective any joint solution is, depends primarily on the extent of Indonesia's stability. Refugee flows will also accelerate if Indonesia starts to break apart. The refugee population of one million already within its borders will soar, dragging the economy down further and aggravating communal violence. Refugees could also be driven beyond Indonesia into neighboring countries that are neither prepared to receive them nor able to bear the burden of caring for them. Malaysia, which lies across the water from Aceh, has already seen rising illegal immigration from Indonesia, and its officials worry about the social tensions that could result. The refugee problem also figures prominently in Australian and Singaporean discussions of Indonesia. Indonesia's neighbors have other worries, as well, as they watch this wobbly behemoth. For Malaysia, one is that the Malaysian Islamic Party, already powerful in northern Malaysia, could receive a fillip were militant Islam to become more significant in Indonesia's politics as a result of the turmoil-or were it to dominate its successor states. Thailand and the Philippines, which have breakaway Islamist groups in their southern regions, fear that Indonesia's collapse could produce an undesirable demonstration effect. Papua New Guinea, which borders West Papua, could be swamped by refugees and also face an older problem: incursions from the Indonesian military in hot pursuit of Papuan guerrillas. Singapore and Malaysia have invested in pipelines carrying energy from Riau and from Indonesia's Natuna gas fields (located in the South China Sea between peninsular Malaysia and Sarawak) and are watching nervously. ASEAN, whose economic and political clout has fallen short of members' hopes, will be reduced to a salon if Indonesia, its keystone, crumbles. Neither

is it clear how Japan, China and Australia would react to various scenarios in Indonesia. Few convergent interests unite them, and history has done much to divide them. This augurs ill for cooperation on economic assistance, refugee relief, piracy, or peacekeeping to stem Indonesia's unraveling or to deal with the consequences if that proves impossible. Indeed, anarchy in Indonesia could start a scramble among these states that is driven more by fear, uncertainty and worstcase thinking than by the opportunistic pursuit of advantage. A process leading to sponsorship of competitive proxy proto-statelets that rise from Indonesia's wreckage is an extreme scenario, but cannot be ruled out. Beyond the general tendency of states divided by suspicion to jockey for position when uncertainty or opportunity prevails, there are other specific motives for intervention. China could be drawn into the fray if Indonesia's seven-million-strong Chinese population, which has often been a scapegoat in times of trouble, were to be victimized. Beijing's increasing concern for secure energy supplies since becoming a net importer in 1993 has already made it more assertive in the South China Sea, and could provide another motive. Given Indonesia's uncertain future, Chinese maps depicting Beijing's jurisdiction over Indonesia's Natuna gas fields are a worrisome portent, particularly for Malaysia and Singapore, who envision energy pipelines from this site. Japan would move cautiously if Indonesia begins to resemble a lost cause, but it depends on Indonesia's straits and owns most of the ships that ply them. Tokyo cannot remain utterly passive if Indonesia's crisis disrupts the Japanese economy, or if others states assert their interests in ways that could do so. Indonesia's importance for Australia goes beyond the significance of the LombokMakasar passage. In a region being shaped by China's growing power, Indonesia, by virtue of its location and size, is central to Australian national security. Its collapse would lay waste to much of Australia's strategic planning. The consequences of Indonesia's breakup would affect American interests, as well. American energy and raw materials companies (Exxon-Mobil, Texaco, Chevron, Newmont Mining, Conoco and Freeport-McMoRan, among others) operate in Indonesia, particularly in Aceh, Riau, and West Papua, and many of the ships that traverse the Strait of Malacca are American-owned. The United States is also a major trader and investor in East Asia and is to some degree hostage to its fate, especially now that the American economy is slowing. Moreover, if

Indonesia fractures, worst-case thinking and preemptive action among its neighbors could upset regional equilibrium and undermine the American strategic canopy in East Asia. The United States has a network of bases and alliances and 100,000 military personnel in the region, and is considered the guarantor of stability by most states-a status it will forfeit if it stands aside as Indonesia falls apart. America's competitors will scrutinize its actions to gauge its resolve and acumen. So will its friends and allies-Australia, Japan, Singapore, Thailand and South Korea-

