Evidence-case-digests-1-42.pdf

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

1) Armed Forces of the Philippines vs Republic of the Philippines KEYWORD: AFP Land Registration; Authority of Witness DOCTRINE: There is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a witness for a party to present some form of authorization to testify as a witness for the party presenting him or her. All that the Rules require of a witness is that the witness possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided therein. FACTS: Petitioner filed an Application for Registration of Title over three parcels of land located in West Bicutan, Taguig City, before the RTC of Pasig City. The said application was later docketed and raffled to Branch 68 of the court a quo. These three parcels of land constitute a land grant by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1218, issued by former President Fidel V. Ramos on May 8, 1998. The application was filed by Mr. Honorio S. Azcueta (Mr. Azcueta), the then Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner, who was duly authorized to do so by the Board of Trustees of the petitioner, as evidenced by a notarized Secretary’s Certificate dated August 18, 2003. After due posting and publication of the requisite notices, and since no oppositor registered any oppositions after the petitioner met the jurisdictional requirements, the court a quo issued an order of general default against the whole world, and the petitioner was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. The petitioner then presented as its witness, Ms. Alma P. Aban (Ms. Aban), its Vice President and Head of its Asset Enhancement Office. She testified, inter alia, that: among her main duties is to ensure that the properties and assets of petitioner, especially real property, are legally titled and freed of liens and encumbrances; the subject properties were acquired by the petitioner through a land grant under Presidential Proclamation No. 1218; prior to Presidential Proclamation No. 1218, the Republic of 1| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

the Philippines was in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and peaceful possession and occupation of the subject properties in the concept of an owner to the exclusion of the world since time immemorial; petitioner, after the Republic of the Philippines transferred ownership of the subject properties to it, assumed open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and peaceful possession and occupation, and exercised control over them in the concept of owner, and likewise assumed the obligations of an owner; petitioner has been paying the real estate taxes on the subject properties; and the subject properties are not mortgaged, encumbered, or tenanted. Subsequently, petitioner submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence, following which, the court a quo granted the application in a Decision dated April 21, 2008. In response, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 12, 2008, wherein it argued that the petitioner failed to prove that it has personality to own property in its name and the petitioner failed to show that the witness it presented was duly authorized to appear for and in its behalf. On February 17, 2009, the court a quo issued an Order granting the Motion for Reconsideration of the OSG on the ground that the petitioner failed to prosecute its case. ISSUE: Whether the court a quo acted contrary to law and jurisprudence when it dismissed petitioner’s application for land registration on the ground that petitioner failed to prosecute the subject case. RULING: YES. Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides only three instances wherein the Court may dismiss a case for failure to prosecute. An action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute in any of the following instances: (1) if the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of trial; or (2) if he fails to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the Rules of Court or any order of the court. Once a case is

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and is understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. In other words, unless there be a qualification in the order of dismissal that it is without prejudice, the dismissal should be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and is with prejudice. First, the petitioner did not fail to appear at the time of the trial. In fact, the Decision of the RTC dated April 21, 2008 ordering the registration of petitioner’s title to the subject lots shows that the petitioner appeared before the Court and was represented by counsel. Records would also reveal that the petitioner was able to present its evidence, and as a result, the RTC rendered judgment in its favor. Second, the petitioner did not fail to prosecute the subject case considering that it appeared during trial, presented Ms. Aban, who gave competent testimony as regards the titling of the subject lots, and the court a quo never held petitioner liable for any delay in prosecuting the subject case. Third, a perusal of the records would demonstrate that the petitioner did not fail to comply with the Rules or any order of the court a quo, as there is no ruling on the part of the latter to this effect. Indeed, there was no basis for the court a quo’s ruling that the petitioner failed to prosecute the subject case, because none of the grounds provided in the Rules for dismissing a case due to failure to prosecute is present. On the alleged lack of authority of the witness, Ms. Aban, to testify on behalf of the petitioner. (Related to Evidence Class) The SC ruled that there is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a witness for a party to present some form of authorization to testify as a witness for the party presenting him or her. No law or jurisprudence would support the conclusion that such omission can be considered as a failure to prosecute on the part of the party presenting such 2| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

witness. All that the Rules require of a witness is that the witness possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided therein. Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualifications based on privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. As a general rule, where there are express exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the operation of a statute and no other exception will be implied. The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein. Hence, Ms. Aban is qualified to testify as a witness for the petitioner since she possesses the qualifications of being able to perceive and being able to make her perceptions known to others. Furthermore, she possesses none of the disqualifications described above. The OSG and the court a quo did not question the Verification/Certification of the application, and neither did they question the authority of Mr. Azcueta to file the subject application on behalf of the petitioner. Case records would reveal that the application was signed and filed by Mr. Azcueta in his capacity as the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner, as authorized by petitioner’s Board of Trustees. The authority of Mr. Azcueta to file the subject application was established by a Secretary’s Certificate attached to the said application. The asseveration that the subject case was not prosecuted by a duly authorized representative of the petitioner is thus unfounded.

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

2) Alvarez vs Ramirez KEYWORD: Arson by hubby DOCTRINE: The martial disqualification rule is not absolute and admits of exceptions such as when the relationship of the husband and wife is already strained that the preservation of the marriage the two is no longer an interest the State aims to protect. FACTS: Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN for arson pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent. The private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection. Note (sa later part sa case nani gi discuss): Maximo Alvarez set Susan Ramirez’ house knowing fully well that his wife, Esperanza was there. Their relationship was already strained and that they already separated de facto six months prior to the incident. ISSUE: WON Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in the case for Arson RULING: Yes. The marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions. As a general rule, Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. — During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or 3| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

the latter's ascendants."

direct

descendants

or

The reasons given for the rule are: 1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife; 2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury; 3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and 4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.|||

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect. At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because (as stated by this Court in Francisco), "it was the latter himself who gave rise to its necessity." 3) Guerrero vs St. Claire’s Realty and Co. KEYWORD: St. Claire DOCTRINE: Dead man’s statute applies only if the defending party is sued in his representative capacity. FACTS: Petitioners’ original and amended complaints alleged that during their lifetime the spouses Isidoro Guerrero and Panay Ramos were the absolute owners of the disputed property, which is a parcel of land located at San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal. During their lifetime the land were conveyed to Andres Geurrero, one of their son and took possession over the property. Shortly after the beginning of the Japanese occupation, Andres Guerrero entrusted the land to his sister, Cristina Guerrero, and allowed her to have the property cultivated and to retain the owner’s share in the harvests. Subsequently, Andres died, and his surviving heir succeeded but, it was around this time that a relative named Manuel Geurrero came forward and told them the property they were supposed to inherit from their father, Andres, was already owned by Manuel Geurrero.

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It was discovered by the heirs of Andres that Manuel Geurrero supposedly bought the property from their aunt Christina. So, the heirs of Andres went to court and filed an action to recover the property. At this time, the property was already owned by St. Claire, who bought it from the relatives of Manuel Geurrero, who in turn bought the property from Manuel Gerrero himself. There were already series of transfers, from Manuel Gerrero to St. Claire. During trial, they presented witnesses(Laura and Jose Cervantes) to prove that Manuel Geurrero did not acquire ownership over the property, because, Christina who purportedly executed a deed of sale in favor of Manuel Geurrero, was not the real owner as the real owner was Andres Guerrero. Also, they tried to prove that the actual transaction entered into was not a sale but a mortgage to guarantee the loan obligation of Christina Defendants Guerreros filed a written motion to disqualify Laura Cervantes as a witness on the basis of Section 20(a), Rule 130, of the New Rules of Court. On November 16, 1973, the trial court granted the motion and declared that Laura Cervantes, Jose Cervantes as well as other witnesses similarly situated, are disqualified to testify in the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the witnesses Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes were correctly disqualified from testifying in the case and their testimonies excluded on the basis of Section 20(a), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court. RULING: Upon the facts and under the law, this Court is fully persuaded that the affirmative rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were made in error. The plain truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and neither are they assignors of the parties nor

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

"persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not Cristina Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned the disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did not really sell but merely mortgaged the property to Manuel Guerrero.chanr "Following this rule of construction, it may be said that incompetency to testify established in the provision above quoted, affects only the persons therein mentioned, and no others, that is, only parties plaintiff or their assignors, persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. Mere witnesses who are neither parties plaintiff, nor their assignors, nor persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, are not included in the prohibition.” Moreover, the present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of the dead man’s rule. "It has been held that statutes providing that a party in interest is incompetent to testify where the adverse party is dead or insane, must be applied strictly in accordance with their express wording, irrespective of their spirit. The law uses the word ‘against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person.’ It should be noted that after the mention of an executor or administrator the words or other representative follows, which means that the word ‘representative’ includes only those who, like the executor or administrator, are sued in their representative, not personal, capacity. 4) Goni vs CA KEYWORD: Sale of Hacienda; Recovery of Property and Damages

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DOCTRINE: The adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or communications with the deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse party must be confined to those transactions or communications which were had with the agent. FACTS: The Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas [TABACALERA] owned the three (3) haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria situated in the Municipality of Bais, Negros Oriental. Sometime in 1949, the late Praxedes T. Villanueva negotiated with TABACALERA for the purchase of said haciendas. As he did not have sufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva with the consent of TABACALERA, offered to sell Hacienda Sarria to one Santiago Villegas, who was later substituted by Joaquin Villegas. Private respondent Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA. Villanueva further contracted or promised to sell to the latter (Vicente) fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria for the sum of P13,807.00. Vicente thereafter advised TABACALERA to debit from his account the amount of P13,807.00 as payment for the balance of the purchase price. However, as only the amount of P12,460.24 was actually needed to complete the purchase price, only the latter amount was debited from private respondent’s account. The difference was supposedly paid by private respondent Vicente to Villanueva, but as no receipt evidencing such payment was presented. Subsequent to the execution of the contract/promise to sell, Villanueva was able to raise funds by selling a property in Ayungon, Negros Oriental. He thus went to private respondent Vicente for the purpose of rescinding the contract/promise to sell. However, as the amount of P12,460.24 had already been debited from private respondent's account, it was agreed that lots 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

Maria would merely be leased to private respondent Vicente for a period of five (5) years. On December 10, 1949, TABACALERA executed a formal deed of sale covering the three haciendas in favor of Villanueva. Fields Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria were thereafter registered in the name of Villanueva. Meanwhile, Fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to private respondent Vicente. On November 12, 1951, Villanueva died. Intestate proceedings were instituted, among the properties included in the inventory submitted to the court were fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria. Private respondent Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property and damages. He sought to recover field no. 3 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria, basing his entitlement thereto on the contract/promise to sell executed by the late Praxedes Villanueva in his favor on October 24, 1949. The trial court rendered a decision ordering therein defendants-heirs to deliver to Gaspar Vicente field no 3, to execute a formal deed of sale covering fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 in favor of Vicente. CA affirmed lower Court. ISSUE:

1. May Gaspar Vicente testify on matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, which constitutes a claim or demand upon his estate, in violation of Rule 130, sec. 20 par. (a) ? 2. May not a written promise to sell dated October 24 1949 be novated into a verbal agreement of lease during the lifetime of the promisor, whose death occurred on November 12, 1951, by facts and circumstances substantiated by competent oral evidence in this case?

RULING: 1. YES. Gaspar Vicente is qualified to testify on matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva. Under ordinary circumstances, private respondent Vicente would be disqualified by 6| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

reason of interest from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, such disqualification being anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute. The object and purpose of Rule 130, Sec. 20 par. (a) is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased. The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the latter had been distributed to them, remains within the ambit of the protection. The reason is that the defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives" of the deceased, not only because they succeeded to the decedent’s right by descent or operation of law, but more importantly because they are so placed in litigation that they are called on to defend which they have obtained from the deceased and make the defense which the deceased might have made if living, or to establish a claim which deceased might have been interested to establish, if living. HOWEVER, the protection under the Rules, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined private respondent Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff’s deposition is taken by the representatives of the estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased’s lifetime." It must further be observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against private respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and surrender of fields nos. 13 and 14. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva,

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

said action not having been brought against, but by the estate of representatives of the estate/deceased person. Under the great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or communications with the deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse party must be confined to those transactions or communications which were had with the agent. The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20 (a) of Rule 130, where one of the parties no longer has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of the other because death has permanently sealed the former’s lips, does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the reason that petitioner Goni could and did not negate the binding effect of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the existence of the said contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goni testified that the same was subsequently novated into a verbal contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria. 2. YES. The contract was validly novated. Novation takes place when the object or principal condition of an obligation is changed or altered. In order, however, that an obligation may be extinguished by another which substitutes the same, it is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with each other. The novation of the written contract/promise to sell into a verbal agreement of lease was clearly and convincingly proven not only by the testimony of petitioner Goñi, but likewise by the acts and conduct of the parties subsequent to the execution of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, after the milling season of crop year 1949-50, only fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to private respondent Vicente. Fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 were subsequently registered in Villanueva's name. Villanueva likewise executed a deed of sale covering Hacienda Sarria in favor of Joaquin Villegas. All these were known to private respondent Vicente, yet he did not take any steps toward asserting and/or protecting his claim over 7| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 either by demanding during the lifetime of Villanueva that the latter execute a similar document in his favor, or causing notice of his adverse claim to be annotated on the certificate of title of said lots. 5) Tongco vs Vianzon KEYWORD: “Widow asked for annulment of decrees of lots issued in the name of the conjugal partnership after husband’s death” DOCTRINE: Dead Man’s Statute; the suit must involve a claim against the estate of the deceased; the law was designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not designed to suppress the truth. FACTS: Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon contracted marriage on July 5, 1984. Marcelino died on July 8, 1925, leaving Anastacia as his widow. Shortly before the death of Marcelino, he had presented claims in a cadastral case in which he had asked for titles to certain properties in the name of the conjugal partnership. Corresponding decrees for these lots were issued in the name of the conjugal partnership. After the death of Marcelino, the Judge of First Instance in a cadastral case rendered a decision annulling decrees Nos. 191390, 191504, and 190925, as well as the original certificates of title Nos. 3247, 3298, and 3297 and ordering that in lieu thereof new decrees and certificates of title be issued as the exclusive property of Anastacia. A motion for new trial by counsel for the losing party was denied. In an action for recovery of specified property filed by the administratrix of the estate against Anastacia on July 19, 1926, a judgment was rendered by Judge Rovira couched in the following language: "Therefore, the court renders judgment absolving the defendant from the complaint in this case, and only declares that one-half of the value of the shares in the Sociedad Cooperativa de Credito Rural

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

de Orani, to the amount of ten pesos (P10), belong to the intestate estate of Marcelino Tongco, which one-half interest must appear in the inventory of the property of the estate of the deceased Marcelino Tongco." The motion for new trial was denied. From both of the judgment, the administratrix of the estate of Marcelino Tongco has appealed. As pursuant to the agreement of the parties the two cases were tried together. ISSUE: Whether the property in dispute should be assigned to the estate of Marcelino Tongco, or whether it should be set aside as belonging exclusively to the widow. (This was not state in the case but to answer Atty Torreg’s question, “so tell me, why should we be interested in this case?” the evidence related issue I think is: WON the widow’s testimony should be disqualified pursuant dead man’s statute) RULING: SC ruled in favor of Vianzon and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. It is true that by reason of the provisions of article 1407 of the Civil Code the presumption is that all the property of the spouses is partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. But even proceeding on this assumption, we still think that the widow has proved in a decisive and conclusive manner that the property in question belonged exclusively to her, that is, it would, unless we are forced to disregard her testimony. The administratrix of the estate attack the ruling of the trial judge to the effect that the widow was competent to testify. Counsel relies on that portion of section 383 of the Code of Civil Procedure as provides that "Parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, . . ., upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person . . ., cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring 8| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

before the death of such deceased person . . ." Counsel is eminently correct in emphasizing that the object and purpose of this statute is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party. He has, however, neglected the equally important rule that the law was designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not designed to suppress the truth. The law twice makes use of the word "against." The actions were not brought "against" the administratrix of the estate, nor were they brought upon claims "against" the estate. In the first case at bar, the action is one by the administratrix to enforce a demand "by" the estate. In the second case at bar, the same analogy holds true for the claim was presented in cadastral proceedings where in one sense there is no plaintiff and there is no defendant. Moreover, a waiver was accomplished when the adverse party undertook to cross-examination the interested person with respect to the prohibited matter. 6) Lichauco vs Atlantic Gulf KEYWORD: Pacific war, settlement of estate, claim against the estate, self-serving statement DOCTRINE: A self-serving declaration is a statement favourable to the interest of the defendant. It is inadmissible. A declaration against interest of the person making it is admissible in evidence notwithstanding its hearsay character, if the declaration is relevant and the declarant has died, become insane, or for some other reason is not available as a witness. FACTS: Fitzsimmons was a president of a corporation. He held 1000 shares of stock in a corporation, 545 shares of which were not fully paid which was evidenced by a promissory notes in favor of the corporation. Soon after the Japanese invasion, Fitzsimmons died in an interment camp in Santo Tomas. A special proceeding was for the settlement

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

of the estate was instituted. The corporation of Fitzsimmons filed a claim of 63,000 pesos of which Fitzsimmons owed to the corporation. The claim was evidenced by the testimony of the chief accountant and assistant accountant of the corporation. Aside from the accountant, the also presented the vice-president-treasurer and the president but was objected to by the administrator of the estate for being violative of the Rule 123. The administrator of Fitzsimmons denied the claim and presented the Exhibit 1 which was an inventory made by Atty. Linchauco in the settlement of the conjugal partnership brought about by the divorce of Fitzsimmons and his wife. In the inventory there was no mention of any liabilities pertaining to the corporation. Complainant Contention: The testimony of the vice-president and president are not violative of the Rule 123. Plaintiff also argues that the Exhibit 1 is self-serving. Respondent Contention: That the vice-president and treasurer of the corporation were incompetent under Section 26 (c) of the Rule 123, they being not only large stockholders and members of the board of directors but they are also vice-president-treasurer of the claimant corporation. Respondent also argues that the Exhibit 1 is not self-serving ISSUES: 1. Whether the vice-president-treasurer and president of the corporation which are a party to an action against the executor or administrator are disqualified from testifying under the Rule 123, section 26 (c) of the rules of court? 2. Whether the Exhibit 1 is be admitted as evidence? HELD: 1. NO. We are constrained to hold that the officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified from testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact

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occurring before the death of such deceased person. 2. YES. A self-serving declaration is a statement favourable to the interest of the defendant. It is inadmissible. The vital objection to the admission of this kind of evidence is its hearsay character. On the other hand, a declaration against interest of the person making it is admissible in evidence notwithstanding its hearsay character, if the declaration is relevant and the declarant has died, become insane, or for some other reason is not available as a witness. “The true test in reference to the reliability of the declaration is not whether it was made ante litem motam, as is the case with reference to some classes of hearsay evidence, but whether the declaration was uttered under circumstances justifying the conclusion that there was no probable motive to falsify. In this case, there was no probable motive on the part of Fitzsimmons to falsify his inventory Exhibit 1 by not including therein the claim of the corporation to be deducted from the assets of the conjugal partnership. On the other hand, if Mr. Fitzsimmons, who was the president and one of the largest stockholders of the claimant corporation, really owed the latter around P63,000, and had not paid it before he liquidated his conjugal partnership as a consequence of the decree of divorce he obtained against his wife, we see no reason why he did not include such obligation in said liquidation. Judging from the high opinion which the officers and stockholders of the corporation entertained of Fitzsimmons as shown by their resolution hereinafter quoted, they cannot impute bad faith to him in not acknowledging the claim in question. We find, therefore, that Exhibit 1, insofar as the omission therefrom of the claims in question was concerned, far from being self-serving to, was a declaration against the interest of, the defendant Fitzsimmons. He having died and therefore cannot be made as a witness, said document was correctly admitted by the trial court in evidence. 7) Razon vs IAC

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

KEYWORD: Dead Man’s Statute rule does NOT apply in a case filed by the administrator. DOCTRINE: Failure to object timely to oral testimony on the basis of DMS rule is a WAIVER. Mere oral testimony is NOT enough to prove valid transfer of shares of stocks. FACTS: In 1962, Enrique Razon organized the E. Razon, Inc. for the purpose of bidding for the arrastre services in South Harbor, Manila. On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for 1,500 shares of stock was issued in the name of Juan T. Chuidian. This was registered under his name in the books of the corporation. No one questioned his ownership of the stocks. He was even elected as a director. When he died intestate, his estate was administered by his son Vicente. Razon refused to deliver the stock certificate to Vicente, prompting the latter to file this case. Alleging that Chuidian is a mere nominal investor, Razon asserts that he himself paid for the stocks, making him the true owner thereof. He claims that he and the late Chuidian had an understanding that Razon would possess the stock certificate until and if Chuidian will pay for the same. The CFI (now RTC) of Manila ruled in favor of Razon. However, this was reversed by the IAC (now CA), which applied the Dead Man’s Statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Razon argues that the rule does not apply because Vicente did not object to his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement between him and Chuidian. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Dead Man’s Statute rule applies in this case. 2. W/N Razon’s oral testimony is enough to prove that he owns the stocks RULING: 1. NO, the Dead Man’s Statute rule does not apply. Razon’s testimony is admissible.

