Estafa-jurisprudence.docx

PEOPLE v. FELIX MANANSALA + [ GR No. L-13142, Jan 30, 1959] DOCTRINE xxx "the only person who could have made the erasures and the super impositions mentioned is the one who will be benefited by the alterations thus made" and that "he alone could have the motive for making such alterations." It is an established rule that when a person has in his possession a falsified document and makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is justified that such person is the forger. (See U. S. vs. Viloria, 1 Phil. 682; People The circumstances, therefore, that accused made use of and benefited from the falsified TVR is a strong evidence that he either himself falsified it or caused the same to be falsified (U. S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil. 449), he being criminally responsible in either case. xxx Appellant's exclusive possession, opportunity and motive to falsify the TVR in question constitute circumstantial evidence justifying the inference (sometimes loosely referred to as a presumption of fact) that the forger was appellant herein, in the absence of adequate explanation. xxx

ESTAFA (Presumptive Author) Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents RICHARD CHUA vs People of the Philippines G.R. No. 183132 February 8, 2012 However, since he benefited from the fictitious transactions in question, the inevitable conclusion is that he falsified them. It is an established rule that when it is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified document and makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is justified that such person is the forger. Falsification of Public Document SPOUSES REVELO VILLAMAR and CORAZON PENULIARVILLAMAR vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 178652

December 8, 2010 It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the person who stood to benefit by the falsification of a public document and was in possession of it is presumed to be the material author of the falsification. Falsification of Public Document NORMALLAH A. PACASUM vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 180314 April 16, 2009 citing (U.S. v. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453; People v. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People v. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People v. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338; People v. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253). The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers.

Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document GINA A. DOMINGO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 186101 October 12, 2009 xxx if a person has in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it, taking advantage of it and profiting from it, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.

For petitioner to be convicted of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document committed in the manner described in the Information, all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public document must exist. To secure a conviction for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the following requisites must concur: (1) The accused made false pretenses or fraudulent representations as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (2) The false pretenses or fraudulent representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; (3) The false pretenses or fraudulent representations constitute the very cause which induced the offended party to part with his money or property; (4) That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. [Gonzaludo v. People, G.R. No. 150910, February 6, 2006, 481 SCRA 569, 577] -vis a visArticle 172 of the RPC: Falsification of a public document. The following requisites must concur, to wit: (1) That the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who took advantage of his official position; (2) That he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (which in this case involves forging a signature);

(3) That the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document. ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

To secure a conviction for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the following requisites must concur: (1) The accused made false pretenses or fraudulent representations as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (2) The false pretenses or fraudulent representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; (3) The false pretenses or fraudulent representations constitute the very cause which induced the offended party to part with his money or property; (4) That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. G.R. No. 150910 February 6, 2006 Gonzaludo vs. People

PRESUMPTION AGAINST THE POSSESSOR OF A FALSIFIED DOCUMENT ROOTS IN JURISPRUDENCE In the 1906 case of U.S. v. Castillo, the Court laid down the rule that the utterance or use of a forged instrument, when unexplained, is strong evidence tending to establish that the user himself (or herself) either forged the instrument or caused it to be forged. In this case, the accused merely denied ever presenting the forged check to the complainant or receiving the amount it represented; the Court found no merit in these denials. In People v. De Lara, the Court again applied the presumption after finding the explanation of the accused on how he came into possession of checks that were subsequently encashed to be unusual and unreasonable as to carry conviction.

In People v. Domingo (1926), the Court applied the presumption because a few days after the certificate of title (over a property) was loaned to the accused, a forged deed of sale covering the property was executed by two alleged vendors. The Court ruled that the failure of the accused to explain what she did with the certificate of title loaned to her could only lead to the inference that she placed the certificate of title in the hands of her confederates as without the certificate, the forgery could not have been accomplished. In People v. Astudillo (1934), the Court clarified that for the presumption to apply, the use of the forged document must be accompanied by these circumstances: the use is so closely connected in time with the forgery, or the user may be proved to have the capacity to undertake the forgery, or such close connection with the forgers to create a reasonable link. These additional circumstances have been loosely applied in subsequent cases. In Alarcon v. Court of Appeals (1967), the Court applied the presumption after considering the patent irregularity in the transaction and the extraordinary interest of the accused in the property covered by the forged document/s in holding that no reasonable and fairminded man would say that the accused had no knowledge of the falsification. In, Sarep v. Sandiganbayan (1989 case), gave occasion for the ruling that since the accused was the only person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the document found in his possession, the presumption of authorship of the falsification applies in the absence of contrary convincing proof by the accused. In the more recent (1992) Caubang v. People, the accused - who claimed to have the authority to transact (in behalf of an entity) with a government agency in Manila - attempted to overthrow the presumption of authorship against him by alleging intervening circumstances from the time he arrived in Manila until the transaction with the government agency was made. The accused claimed the he did not carry the forged document when he arrived in Manila and that third persons (including a fixer) actually transacted with the government. Allegedly, these claims disproved that he had any