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism each of whom would be hurt by Indonesia's collapse.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism A2: IRAQ IMPACT Iraq models Europe, not the U.S. Rubini in 03 [Daniel L. Rubini is the Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Justice in Iraq, “Ask the White House,” 11-03, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ask/20031113.html] Scott, from Washington DC writes: Judge Rubini - What similarities does the Iraqi judiciary process have with the United States? Also, what position does Iraq have concerning International Court of Justice decisions? Thanks, Daniel Rubini In the organizational sense, the court system resembles the European process. It does not resemble U.S., although the same basic elements of preliminary investigation, trial with presumption of innocence, and right of appeal are all present. Right now we are not affected on a day to day basis by the international courts. And without further checking, I do not know what protocols previous Iraq governments signed regarding the International Courts. [Continued…] Iraq’s legal system, without rule by decree from Saddam Hussein is more like a European system based on Spanish civil codes. It is not like the American system which is inherited from the British common law system.

More evidence Rubini in 03 [Daniel L. Rubini is the Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Justice in Iraq, “Ask the White House,” 11-03, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ask/20031113.html] The first action taken by the Coalition was to roll away 35 years of thuggery and eliminate rule by decree. We did not “Americanize” the system, but have sought to reintroduce universal concepts of fundamental fairness and due process. Rule of law can and is being accomplished, and the Iraqi system resembles more the European civil code than the American system.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism A2: RUSSIA IMPACT Russia models Canada, not the U.S. RIA News ‘01 [“Some Courts In Russia Use "Canadian Model" In Their Work,” 4-28, http://english.pravda.ru/region/2001/04/28/4385.html#] The district court in the city of Kaluga (Central Russia) is leading the country's judicial system in terms of considering cases. In 1998, more than half hearings of criminal cases in that court exceeded the term stipulated by the law, stated chairman of the Kaluga district court Viktor Rakcheyev. But by the end of 2000, the number of the overdue cases accounted for only eight percent, and in the first quarter of this year - for only 0.3 percent. The secret of such a successful work of the Kaluga court lies in the fact that half a year ago this and two other courts, one in Voronezh and the other one in Kursk (central Russia), started to work in accordance with the "Canadian method" of legal proceedings. The Canadian method is used there within the framework of the Russian-Canadian four-year programme for partnership in the sphere of the judicial system. Last autumn, Viktor Rakcheyev, as a member of the delegation of judges from the district courts of Kaluga, Kursk and Voronezh, visited Canada where he familiarised himself with the activity of the Supreme Court and provincial courts of Canada. On returning home, Viktor Rakcheyev started introducing the Canadian "progressive experience." To begin with, the Kaluga judges stopped receiving law suits themselves. Today this work is being done by the judges' aides and consultants. The novelty of this procedure is that now the equality of the sides, obligatory for justice, has been ensured. Earlier, a judge, in explaining to a plaintiff how to write a law suit, actually helped one of the sides in the trial. In the future, tape recording, instead of writing protocols, customary for Russia, will be used in the Kaluga court. Computer systems will also be introduced, which will make it possible for the judges to turn any time to the experience in clerical work in other countries through the Internet.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism -----STATES-----

2AC – STATES CP Perm --- do both. Gets double solvency and solves the links. States Fiat is a voting issue --A) Plan-inclusive --- crushes Aff ground and hurts topic-specific education B) Uniformity isn’t real world --- there’s no literature for it and impossible to read offense against. C) Fiats Multiple Actors – Not reciprocal - they could fiat any combination of actors to create thousands of counterplans not grounded in the literature

Federal regulation key to an effective climate of regulation that encourages investment Vogel and Toffel 03 (David Vogel Professor at the Haas School of Business at UC Berkeley, Michael Toffel September, “Environmental Federalism in the European Union and the United States” http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/globus/activities/conference/papers/vogel.pdf.)

