Europe Toolbox - Scholars

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 Scholars

1 Europe

Europe Toolbox EU Counterplan Europe Toolbox ..............................................................................................................................................................1 ***EU Counterplan.........................................................................................................................................................3 European Union Counterplan 1NC ................................................................................................................................4 European Union Counterplan 1NC – Key to Legitimacy...............................................................................................5 EU Action Solves – International Coalitions..................................................................................................................6 EU Action Solves – International Coalitions..................................................................................................................7 EU Action Solves – China Relationship ........................................................................................................................8 EU Action Solves – Developing Countries.....................................................................................................................9 EU Action Solves – Economics ...................................................................................................................................10 EU Action Solves – Momentum ...................................................................................................................................11 EU Action Solves – Promoting Renewables Markets...................................................................................................12 EU Action Solves – Comprehensive Climate Policy....................................................................................................13 EU Action Solves – Global Emissions Trading ...........................................................................................................14 EU Action Solves – Key to EU Leadership .................................................................................................................15 EU Action Solves – Key to EU Leadership .................................................................................................................16 EU Action Solves – Key to EU Leadership..................................................................................................................17 EU Modeled .................................................................................................................................................................18 EU Modeled .................................................................................................................................................................19 AT: EU Doesn’t Emit Enough to Solve ........................................................................................................................20 AT: Perm – Independent Action Key to Leadership.....................................................................................................21 AT: Perm – Independent Action Key to Leadership.....................................................................................................22 ***AT: EU Counterplan................................................................................................................................................23 EU Action Fails – Climate Change ..............................................................................................................................24 EU Action Bad – Trade War .........................................................................................................................................25 EU Climate Policy Bad – ETS Proves .........................................................................................................................26 EU Modeling Bad – Australia Proves ..........................................................................................................................27 EU Modeling Bad – Carbon Prices...............................................................................................................................28 AT: EU Action Induces U.S. ........................................................................................................................................29 U.S.-EU Climate Cooperation Now..............................................................................................................................30 U.S.-EU Climate Cooperation Now..............................................................................................................................31 ......................................................................................................................................................................................31 ***EU Leadership DA..................................................................................................................................................32 European Union Leadership DA 1NC .........................................................................................................................33 European Union Leadership DA 1NC..........................................................................................................................34 Yes EU Environmental Leadership ..............................................................................................................................35 Yes EU Environmental Leadership...............................................................................................................................36 Yes EU Leadership – General ......................................................................................................................................37 Yes Perception of US Lagging Behind EU...................................................................................................................38 EU Leadership Brinks...................................................................................................................................................39 U.S. Climate Action Undermines EU Leadership ........................................................................................................40 U.S. Climate Action Undermines EU Leadership ........................................................................................................41 Climate Key to Overall EU Leadership – Spillover ....................................................................................................42 EU Leadership Good – Laundry List ...........................................................................................................................43 AT: EU Leadership Kills U.S. Heg...............................................................................................................................44 AT: Hard Power Pre-Requisite to Leadership...............................................................................................................45 AT: NMD Turn – Non-Unique .....................................................................................................................................46 AT: NMD Turn..............................................................................................................................................................47 AT: NMD Turn..............................................................................................................................................................48 ***AT: EU Leadership DA...........................................................................................................................................49 No EU Leadership ........................................................................................................................................................50 No EU Leadership ........................................................................................................................................................51 U.S. Leadership Doesn’t Trade Off with EU................................................................................................................52 Soft Power Not Key to EU Leadership ........................................................................................................................53

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 Scholars

2 Europe

EU Leadership Resilient ..............................................................................................................................................54 EU Leadership Ineffective ...........................................................................................................................................55 EU Leadership Bad – Undermines U.S. Hegemony ....................................................................................................56 EU Leadership Bad – Undermines U.S. Hegemony.....................................................................................................57 EU Leadership Bad – Undermines U.S. Hegemony.....................................................................................................58 EU Leadership Bad – NMD Good ...............................................................................................................................59 Yes NMD.......................................................................................................................................................................60 NMD Good – Nuclear War...........................................................................................................................................61 NMD Good – Deters WMD Prolif ...............................................................................................................................62 NMD Good – Key to Heg.............................................................................................................................................63 NMD Good – AT: U.S.-Russia Nuclear War.................................................................................................................64 ***Condition Counterplan............................................................................................................................................65 Issue Linkage Solves – Climate ..................................................................................................................................66 Issue Linkage Solves – Climate ...................................................................................................................................67 Issue Linkage Solves – Climate/Security......................................................................................................................68 Issue Linkage Solves – General ...................................................................................................................................69 Conditional GHG Cuts Good – General ......................................................................................................................70 Conditional GHG Cuts Good – Capital Flight .............................................................................................................71 Conditioning Solves – China ......................................................................................................................................72 Conditioning Solves – Developing Countries...............................................................................................................73 Conditioning on EU Action Solves Climate Change ..................................................................................................74 EU Says Yes to Conditions ..........................................................................................................................................75 R & D Issue Linkage Solves ........................................................................................................................................76 Trade Issue Linkage Solves ..........................................................................................................................................77 Trade Issue Linkage Solves...........................................................................................................................................78 Trade Issue Linkage Key to Global Trade....................................................................................................................79 AT: Lie Perm.................................................................................................................................................................80 ***AT: Condition Counterplan.....................................................................................................................................81 Conditioning Fails – Climate ......................................................................................................................................82 Conditioning Fails – Power Differential.......................................................................................................................83 Conditioning Fails – R&D............................................................................................................................................84 Conditioning Fails – Developing Countries .................................................................................................................85 AT: Capital Flight – Alt Cause......................................................................................................................................86 ***Relations..................................................................................................................................................................87 US-EU Relations Low..................................................................................................................................................88 U.S.-EU Relations Good – Laundry List......................................................................................................................89 U.S.-EU Relations Good – Democracy .......................................................................................................................90 U.S.-EU Relations Good – Economy ...........................................................................................................................91 U.S.-EU Relations Good – Economy/Leadership ........................................................................................................92 U.S.-EU Relations Good – Leadership ........................................................................................................................93 U.S.-EU Relations Good – Terrorism...........................................................................................................................94 U.S.-EU Relations Good – Terrorism...........................................................................................................................95 U.S.-EU Relations Good – Terrorism...........................................................................................................................96 U.S.-EU Relations Good – Iran ...................................................................................................................................97 U.S.-EU Relations Good – Trade .................................................................................................................................98 EU Relations Bad – Heg ..............................................................................................................................................99 EU Relations Bad – Terrorism ...................................................................................................................................100

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 Scholars

***EU Counterplan

3 Europe

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 Scholars

4 Europe

European Union Counterplan 1NC ( ) Text:

( ) EU action on climate is currently insufficient – expansion sets a global model that solves climate change far better than U.S. action Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organization that works in the public interest to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development, July 5, 2006, “Energy, Climate, Democracy and the Future of Europe,” online: http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/E3G-OSI_Brussels_Roundtable_Report.pdf, accessed July 16, 2008 Europe has the capacity and resources – both internally and globally – to lead the necessary transformation to a low carbon and energy secure economy, but current European actions in this area is not adequate to the scale of the task. The EU cannot balance the goals of energy security, climate security and competitiveness: it needs to achieve all of them at the same time. This requires a form of convergent policymaking which cuts across traditional boundaries and builds imaginative and forceful synergies. Despite the existence of an embryonic European Energy policy, it remains very weak in the face of the challenges it is trying to address. The absence of mutual reinforcing EU policies is illustrated by the fact that, at the moment, EU climate policy is being watered down when it should be accelerated in order to deliver energy security objectives. In the automobile sector, for example, the difference between US and EU car efficiency – mainly driven by climate change policies – has already saved the EU 0.5% of GDP per annum in oil costs since 2004. High energy prices mean that similar economic gains have resulted from other climate change polices on domestic and commercial energy efficiency and the promotion of European energy services markets. The UK alone will reap net economic benefits of over Euro 150 billion from its current climate change programme to deliver Kyoto; Germany has created hundreds of thousands of new jobs from its aggressive renewable energy programmes. Such initiatives, that have immediate ecological, economic and security impacts, should be enhanced to encourage further and quicker investment in energy and climate security. The EU is well placed to do this, as many of these initiatives – such as the EU Emission trading system – require sophisticated publicprivate partnerships. Europe has decades of experience in creating these approaches, and unlike the US has strong public political support for further action. Put another way, while the US has created the world’s most effective military-industrial innovation system; Europe is well placed to create the world’s most effective innovation and investment system for clean energy technologies and services.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 Scholars

5 Europe

European Union Counterplan 1NC – Key to Legitimacy ( ) Action on climate change is the single most important litmus test of EU legitimacy – it’ll determine Europe’s entire future course Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organization that works in the public interest to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development, et al., December 17, 2007, “Central and Eastern Europe’s climate change opportunity,” online: http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/europe-articles/centraland-eastern-europes-climate-change-opportunity/, accessed July 16, 2008 We are living at a pivotal time in terms of Europe’s future, and taking the right decisions now could enable decades of investment in clean technologies and smart infrastructure. This would ensure the creation of millions of good jobs across Europe and underpin the creation of a new, inclusive social contract. This is a one-off opportunity for the direct development of a new ‘green industrial revolution.’ The citizens of CEE member states definitely want to part of this opportunity, but can they ensure that their leaders will look to the future rather than the past? The efforts of environmental organisations and civil society groups will be central to making sure that they do, and they could start by focusing attention on opportunities contained in the EU Budget Review. The political context for action on climate change has improved over the past three years, while an upturn in economic growth has restored some much needed confidence. The European Commission (EC) in particular has recognised the importance of an outward-looking and future-focused European project. It has rightly identified the environment as a core issue that binds Europeans together. Strong leadership from former UK Prime Minister Blair, German Chancellor Merkel and EC President Barroso has helped to secure agreement on ambitious climate and energy aims. But, of course, it is one thing for politicians to set a policy agenda, and a distinctly different challenge to actually follow through with action to reach those goals. Europe is now in a different phase. Its ability to rise to the climate change challenge is the litmus test of its legitimacy and practical value. The decisions taken now will shape the future of all of Europe and determine its place in the world.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 Scholars

6 Europe

EU Action Solves – International Coalitions Europe forms successful international partnerships to solve warming ECF 4(http://ecf.pik-potsdam.de/Press/press_releases/ecf_press_release_300304.pdf European climate forum) The world is watching Europe for leadership in climate policy. Currently, Europe is implementing emissions trading, a key instrument of climate policy. After years of debates and negotiations, this is the first large-scale experience with a practical step to address the challenge of climate change. By the end of March, the National Allocation Plans that provide the basis for emissions trading have to be finalized. Unfortunately, various voices - including the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederation of Europe and the European commissioner for energy - are trying to undermine that process. Today's compromise between the German minister for economics and the minister for the environment has averted one such attempt. While we share the concern for European competitiveness, critics of emissions trading fail to acknowledge two key facts: humankind is currently headed for dangerous climate change, and European competitiveness can actually be enhanced by engaging in the experience of emissions trading. Everybody understands that it is wise not to fly an airplane in which some key components may cause disaster. The current global energy system has become such an airplane. The reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as well as the recent Pentagon study on the risks of abrupt climate change show that the risks of man-made climate change are serious beyond reasonable doubt. The Kyoto protocol has helped to consolidate wordwide concern about climate change and it has established the idea of emissions trading in the international policy debate. To proceed further, it will be necessary to show Russia that it is in its own best interest to join the protocol. To reap the benefits of European climate policy, it will also be necessary to establish bilateral partnerships between Europe and other world regions: - An energy partnership between Europe and North Africa provides opportunities for major steps towards a sustainable energy system, using first natural gas and then solar energy, - A partnership between Europe and China can lead to major emissions reductions by joint developments of more efficient energy technologies, - European cities can engage in partnerships with megacities in developing countries to harness the potential of information technologies for sustainable urban development. All these initiatives provide large business opportunities. Europe needs these opportunities both for environmental reasons and in order to overcome persistent unemployment. A properly functioning emission trading system, linked to other climate policy initiatives, will spur technological innovation in Europe in areas like renewable energy, highly efficient energy use, and new transport systems. Rather than quarreling over the details of the implementation of emissions trading in Europe, we should be planning how best to take advantage technologically and economically of this system.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 Scholars

7 Europe

EU Action Solves – International Coalitions The EU can only effectively solve warming by uniting with nations Murphy et al & Egenhofer 8, (http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/eu_objectives_climate.pdf Deborah (International Institute for Sustainable Development); and Christian: Furthering EU Objectives on Climate Change and Clean Energy (Centre for European Policy Studies))

The EU has taken on ambitious climate and clean energy goals. Despite best efforts at home, attaining the overall environmental goal of avoiding dangerous anthropogenic interference with the global atmosphere will depend significantly on what happens in developing countries, especially the BICSAM nations characterized by high economic growth and rapidly growing emissions. Engaging these countries in clean energy and climate change efforts will require a strategy that accounts for their particular needs, including economic growth, energy investment, and vulnerability to climate change impacts. In each country, the EU will need to acknowledge and build on domestic actions that have been taken to address the climate change and clean energy challenge. These unilateral actions are not insignificant; the Center for Clean Air Policy estimates that the combined emission reductions in China, Brazil and Mexico from domestic measures will “be greater than reductions under the Kyoto Protocol (without the US), EU’s reduction commitments in 2020, and reductions estimated in current US legislative proposal in 2015” (Ogonowski et al., 2007: 2). While historical emissions of GHGs contributing to anthropogenic climate change have been mainly from developed countries, an increasing share is coming from developing countries. The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2006a) reported that over the 1990–2004 period, total fossil fuel combustion emissions of CO2 increased about 28 per cent worldwide, with four per cent of this increase taking place in Annex I countries and 76 per cent in non- Annex I countries. The Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2007b: 73) reported that in 2004, non-OECD emissions of CO2 were greater than OECD emissions for the first time; and by 2010, developing countries will emit nearly 20 per cent more CO2 emissions than developed countries. Rising populations, income levels and energy use are leading to rapid increases in GHG emissions in developing countries, which are critically important on an aggregate basis. This means that action by the EU and other developed countries will be insufficient in preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with the global Furthering EU Objectives on Climate Change and Clean Energy: Building partnerships with major developing economies 15 atmosphere. Meeting the EU goal to limit global warming to no more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels means that GHG emissions will need to be reduced in developed countries by 60 to 80 per cent by 2050; and that many developing countries will also need to significantly reduce emissions (CEC, 2007b: 3) notes that. The Stern Review (2006) seconds this view, noting that the world will have little chance of effectively addressing the climate change threat unless leading developed and developing nations act together to reduce their emissions.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 Scholars

8 Europe

EU Action Solves – China Relationship ( ) The EU can get China on board for emissions reductions, which solves climate change Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organization that works in the public interest to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development, July 5, 2006, “Energy, Climate, Democracy and the Future of Europe,” online: http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/E3G-OSI_Brussels_Roundtable_Report.pdf, accessed July 16, 2008 China has also set an extremely ambitious target of reducing energy intensity per unit of GDP by 20% by 2010. It is in Europe’s interest to act decisively to help China achieve this, in parallel with developing a more aggressive domestic energy efficiency policy; for example, by harmonising efficient product standards in the EU and China and lowering relevant tariffs. The energy and climate security benefits of cheap and highly efficient Chinese appliances in Europe outweigh any possible “competitiveness” issues around tariff reduction. In the same way Europe (and the rest of the world) has a greater interest in ensuring energy and climate security rather than overprotecting intellectual property rights (IPR) around clean technologies. Fears around IPR protection are holding up EU-China and EU-India cooperation in renewable technologies, coal, efficiency and other areas. However, many European companies already successfully manage access to IPR as part of their commercial and governmental relationships in China and India, showing a strategic balance of risk and reward can be found if ultimate objectives are clear.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 Scholars

9 Europe

EU Action Solves – Developing Countries EU will engage 3rd world countries Murphy et al & Egenhofer 8, (http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/eu_objectives_climate.pdf Deborah (International Institute for Sustainable Development); and Christian: Furthering EU Objectives on Climate Change and Clean Energy (Centre for European Policy Studies))

Obviously, the EU is not alone in wanting to engage the big developing country emitters in clean energy and climate change efforts, which can not only help to meet environmental goals, but also promote sustainable economic growth. These countries are important trading partners, and increased technology cooperation and dissemination could help increase access to BICSAM markets for advanced clean energy technologies. The EU has engaged with each of these nations to varying degrees on a bilateral basis, with high-level summits and focused energy initiatives being common means to discuss issues related to energy and climate change. Examples include: the EU-India energy panel; emphasizing biofuels in the joint declaration with Brazil; action plans on clean coal and industrial cooperation on energy efficiency and renewable energy with China; and promoting cooperation in the energy sector in the global agreement with Mexico. Annex 1 includes additional information about EU relations with BICSAM nations. It makes sense for the EU to initially focus on BICSAM nations when it comes to GHG mitigation policies and activities. Indeed, it could be argued that initial efforts should be focused on China and India, as emission limits or cuts in these countries have the potential to have a huge impact on meeting global reduction goals because of the massive size of their populations and economies, and their level of economic growth. Engaging all five of the BICSAM nations, because of their elevated economic growth and increasing regional and international influence, would likely have important ripple effects in other developing countries throughout the world.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 Scholars

10 Europe

EU Action Solves – Economics ( ) Europe’s economic power makes it able to affect global carbon emissions Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organization that works in the public interest to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development, July 5, 2006, “Energy, Climate, Democracy and the Future of Europe,” online: http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/E3G-OSI_Brussels_Roundtable_Report.pdf, accessed July 16, 2008 But this is as much an external agenda as it is about Europe’s own energy system. Europe’s core strategic interests lie in helping drive the global transformation to high efficiency and low carbon energy system, not narrow commercial advantage in proprietary clean technologies or gaining privileged access to energy resources. Europe can use its enormous economic weight to drive change, especially in relationships with India and China. The industrial boom in China – mainly fuelled by our investment and consumption – means that it is currently building coal-fuelled power stations at the unprecedented pace of a major 1GW plant every 4 days. The lifetime emissions of the coal power plants build by 2030 will equal 2/3rds of total global emissions over the last 2 decades, and will push us into levels of climate change which have a high risk of catastrophic outcomes. We cannot stop India and China building coal power stations to meet their energy security aims, but we could prevent lock-in to their carbon emissions by helping deploy carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies. The EU has already agreed to build a commercial scale CCS demonstration plant with China. While this is a good first step, unless the planned completion date of 2020 is moved forward it will have little impact on climate stability. E3G work in this area suggests that a plant could be built by 2010, if the right level of political and financial investment was mobilised inside a robust commercial framework.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 Scholars

11 Europe

EU Action Solves – Momentum ( ) Momentum for more stringent climate action building within Europe – capitalizing is key Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organization that works in the public interest to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development, July 5, 2006, “Energy, Climate, Democracy and the Future of Europe,” online: http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/E3G-OSI_Brussels_Roundtable_Report.pdf, accessed July 16, 2008 Various ideas have been put forward as to how things could be taken further on these issues. Of these, the possibility of launching a campaign for clean and fair energy has specifically been discussed. This could begin with a Clean and Fair Energy Forum and should include a broad coalition of environmentalists, businesses, democracy promoters, economists, and academics. OSI and George Soros could offer conveying power. • Various participants expressed a clear interest in continuing this conversation and possibly taking it to a further level of commitment and action. These discussions are proving that there is strong resonance across Europe and across institutions for many of these ideas, but that there is a need to enlarge the audience and members of the embryonic coalition. Further engagement with other stakeholders in this process is required in order to bring to life this vision through a set of iconic choices.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 Scholars

12 Europe

EU Action Solves – Promoting Renewables Markets EU Is Important For Opening Renewable Energy Market Opportunities Hovi, Skodvin, and Andresen 4 (Jon, Tora, and Steinar, Professor University of Oslo, Senior Research Fellow at CICERO, Senior Research Fellow at Fridtjof Nansen, “The Persistence of the Kyoto Protocol: Why Other Annex I Countries Move On Without the United States”, Global Environmental Politics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2004, pg 12) Thus, the promotion of renewable energy sources by the EU and the EU emissions trading scheme represent new market opportunities for industry, in which the industry already has made initial investments. The whole point, particularly of the emissions trading scheme, is the implementation of a climate policy to reduce CO2 emissions within the Community. Thus, even though the costs (in relation to the environmental improvement achieved) increase for the EU as such with the US exit, important industries may have something to gain from the maintenance of these policies. Granted, this analysis does not give a complete picture of the interests of all European industries. Counterforces do exist. In the current situation, however, there are clearly European industries reaping benefits from the maintenance of current EU climate policies. In sum, the discussion in this section suggests that there are self-reinforcing mechanisms at work in the process whereby EU climate policies are developed and institutionalized.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 Scholars

13 Europe

EU Action Solves – Comprehensive Climate Policy The EU is committed to a comprehensive warming policy Dimas 3/7 (http://mail.google.com/mail/#inbox/11b2d9cb8e7ed8d3 Member of the European Commission, responsible for environment, Stavros European Parliament Environment Committee) The conclusion is clear: the international community needs to act fast. The next decade or so will determine whether we manage to bring the situation under control or we allow climate change to reach dangerous levels that will threaten our prosperity and the stability of our societies. The European Union has both the opportunity and the means to lead the global response that is needed to win this battle. The Commission’s climate and energy package provides us with the necessary tools – and I am delighted that it has now been fully endorsed by EU leaders. The package is unique, both in its integrated approach and in the opportunities it opens up. President Barroso has described it as heralding a new industrial revolution to create the low-carbon economy of the future. It will strengthen not only the fight against climate change but also our energy security and our competitiveness. 3 The targets proposed by the Commission are essential if we are to prevent global warming from going more than 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial temperature. This has to be the fundamental objective of any new global agreement because science warns us that any bigger temperature rise will greatly increase the risk of irreversible and possibly disastrous changes. We have a duty to do whatever we can to protect our children and grandchildren from these dangers. As we stated in our January communication, staying within the 2 degrees limit means that global emissions will need to peak by around the year 2020 and then fall by as much as 50% of 1990 levels by 2050. The European Council has set out key targets that need to be included in a global and comprehensive new agreement that would take effect after the Kyoto Protocol targets expire in 2012. The group of developed countries must reduce its emissions to 30% below 1990 levels by 2020. The EU has committed itself to take on this target in the context of an international agreement that comprises other industrialised countries. Developing countries whose emissions are projected to overtake those of developed countries by 2020, should also participate although in a differentiated manner. Those among them that reach a level of economic prosperity similar to developed countries should take on obligatory emissions reduction commitments. These should reflect each country's per capita emissions, its potential to reduce them and its financial capacity. Naturally, no mandatory reductions would be asked from the least developed countries, which in any case have the lowest emission levels. And as they are also the most vulnerable to climate change, we must increase our cooperation with them to help them minimise the negative impacts of climate change. The Commission's climate change Communication outlines concrete options for strengthening developing countries' participation in a future regime. These include the possible expansion of Kyoto's clean development mechanism so that emissionsaving projects in developing countries can put those countries on a low-emissions path. The Commission also proposes improving access to finance for new energy infrastructure. We will have to be innovative in the way we approach developing countries. In Parliament, some have called for a strong partnership with key developing countries such as China and India. It is certainly worth exploring this avenue.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 Scholars

14 Europe

EU Action Solves – Global Emissions Trading EU solves cap and trade, even though it faced difficulties MITEI 7 (http://www.iconocast.com/D1/V5/News7.htm The MIT Energy Initiative is an Institute-wide initiative designed to help transform the global energy system to meet the challenges of the future)

Already, the EU ETS is far larger than either of the U.S. programs for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. Further, the EU ETS operates internationally. Allowances are traded by facilities in 27 independent nations that differ widely in per capita income, market experience and other features. As a result, "I think the EU ETS has a lot to tell us about how a global system might actually work," Ellerman said. What are some of the lessons to be learned from the European experience? First, it shows that the economic effects-in a macroeconomic sense-have not been large. Second, permitting "banking and borrowing" will make a cap-and-trade system work more efficiently. Within the EU ETS, facilities can bank (save some of this year's allowance for use next year) or borrow (use some of next year's allowances now and not have them available next year). Many facilities took advantage of the opportunity to trade across time. But they always produced the necessary allowances within the required time period. Concerns that facilities would postpone their obligations indefinitely have proved unwarranted. A third lesson is that the process of allocating emissions allowances is going to be contentious-and yet cap-and-trade is still the most politically feasible approach to controlling carbon emissions. In a cap-and-trade system, those most affected-the current polluters-receive some assets along with the liabilities they are being asked to assume. Finally, the MIT analysis shows that everything does not have to be perfectly in place to start up. When the EU ETS began, the overall EU cap had not been finally determined, registries for trading emissions were not established everywhere, and many available allowances-especially from Eastern Europe-could not come onto the market. The volatility of prices during the first period reflects those imperfections. "Obviously you're better off having things all settled and worked out before it gets started," said Ellerman. "But that certainly wasn't the case in Europe, and yet a transparent and widely accepted price for CO2 emission allowances emerged rapidly, as did a functioning market and the infrastructure to support it."