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The DMS rule applies only to a case filed AGAINST the administrator of an estate upon a claim against the estate. This case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. Rather, it is the administrator Vicente who is filing this case. Furthermore, he did not object to the oral testimony. A failure to make a timely objection is deemed to be a waiver the rule. 2. NO, mere oral testimony is insufficient to prove ownership over stocks. Several evidence shows that Chuidian was considered a valid stockholder of the corporation: the stocks were registered under his name in the books, he was elected as a director. In the case of Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that, to be effective, the transfer of shares of stock must follow the mode and manner prescribed by law. Razon must show that the transfer satisfied all the requirements under the corporation's by-laws. Since he failed to present any by-laws, the provisions of the Corporation Code apply. Under the Corporation Code, a stock certificate must be properly indorsed. The title to such certificate of stock is vested in the transferee by the delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of stock. Since the stock certificate was no indorsed, the inevitable conclusion is that the shares of stock belong to Chuidian. Furthermore, preponderance of evidence shows that the stocks were given to Chuidian for value, since he was the legal counsel who handled the legal affairs of the corporation. The decision of the IAC is AFFIRMED. All cash and stock dividends as, well as all pre-emptive rights that have accrued and attached to the 1,500 shares in E. Razon, Inc., since 1966 are declared to belong to the estate of Juan T. Chuidian. 8) Mendezona vs Viuda de Goitia KEYWORD: DOCTRINE: Dead Man's Statute does not apply if what is being testified against the executor is a denial of

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something that happen before the deceased passed away.

appealed from the committee's decision by means of the complaints in these two cases.

FACTS: Defendant Encarnacion C. Vda, de Goitia has been duly appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband Benigno Goitia in special proceeding No. 30273 of this court.

One of the assignment of errors raised by defendant relates to Exhibits A and B, being the appellees' depositions made before the American consul at Bilbao, Spain, in accordance with section 356 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Counsel for the appellant was notified of the taking of these depositions, and he did not suggest any other interrogatory in addition to the questions of the committee. When these depositions were read in court, the defendant objected to their admission, invoking section 383, No. 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Her objection referred mainly to the following questions:

Benigno Goitia was the representative and attorney-in-fact of the plaintiffs in the joint-account partnership known as the "Tren de Aguadas" and located in the City of Manila, of which the plaintiff Leonor Mendezona, widow of Juan Bautista Goitia, owns 180 shares worth P18,000, and the plaintiff Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal owns 72 shares worth P7,200. Prior to 1915, Benigno Goitia, at that time the manager of the aforesaid co-partnership, collected the dividends for the plaintiffs, which he remitted to them every year. Prior to 1915, the usual dividends which Benigno Goitia forwarded to plaintiff Leonor Mendezona each year were P540, and to plaintiff Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal, P216, that from 1915 until his death in August, 1926, Benigno Goitia failed to remit to the dividends upon their shares in the "Tren de Aguadas". That some time before his death, more particularly, in July, 1926, Benigno Goitia, who was no longer the manager of the said business, receive as attorney-in-fact of both plaintiff, the amount of P90 as dividend upon plaintiff Leonor Mendezona's shares, and P36 upon Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal's stock, that from 1915 to 1926, the "Tren de Aguadas" paid dividends to the share-holders, one of them, Ramon Salinas, having received the total amount of P1,155 as ordinary and special dividends upon his 15 shares' that calculating the dividends due from 1915 to 1926 upon Leonor Mendezona's 180 shares at P540 per annum, and at P216 yearly upon the 72 shares held by Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal. Counsel for both plaintiffs filed their claims with the committee of claims and appraisal of the estate of Benigno Goitia, and, upon their disallowance, 11| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

1. Did Mr. Benigno Goitia render you an account of your partnership in the "Tren de Aguadas?" — Yes, until the year 1914. 2. From the year 1915, did Mr. Benigno Goitia send you any report or money on account of profits upon your shares? — He sent me nothing, nor did he answer, my letters. 3. did you ever ask him to send you a statement of your account — Yes, several times by letter, but I never received an answer. The first of these questions tends to show the relationship between the principals and their attorney-in-fact Benigno Goitia up to 1914. Supposing it was error to permit such a question, it would not be reversible error, for that very relationship is proved by Exhibits C to F, and H to I. As to the other two questions, it is to be noted that the deponents deny having received from the deceased Benigno Goitia any money on account of profits on their shares, since 1915. ISSUE: WON the deposition violates Dead Man's Statute RULING: No.

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We are of opinion that the claimants' denial that a certain fact occurred before the death of their attorney-in-fact Benigno Agoitia does not come within the legal prohibitions (section 383, No. 7, Code of Civil Procedure). The law prohibits a witness directly interested in a claim against the estate of a decedent from testifying upon a matter of fact which took place before the death of the deceased. The underlying principle of this prohibition is to protect the intestate estate from fictitious claims. But this protection should not be treated as an absolute bar or prohibition from the filing of just claims against the decedent's estate The facts in the case of Maxilom vs. Tabotabo (9 Phil., 390), differ from those in the case at bar. In that case, the plaintiff Maxilom liquidated his accounts with the deceased Tabotabo during his lifetime, with the result that there was a balance in his favor and against Tabotabo of P312.37, Mexican currency. The liquidation was signed by both Maxilom and Tabotabo. In spite of this, some years later, or in 1906, Maxilom filed a claim against the estate of Tabotabo for P1,062.37, Mexican currency, alleging that P750 which included the 1899 liquidation had not really been received, and that therefore instead of P312.37, Mexican currency, that liquidation should have shown a balance of P1,062.37 in favor of Maxilom. It is evident that in view of the prohibition of section 383, paragraph 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, Maxilom could not testify in his own behalf against Tabotabo's estate, so as to alter the balance of the liquidation made by and between himself and the decedent. But in the case before us there has been no such liquidation between the plaintiffs and the deceased Goitia. They testify, denying any such liquidation. To apply to them the rule that "if death has sealed the lips of one of the parties, the law seals those of the other," would be to exclude all possibility of a claim against the testamentary estate. We do not believe that this was the legislator's intention. The plaintiffs-appellees did not testify to a fact which took place before their representative's death, but on the contrary denied that it had taken place at all, i.e. they denied that a liquidation had been made or any money remitted on account of their shares in 12| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

the "Tren de Aguadas" which is the ground of their claim. It was incumbent upon the appellant to prove by proper evidence that the affirmative proposition was true, either by bringing into court the books which the attorney-in-fact was in duty bound to keep, or by introducing copies of the drafts kept by the banks which drew them, as was the decedents's usual practice according to Exhibit I, or by other similar evidence. The appellant admits having found a book of accounts kept by the decedent showing an item of P90 for the account of Leonor Mendezona and another of P36 for the account of Valentina Izaguirre, which agrees with the statement of Ruperto Santos, who succeeded Benigno Goitia in the administration of said partnership, to the effect that the deceased attorney-in-fact had collected the amounts due the plaintiffs as dividends on their shares for the months of May and June, 1926, or P90 for Leonor Mendezona, and P36 for Valentina Izaguirre, amounts which had not been remitted by the deceased to the plaintiffs. 9) Garcia vs Dominga Robles KEYWORD: Leasehold Agreement which excluded 2 heirs. DOCTRINE: The Dead Man’s Statute provides that "if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction." FACTS: Makapugay is the owner of a 2.5-hectare farm being tilled by Eugenio as agricultural lessee under a leasehold agreement. Makapugay passed away and was succeeded by her nephews and niece, namely Amanda, Justo and Augusto. On the other hand, Eugenio’s children – Garcia, Salamat and Pedro – succeeded him. Before she passed away, Makapugay appointed Amanda as her attorney-in-fact. After Eugenio died, Amanda and Pedro entered into a leasehold agreement, “Kasunduan sa Buwisan”, which

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installed and recognized Pedro as the lone agricultural lessee and cultivator of the land. Pedro passed away in 1984, and his wife, Dominga, took over as agricultural lessee. Learning that the “Kasunduan sa Buwisan” excluded Pedro’s heirs - Amanda, Justo and Augusto, and Pedro’s sisters Garcia and Salamat, entered into a "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" whereby Garcia and Salamat were acknowledged as co-lessees of Pedro. Thereafter, petitioners Garcia and Salamat filed a Complaint for nullification of the first leasehold agreement. Garcia and Salamat claimed that: 1) they entered into an agreement with their brother Pedro to farm the land on a "per-season basis"; 2) that Pedro reneged on this agreement and cultivated the land all by himself; 3) that as a result, Amanda was deceived into installing him as sole agricultural lessee; 4) that when Amanda learned of Pedro’s misrepresentations, she executed an Affidavit stating among others that Pedro assured her that he would not deprive Garcia and Salamat of their "cultivatory rights"; and 5) that in order to correct matters, Amanda, Justo and Augusto executed in their favor the "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa", recognizing them as Pedro’s co-lessees. In her Answer, herein respondent Dominga claimed that: 1) that Amanda’s July 10, 1996 Affidavit and "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" of even date between her and the petitioners are self-serving and violate the existing 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract; 2) Dominga further claimed that Pedro has been in possession of the land even while Eugenio lived; 3) that petitioners have never cultivated nor possessed the land even for a single 13| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

cropping; that Pedro has been the one paying the lease rentals as evidenced by receipts; 4) that when Pedro died in 1984, she succeeded in his rights as lessee by operation of law, and that she had been remitting lease rentals to the landowners since 1985; and 5) that petitioners had no right to institute themselves as her co-lessees. Ruling of the PARAD The PARAD held that Amanda’s act of executing the July 10, 1996 Affidavit and "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" amounted to dispossession of Pedro’s landholding and rights without cause Ruling of the DARAB Amanda’s Affidavit and the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" between the landowners and petitioners cannot defeat Pedro’s 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract and his rights as the sole tenant over the land; that for sleeping on their rights, petitioners are now barred by laches from claiming that they are co-lessees ISSUE: WON Amanda’s Affidavit stating that “(the late) Pedro assured her (Amanda) that he would not deprive Garcia and Salamat of their "cultivatory rights” is admissible. RULING: No. Violation of the Dead Man’s Statute. Amanda’s declaration in her Affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged admission and recognition of the alternate farming scheme is inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead Man’s Statute, which provides that "if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction." Thus, since Pedro is deceased, and Amanda’s declaration which pertains to the leasehold agreement affects the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" which she as assignor entered into with petitioners, and which is

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now the subject matter of the present case and claim against Pedro’s surviving spouse and lawful successor-in-interest Dominga, such declaration cannot be admitted and used against the latter, who is placed in an unfair situation by reason of her being unable to contradict or disprove such declaration as a result of her husband-declarant Pedro’s prior death. If petitioners earnestly believed that they had a right, under their supposed mutual agreement with Pedro, to cultivate the land under an alternate farming scheme, then they should have confronted Pedro or sought an audience with Amanda to discuss the possibility of their institution as co-lessees of the land; and they should have done so soon after the passing away of their father Eugenio. However, it was only in 1996, or 17 years after Pedro was installed as tenant in 1979 and long after his death in 1984, that they came forward to question Pedro’s succession to the leasehold. As correctly held by the PARAD, petitioners slept on their rights, and are thus precluded from questioning Pedro’s 1979 agricultural leasehold contract. Amanda, on the other hand, cannot claim that Pedro deceived her into believing that he is the sole successor to the leasehold. Part of her duties as the landowner’s representative or administrator was to know the personal circumstances of the lessee Eugenio; more especially so, when Eugenio died. She was duty-bound to make an inquiry as to who survived Eugenio, in order that the landowner – or she as representative – could choose from among them who would succeed to the leasehold. Under Section 9 of RA 3844, Makapugay, or Amanda – as Makapugay’s duly appointed representative or administrator – was required to make a choice, within one month from Eugenio’s death, who would succeed as agricultural lessee. There is no other logical conclusion than that the "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" between Amanda and petitioners, which is grounded on Pedro’s inadmissible verbal admission, and which agreement was entered into without obtaining Dominga’s consent, constitutes an undue infringement of Dominga’s rights as Pedro’s successor-in-interest 14| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

under Section 9, and operates to deprive her of such rights and dispossess her of the leasehold against her will. Under Section 732 of RA 3844, Dominga is entitled to sennity of tenure; and under Section 16,33 any modification of the lease agreement must be done with the consent of both parties and without prejudicing Dominga's security of tenure. 10) People v. Carlos PRINCIPLE: If documents were obtained from the addressee by voluntary delivery, they are privileged; but if they were obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the consent, the privilege should cease. FACTS: Dr. Pablo Sityar was a victom of an alleged murder. He performed surgery on defendant Carlos’ wife for appendicitis. There after, the wife was required to go to the Doctor’s clinic several times to dress the wounds. Carlos had always accompanied his wide. On one vistit, Dr. Sityar asked Carlos to do an errand and buy medicine. While he was away, the Doctor outraged his wife. Nevertheless, Carlos went a week after to his clinic to consult his lung problem. Several months after, he was admitted to PGH where he remained under the care of two other Physicians. While he was there, Dr. Sityar billed him for professiona services he had rendered for his wife. A few days later, Carlos went to the clinic of Dr. Sityar, found him there alone, and without any preliminary quarrel, attacked the Doctor and stabbed him twice. Carlos surrendered himself to police, admits he killed the deceased but argues that it was in self-defense. He says that he went over the clinic to protest the charges of the doctor and asked for an extension. He was allegedly insulted by the doctor, and a quarrel ensued. The deceased took a pocket knife from his desk, attached Carlos, but carlos was able to take away the knife from him, and stabbed him.

The defendant's testimony as to the struggle described is in conflict with the evidence presented by the prosecution. But assuming that it is true, it is very evident that it fails to establish a case of

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self-defense and that, in reality, the only question here to be determined is whether the defendant is guilty of murder or of simple homicide. The court found that there was premeditation that constituted murder. A letter written to Carlos made by the wife was presented where the wife feared that Carlos would result to physical violence with the Doctor. Carlos argued that such letter was a privileged communication and not admissible as evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not the letter was a admissible as evidence RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that it was not. The letter was a privileged communication and not admissible. Where a privileged communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes admissible. follows:

“Professor Wigmore states the rule as For documents of communication coming into the possession of a third person, a distinction should obtain, analogous to that already indicated for a client's communications (ante, par. 2325, 2326); i. e., if they were obtained from the addressee by voluntary delivery, they should still be privileged (for otherwise the privilege could by collusion be practically nullified for written communications); but if they were obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the addressee's consent, the privilege should cease.”

However, if the letter was obtained through a search with no warrant, the documents are considered as obtained through illegal search and 15| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

thus inadmissible as evidence in a criminal case. The letter must be excluded for reasons not discussed in the briefs. The letter was written by the wife of the defendant and if she had testified at the trial the letter might have been admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand and the letter was therefore not offered for that purpose. If the defendant either by answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to the statements contained in the letter it might also have been admissible, but such is not the case; the fact that he had the letter in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on his part. The letter is nothing but pure hearsay and its admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine them. The question is radically different from that of the admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a conversation between a husband and wife overheard by the witness. Testimony of that character is admissible on the ground that it relates to a conversation in which both spouses took part and on the further ground that where the defendant has the opportunity to answer a statement made to him by his spouse and fails to do so, his silence implies assent. That cannot apply where the statement is contained in an unanswered letter. Defendant is only guilty of homicide and not murder. 11) Uy Chico v. Union Life KEYWORD: Attorney compromised FACTS: The father of the plaintiff Uy Chico died in 1897, at which time he was conducting a business under his own name, Uy Layco. The plaintiff and his brother took over the business and continued it under the same name, "Uy Layco." The plaintiff purchased his brother's interest in the business and continued to carry on the business under the father's name. A fire engulfed the business premises. At the time of

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the fire "Uy Layco" was heavily indebted and subsequent to the fire, the creditors of the estate of the plaintiff's father. During the course of these proceedings, the plaintiff's attorney surrendered the policies of insurance to the administrator of the estate, who compromised with the insurance company for one-half their face value, or P6,000. This money was paid into court and is now being held by the sheriff. The plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining that the policies and goods insured belonged to him and not to the estate of his deceased father and alleges that he is not bound by the compromise effected by the administrator of his father's estate. Defendant showed that plaintiff had agreed to the compromise and his had surrendered the policy to the administrator. To prove this, the defendant introduced evidence showing that the plaintiff's attorney had surrendered the policies to the administrator with the understanding that such a compromise was to be effected. The plaintiff was asked, while on the witness stand, if he had any objection to his attorney's testifying concerning the surrender of the policies, to which he replied in the negative. The attorney was then called for that purpose. Whereupon, counsel for the plaintiff formally withdrew the waiver previously given by the plaintiff and objected to the testimony of the attorney on the ground that it was privileged. ISSUE: Was the testimony privileged? RULING: The communication was not privileged. The evidence in question concerned the dealings of the plaintiff's attorney with a third person. The very essence of the veil of secrecy which surrounds communications made between attorney and client is that such communications are not intended for the information of third persons or to be acted upon by them, put of the purpose of advising the client as to his rights.

