Factor Of Time Op Desert Storm

FACTOR OF TIME : OP DESERT STORM

VISION OF DURATION OF WAR 1. Essential pre-requisite for success in war is to adopt an accurate vision as to the probable duration of war. Failure to correctly devp this vision in peacetime has serious consequences on force plg, devp of doctrine and the outcome of the war itself. Correctly esmt the duration of the war is also critical to anticipating the extent of vulnerability of a country or alliance or coalition as a whole. US Coalition 2. The plan for Op DESERT STORM was published on 16 Dec 1990. The planners saw Op DESERT STORM as an offn op to be exec immediately on being directed by higher auth and envisioned it to be acmp in Four phs, each with its own separate set of objs and time esmt. The exec of the phs was not necessarily discrete or sequential; phs could overlap as resources become available or priorities shifted. The op was to commence with ph I, Strat Air Campaign, which was expected to last six to nine days (under the cover of which, grnd forces were to mov into attk posns for the final ph of Op DESERT STORM). Ph II, Air Supremacy, was to be initiated coincident with, or immediately following ph I and expected to last from one to two days. Ph III, Battlefd Prep, was to be an extn of ph II. It was anticipated that this ph might commence during the short ph II, if AD sys had been degraded, and would last for about a week. Ph IV, Grnd Offn Ops, would commence approx Three weeks after the launching of Op DESERT STORM. Though the planners did not specify in writing exactly how long they expected this ph to last, an assumption was that it would be completed within a week. Thus, it can be seen that US had envisioned the duration of the war to be about Four to Five weeks (which was in fact the time it took to achieve its objs eventually). Iraq 3. Early in the crisis, Saddam announced that “if war breaks out between the US and Iraq . . . the harm inflicted on the invaders will be even more severe than what they experienced in Vietnam, and Iraq will come out on top.” Central was his assumption that the US and the coalition possessed only two options – a long and costly war, or sanctions − and that the coalition would not hold together long enough for either to have a significant impact on Iraq. In a newspaper interview published shortly after the invasion, Saddam stated that “if need be, Iraq could fight for Three, Four, or Five or Six yrs.” Conversely, if the US chose to impose permt sanctions, Iraq was “prep . . . to stand this for yrs.” Thus, it can be seen that Saddam was way off the mark in correctly assessing the likely duration of war, a fact which contributed in large measure to his defeat. .

TIME FOR PREP 4. Time between formal declaration of war and commencement of hostilities depends on the mob of comb forces and their subsequent mov to conc areas in order to be available for being applied in battle. The ideal sit would entail adequate availability of time for build-up of comb forces in the intended theatre of ops before declaration of war and outbreak of hostilities. Iraq 5. The conflict between Iraq and Kuwait had actually begun three decades earlier, when, in Jun 1961, Iraq refused to recognize the newly-indep state of Kuwait and threatened to occupy it. The factor of Iraq possessing the largest mil in the region and the resultant power asymmetries with its neighbors coupled with Iraq's post-war eco crisis provided the backgrnd to the invasion of Kuwait. In Apr 1990, Iraq sent a confd letter to Kuwait accusing it of territorial encroachments, and in Jul, tensions reached a crisis pt when Iraq publicly accused Kuwait of eco aggression by exceeding its OPEC quota and driving down the price of oil. The actual prep for the invasion may have begun in May 1990 and the rapid dply of eight Republican Gd divs with 120,000 tps and 1,000 tks to the bdr with Kuwait in late Jul is evidence of a certain amount of prior plg. However, the Gulf war started w/o a formal declaration of war, as seen from the sudden and unilateral initiation of hostilities by Iraq on 02 Aug 1990. US Coalition 6. Auth for Use of Force. On 29 Nov 1990, a resolution by the UNSC auth the use of force for the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait. 7. The International community was caught unprepared by the sudden Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. However, the US started prep for commencement of hostilities immediately as is evident from the desp of 82 nd Airborne and several fighter sqns to the region on 07 Aug 1990, marking the commencement of Op DESERT SHIELD. In Nov 1990 President George Bush ordered addl dply of US forces in the region to give it an ‘Offensive Option’, well before the formal auth for use of force by the UNSC. On 12 Jan 1991, the US Congress finally auth the use of mil force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait and its coalition partners followed suit immediately. Op DESERT STORM actually commenced on 16 Jan 1991, a day after expiry of the UN deadline for Iraq to withdraw unilaterally from Kuwait, with the US coalition commencing hostilities by bombing mil tgts in Baghdad as also other areas of Iraq and Kuwait. The allied grnd forces aslt began on 23 Feb 1991 and by 26 Feb Kuwaiti resistance ldrs had taken over cont of Kuwait city. President Bush ordered a ceasefire on 27 Feb and it was formally accepted on 03 mar 1991, bringing the mil part of Op DESERT STORM to an end. From 16 Jan through 28 Feb 1991, the US and its allies conducted one of the most operationally successful wars in history.