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 Scholars

15 Europe

EU Action Solves – Key to EU Leadership ( ) Effective action on climate is the most important factor in the EU’s international image – and independently key to global stability Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organization that works in the public interest to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development, July 5, 2006, “Energy, Climate, Democracy and the Future of Europe,” online: http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/E3G-OSI_Brussels_Roundtable_Report.pdf, accessed July 16, 2008 There is a growing realisation that achieving energy security and climate security is at the core of future global challenges, with implications that go well beyond their traditional policy spheres. For Europe, these challenges will lie at the heart of the future success of its political project, and of the ability of Europeans to continue to live by the values it was founded upon. Achieving energy and climate security globally is critical to ensure Europe’s future security and prosperity and is at the heart of Europe’s values. The changing geopolitics of energy, illustrated by the accelerating global scramble for resources, represents the most major threat to the international rules-based order. The increasing provision of political and financial support to dictatorial regimes in Africa and Central Asia and elsewhere in order to secure access to their national resources has led to democratic retreat and fuelled the destabilisation of whole regions. The anti-democratic changes in Russia are an example of the direction the world might move as geopolitical competition for fossil fuels emboldens authoritarian regimes. The strengthening Chinese engagement with repressive leaders in resource rich African countries embodies an even more serious risk. If China continues further along this “hard power” path to secure its energy security, it could lead to a world characterised by new ‘great power competition’, in which Europe would fare badly. Europe by its very nature and purpose is ill-fitted to a world dominated by large powers struggling for the appropriation of world influence and resources. Europe tested this approach to destruction in two world wars and understands that it is not a sustainable foundation for peace and stability. Europe can only thrive in a world promoting cooperation between countries and regions based on a strong multilateral rules-based system, reflecting the European model of fair, peaceful and cooperative development. If badly managed, the impacts of climate change could accentuate these trends. Military planners in many of the major powers are already predicting the need for enhanced militarization in order to counteract mass environmental migration in the coming decades. Some security analysts are already calling the crisis in Darfur the first climate change induced conflict. The EU is already struggling with the pressures of illegal immigration from North and West Africa, including the value choices around the interception of migrants at sea and building stronger and more intrusive border controls around “Fortress Europe”. These policy choices are already changing how our neighbours see Europe – from an open to a closed society – and will ultimately shape the future European identity.

( ) Climate action is the critical litmus test for the EU’s international engagement Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organization that works in the public interest to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development, July 5, 2006, “Energy, Climate, Democracy and the Future of Europe,” online: http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/E3G-OSI_Brussels_Roundtable_Report.pdf, accessed July 16, 2008 The stark geopolitics of climate security will force Europe to take a lead to prevent and manage these pressures in non-military ways. As a recent Pentagon study explained, in the event of rapid climate change the US always has the option to retreat behind its natural borders of the Atlantic and Pacific. Europe has no such “defensive” option to remove itself from the destabilising impacts of climate change in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, and the resulting migratory and other pressures. Europe’s leadership in managing global energy and climate security is not an issue of economics or moral philanthropy, but an essential component of European strategic interest. Such leadership is required in order for Europe to preserve its future prosperity and stability while living in accordance with its fundamental values.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 Scholars

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EU Action Solves – Key to EU Leadership ( ) Demonstrating that no other nation or group can lead on climate change is critical to EU leadership Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organization that works in the public interest to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development, July 5, 2006, “Energy, Climate, Democracy and the Future of Europe,” online: http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/E3G-OSI_Brussels_Roundtable_Report.pdf, accessed July 16, 2008 The EU has great potential for action, but has failed to make the necessary political choices to act. The key barrier has been a failure to see the strategic importance of global climate and energy security to Europe’s future, and therefore the need to lever a much higher level of political and financial investment. European energy policies and strategies tend to be formed in a narrow framework of perceived national interests. These seem based on a backward looking view of sovereign security which ignores the growing reality of interdependence. German energy policy is a good example of this paradox; as it has focused on securing unilateral access to Russian gas over the concerns of its European neighbours for their security. Does Germany assume that it could thrive on its own by securing access to energy resources while sitting in the middle of a European continent struggling to meet its energy needs? Member State responses to the EU Green paper showed how the initial acknowledgement of the needed for stronger common purpose became quickly eroded by narrow national views and an unwillingness to look to the long term. However, and despite all these problems, there is no other major power with the interests, resources and potential political will to take the lead in promoting global cooperation in the area of energy and climate security. Europe needs to play this role as it not only goes to the heart of its system of values but will also help determine its future place in the international system. The conversations E3G has held across Europe suggest that these issues, more than any other, have the potential to engage European citizens with a new sense of purpose and vision for a renewed European project. Energy and climate security and the maintenance of democracy are issues that cannot be dealt with in silos and have thus to be made central to the EU project to mobilise the scale of political and financial energy needed to drive it forward. Generating the political energy needed to overcome these national barriers, and the institutional silos in European policy making will require a new powerful coalition of actors. Building a convergent agenda around energy and climate security, framed around its importance in the European project and to securing peace and democracy globally has the potential to animate a coalition powerful enough to drive this agenda forward. Certainly no individual policy silo has the political strength to drive these changes at the scale and pace required.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 Scholars

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EU Action Solves – Key to EU Leadership ( ) Wide-scale European action on climate change would demonstrate substantial international leadership Nick Mabey, Chief Executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organization that works in the public interest to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development, et al., December 17, 2007, “Central and Eastern Europe’s climate change opportunity,” online: http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/europe-articles/centraland-eastern-europes-climate-change-opportunity/, accessed July 16, 2008 The key to securing all of these objectives will be effective investment, which will come from both public and private sources. By taking a positive stance on the EU Budget Reform, CEE leaders could leverage funding that will provide their economies with the low carbon foundations that will be needed in an era of increasingly severe energy and climate constraints. Used this way, EU money would pave the way for a major deployment of climate compatible electricity generation, low carbon transport systems, domestic and commercial energy efficiency improvements and widespread deployment of renewable energy technologies. Such an approach would solve many political problems. It would demonstrate the EU’s relevance and added value, and would reduce the vulnerability of economies to energy price shocks and the political influence of energy exporters. It would also be a major step towards meeting climate targets and jobs and competitiveness goals, and would also strengthen the EU’s leadership capacity on climate change. Finally, it would be a major driver for greater prosperity and improved quality of life throughout the EU and beyond.

EU action key to EU’s international leadership Dimas 3/7 (http://mail.google.com/mail/#inbox/11b2d9cb8e7ed8d3 Member of the European Commission, responsible for environment, Stavros European Parliament Environment Committee) The European Union is not waiting for others to take action. Even before negotiations on a global agreement start, the EU leaders have agreed that the EU should make a firm, independent commitment to reduce our emissions by at least 20%. There are compelling reasons for making this independent commitment. First, this will enhance our leadership position internationally. In the current climate, countries are waiting for the others to move first. Only EU leadership can break the impasse. Our commitment to act, combined with the growing pressure for action coming from science and public opinion, can be the catalyst for change. 4 The economic cost of making this independent commitment is limited. Our analysis shows it will cost between 0.02 and 0.09 per cent of the European Union's annual GDP. Compared to the consequences of inaction, this is a reasonable price to pay, especially if the important co-benefits of action in other areas are taken into account. These include increased energy security, efficient use of resources, improved competitiveness through innovation, and significant health benefits from reduced air pollution. An EU independent commitment will help in another way too. It will give a clear signal to economic operators that we are serious about moving towards a lowcarbon economy. This will provide the long-term certainty that our industry has been asking for. It will create a secure basis for the future of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme and will give industry a clear incentive to invest in low carbon technology beyond 2012.

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EU Modeled Europe sets the example for fighting warming VROM international 7 (http://www2.minvrom.nl/pagina.html?id=10618 netherlands ministry of housing and special planning) 'Europe must set a good example in combating the threat of climate change'. Environment State Secretary Van Geel is pleased that the European Commission is now proposing to drastically cut greenhouse gas emissions in the EU. The European Commission wants industrialised countries to collectively reduce the emission of greenhouse gases by 30% in 2020. Van Geel sees this as a positive development. If other industrialised countries do not participate, the European Commission wants the EU itself at any rate to cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 20%. According to Van Geel, this is a minimum. ‘What exactly the Netherlands will be doing within the EU is up to the new cabinet’, says the outgoing state secretary. Van Geel sees it as very important that Europe shows leadership and sets a good example: ‘Climate change is one of this century’s greatest threats. The melting of the polar ice caps and the thawing of the tundra are particularly alarming. Quick action is necessary to combat climate change'. Sending a clear signal The state secretary also finds it important that wealthy countries set a good example, because otherwise developing countries will not follow their lead. Europe cannot solve global climate change by itself. Other countries, with the United States in particular, will have to assume their share of the responsibility. Fastgrowing developing countries, such as China and India, will also have to make a contribution. Van Geel sees it as positive that by establishing a minimum a clear signal is being sent to the business sector. This will allow CO2 to retain a price after 2012 as well. ‘This will boost CO2 emission rights trading’, says Van Geel. In order to keep the large risks of climate change in check, the European Union has taken the stance that the temperature must not rise more than two degrees Celsius in comparison to the preindustrial level. In order to remain under that level, Van Geel proposed ambitious goals during the Dutch EU presidency back in 2004. He is pleased that the European Commission is now following this ambitious course.

The EU is a global model in climate change Dimas 7 (http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_6670_en.htm "Climate Change: Why a Global Response needs European Leadership" - Speech by EU Commissioner Dimas Stavros, Member of the European Commission, responsible for environment) Damaged economies, refugees, political instability, and the loss of life are typically the results of war. But they will also be the results of unchecked climate change. It is like a war because to reduce emissions something very like a war economy is needed. All sectors - transport, energy, agriculture and foreign policy must work closely together to meet a common objective. And it is a world war because every country in the world will be affected by the results of climate change - although it will be the poorest who are hit hardest.] In today's world of accelerating globalization there are many challenges that nations simply cannot address working on their own. Fighting terrorism, pandemics such as bird flu, poverty in Africa, nuclear proliferation and energy security. These are all areas where countries have to find a way of working together if their policies are to have any chance of success. Political challenges are increasingly global in their nature and there can be no more obvious case than climate change where there is no alternative to global cooperation. No country can tackle climate change in isolation. The UK's emissions of greenhouse gasses are responsible for about 2% of the global total. EU emissions are responsible for about 14%. A global response is the only possible solution and there are five clear reasons why this will need a strong and effective European Union. The first is because effective "climate diplomacy" will be essential if we are to convince the United States and key developing countries to come to the negotiating table. As Margaret Beckett said in her recent speech in Berlin, and I quote, "… today being a credible foreign minister means being serious about climate security". The EU has over 450 million citizens and has the largest market in the world. It is self-evident that by acting together we have a much greater diplomatic influence than by acting alone. The second reason is leadership by example. The EU has provided the world with a demonstration of how it is possible for twenty-seven very different countries to act together to reduce emissions and without damaging national economies. A third reason is because the EU has developed the world's first example of a cross-border Emissions Trading Scheme to reduce greenhouse emissions. This is the most effective policy tool that exists for reducing emissions - and it is a model that the rest of the world is already looking to as we work towards a global approach to emissions control.

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EU Modeled EU takes the lead in a war against climate change EurActive.com 7 (http://www.euractiv.com/en/sustainability/eu-defends-leadership-world-war-climate-change/article-160848 European news source)

On 10 January 2007 the Commission invited EU members to endorse a 20% reduction in greenhousegas emissions by 2020 in a bid to reduce its dependency on imported fuels and trigger a new "industrial revolution" (EurActiv 11/01/07). But the proposal was criticised by UNICE, the European employers association, which said that unilateral action "could jeopardise the future of business within the EU". "Our proposals are not easy," Dimas told a group of British MPs in London. But he added that they were "essential" if the economic damage from climate change is to be kept "within manageable limits", as shown by the Stern Review in the UK. "Damaged economies, refugees, political instability and loss of life are typically the results of war. But they will also be the results of unchecked climate change," Dimas said. "It is clear that the fight against climate change is much more than a battle. It is a world war that will last for many years." "It is like a war because to reduce emissions something very like a war economy is needed," Dimas added, saying that benefits would come in terms of "increased energy security and public health". The Commission, he continued, is already working on new measures. These include: Extending the EU carbon trading scheme "to cover more sector and more gases" and linking up with similar schemes such as Japan's voluntary system and the emerging state-based policy in the United States, and; tackling car pollution, saying that the EU will "shortly" review its strategy on CO2 emissions from new vehicles. "It is clear that further action will be needed to reach our 2012 target of average emissions of 120 grammes per kilometre," Dimas said, adding that "the Commission will propose legislation later this year". Meanwhile, in Brussels, Commission President José Manuel Barroso met with a group of 15 business leaders telling them it was "to their advantage to lead and not to be led" on the way to a lowcarbon economy. Most of them agreed. "Climate change is business and will lead to new jobs," said Lars Goeran Josefsson, chief executive of Swedish power company Vattenfall. "Combating climate change … is a business opportunity," agreed Fulvo Conti from Enel, saying the Italian utility and other energy groups were already investing billions in energy research and energy efficiency. "Acting now brings advantages: higher productivity from increased energy efficiency, new markets, new jobs," Barroso said as he presented the Commission's proposals on 10 January. "European Union companies can take the lead".

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AT: EU Doesn’t Emit Enough to Solve The EU’s emissions history is similar to the US Bruton 7 (http://www.eurunion.org/newsweb/euinmedia/jbsfchron022807.htm John, EU ambassador to the United States) American energy companies, many of them having been in denial about global warming, are coming around to face the facts. Exxon Mobil Corp. announced in September that it may stop funding a think tank that has sought to cast doubts on climate change and that it will contribute more than $1.25 million to a European Union study on how to store carbon dioxide in natural gas fields. As the United States begins to wake up to the harsh realities of global warming, the European Union stands ready to assist with the knowledge and expertise European nations and industry have gained over the years. Since the early 1990s, the European Union and its 27- member states have worked to slow the rate of global warming. Many of the policies recently adopted in California, such as caps on greenhouse-gas emissions and market-based programs to reduce greenhouse gases, have already been tried and tested in Europe. The European Union keeps working to develop new policies and systems as the region continually seeks to limit greenhouse-gas emissions and reverse the alarming rise in global temperatures. Since 2000, the European Union has launched more than 30 initiatives to address climate change, including research on energy efficiency and renewable energy sources such as wind, sun, water and waste. The 15 nations that were EU-member states when the Kyoto protocol was signed in 1997 are on track to meet, as a joint commitment, the EU's 8 percent reduction target of greenhouse gases by 2010 compared to 1990 levels. This, while keeping our economy growing. The European Union and the United States were at similar greenhouse-gas emission levels in 1990, but between 1990 and 2004, the EU economy grew by 32 percent and the greenhouse gas emissions went down by almost 1 percent compared to 1990 levels. By contrast, the U.S. economy grew by 52.6 percent between 1990 and 2004, but its emissions grew by 15.8 percent and are projected to increase to 32.4 percent above 1990 levels by 2010. The 27 nations of the EU aim to reduce emissions further by at least 20 percent collectively by 2020 and are also committed to significantly reducing energy consumption while increasing energy efficiency. The EU today accounts for 14 percent of the world's greenhouse-gas emissions, but intends to reduce that figure to around 8 percent by 2050.

The EU Russia and the US are the worlds biggest emitters Planet ark 7( http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/41809/story.htm environmental news agency) Combined emissions

by the United States, Russia and the EU, accounting for about half the world total, rose by 0.4 percent to 14.55 billion tonnes in 2005 from 2004, according to data compiled by Reuters from the UN Climate Change Secretariat. "Emissions trends are continuing upwards, which contradicts political rhetoric globally," Bill Hare, a Greenpeace adviser who also works at German Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, said during 166-nation UN climate talks in Bonn. And experts say that emissions by developing nations led by China and India, which do not have to report 2005 data to the Bonn-based Secretariat, are rising far faster as they use more coal and oil to power their fast-growing economies. A report by UN climate panel last week said the world was running out of time to make the deep cuts needed to combat global warming, which could bring widening droughts, heatwaves, floods, spread disease and push up world sea levels. It said world

emissions would have to peak by 2015 and fall by 50 to 85 percent by 2050 to reach a goal of limiting temperature rises to 2 to 2.4 Celsius (3.6 to 8.6 Fahrenheit) above pre-industrial levels. "Deep emissions cuts by industrialised countries are needed," Yvo de Boer, head of the UN Climate Change Secretariat, told 1,000 delegates at the opening of the May 7-18 talks in Bonn on ways to slow warming. And Germany wants to use a meeting of leading industrialised and developing nations it will host next month to push for new commitments to cap greenhouse gases. US RISE US data submitted to the Secretariat show

emissions rose by 0.7 percent in 2005 to a record 7.24 billion tonnes and were 16.3 percent above 1990 levels. Russia's report shows that emissions, which plunged with the collapse of Soviet-era smokestack industries in the 1990s, rose by 2.2 percent in 2005 to 2.13 billion tonnes. But they were still 28.7 percent below 1990 levels. Emissions by 27 EU members dipped by 0.8 percent to 5.18 billion tonnes and were 8.0 percent below 1990 levels, with big 2005 cuts by Germany, Finland and the Netherlands. "The figures could still be adjusted slightly," said Andreas Barkman of the European Environment Agency. The United States, the EU and Russia are the main emitters among industrialised societies. Nations including Japan and Canada have not sent in data for 2005.

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AT: Perm – Independent Action Key to Leadership ( ) The EU’s ability to differentiate itself from the U.S. on climate is key to its soft power John Vogler, Professor in the School of Politics, International Relations & Philosophy at Keele University, and Charlotte Bretherton, Senior Lecturer in International Politics/European Studies at Liverpool John Moores University, March 2004, “The European Union as a Protagonist to the US on Climate Change,” online: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/4/4/2/p74423_index.html There are a whole range of questions relating to the above and to the intriguing development of a panEuropean and potentially expanding Community emissions trading system. The focus of this paper is, however, more narrow. It is upon the capacity of the EU as an actor to lead the global climate change regime and to operate effectively in the absence of the US. This will be a crucial determinant of the future of the climate regime - and arguably already has been, for much of the analysis below rests upon evidence of the Union’s performance over a decade of climate politics.

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AT: Perm – Independent Action Key to Leadership Perm doesn’t solve – when the EU acts with the US, it is perceived as placation and as acting two-faced. Deva Mohd Ridzam, former ambassador to EU, 07 [May 6, Comment; LOCAL; Pg. 24, “EU can use past for future benefits,” new straits times, l/n] Among the reasons why the EU is not a political giant is that it is Janus-faced (two-faced) about democracy and human rights. The way it reacted to the democratically-elected Hamas government leaves the Palestinian people wondering why they are again and again being pushed into further misery. This causes extreme anger. The EU's credibility is on the line as never before in the Middle East and elsewhere. It refuses to introduce sanctions against Israel for its atrocities over the years. The EU even supports Israel's withholding of Palestinian money, including its tax revenues. The EU has not been fair and even-handed in that region, including Lebanon and Iran. It should stop playing "bad cop, good cop" with the US.

Perm can’t solve – EU soft power is dependent on the US ceding international leadership Irish Times 07 [March 26, OPINION; Opinion; Pg. 14, “Was the Treaty of Rome meant to found an economic, and not a political, union?,” In order to examine the Rome Treaty in greater depth, it is useful to see how the enterprise has developed in the last 50 years. For example: the European Economic Union became described as the European Community (or Communities) and now European Union. These changes in terminology are a conscious removal of the limiting notion of simply an "economic" identity; from six member states at the outset, the union has now grown to 27 members with more to come, thus unavoidably obtaining greater political influence; these new members include former communist states and former dictatorships that have chosen democracy as required by the final preamble that calls upon "the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts"; there are increasing demands from the people that the EU should do more in environmental policy, aid to developing countries, human rights and other areas beyond the economic, especially as the United States has developed different priorities, thus ceding international leadership in these areas to the EU; development has continued through treaty changes, eg the Single Act, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and continues with the ongoing debate about a constitutional or institutional treaty that could profoundly change the nature of the European construct. This point is fundamental to an assessment of its future wellbeing.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 Scholars

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EU Action Fails – Climate Change EU’s efforts at solving climate change are weak and fail to solve WWF 8 (http://www.climnet.org/EUenergy/wwf%20pr%2020080123%20energy%20package%20reaction.pdf, press release world wildlife fund)

Brussels, Belgium – Today the European Commission presented draft laws to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Europe by only 20 per cent by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. WWF says that Europe should have been more determined and aim at a 30 per cent reduction, in line with the European Council decisions of March 2007 – which included the option to achieve 30 per cent if other industrialised countries engaged on climate change too. A higher target is also essential to keep global warming below 2 degrees Celsius. The conservation organisation says that, as a global leader on climate change, the European Union should be planning for success, not for failure, of international negotiations to cut climate pollution. The 20 per cent target is not even in line with the latest Bali agreement – that developed countries should cut emissions by 25 to 40 per cent by 2020. Drastic improvements of proposed measures are therefore needed by the European Parliament and Council. “The European Commission presented a relatively weak proposal and not a single European country supported more ambitious targets,” says Dr Stephan Singer, Head of European Climate and Energy Unit at WWF. “As the European Union has already reduced its emissions by about 10 per cent since 1990, the 20 per cent target is much softer than it apparently looks. Overall, it is a very small effort to cope with a threat that might lead to Arctic melting and displacement of millions of people in developing countries because of increased floods.” Similarly, the proposal still gives too many pollution permits for free to carbon-intensive industries under the Emissions Trading Scheme. WWF pleaded for full auctioning of allowances to reward cleaner companies as well as to provide funds for sustainable and clean energy development and for adaptation to climate change in developing countries.

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EU Action Bad – Trade War ( ) EU action on climate causes global protectionist backlash that undermines the entire multilateral trade system Michael Richardson, energy and security specialist at the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore, February 19, 2008, The New Zealand Herald, “EU’s crusade not without pitfalls,” lexis The European Union aims to become the world's leader in the fight against global warming and climate change. But in doing so, it may trigger a green trade war of retaliation and litigation from China, India and other leading carbon polluters in lower-cost Asian economies that refuse to follow the new environmental and energy use standards set by Europe and perhaps soon by the United States as well. If this were to happen, it would complicate the plans of Australia and New Zealand to make themselves honest brokers between developed and developing countries in the contentious international negotiations on climate change. It would also undermine the multilateral trading system policed by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and add momentum to protectionist pressures that already pose a significant challenge to the open international trade regime that has helped bring prosperity to the Asia-Pacific region.