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It is evident that a communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions be delivering the communication to the third person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a privileged communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such a communication, after reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a communication between the client and a third person, and that the attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary or agent. The testimony was to the effect that when the attorney delivered the policies to the administrator, he understood that there was a compromise to be effected, and that when he informed the plaintiff of the surrender of the policies for that purpose the plaintiff made no objection whatever. The evidence is sufficient to show that the plaintiff acquiesced in the compromise settlement of the policies. Having agreed to the compromise, he cannot now disavow it and maintain an action for the recovery of their face value. 12) Regala v Sandiganbayan KEYWORD: Who’s your client? PRINCIPLE: As a general rule, a lawyer may not invoke the attorney-client privilege and refuse to identify the identity of his client. However, such rule is qualified if revealing the client’s identity would implicate the client in the very activity for which he sought legal advice for, if disclosure would open client to civil liability or if revealing the client’s name would establish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual and as such, refuse to give the client’s identity in invoking the privilege. FACTS: A complaint was filed by PCGG before the Sandiganbayan for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten

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wealth, among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case No. 0033**, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings. Respondent PCGG then filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" which excluded respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant, he in turn undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33. Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco. In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings. Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions required by respondent PCGG ISSUE: 17| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

W/N the revelation of the client’s identity is within the ambit of the attorney-client privilege HELD: Under the circumstances of this case, yes. The general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established. First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood; Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established, privilege does not attach until there is a client; Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship. Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. The general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions. 1. Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice. 2. Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged 3. Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged. Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences. The circumstances in this case would reveal that the instant case falls under at least 2 exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's

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connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance. Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. Compelling disclosure of the client's name in circumstances such as the one which exists in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigants which we cannot and will not countenance. The logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case that it would be di fficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as much "communication" as information revealed directly about the transaction in question itself, a communication which is clearly and distinctly privileged. Moreover, the PCGG's demand not only touches upon the question of the identity of their clients but also on documents related to the suspected transactions, not only in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. (back story) **In Civil Case No. 0033, defendants therein, including herein petitioners and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through the use of coconut levy funds the fi nancial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others and that through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fi fteen million shares. The PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to the subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves, among others, to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through 18| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

government concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of offi cial position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust. 13) Barton v Leyte Asphalt PRINCIPLE: The privilege which protects communications between attorney and client does not extend to a copy of a letter written by the client to his attorney which comes to the hands of the adverse party. Where the authenticity of such a document is admitted, the court will take no notice of the manner in which it was obtained. FACTS: James Barton, a US citizen residing in Manila sough to recover $318,563.30 in damages for breach of contract from Leyte Asphalt, a Philippine company with principal office in Cebu. Leyte Asphalt is the owner of Lucio mine in Leyte, a valuable deposit of bituminous limestone and other asphalt products. William Anderson, president and general manage of Leyte Asphalt, wrote a letter to Barton authorizing him to sell the products in the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand. Barton also eventually entered into subagency agreement in San Francisco and Australia. There was a large order from Ludvigsen and McCurdy for 6,000 ton of bituminous limestone. However, Anderson told Barton that the company was behind construction so it could not make big contracts at the moment. Despite Anderson’s response, Barton wrote a notification to Leytre Asphalt for the company to be prepared to ship 5,000 tons. There were six causes of actions for various agreements that Barton filed with the CFI. Howeber, CFI only allowed Barton to recover from two. Among the evidences present in the case was a carbon copy of a letter written by Barton to his lawyer, Atty. Ingersoll. He wrote that his profit from

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

the San Francisco contract would have been at the rate of 85 cents per ton. When the letter was offered in evidence by Leyte Asphalt, Barton’s lawyer announced that he had no objection to the introduction of the letter evidence if counsel for the company would explain where the letter was secured. Upon this the attorney for the defendant informed the court that he received the letter from the former attorneys of the defendant without explanation of the manner in which the document had come into their possession. Upon this Barton’s lawyermade this announcement: "We hereby give notice at this time that unless such an explanation is made, explaining fully how this carbon copy came into the possession of the defendant company, or any one representing it, we propose to object to its admission on the ground that it is a confidential communication between client and lawyer." No further information was then given by the attorney for the defendant as to the manner in which the letter had come to his hands. Trial judge thereupon excluded the document, on the ground that it was a privileged communication between client and attorney. RULING: CFU ruling was erroneous; for even supposing that the letter was within the privilege which protects communications between attorney and client, this privilege was lost when the letter came to the hands of the adverse party. And it makes no difference how the adversary acquired possession. The law protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by him to his attorney in the confidence of the legal relation, but when such a document, containing admissions of the client, comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the adversary, it is admissible in evidence. Since the means of preserving secrecy of communication are entirely in the client's hands, and since the privilege is derogation from the general testimonial duty and should be strictly construed, it would be improper to extend its 19| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

prohibition to third persons who obtain knowledge of the communications. One who overhears the communications, whether with or without the client's knowledge, is not within the protection of the privilege. The same rule ought to apply to one who surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of a document in original or copy. 14) Orient Insurance Company vs. E. P. Revilla ONE LINER: Insurance Company only read the part of the letter which is advantageous to it. Deemed waiver of privileged communication. FACTS: The object of Orient Insurance Co.’s (Orient) petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus is to require respondent judge to permit Orient’s counsel to examine a letter, part of which has already been read into the record in the course of the examination of one of the witnesses testifying for private respondent Teal Motor Co., Inc. (TMC). TMC, as plaintiff, filed a civil action against Orient for the purpose of recovering upon 2 fire insurance policies issued by the latter over TMC’s stock merchandise. The policy contained a clause stipulating to the effect that all benefits would be forfeited if, in case of loss, the claim should be rejected by the insurer and action is not commenced within 3 months after such rejection. Orient’s defense alleges that the claim was rejected on April 15, 1929, and that notice of such rejection was given to plaintiff by letter on the same day. However, suit was not instituted by TMC until August 3, more than 3 months after rejection of the claim. According to TMC, on the day they were notified of the rejection, Orient representative E. E. Elser expressly requested TMC to defer judicial action until after July 31 for possibilities of compromise between the parties. TMC relied on the request and delayed institution of action. However, during the trial of the civil case, witness TMC president E. M. Bachrach made an oral statement as to the substance of part of a letter received by TMC from its attorneys, saying that he waited for about a week longer and not having heard

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

anything about it, he received a letter on July 13 from our attorneys urging me to file these cases. When asked by the counsel for Orient to produce the letter, Bachrach only offered in evidence part of the letter supporting his testimony (relating to the urging of the filing of complaints) but refused to reveal the other part as it contained private matter privileged in nature between the attorneys and TMC (relating to contract of fees, retaining of counsel’s services in connection with the cases, alleged to be matters entirely distinct from the issue). Orient demanded for the production of “the best evidence,” it being well-known a rule of law that a witness cannot be permitted to give oral testimony as to the contents of a paper writing which can be produced in court. In response, only a portion of the letter referred to by the witness was read into the record. Orient now insists that inasmuch as all the letters refers to the case then in court, the entire document should be exhibited pursuant to the rule that when part of a document is offered in evidence, the entire document must be presented. ISSUE: Does presentation of part of the letter constitute waiver to present the whole document? Yes. Is a contract for fees and other terms of employment between attorney and client privileged in nature? No. RULING: The excerpt in question must be considered as proof submitted by TMC, and there can be no question that, part of the letter having been introduced in behalf of the plaintiff, the whole of the letter could properly be examined by Orient, in accordance with the express provision of section 283, Code of Civil Procedure. As to the alleged privileged nature of the terms of employment between attorney and client as contained in other portions of the letter, the court found it difficult to consider a contract for fees as privileged. However irrelevant under the circumstances, it cannot be privileged in nature. Contracts between attorneys and clients are inherently personal and considered as private matters, but they are a constant subject of litigation, and contracts relating to fees are essentially not of privileged nature. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the letter contained privileged matters, such was waived by the introduction in evidence of part of the letter. Section

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238 of the Code of Civil Procedure, making the whole of a declaration, conversation, or writing admissible when part has been given in evidence by one party, makes no exception as to privileged matter; and neither do jurisprudence on the subject recognize any exception. Hence, Orient was entitled to examine the whole of the letter, with a view to the introduction in evidence of such parts thereof as may be relevant to the case on trial, and the respondent judge was in error in refusing to permit the inspection by Orient.

But, even supposing that the matter contained in the letter and withheld from the inspection of the adversary was originally of a privileged nature, the privilege was waived by the introduction in evidence of part of the letter. The provision in section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure making the whole of a declaration, conversation, or writing admissible when part has been given in evidence by one party, makes no exception as to privileged matter; and the jurisprudence on the subject does not recognize any exception.

15) People v Sandiganbayan KEYWORDS: Congressman falsified his arraignment; Counsel testified against him; Privileged communication does not apply FACTS: Respondent Paredes was successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same province, and then the Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was the counsel for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the present case. Paredes applied for a free patent over a land which was approved and was granted an original certificate of title in his favor. However the Director of Lands filed an action for the cancellation of respondent Paredes patent and certificate of title since the land had been designated and reserved as a school site. The trial court rendered judgment nullifying said patent and title after finding that Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application. Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

An information for perjury was then filed against respondent Paredes in the MCTC. However, the proceedings were terminated on the ground of prescription. In this criminal case, Paredes was likewise represented by Sansaet as counsel. After that, the Tanodbayan recommended the filing of a criminal case against Paredes for violation of the provisions of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It was alleged that by using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his application for free patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. Sansaet was Paredes’ counsel of record therein. By way of defense, Paredes alleged that double jeopardy has already attached since the second complaint filed in court arose from the same set of facts and same evidence of the earlier perjury case which, after its arraignment, was ordered dismissed by the court upon recommendation of the Department of Justice. To support such defense the accused presented court records and transcripts as proof that he was arraigned in the perjury case. Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft charges against respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the 3 respondents herein for falsification of public documents. He claimed that respondent Honrada, the Clerk of Court of the MCTC, in conspiracy with his herein co-respondents, simulated and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge. In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice of arraignment was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal in connection with that perjury case; and a certification of the Presiding Judge that said perjury case in his court did not reach the arraignment stage since action thereon was suspended pending the review of the case by the Department of Justice.

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To avoid responsibility, Sansaet revealed in an Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications, that Paredes contrived to have the graft case dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by making it appear that the perjury case had been dismissed by the trial court after he had been arraigned. He further revealed that the documents were prepared and falsified by his co-respondents in this case in the house of Paredes. He claimed that he participated in the scheme upon the instigation and inducement of Paredes. This was to pave the way for Sansaet’s discharge as state witness. The proposal for Sansaet to be a state witness was rejected by the Ombudsman since it was difficult to believe that a lawyer of his stature, in the absence of deliberate intent to conspire, would be unwittingly induced by another to commit a crime. Sandiganbayan ruled that a lawyer-client relationship existed between Paredes and Sansaet during the relevant periods so the facts and other confidential matters involved in this case must have been disclosed by Paredes, as client, to respondent Sansaet, as his lawyer. Because of this, Sansaet cannot be presented as a witness against accused Paredes without the latter’s consent. ISSUE: W/N the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by the attorney-client privilege. RULING: No, the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet is not barred by the attorney-client privilege. The facts of the case constitute an exception to the rule on privileged communication made during lawyer-client relationship. In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule was taken, the privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications made by the client to his attorney but extends as well to information communicated by the client to the attorney by other means.

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

In the present case, it may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with falsification, and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes was the accused and Sansaet his counsel therein. The clincher for this conclusion is the undisputed fact that said documents were filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to the motion for reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the graft case before the Tanodbayan. Also, the acts and words of the parties during the period when the documents were being falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes would not have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the same except under conditions of secrecy and confidence. However, a distinction must be made between confidential communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which his attorney is bound to respect. For the application of the attorney-client privilege, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In other words, if the client seeks his lawyers advice with respect to a crime that the former has committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the client’s consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyers advice. In the present case, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in 22| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

the process of falsifying, the documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. In fact, it has also been pointed out to the Court that the prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice. To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law. 16) US v. GORDON-NIKKAR KEYWORD: lawyer’s advise to commit perjury; not protected by the attorney-client privilege) PRINCIPLE: A communication divulged to "strangers" or outsiders can scarcely be considered

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

a confidential communication between attorney and client. The attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications regarding an intended crime. . FACTS: Appellant Gordon-Nikkar was convicted after trial by jury of the crime of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute approximately four kilograms of cocaine, and the possession with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine. On appeal, she contends her conviction should be reversed because the district court permitted a Government witness, Brenda Marchand, to give testimony regarding allegedly privileged conversations between appellant's attorney and his clients Brenda Marchand was charged as a co-defendant with the crimes for which appellant was convicted. Marchand subsequently pled guilty and testified at trial for the Government. Prior to entering her plea, Marchand had two meetings in the office of appellant's attorney, Mr. Estrumsa. Marchand, however, was not a client of Estrumsa, and it is unclear whether all the other persons in these meetings were Estrumsa's clients.

No. There were at least five persons present at Estrumsa's office on this occasion; at least one of the persons, Brenda Marchand, and perhaps others, were not clients of Mr. Estrumsa. A communication divulged to "strangers" or outsiders can scarcely be considered a confidential communication between attorney and client. Therefore, this communication is not protected by the attorney-client privilege. But even if it appeared that the communication in question were otherwise privileged (i.e., that the communication was considered confidential despite the presence of a stranger), the testimony was nonetheless admissible. The conversations in question dealt with plans to commit perjury so as to hide the criminal activity of appellant and others. It is beyond dispute that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications regarding an intended crime. The policy underlying the attorney-client privilege is to promote the administration of justice. It would be a perversion of the privilege to extend it so as to protect communications designed to frustrate justice by committing other crimes to conceal past misdeeds.

Of the two conversations related by Marchand, the second was the subject of thorough cross-examination by Estrumsa. The second conversation involved Estrumsa's alleged recommendation that Marchand leave the country and go to Venezuela. On redirect, the Government inquired, over defense objection, into the substance of the conversation during the first meeting. Marchand testified that at this meeting the participants, at Mr. Estrumsa's suggestion, agreed to give perjured cover-up testimony at trial to the effect that none of them had possessed the cocaine, but instead merely happened to be at a party where the cocaine was discovered.

17) US v. MCPARTLIN

ISSUE: Whether the statements in Attorney Estrumsa's office were protected by the attorney-client privilege.

FACTS:

HELD: 23| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

KEY WORDS: bribery, sludge-hauling contract, attorney-client-privilege PRINCIPLE: Communications by a client to his own lawyer remain privileged when the lawyer subsequently shares them with co-defendants for purposes of a common defense. Waiver is not to be inferred from the disclosure in confidence to a co-party's attorney for a common purpose. The privilege protects communications to the attorney's . . . agents . . for rendering his services.

The Sanitary District is a municipal corporation with primary responsibility for disposing of sewage from Chicago and surrounding areas. The Sanitary District operates a sewage treatment plant in

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

Stickney, Illinois. The District announced plans to have the sludge from its treatment plant be transported to Fulton County, Illinois, and solicited bids on the project. During the week before the bids were to be submitted, Bull (president of a towing company, and of the alleged intermediaries through whom many of the bribe payments were made) visited Robert Howson (vice president of Ingram Contractors, Inc.), and told Howson that if Ingram Corporation expected to secure the contract, it would have to make a "political contribution." Howson responded that he was not in that sort of business, but then took Bull to meet William J. Benton (vice president of Ingram Corporation and president of Ingram Contractors, Inc.) Benton then telephoned defendant Frederick Ingram (chairman of the board of Ingram Corporation) to inform him of Weber's "political contribution" proposal. Ingram agreed, provided that the contribution could be added to the cost of the contract. These was the beginning of a series of transactions between the defendants which are the basis of the charges in this case. The indictment charged that defendant Frederick B. Ingram, had paid defendant Robert F. McPartlin, an Illinois legislator (introduced by Weber to Benton as the man who handled all political contributions for the Democratic Party in Illinois), defendant Valentine Janicki, a trustee for the Metropolitan Sanitary District, and others more than $900,000 to secure for the Ingram Corporation a multi-million dollar sludge-hauling contract with the District. Defendants Franklin H. Weber, a businessman, and Edwin T. Bull, were alleged to be intermediaries through whom many of the payments were made. William J. Benton (vice president of Ingram Corporation) was an unindicted co-conspirator who played a major role in the conspiracy and testified as a witness for the prosecution. Sometime later, a federal grand jury commenced an investigation of the events surrounding the sludge-hauling contract. Later, the government granted immunity to Benton (vice president of the Ingram Corp).

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Evidence showed that Benton, acting with the knowledge and complicity of Frederick Ingram and through intermediaries Bull and Weber, bribed McPartlin and Janicki to cause the sludge-hauling contract to be awarded to Ingram Corporation and one of its subsidiaries, and later bribed the same officials to secure favorable treatment under the contract and modifications of the contract. At trial, Ingram contended that he did not learn until the February, 1972 meeting with Benton that his company had secured a multi-million dollar contract by paying more than $300,000 to Chicago officials. Ingram testified that he protested against paying the bribes, but reluctantly agreed when Benton informed him that if he refused to pay, the Sanitary District would not pay the additional $2,100,000 for the pipeline and would use the liquidated damages clause to penalize Ingram Corporation. Throughout the period covered by the indictment, Benton kept diaries, or appointment calendars, in which he made notes concerning meetings and telephone conversations, naming the persons involved and often recording the substance of the conversations. The defendants were convicted of numerous violations of the Travel Act,18 U.S.C. § 1952, and the Wire, Radio, Television Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and of conspiring to violate those acts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Destroying Benton's credibility was important to Ingram, as it was to the other defendants, even though Ingram's defense was based, in part, on the argument that he had made the payments in response to the threats Benton had reported to him, because Ingram's account of events in issue differed materially from Benton's, and because the government's case hinged largely on Benton's testimony. Since Benton's diaries corroborated so much of his testimony, it was imperative from the standpoint of all defendants that an effort be made to discredit them. Such an effort was made, and Frederick Ingram and McPartlin cooperated in that effort.

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An investigator acting for Frederick Ingram's counsel twice interviewed McPartlin with the consent of the latter's counsel for the purpose of determining whether there was a basis for challenging the truth of some of the diary entries. In the second of these interviews McPartlin made certain statements, which Ingram argues tend to support his defense. At trial, when Ingram offered evidence of these statements, McPartlin's counsel objected on the ground of the attorney-client privilege, and the court, after an in camera hearing, sustained the objection on this ground. ISSUES: 1. Whether statements made by McPartlin are covered under the lawyer-client privilege communication. 2. Whether the statement was covered by the privilege since it was made to an investigator rather than an attorney. HELD: 1. YES, the statements made by McPartlin cannot be disclosed because they remain protected by the attorney-client privilege. McPartlin was entitled to the protection of the attorney-client privilege, because his statements were made in confidence to an attorney for a co-defendant for a common purpose related to both defenses. They were made in connection with the project of attempting to discredit Benton, a project in which Ingram and McPartlin and their attorneys were jointly engaged for the benefit of both defendants. Ingram acknowledges that communications by a client to his own lawyer remain privileged when the lawyer subsequently shares them with co-defendants for purposes of a common defense. This is known as the common-defense rule which has been recognized in cases. Uninhibited communication among joint parties and their counsel about matters of common concern is often important to the protection of their interests. In criminal cases it can be necessary to a fair opportunity to defend. Therefore, waiver is not to

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be inferred from the disclosure in confidence to a co-party's attorney for a common purpose. In the case at bar, the judge found, as a preliminary question of fact, that McPartlin had made the statements to the investigator in confidence. That finding is not clearly erroneous. Ingram even argued that the co-defendants' defenses must be in all respects compatible if the joint-defense privilege is to be applicable. The cases do not establish such a limitation, and there is no reason to impose it. Rule 503(b)(3) of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, as approved by the Supreme Court, stated that the privilege applies to communications by a client "to a lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest." The Advisory Committee's Note to proposed Rule 503(b) makes it clear that the joint-interest privilege is not limited to situations in which the positions of the parties are compatible in all respects. In this instance the US SC followed such recommendation. The privilege protects pooling of information for any defense purpose common to the participating defendants. Cooperation between defendants in such circumstances is often not only in their own best interests but serves to expedite the trial or, as in the case at bar, the trial preparation. NOTE: The exclusion of the McPartlin statements would not be reversible error even if he had not been entitled to claim the privilege. The Court was satisfied from their examination that the statements merely corroborated facts which were admitted in evidence and which the jury obviously found to be true. The Court did not disclose the contents of the statements because they remain protected by the attorney-client privilege, on which they alternatively based their ruling on this point. 2. The argument of Ingram that the communication was not privileged because it was made to an investigator rather than an attorney will not prevail. The investigator was an agent for Ingram's attorney, however, so it is as if the communication was to the attorney himself. It has never been questioned that the privilege protects

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communications to the attorney's agents for rendering his services. It was also not fatal to the privilege that McPartlin made the statement to Ingram's attorney rather than his own. When the Ingram and McPartlin camps decided to join in an attempt to discredit Benton, the attorney for each represented both for purposes of that joint effort. The relationship was no different than it would have been if during the trial the Ingram and McPartlin attorneys had decided that Ingram's attorney would cross-examine Benton on behalf of both, and during cross-examination McPartlin passed Ingram's attorney a note containing information for use in the cross-examination. The attorney who thus undertakes to serve his client's co-defendant for a limited purpose becomes the co-defendant's attorney for that purpose. 18) Lim v. Court of Appeals KEYWORD:Annulment of Marriage; physician-patient relationship; wife is allegedly schizophrenic PRINCIPLE: The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated." Facts: Nelly and Juan Lim are lawfully married to each other. Juan filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground that Nelly has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called

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schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage and until the present." Juan’s counsel announced that he would present as his next witness the Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado to testify. Nelly's counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged since Dr. Acampado had examined Nelly in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia. Over such opposition, the subpoena was issued. Nelly's counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to quash the subpoena and suspend the proceedings pending resolution of the motion. Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand, the court heard this urgent motion. Nelly’s counsel argued that having seen and examined Nelly in a professional capacity, Dr. Acampado is barred from testifying under the rule on the confidentiality of a physician-patient relationship. Juan’s counsel contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert witness and would not testify on any information acquired while attending to Nelly in a professional capacity. The trial court denied the motion and allowed the witness to testify. Dr. Acampado thus took the witness stand, was qualified by Juan’s counsel as an expert witness and was asked hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise. She neither revealed the illness she examined and treated Nelly for nor disclosed the results of her examination and the medicines she had prescribed. Nelly filed with CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul the order of respondent Judge allowing Dr. Acampado to testify on the ground that the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and to prohibit him from proceeding with the reception of Dr. Acampado's testimony.