8. Hence, it can be seen from the above that though Op DESERT STORM actually commenced on 16 Jan 1991, prep for it had begun in full measure as early as Aug 1990 immediately after the invasion of Kuwait, a period of almost Six months. This period was utilized by the international community, especially the US and its traditional allies, to renew their commitment to international peace and pledge their contribution to the Kuwaiti cause. Had adequate time not been afforded, it may not have been possible for the coalition forces to contribute and dply the kind of force level which they eventually did, as enumerated below:-

PLG AND REACTION TIME 9. A favourable geo-strat posn of a country or its allies can considerably facilitate the timely build-up and dply of forces in conc areas and their subsequent mov to assy areas. Reaction time to unforeseen action could be shortened considerably if forces are on alert or a higher state of comb readiness. Reaction time can be shortened, especially in times of crisis or sudden outbreak of hostilities, by dply of forces in fwd areas or areas of potential trouble. Pre-positioning of wpns and eqpt at various strat loc worldwide also significantly reduce the time needed to react to any cgy requiring the emp of mil forces. US Coalition 10. The roots of US presence in the geo-strat Persian gulf region lay in the necessity for unrestricted access to oil. The first mil response, necessitated by the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, was the formation of a permanent unified comd (Central Comd) in 1983, which led to a mil strat of deterrence through force proj. This HQ began designing strat, plans and devp of regional airfds as the hub of US efforts to proj power into the Gulf region. 11. The collapse of the Soviet Union during the latter part of the decade removed the maj threat to the gulf region against which most mil plg had been done. However, in 1989, the new Def Plg Guidance emphasized the imp of US interests in Southwest Asia and it envisioned the necessity for def the Arabian Peninsula against regional military threats, the most likely being from Iraq. Force projection was critical; hence, the plan relied heavily on early dply of USAF assets to demonstrate resolve and to asst surface forces should grnd comb become necessary. The modest force package envisioned earlier was considered too lt to counter a potential Iraqi force and therefore, the US grnd, naval, and marine amph forces were significantly incr and American air power was augmented. 12. As a consequence of the above, US decided to dply its Fifth Fleet in the Persian gulf and part of Indian ocean. It is because of the presence of the Fifth Fleet that the US could react to the sudden invasion of Kuwait with such speed. Moreover, the strat loc of its coalition partners in the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, coupled with the existence of a concrete plan for offn mil intervention in the region much before the origins of the crisis at hand assisted the US in timely build-up and dply of the reqd force levels. The speedy build-up of US forces is best illustrated by the eg below :Aircraft USAF + Marines +Army + Navy + JTF

01 Nov 90 2132

16 Jan 91 3428

Iraq 13. Following the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam adopted a confrontational stance towards his Arab neighbors and abandoned his accommodating wartime policies. These steps alienated a maj chunk of the Arab world and in spite of Saddam’s boast that in a protracted war, Iraq “will not remain alone” due to the mob of popular opinion in the Arab world, none of them, with the inconsequential exception of Jordan, came to his rescue. Therefore, Iraq could not optimize its geo-strat posn in the Arab world. 14. It remains unclear when Saddam initiated plg for the invasion or when he decided to invade Kuwait but there is some evidence to suggest that his planners may have commenced their efforts as early as Jan 1990. However, they had only planned for the invasion of Kuwait and did not utilize the available time to plan for a possible offn action against them by US led coalition forces. Another Iraqi failure was the lack of detailed info and int about coalition build-up and intentions which eventually left them with no reaction time to prep for the massive onslaught by the coalition forces. .