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EU Climate Policy Bad – ETS Proves ETS is flawed and alarmist Heritage foundation 2/8 http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/wm1800.cfm The EU's History of Failure The

EU has long engaged in the politics of alarmism about climate change and even used it to justify further centralization of power under the European Reform Treaty.[5] The EU wants to globalize its precautionary-based approach to risk management and even threatened to boycott a key environmental conference in the U.S. if the American hosts failed to agree to specific numbers for emissions cuts.[6] The Guardian notes that the EU is aiming for

"the moral high ground" with its Climate Plan Package, pledging to cut emissions by an additional 10 percent by 2020 if the United States signs on to a Kyoto II deal.[7] America should be wary of adopting European-style policies in light of their documented failure. When the EU introduced the ETS in 2005 as the main pillar of European climate policy, it claimed to be a "world leader" in this area.[8] By December 2007, the trading price of carbon completely crashed after it was revealed that permits had been vastly over-allocated, and the project has since been grossly discredited. However, it remains the primary policy vehicle for achieving the goals of the Climate Plan Package. Several NGOs and think tanks have warned that the next phase of the ETS will not fare any better, because vast quantities of imported credits agreed to under the Kyoto Protocol will grossly distort the market.[9] Energy-intensive industries such the steel and cement sectors have already threatened to move production offshore.[10] An in-depth study of the ETS by British-based think tank Open Europe concluded: …Far from creating a credible basis for EU level action on climate change, the ETS has instead established a web of politically powerful vested interest groups, massive economic distortions and covert industrial subsidies. It will do practically nothing to fight climate change.[11] The ETS is fundamentally flawed

because it puts the cart before the horse: It demands greenhouse gas emissions reductions well before the technologies capable of economically meeting them exist. The result is either ruinous economic consequences or failure to reduce emissions via continued over-allocation of permits. The EU originally chose the latter and is now choosing the former.

EU’s climate policy shouldn’t be modeled Heritage foundation 2/8 http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/wm1800.cfm Not only is there serious concern about the second phase of the ETS, but many other parts of the EU's Climate Plan Package are highly questionable. Under the Plan, Britain has pledged to increase its use of renewable energy to 15 percent from the current level of about 1 percent.[15] Remarkably, nuclear power will not be allowed to constitute any part of that target. As The Heritage Foundation's Jack Spencer notes, nuclear fuel reprocessing is safe, affordable, clean, and technologically feasible.[16] Meeting its renewables target without nuclear fuel reprocessing will be a multibillion-dollar experiment that will require the government to build tens of thousands more wind turbines, including up to 7,000 offshore giant turbines.[17] As British writer Christopher Booker notes, "To build two turbines a day, nearly as high as the Eiffel Tower, is inconceivable."[18] With prohibitive financial costs, unreliable technology, and public opposition, the British plan does not make for effective or efficient environmental policy. In order to prop up the regional carbon market, EU President Jose

Manuel Barroso has threatened to impose a European "green tax" on imports from countries that are not part of a future Kyoto Protocol-style deal.[19] Having failed to sign the U.S. up to its growth-sapping measures through moral posturing alone, the EU is ready to compel them this time around. Furthermore, any such trade-interfering measure is likely to includeblatant acts of protectionism. The BBC has described such tariffs as "the nuclear bomb of climate negotiations,"[20] and they would have a profoundly negative effect on transatlantic relations. Rather than equalize trade, they will simply distort it. The United States should send Europe the message that it will not tolerate such a move and will challenge it at the World Trade Organization if necessary.

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EU Modeling Bad – Australia Proves Countries that model the EU ETS face the same mistakes The Australian 7 (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22770268-5014340,00.html, Australian news source) EMISSIONS trading scheme is a market-based mechanism for trading permits -- known as "allowances" -- to emit carbon dioxide. The European Union ETS is no trivial market. In 2006, the value of allowances traded in the EU ETS reached around $A30 billion . However, the introduction of the EU ETS was not without significant problems. Now, Australia is planning to implement its own ETS. So, are we taking the best of the European scheme and improving on it? Unfortunately, it seems we are set to repeat some of its worst mistakes. If there's just one lesson to take away from the introductory phase of the EU ETS, it is this: governments are not very good at making allocations based on forward projections of industry activity. Consider this. In May 2006, over just a few days, the price of an EU allowance plummeted from around 30 euros per tonne of CO2 to less than 10 euros per tonne. The immediate trigger for the crash was the unofficial release of data on companies' actual emissions performance in 2005, but the root cause was that governments had flooded the market by giving away too many allowances for free -- before trading even started. Prior to the release of emissions data, most analysts believed the market faced a shortfall in allowances. When the actual data were released, the market collapsed and never recovered. It's easy to point the finger at governments for getting the initial allocations wrong, but it's actually unreasonable to expect them to be able to get it right. European governments over-allocated because they wanted to avoid penalising sectors that were exposed to international competition, so cuts in emissions -- where required at all -- were applied to the electricity sector only. In theory, forecasts of industry activity can be used to determine the appropriate allocation to each industry sector, thereby avoiding over-allocation. In practice, governments will always be at an information disadvantage with respect to industry when forecasting sector-specific emissions, and industry will always have a strong incentive to inflate projections in order to increase their allocation. In the end, a familiar battle was played out in every European capital between environment and industry departments. Most often, when faced with tremendous uncertainty in modelling future projections, industry departments won. The result, in the first phase of the EU ETS, was massive over-allocation -- up to 50 per cent in some industry sectors. The Australian ETS is heading down a similar path, using free allocation as a means to compensate for "disproportionate loss of asset value" and "trade exposed energy intensive industries". Both of these methods will rely on inherently uncertain economic modelling, which in turn will be highly reliant on sector-specific commercial information. Once again, the government will be at an information disadvantage; the end result is likely to be over-allocation. Whether or not this floods the overall market will depend on how many permits the government makes available to other sectors via auction, but ultimately any over-allocation will simply lead to a larger than necessary cash contribution from those who will ultimately pick up the tab for higher energy and commodity prices: consumers. Further, unlike the European over-allocation, which at least became transparent after fairly soon after emissions data were released, the true extent of "loss of asset value" or "trade exposure" will remain somewhat murky, even after the fact. And because the compensation for loss of asset value is "once and for all", there may never be an opportunity to correct the mistakes that will almost certainly be made.

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EU Modeling Bad – Carbon Prices The EU model kills carbon economies HOURCADE 6 (http://www.epe-asso.org/pdf_rapa/EpE_rapports_et_documents7.pdf Jean-Charles Centre International de Recherche sur l’Environnement et le Développement (CIRED) EU ETS review)

The EU directive on carbon-trading is critical for the future of climate policies both because it opens a “real-life” test before the 2008-2012 period, and because of its role as a model for other Parties to the UNFCCC. It may be misleading, therefore, to consider that the introduction of a price-cap is premature given the anticipated low costs of carbon: current modeling exercises by general equilibrium models conclude that the withdrawal of the US and the permanence of a risk of ‘hot air’ in former USSR will lead to a very low world carbon price. But the two assumptions on which these results depend may not become reality. The first is the capacity of EU25 to import carbon from Russia and Ukraine (due to the claimed political reluctance of the EU to do so). As of now, EU industry would not have access to ‘hot air’; the second is the fact that appropriate measures may not be taken in time to control emissions trends in the transportation sector (due to a mix of technical and institutional difficulties and of the political sensitivity of these measures), thus pushing the carbon prices upwards. Moreover the European carbon market is a prototype and there is no certainty that its behaviour will not demonstrate large fluctuations around an average value, in particular by the end of the period in case of a low number of exchanges. 19/19 despite these uncertainties, it is not very likely that carbon prices in Europe up to 2012, will reach levels capable of strongly changing the product competitiveness of the European industry (the expected changes of production prices in carbon intensive industry will be around one tenth lower than the one triggered by the large changes in €/$ exchange rate during the three last decades); however, in an increasingly globalised economy, economic analysis shows that moderate increases in production costs may affect far more significantly profit margins and stock values. The resulting lack of investment in new capacity during the medium term may have long-term implications as to whether these businesses remain within the EU. in a context of harsh international competition from large developing countries on labor intensive industries and services (including skilled labor), the political sensitivity to employment issues may not lead governments and the European authorities to impose really strong carbon constraints on carbon intensive industry (which is generally capital intensive) if pessimistic assumption about carbon prices prove to be right. As it stands, the EU ETS does not provide for an emergency measure operating as a safety valve (except for art.29 Force Majeure when a Member State can ask the Commission for the right to issue more credits. The Commission judges if it is a case of Force Majeure.). The penalties for non-compliance are not meant to be price-caps, as non-complying installations need to pay back the excess emissions in the next commitment period. The response by industry will simply be imports from non-constrained countries and political lobbying against significant targets in the future.

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AT: EU Action Induces U.S. ( ) The U.S. would never take action on climate in response to international demands Jon Hovi, Professor of Political Science, University of Oslo, and Senior Researcher at CICERO, et al., 2003, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 8 To sum up, there is little indication that the decision to move on with the Kyoto Protocol will induce the United States or other significant emitters of greenhouse gases to join the climate regime or, for that matter, take on other binding commitments to combat climate change. Note that we do not deny that the US might take action to combat climate change. What we are saying is that such action is unlikely to be caused by the remaining parties' decision to move on with Kyoto. 30 Hence we dismiss hypothesis 2 also.

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U.S.-EU Climate Cooperation Now The US and Europe are working together to decrease warming Graffy, 6/8 (Foundationhttp://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/104981.htm Colleen P. Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Remarks at the Heritage)

Both the U.S. and Europe recognize climate change as a serious problem, and we share a common goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We are both committed to negotiating, under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, a new post-2012 climate change framework by the end of 2009. And we are committed to working with all international partners, including the major economies, to reach agreement on this post-2012 framework. Last May, during the U.S.-EU Summit in Washington, our leaders agreed to a series of commitments to ensure secure, affordable and clean supplies of energy, while tackling climate change. But the Summit commitments are only one example of our ongoing and robust transatlantic cooperation on these issues. Another example is our High-Level Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development, which was last held on March 7. Not only do the U.S. and EU cooperate closely bilaterally, but we also work together multilaterally. Last September, the President launched the Major Economies Process (MEP) as a way to support and accelerate the UN process. We believe that when you gather around a single table the 17 economies that represent 80 percent of the world’s economy and 80 percent of the world’s emissions, you can make a significant contribution to the UN talks. The EU and several European countries participate in the MEP, and France just hosted the latest meeting in Paris in April. The result is that for the first time ever there will be a Major Economies Meeting (MEM) at the time of the G-8 Summit where MEM countries will be represented at the leader level. European countries also played an important role at the recent Washington International Renewable Energy Conference (WIREC), which brought together government officials, civil society and private sector leaders from around the world to advance the development and commercialization of renewable energy And let’s not forget the World Trade Organization (WTO). Last year, U.S. Trade Representative Susan C. Schwab announced that the United States and the European Union had submitted a proposal—in the WTO— to increase global trade in environmental goods and services. This initiative places priority on technologies that are directly linked to addressing climate change and energy security. The U.S. and EU also proposed to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental technologies and services in the Doha Round. In addition, the U.S. is forming several other international partnerships to pursue clean and renewable energy, such as the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP). The APP, which includes Australia, Canada, China, Japan, Korea and India, has endorsed more than 25 new renewable energy projects. There are also other international partnerships and initiatives, including working with Sweden to advance biofuel and clean vehicle technologies, and working with the private sector and the United Kingdom's Wave Hub to harness the power of the ocean. And of course we have the agreement reached under the Montreal Protocol to speed the phase-out of hydro chlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) that deplete the ozone layer. If you leave today with only one message from my remarks, I hope it is the message that the United States is actively engaged and working with other countries in a multilateral way to find solutions to these energy issues that the whole world is facing.

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U.S.-EU Climate Cooperation Now The EU and US are working to stop climate change Graffy, 6/8 (Foundationhttp://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/104981.htm Colleen P. Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Remarks at the Heritage)

Another example is USAID’s Global Climate Change Program, which has been working in more than 40 countries in Europe and Eurasia and has dedicated over a billion U.S. dollars to fund environmental programs that have reduced greenhouse gas emissions while promoting energy reforms. They are helping developing and transition countries achieve economic development without sacrificing environmental protection. To give you one example: A recent USAID forest conservation project helped our ambassador in Bulgaria bring together American and Bulgarian volunteers to plant more than 500 trees to help replace those burned in forest fires in 2007. I’ve captured a small sampling of our green diplomacy in this Green Newsletter which will be available on our website. So, when I am posed the question: “Does America have friends in Europe with regard to trade and climate change?” I would say not only does the U.S. have friends, the U.S. also has partners. Let’s remember that the transatlantic market today makes up nearly 55 percent of global GDP and about 40 percent of world trade. So there is a strong incentive to work together as friends and partners. Both the United States and Europe believe in strong and effective regulation to protect our citizens and the environment. However, in some cases, unnecessary differences in our regulatory approaches have made our companies less competitive, raised consumer costs, reduced consumer choice and slowed job creation. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and BusinessEurope believe that if we could align our economies better, we could generate $10 billion in saved costs and potential growth for the transatlantic economy. And so, working together, we are trying to do exactly that, by creating the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), which met for the second time today in Brussels. The TEC was created in April 2007, under the Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration, and was signed by President Bush, Chancellor Merkel and European Commission President Barroso during the U.S.EU Summit in Washington, DC. The goal of the TEC is to promote regulatory cooperation, eliminate barriers to transatlantic trade, advance capital market liberalization, and strengthen support for open investment regimes. In short, it is trying to reduce barriers to trade and investment. In the area of the environment, the Transatlantic Economic Council is recommending that the June 2008 U.S.-EU Summit consider joint efforts in clean energy technologies that will help us address our shared concerns about energy security and climate change.

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European Union Leadership DA 1NC ( ) The EU utilizes the lack of U.S. action on climate change to bolster its international leadership – but the plan would decisively undermine EU leadership internationally Jon Hovi, Professor of Political Science, University of Oslo, and Senior Researcher at CICERO, et al., 2003, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 18-20 In line with hypothesis 1, the US exit seemed to mean the end of the Protocol. What was the point in continuing the process when the largest emitter—and the most influential player—was out of the picture? This may have been exactly what the US had in mind. However, in the EU the Kyoto Protocol was not seen only through economic and environmental lenses.

The political lenses were of equal, if not higher significance. When the US announced that the Kyoto Protocol was fatally flawed in March 2001, the other main parties essentially had two choices: (i) to move on with Kyoto and possibly try to get the US back on board, or (ii) to start all over and negotiate a new international climate treaty. Most countries wanted to try to convince the US to rejoin. This was also the official view presented by the EU, but this "cooperative window of opportunity" proved to be closed. The option of starting negotiations on an alternative regime with the US gained some ground in academic circles, especially in the US, 77 but in Europe this never emerged as a real policy alternative. 78 Here the Kyoto Protocol was the"only game in town"—irrespective of US participation. It was the result of 12 years of intense international diplomacy. Although it was hardly more than a "baby-step" towards solving the problem, it was nevertheless a start. Potential alternatives were regarded as even more uncertain, as well as more time consuming.

When the attempt to bring the US back failed, the EU invested a lot of political energy to mobilize sufficient support for the Protocol among other Annex I parties to enable the Protocol to enter into force even without the US. The crucial challenge in this regard was to persuade the reluctant "Gang of Four"— Australia, Canada, Japan and Russia, all previous allies of the US in the climate negotiations—to ratify the agreement. The EU embarked upon a two-pronged strategy. Internally, it set a "good" example by heading for swift ratification. Externally, it sought to persuade the reluctant "Gang of Four" to ratify the Protocol. While the EU's internal strategy was highly successful, the external strategy was only moderately so. True, Canada has ratified the agreement despite significant domestic opposition, e.g., from the powerful fossil fuel lobby. 79 After much hesitation, Japan has also [End Page 18] ratified the Protocol. But Russia's ratification is still uncertain. At best, the agreement will be presented for ratification by the Duma late in 2003. And Australia will not ratify. Clearly, the EU has had more of a leadership role after the US exit than before, particularly in the mobilization of continued support for the Kyoto agreement. On the other hand, the EU's mobilization of support essentially amounted to giving in to the requirements of the "Gang of Four." Both at the resumed COP 6 in Bonn, and at the COP 7 in Marrakesh, considerable concessions by the EU were required to reach agreement. Thus, while the result of the resumed COP 6 was a "Kyoto-light" agreement, this result turned into a "Kyoto ultra-light" after the Marrakesh meeting. 80 Curiously, the EU now gave concessions on issues where it had previously refused to concede to US demands. Thus, the revised Kyoto Protocol came very close to what the previous US administration had actively worked to achieve.

Would the "Gang of Four" have reacted differently in the absence of EU influence? Needless to say, this counterfactual question cannot be easily answered. However, it seems fair to conclude that had it not been for the EU, the Kyoto Protocol might have been dead. Japan and Canada would most likely not have ratified without pressure from the EU. Still, Russia remains the key to success—or failure—of the EU's efforts to save Kyoto. The EU has assisted Russia to make it eligible for emissions trading under the Protocol. There are, however, remaining problems. Russia's most important incentive to ratify is the opportunity to sell "hot air." But the potential for making good money here is presently bleak. First, the largest potential buyer, the US, is out of the market. Second, the EU has been strongly opposed to buying "hot air." This implies that there is no strong economic incentive for Russia to enter the agreement. Nevertheless, the desire to gain political goodwill might tip the balance in favor of Russian

ratification. 81 In sum, the US exit seems to have represented an opportunity for the EU to realize its leadership ambition. It was important that the EU took the lead. Otherwise, the fate of the Protocol would have been far more uncertain. At the same time, it is important to note that the EU's indulgence in accommodating the requirements of the "Gang of Four" suggests that it was political benefits associated with leadership, rather than a sense of responsibility for the global environment, that was the major driving force for this course of action.

However, major stumbling blocks remain. One potential stumbling block is Russian ratification. But even if Russia does ratify, and the Protocol enters into force, events at the COP 8 in New Delhi in 2002 may be interpreted as strategic moves to sidetrack Kyoto. In particular, the potential alliance between the US and developing countries may be seen in this light. 82 If an alternative approach [End Page 19] centered around the US, China, India, Australia and others is attempted, it will represent a serious challenge to the EU, now the major proponent of Kyoto's targets and time-tables approach.

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European Union Leadership DA 1NC ( ) Strong climate leadership is key to overall EU leadership, which solves many scenarios for global extinction Parliament of Ireland 2 (Joint Committee on European Affairs, February 4, 2002, http://www.irlgov.ie/committees-02/c-europeanaffairs/future/page1.htm) As the Laeken Declaration put it, "Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation" adding that Europe must exercise its power in order "to set globalisation within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development". 2.6 Only a strong European Union is big enough to create a space, and a stable set of rules, within which all Europeans can live securely, move freely, and provide for themselves, for their families and for their old age. Individual states are too small to do that on their own. Only a strong European Union is big enough to deal with the globalised human diseases, such as AIDS and tuberculosis. Only a strong European Union is big enough to deal with globalised criminal conspiracies, like the Mafia, that threaten the security of all Europeans. Only a strong European Union is big enough to deal with globalised environmental threats, such as global warming, which threaten our continent and generations of its future inhabitants. Only a strong European Union is big enough to deal with globalised economic forces, which could spread recession from one country to another and destroy millions of jobs. Only a strong European Union is big enough to regulate, in the interests of society as a whole, the activities of profit seeking private corporations, some of which now have more spending power than many individual states. 2.7 These tasks are too large for individual states. 2.8 Only by coming together in the European Union can we ensure that humanity, and the values which make us, as individuals, truly human, prevail over blind global forces that will otherwise overwhelm us.

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Yes EU Environmental Leadership EU leadership on the environment high EC`8 (European Commisson, European Forum, Young global leaders are key to tackling climate change" says Stavros Dimas, July 18, 2008, http://www.egovmonitor.com/node/20047)

It is largely thanks to Europe's leadership that negotiations on such an agreement are now well under way. At the Bali conference last December, the EU succeeded in convincing other Parties not only to start these negotiations and to agree to an ambitious roadmap to guide them, but also to conclude them at the end of 2009 in Copenhagen. The importance of this process cannot be overstated if we are to avoid a crippling environmental and economic burden on future generations. Developed nations should lead by example. The European Council of March 2007 set out the European Union's leadership vision clearly for the world to see. The EU committed to two new targets for reducing EU emissions from 1990 levels by 2020. The first is a cut of 30% that is conditional on other developed countries committing to comparable efforts under the future global agreement. The second is a reduction of at least 20%, independently of what other countries do.

Climate change leadership high-Climate targets EC`8 (European Commisson, European Forum, Young global leaders are key to tackling climate change" says Stavros Dimas, July 18, 2008, http://www.egovmonitor.com/node/20047)

Once agreed upon by Council and the European Parliament, which I hope will happen by early next year, the climate and energy package will reaffirm EU leadership in view of the UN negotiations. By implementing the most ambitious set of climate and energy targets anywhere in the industrialised world, the EU is demonstrating to our partners that making the deep emissions cuts necessary to avert dangerous climate change is fully compatible with continued economic growth and prosperity. This is a vital message if we are to succeed in rallying all countries behind a global agreement. The climate and energy package will create conditions for increased innovation and investment in cleaner technologies. This opens up great opportunities for entrepreneurs to gain a "first mover advantage" in developing and marketing the solutions that will be in increasing demand in an ever more carbon constrained world. The environmental sector contributes over 2% of the EU's GDP and this figure is bound to increase. And as I have already mentioned, implementing the measures in our package is essential for safeguarding sustainable economic growth and improve energy security. It is estimated that the package will reduce the EU's energy imports by 50 billion Euros per year by 2020. These estimates were made at a time when oil prices were expected to be 61 dollar per barrel, the benefits are likely to be much lower still if today's prices around 140 dollars are maintained.

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Yes EU Environmental Leadership EU Leadership High Now Especially In Environmental Performance Seventh Space 8 (“Action plan for sustainable action, consumption, and industry”, July 16, 2008, http://7thspace.com/headlines/286935/action_plan_for_sustainable_consumption_production_and_industry.html) Our current patterns of consumption and production have significant environmental impacts, including greenhouse gases, pollution and the depletion of natural resources. Much can be done to make the way we consume and produce in Europe more sustainable, without additional costs for companies and households, and can bring benefits. The European Commission therefore today proposed a package of actions and proposals to improve the environmental performance of products and stimulating the demand for more sustainable goods and production technologies. EU industry will be encouraged to take up new opportunities and innovate in order to ensure its continued leadership in environmental performance. The Action plan also explores means for promoting sustainable production and consumption internationally.

EU Is Taking A Leadership Role To Reduce Aviation Emissions International Herald Tribune 8 (“EU parliament votes to include airlines in emissions trading, despite U.S. concern”, The Associated Press, July 8, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/07/08/europe/EU-EU-AirlinesCarbon-Trading.php) U.S. officials say the EU will likely break international aviation rules if it insists on including non-European airlines in the program — even though the EU says it is certain its system would be legal. The EU wants to use the new rules as a base to reach a broad international agreement to reduce emissions from aviation. "We are taking a leadership role and we are making it clear that we are open to dialogue with our partners with a common goal of getting an international agreement," said EU Environment Commissioner Stavros Dimas.

EU Is Taking The Lead Role On Greenhouse Gas Pollution Daily Dispatch Online 8 (“East-West Rift At EU Carbon Gases Meeting”, July 7, 2008, http://www.dispatch.co.za/article.aspx?id=221330) Europe has taken the lead role in curbing greenhouse-gas pollution that stokes climate change. It championed the United Nations’ Kyoto Protocol after that pact was nearly destroyed by a United States walkout in 2001 and last year promised to deepen its 2020 cuts to 30 percent if other rich economies followed suit. British Environment Secretary Hilary Benn stressed the EU plan to incorporate “tangible” mechanisms enabling the 20 percent cut to be deepened to 30 percent. “The single most important thing Europe has got to do is to show leadership, by the package we’ve got before us, and not just with the 20 percent commitment, but the very clear commitment to do three percent within an international deal,” Benn said.

EU Is The Climate Hegemon John Vogler, Professor in the School of Politics, International Relations & Philosophy at Keele University, and Charlotte Bretherton, Senior Lecturer in International Politics/European Studies at Liverpool John Moores University, March 2004, “The European Union as a Protagonist to the US on Climate Change,” online: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/4/4/2/p74423_index.html Over the past decade, its increasingly robust performance in climate change negotiations has prompted claims of a leadership role for the EU in global climate politics. After Bonn and Marrakech, and with the Union's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and development of its own scheme for emissions trading, there has even been the suggestion that the EU could now act as international climate hegemon (Legge and Egenhofer, 2001).