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

CA denied the petition ruling that Nelly failed in establishing the confidential nature of the testimony given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado when she testified. Hence, the respondent Judge committed no grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE: W/N the information given by the physician (Dr. Acampado) in her testimony in open court a privileged communication? NO. HELD: Paragraph (c), Section 24 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads: "SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: xxx xxx xxx (c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient." This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient. It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the community. Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is made to the physician's testimony. 27| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites must concur: 1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case; 2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; 3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; 4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and 5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient." These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to wit: 1. the communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. 2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. 3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered 4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are

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therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated." One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned requisites.

failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to a waiver thereof.

In this case, Nelly failed to establish the presence of the requisites.

KEY WORDS: annulment, psychiatric evaluation report

Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. She did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner. The facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado's answers to the questions propounded to her relating to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge she had about the petitioner which was acquired by reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an expert witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded. While it may be true that Nelly’s counsel opposed the oral request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion for the quashal of the said subpoena a day before the witness was to testify, Nelly makes no claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel had objected to any question asked of the witness on the ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the privilege, despite the trial court's advice that said counsel may interpose his objection to the testimony "once it becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule." The particular portions of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in Nelly's Petition and Memorandum, and in Juan's Memorandum, do not at all show that any objections were interposed. Even granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the

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19) Krohn vs CA

PRINCIPLE: The person against whom the privilege (physician-patient) is claimed is must be one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. FACTS: Edgar Krohn, Jr. and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married in Manila on June 14, 1964 and had three children. Their blessings notwithstanding, the relationship between the couple developed into a stormy one. Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain. The effort however proved futile. Later, they finally separated in fact. In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz. Presenting the report among others, he obtained a decree from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of "incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due discretion existent at the time of the wedding and thereafter." This decree was eventually confirmed and pronounced “Final and Definite”. On 1993, Edgar filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with the RTC. In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely denied in her Answer as “either unfounded or irrelevant”. Petitioner’s arguments: She argues that since Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court prohibits a physician from testifying on matters which he may have acquired in attending to a patient in professional capacity, with more reason should a third person (like respondent-husband) be PROHIBITED from testifying on privileged matters between a physician and patient or from submitting

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any medical report, findings or evaluation prepared by a physician which the latter has acquired as a result of his confidential and privileged relation with a patient. She further argues that to allow her husband to testify on the contents of the psychiatric evaluation report will set a very bad and dangerous precedent because it abets circumvention of the rule's intent in preserving the sanctity, security and confidence to the relation of physician and his patient. Her thesis is that what cannot be done directly should not be allowed to be done indirectly. Respondent’s arguments: Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that the rules are very explicit: the prohibition applies only to a physician. Thus, the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the case at bar where the person sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged communication is the husband and not the physician of the petitioner. In fact, according to him, the Rules sanction his testimony considering that a husband may testify against his wife in a civil case filed by one against the other. Besides, private respondent submits that privileged communication may be waived by the person entitled thereto, and this petitioner expressly did when she gave her unconditional consent to the use of the psychiatric evaluation report when it was presented to the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale which took it into account among others in deciding the case and declaring their marriage null and void. Private respondent further argues that petitioner also gave her implied consent when she failed to specifically object to the admissibility of the report in her Answer where she merely described the evaluation report as "either unfounded or irrelevant." At any rate, failure to interpose a timely objection at the earliest opportunity to the evidence presented on privileged matters may be construed as an implied waiver. ISSUE: WoN the psychiatric evaluation report is admissible.

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RULING: YES. Statutes making communications between physician and patient privileged are intended to inspire confidence in the patient and encourage him to make a full disclosure to his physician of his symptoms and condition. Consequently, this prevents the physician from making public information that will result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to the patient. For, the patient should rest assured with the knowledge that the law recognizes the communication as confidential, and guards against the possibility of his feelings being shocked or his reputation tarnished by their subsequent disclosure. The physician-patient privilege creates a zone of privacy, intended to preclude the humiliation of the patient that may follow the disclosure of his ailments. Indeed, certain types of information communicated in the context of the physician-patient relationship fall within the constitutionally protected zone of privacy, including a patient's interest in keeping his mental health records confidential. Thus, it has been observed that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is founded upon the notion that certain forms of antisocial behavior may be prevented by encouraging those in need of treatment for emotional problems to secure the services of a psychotherapist. Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however misplaced. Lim v. Court of Appeals clearly lays down the requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient. In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners.

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Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report. Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private respondent on the ground that it was privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial court dated 10 May 1991, he invoked the rule on privileged communications but never questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such objection and, consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted. 20) Blue Cross Health v. Olivares Gr. No. 169737

the burden to prove that Neomi had a pre-existing condition was under Blue Cross. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration of the health care company. ISSUE: 1. Whether petitioner was able to prove that respondent Neomi's stroke was caused by a pre-existing condition and therefore was excluded from the coverage of the health care agreement. RULING: No. Petition dismissed. The contract of insurance as in this case is a contract of adhesion. If there is ambiguity in the terms must be interpreted and enforced stringently against the insurer which prepared the contract. The agreement defined a pre-existing condition as:

PRINCIPLES: Presumption; more specifically Disputable presumption; presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. However there are exceptions, one of which when “suppression is an exercise of a privilege.” As such, the presumption that an evidence wilfully supressed is adverse when produce does not apply.

“a disability which existed before the commencement date of membership whose natural history can be clinically determined, whether or not the Member was aware of such illness or condition. Such conditions also include disabilities existing prior to reinstatement date in the case of lapse of an Agreement.”

FACTS: Neomi Olivares applied for a health care program with Blue Cross for the amount of 12,000 pesos. 38 days after she applied, she suffered from a stroke. Ailments due to “pre-existing conditions” were excluded from the coverage. She was confined in Medical City and discharged with a bill of Php 34,000. Blue Cross refused to pay unless she had her physician’s certification that she was suffering from a pre-existing condition. When Blue Cross still refused to pay, she filed suit in the MTC. The health care company rebutted by saying that the physician didn’t disclose the condition due to the patient’s invocation of the doctor-client privilege. The MTC dismissed for a lack of cause of action because the physician didn’t disclose the condition. In the RTC, the spouses were awarded the amount of the hospital bills plus 60,000 in damages. This was under the ratio that

“Under this provision, disabilities which existed before the commencement of the agreement are excluded from its coverage if they become manifest within one year from its effectivity.”

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Petitioners:

averred that the non-disclosure of the pre-existing condition made a presumption in its favor.

Respondents:

Maintained that the petitioner had the duty to prove its accusation.

(This is the one relevant in the subject of evidence) Petitioner never presented evidence to prove its presumption that the Doctor’s report would work against Neomi. They only perceived that the

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invocation of the privilege made the report adverse to Neomi and such was a disreputable presumption. They should have made an independent assessment of Neomi’s condition when it failed to obtain the report. They shouldn’t have waited for the attending physician’s report to come out. Under Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states: Disputable presumptions. ― The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: (e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. The exception on presenting evidence applies when the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Hence, Neomi had the privilege not to present the Doctor’s report under the doctor-client privilege.

21) Chan vs. Chan KEYWORDS: Nullity of Marriage Case; Wife requested subpoena duces tecum for the medical records of husband before trial, latter objected under Privileged Communication Rule PRINCIPLES:  Objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence for admission in court.  Physician-Patient Privileged Communication does not only cover the hospital records, but also the examination of the physician at the trial. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient's records. Disclosing them would be equivalent to compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter's prior consent. FACTS: Josielene Chan filed with the RTC a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of her marriage to 31| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

Johnny Chan, the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her. She claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. She had convinced him to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation. Johnny claimed that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. To save their marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to the hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. The marriage relations got worse when the police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime and released her only after the case against her ended. By then, their marriage relationship could no longer be repaired. During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form carried a physician's handwritten note that Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny's medical records when he was there confined. The request was accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces tecum. Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege. RTC: sustained the opposition. CA: denied Josielene's petition. If courts were to allow the production of medical records, then patients would be left with no assurance that whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept confidential. The

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prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital records. Although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do so in this case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing his alleged forcible confinement. ISSUE: WON the denial of the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny's hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication is correct RULING: Yes. The time to object to the admission of evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be made part of the physician's testimony or as independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern the patient's health problems. Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence for admission in court. Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene's request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny's hospital records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure. It is possible to treat Josielene's motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to trial. But the right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are "not privileged." Josielene claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the 32| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

"testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24 (c) of Rule 130 states that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined" regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial. To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records — the results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient's illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him — would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient's consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient's records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter's prior consent. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC that he had been confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the privileged character of its records. But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature. 22) NERI V SENATE COMMITTEE ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

ON

DOCTRINE: The confidentiality of the President’s conversations and correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality of judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value as the right to privacy of all citizens

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and more, because it is dictated by public interest and the constitutionally ordained separation of governmental powers. FACTS: The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations of the Senate (popularly known as the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee), among others, to conduct an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. Petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking executive privilege. On November 22, 2007, the respondent Committees issued the show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory, citing petitioner in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. ISSUES:

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(1) Whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal system; (2) Whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege; (3) Whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are critical to the exercise of their functions; RULING: (1) There Is a Recognized Presumptive Presidential Communications Privilege The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez, affirmed that the presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. “There are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public". There is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters". "The right to information does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President", which means that he personally consulted with her. President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a specific matter involving an executive agreement between the Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three (3) questions. (2) There Are Factual and Legal Bases to Hold that the Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions Are Covered by Executive Privilege

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A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power." B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive. In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of the executive branch" is absent because the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official family. C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a generalized interest; and in balancing respondent Committees’ and the President’s clashing interests, the Court did not disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified presidential communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations with another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the President’s communication with her advisor. The NBN Project involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. It was actually a product of the meeting of minds between officials of the Philippines and China. Whatever the President says about the agreement - particularly while official negotiations are ongoing - are matters which China will surely view with particular interest. Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were seeking information from the President’s representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The Court denied the petition, stressing that "secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of

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freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information." No Executive can effectively discharge constitutional functions in the face of intense and unchecked legislative incursion into the core of the President’s decision-making process, which inevitably would involve her conversations with a member of her Cabinet. For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed Decision did not enjoin respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is expected from them is to respect matters that are covered by executive privilege. (3) Respondent Committees Failed to Show that the Communications Elicited by the Three Questions Are Critical to the Exercise of their Functions In U.S. v. Nixon, Court ruled that the President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in performance of the President's responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice. (emphasis supplied) xxx xxx xxx ...the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts. A President's acknowledged need for confidentiality in the communications of his office is general in nature, whereas the constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair adjudication of a particular criminal case in the administration of justice. Without

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access to specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated. The President's broad interest in confidentiality of communication will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases.

by the Committee." Court rules which prohibit leading, hypothetical, or repetitive questions or questions calling for a hearsay answer, to name a few, do not apply to a legislative inquiry. Every person, from the highest public official to the most ordinary citizen, has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in proper proceedings by a competent court or body.

We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. (emphasis supplied)

23) Lee vs. CA

In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a court’s need for facts in order to adjudge liability in a criminal case but rather with the Senate’s need for information in relation to its legislative functions. This leads us to consider once again just how critical is the subject information in the discharge of respondent Committees’ functions. The burden to show this is on the respondent Committees, since they seek to intrude into the sphere of competence of the President in order to gather information which, according to said respondents, would "aid" them in crafting legislation. Interestingly, during the Oral Argument before this Court, the counsel for respondent Committees impliedly admitted that the Senate could still come up with legislations even without petitioner answering the three (3) questions. In other words, the information being elicited is not so critical after all. Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject to the exacting standards of evidence essential to arrive at accurate factual findings to which to apply the law. Hence, Section 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that "technical rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings which do not affect substantive rights need not be observed

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KEY WORDS: cheater Chinese family(KEH) vs 2nd family (Tiu)

husband;

1st

ONE LINER/PRINCIPLE: The parental and filial privilege rule applies only to “direct” ascendants/descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. It has no application to a stepdaughter who has no common ancestry to her stepmother. FACTS: Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) came to the Philippines as immigrants from China. They has 11 children (Lee-Keh children). Lee then brought from China Tiu Chuan (Tiu), a young Chinese woman to serve as housemaid. The respondent Leh-Keh children believes that Tiu left the Leh-Keh household and move into another property of Lee and had an illicit relation and made 8 children After Keh died, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s children with Lee (Lee’s other children) claimed that they were too children of Lee and Keh.Leh-Keh children then requested the NBI to investigate. NBI’s Findings NBI concluded that the mother of the 8 children is obviously not Keh, but most probably Tiu. Upon further evaluation, this could be Lee’s grand design in order to elevate the status of his 8 children as legitimate children and secure their future. NBI also found out from the hospital records that the eldest among the Lee’s other children (who was recorded as the 12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17

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yo mother, when Keh was already 38 years old at the time and so forth. IOW, by the hospital records of the Lee’s other children, Keh’s declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly gave birth to such other children, numbering 8. On the basis of this report, the respondent Leh-Keh children file two separate petitions for the deletion from the certificate of live birth of Petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lee’s other children, the name Keh and replace the same with Tiu to indicate her true mother’s name. Lee-Keh children then filed a request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, petitioner’s presumed mother, to testify in the case. RTC granted it. Tiu moved to quash the same. Tiu’s contention The subpoena issued on Tiu are: 1. Oppressive considering her advanced age; and 2. It violates Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule parental privilege, compelling her to testify against her stepdaughter RTC – granted the quashal for being oppressive considering Tiu’s old age and the purpose of the subpoena is to badger her to admit the she was petitioner’s mother. CA- set aside the order of the RTC. ISSUE: WON TIU MAY BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN THE CORRECTION OF ENTRY CASE TO SHOW THAT PETITIONER EMMA LEE IS NOT KEH’S DAUGHTER RULING: YES, TIU MAY BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY. Sec. 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to “direct” ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.

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Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner 24) ESTRADA v. DESIERTO DOCTRINE: FACTS: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada (Erap) was elected president while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) was elected as his VP. 10 million Filipinos voted for petitioner believing he would rescue them from lifes adversity. They were both to serve a 6-year term commencing June 30, 1998. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends, of receiving millions of pesos from juteng lords. The next day, Senator Teofisto Guingona then took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled “I Accuse”. He accused the petitioner of receiving P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson from 1998-2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson 70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice for joint investigation. The HREP did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security decided to investigate the expose of Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Alvarez, Herrera, and Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner. Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. The church and former Presidents Cory Aquino and Fidel Ramos joined the cry for resignation. Respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services and later asked for the petitioner’s resignation. However, petitioner held on to his office and refused to sign. 4 economic advisers resigned, as well as Secretary Mar Roxas II of DTI. The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of

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Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the HREP to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both house of the Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Fuentebella. On November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21 senators took their oath as judges with SC CJ Justice Hilario Davide presiding. In December, the impeachment trial started. They day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. The dramatic point of the hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior VP of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature “Jose Velarde” on documents involving a P500 million investment agreement with their bank. On January 16, when by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that the petitioner held a 3.3 billion secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The prosecutors walked out in protest. This led to protests all over Metro Manila demanding petitioner to resign. On January 19, the fall of petitioner seemed inevitable. At 2:30pm petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3pm, the AFP withdrew their support for the government. A little later, PNP Chief Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar announcement. Rallies for resignation exploded around the nation. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced that he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second envelope. January 20 was the day of surrender. At 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide, after negotiations in the Malacañang, administered the oath to respondent GMA as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 pm, petitioner and his family hurriedly left the Palace. He then issued a press statement stating that: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the 37| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society. It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country. I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people. MABUHAY ! ISSUE: (daghan nig issue but I’ll just include the ones related to evidence) WON the use of the Angara Diary as evidence was proper - YES WON the use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of petitioner violates the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence – NO it does not violate hearsay evidence rule RULING: To begin with, the Angara diary is NOT an out of court statement. The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

Diary. The said diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings. The three parts of the diary were attached as Annexes A-C of the Memorandum of private respondents. In fact, petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum both the second part of the diary, and the third part. It was also extensively used by the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to contest to the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so. Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not covered by the hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness. There are 3 reasons for excluding hearsay evidence, namely: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence; and (3) absence of oath. Not all hearsay evidence however is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by the courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness, and necessity. A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further determine whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules of exclusion. A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class. The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not be a candidate, his statement that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be opened by Monday and “pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. I just want to clear my name then I will go”. The reason for the meltdown is obvious – his will not to resign has wilted. It is, however, argued that the Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence, not binding on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of Adoptive Admission. An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party’s 38| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person. In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of a dignified exit or resignation. Petitioner did not object to the suggested option but simply said he could never leave the country. Petitioner’s silence on this and other related suggestions can be taken as an admission by him. Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara Diary against him violated the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in Section 28 of the Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as herein otherwise provided. Petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. One of them is provided in Section 29 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent. Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the little president. Indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days before he left the Palace. Thus, according to the Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary Angara: “Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you have been the only one I’ve listened to. And now, at the end, you still are.” True to this trust, petitioner has to ask Secretary Angara if he already had to leave the Palace after their final lunch. Angara told him to go and he did. Petitioner cannot deny that Angara headed his team of negotiators that met with the team of respondent Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer of power after his relinquishment. The Diary shows that petitioner was always briefed by Secretary Angara on the progress of their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara. Under our rules of evidence, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

statements. These are statements which are relevant independently of whether they are true or not. They belong to 2 classes: (1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2) those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The second class includes the following: (a) Statements of a person showing his state of mind, that is his mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other emotions; xxx As aforediscussed, the Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner which reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can reasonably deduce petitioner’s intent to resign. They are admissible and they are not covered by the rules on hearsay. Petitioner also contends that the rules on authentication of private writings and best evidence were violated. It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only a copy of the Angara Diary. In doing so, the Court did NOT, however, violate the best evidence rule. The Court held that with regard to the Best Evidence Rule, the production of the original may be dispensed with whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production. Secondary evidence of the content of the writing will be received in evidence if no objection is made to its reception. With regard to the authentication, it is no longer required because the genuineness of such was not denied. 25) PEOPLE v GODOY (Teacher falsely prosecuted for rape) PRINCIPLE: No implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the accused did not take part in any of the negotiations

39| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

FACTS: Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate informations filed before the RTC of Palawan with rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention. According to complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M. of January 21, 1994, she went to the boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point which is near the Palawan National School (PNS), Pulot Branch, where she was studying. When she saw that the house was dark, she decided to pass through the kitchen door at the back because she knew that there was nobody inside. As soon as she opened the door, somebody suddenly grabbed her, poked a knife on her neck, dragged her by the hand and told her not to shout. She was then forced to lie down on the floor. Although it was dark, complainant was able to recognize her assailant, by the light coming from the moon and through his voice, as accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was her Physics teacher at PNS. When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her panty with one hand while holding the knife with the other hand, opened the zipper of his pants, and then inserted his private organ inside her private parts against her will. She felt pain because it was her first experience and she cried. Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter a word. She was very frightened because a knife was continually pointed at her. She also could not fight back nor plead with appellant not to rape her because he was her teacher and she was afraid of him. She was threatened not to report the incident to anyone or else she and her family would be killed. Thereafter, while she was putting on her panty, she noticed that her skirt was stained with blood. Appellant walked with her to the gate of the house and she then proceeded alone to the boarding house where she lived. She did not see where appellant went after she left him at the gate. When she arrived at her boarding house, she saw her landlady but she did not mention anything about the incident.