We conclude with two general observations about the dynamics of environmental policy in the federal systems of the US and the EU. On one hand, the continued efforts of both states in the US and member states in the EU to strengthen a broad range of environmental regulations suggest that fears of a regulatory race to the bottom may be misplaced. Clearly, concerns that strong regulations will make domestic producers vulnerable to competition from products produced in political jurisdictions with less stringent standards have not prevented many states on both sides of the Atlantic from enacting many relatively stringent and ambitious environmental standards. But on the other hand, the impact of such state policies remains limited, in part because not all states will chose to adopt or vigorously enforce relatively stringent standards. Thus in the long run, there is no substitute for centralized standards; they represent the most important mechanism of policy diffusion. Accordingly, the most important role played by state standards is to prompt more stringent central ones. Unless this dynamic comes into play, the effectiveness of state environmental regulations remains limited. It is not coincidental that the one case we have examined in which both EU and US standards are the most comparable – and relatively stringent - is automobile emissions, in which the American central government plays a critical role in setting national standards. By contrast, the lack of a central government role with respect to both packaging waste and climate change clearly reflects and reinforces the relative laxity of American regulations in these policy areas. And the EU’s more centralized policies in both areas reveal the greater vigor of its recent environmental efforts.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism 2AC – STATES CP No solvency ---- variance: A) State action lacks uniformity Goldsmith ‘97 (Jack, Associate Prof – U Chicago, Virginia Law Review, November, Lexis) Nonetheless, these concerns need not affect the legitimacy of the federal common law of foreign relations. Although federal courts might be generally unsuited to make federal foreign relations law on both legitimacy and competence grounds, the adverse

consequences of state-by-state regulation in the face of federal political branch silence might be worse. States suffer from many of the same disabilities as federal courts in this context. Moreover, federal courts, in contrast to the states, have independence from local political processes and, as a branch of the national government, are likely to be more sensitive to national foreign relations interests. Even in the absence of strategic behavior by the states, one might think that, all

things being equal, suboptimal but uniform federal judge-made regulation of foreign relations is preferable to the nonuniformity inherent in state-by-state regulation of a foreign relations issue. 213 Finally, the federal common law of foreign relations is designed to protect political branch prerogatives in foreign relations that the political branches themselves are structurally unsuited to protect. Any remaining concerns about the legitimacy or competence of the federal common law of foreign relations are thus mitigated by the political branches' ability to override judicial errors in the development of such law.

B) That tanks solvency Donahue ‘97 (John D., JFK School of Government, Disunited States, p. 42) Even when states vary, of course, there are arguments for uniformity. Institutions and individuals who live or do business in several states face the expense, bother, and confusion of coping with different (and sometimes conflicting) rules. Inconsistencies among state laws and regulations can lead to disputes of great complexity and to resolutions of limited appeal. After taking its case all the way to the Supreme Court, for example, a cruise ship operator won the right to be sued only in Florida by aggrieved passengers who had been on a trip between Washington State and Mexico.

Links to politics ---- Bush would take credit for the counterplan --- he can spin anything in his favor

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism EXT – INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATE INCENTIVES CREATE CONFUSION, DISCOURAGING COMMERCIAL APPLICATION -- FEDERAL INCENTIVES SOLVE Stephanie Bruno, “Green Building Inertia,” Times-Picayune (New Orleans), 5-18-2008 lexis When the state of Louisiana made tax credits available for the installation of wind and solar technology earlier this year, the hope was that the new incentives would ignite a booming industry in the use of renewable energy sources to power both residential and commercial developments. The pace of residential solar installations has picked up dramatically since the state tax credits were implemented, but commercial developers have hesitated to use them because they are uncertain how they intersect with federal renewable energy and new market tax credits. The state offers an income tax credit equal to 50 percent of the first $25,000 a developer spends to install a renewable energy system. Architect and developer Marcel Wisznia said it is unclear whether that credit can piggyback on a federal credit of 30 percent to make an 80 percent overall credit. "Does the federal credit apply to the balance of the expense after the state credit is applied, or does it apply to the full amount of the cost of the installation?" Wisznia asked. "It hasn't been tested yet." According to developer Pres Kabacoff, the chief executive of HRI Properties, the legislation establishing the state tax credits needs to be modified if developers are going to fully embrace renewable energy technologies and incorporate them into their plans. Kabacoff said the legislation, which was passed during the 2007 regular session, needs to be tweaked to make it easier for developers to use the state credits in conjunction with federal credits. He went to Baton Rouge recently to work on a bill that would modify the legislation, but the Legislature cannot make changes until next year, when it will take up fiscal measures.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism 2AC – LOPEZ CP Perm --- do both. Gets double solvency and solves the links. Perm --- do the counterplan. Severance is justified because the counterplan changes the normal means enactment of the plan. Lopez is illegitimate and a voting issue --A) Plan-inclusive --- crushes Aff ground and hurts topic-specific education B) Uniformity isn’t real world --- there’s no literature that assumes it and impossible to read offense against. C) Fiats Multiple Actors – Not reciprocal - they could fiat any combination of actors to create thousands of counterplans not grounded in the literature D) Counter-interpretation --- they can fiat the states but not the Supreme Court. It solves their offense and its necessary to give the Aff federal key warrants. No solvency --- Rollback: A) Congress Ignagni and Meerik ‘94 (Prof Poli Sci @ UT Arlington and UNT, Political Research Quarterly, June, v47, n2, p.358-9)