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Yes EU Leadership – General EU Soft Power Now The UN Dispatch 8 (“The Mediterranean Union”, July 15, 2008, http://www.undispatch.com/archives/2008/07/the_mediterrane.php) The ability of Europeans to use soft power through practically-based international unions to slowly end conflict and spread democracy is exemplified by the success of the European Union, and I hope that this new Mediterranean Union will create the same turn-around in Middle Eastern diplomacy that the European Coal and Steel Community (which later became the EU, of course) created for European diplomacy.

EU Soft Power Is Real Europa 8 (“Benita Ferrero-Waldner European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood PolicyAt what point will global warming force lifestyle changes and what will those changes be?”, July 1, 2008, http://www.edubourse.com/finance/actualites.php?actu=43054) This brings me onto my next point – External Action. Climate Change is of course a global phenomenon and therefore requires global action. As I have said, our international influence depends on the credibility of our internal agenda. The environmental standards we are setting will set the standard both for imports and exports driving more environmental production in other parts of the world. Europe’s “soft power” is real. Just look at the way in which the Mercosur countries have emulated the EU in creating the possibility for free movement of citizens between countries in the block.

EU Leadership Is High And Sustainable Reuters 8 (“Poland Tells France Won’t Be Obstacle To EU Treaty”, July 4, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKL0447720820080704) Kaczynski said earlier this week it would be "pointless" to sign the Lisbon treaty after it was rejected by Irish voters in a referendum on June 12 and that Warsaw would not ratify it unless Ireland managed to overcome its voters' opposition to it. The treaty, which needs the backing of all 27 member states to come into force, aims to give the EU a stronger leadership, a more effective foreign policy and a fairer decision-making system. It would create a powerful new foreign policy chief and a president of the European Council, its highest political body.

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Yes Perception of US Lagging Behind EU ( ) The U.S. is perceived as lagging far behind the EU on environmental issues John Vogler, Professor in the School of Politics, International Relations & Philosophy at Keele University, and Charlotte Bretherton, Senior Lecturer in International Politics/European Studies at Liverpool John Moores University, March 2004, “The European Union as a Protagonist to the US on Climate Change,” online: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/4/4/2/p74423_index.html The ending of the Cold War had enormous overall significance for the development of the EU’s external roles. Routine objections from the Soviet Union to EC participation came to an end and new relationships were forged with countries in Asia and Latin America, so that the potential influence of the Union is now truly global. The EU has also benefited in terms of opportunity, from the way in which some very high-profile environmental negotiations on stratospheric ozone, climate and the Rio process coincided with the ending of the Cold War. During the negotiations for the 1987 Montreal Protocol the chief US negotiator could make out a credible (but disputed) case for American leadership (and that the whole agreement had been delayed by the inability of the EC to resolve its internal difficulties) (Benedick 1991). Whatever the merits of Benedick’s case at the time, during the past decade, as climate change has come to the fore, the idea of US environmental leadership has, to put it politely, ceased to be credible. As one Commission official referring to a range of environmental negotiations put it, ’the US has raised sitting on its hands to the status of an art form’ (Interview DGXI Brussels 6 June 1996). US obstructionism and disengagement across a range of negotiations left the EU with a leadership opportunity that it was, in the view of Commission officials uniquely qualified to seize: The US is a strong political actor whereas the EU is a slow moving but weighty ship. The Community position has more weight in the long term. The US often cannot define a credible negotiating platform - they cannot think of all the ramifications, on North -South issues for example as the Community can. In climate, forests and biodiversity the EU is the only leader while the US is absent, blocking or destructive (Interview DGXI Brussels 4 June 1996).

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EU Leadership Brinks EU Leadership In a Delicate Phase AGI 8 (Agenzia News Online, “EU: Marcegaglia, Need Leadership Which Talks About Real Issues”, June 23, 2008, http://www.agi.it/business/news/200806231436-eco-ren0040-art.html) President of Confindustria Emma Marcegaglia identified the lack of a real leadership as the basis of the problems of a common European vision: in the EU, said Marcegaglia to the 2008 Assolombarda Assembly, "we are in a delicate phase, with a deficit in popularity which needs to be tackled seriously"; the 'no' vote from Ireland to the EU treaty "is a symptom of the uneasiness that exists in Europe. We need to find a leadership" was the suggestion of the President of Confindustria "which will make Europe go back to talking to its own citizens about real issues: immigration, the high cost of living." Marcegaglia, reminding the assembly that Europe "is our point of reference" said that "heads of Government must no longer offload unpopular decisions on Europe, but should leave some sovereignty and arrive at a different Europe which no longer talks about vetoes but about the well-being of its people and their own achievements."

EU Climate Policy Leadership Is Fragile Hovi, Skodvin, and Andresen 4 (Jon, Tora, and Steinar, Professor University of Oslo, Senior Research Fellow at CICERO, Senior Research Fellow at Fridtjof Nansen, “The Persistence of the Kyoto Protocol: Why Other Annex I Countries Move On Without the United States”, Global Environmental Politics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2004, pg 12) The development of an EU climate policy has taken place over a relatively long time period, it is the result of a complex internal negotiation process, and the process has, at least in periods, been characterized by a relatively high level of conflict. Thus, the climate position the EU has today has been hard fought and rests on a delicate balancing of diverging interests. Are there mechanisms at work in this process that may have generated an institutional dynamic that in turn has served to limit the EU’s climate policy options when the US withdrew from the Kyoto agreement?

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U.S. Climate Action Undermines EU Leadership ( ) U.S. inaction on climate change creates a critical void that’s key to the EU’s leadership – the plan shuts the window Jon Hovi, Professor of Political Science, University of Oslo, and Senior Researcher at CICERO, et al., 2003, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 15-16 On the other hand, the EU has, since the beginning of the climate process, attempted to play a lead role in the drive for international regulatory policies to reduce GHG emissions. In this section, we explore the hypothesis that the US exit in 2001 represented a "window of opportunity" for the EU to succeed in this ambition. 4.1. EU leadership in a Strategic Policy Perspective When the climate issue surfaced internationally towards the late 1980s, it represented a very suitable candidate for EU leadership. Other key actors, most notably the US and Japan, were either outright negative (US) or not very enthusiastic (Japan). The EU's ambition was to use this opportunity and fill the existing leadership vacuum. The climate issue was seen by the EU not only as a serious environmental problem, but was also perceived in a strategic policy perspective, as a means to project itself as a united leader on the international political scene. Thus, EU climate policy not only represented a strategy to confront the climate problem. It can also be understood as a strategy directed towards the development and reinforcement of an EU "foreign policy." The efforts to develop a coherent EU (then EC) strategy towards climate change took place during a period when the EU underwent major political and institutional changes with the development towards European integration and the 1992 Single European Market. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty implied a shift in sovereignty away from separate member states in several issue areas including environmental policy. For instance, the Treaty implies a fundamental change towards majority voting on EU environmental policy decisions. This process generated some internal turbulence and controversy especially after the Danish referendum voted against the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. National resistance against increased monetary and political integration was to some extent directed towards the development of environmental policy in the sense that some countries, for instance the UK, targeted this issue area as a particular candidate for repatriation. 64 However, despite the controversies generated by the integration process, there has been a significant momentum within the EU towards concerted foreign policy-making. As pointed out by Wynne "the EC member states share a common interest in creating a sufficiently united identity to be recognized as a global power in foreign policy, security and trade agreements in the new, post cold war world order." 65 The internal [End Page 15] dimension of this ambition should be noted, however: "in order to fulfill ambitions as a credible global actor, the EC needs to secure greater internal institutional and political cohesion." 66 In the beginning of the 1990s, therefore, the EU needed an international issue both to make its mark as a united and strong global actor as well as to reinforce its (internal) institutional and political cohesion. The climate change negotiations offered an opportunity for the emerging European Union to establish such a position: "the international concern over climate change provided an opportunity for the EC to develop its own institutional presence in international environmental matters, [and] hence foreign policy more generally."

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U.S. Climate Action Undermines EU Leadership ( ) U.S. action on climate undermines EU leadership John Vogler, Professor in the School of Politics, International Relations & Philosophy at Keele University, and Charlotte Bretherton, Senior Lecturer in International Politics/European Studies at Liverpool John Moores University, March 2004, “The European Union as a Protagonist to the US on Climate Change,” online: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/4/4/2/p74423_index.html It is possible, however, that the period between the end of the Cold War and the attacks of 9/11 2001 was singularly propitious for EU actorness. Despite demands that the EU should assert or increase its influence on the world stage, and in particular should strive for an identity and roles which sharply distinguish its stance from that of the USA, the contemporary period is undoubtedly dominated by the US-led ‘war on terror’. It has been characterised by significant disregard for international law and the authority of the United Nations, by sustained efforts by the US government to undermine the newly established International Criminal Court3 and by widespread contravention of civil and human rights norms on the part of the USA and its allies. To the extent that ‘security threats’ dominate the agenda of international politics, the EU may encounter a diminution in opportunity to develop a distinctive posture – and, more specifically, to maintain a leadership role in climate change diplomacy. Here it is interesting to note that US observers at COP 8 (in New Delhi, 2002) attempted systematically to undermine EU leadership (and the emerging principles of the climate change regime) by supporting developing countries in fending off the EU’s ‘unreasonable demands’ for broader participation in post-2012 emissions reduction targets (Ott 2002:3). This represented, of course, a complete reversal of the former US position on developing country participation.

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Climate Key to Overall EU Leadership – Spillover ( ) Strength on climate spills over to bolster EU leadership in other areas – and US action on climate undermines EU leadership Jon Hovi, Professor of Political Science, University of Oslo, and Senior Researcher at CICERO, et al., 2003, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 20-21 Finally, we found some support for the assumption that the persistence of Kyoto can be explained by the ambition of the EU to stand forth as an international leader in climate politics. This ambition was rooted not only in a concern for the environment. It was also as a means to unify and strengthen EU foreign policy more generally. While the EU was not very successful prior to the US exit, this window of opportunity was quite effectively utilized, although at the expense of the environmental integrity of the Protocol. Needless to say, there are a host of factors not explored here that may also help explain the persistence of the Kyoto Protocol. Notably, the perspective adopted in this article has been rooted in the "logic of consequences" rather than the "logic of appropriateness." 83 In other words, we have focused on explanations based on the assumption that Annex I parties' choice of climate policy is determined by a concern for the consequences of these policies. We have not considered, say, the possibility that decision-makers are primarily motivated by a desire to "do the right thing." Obviously, including this and yet other explanations in addition to the ones discussed above might have enabled us to present a more complete picture. However, doing so would have required more space than available here. [End Page 20] Are there any more general lessons to be learned from this case? A first observation is that economic costs and benefits do not always determine action in international negotiations. Internal political strategy and institutional dynamics matter as well. Second, economic and environmental concerns are not necessarily the only or the most important driving forces, even in climate negotiations. Finally, it is important to recognize that the present climate agreement at best covers some 1/3 of global emissions. The Kyoto Protocol may be a considerable political achievement, but its environmental impact is slim. A more effective regime is likely to require the creativity of the US as well as the ambitiousness of the EU.

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EU Leadership Good – Laundry List EU Soft Power Is a Precondition To Solve Climate Change, Proliferation of WMD’s, Economic Tension, International Terrorism, Energy Security, and Poverty Hellenic Foundation For European And Foreign Policy 7 (“The European Union’s Soft Power: A Force For Change”, Regeringskansliet, October 24, 2007, http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/7417/a/90906) If we look at the big issues confronting our world in the years ahead - climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, economic growth through trade and reforms, international terrorism, energy security, building bridges between civilisations, trying to lift the bottom billion of our world out of despair - it is very difficult to see them being moved towards some sort of solution without more active engagement on the part of the European Union. I would say that an active role for the European Union is a precondition for moving all of these issues in the direction we all seek - although it is obviously not enough. We must reinforce our cooperation across the Atlantic with the United States - our traditional and firm partner - but we must also intensify our efforts at building truly strategic relationships with the rising and responsible powers of - to name just a few - India, China and Brazil. With the Reform Treaty now agreed, we are creating new possibilities for our Europe to live up to its responsibilities as well as its opportunities in these important areas.

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AT: EU Leadership Kills U.S. Heg EU credibility key to heg-The credibility’s of both are intertwined Ischinger`4 (German Ambassador to the United States in Washington DC. This article, which represents the author's personal view, is an expanded version of a speech delivered at an Aspen Institute conference on Transatlantic Relations in Lyon, France, "Transatlantic Power, Legitimacy, and Credibility" - Speech given by Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger at the Aspen Conference in Lyon on 30 January, 2004 http://www.germany.info/relaunch/politics/speeches/013004.html)

The European Union also suffered. Europe was divided in 2003, regardless of how large a popular majority existed in Europe - "old" and "new" - against the war in Iraq. It will not be easy for the EU to regain influence and credibility as a foreign policy actor any time soon. Creating the office of a European foreign minister and vesting it with the necessary powers seems to be a necessary, albeit insufficient, step if Europe wants to be taken seriously as a political player in Washington. In what was probably one of the most negative results of 2003 in terms of the transatlantic relationship, mistrust of European intentions and of the EU as such has become rampant in Washington. European governments that opposed the Iraq war believe that, on most of the "war issues," they were right and the US was wrong--in saying, for example, that there was no imminent threat of weapons of mass destruction and that creating post-intervention stability in Iraq would be difficult and costly and would require a long-term US commitment. The fact that these Europeans were right, however, has not been of much help in restoring US trust in Europe, and in the European Union. It is to the credit of these European governments that they have generally resisted the temptation to say I-told-you-so. It is even more to their credit that they have instead begun to offer assistance in the rehabilitation of Iraq, recognizing that restoring stability and supporting modernization in the region is a key European interest in the current situation. Credibility As the EU's credibility has suffered, so has the credibility of the United States as a "benign hegemon"--and not just because weapons of mass destruction have not been found in Iraq. Polls by the highly respected Pew Research Center reveal a rather dramatic drop in US standing, and by no means in Europe alone. Can Washington be trusted? Specifically, can it be trusted to lead with reasonable regard for the interests of allies and partners? Does Washington respect its obligations under international law, or is it defining itself as above the UN Charter? The transatlantic partnership is about more than just relationships between nation-states and international organizations. It is about the very principles of the international order, and about the evolution of this order. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer asked the key question: "What kind of world order do we want?" Essentially, the centuries-old fiction of the sovereignty and equality of nations under international law is being challenged today. If international law protects the state even when that state is ruled by a barbaric dictator, then international law itself must be changed so that dictators are no longer protected; this is a popularly held view in the US and is shared by some in Europe. Americans also question the legitimacy of the Security Council, including the "power monopoly" Europeans claim the Security Council has. It cannot be right, these critics argue, that a body that includes dubious dictatorships should vote on, and decide, the course of the world. And they ask how many times the Security Council has actually mandated military operations in the last 50 years. Rarely, is the answer--not even in the 1999 intervention in Kosovo that NATO, including the Europeans, supported. Indeed, to the dismay of many Europeans, some in Washington appear to have concluded that it is power, and not the UN Security Council, that legitimizes.

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AT: Hard Power Pre-Requisite to Leadership The EU will soon develop the military power their evidence assumes Harding`3 (Gareth, United Press International EU specialist, Analysis: EU talks tough, goes global, June 17, 2003 Tuesday, Lexis)

The stark facts are that EU members -- with their 375 million inhabitants and a combined gross domestic product of nearly $10 trillion -- spend only $150 billion a year on defense, while the United States, with 280 million citizens and a GDP of nearly $7 trillion, is set to fork over $380 billion on defense in 2003. Steven Everts, an analyst at the London-based Center for European Reform, believes "Europe will acquire the tools of hard power and the will to deal with tough security problems, but don't expect it to become the sort of behemoth the United States is." Curiously, given his gloomy assessment of the EU's current state, Robertson is more upbeat about the bloc's long-term prospects. "By 2015 the EU will have moved beyond the economic powerhouse it already is. By the middle of the next decade, the Union will also be a political force to be reckoned with." If the last few months of hyperactivity are anything to go by, the "flabby giant" is at last shedding its puppy fat and learning how to flex its biceps.

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AT: NMD Turn – Non-Unique NMD not coming-Poland won’t cooperate Dempsey & Bilefsky`8 (Judy Dempsey and Dan Bilefsky, New York Times, U.S. and Czechs Sign Accord on Missile Shield, July 9, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/09/world/europe/09shield.html?em&ex=1215748800&en=f870cb9afdaab674&ei=5087%0A)

Ms. Rice is on a European tour that includes Bulgaria and Georgia, but not Poland. The United States hopes to base 10 interceptor missiles there, but the governments in Warsaw and Washington have so far failed to reach agreement on the terms. Unlike the Czech Republic’s government, the Polish centerright government led by Donald Tusk has taken a tough negotiating stance. In return for hosting the interceptors, Poland has asked the United States to modernize Polish air defenses so that the country can defend itself against incoming short-range and medium-range missiles.

Even if Czech leadership want NMD the rest of the country says no Dempsey & Bilefsky`8 (Judy Dempsey and Dan Bilefsky, New York Times, U.S. and Czechs Sign Accord on Missile Shield, July 9, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/09/world/europe/09shield.html?em&ex=1215748800&en=f870cb9afdaab674&ei=5087%0A)

The accord with the Czech Republic is not without its problems. The deal signed on Tuesday does not ensure that the radar system will be built immediately or that the next American administration will stick to the project. Negotiations are still taking place on a second treaty, to deal with the legal status of American troops to be deployed at the planned radar base. Both treaties require ratification by Czech legislators, many of whom are skeptical about the project, while the public is largely opposed. Mr. Topolanek’s coalition government does not have enough seats to assure support for the plans and may need opposition votes. Legislators from the Green Party, the government’s junior coalition partner, have indicated they may block the proposals, and opposition parties have demanded a national referendum. About two-thirds of Czechs oppose the radar deployment, according to opinion polls. “Ratification will be difficult,” said Jiri Schneider, program director at the Prague Security Studies Institute. “The missile defense plan has sparked a national debate about how exposed we want to be on the international stage.” Czech political analysts said that, for the older generation, the missile defense plans had tapped into a deep suspicion of security alliances that stretched back across the past century.

The Czechs are the first step-So far they’re saying no Kuchtova`8 (Dana Kuchtova is the 1st Vice-Chair of the Czech Green party and former Minister of Education, Czechs to U.S. Missile Defense: Keep Out, July 8, 2008, http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/needtoknow/2008/07/czechs_to_us_missile_defense_k.html)

Secratary of State Condoleeza Rice is in Prague today to ink the U.S. Missile Shield Treaty, but the question remains, who invited her? The U.S. National Missile Defense project is a complex, farreaching system involving the production of new weapons and the installation of U.S. military bases around the world. In Europe, the first step is the installation of an advanced radar facility in the Czech Republic, as well as a base for interceptor missiles in neighboring Poland. But Czechs want no part of it. Polls have consistently confirmed that 70 % of the Czech population are against building even “defensive” radar installations on their soil (the Polish numbers are not much different). And thus far all attempts to allow referenda have been blocked. This disregard for the will of the people could lead to a breakdown of the governement’s tenuous coalition. Despite that, Czech and U.S. leaders are continuing their negotiations, which will reach their formal climax today when the Secratary of State signs the treaty. And while the American public may have accepted the idea of immediate threats and continuing danger, the situation in Eastern Europe is not so black and white. Korea and Iran, the supposed impetus for the Shield, are at best hypothetical threats to Europe. Clearly there must be other motives.

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AT: NMD Turn The EU needs the U.S.-They won’t reject NMD Valasek`2k (Tomas, Senior Analyst for Weekly Defense Magazine, Europe's NMD Deliberations, June 8, 2000, http://www.cdi.org/weekly/2000/issue23.html)

But for Europe, the choices are less clear. Senior politicians in Germany, Italy, and France did speak out against NMD. But their main criticism is that it will weaken U.S. -- European strategic links by fostering a siege mentality in the United States. Implicitly, the European NATO allies make it clear they want to remain under the United States' protective umbrella. This makes it unlikely that they will wholeheartedly embrace Russian proposals and disregard the possible rift with Washington. Russia's dreams of teaming up with Europe to counterbalance the United States are likely to remain just that. As the war in Chechnya demonstrated, the EU's values and interests lie much closer to those of the United States than to Russia's. Regardless of Russia's overtures, Washington can ill-afford to ignore Europe' s reservations. The EU's outright opposition to U.S. deployment of an NMD system -- a possibility, although not yet a reality, as the EU has not formulated a joint position on NMD -- would put in doubt the future of NATO. But there is another very practical consideration: NMD, especially in its later stages, simply won't work without cooperation from Europe.

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AT: NMD Turn ( ) NMD in Europe means U.S.-Russian nuclear war London Times, June 4, 2007 President Putin has warned the US that its deployment of a new anti-missile network across Eastern Europe would prompt Russia to point its own missiles at European targets and could trigger nuclear war. In an exclusive interview with The Times, the Russian leader says: “It is obvious that if part of the strategic nuclear potential of the US is located in Europe and will be threatening us, we will have to respond. “This system of missile defence on one side and the absence of this system on the other ... increases the possibility of unleashing a nuclear conflict.” Russia has been alarmed at America’s plans to install a network of defences in Eastern Europe to shoot down incoming missiles it fears that Iran might launch. Mr Putin expressed scepticism of this motive, arguing that “There are no such missiles – Iran does not have missiles with the range”. The US was insisting, he said, that the defence system was to be “installed for the protection from something that does not exist. Is it not sort of funny? It would be funny if it were not so sad.” He speculated that the US’s real motive was to provoke Russia’s retaliation and so “to avoid further closeness of Russia and Europe”. Mr Putin’s tough warning comes days before the start of the G8 meeting of the world’s most powerful industrialised economies. His uncompromising stand on America’s missile defence, Kosovo, Iran and climate change was partly blamed for the failure of last month’s summit between Russia and the European Union. Mr Putin had warm words for the “cordial reception” that Tony Blair had given him, and for Gordon Brown, “a high-class specialist”. But he offered little room for compromise on Britain’s request for the extradition of Andrei Lugovoy, the former intelligence officer, wanted on charges of the murder of dissident former agent Alexander Litvinenko by radioactive poisoning in London. “No matter from what angle we look at this problem, it’s all stupid, stupid nonsense”, he said of Britain’s extradition request. “I will not see any single positive component. It’s complete nonsense.” Russian authorities were investigating the case and if enough evidence were found, the case would “certainly be sent to court”, he said. In theory, he added, “there are possible circumstances” in which Russia would comply with the extradition “but it would require an amendment to the Constitution.” But Britain had not provided justification for such a dramatic move, he said. If heads of British law enforcement agencies “did not know that the constitution prohibits the extradition of Russian citizens to foreign states then their competence is questionable” and “they should work for parliament or newspapers” because the request was at heart “only a political public relations step”. He also gave no quarter on the cases of Shell and BP, the British oil giants, who have recently seen the terms of their investments in Russia rewritten because of alleged breaches of their licences. Mr Putin insisted that he wants “cooperation not confrontation”, repeatedly blaming the US for its intransigence. But of all the potential clashes at the G8 meeting, which begins on Wednesday in Germany, it is his warnings on Russian retaliation to the US missile defence plans that are likely to cause the greatest friction. He called on “our American friends to rethink their decision” and warned that ”We cannot be responsible for our reciprocal steps because it is not us who are initiating an arms race in Europe”. He added: “We will need to establish such systems which would be able to penetrate the [US] missile defence systems... What kind of means will be used to hit the targets that our military believe are potential threats – ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles, or some kind of new weapons system – this is a purely technical issue?

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 Scholars

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No EU Leadership EU leadership low Right Side News 8 (“As the earth cools: What does it mean for the energy industry?”, June 18, 2008, http://www.rightsidenews.com/200806181211/energy-and-environment/as-the-earth-cools-what-does-it-mean-forthe-energy-industry.html) The ability of the West to act unilaterally on carbon management is quite limited. The U.S. and Japan will not tell Asia and Africa to choose poverty, disease, hunger and illiteracy over electricity. Europe may but Europe’s hard, soft and moral power are now negligible. Europe has no ability at all to make credible military threats; its soft power compares unfavorably with a wet noodle; its moral authority is imperceptible given that it will miss its own Kyoto targets by a considerable margin.

