Election.docx

The mere absence from one’s residence or origin –domicile –to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice his vocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. A previous registration as voter in a municipality other than that in which he is elected is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of his residence or origin. FACTS: The respondent was proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur. He was born in Caoayan, Ilocos Sur in 1895; came to Manila to pursue his studies; went to the US for the same purpose; returned to the Philippines in 1923; lectured in the UP; and engaged in newspaper work in Manila, Iloilo and later on again in Manila. The crucial and pivotal point upon which the eligibility of respondent to office is assailed, is his registration as voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947. Whether or not respondent's acts, activities, and utterances constitute abandonment or loss of his residence of origin. HELD: Mere absence from one's residence of origin –domicile –to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. The determination of a person's legal residence or domicile largely depends upon intention which may be inferred from his acts, activities and utterances. The party who claims that a person has abandoned or lost his residence of origin must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss. A previous registration as voter in a municipality other than that in which he is elected is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of his residence of origin. A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for “greener pastures”, as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot, but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from the place of his professional or business activities; so there he registers as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and it not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin, has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to the place of his birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one’s birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another. TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC FACTS:Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her

Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte. HELD:Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons: 1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte; 2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. 4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones. JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC and ERASMO Doctrine: Proof required to establish domicile of a reinstated Filipino citizen running for governor of a province FACTS:Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He migrated to Australia when he was eight years old and acquired Australian citizenship. In 2008, he returned to the Philippines and lived in Zamboanga, he took an oath of allegiance to the Philippines and was issued a certificate of reacquisition of citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration and he renounced his Australian citizenship. Jalosjos applied for registration as a voter in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, but Private Respondent Erasmo, the barangay captain, opposed the registration. COMELEC approved the application and included Jalosjos in the voter's list. This decision was affirmed at the MCTC and at the RTC. Jalosjos then filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay for the 2010 elections. Erasmo filed a petition to cancel the COC on the ground of failure to comply with the one year residency requirement of the Local Government Code (LGC). COMELEC held that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish a domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that when he first moved back to the Philippines, he was merely a guest or transient at his brother's house in Ipil, and for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile. Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the elections. ISSUE:Whether or not the COMELEC is correct in holding that petitioner did not present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish domicile at Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

HELD:NO. The COMELEC is incorrect. Jalosjos has successfully proven by his acts of renouncing his Australian citizenship and by living in Ipil, that he has changed his domicile to Zamboanga Sibugay. The LGC requires that a gubernatorial candidate be a resident of the province for at least one year before the elections. For the purposes of election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile: i.e. he must have an intention to reside in a particulaar place, but must also have personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The question of residence is a question of intention. To determine compliance with the residency/domicile requirement, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a)

every person has a domicile or residence somewhere;

(b)

where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and

(c)

a person can have but one domicile at a time.

The facts show that Jalosjos' domicile of origin was Quezon city. When he acquired Australian citizenship, Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice. On the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country and reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Philippines. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. To hold that Jalosjos has not established a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere. Neither can COMELEC conclude that Jalosjos did not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother's house. A candidate is not required to have a house in order to establish his residence or domicile in that place. It is enough that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile. As evidence, Jalosjos presented his next-door neighbors who testified that he was physically present in Ipil, he presented correspondence with political leaders and local and national party mates, furthermore, he is a registered voter by final judgement of the RTC. The court also noted that Jalosjos has since acquired a lot in Ipil and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. This, without a doubt is sufficient to establish his intent to set his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. FACTS: Petitioner Akbayan Youth seek to direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before May 2001 General Elections for new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189. A request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001 was passed but it was denied by the COMELEC. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the Commission has no

more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities. ISSUE:Whether or not the Court can compel respondent COMELEC, to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELEC’s imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections. HELD:The Supreme Court could not compel Comelec to conduct a special registration of new voters. The right to suffrage is not absolute and must be exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the Constitution. Petitioners failed to register, thus missed their chance. However, court took judicial notice of the fact that the President issued a proclamation calling Congress to a Special Session to allow the conduct of special registration for new voters and that bills had been filed in Congress to amend Republic Act No. 8189. KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE PALATINO, et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS On February 12, 2009 the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8585 adjusting the deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections to October 31, 2009, instead of December 15, 2009 as fixed by their prior Resolution No. 8514 pursuant to R.A. 8189 or the Voter‘s Registration Act of 1996. The public clamored for an extension but the COMELEC argued that they need more time to prepare for the automated elections. It contends that the Omnibus Election Code confer upon it the power to promulgate rules ad regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and honest elections. It also cited the case of Akbayan-Youth v. Commission on Elections where the court denied a similar prayer for an extension of the deadline of voter registration for the May 14, 2001 elections. Raymond V. Palatino, representative of Kabataan Party-list assailed the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 and seeks declaration of its nullity. Palatino contends that this would be considered an encroachment of the legislative power of Congress as it amends the system of continuing voter registration under Section 8 of The Voter‘s Registration Act of 1996. It was prayed that Resolution No. 8585 be declared null and void and to extend the registration until January 9, 2010. ISSUE:Whether or not R.A. 8585, adjusting the deadline of voter registration to October 31, 2009 instead of December 15, 2009, is null and void. Ruling: COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is null and void insofar as it set the deadline of voter registration for the 10 May 2010 elections on 31 October 2009. Voter registration for the 2010 elections is extended until 9 January 2010. The clear text of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189 decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during regular offices hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election. By this provision, Congress itself has determined that the period of 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election is enough time for the COMELEC to make ALL the necessary preparations with respect to the coming elections. And the COMELEC’s rule-making power should be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law. Both Section 29 of Republic Act No. 6646 and Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436 grant the COMELEC the power to fix other periods and dates for pre-election activities only if the same cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by law. There is no ground to hold that the mandate of continuing voter registration cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by Section 8 of Republic Act 8189. There is, thus, no occasion for the COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other dates or deadlines therefor. The present case is different from Akbayan-Youth vs. COMELEC. Petitioners in Akbayan filed their petition with the Court within the 120-day prohibitive period for the conduct of voter registration under Section 8 of R.A. 8189, and sought the conduct of a two-day registration on 17 and 18 February 2001, also within the 120-day prohibitive period. In the present case, both the dates of filing of the petition (30 October 2009) and the extension sought (until 9 January 2010) are prior to the 120-day prohibitive period. Facts: Bagong Bayani and and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before the COMELEC a Petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the COMELEC. This resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those impleaded, in the 2001 party list elections. Petitioners seek the

disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the none-marginalized or overrepresented. Issues: a. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections b. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to ‘marginalized and underrepresented’ sectors and organizations. Held: The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the COMELEC which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. The resolution of this Court directed the COMELEC “to refrain proclaiming any winner” during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the COMELEC have compiled and reported its compliance. a. Yes b. No. Rationale: a. Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system. For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." b. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. The provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007. In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules: 1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution); 2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat; 3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.

4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the partylist election (3 seat cap rule, same case). The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution. BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest). On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties. ISSUES: I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house? II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling. III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid. IV. How are party-list seats allocated? V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections. VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

HELD: I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives. How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula: (Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives Hence, (220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55 II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled. III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast a requalified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained: To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55

seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied partylist seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present. It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.” IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat. But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules: RANKING: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. 2% GUARANTY. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. ADDITIONAL SEATS 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. LIMITATION. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation). The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives. How is this done? Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed. Example: In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900). Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79 Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats. Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.

V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc)from participating in the party-list elections. Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Borja vs Comelec Borja vs Comelec case brief summary Facts:Jose Capco Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros in the 1988 election. On September 2, 1989 he became mayor, by operation of law upon the death of the incumbent mayor. He was elected for mayor in the 1992 election and was reelected in the 1995 election. He filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor relative to the upcoming 1998 elections. Petitioner who was a candidate for mayor sought the disqualification of Jose Capco Jr. on the ground of the three-term limit rule under the constitution and local government code. Capco got the majority of votes and was proclaimed as mayor of Pateros. Issue:Whether or not Capco Jr. is eligible to run for mayor. Ruling:Yes, the three-term limit for elective local official refers to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. In relation to this it is not enough that a person has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position. Therefore, the succession by operation of law by Capco does not count as a term in counting the three-term limit rule. FACTS: The case is a resolution of two consolidated petitions – one filed by Attys. Venancio Q. Rivera III and Atty. Normandick de Guzman against Marino “Boking Morales, and the other one filed by Anthony D. Dee, the candidate who obtained the second highest vote after Morales. In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. Petitioners filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel respondent Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that he was elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy violated Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160. Respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the second term from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer" since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). He was also preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft case from January to July 1999. ISSUE: Whether or not Morales violated the three-‐term limit rule when he ran for re-‐election as mayor in the 2004 elections.

HELD: For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. Respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years. His assumption of office for the second term constituted “service for the full term” and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-termlimit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions barring local electiveofficials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position. The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. Therefore, having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes. Facts: Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with the COMELEC to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat on the ground that the latter was elected and had fully served three previous consecutive terms in violation of Section 43 of the Local Government Code. Dizon alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales should not have been allowed to have filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the same position and same municipality. Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and qualified to run as mayor of Mabalacat because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. He averred that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the RTC declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998 elections. Thus, he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. His term should be reckoned from 2001. He added that his election in 2004 is only for his second term. COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It took judicial notice of SC’s ruling in the Rivera case promulgated on May 9, 2007 where it was held that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and 2001 (notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest case that the then proclamation of Morales was void). The SC ruled in that case that Morales violated the three-term limit under Section 43 of the LGC. Hence, Morales was considered not a candidate in the 2004 elections, and this failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and allows him to run again for the same position in 2007 elections. Issues: 1. WON the period served by Morales in the 2004-2007 term (although he was ousted from his office as Mayor on May16, 2007) should be considered his fourth term 2. WON the 2007-2010 term of Morales is his 5th term Held: 1. NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during his fourth term. We cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes. Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code state that the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. We disqualified Morales from his candidacy in the May 2004 elections because of the three-term limit. Although the trial court previously ruled that Morales’ proclamation for the 1998-2001 term was void, there was no interruption of the continuity of Morales’ service with respect to the 1998-2001 term because the trial court’s ruling was promulgated only on 4 July 2001, or after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term. Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayor’s office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. (4th term) 2. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales’ fifth term in office. NO. Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods: 1995-1998 1998-2001 2001-2004 2004-2007. However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales’ occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 2004-2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the threeterm limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales’ first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Aldovino VS COMELEC FACTS: Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office. Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by herein petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional limit. ISSUE: WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC? RULING: NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).

The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilo’s disqualification. “Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It noted that preventive suspension can pose as a threat “more potent” than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the threeterm limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed. FACTS: The court declared as unconstitutional the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. BACKGROUND: Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as unconstitutional. Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration. The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679: “Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in GOCCs shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon filling of his certificate of candidacy“ ISSUE: Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal protection clause of the constitution. HELD: The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as constitutional. RULING: These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan political campaign is unmistakable. The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification if the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated different from the other. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privelege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not enfringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and reasonable ground exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials and appointive officials. Elective officials occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. Appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing authority.