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism 2AC – LOPEZ CP B) Executive Goldsmith ‘97 (Jack, Associate Prof – U Chicago, Virginia Law Review, November, Lexis) The executive branch has special monitoring capabilities and preemptive lawmaking powers when foreign relations is at issue. As for monitoring, it is inconceivable that the executive branch will be unaware of a state's action that adversely affects U.S. foreign relations or unduly burdens the federal government's ability to conduct foreign relations. The President is the primary agent of U.S. foreign relations and the primary organ of communication with foreign governments. 266 And the executive branch receives all foreign government complaints about state activity. When the executive branch identifies harmful state foreign relations activity, it is much better positioned than Congress to address it. Foreign relations is (and is perceived to be) the President's responsibility. He is thus more accountable for foreign relations problems than Congress, and has a greater interest in redressing state-created foreign relations difficulties. The President also has a massive executive branch bureaucracy at his disposal to monitor and redress such difficulties. Importantly, the executive branch's ability to respond to these difficulties is not burdened by collective action problems to nearly the same degree as Congress. 267 In addition, the President's unique role in foreign relations enables him to redress unacceptable state foreign relations activity in a variety of ways. First, he exercises special influence on the congressional foreign relations agenda and the content of foreign relations legislation. 268 Second, he or one of his subordi- [*1685] nates can communicate directly with states on behalf of the federal government in order to influence or alter the offensive state activity. 269 Sometimes this communication is nothing more than an informal telephone call to the proper state or local official. Other times the State Department will send a formal letter to the state urging it to cease its offensive behavior. And

sometimes the executive branch will file an amicus brief in state court. 270 These means of "informal" presidential control are often employed and often, though not always, successful in changing the offending state behavior. 271 Third, the President has limited but important federal lawmaking powers that enable him, on his own, to preempt state law that adversely affects the nation's foreign relations or the political branches' ability to conduct such relations. Some of these powers derive directly from the Constitution itself. For example, incident to his power to recognize foreign governments, 272 the President can enter into international agreements that preempt state law. The most famous instance is the Litvinov Agreement, which officially recognized the Soviet Union and assigned all Soviet property in the United States to the federal government. This "executive agreement" preempted inconsis- [*1686] tent state property and creditor law. 273 It also ended state court uncertainty about the domestic effect of the Soviet Union's extraterritorial confiscations. 274

No solvency ---- variance: A) State action lacks uniformity Goldsmith ‘97 (Jack, Associate Prof – U Chicago, Virginia Law Review, November, Lexis) Nonetheless, these concerns need not affect the legitimacy of the federal common law of foreign relations. Although federal courts might be generally unsuited to make federal foreign relations law on both legitimacy and competence grounds, the adverse consequences of state-by-state regulation in the face of federal political branch silence might be worse. States suffer from many of the same disabilities as federal courts in this context. Moreover, federal courts, in contrast to the states, have independence from local political processes and, as a branch of the national government, are likely to be more sensitive to national foreign relations interests. Even in the absence of strategic behavior by the states, one might think that, all things

being equal, suboptimal but uniform federal judge-made regulation of foreign relations is preferable to the nonuniformity inherent in state-by-state regulation of a foreign relations issue. 213 Finally, the federal common law of foreign relations is designed to protect political branch prerogatives in foreign relations that the political branches themselves are structurally unsuited to protect. Any remaining concerns about the legitimacy or competence of the federal common law of foreign relations are thus mitigated by the political branches' ability to override judicial errors in the development of such law.