knowledge or inference in the making of the submitted forged document. Rejecting this claim, the Court ruled that: [U]tilizing a fixer as part of the scenario becomes a convenient ploy to divert the mind of the court from the more plausible inference that the accused-petitioner engineered the spurious [document]. xxxx Even if the allegation that some other person [did the transaction] was true, the accused-petitioner would still be subjected to the same conclusion. xxxx Having been the one responsible for the filing of the registration papers, including the means he felt necessary to accomplish the registration, the accused must likewise be accountable therefor. As the authorized representative, he is deemed to have been the one in custody or possession, or at least the one who has gotten hold even for a short while, of the papers which included the [falsified document]. That he knew of the execution of the statement is a possibility not too difficult to imagine under the circumstances. xxxx The [submission] of the previously inexistent document [with the government] subjects the accused-petitioner to the inference that he used it as part of the registration papers. In the absence of a credible and satisfactory explanation of how the document came into being and then filed with the [government agency], the accused is presumed to be the forger. In Dava v. People (1991), involving an accused who misrepresented to his friend that he had no driver’s license and thereafter induced his friend to deal with fixers so that he could have a driver’s license, the Court ruled that the patent irregularity that attended the

procurement of the license cannot escape the conclusion that the accused knew that the license he obtained was fake and that he acted as a principal by inducement in the falsification of the license. The above case law instructs us that if a person had in his possession (actual or constructive) a falsified document and made use of it, taking advantage of it and/or profiting from such use, the presumption that he authored the falsification also applies.

Circumstantial Evidence To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. Circumstantial evidence on record will be sufficient to convict the accused if it shows a series of circumstances duly proved and consistent with each other. Each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accused's guilt and inconsistent with the accused's innocence. 9 The circumstances must be proved, and not themselves presumed. (People v. Macabare y Lopez, G.R. No. 179941, [August 25, 2009], 613 PHIL 474-490)

ESTAFARule 171

The foregoing elements were not established. There was no positive testimonyand positive identification from the prosecution’s witnesses that the accused CharisaKey Esteban falsified a public document. Neither did the prosecution refute thetestimony of the herein accused and her witness that the falsification was committed bya certain Boy Perez. In Alonzo vs. IAC 151 SCRA 552, our Supreme Court held, “ Therespondent court mistakenly applied the rule that: “one found in the possession of and who used a forged document is the forger or the one who caused the forgery andtherefore , guilty of falsification. The accused is entitled to the constitutionalpresumption of innocence especially where the evidence on the alleged forged voucheris extremely doubtful.” In all criminal cases, mere speculations cannot substitute forproof in establishing the guilt of the accused. Indeed, suspicion no matter how strongmust never sway judgment. Where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must beacquitted even though their innocence may not have been established. The Constitutionpresumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy of long standingthat the presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted as amatter of right. Although the evidence for the defense may be frail, criminal convictionmust come, not from its weakness, but from the strength of that for the prosecution.

632 Phil. 191 In Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals,55 the heirs of the deceased falsified the signature of the latter in a Notice of Appeal. The Court rejected the imputation of falsification because the forgery produced no effect: In the instant case, given the heirs' admissions contained in several pleadings that Avelino and Pedro are already deceased and their submission to the jurisdiction of the Regional Adjudicator as the successors-in-interest of the decedents, the effect would be the same if the heirs did not sign the decedents' names but their own names on the appeal.56

It appears from the evidence in chief of the defendants-appellants (petitioners herein) that the witness, Atty. Gertrudo B. Flores, the notary public before whom the deed of donation was acknowledged, had known very well the donor, Josefa Capuno, being the widow of a late distant relative of Atty. Flores from Sta. Ana, San Pablo City (TSN, p. 6, Hearing on May 18, 1973); that Josefa Capuno had told him (Atty. Flores) that Atty. Gajitos who had originally drafted the deed had read to her the contents of the document (TSN, p. 8, Hearing on May 18, 1973); and that she was in her sound mind and active discernment (TSN, p. 9, Hearing on May 18, 1973). On the essential and material facts, the testimony of the notary public who is also a lawyer is satisfactory and must be given m•re credence than the testimonies of the Capuno witnesses which merely implied that the thumbmark on the deed of donation was not affixed by Josefa Capuno since no deed was notarized during her confinement at the hospital. These witnesses are interested in inheriting the properties donated under the questioned document. Assuming that the thumbmark was a fake, then the notary public was responsible therefor or participated in the commission of the criminal act, but there is no showing that the Capunos ever complained or instituted criminal or disciplinary action against him for the falsification which belie private respondents' allegations of forgery. Considering that the deed of donation is a public instrument and therefore entitled to the presumption of law that official duty has been regularly performed, We must sustain its validity because private respondents have failed to prove the two alleged grounds for the annulment of the donation by strong, complete and conclusive evidence of its falsity or nullity. We have reviewed and analyzed the evidence presented by the plaintiffs- appellees and We find the same to be weak, flimsy and insufficient to annul the donation. Hence, the complaint must fall and should be dismissed. In not dismissing said complaint, respondent court gravely erred and abused its discretion. As to the third issue, We find its resolution moot and academic since We have ruled that the deed of donation was valid and may not be annulled. Assuming that in Special Proceedings No. Sp-296 entitled "IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA CAPUNO", it was therein established that Josefa Capuno died a widow, without any ascendant nor descendant, whether legitimate or otherwise and that her only heirs are her niece, Lydia Capuno, and her nephews, Felix Capuno, Simeon Capuno, Gerardo Capuno, and Aniceto Capuno, who are the plaintiffs, such declaration of heirship cannot affect, prejudice nor reduce the donation since private respondents admit that there are fifteen (15) parcels of land left by the donor, Josefa Capuno, at the time of her death which were not disposed of by virtue of a will or testament. (TSN, pp. 32-33, Hearing on Nov. 11, 1971). The records do not show the disposition of these fifteen parcels of land. We can presume, however, that they constitute the intestate estate of the deceased, Josefa Capuno, to which private respondents may legally succeed and inherit. The deed of donation inter vivos must, however, be respected.