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AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Potenciano ILUSORIO and Teresa ILUSORIO vs COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, et al. No. L-20344 / 17 SCRA 25 May 16, 1966

palay used as seed, and the cost of harvesting and threshing of the past three normal harvests. o First class lands are those that yieldmore than 40 cavans per hectare. o Second class lands are those that yield 40 cavans or less per hectare. o Both are computed upon the normal average harvest of the past three preceding years.

Petition for Review on Certiorari of a Decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations. Facts: -

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Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land located in San Miguel, Bulacan. Respondents are tenants on the same property. Respondents wanted to change their tenancy contract from shared tenancy to leasehold tenancy. However, petitioners refused, and instituted this case with the CAR. Their case was based on the unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 1199. The CAR rejected the idea, maintaining the constitutionality of the same.

Whether or not Section 14 of R.A. 1199 violates the freedom of contract and impairs property rights. o Petitioners used this as the basis of their argument of unconstitutionality. Whether or not the CAR arbitrarily fixed the rentals to be paid by respondents on the basis of the average harvest for three preceding agricultural years, instead of determining it from year to year. o The CAR fixed the rentals to be paid by respondents at 20% of the average harvest from 1959-60, 1960-61, and 1961-62.

SC: CAR decision AFFIRMED. The prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts is not absolute. They are restricted to contracts with respect to property, or some object of value, and confer rights which may be asserted in court. They have no application to statute relating to public subjects, within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State, involving public right and welfare of the entire community affected by it. o They do not prevent proper exercise of police power. o Such regulations are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community. o Such laws do not impair the right of the landowner to dispose or alienate his property, nor prohibit him to make such transfer or alienation.  They only provide that in case of transfer, the tenancy relationship between landowner and tenant should be preserved. The purpose of the law is to maintain the tenants in peaceful possession and cultivation of the land, and afford them protection against unjustified dismissal. o R.A. 1199 is a remedial legislation, pursuant to social justice in the exercise of the police power of the State. Section 46 (a) of the same Act, as amended, fixes the consideration for use of ricelands to be not more than 25% in case of first class land, and 20% in case of second class land, of the average gross produce, after deducting the amount of

Lucia DE LA PAZ vs COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS and Marcos Papag No. L-21488 / 25 SCRA 479 October 14, 1968 Petition for Certiorari of a Decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations. Facts: -

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Respondent Papag was the tenant of herein petitioner De La Paz. The former sent the latter a letter informing her of his desire to change their tenancy relation to leasehold. Said letter was received by petitioner. However, instead of agreeing to the proposal, petitioner filed a petition before the CAR, praying that the court cause confrontation of the parties for arbitration. Respondent prayed to dismiss the petition on the ground that it had been filed only to delay the change sought by him. While the case was pending before the CAR, petitioner filed another case before the same court and against the same tenant, this time to eject respondent tenant on the ground that he had deliberately failed to deliver her share of the rice crop. After a stipulation of facts, the parties agreed that the main issues to be tackled are: o Constitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 1199. o Rentals shall be determined by evidence submitted.

CAR: Both cases DISMISSED against the tenant. The CAR set the tenancy relation to leasehold. Rentals were set as follows: o Palagad crop, at 13.5 cavans of palay. o Panahon crop, at 18 cavans of palay. o Both to be paid within 10 days from threshing. Petitioner appealed. Issue: Whether or not Section 46(a) of R.A. 1199, in computing the normal average harvest for the 3 preceding agricultural years, means only calendar years. SC: CAR decision AFFIRMED. Calendar Years vs Agricultural Years: If the law means “calendar years”, then all crops produced in one o calendar year have to be added together, and the average of three of such years is the measure of productivity.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello o

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If the law means “agricultural years”, then every crop represents one

year, and the average of three such crops should be used as basis to determine productivity. The CAR acted correctly to avoid any inequity when it sent the computation for rent for each crop. o The consideration declared by law, under Section 46(a), as rentals for the use of ricelands is computed on the bases of the past three normal harvests, without any qualification . o Such average of three normal harvests, or three agricultural years, is the bases for computing rental. o Since respondent produces two crops a year (the latter being invariably bigger), it is only fair that separate rentals be fixed for each crop. o A fixed rental for both crops would be disadvantageous:  To the tenant at harvest time of the palagad crop, where produce is lesser.  To the landowner at harvest time of the panahon crop, where produce is bigger. If improvements were introduced on the farm by the landowner which increase productivity, he may demand for an increase in the rental proportionate to the increase in production resulting from such improvements.

Cayetano DE BORJA vs COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, et al. No. L-24398 Cayetano DE BORJA vs Hon. Jose Santos, et al. No. L-27478 / 79 SCRA 557 October 25, 1977 Petitions for Review of the Decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations. Facts: -

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Private respondents herein are shared tenants of petitioner de Borja on several parcels of land located in San Miguel, Bulacan, and Gapan Nueva Ecija. Private respondents informed petitioner of their desire to change their relationship from shared tenancy to leasehold. Petitioner opposed such conversion. Respondents filed an action against petitioner with the CAR, asking the court to: o Uphold the change of tenancy system. o Order a reliquidation of harvests from agricultural year 1959-1960, up to the agricultural year 1963-1964. An issue raised was the efficacy of the shared tenancy contract, since the period for the same was left blank in the contracts.