EU Leadership Is Fragile Going Into The World Trade Organization Talks Business Week 8 (“EU: Trade pact would raise economy”, Business Week, July 17, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D91VMV1O3.htm) Global trade talks present a crucial test for how a new world order can handle future world challenges such as climate change and food supply, the EU's trade chief said Thursday. EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson said next week's World Trade Organization talks in Geneva would test the ability of members to strike a deal at a time of "huge reordering of the global economy and politics." "If collectively we fail this test in Geneva, it will reduce our ability" to tackle future tests to negotiate a pact limiting greenhouse gas emissions or tackle food scarcity, energy security or other world problems, he said. "Rising powers are reshaping the postwar world," he told reporters. "The risk we face is ... the absence of coordinated global action and leadership." The Doha round of trade talks -- under way since 2001 -- "happens to be the first test of global leadership in this new order," he said, describing it as a test of responsibility for fast-growing countries like Brazil, China and India. Mandelson said a deal to create more trade opportunities was even more essential as the world economy slowed, saying the last 15 years of rapid expansion had relied heavily on an earlier WTO agreement that opened up world markets. "Failure will be very costly," he said, calling on developing nations to make concessions. The EU expected strong exporters like Brazil and China "to make the contribution that reflects their growing strength," he said. The EU's top farm official Mariann Fischer Boel said an agreement on farm subsidy cuts needed to be made this month or talks would likely be frozen for the foreseeable future. Expectations are low, however, for negotiations whose framework reflects the world of 2001 without focussing on new problems such as biofuel tariffs and energy supplies. U.S. President George W. Bush, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva have called for a breakthrough. The round has been touted as a key hope for developing countries since its inception in Qatar's capital, Doha, in 2001, shortly after the Sept. 11 terror attacks. Early estimates said a deal could boost global wealth by hundreds of billions of dollars a year, with great gains for poorer countries. But experts now say the most that can be hoped for is a watered-down pact with numerous loopholes. The standoff boils down to a simple scenario: the U.S., EU, Japan and other rich nations would cut tariffs on imports of cheap goods and produce from poorer countries. In exchange, Western manufacturers, banks and service providers would get new openings in emerging markets such as Brazil, China and India. But both sides have balked at the grand trade-off. A binding treaty would have to be ratified by all 152 WTO members.

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No EU Leadership EU Leadership Low- It Has No Game Plan Turkish Weekly 8 (“In Praise of Euro skepticism”, The Journal of Turkish Weekly, July 17, 2008, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=57564) The EU has no coherent strategy on many issues. It has only sketchy economic policies toward Russia; ambitions, but no game plan, to become a player in the Middle East; and, despite its original leadership on the Kyoto Protocol, no successor program on climate change. And the biggest question of all – how to engage with China, India, and other giants of the future – has received virtually no attention from EU-level policymakers. These issues require attention now, and an integral part of the EU’s search for new global strategies should be to invite, rather than avoid, criticism of its activities. If the EU is to lift its gaze from its navel to the horizon, it must reconcile the very different views that exist across Europe of its place in the world and its own best interests. That means engaging with those shades of political opinion that the European Commission and the European Parliament consider “Euroskeptical.”

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U.S. Leadership Doesn’t Trade Off with EU EU/U.S. soft isn’t zero-sum-It can also help Nye`4 (Joseph Nye, Dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard, SOFT POWER 2004, p 82, DRG/E48) Not only can European soft power be used to counter American soft power and raise the price of unilateral actions, but it can also be a source of assistance and reinforcement for American soft power and increase the likelihood of the United States’ achieving its objectives. Soft power can be shared and used in a cooperative fashion. European promotion of democracy and human rights helps advance shared values that are consistent with American objectives. The Islamist extremists of Al Qaeda are fighting against Western values, not just American values, and European public diplomacy that counters their appeal is beneficial to the United States.

Soft power is not zero-sum. Grant 3 [Charles, Center for European Reform, “The Decline of American Power,” CER Bulletin, Issue 29, April/May, http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/29_grant.html] President Bush could do wonders for America's image by adopting a more diplomatic style and by focussing on the Middle East peace process. Tony Blair will need to show his European partners that Britain's support for the US is not unconditional and that it has a European destiny. Jacques Chirac should accept the reality of EU enlargement, learn to make friends in Eastern Europe, and abandon the idea that the rationale of EU foreign policy is to resist the US. The example of the European Union shows that soft power is not a zero-sum game: it has enabled all the member-states to enhance their influence and well-being. A stronger West needs countries with more power hard and soft on both sides of the Atlantic.

European and US interests are not zero-sum. HM Treasury 1 [“Britain, Europe and America - the challenge of globalization,” July 26, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/Newsroom_and_Speeches/Press/2001/press_91_01.cfm] It is in the interests of British business and British jobs not to detach Britain from Europe or from America but instead to build stronger links in both directions. And it is in the interests of Europe to build a longterm relationship with America based not on an assertion of complete independence from one another, but on a frank recognition of our interdependence. For we will succeed in this new century only if we succeed together. This is what some theorists are calling - non-zero - thinking - non-zero-sum solutions in which both sides win.

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Soft Power Not Key to EU Leadership The EU needs hard power to have true influence Landaburu`6 (Eneko Landaburu, European Commission’s Director General for External Relations, EUROPE’S WORLD, Summer 2006, p. http://europesworld.link.be/europesworld/PDFs/Issue3/EW3_1.3_Landaburu_hard_facts_about_Europes_soft_power.pdf)

The EU is therefore a real player on the world stage because of its wide-ranging and comprehensive set of “soft-power” tools. Nevertheless, the EU’s citizens should be aware that they will never get the ability to shape world events that most of them say they want unless they are prepared to pay the extra cost, either in financial terms, or in terms of institutional and political reforms that will give them the kind of hard power enabling the EU to act entirely independent of the US security umbrella.

The EU needs hard power to make it’s soft power effective. Hyde-Price 4 [Adrian, Professor Department of Politics, The EU, “Power and Coercion: From ‘Civilian’ to ‘Civilising’ Power,” October, http://www.arena.uio.no/cidel/WorkshopOsloSecurity/Hyde-Price.pdf] The central theme running throughout the paper is that if the EU is to become an effective and credible international actor able to shape its immediate environment and contribute to global peace and security, it must develop the military capabilities and political will to back up its diplomacy by force when necessary. As experience drawn from the Balkan wars of the 1990s suggests, the EU can only engage in effective ‘milieu shaping’ if it develops credible capabilities for coercive diplomacy and military crisis management. In this sense, it is argued, the EU can only be a ‘civilising power’ if it is also a ‘Centaur’ – half-man and half-beast – willing and able to use force as part of a comprehensive security strategy.

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EU Leadership Resilient ( ) EU leadership is resilient – if they’re displaced by the U.S. they’ll work twice as hard to regain leadership Gerard Baker, Associate Editor of the Financial Times, September 22, 2003, “Against United Europe,” The Weekly Standard It is certainly true that the One Europe vision has suffered a setback. To their serious divisions over Iraq, Europeans have spent much of the summer adding some entertainingly trivial ones. Last month an insanely puerile food fight erupted between Italy and Germany over a speech by Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi to the European parliament. "Mafioso" and "Nazi" insults were traded, and the tussle ended with the German chancellor canceling his plans to take a holiday in Italy. Such enmities run deep, so who can fear a united Europe?

But European political elites have demonstrated time and again that, despite enduring national differences, the European project goes on. Indeed, it is usually at moments when Europe seems to be breaking apart that the largest strides towards unity are taken, often in the face of public opposition. European strategists are animated by the bicycle theory--if you don't keep moving forward, you fall off--and they have no intention of falling off. In 1993, when the European exchange rate mechanism, the system that kept the E.U.'s currencies locked together, collapsed under the weight of economic realities, the idea of a single currency, for which the mechanism was a precursor, looked dead. John Major, the British prime minister, gleefully observed that the euro idea had all the relevance of a "raindance." In just three years came the deluge, and the design for the new euro was unveiled.

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EU Leadership Ineffective The presidency cycle makes EU soft power fails Roth`7(Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, 07 [Jan 12, Financial Times, Asia Edition 1, comment; Pg. 11, “Europe must pull its weight on human rights,” l/n)

Even when a common position is reached, the EU's insistence on working almost exclusively through its "presidency" often undermines its clout. It is difficult to imagine a less effective way to

maintain continuity or build expertise than the EU's rotating blur of six-month leaders, even when bolstered by the incoming president and other EU officials to form a leadership troika. The refusal to assign long-term responsibility on certain issues to the governments best placed to address them is a recipe for dysfunction.

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EU Leadership Bad – Undermines U.S. Hegemony ( ) Strong, assertive EU would undermine U.S. hegemony globally Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to President Carter, Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins, 2004, The Choice: Global Leadership or Global Domination, p. 124-125 America has played so central a role in world affairs during the last sixty years that currently it is almost impossible either for the Europeans or for the Asians to envisage any international arrangement that does not somehow politically involve America as well. For Europe, that reality has been enshrined in NATO, and in the years to come probably also will be cemented through the overlapping responsibilities of NATO and the EU’s own slowly emerging military capabilities. In the Far East. American defense ties with Japan and South Korea, as well as informally with Taiwan, have made these three states’ security inseparable from America’s. Even China itself for decades critical of America’s military presence in Asia, has in recent years moved to a recognition (as a PRC official put it) that “the purposes of China’s policy and that of the United States on maintaining Asian stability are generally identical.”

That condition could be undermined if Europe and Asia were to he swept by a populist anti-American movement that defined itself as Pan-Europearnsm in the west and as Pan-Asianism in the east. Each has its forerunners, though neither has so far succeeded in mobilizing the hearts and minds of most Europeans or Asians. Both are nascent forms of supranationalist regionalism. In Europe, a Pan-European movement surfaced after the calamities of World War I, but it failed to overcome the nationalistic particularisms of the European peoples. During World War II, Hitler tried, especially during his attack on the Soviet Union, to enlist the loyalties of Fascist-minded Frenchmen, Belgians Dutchmen, and Norwegians on behalf of the defense of a common “Europa” against the Bolshevist hordes. The effort met with minimal success. In the Far East, the Japanese militarists promoted the “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere,” exploiting the idea of Pan-Asianism to appeal to the anti-colonial sentiments of the Chinese, Thais, Javanese, Burmese, and Indians. Again the effort foundered, though it did contribute marginally to the rise of anticolonial passions.

One cannot entirely dismiss the possibility—remote as it currently may be—of an anti-American reaction that cloaks itself in European and Asianist garbs. It could happen if Pan-Europeanism and PanAsianism become the rallying cries for those who view America as a common menace. AntiAmericanism would then be deliberately defined in regionally nationalistic terms, and the effort to reduce or even expel the American presence from the western and eastern extremities of Eurasia would serve as a common platform.

( ) European leadership enables the EU to undermine U.S. hegemony Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to President Carter, Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins, 2004, The Choice: Global Leadership or Global Domination, p. 91 A politically powerful Europe, able to compete economically while militarily no longer dependent on the United States, would inevitably contest American preeminence in two regions that are strategically vital to America: the Middle East and Latin America. The rivalry would be felt first in the Middle East, given not only its geographic proximity to Europe, but especially Europe's greater dependence on its oil. Given Arab resentment of U.S. policies, European overtures would find a sympathetic reception ",while Israel would stand to lose the privileged position it has enjoyed as America's favored client state. A European challenge in Latin America 'would likely come next. The Spaniards, Portuguese, and French have long-standing historical and cultural connections with Latin American societies. Latin American nationalism would be quite responsive to intensified political, economic, and cultural ties with an assertive Europe, whim would diminish the traditional U.S. domination of the region. Thus a Europe that became simultaneously an economic giant: and a militarily serious power could confine the scope of U.S. preeminence largely to the Pacific Ocean.

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EU Leadership Bad – Undermines U.S. Hegemony ( ) EU global leadership kills U.S. unipolar dominance Gerard Baker, Associate Editor of the Financial Times, September 22, 2003, “Against United Europe,” The Weekly Standard If this complacency becomes official U.S. policy, it will be folly of the highest order. The events of the last year should have demonstrated the risks for the United States inherent in a united Europe. The new Europe in the making is not the New Europe Donald Rumsfeld hailed in the run-up to the Iraq war--an alliance of Atlanticist nations like Britain, Spain, and the ex-Communist states of Eastern Europe. It is likely to bear a much closer resemblance to the Old Europe of Gaullist stripe, defining itself as a selfappointed counterweight to U.S. power; Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder are likely to be the main drivers of its political direction. CALM DOWN, say Europe's supporters in America. There are many reasons why the United States should not get agitated at events across the Atlantic. For starters, there is the "It will never happen, so why worry?" argument. Whatever the ambitions of the Gaullist superstaters at the heart of Europe, haven't the events of this year revealed that the continent is simply too divided to have a meaningful European foreign policy identity? It is certainly true that the One Europe vision has suffered a setback. To their serious divisions over Iraq, Europeans have spent much of the summer adding some entertainingly trivial ones. Last month an insanely puerile food fight erupted between Italy and Germany over a speech by Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi to the European parliament. "Mafioso" and "Nazi" insults were traded, and the tussle ended with the German chancellor canceling his plans to take a holiday in Italy. Such enmities run deep, so who can fear a united Europe? But European political elites have demonstrated time and again that, despite enduring national differences, the European project goes on. Indeed, it is usually at moments when Europe seems to be breaking apart that the largest strides towards unity are taken, often in the face of public opposition. European strategists are animated by the bicycle theory--if you don't keep moving forward, you fall off--and they have no intention of falling off. In 1993, when the European exchange rate mechanism, the system that kept the E.U.'s currencies locked together, collapsed under the weight of economic realities, the idea of a single currency, for which the mechanism was a precursor, looked dead. John Major, the British prime minister, gleefully observed that the euro idea had all the relevance of a "raindance." In just three years came the deluge, and the design for the new euro was unveiled. There is a powerful dynamic at the heart of the E.U. that tilts the whole process strongly towards closer integration--and towards a particular sort of integration. It is a bargain between Germany, the most federalist country, and France, which supports European union on French terms, together with smaller countries such as Belgium that see an opportunity to punch way above their weight in international affairs if Europe is united. These countries are now eagerly pressing ahead with an embryonic E.U. security policy, formed around a Franco-Belgian-German core. In neither France nor Germany is there any talk of reorienting policy post-Iraq towards Atlantic cooperation. Indeed, they take seriously Jacques Chirac's notion of a new world in which Europe balances the United States. Very well, say the doubters, but surely Iraq showed a new arithmetic at work--one basically favorable to the United States. Whatever the Franco-German dreams, European integration will be good for Americans because, thanks to Tony Blair's Britain, Jose Maria Aznar's Spain, and the entry next year of Eastern European countries, the E.U. is moving in our direction. This is one of the most enduring and dangerous myths about Europe, one sadly fostered by successive British prime ministers, including Blair. If only Britain would put itself at the "heart of Europe," it goes, Britain would lead it. This has never happened. Which is hardly surprising. It is no accident that the countries that have resisted most European moves towards integration have been the least influential. In Europe, as in life, if you pay, you play. The Franco-German axis, together with the deracinated, committed Europeanists who make up the bureaucracy in Brussels, will always win this game. As for the role of the new Eastern European members, optimism about their influence is misplaced. Once inside the E.U., which has powerful economic leverage over small, relatively poor countries, the magnetic pull of Brussels overwhelms all. When in April the United States offered Poland a sector to control in Iraq, the reaction in official Europe was vicious. "One cannot entrust his purse to Europe and his security to America," warned Romano Prodi, the president of the European Commission. All right, say the non-worriers, but so what? Even if a new E.U. takes the Franco-German tilt, does it really matter? Everyone knows, thanks to Robert Kagan's analysis, that Europeans are ideologically committed to weak-kneed multilateralism, that they are not really interested in exercising power. What possible effect could a United Europe have on America's ability to execute its intentions? As one conservative puts it, "Why get upset about 10,000 Vanessa Redgraves marching through Paris?" This "Europe as soft multilateralists" argument is only half right. The E.U.'s increasingly urgent efforts to turn itself

into a single state expose a fundamental deception in the European project. The Europeans are not multilateralists at home. On the contrary, they want to turn Europe from an intergovernmental institution into a single nation--with real power. It's true that even the French have no grand design to take on the United States in some new superpower struggle. But this misses the point. The kind of multilateralism they do believe in is the one that uses institutions to hold American power in check. Think of the E.U. not as a Superpower but as a kind of Sniperpower, constantly picking off parts of U.S. foreign policy objectives around the world. It made life difficult enough over the Iraq war; it could make life in post-Saddam Iraq much harder for the United States. It could cause plenty of mischief in all corners of the globe. Imagine a united Europe aggressively pursuing a single line against the United States in the councils of NATO. Or throwing its sizable economic weight around in Latin America or Africa.

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EU Leadership Bad – Undermines U.S. Hegemony EU leadership hurts hegemony Harding`3 (Gareth, United Press International EU specialist, Analysis: EU talks tough, goes global, June 17, 2003 Tuesday, Lexis)

But in recent months, the 15-member bloc appears to have got tired of taunts about its weakness and started taking the diplomatic equivalent of steroids. The result is a far more aggressive foreign policy that threatens to challenge the U.S. global hegemony. A year ago, the idea of the EU sending peacekeepers to the Congo without NATO back-up would have been unthinkable. Today, there are close to 1,400 European troops stationed in the northeastern region of the war-torn African state in an attempt to stop bloodletting between rival tribes. In addition, the EU has taken over policing operations in Bosnia and peacekeeping duties in Macedonia and next year plans to replace NATO as the leading peacekeeping force in the Balkans. "We are trying to move from a foreign policy of communiques and declarations ? full of strong nouns and weak verbs ? to something more substantive, more muscular, more focused, that can have more impact," said EU foreign policy commissioner Chris Patten recently. Monday's meeting of EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg underlined the bloc's beefier approach to world affairs. Ministers slapped tougher travel bans on members of the military junta in Myanmar, the former Burma, told Cuba to release all its political prisoners ? earlier this month it imposed mild sanctions on the communist regime for the first time ? and warned Iran to immediately sign an international nuclear protocol or risk seeing trade talks suspended. But it was the statement on weapons of mass destruction that raised the most eyebrows. In a move that brings the EU closer into line with the U.S. position on WMD, the bloc said it was ultimately prepared to use force to make sure rogue regimes did not get their hands on lethal weapons. Contrasting the ease with which the policy on WMD was agreed with the torturous discussions about Iraq earlier in the year, the Financial Times newspaper noted: "It took 45 minutes on Monday for European Union foreign ministers to wrap up a debate that six months ago would have torn them asunder." At the Luxembourg meet, EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana presented ministers with a "European Security Strategy," setting out the new threats the EU faces and the instruments it needs to tackle them. "We are a European Union of 25 members with 450 million people, producing one quarter of the world's gross domestic product," Solana told reporters. "We cannot close our eyes to what is going on in the world. The EU has to be a strong global actor."

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EU Leadership Bad – NMD Good The EU doesn’t want NMD in Europe- They’ll use leadership to kill NMD Valasek`2k (Tomas, Senior Analyst for Weekly Defense Magazine, Europe's NMD Deliberations, June 8, 2000, http://www.cdi.org/weekly/2000/issue23.html)

On the heels of President Clinton's visit to Europe, Russia's President Vladimir Putin traveled to Italy with a proposal to create a continent -wide missile defense system. The plan -- clearly designed to counter the U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) system -- is finding many sympathetic ears among European leaders. NATO allies seemed to have embraced the Russian proposal as a possible way to diffuse tensions within the alliance stemming from European opposition to NMD. Europe is virtually unanimous in its criticism of NMD, despite President Clinton's recent offer to share missile defense technology with "civilized nations." The Department of State, commenting on President Clinton's proposal, concluded that "Mr. Clinton's defense of NMD fell on mostly deaf ears in European media outlets, where editorials continued their drumbeat of criticism. Only a right-of-center German newspaper argued against the 'wholesale rejection' of the U.S. proposal." European politicians criticized the plan in terms that were perhaps less verbose but no less firm. President Putin's counterproposal comes at an opportune time both for Russia and Europe. Russia is equally opposed to NMD, so reaching out to the European Union (EU) countries will bolster the critics' strength. Moreover, Moscow senses a chance to regain its influence on the continent. The war in Chechnya has put a strain on EU-Russian relations, particularly after the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe reproached Russia for its conduct in Chechnya and Moscow withdrew from the Council in protest. Mutual opposition to NMD gives Moscow an opening to mend fences with EU countries. Lastly, Russia's longterm objective, as stated in the 1999 draft National Security Concept, is to change the balance of power in the world currently dominated by the United States. "If the EU and Russia were to get back together," said Paul Beaver, an expert at Jane's Missiles and Rockets, "it would bring the world back into a bipolar situation again."

b) NMD key to solve prolif DeBiaso`6 (Dr. Peppi DeBiaso, Director, Office of Missile Defense Policy, U.S. DOD, Comparative Strategy, 2006, vol 25. p. 165)

The presence of effective missile defense makes it more costly for a rival to compete militarily or wage missile warfare against the United States. Defenses would pose a direct counter to the buildup of ballistic missiles by negating advantages an adversary hoped to achieve by acquiring missiles in the first place. Political leaders and military planners could no longer expect that ballistic missiles would have a “free ride” against their targets in the United States or in the countries of allies. Rather, they would now face the certainty that missile defenses would inflict losses during the conduct of a military campaign. Furthermore, the approach the United States is taking to missile defense, fielding multiple layers of systems to intercept ballistic missiles throughout all phases of their flight, imposes additional demands on the offense if it is to be successful. It must now penetrate several layers of defense each having different technical and operational characteristics. Under these conditions,

defenses should reinforce the perception of ballistic missiles as an unwise investment by making it more difficult, time consuming and expensive to counter the defenses and create new incentives to shift military competition into other, nonballistic missile, areas where the U.S. may enjoy distinct advantages.

c) Nuke war Seaquist`3(Larry former US Navy warship captain, has been the custodian of nuclear weapons at sea and a contributor to nuclear deterrence strategy in the Pentagon, April 3, 2003 (“Listen to the Nuclear Chatter”, http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0403/p11s02-coop.html)

The pattern of nuclear proliferation is shifting, and with it the dynamics of deterrence. Formerly we worried about countries like Iraq and Iran making their weapons from scratch. But in the future, we'll deal also with shadowy networks of terrorists who buy their weapons on the underground market. Where does a superpower fly a squadron of bombers if it wants to grab the attention of a covert terrorist organization like Al Qaeda, with scattered cells all over the globe? At heart, nuclear signaling is much more than just writing diplomatic notes on a warhead. By threatening catastrophe, each party hopes to extract a measure of

safety from the mutual standoff. That's the theory. But instead of calming the situation, nuclear threats ricocheting among today's players may lead one of the smaller, inexperienced parties to panic and shoot. Regardless of who pulls the trigger or why, a nuclear detonation would be a disaster. A mushroom cloud rising over the dead in any city could thrust civilization into an era of unlimited violence just when bio-weapons are creeping into our mass-killing capabilities. Clearly, humankind must steer in the other direction, toward managing disagreements with less deadly methods.

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Yes NMD NMD coming-Poland’s cool with it China Veiw`8 (China Veiw, Yan Liang, Chinese News service of Xinhua News Agency,

U.S. seeking to reach missile defense agreement with Poland, July 18, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/18/content_8565009.htm)

The United States is mulling meeting Poland's demands with regard to a missile defence base, local media reported on Thursday. According to daily Dziennik, U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice discussed the issue with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on Monday. The U.S. is seriously considering placing a Patriot missile battery in Poland. In return it wants Poland's assurance that the missiles could be used at any other place any time, according to the report. Poland is ready to accept such offer, according to earlier statements by Poland's defense and foreign ministers. The United States plans to install a base for 10 interceptor missiles in northern Poland to protect the U.S. and Europe from possible future attacks from Iran. Talks later became bogged down over Polish demands for more military aid. Warsaw has been lobbying Washington to provide a THAAD or Patriot-type air defense system in exchange for a Polish green light for hosting the silos.