B) That tanks solvency Donahue ‘97 (John D., JFK School of Government, Disunited States, p. 42) Even when states vary, of course, there are arguments for uniformity. Institutions and individuals who live or do business in several states face the expense, bother, and confusion of coping with different (and sometimes conflicting) rules. Inconsistencies among state laws and regulations

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism can lead to disputes of great complexity and to resolutions of limited appeal. After taking its case all the way to the Supreme Court, for example, a cruise ship operator won the right to be sued only in Florida by aggrieved passengers who had been on a trip between Washington State and Mexico.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism EXT – CONGRESS ROLLBACK Congress can override the Courts devolution Goldsmith ‘97 (Jack, Associate Prof – U Chicago, Virginia Law Review, November, Lexis) Nonetheless, these concerns need not affect the legitimacy of the federal common law of foreign relations. Although federal courts might be generally unsuited to make federal foreign relations law on both legitimacy and competence grounds, the adverse consequences of state-by-state regulation in the face of federal political branch silence might be worse. States suffer from many of the same disabilities as federal courts in this context. Moreover, federal courts, in contrast to the states, have independence from local political processes and, as a branch of the national government, are likely to be more sensitive to national foreign relations interests. Even in the absence of strategic behavior by the states, one might think that, all things being equal, suboptimal but uniform federal judge-made regulation of foreign relations is preferable to the nonuniformity inherent in state-by-state regulation of a foreign relations issue. Finally, the federal common law of foreign relations is designed to protect 213

political branch prerogatives in foreign relations that the political branches themselves are structurally unsuited to protect. Any remaining concerns about the legitimacy or competence of the federal common law of foreign relations are thus mitigated by the political branches' ability to override judicial errors in the development of such law.

Congress will roll back contravening judicial decisions Calabresi ‘95 (Steven G., Assistant Prof – Northwestern U., Michigan Law Review, Lexis) Moreover, even when the Court is determined to resist the policy objectives of a lawmaking majority, Dahl demonstrates that "Congress and the president do generally succeed in overcoming a hostile Court on major policy issues." Dahl shows that when the Court strikes down a major national policy initiative, Congress and the President typically repass the law in defiance of the Court. These arguments, confirmed in recent scholarship, constitute an important rebuttal to those who profess fear that national judicial activism someday might lead to a dangerous weakening of the constitutional powers of the national government. 193

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Congress will respond to state intrusion in foreign affairs and roll back the CP Goldsmith ‘97 (Jack, Associate Prof – U Chicago, Virginia Law Review, November, Lexis) Nonetheless, the following observations seem appropriate. The likelihood of congressional redress for untoward state activity will increase as does the clarity and extent of the threat posed to the national interest. To the extent that state activity is less threatening, some would predict that Congress would be [*1683] less likely to respond, since constituents and organized groups tend to care little about foreign relations issues. 263 But this analysis applies, if at all, only to traditional foreign relations concerns such as foreign sovereign immunity. The GATT and North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") debates demonstrated that

as foreign relations comes to include political and economic factors that more broadly implicate organized interests, the foreign relations lawmaking process will share many of the characteristics of the domestic lawmaking process. As the GATT and NAFTA process showed, states as an interest group will become more active in protecting their interests in these contexts. But as GATT and NAFTA also showed, two countervailing factors create special pressure for the national political branches to federalize such matters. First, the expansion of the category of foreign relations enhances potential federal power and creates new incentives for federal legislators to exercise this power to obtain increased political support from interested political groups. 264 Second, the demands of globalism create pressure for legal uniformity and harmonization that can be achieved most easily at the federal level. 265 Although these observations are admittedly general, they suggest that Congress is more likely to address state activity

that harms the national foreign relations interest than it is to address other harmful state acts. But even assuming that Congress is relatively nonresponsive in this context, the need for a judge-made foreign relations law still does not follow. This is because there is another federal foreign relations lawmaker: the executive branch. [*1684]