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant went home to her parents' house at Ipilan, Brooke's Point. She likewise did not tell her parents about the incident for fear that appellant might make good his threat. At around 3:00 P.M. of that same day, appellant arrived at the house of her parents and asked permission from the latter if complainant could accompany him to solicit funds because she was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When her parents agreed, she was constrained to go with appellant because she did not want her parents to get into trouble. She was forced to ride the jeep because appellant threatened to kill her if she would not board the vehicle. The jeep proceeded to the Sunset Garden at the poblacion, Brooke's Point where they alighted. At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to a room where they stayed for three days. During the entire duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden, complainant was not allowed to leave the room which was always kept locked. She was continuously guarded and constantly raped by appellant. She was, however, never drunk or unconscious. Nonetheless, she was forced to have sex with appellant because the latter was always carrying a knife with him. In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought her to the house of his friend at Edward's Subdivision where she was raped by him three times. She was likewise detained and locked inside the room and tightly guarded by appellant. After two days, or on January 27, 1994, they left the place because appellant came to know that complainant had been reported and indicated as a missing person in the police blotter. They went to see a certain Naem from whom appellant sought help. On that same day, she was released but only after her parents agreed to settle the case with appellant. Early the next morning, Helen (mother of Mia) and her husband went to the PNP station at Pulot, Brooke's Point and had the incident recorded in the police blotter. When she returned home, a certain Naem was waiting there and he informed her that Mia was at Brooke's Point. He further conveyed 40| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

appellant's willingness to become a Muslim so he could marry Mia and thus settle the case. Helen Taha readily acceded because she wanted to see her daughter. In the morning of January 27, 1994, she went to the house of Naem who sent somebody to fetch complainant. She testified that when Mia arrived, she was crying as she reported that she was raped by appellant, and that the latter threatened to kill her if she did not return within an hour. Because of this, she immediately brought Mia to the hospital where the latter was examined and then they proceeded to the municipal hall to file a complaint for rape and kidnapping. Both Mia and Helen Taha executed separate sworn statements before the PNP at Brooke's Point. Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house and offered P50,000.00 for the settlement of the case. On their part, her husband insisted that they just settle, hence all three of them, Adjeril(father), Helen and Mia Taha, went to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where they met with the mother of appellant who gave them P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently executed an affidavit of desistance for the case of kidnapping pending in the prosecutor's office. The defense presented a different version of what actually transpired. According to appellant, he first met Mia Taha sometime in August, 1993 at the PNS. Although he did not court her, he fell in love with her because she often told him " Sir, I love you". What started as a joke later developed into a serious relationship which was kept a secret from everybody else. He stated that there was no rape and kidnapping that was done as they were in a serious relationship. The defense presented witnesses that corroborated their alleged relationship (will be discussed in the ruling). The appellant also said that whenever she wanted to leave the complainant, she threatened to commit suicide. While appellant was already on his way out of Edward's Subdivision, he was met by Chief of

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

Police Eliseo Crespo who invited him to the police station. Appellant waited at the police station the whole afternoon but when complainant, her parents and relatives arrived at around 5:00 P.M., he was not given the chance to talk to any one of them. That afternoon of January 2 7, 1994, appellant was no longer allowed to leave and he was detained at the police station after Mia and her parents lodged a complaint for rape and kidnapping against him. During his detention, Mia's cousin, Lorna Casantosan, delivered to appellant on different occasions two letters from complainant. As Mia's teacher, appellant is familiar with and was, therefore, able to identify the handwriting in said letters as that of Mia Taha. After a time, he came to know, through his mother, that an affidavit of desistance was reportedly executed by complainants. However, he claims that he never knew and it was never mentioned to him, not until the day he testified in court, that his mother paid P30,000.00 to Mia's father because, although he did not dissuade them, neither did he request his mother to talk to complainants in order to settle the case. However, pursuant to a joint resolution issued on March 11, 1994 by the Prosecutor, two separate informations for rape and for kidnapping with serious illegal detention were nevertheless filed against appellant Danny Godoy with no bail recommended in both charges. ISSUE: Whether the offer of compromise is an admission of guilt of the appellant RULING: NO. In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably convince this Court that there was no rape committed on the alleged date and place, and that the charge of rape was the contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for redress of an actual wrong. The prosecution has palpably failed to prove beyond peradventure of doubt that appellant had sexual congress with complainant against her will. According to complainant, when she entered the kitchen of the boarding house, appellant was already inside apparently waiting for her. If so, it is quite 41| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

perplexing how appellant could have known that she was going there on that particular day and at that time, considering that she does not even live there, unless of course it was appellant's intention to satisfy his lustful desires on anybody who happened to come along. But then this would be stretching the imagination too far aside from the fact that such a generic intent with an indeterminate victim was never established nor even intimated by the prosecution. Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on that fateful day, he went to the boarding house upon the invitation of complainant because the latter requested him to help her with her monologue for the Miss PNS contest. However, they were not able to go inside the house because it was locked and there was no light, so they just sat on a bench outside the house and talked. This testimony of appellant was substantially corroborated by defense witness Filomena Pielago. She affirmed that in the evening of January 21, 1994, she saw both appellant and complainant seated on a bench outside the boarding house. It was further alleged by complainant that after her alleged ravishment, she put on her panty and then appellant openly accompanied her all the way to the gate of the house where they eventually parted ways. This is inconceivable. It is not the natural tendency of a man to remain for long by the side of the woman he had raped, and in public in a highly populated area at that. Given the stealth that accompanies it and the anxiety to end further exposure at the scene, the logical post-incident impulse of the felon is to distance himself from his victim as far and as soon as practicable, to avoid discovery and apprehension. Complainant's professed reason for going to the boarding house is vague and tenuous. At first, she asserted that she was at the boarding house talking with a friend and then, later, she said it was her cousin. Subsequently, she again wavered and said that she was not able to talk to her cousin. Furthermore, she initially stated that on January 21, 1994 at around 7:00 P.M., she was at the boarding house conversing with her cousin. Then in the course of her narration, she gave another version

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

and said that when she reached the boarding house it was dark and there was nobody inside. Complainant testified that appellant raped her through the use of force and intimidation, specifically by holding a knife to her neck. However, the element of force was not sufficiently established. The physical facts adverted to by the lower court as corroborative of the prosecution's theory on the use of force are undoubtedly the medico-legal findings of Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia. Upon closer scrutiny, however, we find that said findings neither support nor confirm the charge that rape was so committed through forcible means by appellant against complainant on January 21, 1994.

relationship is uncovered, the alleged victim or her parents for that matter would rather take the risk of instituting a criminal action in the hope that the court would take the cudgels for them than for the woman to admit to her own acts of indiscretion. And this, as the records reveal, is precisely what happened to appellant. Appellant's claim that he and complainant were lovers is fortified by the highly credible testimonies of several witnesses for the defense, viz.: (daghan ni pero ang significant ra ako gi-include para di na kaayo taas)

In rape of the nature alleged in this case, we repeat, the testimony of the complainant must be corroborated by physical evidence showing use of force.

1. Filomena Pielago testified that on the night of January 21, 1994, she saw appellant and complainant sitting on a bench in front of the house where the sexual attack allegedly took place, and the couple were talking intimately. She had warned Mia about the latter's illicit affair with appellant.

There is likewise no evidence on record that she put up a struggle when appellant forced her to lie on the floor, removed her panty, opened the zipper of his trousers, and inserted his organ inside her genitals. Neither did she demonstrate that appellant, in committing the heinous act, subjected her to any force of whatever nature or form.

2. Fernando Rubio, an acquaintance of appellant and owner of the house at Edward's Subdivision, testified that he asked Mia why she decided to have an affair with appellant who is a married man. Mia answered that she really loves him. He heard her call appellant "Papa". The couple looked happy and were sweet to each other.

Complainant's enigmatic behavior after her alleged ravishment can only be described as paradoxical: it was so strangely normal as to be abnormal. It seems odd, if not incredible, that upon seeing allegedly raped her only the day before, she did not accuse, revile or denounce him, or show rage, revulsion, and disgust. Instead, she meekly went with appellant despite the presence of her parents and the proximity of neighbors which, if only for such facts, would naturally have deterred appellant from pursuing any evil design.

3. Erna Baradero, a co-teacher of appellant, saw the couple the day before the alleged rape incident, inside one of the classrooms and they were holding hands, and she heard Mia tell appellant "Mahal na mahal kita Sir, iwanan mo ang iyong asawa at tatakas tayo." She tried to dissuade complainant from continuing with her relationship with appellant.

The main defense proffered by appellant is that he and complainant were sweethearts. While the "sweetheart theory" does not often gain favor with this Court, such is not always the case if the hard fact is that the accused and the supposed victim are, in truth, intimately related except that, as is usual in most cases, either the relationship is illicit or the victim's parents are against it. It is not improbable that in some instances, when the 42| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

The positive allegations of appellant that he was having an intimate relationship with complainant, which were substantially corroborated by several witnesses, were never successfully confuted. The rebuttal testimony of complainant merely consisted of bare, unexplained denials of the positive, definite, consistent and detailed assertions of appellant. Mere denials are self-serving negative evidence. They cannot obtain evidentiary weight greater than the declarations of credible disinterested witnesses.

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

(TOPIC) The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed to be an admission of guilt. This inference in the instant case. In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom. A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves appellant's innocence of the offense charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not come from appellant but was actually suggested by a certain Naem, who is an imam or Muslim leader and who likewise informed appellant that he could be converted into a Muslim so he could marry complainant. As a matter of fact, when said offer was first made to appellant, he declined because of the fact that he was already married. On top of these, appellant did not know, not until the trial proper, that his mother actually paid P30,000.00 for the settlement of these cases. Complainant's own mother, Helen Taha, testified that present during the negotiations were herself, her husband, Mia, and appellant's mother. Appellant himself was never present in any of said meetings. It has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution. In another case, this Court ruled that no implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the accused did not take part in any of the negotiations and the effort to settle the case was in accordance with the established tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices 43| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

and traditions, in an effort to prevent further deterioration of the relations between the parties. In the cases at bar, the letters written by complainant to appellant are very revealing. Most probably written out of desperation and exasperation with the way she was being treated by her parents, complainant threw all caution to the winds when she wrote. Oo aaminin ko nagkasala ako sa iyo pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat kong ipaglaban obviously referring to her ineptitude and impotence in helping appellant out of his predicament. It could, therefore, be safely presumed that the rape charge was merely an offshoot of the discovery by her parents of the intimate relationship between her and appellant. In order to avoid retribution from her parents, together with the moral pressure exerted upon her by her mother, she was forced to concoct her account of the alleged rape. (Re: Kidnapping) When they left the house, appellant walked ahead of her, obviously with her parents and their neighbors witnessing their departure. It is difficult to comprehend how one could deduce from these normal and innocuous arrangement any felonious intent of appellant to deprive complainant of her liberty. One will look in vain for a case where a kidnapping was committed under such inauspicious circumstances as described by complainant. Appellant declared that when they left the house of the Taha family, complainant was bringing with her a plastic bag which later turned out to contain her clothes. This bag was left behind by Mia at Edward's Subdivision, as hereinbefore noted, and was later delivered to appellant by Benedicto Rubio. Again, we cannot conceive of a ridiculous situation where the kidnap victim was first allowed to prepare and pack her clothes, as if she was merely leaving for a pleasant sojourn with the criminal, all these with the knowledge and consent of her parents who passively looked on without comment. 26) People vs Gener de Guzman

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

FACTS: Gilda Ambray filed with the MTC of Bacoor, Cavite, a complaint charging accused Gener de Guzman with the crime of rape. On even date, de Guzman was arrested and detained but was later released upon the filing and approval of his bail bond. Finding a prima facie case against him on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution, the MTC forwarded the record of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor for the filing of the necessary information with the appropriate court. A case for rape was then filed. Trial followed. Testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution established the following facts: Homeward bound from a Department Store where she worked as a sales clerk, complainant Gilda Ambray was at the gate of Meadow Wood Subdivision waiting for a tricycle ride toward her residence. She waited for about ten minutes. When she noticed the accused, sitting at the guardhouse, she approached him and asked him some questions. He answered in a stammering manner. The complainant recognized the accused very well because it was summertime and the gate of the subdivision was well-lit. After Gilda started to walk, the accused mounted his tricycle, followed her and offered her a ride, to which she agreed. While on board the tricycle, Gilda noticed that the accused took a different route. The accused would once in a while stop the tricycle and tell her that it was not in good condition. When they reached Phase II of the same subdivision near an unfinished house, the accused stopped and told Gilda to push the tricycle. She alighted from the tricycle and paid him, which he did not accept. Gilda then walked away, but after she had taken about ten steps, the accused embraced her from behind, covered her mouth and held her neck tightly. The accused then dragged her to a vacant lot 10 meters away from the unfinished house. Afterwards, the motherfucker consummated his ill intention. The accused then warned Gilda not to tell anybody, otherwise, he would kill her and all members of her family. Gilda picked up her pants and underwear and hurriedly ran toward her home, without looking back. When Gilda arrived home, she told her mother and her husband, Aquilino Ambray, that she was raped 44| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

by the accused. Aquilino got angry and wanted to retaliate but was prevailed upon not to by Gilda's mother. Gilda and her mother reported the incident to one Tony Antonio, the President of the Homeowners' Association. The accused was then brought to the municipal jail which ultimately resulted to the filing of the instant case. Gener de Guzman interposed the defense of alibi. According to him, he had a drinking session with his friends. In its decision, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The accused appealed hence the case at bar. The upshot of the accused's stance in the errors assigned is that he was not positively identified and that neither force nor intimidation was proven ISSUE: WON accused is guilty of rape – YES oy RULING: Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy, not generally attempted except in dark or deserted and secluded places away from prying eyes, and the crime usually commences solely upon the word of the offended woman herself and conviction invariably turns upon her credibility, as the People's single witness of the actual occurrence. The determination of the guilt of the accused depends primarily on the credibility of the complainant Gilda Ambray, since only she and the accused witnessed the incident when it happened. Her testimony alone, if credible, would render the accused's conviction inevitable. A meticulous assessment of Gilda's testimony demonstrates beyond doubt the truthfulness of her story, which she narrated in a categorical, straightforward and candid manner. Further strengthening her credibility in recounting her ordeal at the hands of the accused was her conduct immediately after the sexual assault. She ran home without looking back, and upon her arrival she reported the rape to her husband and her mother. Immediately thereafter, she reported it to the President of the Homeowners' Association who then sought police assistance. All the foregoing acts of Gilda were done within 24 hours after the commission of the crime. The

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

quickness and spontaneity of these deeds manifested the natural reactions of a virtuous woman who had just undergone sexual molestation against herself. We likewise agree with the trial court that the accused used force and intimidation upon Gilda. In this case, the accused embraced Gilda from behind, held her neck tightly, and covered her mouth. As she struggled to free herself, she sustained her injuries. Moreover, the accused also threatened Gilda with death if she would not yield to his bestial desires. The threat certainly constituted intimidation. The accused's contention that it was highly incredible that there was force or intimidation since the assailant committed three acts of sexual intercourse with Gilda in three hours, deserves scant consideration. In the first place, Gilda explained in her re-direct examination that the three hours mentioned in her cross-examination referred to the time which elapsed from the moment she was at the gate of Meadow Wood Subdivision and until she reported the incident to the President of the Homeowners' Association. The principal object of re-direct examination is to prevent injustice to the witness and the party who has called him by affording an opportunity to the witness to explain the testimony given on cross-examination, and to explain any apparent contradiction or inconsistency in his statements, an opportunity which is ordinarily afforded to him during cross-examination. The re-direct examination serves the purpose of completing the answer of a witness, or of adding a new matter which has been omitted, or of correcting a possible misinterpretation of testimony. In the second place, on direct examination, Gilda categorically declared that the accused tried to thrice insert his penis into her vagina. He failed in the first and second attempts because she struggled, but succeeded on the third because she was already weak. While it may be true that on cross-examination she testified that she was raped once, yet on re-direct examination she said that she was raped three times, no inconsistency at all may be deduced therefrom. There was merely confusion as to the legal qualifications of the three separate acts, i.e., Gilda's answers were conclusions of law. A 45| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

witness is not permitted to testify as to a conclusion of law, among which, legal responsibility is one of the most conspicuous. A witness, no matter how skillful, is not to be asked or permitted to testify as to whether or not a party is responsible to the law. The accused is guilty of rape. 27) San Miguel vs Kalalo KEYWORD: Inumin ng Tagumpay, San Miguel Beer FACTS: Kalalo was a dealer of San Miguel Corp. In the course of the dealings of Kalalo, an agent of SMC requested her to issue several postdated checks to secure her credit overdraft for the delivery of SMC beer products over the Christmas season. After making several cash payments and returning a number of empty beer bottles and cases, she noticed she still owed SMC a substantial amount. She insisted a detailed statement of account but SMC failed to do so. To protect her rights, she ordered her bank to stop payment on the last seven checks she had issued to SMC totaling 921,215. SMC sent demand letters. Kalalo’s counsel made in return an Offer of Compromise which SMC did not accept but instead, it filed a case for violation of the Bouncing Check Law. During trial and after the prosecution rested its case, SMC now complied with the statement of account showing that she owed SMC 71,009. Kalalo recanted her Offer of Compromise stating that at the time she prepared the letter, she was threatened by SMC for imprisonment and that she does not know how much she owed. She was acquitted by the MeTC. The appeal before the RTC by SMC on the issue of civil liability (arguing that SMC is entitled 921,215) and a subsequent Petition for Review before the CA was likewise dismissed. Hence this petition. ISSUE: WON the Offer of Compromise may be considered in evidence against Kalalo? SMC argues that her Offer of Compromise unequivocally admitted her liability while being assister by her counsel.

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

RULING: No Contrary to SMCs contention, the aforequoted letter does not contain an express acknowledgment of liability. At most, what respondent acknowledged was the receipt of the statement of account, not the existence of her liability to SMC. Furthermore, the fact that Kalalo made a compromise offer to SMC cannot be considered as an admission of liability. In Pentagon Steel vs CA, the reason why compromise offer may not be considered as evidence against the offerror: 1. Indeed, if every offer to buy peace could be used as evidence against a person who presents it, many settlements would be prevented and unnecessary litigation would result, since no prudent person would dare offer or entertain a compromise if his or her compromise position could be exploited as a confession of weakness. 2. A true offer of compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve an admission on the part of a defendant that he or she is legally liable, or on the part of a plaintiff, that his or her claim is groundless or even doubtful, since it is made with a view to avoid controversy and save the expense of litigation. SMC argues that Kalalo’s Offer of Compromise may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt pursuant to Sec. 27 Rule 130 ROC. RULING: No The Offer of Compromise was made prior to the filing of the criminal complaint against her for a violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. The Offer of Compromise was clearly not made in the context of a criminal proceeding and, therefore, cannot be considered as an implied admission of guilt. Finally, during the testimony of Kalalo and after her receipt of the Statement of Account from SMC, she recanted the contents of the Offer of Compromise. She explained that, at the time she had the letter prepared, the final amount owed to SMC was yet undetermined; and that she was constantly facing threats of imprisonment from SMCs agents. 46| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

28) PEOPLE v YPARRAGUIRRE PRINCIPLE: An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can be received in evidence against the offeror. What is required is that after committing the crime, the accused or his representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved. FACTS: Rosita Bacaling, a 17 year old barrio lass, who was not yet deflorated, was working as a housemaid with accused-appellant Yparraguirre and his wife. While she was cooking porridge for the Yparraguirres, appellant arrived from work. Finding out that the children were sleeping, he gave Rosita a white envelope with 15 tablets inside, allegedly for the skin disease of Rosita’s thigh. The latter took all the tablets as instructed. However, she became weak and fell down. She later on found herself on the bed of the appellant who pointed a hunting knife at her neck and succeeded carnal knowledge against her will. She was later on punched on the stomach and lost consciousness. She was threatened by the appellant should she report the incident. After one month, she went home to her mother where her mother found her helpless, not being able to talk and eat, which resulted to her confinement in a mental hospital in Davao. When Rosita finally revealed to her mother the incident, a case of rape was filed against appellant who pleaded not guilty. He was later on convicted. Note: Prior to the filing of the case, the wife of the appellant went to the house of Rosita and offered compromise with her mother so as to drop the case. Not discussed in the facts. ISSUE: WON the offer of compromise made before filing of a criminal complaint should be admitted as evidence. RULING: There is evidence that after Rosita revealed the rape to her mother, appellant's wife, Mary Ann,

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

offered the mother, Merlyn P15,000.00 to dissuade her from filing the complaint. When Merlyn refused, Mary Ann increased the offer to P25,000.00. Still Merlyn refused to accept it. As pointed out by appellant, no criminal complaint had been filed at the time the compromise offer was made. Nevertheless, the rape incident was already known to appellant's wife. Wife herself testified that Merlyn told her about it on the day when wife first offered the money. An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can be received in evidence against the offeror. What is required is that after committing the crime, the accused or his representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved. The prosecution’s evidence, which rests mainly on the testimony of Rosita, is credible, reliable and trustworthy. Rosita testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner and never wavered even on cross-examination and rebuttal. The inconsistencies in her testimony are minor which tend to buttress, rather than weaken, the conclusion that her testimony was not contrived. Appellant's allegation that Rosita should have fallen asleep for hours after ingesting the tablets is speculative. There is no evidence that the tablets were sleeping tablets. They, however, weakened Rosita and prevented her from making any resistance to appellant's lewd acts. The delay in filing the complaint does not in any way affect Rosita's credibility. She was afraid of appellant's threat to her life. Rosita was a seventeen-year old barrio lass and a high school dropout. She was also the breadwinner of the family. It is hard to believe that Rosita would fabricate a story of defloration, open herself to public trial and place her family, who depended on her, in a very humiliating and compromising situation for no reason at all. She had been working for the Yparraguirres for two months and the spouses actually found her to be a good worker. Rosita's psychological condition could not have been the product of ill-motive and fabrication. The positive identification of accused-appellant as the rapist prevails over his defense of alibi. It was not physically impossible for appellant to have been 47| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

at the scene of the crime. The public market was merely a ten-minute walk from their rented room and during work breaks, appellant would sometimes go home to bring food to his children.