The Czech’s are warming up to the NMD idea Dempsey & Bilefsky`8 (Judy Dempsey and Dan Bilefsky, New York Times, U.S. and Czechs Sign Accord on Missile Shield, July 9, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/09/world/europe/09shield.html?em&ex=1215748800&en=f870cb9afdaab674&ei=5087%0A)

The United States and the Czech Republic signed a landmark accord on Tuesday to allow the Pentagon to deploy part of its widely debated antiballistic missile shield on territory once occupied by Soviet troops. The accord, the first of its kind to be reached with a Central or East European country, was signed in Prague by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her Czech counterpart, Karel Schwarzenberg, despite strong opposition from Russia. It also needs to be ratified by Czech lawmakers, many of whom oppose it. Russia warned on Tuesday that the accord could lead to a military response, which the Kremlin had previously threatened but never specified. President Dmitri A. Medvedev and his predecessor, Vladimir V. Putin, who is now the Russian prime minister, have told the United States that the Kremlin sees a missile shield in this part of Europe as a threat to Russian security. Mr. Putin has said it could even lead to a new cold war. But American and Czech officials said the system’s radar component, to be stationed south of Prague, would defend the NATO members in Europe and the United States against long-range weapons from the Middle East, particularly Iran. “Ballistic missile proliferation is not an imaginary threat,” Ms. Rice said Tuesday after meeting with the Czech prime minister, Mirek Topolanek. She said Iran continued to work toward a nuclear bomb, along with long-range missiles that could carry a warhead.

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NMD Good – Nuclear War ( ) NMD is critical to deter countless nations from nuclear attacks on the U.S. and allies Investor’s Business Daily, 11-7, 2007 Is it possible that Democrats are still skeptical that a missile shield will actually work? If so, evidence that it will has reached the point that it can no longer be denied. Or is their lack of support simply due to a reflexive opposition to the military and toward symbols of what they perceive to be projections of U.S. power? Either way, their actions could leave us vulnerable to nuclear attack from a rogue nation such as Iran (see editorial at left) or North Korea, which is supposedly backing down on its nuclear weapons program but will remain a threat as long as its communist regime stays in place. The risk doesn't end, however, with those two legs of the Axis of Evil, both of which are on the State Department's list of terrorist states. Nuclear-armed Pakistan is now an ally, yet it could become an enemy depending on how its internal turmoil is resolved. Both al-Qaida and the Taliban have powerful bases in the region. What if the Musharraf government one day falls and one of those terrorist groups suddenly has the keys to a nuclear arsenal? It's just as plausible that the threat could come from any of the Mideast nations that want to keep up with Iran's nuclear program. With Egypt making its announcement last week, there are now 13 countries in the region that have in the last year said they want nuclear power. They can claim, as Iran has, that they want it merely for energy. But the step from nuclear power to nuclear weapons is not that far. Given the volatility of the region, it would be wise to make sure that all precautions — and that includes a missile defense — are taken. Even Russia, with its extensive nuclear weaponry, could be a threat. President Vladimir Putin has raised objections to America's allying with former Soviet satellites to place U.S. missile defense components in their countries. This, warns Putin in language reminiscent of the Cold War, will turn Europe into a "powder keg." For his part, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has declared: "The arms race is starting again." Are congressional Democrats prepared to leave us only partly protected in a world where nuclear arms might soon begin to spread like a Southern California wildfire? Some have looked at the Democrats' actions and said, emphatically, yes. "Their aim," Heritage Foundation defense analyst Baker Spring said earlier this year, "is to force the U.S. to adopt a position that prohibits it from developing — much less deploying — missile defense interceptors in space under any circumstance and for all time."

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NMD Good – Deters WMD Prolif ( ) European NMD is key to deter ballistic missile and WMD prolif Peter Brookes, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, is a senior fellow for National Security Affairs at the Heritage Foundation, 11-8, 2007, online: http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=E2E0BCA0-8DDF-484C-B974-22FE89CF0715, accessed November 8, 2007 If anything, the opposite is true. Defensive weapons systems such as missile defense have a stabilizing effect on the security environment, as opposed to offensive weapons, which research has shown can be destabilizing. As a defensive capability, U.S. missile defense plans for Europe will act as a deterrent to rogue nations and non-state actors from acquiring ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. There will be less motivation for ballistic missile capability if Europe has the ability to defend against it. To make America and its allies deliberately vulnerable to attack is not only nonsensical, it is likely to incur further proliferation. As President Bush stated, "Missile defense is a vital tool for our security, it's a vital tool for deterrence and it's a vital tool for counterproliferation."[8]

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NMD Good – Key to Heg Lack of NMD hurts power projection-There’s no protection regional ballistics DeBiaso`6(Dr. Peppi DeBiaso, Director, Office of Missile Defense Policy, U.S. DOD, Comparative Strategy, 2006,

vol 25. p.

159)

As a result, states possessing even a small missile force could project devastating power regionally, and may prevent the United States and its security partners from intervening to defend an ally or friend against such aggression. Ballistic missiles armed with WMD could hold at risk regional U.S. and allied targets, e.g., staging areas, bases, troop concentrations, political-economic targets, or population centers, making it possible for relatively small aggressors to deny access to the United States into a contested region or theater of conflict. North Korean ballistic missiles, for example, allow it to directly threaten the capitals and population centers of Japan and South Korea, as well as U.S. forces stationed in those countries. And in the Middle East, Iran has already attempted to limit the ability of the U.S. to operate militarily in the region by threatening missile attacks. As Iranian officials have recently observed, “today America has no base in Iraq, or the Middle East and the Persian Gulf which is not within firing range of our missiles.” 3

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NMD Good – AT: U.S.-Russia Nuclear War ( ) No chance of a U.S.-Russia nuclear war – rational policymaking on both sides prevents escalation St. Petersburg Times, 11-6, 2007 In reality, however, the nuclear factor plays an increasingly minor role in U.S.-Russian relations. And, paradoxically, its importance began to diminish after the Cuban missile crisis, when it became clear that neither side was willing to use its nuclear weapons against the other. Despite having 20 times more nuclear weapons than the Soviet Union, the United States rejected any plan involving a first strike against Moscow. In the late 1950s, Robert McNamara calculated the probable losses in the event of a Soviet first nuclear strike against the United States. After becoming defense secretary in the early 1960s, however, McNamara acknowledged that Soviet nuclear weapons were not capable of inflicting the level of damage that he had earlier estimated, and he thus ruled out any plan for a U.S. first strike. For nuclear weapons to be an important factor in politics, there must be a real fear that the leader possessing the weapons is crazy enough to actually use them. That is why the nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea have generated such heightened concern around the world. Putin, however, has shown — whether he intended to or not — that he is a rational leader. And even drawing unfounded, exaggerated historical parallels with the Cuban missile crisis can’t ruin that reputation — at least not yet.

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Issue Linkage Solves – Climate Intl cooperation is key to reducing ghg emissions Kemfert 4 (Claudia Kemfert, Department of Economics, University of Oldenburg, Germnay. “Climate coalitions and international trade: assessment of cooperation incentives by issue linkage” Energy Policy, 32, 2004)

The greatest success of international climate control policy was the establishment of the Kyoto protocol. It is one of the leading and most important

international environmental agreements in the history of global negotiation and bargaining policies. However, recent climate change negotiation processes confirm that

the initial climate change control coalition was not stable: The United States, the world’s largest economy and emitter of GHGs left the coalition and now acts as a singleton and free rider. The reason for this behavior can be explained by game theoretic validation: Economic payoffs for free riding are higher than joining the coalition.1 This paper confirms this by global modeling results. Because the remaining climate coalition partners still intend to reach an international climate control agreement, the environmental effectiveness is potentially diminished. International greenhouse gas reductions imposed by the Kyoto protocol can most likely not be met.

Conditions are key to creating benefits to reducing GHG emmissions globally Kemfert 4 (Claudia Kemfert, Department of Economics, University of Oldenburg, Germnay. “Climate coalitions and international trade: assessment of cooperation incentives by issue linkage” Energy Policy, 32, 2004)

Scientific investigations will most likely reveal that continued accumulation of anthropogenic greenhouse gases (GHGs) will ultimately have severe consequences on the climate as well as ecological and social systems. Irreversible climate changes induce significant costs, and no future efforts can reverse the resulting damage. International climate control agreements intend to relieve this process. A substantial reduction of GHG emissions requires cooperation between countries. However, greenhouse gas emissions reduction is still an international public good necessitating long-term and global economic efforts. The formulation of the Kyoto protocol and its ensuing negotiation attempts represent one initial outcome of cooperative international climate control policiy actions. Latest negotiation outcomes confirm that individual countries are mainly concerned with potential economic disadvantages resulting from emissions reduction. Maximization of national welfare leads to either unilateral operations, a formation of small coalitions or ‘‘free rider’’ actions.Whether a stable coalition can be reached depends on the opportunities to reduce interest conflicts regarding a minimum agreement. A bargaining situation contains opportunities to collaborate for mutual benefits. As real negotiation processes demonstrate, a full agreement of all players is unlikely. More realistically, some players may act independently or unilaterally to maximize their own welfare and selfinterests, while other players create small and stable coalitions (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1992; Carraro and Siniscalco (1993); Hoel, 1994). The decision to join a coalition or initiate a partial coalition depends on the difference in net benefits of a cooperative and a non-cooperative strategy (Barrett, 1994). As long as the environment and climate are treated as a public good and there are no penalties or sanction mechanisms for polluting entities, there will be no economic incentives for unilateral or cooperative action to protect the environment. Moreover, as long as cooperative behavior is imposed by voluntarily actions, finding a common or global agreement will be driven by the varying interests of negotiating countries. These interests must be harmonized between nations or groups of countries.

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Issue Linkage Solves – Climate Conditioning ensures agreement – it allows both sides to net-benefit from a deal that they would otherwise reject. Hovi 8 [Jon, Tora Skodvin, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, “Which Way to U.S. Climate Cooperation? Issue Linkage versus a U.S.-Based Agreement,” Review of Policy Research, Vol. 25, No. 2, The Policy Studies Organization] The seminal works by Tollison and Willett (1979) and Sebenius (1983) redirected attention toward a second possibility, namely that issue linkage might be used to generate mutual gains for both (or all) parties in a bargaining situation in which at least one party would stand to lose from a single-issue agreement. Negotiating simultaneously two or more issues might thus enable the parties to reach agreement on both or all issues, whereas otherwise, negotiating the issues singly, the parties might not reach an agreement. In particular, a party might accept a loss on one issue if this sacrifice enables it to obtain a (greater) benefit on the other issue(s). Used in this way, issue linkage is akin to a side payment.

Conditioning common public goods like warming is the only way to achieve international action. Hovi 8 [Jon, Tora Skodvin, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, “Which Way to U.S. Climate Cooperation? Issue Linkage versus a U.S.-Based Agreement,” Review of Policy Research, Vol. 25, No. 2, The Policy Studies Organization] In the past two decades, a third possibility has received extensive scholarly attention, particularly in the economics literature (see, for instance, Folmer, Moucher, & Ragland, 1993). Some argue that issue linkage can be used as a tool to overcome the free rider problem associated with provision of international public goods (such as abatement of GHG emissions). A public (or collective) good is characterized by nonexclusiveness, meaning that if such a good becomes available to one member of a group, it is unfeasible to exclude other group members from consuming it (Olson, 1971). This creates a situation where a group member might benefit even more by not participating in providing the public good (free riding).5 However, if many group members free ride, the result will likely be suboptimal provision of the public good. Avoiding free riding might be possible by linking each country’s access to the exclusive benefits of a private good to its contribution in providing a public good. Such linkage would entail that a party receive a private (exclusive) good if and only if it were to contribute in providing the public good. Thus, the general idea is that linking issues will not only “change the balance of interests in favor of a negotiated agreement” (Davis, 2004, p. 153), but will also do so in a way that ensures greater provision of the public good.

Conditioning overcomes differences in policy interests. Perez 6 [Oren, Faculty of Law at Bar Ilan University, “Multiple Regimes, Issue Linkage, and International Cooperation: Exploring the Role of the World Trade Organization,” January, http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/perezwtorole.pdf] Finally, issue linkage can resolve the problem of asymmetric preferences and varied geo-economic conditions, by allowing countries to link together issues in which they have dissimilar interests. Institutional linkage operates in this context as an indirect form of side payment. If cooperation on an individual issue benefits country A but hurts B (or is simply not of interest to B), then linkage allows country A to compensate B by offering cooperation on a different issue that benefits B. Linkage thus utilizes the mechanism of economic exchange to bridge between different worldviews (regarding, for example, the value of natural resources). The use of linkage as a form of side payment when there are asymmetric benefits across countries is especially important in the context of the relations between Northern and Southern countries.

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Issue Linkage Solves – Climate/Security Energy-security issue linkage key to solving climate change Froyn and Bang 7 (Camilla Froyn and Guri Bang, "Issue linkage: Energy security and climate change concerns as triggers for change in U.S. climate policy" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb 28, 2007 Online )

This article explores the relationship between public concerns about energy security and climate change, and climate policy development in the United States. Federal climate policy has been following a different path than in most other industrialized countries, a path of not accepting mandatory limits to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. As the world’s largest emitter, however, the development of policy response to the climate change challenge in the United States will be decisive for the global response (Bang et al, 2007:1288-9). It is therefore interesting to investigate whether U.S. climate policy stands to be altered through linkage of the energy security and climate change issues. If public concerns about these issues increases, calculated issue linkage by policymakers could potentially lead to new policy programs that aim at both increasing energy security and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Energy and climate change are closely related policy areas, through factors like a country’s energy source mix, involved actors, and economic interests. Energy policy decisions have consequences for climate change issues, and climate policy decisions invariably take into account energy issues. In the long term climate change might become a huge influence on economic growth, but in the short term it is limits to GHG emissions that cause economic concerns. In terms of political salience, energy issues are generally considered much more important than climate change issues because of the direct short term coupling between energy use and national economic development. As the largest energy producer, consumer, and net importer in the world, as well as being home to the largest coal reserves in the world (EIA 2004a), the United States is very dependent on fossil fuel energy for its short term economic growth. Because of this, and because of growing fossil fuel import dependence, energy security has risen to become a top- prioritized issue in U.S. politics. At the same time, 82.4 percent of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2004 consisted of carbon dioxide from the combustion of fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and natural gas (EIA 2006b). In effect, therefore, U.S. emissions trends are driven largely by trends in fossil energy consumption, and with strong fossil fuel dependence the United States is constrained in energy policy choices for the near future. Energy use and production are key components for understanding the climate change issue. The balance of evidence in climate science points to the relationship between fossil fuel use causing increasing emissions and rising temperatures as the main cause of climate changes expected to occur over the next century (IPCC 2007). However, the domestic resistance to mandatory emission limits in the United States has been robust because of fears that it will incur economic loss for both individual consumers and the national economy (Victor 2001: 4; Victor 2004: 1-4; Jacobson 2002: 422-3). Energy security concerns and climate change concerns are coupled in the U.S. political discourse on both energy policy and climate policy, and currently the debate focuses on how fossil fuel consumption, in particular coal, can continue and greenhouse gas emissions can be reduced without adverse economic effects. 8 This article study the close relationship between energy and climate policy, investigating under what circumstances changes in public concerns for energy security and climate change can cause a new, mandatory federal climate policy.

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Issue Linkage Solves – General Issue linkage solves asymmetrical enforcement capabilities. Perez 6 [Oren, Faculty of Law at Bar Ilan University, “Multiple Regimes, Issue Linkage, and International Cooperation: Exploring the Role of the World Trade Organization,” January, http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/perezwtorole.pdf] Spagnolo argues that under this highly stylized model any rule which constrains the ability of governments to link several issues in one agreement (e.g., by punishing the violation of rules—defection—of one agreement through the introduction of retaliatory measures in another regime) is strictly welfare-reducing, since it constrains the optimal design of international agreements. The basic logic is the following: issue linkage can facilitate cooperation by allowing countries to use the surplus or slack enforcement power that may be available in one policy domain to discipline cooperation in other domains. Surplus enforcement power is defined as the expected losses from punishment (in response to defection) minus the expected gains from one-off defection (free-riding), that may be available in one domain to discipline cooperation in additional domains.19 Spagnolo argues that a single “grand international agreement” may thus prove superior to any fragmented structure, because it aggregates available enforcement power, allowing for its more efficient allocation to additional policy domains. This basic intuition holds in cases where policy issues are separable and countries are assumed either symmetric or asymmetric.20 In Section 6, I provide a more detailed exposition of Spagnolo’s argument, which I also use to clarify my critique of some of his assumptions.

Conditioning solves best – ensures stringent enforcement and benefits all parties. Perez 6 [Oren, Faculty of Law at Bar Ilan University, “Multiple Regimes, Issue Linkage, and International Cooperation: Exploring the Role of the World Trade Organization,” January, http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/perezwtorole.pdf] The idea of linkage provides an alternative framework for thinking about the relationship between international regimes. It replaces the narrative of conflict, which dominated the “trade and ――” debate with a narrative of synergy and collaboration. The linkage literature highlights three possible advantages of crossregime linkage. First, by allowing countries to use the surplus enforcement power that may be available in one policy domain to discipline cooperation in other domains, linkage can extend the set of sustainable (or self-enforcing) agreements.31 Second, linkage can be instrumental in resolving the problem of free-riding by bridging the negotiations regarding a global public good dilemma and negotiations on a club good.32 Finally, by allowing countries to engage in cross-regime bargaining, linkage provides a (welfare-enhancing) mechanism that can bridge distinct world views and preferences regarding various global dilemmas.33 There is tentative and very preliminary empirical support for these arguments,34 which give support to the claim that the WTO should extend its involvement in the resolution of transnational environmental dilemmas.35

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Conditional GHG Cuts Good – General Strong U.S. action on emissions can bring other countries on board – conditioning on strict commitments is key. Ubide et al 8 [Angel, Director of Global Economics for the Tudor Investment Corporation, Tom Burke, Environmental Policy Adviser, “Symposium on America, Europe, and the World: Session Two [Rush Transcript; Federal News Service],” April 23, Council on Foreign Relation, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16095/symposium_on_america_europe_and_the_world.html]

First has been the obvious reluctance to embrace and enact domestic CO2 emission reductions. Like I said, I think this is poised to end. But the other issue that's been divergent has been a difference between the EU and the U.S. in terms of willingness to pursue international agreements with limited commitments from developing countries. The EU has been much more willing to accept a framework that either had vague or weak commitments from developing countries, whereas this has been a very primary issue in the United States. It's a primary issue regardless of the administration, it was a primary issue in 1997 in the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, and if you look at the debate in the Senate right now over the form of regulation, it goes to the points that Adam was talking about, there's a lot of emphasis on trade restrictions or trade compensation to deal with the concern that China and other countries, key trading partners, are not going to take action. So figuring out whether or not we can have a common front on that and perhaps the EU can talk us off of the plank we're walking off of in terms of, you know, trade restrictions, but perhaps if we can encourage the EU to act a little more forcibly with developing countries, I think that could be very, very profitable. So I think once the U.S. acts, I think there'll be a huge opportunity for potential convergence on this international stuff as well. I'll also just note that, you know, the Bush administration's efforts with the major emitters' meetings that have been taking place, I think that is a very important forum as well. I think it's a little questionable exactly how much progress that can make absent more action in the United States, but the idea of getting the major emitters to the table and thinking about sectoral as well as economy-wide policies, I think has a lot of legs.

Conditioning our reductions on international reductions gives us a powerful source of leverage. Ubide et al 8 [Angel, Director of Global Economics for the Tudor Investment Corporation, Tom Burke, Environmental Policy Adviser, “Symposium on America, Europe, and the World: Session Two [Rush Transcript; Federal News Service],” April 23, Council on Foreign Relation, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16095/symposium_on_america_europe_and_the_world.html]

[T]o the United States, it means as we're writing that legislation and we're thinking about the structure of our policy, we should be thinking about how we can insert hooks into that legislation and policy that give us more leverage and more opportunity when we return to the international table. Whether this is some sort of a conditional agreement like Europe has right now where it says, well, we'll do 20 percent, we'll do 30 percent if everybody else does something adequate. Putting that sort of thing into law so that Congress doesn't have to come back to revisit it would be quite valuable. A colleague of mine at RFF who, I think may have been at the Council for a little while, Nigel Pervis (sp) has work he's done recently on the idea of Congressional Executive Agreement, trying to turn climate change negotiations into something more akin to trade negotiations set at a lower hurdle in the U.S. Senate and the executive has a little bit more power could be very useful in terms of thinking about how the U.S. process can be ready for engagement.

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Conditional GHG Cuts Good – Capital Flight Intl coop key to prevent capital flight Cosbey and Tarasofsky 7 (Aaron Cosbey is Associate and Senior Advisor with the International Institute for Sustainable Development, Winnipeg, Canada. Richard Tarasofsky heads the Energy, Environment and Development Programme at Chatham House. “Climate Change, Competitiveness and Trade” A Chatham House Report, June 2007.) In the final analysis, one of the best ways to address competitiveness concerns is to achieve international agreement on an approach to combating climate change, ensuring broad participation in any international regime, and helping ensure that different modes of national implementation do not unfairly tilt the playing field in anyone’s favour. This, of course, is more easily said than done, and efforts to get broad participation are dogged by a version of the old chicken-and-egg problem: broad participation would help ease competitiveness concerns, but it is difficult to achieve precisely because of those concerns. As such, any steps at the national and

international level that might be taken to address competitiveness concerns will certainly contribute to building a stronger multilateral regime for addressing climate change.

Stringent environmental regulations will cost hundreds of thousands of jobs and billions of dollars as companies relocate to places with lesser regulations Cosbey and Tarasofsky 7 (Aaron Cosbey is Associate and Senior Advisor with the International Institute for Sustainable Development, Winnipeg, Canada. Richard Tarasofsky heads the Energy, Environment and Development Programme at Chatham House. “Climate Change, Competitiveness and Trade” A Chatham House Report, June 2007.) A rich body of work in the last ten years or so has corrected for these problems in various ways, and has consistently found a statistically significant pollution haven effect.14 On the first question – does environmental stringency affect terms of trade? – the few good studies to date (those correcting for the problems surveyed above) find that increases in compliance costs do affect trade patterns, with one analysis finding a rather improbable 30% increase in import penetration for every 1% increase in pollution abatement costs.15 SQW Ltd (2006) summarizes two studies that seem to show that trade effects will depend in part on the regulating country’s factor endowments and on how intensively the industry uses that factor. For firms that intensively use a scarce factor of production (e.g. timber), even marginal tightening of environmental regulations will have an impact on market share. Firms that use that factor intensively in countries that have abundant stocks will not be so significantly affected by regulation. On the second question – does environmental stringency affect greenfield plant location decisions? – the recent studies using panel data

are in agreement that it can and does, particularly for heavily polluting firms.16 One study found that in the first 15 years after rules were introduced to more heavily regulate highly polluting US counties, those counties (relative to others) lost approximately 590,000 jobs, $37 billion in capital stock and $75 billion (1987$) of output in pollution-intensive industries. All of these studies are based on US state- and countylevel variations in regulatory stringency, and subject to data availability.

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Conditioning Solves – China Chinese action is conditioned on US action Hald-Mortensen 8 (Christian Hald-Mortensen, Danish Institute of International Studies, Master in Political Science, University of Copenhagen. “Transatlantic Climate Policy: Towards a Copenhagen Protocol in 2009” Energizing Europe Conference, London.) After 1997, the Europeans and Americans diverged on the Kyoto Protocol, and the EU gained importance globally because the U.S. rejected the Kyoto Protocol34. This rejection was a major disappointment for Europeans who saw the U.S. as a “rogue state” in global environmental politics35. The U.S. remains crucial for the effectiveness of any climate regime with 20% of world emissions, and because China have made their participation conditional on U.S. participation36. The U.S. debate on climate policy has been highly focused on economic competitiveness. In the late 1990’s a group of major economic interests launched the “Global Climate Information Project”, and spread fear regarding Kyoto’s economic impact37. Such concern was codified into law, when the Senate enacted the Byrd-Hagel Act, stating that the U.S. would accept no agreement that did not subject major developing countries to reductions, or that would hurt the U.S. economy. In 2001, this rationale for voluntary defection was echoed again by President George W. Bush. The President declared in March 2001 that the U.S. defected “because (the Kyoto protocol) exempts 80% of the world, including major population centers such as China and India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy”.