Most Lopez rulings are overturned Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology ‘03 (Fall, p. 770) Unfortunately for the judiciary, despite Lopez and its progeny, the drive to federalize crimes continues. And though Lopez has been used to challenge many of these federal criminal laws, "to date, [Lopez] has been of assistance to few defendants." In fact, as of the summer of 1998, of the 400 Lopez challenges made to federal statutes, only three had been upheld.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism EXT – EXECUTIVE ROLLBACK The President can quickly roll back the counterplan Goldsmith ‘97 (Jack, Associate Prof – U Chicago, Virginia Law Review, November, Lexis) Much more significant than the President's constitutionally derived powers are the broad and numerous foreign relations lawmaking powers delegated to the executive by Congress. 275 Congress has delegated these powers to the executive precisely because the President has access to superior expertise and because structural advantages allow the President to take quick and decisive action. The broadest such delegation is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"). 276 Presidential lawmaking power under IEEPA is triggered by "any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States." 277 IEEPA enables the President to respond quickly to suspend or invalidate state law whose application would interfere with or impede the federal government's conduct of foreign relations. The best known example is President Carter's invocation of IEEPA to lift state-law judicial attachments on Iranian assets and suspend private (largely statelaw governed) claims against Iran as part of the deal to secure the release of the hostages in Iran. 278

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism EXT – VARIANCE State implementation varied – no uniformity Bryner ‘02 (Gary, Dept Political Science @ Brigham Young U., Environs 26 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 1, Fall) Federal agencies are believed to be insulated enough from resource-depleting communities to ensure preservationist values are pursued. When agencies fail to protect resources or reduce pollution, the solution is to replace them with more ambitious regulators and to strengthen the regulatory authority of federal officials. 2 A number of studies have compared states according to their commitment to environmental protection and found significant variation in expenditures, legal authority, methodologies to determine environmental quality, reporting [*3] requirements, enforcement actions, and in the environmental standards they are authorized to set under federal law. 3

Only federal law is uniform ---- state policies are necessarily fragmented and ineffective Morgan and Zietlow ‘05 (Denise, Prof Law – NYU Law and Rebecca, Prof U Toledo Law School, University of Cincinnati Law Review, Summer, Lexis) The limitations that the Supreme Court has placed on Congress's powers in the name of states' rights have severely weakened the one institution that has a constitutional mandate to create a nationally uniform baseline of rights of belonging and the ability to do so. Although state legislatures have played--and should continue to play--an important role in more fully developing our national understanding of what rights are necessary to belong to America, state legislation is simply not an adequate substitute for federal legislation because it must necessarily be piecemeal and varied. In contrast, Congress has greater institutional competence to determine when there is a need for rights of belonging than individual state legislatures have, only Congress can create a nationally uniform baseline of rights, and a shared understanding of rights of belonging reinforces those rights and strengthens our political community. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should not attempt to delegate Congress's role in protecting rights of belonging to state governments based on the assumption that there is parity between the institutions.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism A2: FEDERAL MODELING Spill-up effect no longer true Vogel and Toffel 03 (David Vogel Professor at the Haas School of Business at UC Berkeley, Michael Toffel September, “Environmental Federalism in the European Union and the United States” http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/globus/activities/conference/papers/vogel.pdf.)

At the same time, environmentalists and their supporters continue to be relatively influential in a number of American states. Thus in the US a major discontinuity has emerged between the environmental policy preferences of many states and those of the federal government. This in turn has meant that, unlike in the 1960s and 70s, more stringent state standards are much less likely to ratchet-up federal standards. In marked contrast to two decades ago, when the automobile emission standards of California and other states led to the strengthening of federal standards in this critical area of environmental policy, California’s recent policy efforts to use automobile emission standards to reduce greenhouse gases have produced the opposite effect: they have been legally challenged on the grounds that they violate federal fuel economy standards – an area of regulatory policy in which the federal government has exclusive authority but which it has refused to strengthen in any meaningful way for more than two decades. California’s standards have been diffused to other states, but not nationally.

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism A2: STATES BEST – GENERAL Uniform fiat takes out their competition and experimentation arguments Kansas Law Review ‘99 (November, p. 1322) If all of the states pursued identical regulatory strategies, or were prevented from instituting meaningful agendas altogether, these values, as a logical matter, could not be promoted. Obviously there would be no regulatory diversity, because all of the states would structure the lives of their citizens in the same way. Moreover, this uniformity would prevent state competition and experimentation: people would have no incentive to "vote with their feet" if each state provided the same package of public goods, and experimentation by definition requires that different states attempt different solutions to the same social problems.