29) Bank of Commerce v Manalo KEYWORD: (Spouses purchased Lot 1 & 2, Block 2 in installments) PRINCIPLE: Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at another time, although such evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the parties. FACTS: In 1967, Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) sold to The Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM) through a "Deed of Sale of Real Estate" Lot 1, Block 2 and Lot 2, Block 2 in Xavierville subdivision. Nevertheless, XEI continued selling the residential lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM. In 1972, then XEI president Emerito Ramos contracted the services of Engr. Manalo who works for Hurricane Commercial for the installation of a water pump at the former's residence for P34,887.66. Engr. Manalo proposed to XEI, through Ramos, to purchase a lot in the Xavierville subdivision, and offered as part of the downpayment the ₱34,887.66 Ramos owed him. XEI, through Ramos, agreed. The Manalo spouses chose both abovementioned lots for reservation which was later on confirmed by Ramos. Eventually, the respondent spouses took possession of the lots and constructed a house thereon. In the meantime, many of the lot buyers refused to pay their monthly installments until they were assured that they would be issued Torrens titles over the lots they had purchased. The spouses were notified of XEI’s resumption of selling operations. However, they did not pay the balance of the downpayment because XEI failed toprepare a contract of conditional sale and transmit the same

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

to them for their signature. XEI furnished Manalo spouses with a statement of their account showing that they had a balance of ₱34,724.34 on the downpayment of the two lots after deducting the account of Ramos plus interests. The spouses Manalo received another statement of account from XEI, inclusive of interests on the purchase price of the lots. In reply, Manalo Jr. stated they had not yet received the notice of resumption of XEI's selling operations, and that there had been no arrangement on the payment of interests; hence, they should not be charged with interest on the balance of the downpayment on the property. Further, they demanded that a deed of conditional sale over the two lots be transmitted to them for their signatures. However, XEI ignored the demands. Consequently, the spouses refused to pay the balance of the downpayment of the purchase price. Sometime in June 1976, Manalo constructed a business sign in the sidewalk near his house. XEI informed Manalo that business signs were not allowed along the sidewalk. It demanded that he remove the same, on the ground, among others, that the sidewalk was not part of the land which he had purchased on installment basis from XEI. Subsequently, XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM. OBM warned Manalo, Jr., that "putting up of a business sign is specifically prohibited by their contract of conditional sale" and that his failure to comply with its demand would impel it to avail of the remedies as provided in their contract of conditional sale. The Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM) subsequently acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM. CBM requested Perla Manalo to stop any on-going construction on the property since it (CBM) was the owner of the lot and she had no permission for such construction. Perla informed them that her husband had a contract with OBM, through XEI, to purchase the property. She promised to send CBM the documents. However, she failed to do so. Thus, CBM filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the spouses. Butlater on, CBM moved to withdraw its complaint because of the issues raised.In the meantime, CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of the Philippines. Respondent Spouses then fileda complaint for specific performance and damages against the bank. 48| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

alleged therein that they had always been ready, able and willing to pay the installments on the lots sold to them but no contract was forthcoming; they constructed their house worth ₱2,000,000.00 on the property in good faith; Manalo informed the defendantthat he would abide by the terms and conditions of his original agreement with the OBM; during the hearing of the ejectment case, they offered to pay ₱313,172.34 representing the balance on the purchase price of said lots; such tender of payment was rejected, so that the subject lots could be sold at considerably higher prices to third parties. Both RTC and CA upheld the respondent spouses. ISSUE: W/N XEI impliedly granted the respondent spouses the option to pay in 120 or 180 monthly installments when it did so for the other lot buyers. RULING: We agree with petitioner’s contention that, for a perfected contract of sale or contract to sell to exist in law, there must be an agreement of the parties, not only on the price of the property sold, but also on the manner the price is to be paid by the vendee. Under Article 1458 of the New Civil Code x x x In a contract to sell property by installments, it is not enough that the parties agree on the price as well as the amount of downpayment. The parties must, likewise, agree on the manner of payment of the balance of the purchase price and on the other terms and conditions relative to the sale. Even if the buyer makes a downpayment or portion thereof, such payment cannot be considered as sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase and sale between the parties. We reject the submission of respondents that they and Ramos had intended to incorporate the terms of payment contained in the three contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers in the "corresponding contract of conditional sale," which would later be signed by them. We have meticulously reviewed the respondents’ complaint and find no such allegation therein. Indeed, respondents merely alleged in their complaint that they were bound to pay the balance of the purchase price of the property "in installments." When respondent Manalo, Jr.

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

testified, he was never asked, on direct examination or even on cross-examination, whether the terms of payment of the balance of the purchase price of the lots under the contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers would form part of the "corresponding contract of conditional sale" to be signed by them simultaneously with the payment of the balance of the downpayment on the purchase price. We note that, in its letter to the respondents which was sent to them almost three years from the execution by the parties of their August 22, 1972 letter agreement, XEI stated, in part, that respondents had purchased the property "on installment basis." However, in the said letter, XEI failed to state a specific amount for each installment, and whether such payments were to be made monthly, semi-annually, or annually. Also, respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed to adduce a shred of evidence to prove that they were obliged to pay the ₱278,448.00 monthly, semi-annually or annually. The allegation that the payment of the ₱278,448.00 was to be paid in installments is, thus, vague and indefinite. Case law is that, for a contract to be enforceable, its terms must be certain and explicit, not vague or indefinite. Respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed to allege in their complaint that the terms of payment of the ₱278,448.00 to be incorporated in the "corresponding contract of conditional sale" were those contained in the contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and Soller, Aguila and Roque. They likewise failed to prove such allegation in this Court. The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance of the purchase price of lots purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly installments does not constitute evidence that XEI also agreed to give the respondents the same mode and timeline of payment of the ₱278,448.00. Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at another time, although such evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the parties. Similar acts as evidence. – Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not 49| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like. However, respondents failed to allege and prove, in the trial court, that, as a matter of business usage, habit or pattern of conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the balance of the purchase price in installments of 120 months of fixed amounts with pre-computed interests, and that XEI and the respondents had intended to adopt such terms of payment relative to the sale of the two lots in question. Indeed, respondents adduced in evidence the three contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers merely to prove that XEI continued to sell lots in the subdivision as sales agent of OBM after it acquired said lots, not to prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct on the part of XEI to require all lot buyers in the subdivision to pay the balance of the purchase price of said lots in 120 months. It further failed to prove that the trial court admitted the said deeds as part of the testimony of respondent Manalo, Jr. Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts. Courts must contend with the caveat that, before they admit evidence of usage, of habit or pattern of conduct, the offering party must establish the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform response that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but rather, conduct that is semi-automatic in nature. The offering party must allege and prove specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of habit. The examples offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must be numerous enough to base on inference of systematic conduct. Mere similarity of contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently similar circumstances to outweigh the danger of prejudice and confusion. In determining whether the examples are numerous enough, and sufficiently regular, the key criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response. After all, habit means a course of behavior of a person regularly represented in like circumstances. It is only when examples offered to

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

establish pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an inference of systematic conduct that examples are admissible. The key criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response or ratio of reaction to situations. There are cases where the course of dealings to be followed is defined by the usage of a particular trade or market or profession. As expostulated by Justice Benjamin Cardozo of the United States Supreme Court: "Life casts the moulds of conduct, which will someday become fixed as law. Law preserves the moulds which have taken form and shape from life." Usage furnishes a standard for the measurement of many of the rights and acts of men. It is also well-settled that parties who contract on a subject matter concerning which known usage prevail, incorporate such usage by implication into their agreement, if nothing is said to be contrary. However, the respondents inexplicably failed to adduce sufficient competent evidence to prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct of XEI to justify the use of the terms of payment in the contracts of the other lot buyers, and thus grant respondents the right to pay the ₱278,448.00 in 120 months, presumably because of respondents’ belief that the manner of payment of the said amount is not an essential element of a contract to sell. There is no evidence that XEI or OBM and all the lot buyers in the subdivision, including lot buyers who pay part of the downpayment of the property purchased by them in the form of service, had executed contracts of conditional sale containing uniform terms and conditions. Moreover, under the terms of the contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and three lot buyers in the subdivision, XEI agreed to grant 120 months within which to pay the balance of the purchase price to two of them, but granted one 180 months to do so. There is no evidence on record that XEI granted the same right to buyers of two or more lots. 30) The Learning Child v Ayala Alabang (TAKE NOTE: 3 CONSOLIDATED CASES) FACTS: Ayala Land, Inc. (herein known as “ALI”) sold a parcel of land to Spouses Yuson. Spouses Yuson in turn sold 50| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

it to spouses ALFONSO. In the TCT, there was a “Deed of Restrictions” which stated that the lot shall be used exclusively for the establishment and maintenance of a preparatory school (KINDERGARTEN and NURSERY) with playground and garage. ALI turned over the right and power to enforce the restrictions to Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA). The spouses Alfonso opened a preparatory school named The Learning Child, Inc. However, subsequently the spouses decided to include a GRADE SCHOOL program in violation of the Deed of Restrictions, and did not hear the cries of AVAA to cease from such. Hence, AAVA filed a case for injunction in the RTC against the school and the spouses. AAVA reasoned before the RTC that the construction of grade school rooms is contrary to (1) the Deed of Restrictions and also contrary to the (2) Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of NCR and its related Barangay ordinance. The ordinance stated that Block 3 (where the school is located) is a “residential area” and the ordinance allows only preparatory schools with TWO classrooms. Hence, RTC ruled in favour of AAVA. However, when the spouses filed a motion for reconsideration, the Municipality of Muntinlupa corrected the ordinance and stated that Block 3 is an “institutional area” and no longer a “residential area” (hence NO MORE limit as to classrooms). This was because of a typographical error since what should’ve been residential was Block 1 and NOT Block 3 (where school was located). Because of this, RTC granted the MR and ruled in favour of spouses. CA however reinstated the earlier decision of RTC. Hence, this petition was filed. Before the Supreme Court, the spouses alleged that AAVA should be now estopped since it seems to have abrogated the agreed Deed of Restrictions due to the ff. acts: 1. AAVA Manager admitted that the construction of a school building with 24 rooms was approved in a “Site Development Plan” with his signature 2. AAVA President authorized via letter the construction of a “new school building extension”

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

3.

ALI (NOT AAVA) impliedly requested the reclassification of the property as “institutional”, and 4. ALI subsequently assented to the reclassification of the property via letter ISSUE: 1. WON acts 1 & 2 constitute estoppel by deed? 2. WON acts 3 & 4 comes under the rule of res inter alios acta, it being done by a third party? RULING: AAVA is not estopped, and the acts do NOT come under the rule of res inter alios acta. Estoppel by deed is a bar which precludes one party from asserting as against the other party and his privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of any material facts asserted in it. We have previously cautioned against the perils of the misapplication of the doctrine of estoppel. ACT#1 and #2 The alleged assent of AAVA to the construction of additional classrooms is not at all inconsistent with the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions, which merely limit the use of the subject property exclusively for the establishment and maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school which may include such installations as an office for school administration, playground and garage school vehicles. The deed did not limit the number of buildings or rooms. The construction of more rooms and building extensions is contrary to the ORDINANCE, but NOT to the Deed of Restrictions. ACT#3 and # 4 Numbers 3 and 4 are acts allegedly performed by ALI. AAVA claims that these acts cannot be considered in the case at bar under the res inter alios acta rule, as ALI is not a party to the case. Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court embodies said rule: Sec. 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. We have to clarify that ALIs statements, IF DAMAGING to AAVA, would be binding on the latter. The terms attached to the Deed of Restrictions on 51| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

the title of the subject property, expressly state that “compliance with the said restrictions…. and conditions maybe enjoined and/or enforced by Court action by Ayala Corporation and/or the Ayala Alabang Village Association, their respective successors and assigns”. [52] As such, it appears that Ayala Corporation is JOINTLY INTERESTED with AAVA in an action to enforce the Deed of Restrictions, and is therefore covered under the following exception to the res inter alios acta rule: Sec. 29. Admission by copartner or agent. The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or OTHER PERSON JOINTLY INTERESTED with the party.[53] (Emphasis supplied.) However, the acts of ALI are not at all damaging to the position of AAVA. Since although ALI indeed “assented” to the reclassification and expansion, the assent stated that: “we interpose no objection as long as the conditions are met” which are (1) the approval of the Board and (2) the approval of the residents. None of these were met based on the records. Hence, in other words, the conditions for the assent were NOT met. IN OTHER WORDS (author’s own understanding), although Ayala Land Inc. (AYALA) is a party jointly interested in the case and falls under the exception to res inter alios acta rule, the required conditions to its assent to the changing/alteration of the terms of the Deed of Restrictions were not met. Hence, the acts enumerated above cannot prejudice AAVA. In fact, records show that AAVA has consistently insisted upon the compliance with the Deed of Restrictions by: consistently denying the requests and letters of the spouses, and by immediately asking the spouses to cease and desist. Hence, AAVA is not estopped. SC ruled in favour of AAVA in upholding the Deed of Restrictions since such Deed may be harmonized with the ordinance in this way: there could be construction of MORE rooms provided it is used for preparatory schools. However, since this will prejudice the grade school students already

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

enrolled, they were allowed to graduate elementary. However, the school was not anymore allowed to accept grade school enrolees. OTHER TOPICS NOT RELATED TO EVIDENCE: I. Intervention: Motion for Intervention was denied since intervention was done during appeal and not before judgment as required by the rules. II. The spouses cited Ortigas case Ortigas case ruled that the ordinance could change the contract owing to police power. However, the Ortigas case does not apply here since 1.) the factual antecedents are not the same and 2.) harmonization with the law can still be done. 31) Narra Nickel v. Redmont Consolidated KEYWORD: Admission by Co-partner or agent as exception to Res Inter Alios Acta Rule FACTS: Respondent Redmont, domestic corp organized under Phil Laws, took interest in mining certain areas of Palawan. After inquiring with DENR, it learned that said areas were already covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications of petitioners. Later, Redmont filed before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of DENR 3 petitions for the denials of the said applications. It argued that at least 60% of the capital stocks of petitioners are owned and controlled by MBMI Resources, a Canadian corp, hence disqualified since mining activities are reserved only for corporations deemed Filipino Citizens. In their Answer, petitioners averred that 60% of the capital stocks are owned by Filpinos, POA has no jurisdiction, and Redmont has no standing to sue since it has no present application over the areas. POA issued a resolution disqualifying petitioners, since they are not qualified being foreign corporations effectively controlled by MBMI. Aggrieved, appealed to the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB), again stressing that they are qualified and that they had their MPSAs converted to Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements (FTAAs). Pending resolution, Redmont filed a complaint before the SEC for the revocation of the 52| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

petitioners’ respective certificates for registration. Later, Redmont filed with the RTC a complaint praying for the deferral of the MAB proceedings pending resolution by the SEC. Before the RTC can decide, MAB issued a resolution finding the appeals meritorious. ` Later, RTC issued an order granting the injunction prayed for by Redmont for MAB to defer ruling. Nevertheless, MAB, ruling on the reconsideration of Redmont, denied such. So, Redmont went to the CA assailing the MAB orders. It reversed the MAB orders and upheld the POA decision that petitioners are disqualified. Reconsideration was likewise denied. The decision is premised on the doubt as to the nationality of petitioners because they had a common major investor, MBMI. Also, the conversion of their MPSAs to FTAAs were suspicious. Moreover, POA was declared to have jurisdiction over petitioners, with the capacity to ascertain their nationality. Prior resolution by the CA, Redmont also filed with the Office of the President a petition for the cancellation of petitioners’ FTAAs. The OP canceled and revoked the same because they misrepresented that they are Filipino corporations. It held that the filing of the conversion to FTAA by petitioners while the case was still pending is indicative of their lack of qualification. Hence, the present petition assailing the orders of the OP and CA. ISSUES: 1) WON CA erred in not dismissing the case on the ground of mootness coz the MPSAs were already converted to FTAAs 2) WON petitioners are Foreign corps 3) WON CA correctly applied the exceptions to res inter alios acta rule (RELEVANT TO EVIDENCE) 4) WON POA had jurisdiction

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

RULING: PETITION WITHOUT MERIT 1.

NOT MOOT

 Exception to Mootness principle (all must concur) a. grave violation of the Constitution – misrepresented that they are Filipino corporations b. exceptional character and paramount public interest involved – the intricate corporate layering made by MBMI greatly affects the exploitation of our resources c. to guide the bench, bar, and the public – a ruling on this case will guide the bbp d. capable of repetition yet evading review – MBMI can keep utilizing dummy Filipino corporations All requisites are present.  Conversion of MPSA applications to FTAA applications The CA’s analysis of the actions of petitioners after the case was filed against them by respondent is on point. The changing of applications by petitioners from one type to another just because a case was filed against them, in truth, would raise not a few sceptics’ eyebrows. What is the reason for such conversion? The filing of the Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement application is a clear admission that the respondents are not capable of conducting a large scale mining operation and that they need the financial and technical assistance of a foreign entity in their operation that is why they sought the participation of MBMI Resources, Inc. The participation of MBMI in the corporation only proves the fact that it is the Canadian company that will provide the finances and the resources to operate the mining areas for the greater benefit and interest of the same and not the Filipino stockholders who only have a less substantial financial stake in the corporation. 53| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

In their last attempt to prove that they are Filipino corporations, they alleged before the Court that they have already sold/assigned their shares and interest to DMCI Mining Corp, a Filpino Corp. This only proves that they were in fact not Filipino corporations from the start. 2. GRANDFATHER TEST APPLIES SINCE THE 60-40 FILIPINO-FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS ARE IN DOUBT (NOT FILIPINO NATIONALS) 2 Acknowledged Tests in determining the Nationality of a Corporations: NATIONALITY TEST and GRANDFATHER TEST CONTROL TEST (LIBERAL RULE): shares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality, (1st par. DOJ Opinion 020) GRANDFATHER TEST (STRINGENT RULE): If the percentage of the Filipino ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding to such percentage shall be counted as Philippine nationality (2ND par. DOJ Opinion 020). Under this rule, the combined totals in the Investing Corporation and the Investee Corporation must be traced (i.e., "grandfathered") to determine the total percentage of Filipino ownership. In other words, this rule applies ONLY when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt (i.e., in cases where the joint venture corporation with Filipino and foreign stockholders with less than 60% Filipino stockholdings [or 59%] invests in other joint venture corporation which is either 60-40% Filipino-alien or the 59% less Filipino). Stated differently, where the 60-40 Filipino- foreign equity ownership is not in doubt, the Grandfather Rule will not apply.

