Evidence-64-70 (1).docx

SENATOR ESTRADA V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUSDMAN G.R. Nos. 212140-41 January 21, 2015 Facts: Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal complaints for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014. On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made “pursuant to the right of a respondent to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to have access to the evidence on record (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman). The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present certiorari case. Issue: What is the quantum of evidence necessary during preliminary investigation? Ruling: The quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in administrative proceedings. Probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include hearsay evidence. LUIS UY vs. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA AND ROSAURA MENDOZA G.R. No. 206220 August 19, 2015 FACTS: Luis Uy filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages against respondents Petra Rosca and spouses Jose Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza (Spouses Lacsamana). Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca. He stated that they lived together as husband and wife from the time they were married in until they separated and lived apart. Uy contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone in favor of Spouses Lacsamana over a property he alleges to be a part of their marital property regime is not valid for being simulated or fictitious for lack of consideration and consent. Rosca denied the allegations of Uy and claimed that she and Uy cohabited and attempted to formalize their marital union with a marriage ceremony. However, the celebration was not consummated because of the bombings which occurred on the day of the ceremony. Likewise, they were unable to secure a marriage contract. ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone, without Uy's consent, in favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.

RULING: Yes, the sale is valid. The main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a presumption established in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence. Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. Consequently, with the presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally married. It became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional proof to show that they were legally married. He, however, dismally failed to do so. SIMPLICIA CERCADO-SIGA vs. VICENTE CERCADO, JR. G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015 FACTS: Petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga and Ligaya Cercado-Belison claimed that they are the legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo, who were married last 9 October 1929 in Pililla, Rizal. In support of the existence thereof, petitioners presented a copy of the Contrato Matrimonial which was issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente church. Petitioners insist that the Contrato Matrimonial is a public document because it is required by law to be recorded in the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office (NSO). Petitioners claim to have in their possession a duplicate original of the Contrato Matrimonial which should be regarded as original. Granting that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document, petitioners maintain that said document should be considered an ancient document which should be excluded from the requirement of authentication.
 ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage contract or Contrato Matrimonial is sufficient to prove the fact of marriage. RULING: Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof. As observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioners failed to present any one of such witnesses. While petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document, they now argue that it is an ancient document which need not be authenticated. Petitioners’ argument still has no merit. Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that: 1) is more than 30 years old; 2) is produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. The marriage contract was executed on 9 October 1929, hence it is clearly more than 30-years old. On its face, there appears to be no evidence of alteration.
The marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNABE P. PALANAS ALIAS “ABE" G.R. No. 214453, June 17, 2015 FACTS: At around 6:40 in the morning of March 26, 2006, SPO2 Borre took his five (5)month-old grandson outside his residence at Block 14, Eusebio Avenue, Pasig City. PO3 Leopoldo Zapanta, who slept at SPO2 Borre's residence, was watching television when 4 successive gunshots rang out. PO3 Zapanta looked through the open door of SPO2 Borre's house and saw two 2 men armed with .38 calibre revolvers standing a meter away from SPO2 Borre. He saw Palanas deliver the fourth shot to SPO2 Borre, but he could not identify the other shooter. Thereafter, the two (2) assailants fled on a motorcycle.
 PO3 Zapanta, together with SPO2 Borre's stepson Ramil Ranola, brought SPO2 Borre to the Pasig City General Hospital. On the way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre told Ramil and PO3 Zapanta that it was "Abe or "Abe Palanas" - referring to his neighbor, Palanas who shot him. This statement was repeated to his wife, Resurreccion Borre, who followed him at the hospital. At around 11 o'clock in the morning of even date, SPO2 Borre died. ISSUE: Whether Palanas’ conviction for the crime of Murder should be upheld on the basis of Dying declaration and as part of the res gestae. RULING: Yes. SPO2 Borre's statements constitute a dying declaration, it may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed belief that his own death was already imminent. This declaration is considered evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation. In the same vein, SPO2 Borre's statements may likewise be deemed to form part of the res gestae. In this case, SPO2 Borre's statements refer to a startling occurrence. While on his way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS HON.JESUS M. MUPAS G.R. No. 181892 September 08, 2015 FACTS: Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government for the construction and development of the NAIA-IPT III under a buildoperate-and-transfer (BOT) arrangement. The DOTC and the MIAA invited the public to submit competitive and comparative proposals to AEDC's unsolicited proposal in accordance with the BOT Law and its implementing rules. Both AEDC and Paircargo offered to build, however, DOTC awarded the project to Paircargo (PIATCO). PIATCO engaged the services of Takenaka, as well as, Asahikosan, both foreign corporations organized in Japan, for the construction of the NAIA-IPT, however, PIATCO defaulted on its obligations, and to settle the problem Takenaka and Asahikosan agreed to defer PIATCO’s payments until June 2003. Trial ensued, there has been an issue as to the attendant costs of the construction, PIATCO was required to submit the original

documents to the court. However, PIATCO argues that his non-submission is justified under Sec. 3 rule 130 of the ROC, referring to the submission of numerous accounts. ISSUE: Whether or not the non-submission of original documents is justified. RULING: The court held in the negative, that although the contention of non-submission due to numerous accounts of the document is justifiable under the rule. Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In proving the terms of a written document, the original of the document must be produced in court.—Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. In proving the terms of a written document, the original of the document must be produced in court. Thus, PIATCO having failed to establish that the photocopied documents he presented in courts are authentic, theses photocopied documents are deemed as hearsay, and shall not be admissible as evidence, or reference to the claimed attendant costs of the project.

MARIA PAZ FRONTRERAS y ILAGAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 190583. December 7, 2015. FACTS: An Information for Qualified Theft was filed before the RTC against the petitioner, Salazar, and Carpon. The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner unlawfully deprived Cebuana of cash/ money when she took out pawned items and released them to redeeming pledgers in exchange for redemption payments which she, however, did not turnover to the pawnshop, and instead pocketed them for her own gain. She gravely abused the confidence concurrent with her sensitive position as a vault custodian when she exploited her exclusive and unlimited access to the vault to facilitate the unlawful taking. The accused submitted pawn tickets which were surrendered, together with the redemption payment by their respective pledgers. She submitted them during the spot audit along with a confession letter stating that portions of the ₱1,250,800.00 missing value of jewelry were actually already redeemed. ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial written confession was admissible. RULING: Yes. A confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if voluntarily and freely made, constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no sane person or one of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. The admissibility and validity of a confession, thus hinges on its voluntariness, a condition vividly present in this case. The language of the confession letter was straightforward, coherent and clear. It bore no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity and it was replete with details which could only be known to the petitioner. Moreover, it is obvious

that losing one’s job in an administrative case is less cumbersome than risking one’s liberty by confessing to a crime one did not really commit. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA G.R. No. 195244 June 22, 2015 FACTS: Accused-appelant, Alvin Esugon was charged with Robbery with Homicide, allegedly for robbing cash money amounting to P13,000 from one Josephine Castro and in the process killing the same. Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on the night of the incident, he, his younger sister Cheche, and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of their house. He saw appellant, whom he calls "Nonoy," enter their house and stab her mother with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped through a chair. The RTC found appellant guilty for the crime charged. On appeal, the appellant argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the composite crime of robbery with homicide based solely on the testimony of Carl, a 5year old witness whose recollections could only be the product of his imagination. ISSUE: Whether or not the identification of the perpetrator was credible and competent considering that the witness was a 5 year old child. RULING: YES. Anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social stat us are not necessary to qualify a person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as listed the rules. That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competency. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive ,remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.