China will surely agree to meet reduction conditions – multiple reasons. Victor et al 8 [David G., Senior Adviser, Council on Foreign Relations, “Confronting Climate Change: A Strategy for U.S. Foreign Policy,” Independent Task Force Report, No. 61] As climate change rises up the list of American foreign policy priorities, incentives for reducing greenhouse gas emissions need not directly involve climate policy. Russia, for example, only ratified Kyoto after European countries agreed to support its bid for WTO membership, a carrot from outside the climate sphere. With a large slate of bilateral issues on the table, particularly in the case of China, the United States might find opportunities for deal making by linking the climate issue to a wide array of other concerns. Climate change will be one of the most important foreign policy challenges of the century; as such, it merits status as a central foreign policy objective and efforts toward climate goals should include trade-offs against other goals where needed. The United States and others could also target more general desires among leading developing countries to become central players in international politics, a particularly salient issue with both China and India. The United States has recently focused on making China a ‘‘responsible stakeholder’’ that would play a positive role in the international system. That approach, which implicitly ties together Chinese actions in different areas, has been widely accepted as an effective way of engaging Beijing. The United States has similarly sought to help India further integrate itself into the international mainstream. That approach to India at once appeals to Indian desires to be a great power, but is difficult for those Indians who are still focused primarily on maintaining their country’s independence. The United States could emphasize that being a major and responsible power entails a growing commitment to curb greenhouse gas emissions. So long as the United States takes only voluntary and relatively mild actions to reduce its own emissions, it can hardly argue that China and India are being irresponsible by doing the same—indeed, it might suggest just the opposite. But as the United States takes more aggressive action at home, it will be in a much stronger position to ask the same of others.

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Conditioning Solves – Developing Countries Conditioning climate policy on emissions reductions will lead to an international snowballing effect. ??? Khor 7 [Martin, Third World Network, “Bali Climate Talks to Decide Fate of Kyoto Protocol,” December 5, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/intellectual_property/info.service/twn.ipr.info.120702.htm] The European countries are determined to get the US involved in the next phase of commitments. The US’ well-known argument for staying out is that the large developing countries do not have to commit. Thus Europe and Japan are doubly keen to get the developing countries to make commitments – because they themselves desire this, and because the US requires it. Several European countries, having woken up to the realities of climate science, desperately want the US to be part of a post-2012 set of targets for emission cuts, and to somehow also pull in some developing countries either to commit to cut their emissions or to undertake some semi-hard commitments. Third, the developed countries are lagging behind in meeting their emission reduction commitments and have failed very badly in fulfilling their finance and technology transfer commitments. In their next phase of commitments, they want a “comprehensive” agreement in which developing countries have to make some payment, in order for they themselves to be ready to commit again. Bringing in developing countries and pressurizing them to commit in a “comprehensive agreement” can help the developed countries to reduce their embarrassment of not having fulfilled their first-period commitments, and reduce the pressure on them in negotiations for the second-period emission-reduction commitments. The developed countries would then have something to “trade off” – to have an agenda that includes new and more binding commitments of the developing countries, to balance off the new commitments of developed countries, while the latter also hold up as carrot the promise of finance and technology transfer (which they are supposed to provide anyway, which they have not provided satisfactorily, and which they will once again use as an “incentive”).

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Conditioning on EU Action Solves Climate Change US – EU cooperation key to addressing climate change Hald-Mortensen 8 (Christian Hald-Mortensen, Danish Institute of International Studies, Master in Political Science, University of Copenhagen. “Transatlantic Climate Policy: Towards a Copenhagen Protocol in 2009” Energizing Europe Conference, London.)

Without proper new R&D investments in clean power technology, stabilizing the climate below a dangerous threshold would be very difficult, because the capacity to make cheap cutbacks 20 years from now will not be available. High-carbon infrastructure could increasingly be “locked in”. A first step could be to enact binding clean energy R&D commitments in a Post-Kyoto regime. But much stands in the way for the EU as an energy R&D powerhouse. The EU first needs to build experience in pooling its research efforts across borders. The EU is experimenting with new R&D collaboration models for the future; one successful platform of research collaboration has been the Galileo satellite project, which connected the efforts of several member states. The idea has been to develop a community instrument from this collaboration model. Today, the EU budget has allocated about $400 million will sustainable fossil fuels, carbon capturing & sequestration and clean coal under the 7th Framework Programme71. The 7th framework opens up for allocating funds to research collaboration with non-EU countries such as the United States, and this is a possibility that could be pursued. Historical analogies in research cooperation teach that large-scale cross-country efforts can be successful. In agriculture, the “Green Revolution” 8,500 scientists from more than 100 countries developed higheryield crops. A bargain on energy R&D could help the

transatlantic partners capture emerging clean energy markets, create high-value jobs at home, and set a moral example for emerging economies such as China that have made their reductions contingent on the leadership of the developed countries. The legitimacy of such a transatlantic bargain is underpinned by the Protocol’s “problem-effectiveness” problem72. A final reason why the EU and the U.S. could forge a new “grand bargain” on clean energy is the extent of future benefits flowing from such a policy. Allocating a share of BNP to energy R&D is an investment to position a nation to capture market shares: Markets for low-carbon energy sources are estimated at $500 bn at minimum per year by 205073. Binding transatlantic commitments in energy R&D could help reduce emissions in the long term, but also create job growth and business opportunities.

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EU Says Yes to Conditions If the US conditioned emission decreases on EU reductions the EU would act. Rehn 8 [Olli, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, “Europe Leading the Global Combat, Against Climate Change,” February 14, Seminar of the Tanner Academy The package aims at reducing greenhouse gases by 20% independently of what other countries do. But the EU is even ready to a 30% cut on the condition that other developed countries commit to comparable efforts. This is crucial. We need a 30% cut in collective emissions from developed countries by 2020, if we are to have any chance of stopping global warming before it reaches dangerous levels.

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R & D Issue Linkage Solves Issue linkage on R & D for alternative energy encourages action Cosbey 7 (Aaron Cosbey, Associate & Senior Advisor, Trade and Investment Associate, Climate Change and Energy “Trade Policy Tools and Instruments for Addressing Climate Change and Sustainable Development” Trade Ministers’ Dialogue on Climate Change Issues, 2007.) One possible candidate for analysis is R&D subsidies, given the increasing recognition of the importance of new technologies as a key solution to climate change challenges, and the understanding that private sector innovation will need to be substantially supplemented by public support. State support for low‐GHG retrofits or the purchase of new technologies might also be considered for carve‐out, though again it would be important to understand whether these sorts of measures were likely to be employed in the first place. Subsidies for investment in the area of renewable energy, where there are high up‐front outlays, might also be considered. Some have suggested that initial allocations of permits under cap and trade regimes could be considered actionable subsidies under certain conditions, and it might be important to clarify this question proactively. 21. The shape of any post‐2012 architecture for climate change would be directly relevant to the scope of reform needed. If there were, for example, an international commitment to double national R&D spending on low‐GHG technologies, this would clearly be an area for action. On the other hand, if the commitment were to contribute to a multilateral fund for R&D, this by itself would not imply a need for reform.

Conditioning on private goods is key to international action. Hovi 8 [Jon, Tora Skodvin, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, “Which Way to U.S. Climate Cooperation? Issue Linkage versus a U.S.-Based Agreement,” Review of Policy Research, Vol. 25, No. 2, The Policy Studies Organization] Much of the interest in linkage of cooperation on climate change to cooperation on technology R&D can be traced to an influential contribution by Carraro and Siniscalco (1997). They use a formal model connecting two symmetrical N-player games—a Prisoner’s Dilemma-like game that takes protection of the environment to be a public good, and a cooperative game on technology R&D. Their

model assumes that technological progress benefits only parties, not nonparties, to the technology agreement. Linkage makes participation in the environmental agreement a necessary condition for obtaining the benefits from technology R&D. In this model, therefore, linkage has dramatic consequences for participation: a self-enforcing environmental agreement without linkage admits only three participating countries; however, a self-enforcing environmental agreement with linkage to technology R&D admits up to 100 participating countries. Consequently, it seems that by linking cooperation on an environmental problem to the exclusive benefits resulting from cooperation on technology R&D, one might effectively remove incentives to free ride.

International cooperation on R&D is necessary to solve. Victor et al 8 [David G., Senior Adviser, Council on Foreign Relations, “Confronting Climate Change: A Strategy for U.S. Foreign Policy,” Independent Task Force Report, No. 61] International cooperation on research, development, and demonstration of climate-friendly technologies addresses important gaps in national level efforts. Just as public-sector investment in RD&D is made necessary by the fact that firms cannot fully capture the benefits of their own early-stage investments, so international cooperation addresses the fact that RD&D funded by one country will benefit others. Intensive international RD&D cooperation—among advanced industrial countries as well as with major developing-country emitters—can dramatically ease the task of mitigating emissions by speeding the development of technologies that would reduce the costs to developing countries of cutting their emissions. Eventually, all nations might be expected to contribute to an international RD&D program. However, only a small number of nations account for the vast majority of energy-related research—these countries include all of the largest emitters from energy use—and a program that begins with them would achieve most of the benefit of a concerted global approach.

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Trade Issue Linkage Solves Environmental issues should be conditioned on trade liberalization Carraro and Marchiori 3 (Carraro, Carlo and Marchiori, Carmen, "Endogenous Strategic Issue Linkage in International Negotiations" (April 2003). FEEM Working Paper No. 40.2003. http://ssrn.com/abstract=419060) Different policy strategies have been proposed to increase the number of players who decide to join the equilibrium coalition. Transfers and issue linkage are probably the most popular proposed strategies, even though negotiation rules and treaty design can also be used to achieve equilibria in which large size coalitions form at the equilibrium (Cf. Carraro, 2001). In this paper, we focus on issue linkage.

The basic idea of issue linkage is to design a negotiation framework in which countries do not negotiate only on one issue (e.g. the environmental issue), but force themselves to negotiate on two joint issues (e.g. the environmental one and another interrelated economic issue). Pioneering contributions on issue linkage are those by Tollison and Willett (1979) and Sebenius (1983). They propose this mechanism to promote cooperation not only on environmental matters, but also on other issues, e.g. security and international finance. They also emphasise the increase in transaction costs that can result from the use of issue linkage. Issue linkage was introduced into the economic literature on international environmental cooperation by Folmer et al. (1993) and by Cesar and De Zeeuw (1996) to solve the problem of asymmetries among countries. The intuition is simple: if some countries gain from cooperating on a given economic

issue whereas other countries gain from cooperating on another one, by linking the two issues it may be possible to obtain an agreement that is profitable to all countries. Issue linkage can also be used to mitigate the problem of free-riding. To do this, negotiations that are affected by free-riding -- i.e. negotiations concerning public goods -- must be linked with negotiations on club or quasi-club goods. The intuition is that the incentives to free-ride on the non-excludable benefits of 3 public good provision can be offset by the incentives to appropriate the excludable benefits coming from providing the club good. To

address the free riding problem, Barrett (1995, 1997) proposes linking environmental protection to negotiations on trade liberalisation. In this way, potential free-riders are deterred with threats of trade sanctions. In Carraro and Siniscalco (1995, 1997) and Katsoulacos (1997), environmental cooperation is linked to cooperation in Research and Development. If a country does not cooperate on the control of the environment, it looses the benefits of technological cooperation. An empirical analysis of this type of issue linkage in the case of climate negotiations is contained in Buchner et al. (2002). Finally, Mohr (1995) and Mohr and Thomas (1998) propose linking climate negotiations to international debt swaps.

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Trade Issue Linkage Solves Issue linkage reduces free riders and improves the strength of coalitions Kemfert 4 (Claudia Kemfert, Department of Economics, University of Oldenburg, Germnay. “Climate coalitions and international trade: assessment of cooperation incentives by issue linkage” Energy Policy, 32, 2004)

The USA’s free riding position is (among others) a major problem for international climate policy. Game theory suggests that issue linkage may help increase incentives to join a coalition and overcome free riding. The concept of issue linkage has been introduced to abolish potential asymmetries among counties (see Folmer et al., 1993; Cesar and de Zeeuw, 1996). The idea behind this proposal is that countries benefiting from different issues should combine all issues to obtain a stable, symmetric and favorable coalition. Pioneering issue linkage studies are conducted by Tollison and Willet (1979), Haas et al. (1993) and Sebenius (1983). They propose issue linkages with a public good such as the environment, and other issues, e.g. international security and finance. Barret (1995, 1997) proposes linking environmental protection negotiations with trade liberalization. Free riders would have to pay a trade sanction penalty. He finds that the threat of penalties can enlarge the coalition; a grant coalition is therefore hard to obtain. The grant coalition means that coalition where all negotiating parties agree. Carraro and Siniscalco (1995, 1997), and Katsoulacos (1997) propose linking environmental negotiations with increased expenditures in R&D. Technological cooperation is only possible if countries collaborate on environmental issues. Issue linkage could be an incentive for free riders to join a coalition. Issue linkage is based on the idea that, regarding a public good, the benefits of free riding must be offset by the gains of a jointly provided club good. Tol et al. (2000) explore the incentives of joining a coalition by issue linkage through side payments as capital and technology transfer. They find that technology transfer increases the incentive to cooperate. Model results of this study confirm that finding.

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Trade Issue Linkage Key to Global Trade ( ) A deal conditioned on the participation of developing countries is key to global trade Michael Richardson, energy and security specialist at the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore, February 19, 2008, The New Zealand Herald, “EU’s crusade not without pitfalls,” lexis Of course, the EC proposals, and the way they are to be phased in, are part of a bigger game plan. Europe hopes the United Nations climate-change negotiations, launched in Bali in December, will result in a new global agreement from 2012 on limiting greenhouse gas emissions that covers all major emitters including China, India and other developing countries not covered by the current Kyoto Protocol, which expires in four years. The threat to punish economies that refuse to join any new accord may induce them to sign on. But it may also backfire. WTO head Pascal Lamy told the Bali meeting only a multilateral deal on climate change that included all major polluters could set the right environmental context for global trade. It would then be incumbent upon the trading system to respond to such environmental rules as soon as they were crafted, he said. The alternative outcome would be a real spaghetti bowl of unilateral measures that would achieve neither trade nor environmental goals.

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AT: Lie Perm For conditioning to succeed parties must believe that the conditions are absolute. Hovi 8 [Jon, Tora Skodvin, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, “Which Way to U.S. Climate Cooperation? Issue Linkage versus a U.S.-Based Agreement,” Review of Policy Research, Vol. 25, No. 2, The Policy Studies Organization] Second, both (or all) parties must “believe that agreement on one issue is conditional on agreement on the other issue” (Davis, 2004, p. 156). Thus, for issue linkage to effectively induce the United States to reengage in the Kyoto process, the Kyoto countries need to convince the United States that cooperation on the linked issue will be terminated (or not initiated) unless the United States reengages. However, several scholars are skeptical concerning the prospects for successfully using issue linkage for this purpose because the threat implied in using linkage would likely not be credible. We discuss this problem in more detail in the following sections.

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***AT: Condition Counterplan

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Conditioning Fails – Climate Issue linkage encourages cooperation on the condition, but not on the environmental issue Carraro and Marchiori 3 (Carraro, Carlo and Marchiori, Carmen, "Endogenous Strategic Issue Linkage in International Negotiations" (April 2003). FEEM Working Paper No. 40.2003. http://ssrn.com/abstract=419060)

Let us consider an example. In the case of global environmental issues, incentives

to free-ride on emission abatement are strong and cooperation is unlikely. In addition, there is no supra-national authority that can impose the adoption of issue linkage. Negotiating countries therefore decide independently whether or not to link the negotiation on a global environmental problem to the negotiation on a different economic issue. This decision is a strategic choice that players make. A game therefore describes the incentives to link the two issues. This game is also characterised by free-riding incentives. The reason is that issue linkage may indeed

increase the number of cooperators on the provision of a global environmental good; however, at the same 4 time, issue linkage may reduce the number of cooperators on the second issue (the one linked to the provision of the global environmental good). Hence, even if issue linkage increases the number of signatories -- and therefore the amount of global environmental good provided -- it may not be an equilibrium outcome.

Conditioning only works on small issues – climate is too big. Perroni 0 [Carlo, Department of Economics Warwick University, Paola Conconi, “Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in in Multilateral Negotiations,” April, http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/papers/twerp558.pdf] Our results also suggest that conditionality can only play a positive role with respect to small" environmental problems (small in terms of the associated welfare costs and benefits in comparison with the costs and benefits of trade policies), but is more likely to be an impediment to cooperation for broader issues such as climate change. This provides a rationale for what seems to be the prevailing position in policy circles with respect to global climate treaties.27

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Conditioning Fails – Power Differential The international power differential between conditioning countries dooms the stronger country to back out. Perez 6 [Oren, Faculty of Law at Bar Ilan University, “Multiple Regimes, Issue Linkage, and International Cooperation: Exploring the Role of the World Trade Organization,” January, http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/perezwtorole.pdf] In the remaining part of this section I want to discuss in further detail some of the papers that explored these varied mechanisms. Giancarlo Spagnolo explores the synergic potential of linkage in the context of regimes with asymmetrical enforcement powers.17 He considers a model of two countries, interacting over n policy issues. The interaction over each policy issue takes place within the strategic structure of an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma with complete information. Countries are assumed to be individual, rational players.18 Underlying Spagnolo’s model is the view of the international domain as anarchic space, in which law has no independent force. This means that international agreements are meaningful only to the extent that they are self enforcing. That is, the agreement will be implemented only if there is a possible equilibrium in which (given the incentive structure pertaining to the concrete regime) no party has an incentive to withdraw (defect) unilaterally from the cooperative equilibrium. Another simplifying assumption in Spagnolo’s model is that it disregards the transaction costs associated with the expansion of the transnational regime through issue linkage. These simplifying assumptions raise various difficulties, which will be explored in the next section.

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Conditioning Fails – R&D Conditioning R&D fails – the U.S. has nothing to lose and other nations have too much to gain. Perez 6 [Oren, Faculty of Law at Bar Ilan University, “Multiple Regimes, Issue Linkage, and International Cooperation: Exploring the Role of the World Trade Organization,” January, http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/perezwtorole.pdf] Their results, which rely on computer simulations, indicate that issue linkage is unlikely to be effective in inducing the United States to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol. The intuition for this finding is as follows: the benefits from technological cooperation are much higher for the European Union, Japan, and above all the former Soviet Union, than for the United States. The threat of these three countries (the environmental coalition) to exclude the United States from R&D cooperation if it does not comply with the Kyoto agreement is therefore not credible, because the European Union, Japan, and the former Soviet Union stand to suffer a bigger loss when the issue linkage threat is implemented. In addition, the environmental benefits arising from cooperation on climate change control are smaller than the technological benefits from R&D cooperation. Therefore the European Union, Japan, and the former Soviet Union concludes that improved coordination from expanded trade may thus represent a benefit to weigh against the environmental costs of trade liberalization (e.g., the pollution havens effect). Her paper does not trace the causal path through which trade promotes environmental cooperation. She hypothesizes that trade may promote cooperation by providing opportunities for implicit side payments if explicit side payments are politically difficult, and by providing contractual opportunities for “linking” between environmental and trade concessions (economic threats support bargaining over environmental objectives). Economic integration also allows countries direct leverage over each other’s production, as, for example, through pollution content tariffs. Finally, intensive trade relationships may instill a perception of shared goals that helps resolve disputes in other arenas.29

Conditions on R&D inevitably fail. Hovi 8 [Jon, Tora Skodvin, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo, “Which Way to U.S. Climate Cooperation? Issue Linkage versus a U.S.-Based Agreement,” Review of Policy Research, Vol. 25, No. 2, The Policy Studies Organization] Barrett (2003) lists two possible explanations for this nonrestrictive approach. First, it may be impossible to deprive nonparties of such benefits. Second, it may not be in the best interests of parties to deprive nonparties of such benefits even if they could. Indeed, Barrett argues that it might be a good idea for parties to share their R&D with nonparties. If he is right, linkage to cooperation on technology R&D cannot overcome the free rider problem associated with environmental cooperation.

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Conditioning Fails – Developing Countries ( ) Developing countries would say no Michael Richardson, energy and security specialist at the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore, February 19, 2008, The New Zealand Herald, “EU’s crusade not without pitfalls,” lexis EC President Jose Manuel Barroso says Europe wants industry to stay in Europe, not export its jobs to other parts of the world. The US appears to be moving toward a similar system to pricing, capping and trading carbon emissions. But China, India and other big emerging Asian economies are extremely reluctant to put this kind mandatory restriction on their industries, fearing it would drive up costs and give competing economies an edge in foreign markets. They are likely to retaliate against environmental protection measures imposed by the West or challenge them in the WTO.

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AT: Capital Flight – Alt Cause Recent studies show no connection between capital flight and regulations Cosbey and Tarasofsky 7 (Aaron Cosbey is Associate and Senior Advisor with the International Institute for Sustainable Development, Winnipeg, Canada. Richard Tarasofsky heads the Energy, Environment and Development Programme at Chatham House. “Climate Change, Competitiveness and Trade” A Chatham House Report, June 2007.)

On the third question – is the pollution haven effect strong enough to induce industrial migration? – most of the studies that have addressed this question have failed to account for other explanatory factors.17 A few recent studies that try to control for previous errors, however, seem to find little evidence of regulation-driven migration of industry (SQW Ltd, 2006). These studies seem to show that, at current levels, pollution abatement costs inherent in stringent regulations are not as significant as a host of other determining factors: access to markets (the primary driver in most studies), labour costs, access to resources and other such variables. This is not to say that regulatory costs are not influential at the margin, however.

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***Relations

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US-EU Relations Low The Bush Administration’s invasion of Iraq has collapsed US – EU relations Asmus 3 (. Executive Director Transatlantic Center and Strategic Planning in Brussels. Foreign Affairs. September/October 2003) online: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901faessay82502-p40/ronald-dasmus/rebuilding-the-atlantic-alliance.html One of the most striking consequences of the Bush administration's foreign policy tenure has been the collapse of the Atlantic alliance. Long considered America's most important alliance and a benchmark by which a president's foreign policy skill is measured, the U.S.-European relationship has been shaken to its foundations over a series of disputes that culminated in the U.S.-led war in Iraq. To be sure, there have been rows across the Atlantic before: American opposition to the seizure of the Suez Canal by French, British, and Israeli troops in the 1950s; France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command in the 1960s; the battle over Euromissiles in the early 1980s; and the deep acrimony over how to stop war in the Balkans a decade ago. Still, the current rift has been unprecedented in its

scope, intensity, and, at times, pettiness. Several factors make the recent collapse in transatlantic cooperation surprising. The crisis came on the heels of the alliance's renaissance in the 1990s. Following deep initial differences over Bosnia at the start of the decade, the United States and Europe came together to stem the bloodshed in the Balkans in 1995 and again in 1999. Led by Washington, NATO expanded to include central and eastern Europe as part of a broader effort to secure a new post-Cold War peace. This initiative was also accompanied by the creation of a new NATO partnership with Russia. As a result, Europe today is more democratic, peaceful, and secure than ever. For the first time in a century, Washington need not worry about a major war on the continent -- a testimony to the success in locking in a post-Cold War peace over the last decade.

Moreover, although the Bush administration got off on the wrong foot with Europe during its first year in office over issues such as its spurning of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and the International Criminal Court, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, unleashed a powerful wave of support for the United States in Europe. Tragedy had handed Washington an opportunity to start afresh and reinvigorate this relationship. For the first time ever, NATO invoked the defense clause enshrined in Article V of its charter, and U.S. allies offered to join the fight in Afghanistan. But the opportunity was then squandered. Instead, the decision to make Iraq the next target in the war on terrorism -- and the manner in which the administration chose to topple Saddam Hussein -- led to a spectacular political train wreck across the

Atlantic.

US – EU relations are low in the status quo Heritage 2 (The Heritage Foundation Leadership for America. “The Future of Transatlantic Relations” August 6, 2002) online: http://www.heritage.org/research/Europe/hl756.cfm The transatlantic partnership is under serious strain with the United States and our European friends having more and more disagreements. Our differences run the gamut from economic disputes on steel and farm subsidies to limits on legal cooperation because of the death penalty here in the U.S. There are charges of U.S. "unilateralism" over our actions in Afghanistan and our decisions on the ABM Treaty, Kyoto, the International Criminal Court, the Biological Weapons Protocol, and so on. There is no agreement over what to do about Iraq or other state sponsors of terror or the crisis in the Middle East. After September 11, European critics have switched from complaining of U.S. "isolationism," to worries about "preemption." Add to this the decade-old doubts about the utility of NATO in the post-Cold War world, and one could conclude that there is today a real question as to whether Europe and the United States are parting ways.