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

While corporate layering is allowed under FIA, if it is used to circumvent the Constitution and pertinent laws, then it becomes illegal. Further, the pronouncement of petitioners that the grandfather rule has already been abandoned must be discredited for lack of basis. Revisiting the intent behind Art. XII of the Constitution on National Economy and Patrimony, vis-à-vis corporate layering , it was the intention of the framers to apply the grandfather rule in cases of corporate layering. Applying the statutory construction, when there is a conflict between the Constitution and a statute (FIA), the former prevails. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, Grandfather rule applies when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign ownership is in doubt. In this case, this rule should be applied based on the rulings of the POA and affirmed by the OP, doubt prevails and persists in the corporate ownership of petitioners. Also, as found by the CA, doubt is present in the 60-40 Filipino equity ownership of petitioners Narra, McArthur and Tesoro, since their common investor, the 100% Canadian corporation––MBMI, funded them. IN THIS CASE, grandfathering” the petitioners, it was established that petitioners McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are not Filipino since MBMI, a 100% Canadian corporation, owns 60% or more of their equity interests. Such conclusion is derived from grandfathering petitioners’ corporate owners, namely: MMI, SMMI and PLMDC. Going further and adding to the picture, MBMI’s Summary of Significant Accounting Policies statement– –regarding the "joint venture" agreements that it entered into with the "Olympic" and "Alpha" groups––involves SMMI, Tesoro, PLMDC and Narra. Noticeably, the ownership of the "layered" corporations boils down to MBMI, Olympic or corporations under the "Alpha" group wherein MBMI has joint venture agreements with, practically exercising majority control over the corporations mentioned. In effect, whether looking at the capital structure or the underlying relationships between and among the corporations, petitioners are NOT Filipino nationals and must be 54| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

considered foreign since 60% or more of their capital stocks or equity interests are owned by MBMI. 3. EXCEPTION TO RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE APPLIES – Sec. 29 Rule 130 ROC – ADMISSION BY CO-PARTNER OR AGENT and ADMISSION BY PRIVIES Contention of Petitioners vis-à-vis the application of Sec. 29 Rule 130: Petitioners claim that the CA erred in applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that "by entering into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest" with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur. They challenged the conclusion of the CA which pertains to the close characteristics of "partnerships" and "joint venture agreements." Further, they asserted that before this particular partnership can be formed, it should have been formally reduced into writing since the capital involved is more than three thousand pesos (PhP3,000).Being that there is no evidence of written agreement to form a partnership between petitioners and MBMI, no partnership was created. A partnership is defined as two or more persons who bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. On the other hand, joint ventures have been deemed to be "akin" to partnerships since it is difficult to distinguish between joint ventures and partnerships. The relations of the parties to a joint venture and the nature of their association are so similar and closely akin to a partnership that it is ordinarily held that their rights, duties, and liabilities are to be tested by rules which are closely analogous to and substantially the same, if not exactly the same, as those which govern partnership. In fact, it has been said that the trend in the law has been to blur the distinctions between a partnership and a joint venture, very little law being found applicable to one that does not apply to the other.

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

Though some claim that partnerships and joint ventures are totally different animals, there are very few rules that differentiate one from the other; thus, joint ventures are deemed "akin" or similar to a partnership. In fact, in joint venture agreements, rules and legal incidents governing partnerships are applied.

DENIED 32) People V. Bokingo & Col KEYWORD: Res inter acta alio; Construction workers killed boss; Conspiracy; Confession of one of the accused

Accordingly, culled from the incidents and records of this case, it can be assumed that the relationships entered between and among petitioners and MBMI are no simple "joint venture agreements." As a rule, corporations are prohibited from entering into partnership agreements; consequently, corporations enter into joint venture agreements with other corporations or partnerships for certain transactions in order to form "pseudo partnerships." Obviously, as the intricate web of "ventures" entered into by and among petitioners and MBMI was executed to circumvent the legal prohibition against corporations entering into partnerships, then the relationship created should be deemed as "partnerships," and the laws on partnership should be applied. Thus, a joint venture agreement between and among corporations may be seen as similar to partnerships since the elements of partnership are present.

FACTS: The victim, Noli Paison, was the owner of several apartment units which were being constructed by the accused. Prosecution’s witness who was the victim’s brother in law testified that he saw the accused (Bokingo) mauled and killed the victim. On the other hand, the victim’s wife saw the other accused(Pol) who sprayed tear gas to her and hit her with a sharp object. Upon hearing Bokingo shouting “Tara, patay na sya”, Pol fled the scene with him. Subsequently the accused were caught and during the Preliminary Investigation, accused Bokingo admitted to the crime and that they planned the killing days ahead. On such extrajudicial admission, an information was filed against the accused for murder. In addition, on the basis of the statement of Paison’s wife, conspiracy was alleged to be present in the commission of the crime.

Considering that the relationships found between petitioners and MBMI are considered to be partnerships, then the CA is justified in applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that "by entering into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest" with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.

ISSUE: WON admissible?

4. POA HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONS The POA has jurisdiction to settle disputes over rights to mining areas. This refers to any adverse claim, protest, or opposition to an application for mineral agreement. The POA therefore has the jurisdiction to resolve any adverse claim, protest, or opposition to a pending application for a mineral agreement filed with the concerned Regional Office of the MGB.

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the

extrajudicial

confession

RULING: No. The extra judicial confession is inadmissible for it violated his constitutional rights. Section 12. (1)Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. xxx xxx xxx

is

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(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. In People v. Sunga, we held that "the right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed 'critical stages' in the criminal process. The preliminary investigation can be no different from the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less than the State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal prosecution." In said case, Sunga made an uncounselled admission before the police. He later acknowledged the same admission before the judge in a preliminary investigation. Sunga was thrust into the preliminary investigation and while he did have a counsel, for the latter's lack of vigilance and commitment to Sunga's rights, he was virtually denied his right to counsel. Thus, the uncounselled admission was held inadmissible. In the instant case, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against Bokingco because he was not assisted at all by counsel during the time his confession was taken before a judge. MAIN TOPIC (CONFESSION OF CONSPIRATOR AS TO THE CONSPIRACY)

A

Since the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against the confessor Bokingo, the same may not be used against accused Pol. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered as hearsay against them. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 56| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

of the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by such act or declaration. In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; second, the admission relates to the common object; and third, it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. As we have previously discussed, we did not find any sufficient evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence against Col. Since no sufficient evidence was given to show col’s guilt and conspiracy was not established, Col is acquitted. 33) City of Manila vs. Del Rosario KEYWORDS: “City of Manila seeking recovery of a parcel of Land” FACTS: Petitioner(plaintiff) sought the recovery of a parcel of land in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, district of Tondo. This parcel of land was registered in the name of and was in possession of respondent(defendant) Jacinto Del Rosario. Jacinto Del Rosario alleged that he bought the land from his brother Lorenzo Del Rosario. Lorenzo Del Rosario in turn bought the land from a certain Cipriano Roco. Petitioner alleged that it was the owner of such land, and to prove his claim, he presented documentary evidence consisting of a document containing an offer by the City of Manila to purchase the land and another document establishing the transfer of such land to

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respondent Jacinto. A map was also presented as evidence. 1st document – offer to purchase by City of Manila 2nd document – evidence of the transfer of the land to respondent Jacinto It was however established that Lorenzo del Rosario signed the first document (the offer by the city of manila to purchase the land) before he acquired from Cipriano Roco y Vera the ownership of the land referred to therein, the second document being signed after he had transferred the land to the defendant Jacinto del Rosario, who took possession of the same and had it registered. Further, petitioner offered the testimonies of several witnesses including the ones who vouched for the authenticity of the documentary evidence presented by the petitioner: 1st witness - testified that he did not know of his own knowledge if the land in question belonged to the city. 2nd witness - testified that the land included in Calles Clavel and Barcelona was formerly part of Plaza Divisoria, which belonged to the Central Government (not the city), and that he did not know to whom it now belongs. 3rd witness - testified that the land in question was formerly included in the Gran Divisoria, and that all the land included in it belonged to the city. 4th witness - testified merely that Lorenzo del Rosario had paid 100 pesos to her brother Cipriano Roco for the purpose of instituting a possessory information as to the property abutting on Calle Clavel. Lorenzo Del Rosario – testified as to the authenticity of the documents but he made a statement that the President of the Municipal Board, Señor Herrera, advised him to do so in order to avoid litigation with the city, and such was not contradicted. (it was thus akin to a compromise agreement) At the trial, after the plaintiff rested, the defendant moved for the dismissal of the case upon the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish 57| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

the allegations in the complaint. This motion was overruled by the court. ISSUE: WON the court was correct in overruling the motion of defendant. HELD: No, the court was wrong in overruling the motion. The case was remanded to the Trial court for further proceedings. As to the testimony of the third witness. Villega's [third witness] testimony was merely hearsay. It consisted of what he had learned from some of the oldest residents in that section of the city. His testimony was introduced by the plaintiff apparently for the purpose of proving that the city was generally considered the owner of the land, drawing from this fact the presumption of actual ownership under paragraph 11, section 334, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such testimony, however, does not constitute the "common reputation" referred to in the section mentioned. "common reputation," as used in that section, is equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony of this witness is not sufficient to establish the presumption referred to. As to the testimony of Lorenzo We accordingly hold that the provisions of section 346 of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the case at bar in so far as they declare that an offer of compromise is not admissible in evidence. Again, Lorenzo del Rosario signed the first document before he acquired from Cipriano Roco y Vera the ownership of the land referred to therein, the second document being signed after he had transferred the land to the defendant Jacinto del Rosario, who took possession of the same and had it registered, as the plaintiff admits (par. 2 of the complaint), on the 23d of February, 1893. If this is so, whatever statements Lorenzo del Rosario might have made in the documents mentioned, they are not binding upon the defendant, because, under section 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "where one derives title to real property from another, the

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declaration, act, or omission of the latter, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former only when made while the latter holds the title." The plaintiff also introduced in evidence a map of the city of Manila. This map is not before us. It is sufficient to say, in order to show that it has no value as evidence, that the reliability of the map was not proven at the trial. The map identified by the witness John R. Wilson was introduced by the plaintiff for the sole purpose of showing the location of the land in question. It has, therefore, no value in establishing the right of possession claimed by the plaintiff. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the defendant had a perfect right to ask for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the allegations in the complaint, and the court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss. 34) GEVERO VS IAC FACTS: The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the Subdivision Plan Psd-37365 containing an area of 20,119 square meters and situated at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Said Lot was acquired by purchase from Luis Lancero in Sept. 15 1964 whom in turn issued TCT 4320 to plaintiff (DELCOR). Luis Lancero acquired such parcel of land from Ricardo Gevero on Feb 1952 per deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero which was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering the mother lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha — 1/2 share and her children the other undivided share of the whole area. Teodorica Ddief long before WW2 and was survived by 6 children namely Maria, Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquiop and Ursula all surnamed Gevero. The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on October 17,1966 executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Partition of the estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them was lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and partition executed by the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha, 58| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive, under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved by the Land Registration Commission, Lot 2476-D, among others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at the time of extra-judicial settlement and partition in 1966. Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476. RTC rendered judgement declaring the plaintiff corporation as the true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot. 2476. From said decision, defendant heirs of Ricardo Gevero (petitioners herein) appealed to the IAC (now Court of Appeals) which subsequently, on March 20, 1986, affirmed the decision appealed from. ISSUE: 1.)WON the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero to Lancer is valid, 2.) WON the ½ interests of Teodorica Babangha in one of the lots under Lot 2476 is included in the deed of sale and 3.) WON the respondents action is barred by Laches RULING: Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely invalid citing alleged flaws thereto, such as that the signature of Ricardo was forged without his knowledge of such fact and that Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed of sale when he signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid the Litigation. However, it will be observed that the deed of sale in question was executed with all the legal formalities of a public document. The 1952 deed was duly acknowledged by both parties before the notary public, yet petitioners did not bother to rebut the legal presumption of the regularity of the notarized document. It has the presumption of regularity and to contradict all these, evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. As to petitioners' contention that Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed when he signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid Litigation", it is a basic rule of evidence that the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of

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another (Sec. 28. Rule 130, Rules of Court). This particular rule is embodied in the maxim "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet." Under Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court "where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property is evidence against the former." It is however stressed that the admission of the former owner of a property must have been made while he was the owner thereof in order that such admission may be binding upon the present owner. Hence, Lanceros' declaration or acts of executing the 1968 document have no binding effect on DELCOR, the ownership of the land having passed to DELCOR in 1964. Lastly, Petitioners claim that DELCOR's action is barred by laches considering that the petitioners have remained in the actual, open, uninterrupted and adverse possession thereof until at present. ). The execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing and is deemed legal delivery. Hence, its execution was considered a sufficient delivery of the property. Besides, the property sold is a registered land. It is the act of registration that transfers the ownership of the land sold. If the property is a registered land, the purchaser in good, faith has a right to rely on the certificate of title and is under no duty to go behind it to look for flaws. The Court of Appeals found that it had first investigated and checked the title in the name of Luis Lancero. It likewise inquired into the Subdivision Plan, the corresponding technical description and the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero in favor of Luis Lancero and found everything in order. It even went to the premises and found Luis Lancero to be in possession of the land to the exclusion of any other person. DELCOR had therefore acted in good faith in purchasing the land in question. 35) US v. Pineda KEYWORD: Barium Chlorate instead of Potassium Chlorate PRINCIPLE: Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although it tends to prove the commission of another offense by the defendant." 59| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

FACTS: Santiago Pineda was a registered pharmacist and was an owner of a drug store. Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription (obtained from Dr. Richardson) to Pineda to buy medicine for his sick horses. The prescription specifically read “POTASSIUM CHLORATE”. After it was prepared he used it on 2 horses which were sick. Shortly thereafter they died. When he had the medicine checked with the Bureau of Science, they found out that the medicine contained “BARIUM CHLORATE”. At the instance of Santos, two chemists also went to the drug store and and the same happened. Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses, and found that death was the result of poisoning. They were given Barium Chlorate. (Barium chlorate is a poison, potassium chlorate is not.) ISSUE: Whether the court may admit the testimony of Drs. Pena and Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium chlorate which turned out to be poison. (Four issues here as this is for the most part a torts case, but this is the issue relevant to evidence) HELD: The lower court in admitting the testimony of the chemist Peña and Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium chlorate at the drug store of the accused, which substance proved on analysis to be barium chlorate. What appellant is here relying on is the maxim res inter alois acta. As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is inadmissible. But appellant has confused this maxim and this rule with certain exceptions thereto. The effort is not to convict the accused of a second offense. Nor is there an attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue and thus to prejudice defendant's case. The purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents. The United States Supreme Court has held that:

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"On the trial of a criminal case where the question relates to the tendency of certain testimony to throw light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular person, there is a certain discretion on the part of the trial judge which a court of errors will not interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused.

the responsibility for the quality of drugs which the law imposes on druggist and the position of the made unlawful is the giving of a false name to the drug asked for.

"Whenever the necessity arises for a resort to circumstancial evidence, either from the nature of the inquiry or the failure of direct proof, objections to the testimony on the ground of irrelevancy are not favored.

FACTS: The accused is charged with robbery with homicide.

"Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although it tends to prove the commission of another offense by the defendant." As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons which he sells. And finally it is provided that it shall be unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name." Where a customer calls upon a druggist for a harmless remedy, delivery of a poisonous drug by mistake by the druggist is prima facie negligence, placing the burden on him to show that the mistake was under the circumstances consistent with the exercise of due care. The druggist cannot, for example in filling a prescription calling for potassium chlorate give instead to the customer barium chlorate, a poison, place this poison in a package labeled "potassium chlorate", and expect to escape responsibility on a plea of mistake. His mistake, under the most favorable aspect for himself, was negligence. A plea of accident and mistake cannot excuse for they cannot take place unless there be wanton and criminal carelessness and neglect. How the misfortune occurs in unimportant, if under all the circumstances the fact of occurrence is attributable to the druggist as a legal fault. Rather considering 60| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

36) People vs Irang KEYWORD: The pockmark on his face PRINCIPLE: Res inter alios acta rule, second batch.

On the night of November 9, 1935, 7 armed individuals with white stripes on their faces went to the house of spouses Perfecto Melocotones and Maximiniana Vicente. Some went upstairs, ordered Perfecto to bring out his money, and was attacked with bolos and fell to the floor. Some also went up, approached Maximinia, struck her in the face with the butt of the gun, and lost consciousness. When she regained consciousness she saw her husband already dead. Maximinia turned over to the man who had struck her with the butt of his gun P70 and jewelry valued at P200. She looked at the man's face and saw that he had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid. That same night the house of Juana de la Cruz was assualted by malefactors. All of them had white stripes upon their faces. Juana de la Cruz noticed that one of them had pockmarks and a scar on the left eyelid and was dressed in a maong-colored suit. Maxima Vicente informed Lieutenant Roman Alejandre of the Constabulary that a person who struck her with the butt of his gun and taker her money and jewelry was a man of regular stature, with a lead body and pockmarked face. Having arrested a group of persons, he brought them to Maximiniana Vicente's house so that the latter might identify. She identified the herein accused-appellant Benjamin Irang as the one who had struck her with the butt of his gun and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry. Juana de la Cruz also recognized Benjamin Irang,

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through his pockmarks and scar on his left eyelid, as one of the men who had gone up her house that same nght. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Juana de la Cruz may me admitted as evidence to prove the identity of Benjamin Irang as the perpetrator of the crime charged. HELD: Yes, the testimony of Juana de la Cruz may me admitted as evidence to prove the identity of Benjamin Irang as the perpetrator of the crime charged. While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime. The testimony of Juana de la Cruz to the effect that her house, situated only about one hundred meters from that of Perfecto Melocotones, was assaulted that same night by some malefactors with white stripes upon their faces, and that one of them, with pockmarks on his face and a scar on his left eyelid and dressed in a maong colored suit, who later turned out to be the herein accused-appellant, opened her box, indirectly corroborates Maximiniana Vicente's testimony that the man of the same description was the one who went to her house and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry, having recognized him later to be the herein accused-appellant.

approved or repeated by the declarant after he had abandoned all hope of recovery. FACTS: Justo Babiera sold two parcels of land to Basilio Copreros with the right of repurchase, but having failed to repurchase them within the period stipulated, the title thereto was consolidated in the purchaser, who leased them to Severino Haro. Justo Babiera resorted to every lawful means to regain possession of said two parcels of land, but he failed. The prosecution’s version: On the day of the incident, Severino visited his land with three companions. When he arrived, he was told by Fermin Bruces, Severino’s copartner, that he had found Clemente Babiera’s, son of Justo Babiera, cow grazing on the land. Severino informed Clemente of what his cow had done and told him to take better care of his animal and not to let it run loose. Severino then ordered Fermin to take the cow where the Babiera family lived. Severino and his companions made use of a torch when they were making their way back to town because it was already dark. When they were on the road near Rosendo Paycol’s house, Clemente suddenly sprang from the cogon grass, went after Severino and struck him with his bolo in the back. When Severino turned to see who attacked him, Severino received another bolo blow in the forehead.

KEYWORD: Doctrine of Ratification

Then, Dominga Bores, Clemente’s partner, and Justo appeared, and pinned down Severino. Severino’s companions were not able to help him because of the threat from Clemente. When the assailants already departed, Severino’s companions were directed to bring him to town. They were able to bring Severino to the hospital. Severino made a sworn statement before the deputy fiscal about the incident. This sworn statement was ratified by him before the same deputy fiscal when he was near death.