State actions are incoherent and fail Jim Rossi, Buffalo Law Review, May 2006 (Harry M. Walborsky Professor and Associate Dean for Research, Florida State University College of Law, The Puzzle of State Constitutions, p 311) State constitutions present a challenge for courts within the system of American federalism. The federal constitution defines the scope of federal power, along with many protections for individual liberty. To the extent that federal authorities may be able to override subnational constitutions, as they do in many instances, n2 state constitutions seem subsidiary. State constitutions rarely speak to who is to interpret them, or to how state actors are to solve conflicts between state and federal power. Where state courts interpret state constitutions, the practice has been questioned as pallidly mimicking other jurisdictions, mindlessly following in "lockstep" the federal constitution, or, when a state does go at it alone, frequently unprincipled and incoherent - a "failed discourse." Just as some have questioned whether affording states any independent legal status is really necessary to afford adequate representation in national politics, n6 at some level one might even question whether subnational constitutions really matter at all in a federal system of government. This presents a bit of a puzzle for both federal and state courts in interpreting state constitutions. Why should federal or state courts afford state constitutions any special legal status - beyond other positive legal texts as, say, statutes - in a system where the national government possesses sufficient power to do most of the things it wishes anyway?

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ENDI ‘08 States / Federalism TERRORISM DA – 2AC Extending Lopez cripples the war on terrorism Ledewitz ‘05 (Bruce, Prof Law Duquesne University School of Law, Duquesne University Law Review, Summer, Lexis) In terms of foreign-based terrorism, it is generally conceded that national governments must control national borders, so in that context the issue of federalism does not arise. But in terms of terrorism occurring internally from whatever source, whether domestic or foreign, the situation is quite otherwise. It has been argued vigorously in the United States, for example, that, aside from taxing and spending powers, the central government lacks a regulatory police power. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently held, in cases acknowledged as reinvigorating federalism, that Congress may not regulate weapons in schools 8 or violence against women 9 and has also intimated that Congress may not regulate the crime of ordinary arson. 10 If these holdings were taken seriously, and their consistent application is in doubt 11 , they might cripple central government efforts to combat terrorism occurring within the United States. For example, terrorists in other countries have already used violence against women to accomplish their political and religious goals. Were this to occur in the United States, the Morrison case would simply have to be overruled, either expressly or impliedly, in order for Congress to respond effectively. But, to acknowledge the incapacity of the states to fight terrorism without central government leadership and control is to acknowledge that there really is, and must be, a central government police power. Yet, the acceptance of such a national police power would be taken among many in the United States to be a direct contradiction of federalism.

Impact is extinction Alexander ‘03 (Yonah, Prof, Dir – Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, Washington Times, 8-28, Lexis) contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns. Two myths in particular must be debunked Unlike their historical counterparts,

immediately if an effective counterterrorism "best practices" strategy can be developed [e.g., strengthening international cooperation]. The first illusion is that terrorism can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts - political, social and economic - are addressed. The conventional illusion is that terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced by "freedom fighters" anywhere, "give me liberty and I will give you death," should be tolerated if not glorified. This traditional rationalization of "sacred" violence often conceals that the real purpose of terrorist groups is to gain political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies. For instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to resolve national grievances [such as Jewish settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but primarily to destroy the Jewish state. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's international network not only opposes the presence of American military in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government that follows the rule of the Caliphs." The second myth is that strong action against terrorist infrastructure [leaders, recruitment, funding, propaganda, training, weapons, operational command and control] will only increase terrorism. The argument here is that law-enforcement efforts and military retaliation inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of violent revenge. Clearly, if this perception continues to prevail, particularly in democratic societies, there is the danger it will paralyze governments and thereby encourage further terrorist attacks. In sum, past experience provides useful lessons for a realistic future strategy. The prudent application of force has been demonstrated to be an effective tool for short- and long-term deterrence of terrorism. For example, Israel's targeted killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron commander of the Islamic Jihad, defused a "ticking bomb." The assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab - a top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who was directly responsible for several suicide bombings including the latest bus attack in Jerusalem - disrupted potential terrorist operations. Similarly, the U.S. military operation in Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime as a state sponsor of terror. Thus, it behooves those countries victimized by terrorism to understand a cardinal

message communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940: "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however long For without victory, there is no survival."

and hard the road may be:

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