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U.S.-EU Relations Good – Laundry List Transatlantic cooperation is essential to prevent bioterrorism attacks that are highly probable, quick timeframe, and as dangerous as nuclear war Hamilton 3 (Daniel Hamilton, Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations @ Johns Hopkins University, 6/11/2003 FDCH Congressional Testimony p. lexis) Transatlantic Homeland Security. We must develop transatlantic approaches to what Americans call homeland security and what Europeans call societal preparedness and protection. When the United States was attacked, our allies invoked the North Atlantic Treaty’s mutual defense clause, in essence stating that the September 11 attack was an attack on a shared security space—a common “homeland.” It is unlikely that a successful effort to strengthen

homeland security can be conducted in isolation from one’s allies. The United States may be a primary target for al Qaeda, but we know it has also planned major operations in Europe. A terrorist attack on Europe using weapons of mass destruction would immediately affect American civilians, forces and interests. If such an attack involved contagious disease, it could threaten the American homeland itself in a matter of hours. The SARS epidemic, while deadly, is a mild portent of what could come. A bioterrorist attack in Europe or North America is more likely and could be as consequential as a nuclear attack, but requires a different set of national and international responses. Europeans and Americans alike are woefully ill-prepared for such challenges. After the September 11 attacks, it is clear that controlling borders, operating ports or managing airports and train stations in the age of globalization involves a delicate balance of identifying and intercepting weapons and terrorists without excessively hindering trade, legal migration, travel and tourism upon which European and American prosperity increasingly depends. Americans and Europeans approach this issue, of course, from different perspectives. But unless there is systematic trans-European and transatlantic coordination in the area of

preparedness, each side of the Atlantic is at greater risk of attack.

US – EU partnership is crucial to confronting warming, terrorism, and disease Kenen 4 (Peter B. Kenen. Walker Professor of Economics and International Finance Emeritus Adjunct Senior Fellow for International Economics, Council on Foreign Relations, New York. Transatlantic relations

and the global economy. June 9th, 2004) Finally, the many new problems facing the Atlantic partners and, indeed, the whole world, are different in nature and complexity from those they used to tackle. Some, such as problems posed by demographic trends, require major changes in national regimes. Others, such as global warming, terrorism, and disease, cannot be addressed by national governments individually but cannot be addressed by the Atlantic partners without the active cooperation of other countries’ governments.

US-EU relations are key to preventing proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons that threat US national security PDGS 00 (Partnership for Democratic Governance and Security. Strengthening Transatlantic Security. A U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century. 2000) online: http://www.pdgs.org/Archivo/sts-cap6.htm NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) weapons and their delivery systems pose a major threat to international security. Over 20 countries-several of which are virtually on Europe's doorstep-already possess or are developing such weapons and/or delivery systems. The continued proliferation and potential use of NBC weapons directly threatens the United States, its Allies and friends, and could destabilize other regions of critical importance to us. American military superiority cannot shield us completely from this threat. U.S. dominance in the conventional military arena will likely encourage potential adversaries to resort to asymmetric means for attacking U.S. forces and interests overseas and Americans at home. U.S. defense planners must assume that use of NBC weapons to disrupt U.S. operations and logistics is a likely condition of future warfare. To address the NBC weapons threat, the United States pursues a multidimensional strategy. Each component of our strategy depends, to varying degrees, on close cooperation with our transatlantic Allies and Partners, backed up by active bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts.

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U.S.-EU Relations Good – Democracy US-EU relationship is key to promoting human rights and democracy, which is critical to national security Quinlan 3 (Joseph P. Quinlan. Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Relations, Johns Hopkins University. Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy 2003) The United States defines its "vital interests" as those interests of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety, and vitality of our nation. Chief among these are the physical security and territorial integrity of our nation and those of our Allies, and the protection of our critical infrastructures from paralyzing attack. In Europe these vital interests-and our enduring commitment to the principles of democracy, human rights, individual liberty, and the rule of law-are manifested in and defended by the NATO Alliance and the complex web of interlocking relationships and partnerships that define the architecture of European security in the 21st century. The promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights remain core objectives of U.S. national security strategy. Strong and vibrant democracies already exist in much of Europe. Thus, our efforts to further these objectives focus on those states that are making the difficult transition from closed to open societies. We seek to strengthen their commitment to human rights and enhance their capabilities to implement democratic reforms. We are therefore working with Allies and Partners to institutionalize democratic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, and to integrate the states of that region into Euro-Atlantic structures. Such reforms can help avert or resolve problems that, if left unchecked, may lead to ethnic conflict and regional violence, threatening the security of Allies and Partners. Our goal is to build and strengthen the pillars of civil society throughout Europe. By helping to build civil societies, we are building peace and prosperity, which helps to strengthen U.S. security. By joining the Western democratic family of nations, states that once lived under totalitarian or communist rule are today working to strengthen the forces of democracy and reform, enhancing security for the United States and all of Europe. Our abiding commitment to human rights and democracy is not only the right thing to do, it is also in our own best national interests. Grave violations of human rights, in the Balkans or elsewhere, challenge our values and our security.

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U.S.-EU Relations Good – Economy US – EU relations are key to preventing global economic collapse Quinlan 3 (Joseph P. Quinlan. Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Relations, Johns Hopkins University. Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy 2003) Neither party can afford a transatlantic split. Nor can the rest of the world. Should the U.S. and Europe become regional antagonists rather than global collaborators, the global economy will suffer as a consequence. In that the U.S. and Europe combined account for roughly 40% of world GDP and over one-third of global trade, transatlantic disputes invariably taken on global dimensions. Without U.S.European cooperation, the new global trade round launched at Doha could fail. Aid and assistance to the developing nations—notably Africa—will flounder. Europe’s enlargement process could become more fractious, as evident by the most recent split between “Old” Europe and “New” Europe regarding America’s intent to wage war with Iraqi. When elephants dance, in other words, others stand to be crushed. Moreover, the significance of a transatlantic split goes beyond the global economy. A serious rift would compromise and undermine bilateral cooperation in other areas that require U.S.-European collaboration, rather than competition. The range of global issues that require U.S.-European leadership ranges from the war on terrorism, talks on climatic change, peace in the Middle East, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and rising nuclear tensions on the Korean peninsula. In the end, cracks in the

transatlantic economy represent a clear and present danger to the U.S., Europe and the global economy. The sooner opinion leaders on both sides of the Atlantic come to recognize this dynamic, the better for all concerned.

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U.S.-EU Relations Good – Economy/Leadership ( ) U.S.-EU relations are key to the global economy and U.S. leadership Smith 06 (Mitchell P Smith, associate Professor of Political Science and International & Area Studies and CoDirector of the European Union Center at the University of Oklahoma, Jan/Feb 2006, World Literature Today, Vol.80, Iss. 1; pg. 20, Proquest) So how do we assess the rising soft power of the European Union in comparison, say, with the supreme military power of the United States? Above all, it must be kept in mind that in terms of trade, flows of capital, and international rule-making, the United States-EU relationship is the most densely interdependent on the globe. The United States and EU, in other words, are in fact more partners than rivals. An economically weak European Union is not in the interest of the United States, nor is it helpful for the global economy. The same may be said for a diplomatically weak EU. Pressing global problems cannot be resolved without international leadership, and mounting evidence indicates the United States can no longer lead alone. << INSERT BEARDEN AND/OR KHALILZAD >>

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U.S.-EU Relations Good – Leadership ( ) European relations are key to U.S. leadership Ward 05(“The Challenges of European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Retrospective and Prospective” Ian Ward Professor of Law at the University of Newcastle. Spring 2005 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, accessed 07/13/07Lexis) Moreover, whilst Hutton and Soros might welcome a new European-led world order, others are less sure that the isolation of an "exceptionalist" United States is likely to make the world a better, more stable place. 271 According to British Prime Minister Blair, any EU-U.S. schism would be "profoundly dangerous" for global security. 272 The same doubts are voiced by Timothy Garton Ash, who believes that the transatlantic relationship may not be entirely harmonious, still less perfect, but it is the only credible means for pursuing the goal of a free, or at least a freer, world - a goal that both parties share. 273 A similar conclusion is vigorously pressed by William Wallace, from whom "Europe remains the indispensable partner" for "American global leadership." 274 According to Wallace, the apparent transatlantic divergence is a misconception, representing a critical and dangerous "gap between perception and reality." 275 The same conclusion is advanced by Antony Blinken, who has likewise characterised the much-vaunted "crisis" as a "myth manufactured by elites," both political and academic. 276

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U.S.-EU Relations Good – Terrorism EU-US relations are key to combating global terrorism Ward 05(“The Challenges of European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Retrospective and Prospective” Ian Ward Professor of Law at the University of Newcastle. Spring 2005 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, accessed 07/13/07Lexis) At the same time, however, it must never be forgotten that, in the real Hobbesian world, power talks. It is for this reason that the European Union's relations with the United States will retain their central importance. Whilst the organs of security must remain multilateral, the tools will, for the foreseeable future, be supplied by NATO and, in reality, by the United States. The European Union must work within this context. As the European Union's new Coordinator for Counter- Terrorism has recently confirmed, the effectiveness of an international response to terrorism will be geared by the strength of the EU-U.S. partnership. 383 It has become fashionable to argue for the continuation of a "good cop, bad cop" approach, with the European Union sweet-talking the terrorists and dictators, whilst the United States and NATO hover menacingly in the background threatening apocalyptic intervention.

Strong EU-US Relations are key to stopping Terrorism Catto 04 (“The Post 9/11 Partnership: Transatlantic Cooperation against Terrorism” Henry E. Catto Chairman Atlantic Council Policy Paper December 2004 http://www.acus.org/docs/0412-Post_911_Partnership_Transatlantic_Cooperation_Against_Terrorism.pdf) Since the attacks of September 2001, the United States and the European Union have worked to build effective cooperation in fighting terrorism, especially in law enforcement, border and transportation security, and terrorist financing. This has not always been easy, as demonstrated by disputes over the screening of shipping containers, and information about airline passengers. But despite these differences — and the severe tensions in transatlantic relations generally — the effort to build cooperation against terrorism has been widely regarded as one of the success stories of the U.S.-European partnership.

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U.S.-EU Relations Good – Terrorism EU-US relations are key to combating terrorism –multiple agreements on security issues prove. EC 06 (European Commission, “Justice, Freedom and Security high on US-EU Transatlantic Agenda,” June, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/external/usa/fsj_external_usa_en.htm) EU-US counter-terrorism cooperation in the area of justice, freedom and security after 11 September 2001 has been very successful. Concrete results were achieved with the signature of several agreements: two Europol-US agreements in December 2001 (PDF File 27 KB) and December 2002 (PDF File 308 KB), the latter allowing for sharing of personal data. Following these two agreements, Europol has posted two liaison officers at the European Commission's Delegation in Washington DC. In June 2003 the EU-US Summit signed two criminal judicial cooperation agreements on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition (PDF File 83 KB). In addition, contacts have been established between the EU body for judicial cooperation in criminal matters EUROJUST and US law enforcement authorities and a cooperation agreement is under negotiation. The EU and the US further signed an agreement on the transfer of passenger data (PDF File 83 KB) in May 2004. The annual EU/US Summit and the Ministerial meetings regularly discuss terrorism/justice, freedom and security issues. The EU-US Summit of 26 June 2004 (PDF File 22 KB) adopted a comprehensive joint declaration on combating terrorism including financing, preventive measures and transport security.

Strong EU/US ties are key to fight terrorism through border security, financing and nonproliferation. Council of the EU 05 (“EU-US Relations”2/22, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=393&lang=en) Moreover, the two sides agreed in September 2004 to hold an annual Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial meeting. Integration and enlargement make Europe a stronger partner, with which it is more efficient for the US to deal with. In the economic field, US firms can now do business in a single market of 25 states. The EU can and does tackle more and more issues that are relevant for the US. For instance the fight against terrorism - including terrorist financing, legal assistance and extradition, as well as transport and border security - or the fight against proliferation. As for the world’s hot spots, the EU's developing Common foreign and security policy makes it a more and more capable partner for the US. EU-US relations are a top priority for EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana. Foreign policy decisions in Europe are increasingly taken in the framework of the EU. The EU is part of the "Quartet" coordinating international peace efforts in the Middle East, along with the US, Russia and the UN. In December 2003, the EU adopted its first European Security Strategy. The EU is implementing a Strategy against the proliferation of WMD. The EU also developed civilian and military crisis management capabilities, used in operations notably in the Western Balkans - where the EU launched operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 2 December 2004 following the decision by NATO to terminate its SFOR mission - and Africa. The Constitution will further strengthen the EU's foreign policy structures and instruments.

Both the EU and the US prioritize the fight against terrorism—cooperation is key. Council of the EU 05 (“EU-US Relations”2/22, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=393&lang=en) The fight against terrorism is a top priority for the EU as for the US. Terrorism is identified as one of the key threats in the European Security Strategy. In the wake of both 9/11, 2001 and 3/11, 2004, the EU adopted a wide range of measures to intensify and better co-ordinate the fight against terrorism. A Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator, Gijs de Vries, reporting to HR Solana has been appointed. EU-US cooperation is crucial in this regard. See Speech by G. de Vries in Washington on 13 May 2004 and speech by G. de Vries at Clark University on 17 October 2004.

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U.S.-EU Relations Good – Terrorism Counter-terrorism remains a high priority for the US and the EU. Council of EU 05 (“The European Union Counter-terrorism Strategy,” 10/30 http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st14/st14469-re04.en05.pdf) Across the four pillars of the Union’s Strategy a horizontal feature is the Union’s role in the world. As set out in the European Security Strategy, through its external action the European Union takes on a responsibility for contributing to global security and building a safer world. Acting through and in conjunction with the United Nations and other international or regional organisations, the EU will work to build the international consensus and promote international standards for countering terrorism. The EU will promote efforts in the UN to develop a global strategy for combating terrorism. Continuing to make counter-terrorism a high priority in dialogue with key partner countries, including the USA, will also be a core part of the European approach.

EU-US relations key to terrorism- cooperaiont Aaron 04 (“The Post 9/11 Partnership: Transatlantic Cooperation against Terrorism” David L. Aaron Senior Fellow, Dir. RAND also- Ann M. Beauchesne Exec. Dir. U.S. Chamber’s Homeland Security Frances G. Burwell Dir. Transatlantic Relations Richard Nelson fmr Dir. Development at the Atlantic Council. K. Jack Riley Assc. Dir. RAND December 2004 http://www.acus.org/docs/0412-Post_911_Partnership_Transatlantic_Cooperation_Against_Terrorism.pdf) Over the next three years, the growing U.S.-EU cooperation in combating terrorism would come to be widely regarded as one of the true success stories of transatlantic relations. That cooperation would grow quickly, bringing together agencies and institutions in the United States and Europe that had never worked together before — and in some cases, had not even existed. At U.S.-EU summits, terrorism would become a primary topic and the subject of key declarations. At the June 2004 summit, the Declaration on Combating Terrorism laid out an ambitious agenda for cooperation in this area that was widely seen as reflecting the close and successful partnership built since September 2001.

EU-US cooperation is imperitave to fighting terrorism Aaron 04 (“The Post 9/11 Partnership: Transatlantic Cooperation against Terrorism” David L. Aaron Senior Fellow, Dir. RAND also- Ann M. Beauchesne Exec. Dir. U.S. Chamber’s Homeland Security Frances G. Burwell Dir. Transatlantic Relations Richard Nelson fmr Dir. Development at the Atlantic Council. K. Jack Riley Assc. Dir. RAND December 2004 http://www.acus.org/docs/0412-Post_911_Partnership_Transatlantic_Cooperation_Against_Terrorism.pdf) Over the next decade, and perhaps much longer, the United States and Europe will continue to face the very real threat of large-scale terrorist attacks perpetrated by global organizations and networks. To date, they have taken the first steps against that threat by building a strong partnership using a range of resources and tools — law enforcement, judicial policy, trade and financial measures, border security, and transport and facilities protection. They have done so despite other tensions in the overall transatlantic relationship and very real differences in their approaches to the nature and causes of terrorism. They now face the task of deepening that partnership and constructing a truly comprehensive, joint antiterrorist effort. This will be a severe challenge, but real progress in fighting terrorism will only happen with that stronger U.S.-EU partnership.

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U.S.-EU Relations Good – Iran A.) EU/US cooperation is key to stop Iranian proliferation. European Parliament 4/26/07 (“Economic ties, missile defense and visas highlighted in debate on EU-US relations.” http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/030-5737-113-04-17-90320070420IPR05683-23-04-2007-2007-false/default_en.htm) On environmental and energy questions, the US is pressed to reconsider its position regarding ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and both parties are urged to develop alternative energy production methods and pursue greater energy efficiency. Among a wide range of international issues, Parliament calls on the Council and the USA to intensify efforts, through the Middle East Quartet, to foster negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians for a peace solution on the basis of two secure and viable states. It welcomes the formation of the Palestinian national unity government and urges both transatlantic partners to engage in a constructive dialogue with it. On Iran, Parliament welcomes the close cooperation between the EU and the US on the Iranian nuclear issue, encourages both partners to continue cooperation in strengthening the IAEA and underlines the value of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

B.) Iran Proliferation causes a global nuclear war The Daily Texan, 2004 (September 8, accessed 07/13/07 “Iran Nuclear Program Should Not Be Ignored” http://www.dailytexanonline.com/news/2004/09/08/Opinion/IranNuclear.Program.Should.Not.Be.Ignored712197.shtml) A nuclear Iran would be a geopolitical disaster for the United States. It would pose a direct nuclear threat to Israel making the prospect of nuclear exchange between the two greatest powers in the region an ever-present fear. It would put pressure on other nations in the area, fearful of Iranian aggression, to develop their own nuclear programs. Regional faith in the American security guarantee would wane as local leaders questioned America's willingness to become involved in a nuclear exchange far from its borders. We would be left with the most unstable region in the world simultaneously becoming the most nuclear. This is in addition to the obvious danger that Iran would always be able to covertly supply a terrorist group with a small nuclear device that could one day be detonated in America.

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U.S.-EU Relations Good – Trade US – EU trade relations are key to world trade CRS 3 (Congressional Research Service. Raymond J. Ahearn. Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division U.S.European Union Trade Relations: Issues and Policy Challenges) online: http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/IB10087_06092003.pdf The United States and European Union (EU) share a huge and mutually beneficial economic partnership. Not only is the U.S.-EU trade and investment relationship the largest in the world, it is arguably the most important. Agreement between the two economic superpowers has been critical to making the world trading system more open and efficient. Given a huge level of commercial interactions, trade tensions and disputes are not unexpected. In the past, U.S.-EU trade relations have witnessed periodic episodes of rising trade tensions and even threats of a trade war, only to be followed by successful efforts at dispute settlement. This ebb and flow of trade tensions has occurred again last year and this year with high-profile disputes involving steel, tax breaks for U.S. exporters, and the EU ban on approvals of GMO products.

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EU Relations Bad – Heg EU-US Relations kill US Military efficiency key to Hegemony Schake 01(“Do European Union Defense Initiatives Threaten NATO?” Kori N. Schake a senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University Strategic Forum No. 184 August 2001 http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/sck03/sck03.pdf) The U.S. Government and most military advisors from NATO members have concerns about duplicating planning structures and processes that exist in NATO. The concern most frequently raised is that duplication of NATO planning will divert resources from the Alliance; this already is occurring because of the cost of building EU military staffs. However, although this use of assets may not be optimal, it should not prohibit support by Washington— if only because the United States has long had a planning staff separate from NATO in U.S. European Command. More problematic in terms of coalitions will be managing competing approaches to military planning that are likely to emerge if the European Union seriously attempts to replicate defense and operational planning done by NATO. If EU and NATO staffs plan in different ways to utilize the same forces in managing crises, political leaders are likely to be faced with competition. Even in the unlikely event that these staffs retain a common approach, processes probably will be confusing to political leaders and delay decisions. Furthermore, the staffs are unlikely to maintain a common approach over time because EU military staffs will assume that they cannot rely on the breadth of U.S. military assets. The problem of separate planning is thus a serious one, both politically and militarily. But it is not insurmountable. It simply requires careful and dedicated work to determine how to manage the emerging EU decision structures in ways that do not impede the ability of U.S. and European forces to work together, which they are likely to do in most cases. Military planners manage these kinds of competing demands routinely, whether the context is distributing scarce assets across different contingencies or deconflicting regional plans with drawing rights on the same forces. For NATO, the risk of duplication is probably worth running if it produces a European Union more willing and able to manage crises without relying so heavily on the United States.

EU kills U.S. Hard Power Serfaty 03(“Studies Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership” Simon Serfaty director of European Studies CSIS May 2003 http://www.nato.int/docu/conf/2003/030718_bxl/serfati-transatlpart.pdf) A generation ago, it will be recalled, it was a perceived “decline” of U.S. power that was said to be causing an endangered Europe to rebel against an alleged U.S. “arrogance” in order to insulate the allies from the consequences of failed U.S. policies in Vietnam and elsewhere. By comparison, today’s arguments respond to the same general goal—this time, however, aiming at the rise of U.S. power, especially military power. The goal, it is argued, is no longer to help Europe grow but to make U.S. power shrink by imposing upon the latter the same institutional discipline—at the United Nations and within NATO—that the countries of Europe accepted in the context of their union. In other words, Europe’s fear now stems from an excess of U.S. power that is reportedly inviting a neo-interventionism à l’américaine, that is, sans the Europeans. Indeed, it is now argued in the United States, if the “old” alliance is fading for lack of followership, something “new” may have to be organized in its place—with new NATO members from Eastern and Southeastern Europe, which have not yet been corrupted by membership in the EU, or with late EU members like Britain and Spain, which have not succumbed to pressures from core members like France and Germany.3

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EU Relations Bad – Terrorism EU-US Relations hamper US counter-terrorism abilities Archick and Morelli 06(“The United States and Europe: Current Issues” Kristin Archick and Vince L. Morelli Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division CRS Report for Congress November 21, 2006 http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf) European countries and the EU have been active partners with the United States in the fight against terrorism in the years since September 2001. Washington has welcomed EU efforts to boost police and judicial cooperation among its 25 member states, stem terrorist financing, strengthen border controls, and improve transport security. The EU and the United States have concluded several new agreements on police information-sharing, extradition, mutual legal assistance, container security, and exchanging airline passenger data. Nevertheless, some challenges remain. For example, European opposition to the U.S. death penalty may still impede extradition of terrorist suspects. Some differences also persist in U.S. and EU terrorist blacklists; most notably, the EU does not recognize the Lebanese-based Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Many Europeans also fear that the United States is losing the battle for Muslim “hearts and minds” as a result of the war with Iraq, past prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, and the detention center at Guantánamo Bay. The EU has expressed its strong desire to see that facility closed as soon as possible because the Europeans believe it degrades shared values regarding human rights and disregards international accords on the treatment of prisoners. President Bush has acknowledged European concerns but stated that some of the remaining prisoners cannot be released because they are considered too dangerous. U.S. policymakers are working on forging agreements with foreign governments that would receive some of the prisoners eventually released.

Unilateralism key to fighing terror – the alternative is hard headed multilateralism Stewart Patrick, researcher at the center for international cooperation at NYU, 02 [feb 5, “MULTILATERALISM AND US FOREIGN POLICY: AMBIVALENT ENGAGEMENT, http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/127.html, accessed 7-17-07] We now find ourselves in dramatically different political and economic circumstances, especially in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. While Congress may be much more open to the use of multilateral instruments and to meeting our legal obligations, the current administration’s approach to global engagement appears far less ambivalent, indeed highly selective, based on an overriding conviction in the right and responsibility of the United States to go it alone as circumstances require, a position reinforced at the World Economic Forum by the statements of both the Secretary of State and of Treasury. Indeed, we may well be seeing a convergence around the quintessential "selective" processes defined earlier by Richard Haass as "a la carte multilateralism" and more recently as "hard-headed multilateralism."