PRINCIPLE: A statement made under circumstances which would not render it admissible as a dying declaration becomes admissible as such, it is held, if

The defense’s version: Clemente was in the house of one Oper, when Justo arrived, and later on, Severino, who at once

37) PEOPLE v. BABIERA

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said to him, “Clemente, why do you leave your cow loose?” Clemente denied the imputation, but Severino insisted and the latter added that the cow had damaged his plantation. Severino charged him of 2 pesos for the damage, however Clemente told him that he had no money. Clemente told Severino that he will pay on the following day. At about 7pm, Clemente saw Buenaventura Cabalfin leading his cow, and Severino and his companions followed. Clemente asked them why they are taking the cow away when they already have an agreement with regards the payment of the damaged plantation. A commotion then happened wherein Clemente was allegedly struck by one Margarito Mediavilla, and Severino was hit in the back by a bolo blow. The defense attempted to prove that Severino was of a quarrelsome disposition, provoking, irascible, and fond of starting quarrels in the municipality. The RTC adjudged Clemente Babiera, Justo Babiera, and Dominga Bores guilty of the crime of murder, the first as principal, and the last two as accomplices. ISSUE: Whether the ante mortem declaration of the deceased is admissible in evidence. RULING: YES. while the first affidavit could not be admissible, the second affidavit which confirms the first is now admissible. When a witness made a certain statement unconscious of impeding death and reiterates at the time he is already conscious, is deemed to have ratified the earlier statement. Although said statement in itself is inadmissible as an ante-mortem declaration, inasmuch as there is nothing to show that at the time he made it Severino Haro knew or firmly believed that he was at the point of death, nevertheless, having ratified its contents a week later when he was near death as a result of his wounds, said declaration is admissible as a part of that which he made ante-mortem. “A statement made under circumstances which would not render it admissible as a dying declaration becomes admissible as such, it is held, if approved or

62| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

repeated by the declarant after he had abandoned all hope of recovery.” 38) US vs Mercado KEYWORD: “He has a Pugnacious Disposition” PRINCIPLE: A witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except by showing (a) that he has made contradictory statements; or (b) by showing that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) FACTS: The defendants in this case were charged with the crime of coaccion (translates to coercion): That the said accused on December 22, 1911, in the municipality of Baliuag, Province of Bulacan, P. I., did willfully and criminally, without legitimate authority therefor, and by means of violence or force employed upon the person of Claro Mercado, prevent the latter from rendering aid to Maria R. Mateo in order that Santiago Mercado might at his pleasure maltreat the said Maria R. Mateo, in violation of law." They were then found guilty of the crime charged. During trial, Mr. Ricardo Gonzalez Lloret, attorney for the private prosecutor, asked the witness for the defense, the said Santiago Mercado, who is mentioned in the complaint presented in said cause, the following question: "How many times have you been convicted of assault upon other persons?" To this question, the defendant Tomas Mercado objected on the ground that the question was impertinent. Mr. Lloret explained the purpose of his question by saying: "I wish to demonstrate that he has a pugnacious disposition. I have had occasion to defend him in various causes for assault."

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The defendants contended that the character of the witness, Santiago Mercado, has an intimate relation or may have a strong relation with the facts being investigated in the present cause,” but this objection was overruled. The only argument which the appellant presents in support of his assignment of error is that the question had no relation to the question which was being discussed by the court and did not tend to show that the defendants were either guilty or not guilty of the crime charged; that questions tending to disclose the character of a witness are immaterial. In reply to the argument of the appellant, the Attorney-General contends that the question was a proper question, because it tended to impugn the credibility of the witness and that such questions were for that purpose material and pertinent. It will be remembered that the complaint charged that on the occasion when the alleged crime was committed Santiago Mercado was attempting to and did assault and illtreat one Maria R. Mateo. In answer to said question, the witness admitted that complaint had been presented against him for the offense of assault and battery. ISSUE: Whether the witness should be impeached due to the character of the witness. HELD: The prosecution, to show the circumstances under which the crime charged here was actually committed, showed that this witness, Santiago Mercado, had assaulted and illtreated Maria R. Mateo, under the circumstances described in the complaint. That was an important fact. If the said assault did not actually take place, then the theory of the prosecution must fail. If there was no assault or attempted assault, there was no occasion for the alleged interference on the part of the said Claro Mercado to prevent it, and the probability of the guilt of the defendants is greatly lessened. If the witness who had committed the alleged assault, had assaulted other persons and had been prosecuted therefor, may that fact be considered by the court in weighing the proof and in testing the credibility of the witness? It was an important fact to prove that Santiago Mercado, at the time and place mentioned in the complaint, had assaulted or 63| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

attempted to assault or illtreat Maria R. Mateo, to show that there was occasion for the interference of Claro Mercado. A witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except by showing (a) that he has made contradictory statements; or (b) by showing that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) The question to which the defendant objected neither attempted to show that the witness had made contradictory statements nor that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity was bad. While you cannot impeach the credibility of a witness, except by showing that he has made contradictory statements or that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, yet, nevertheless, you may show by an examination of the witness himself or from the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of a high crime. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) In the present case, the other offense to which the question above related was not a high crime, as that term is generally used, and we assume that the phrase "high crime," as used in section 342, is used in its ordinary signification. High crimes are generally defined as such immoral and unlawful acts as are nearly allied and equal in guilt to felonies. We believe that the objection to the above question was properly interposed and should have been sustained. If there was proof enough adduced during the trial of the cause, excluding the particular proof brought out by this question to show that the defendants are guilty of the crime, then the question and answer and the ruling of the court upon the same did not affect prejudicially the interests of the defendants. Errors committed by the trial court, which are not prejudicial to the rights of the parties, should be disregarded by the court. In our opinion the evidence clearly shows that the witness committed the assault to which reference is made in the complaint in the present cause. Whether he had committed other assaults or not was a matter of no importance in the present action. The admission or rejection,

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therefore, of the proof to which such question related could in no way prejudice the rights of the defendants. After a careful examination of the record, we are persuaded that the same shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged and that the sentence of the lower court should be affirmed, with costs. So ordered. 39) Gonzales v. People FACTS: Gonzales was charged with arson for allegedly burning two-storey residential building to which he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented eyewitness Carlos C. Canlas, owner of the two-storey building testifying that at about 9:30 p.m. he was watching television in his room when his daughter called his attention to check the commotion in an adjacent room. On his way to the room rented by Gonzales, he smelled gas. He saw Gonzales ignite a flame and throw it on a pile of clothes in the middle of the living room where Gonzales had also placed an LPG tank. Fire quickly spread to the other parts of the building. The prosecution also presented two tenants, Villaflor and Simpao, as witnesses. Villaflor testified that he heard Gonzales and his aunt quarreling before the fire. He said he heard Gonzales yell "Susunugin ko itong bahay na ito!" Alarmed, he went to the Barangay Hall to report the incident but immediately went back to his place when someone informed him his house was on fire. Simpao testified that he saw the fire coming from Gonzales's room. He added that Gonzales was laughing while the building was burning. The testimonies were corroborated by P01 Mendoza, who testified that when he and his fellow officer arrived at the crime scene, Gonzales admitted responsibility for the fire. On the other hand, Gonzales averred that the fire was caused by faulty electrical wiring. He testified that he was napping inside his room when he was 64| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

awakened by heat beside his bed. The room was on fire. He shouted for help and Canlas tried to help him but they failed to extinguish it. Gonzales denied he and his aunt were quarreling that evening before the fire started. As his aunt was partly deaf, he said he had to speak in a loud voice. He averred that he merely asked his aunt to buy food because they ran out of LPG. Gonzales said that when he met PO1 Mendoza, he explained that he noticed the fire had started in his room. He sought police protection from his neighbors who accused him of starting it. The defense presented a Physical Science Report prepared by a Police Inspector showing that the ashes obtained from the burnt premises were negative of any flammable substance. RTC convicted petitioner. The CA sustained the conviction holding that the denial of Gonzales cannot prevail over the positive identification of a witness, that the prosecution established circumstantial evidence sufficient to support the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and that although there were discrepancies in the testimony of Canlas and his affidavits, the discrepancies did not necessarily discredit him because affidavits taken ex parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that the alleged discrepancies pertain to minor matters negated any suspicion that the testimony was perjured and rehearsed. In this petition for review, petitioner argues that the trial court and the appellate court erred in giving credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Canlas. He claims that the sworn statements of Canlas before the investigating officer of the fire department and before the city prosecutor were inconsistent. Petitioner cites People v. Salik Magonawal, where the material discrepancies between the court testimony and prior statements of a witness at a preliminary investigation made the testimony incredible.

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The OSG contends that the discrepancies in the testimonies of the witnesses and their sworn statements were not substantial to warrant a review of the findings of fact of the trial court. The OSG asserts that the testimony of Canlas in court clarified, corroborated and complemented his affidavit. Likewise, the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses corroborated Canlas's testimony ISSUE: Whether the discrepancies in the affidavit and the court testimonies of a witness are sufficient to exculpate Gonzales of the crime of arson. HELD: NO. In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes the corpus delicti and the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. When these are present, the only issue is the credibility of the witness. Whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions and sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected circumstances necessary for his accurate recollection of the subject. The eyewitness positively identified Gonzales as the culprit who caused the fire. Both the trial and appellate courts found the testimony of eyewitness Canlas credible. As a general rule, when the findings of both courts are in agreement, this Court will not reverse their findings of fact. The findings of the Physical Science Report is a negative evidence and taken together with the bare denial of petitioner, supported only with testimonies of relatives, constitute inferior evidence as against 65| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

the circumstantial evidence coupled with the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the offense by a credible witness.. 40) Republic v Kenrick Developent KEYWORD: Unsigned Pleading = Mere scrap of paper; Adoptive admission constituting judicial admission PRINCIPLES:  By adoptive admission, a third person's statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing it.  Only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is signed. FACTS: Kenrick built a concrete perimeter fence around parcels of land behind the Civil Aviation Traininger Center of the Air Transportation Office. As a result of this, ATO was dispossessed of huge tracts of land. Kenrick, on the other hand, claimed that the land was theirs, showing a TCT issued in its name which was sold to it by Alfonso Concepcion. The Registrar of Deeds had no record of such TCT nor of its ascendant TCT. ATO verified the authenticity of Kenrick's titles with the Land Registration Authority. LRA submitted its report. Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City had no record of the TCT and its ascendant title. The land allegedly covered by Kenrick's titles was also found to be within Villamor Air Base (headquarters of the Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City. By virtue of a report, OSG filed a complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title against Kenrick and an Answer was filed by the latter which was purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for respondent. During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted a hearing in aid of

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legislation on the matter of land registration and titling. During the hearing, Atty. Garlitos (former counsel of Kenrick) testified that he prepared Kenrick’s answer and transmitted an unsigned draft to Victor Ong (Kenrick’s President). He further stated that the signature in the answer was not his and he authorized no one to sign in his behalf and he did not know who signed the answer. When the Republic found out about this, they promptly filed an urgent motion to declare Kenrick in default for failure to file a valid answer since it was an unsigned pleading which in effect is a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal effect pursuant to Sec. 3 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Trial court: granted Republic's motion. It found Kenrick's answer to be sham, false and intended to defeat the purpose of the rules. It ordered the answer stricken from the records, respondent in default and allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex parte. CA: Granted respondent’s petition for certiorari and directed the lifting of the order of default against respondent and ordered the trial court to proceed to trial with dispatch. It found that Atty. Garlitos' statements in the legislative hearing were unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-examination. It also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos' acts after the filing of the answer and concluded that he assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead which supposedly cured whatever defect the answer may have had. ISSUE: Whether Kenrick should be declared in default RULING: YES Trial court correctly ruled that respondent's answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed to present evidence ex parte. A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify another's statement. Where it appears that a party clearly and unambiguously 66| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

assented to or adopted the statements of another, evidence of those statements is admissible against him. This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a party's reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party's reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person. By adoptive admission, a third person's statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing it. This may occur when a party: a) Expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another b) Hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it c) Utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertions of another d) Replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further points which he or she has heard the other maker e) Reads and signs a written statement made by another Kenrick accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built itscase on them. At no instance did it ever deny or contradict its former counsel's statements. It went to great lengths to explain Atty. Garlitos' testimony as well as its implications, as follows: 1) While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact was that the answer was signed. Hence, the pleading could not be considered invalid for being an unsigned pleading. The fact that the person who signed it was neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor specifically authorized by him was immaterial. The important thing was that the answer bore a signature. 2) While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or his counsel, it does not prohibit a counsel from giving a general authority for any person to sign the answer for him which was what Atty. Garlitos did. The person who actually signed the pleading was of no moment as long as

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counsel knew that it would be signed by another, similar to addressing an authorization letter "to whom it may concern" such that any person could act on it even if he or she was not known beforehand. 3) Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never disowned its contents and he resumed acting as counsel for respondent subsequent to its filing. These circumstances show that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or ratified the signing of the answer by another. Kenrick completely adopted Garlitos’ statements as its own. The adoptive admission constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive on it. Contrary to respondent's position, a signed pleading is one that is signed either by the party himself or his counsel. (Section 3, Rule 7) Only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is signed. Counsel's authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it to just any person. The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters. The preparation and. signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing. Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons something the law strongly proscribes. 67| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

The blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos' subsequent acts. Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing of the answer by another "as long as it conformed to his draft." We give no value whatsoever to such self-serving statement. No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just anyone to sign the answer. Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if it were true that its answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside. Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have their own valid raison d' etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice. Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. Respondent failed to show any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules. The Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible misconduct. Decision is furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the commencement of disbarment proceedings against Atty. Garlitos, Jr. for his possible unprofessional

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41) Civil Service Commission vs. Allyson Belagan PRINCIPLE: When the credibility of a witness is sought to be impeached by proof of his reputation, it is necessary that the reputation shown should be that which existed before the occurrence of the circumstances out of which the litigation arose, or at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit. This is because a person of derogatory character or reputation can still change or reform himself.

employees of the DECS in Baguio City were charging a high-ranking DECS official with sexual harassment. Upon inquiry, she learned that the official being complained of was respondent. She then wrote a letter-complaint for sexual indignities and harassment to former DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria. On October 4, 1994, respondent was placed under suspension.

FACTS: The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate complaints filed respectively by Magdalena Gapuz, founder/directress of the "Mother and Child Learning Center," and Ligaya Annawi, a public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School, against respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), all from Baguio City. Magdalena charged respondent with sexual indignities and harassment, while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and various malfeasances

LIGAYAN:

MAGDALENA: Magdalena Gapuz filed an application with DECS Office in Baguio City for permit to operate a pre-school. One of the requisites for the issuance of the permit was the inspection of the school premises by the DECS Division Office. Respondent and complainant visited the school. In the course of inspection, while both descending the stairs, respondent suddenly placed his arms around complainant's shoulders and kissed her cheek. Fearful that her application might be jeopardized and that her husband might harm respondent, Magdalena just kept quiet.

DECS Secretary: Belagan guilty of sexual indignities and ordered dismissed. He was absolved of charges of administrative malfeasance or dereliction of duty CSC: Guilty of grave misconduct. His position is that which requires a high degree of moral uprightness Respondent filed a MR, contending that he has never been charged of any offense in his thirty-seven years of service. By contrast, Magdalena was charged with several offenses before the MTC of Baguio City. (Respondent listed all the cases; there were A LOT)

Several days later, Magdalena went to the DECS Division Office and asked respondent about the status of her permit. His reply was "Mag-date muna tayo." She declined, explaining that she is married. She then left and reported the matter to DECS Assistant Superintendent Peter Ngabit. Sometime in September 1994, Magdalena read from a local newspaper that certain female

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On 4 separate occasions, Belagan touched her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins, embraced her from behind, pulled her close to him with his organ pressing against her. Aside from this, Ligaya charged him with delaying teachers' salaries, failing to release differentials to substitutes, refusing to release teachers' uniforms and allowances, and failing to constitute the Selection and Promotion Board, as required by the DECS rules and regulations.

Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed against Magdalena cast doubt on her character, integrity, and credibility, MR was denied CA: reversed the CSC and held that Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character being questionable ISSUE: W/N the complaining witness, Magdalena , is Credible RULING:

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Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy. 15 One statutory exception is that relied upon by respondent, i.e.,Section 51 (a) 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we quote here: "SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions. — (a) In Criminal Cases: xxx xxx xxx (3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged." It will be readily observed that the above provision pertains only to criminal cases, not to administrative offenses. And even assuming that this technical rule of evidence can be applied here, still, we cannot sustain respondent's posture. Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved under this provision. Only those which would establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged. This means that the character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged. Thus, on a charge of rape — character for chastity, on a charge of assault — character for peaceableness or violence, and on a charge of embezzlement — character for honesty. In one rape case, where it was established that the alleged victim was morally loose and apparently uncaring about her chastity, we found the conviction of the accused doubtful. In the present administrative case for sexual harassment, respondent did not offer evidence that has a bearing on Magdalena's chastity. What he presented are charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly, these pieces of evidence are inadmissible under the above provision because they do not establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged.

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Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony given. It refers to a person's integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief. 19A witness may be discredited by evidence attacking his general reputation for truth, 20 honesty 21 or integrity. 22 Section 11, Rule 132 of the same Revised Rules on Evidence reads: "SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. — A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense."

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the character or reputation of a complaining witness in a sexual charge is a proper subject of inquiry. This leads us to the ultimate question — is Magdalena's derogatory record sufficient to discredit her credibility? A careful review of the record yields a negative answer. 1) Magdalena's derogatory record is NOT sufficient to discredit her credibility. Evidence of one's character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the time in question. What is to be determined is the character or reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit. Most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed with the MTC of Baguio City relate to acts committed in the 70s and 80s and one was in 1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are

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no longer reliable proofs of Magdalenas character or reputation. Every person can change 2) Belagan also failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted of any of the criminal cases. It is not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility 42) People vs Noel Lee FACTS:

Herminia Marquez and her son, Joseph, were in the living room of their house. They were watching a basketball game on television. Herminia was seated across, Joseph, who sat on a sofa against the wall and window of their hous. When Herminia casually glanced at her son, she saw a hand holding a gun coming out of the open window behind Joseph. She looked up and saw accused-appellant Noel Lee peering through the window and holding the gun aimed at Joseph. Before she could warn him, Joseph turned his body towards the window, and simultaneously, appellant fired his gun hitting Joseph’s head. Joseph slumped on the sofa. Herminia stood up but could not move as accused-appellant fired a second shot at Joseph and three shots more, two hit the sofa and one hit the cement floor. When no more shots were fired, Herminia ran to the window and saw accused-appellant, in a blue sando, flee towards the direction of his house. Joseph was then brought to the MCU Hospital where he later died. Herminia filed a complaint for murder against accused-appellant. The trial court ruled against accused-appellant and sentenced him with the penalty of death. Hence, the automatic review by the Supreme Court. Accused-appellant points out inconsistencies in the eyewitness testimony. In her affidavit before the police officers, Herminia declared that the hand holding a gun pointed at her son came out of a hole in the window, i.e., butas ng bintana. On cross-examination, Herminia stated that she saw a hand holding a gun in the open window, i.e., bukas na bintana. According to accused-appellant, this 70| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

inconsistency is a serious flaw which cannot be repaired by her statement on the witness stand. Accused-appellant makes capital of Joseph’s bad reputation in their community. He alleges that the victim’s drug habit led him to commit other crimes and he may have been shot by any of the persons from whom he had stolen. As proof of Joseph’s bad character, appellant presented Herminia’s letter to the mayor of Caloocan City seeking his assistance for Joseph’s rehabilitation from drugs. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the trial court should not have accepted Herminia’s testimony because it is inconsistent. 2) Whether or not the character evidence is admissible in this case. RULING: 1) Herminia corrected her affidavit by saying in open court that she saw the hand and the gun coming out of the open window, not from a hole in the window. Between Herminia’s testimony in open court and her sworn statement, any inconsistency therein does not necessarily discredit the witness. Affidavits are generally considered inferior to open court declarations because affidavits are taken ex-parte and are almost always incomplete and inaccurate. 2) Character is defined to be the possession by a person of certain qualities of mind and morals, distinguishing him from others; his reputation. Good moral character includes all the elements essential to make up such a character; among these are common honesty and veracity. The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible. In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51 of Rule 130 provides that the accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the prosecution may not prove the bad moral character of the accused except only in rebuttal and when such evidence is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. Both

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sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer to character evidence of the accused. And this evidence must be pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged, meaning, that the character evidence must be relevant and germane to the kind of the act charged. Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said Rule refers to the character of the offended party. Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged. In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no connection between the deceased’s drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in the hands of accused-appellant. Moreover, proof of the victim’s bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder committed with treachery and premeditation. In People v. Soliman, a murder case, the Supreme Court held: “While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or improbability of the commission of an offense, such is not necessary in the crime of murder where the killing is committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary.” In the case at bar, accused-appellant is charged with murder committed through treachery and evident premeditation. The evidence shows that there was treachery. There was no opportunity at all for the victim to defend himself or retaliate against his attacker. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack ensured his death without risk to the assailant. Following the ruling in People v. Soliman, where the killing of the victim was attended by treachery, proof of the victim’s bad character is not necessary. The presence of this aggravating circumstance negates the necessity of proving the victims bad character to establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged and, at the 71| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

same time, qualifies the killing of Joseph Marquez to murder. Supreme Court affirmed but reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.