CAR: Partial decision in favor of respondents. The CAR declared that the tenancy relationship between the parties shall be the leasehold system effective the next agricultural year (1964-65).

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In the interim, respondents moved to order the threshing and temporary liquidation of harvests. But upon finding that said harvests were already threshed, the CAR ordered a temporary liquidation of net produce. o Liquidation of net produce: harvests from gross produce, less seeds used and fees for reaping and threshing. Two years later, a similar order was issued, this time including costs of irrigation. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari, seeking to annul the CAR orders deducting costs of irrigation from gross harvests. He likewise assailed the constitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 1199 Petitioner likewise argues that since the contract does not provide for the efficacy of the share tenancy contracts, it shall have force and effect for as long as respondents shall remain his tenants, meaning they will remain as tenants until either death, dismissal by court, or voluntary surrender of the landholding.

Issue: Whether or not the stipulation as to the period between the parties is limited and effective to only one agricultural year. Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Sec. 14 of R.A. 1199 (its constitutionality was upheld). SC: CAR decision PARTIALLY AFFIRMED. Section 6 of Act 4054 contemplates two situations: o One where the parties expressly stipulate the duration of the contract, in which Sec. 6 allows (the contract shall last in accordance with the stipulation of the parties). o One where the parties omit to stipulate the same, in which Sec. 6 states one agricultural that the contract shall be understood to last only during year. Petitioner argues that since there was no stipulation as to the period, the duration of the contract is indefinite, and will last as long as the respondents remain his tenants. If such argument is upheld, then respondents’ right to seek the change o of relationship from one of share tenancy to leasehold, a right explicitly secured to them by Sec. 14, is rendered nugatory. o This argument contravenes the very spirit and purpose of Section 14, which gives respondents the right of choice and determination of the system that will control and govern their relationship with petitioner. Respondents also averred that it was petitioner’s intent to leave the o same blank, leaving it susceptible to several interpretations.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Spouses ENDAYA, et al. vs COURT OF APPEALS and Pedro Fideli G.R. No. 88113 / 215 SCRA 109 October 23, 1992 Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Facts: -

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Spouses Trinidad owned a piece of land located in Malvar, Batangas. Said land was devoted to production of rice and corn. Private respondent Fidel has been cultivating this land as tenant under a 50-50 share agreement. A lease contract was executed between the spouses and one Cassanova, where the latter was obliged to pay P400 per hectare per annum, and gave him authority to oversee the planting of crops. Respondent signed this lease contract as one of the witnesses. The same lease contract was renewed, but the rental was raised to P600. The same was signed by respondent as witness. During the duration of both lease contracts, respondent continued to cultivate the land, and shared equally with Cassanova. The spouses eventually sold the land to petitioners for P26,000.00. The sale was registered, and a TCT was duly issued. Respondent continued to farm the land, despite petitioners’ demand for him to vacate the land. Respondent then filed a complaint with the RTC-Tanauan, praying that he be declared an agricultural tenant of the petitioners.

RTC-Tanauan: Ruled in favor of PETITIONERS. The lower court ruled that respondent is not an agricultural lessee. CA: RTC decision REVERSED. The CA ruled that respondent is an agricultural lessee. Upon review to the SC, petitioner argued that when the srcinal landowners entered into a lease contract with Cassanova, the relationship between the former and respondent was terminated. The landowner cannot have a civil law lease with one party and an agricultural leasehold agreement with another over the same land. Issue: Whether or not the lease contract terminated the tenancy relationship between the spouses and respondent. SC: CA decision AFFIRMED. The fact that the landowner entered into a civil lease contract and gave the lessee the authority to oversee the farming did not cause the extinguishment of the agricultural leasehold relation, since it is not among the causes provided for by law. o Sec. 10, R.A. 3844, as amended by R.A. 6839, explains that the agricultural leasehold relation shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of term, nor by sale, alienation, or transfer of legal possession of the landholding. o Transactions involving agricultural land over which an agricultural leasehold subsists resulting in change of ownership will not terminate

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the rights of the agricultural lessee. He is given protection by law by making such rights enforceable against the transferee, or the landowner’s successor-in-interest. The execution of a lease agreement did not terminate respondent’s status as an agricultural lessee. o The fact that he signed both agreements did not mean he waived his rights as such. o In fact, it was his right to know about the same, since he had to deal with a new person instead of with the srcinal owners as he used to. Petitioners argue that respondent cannot be an agricultural lessee of their land since the latter did not secure their permission to cultivate the same. o While agricultural tenancy is not created where consent of the true and lawful owners is absent, this principle only applies to a situation where an untenanted farm landis cultivated without the owner’s knowledge, or against his will. o In the present case, petitioners were successors-in-interest to a tenanted land, where consent was already given by the srcinal owners. The same binds petitioners who stepped into the srcinal landowner’s shoes, acquiring not only their rights, but also their obligations.

Trinidad GABRIEL vs Eusebio PANGILINAN G.R. No. L-27797 August 26, 1974 Appeal from the Decision of the CFI-Pampanga. Facts: -

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Petitioner filed a complaint in the CFI-Pampanga against respondent, alleging that she is the owner of a fishpond over which she entered into an oral contract of lease with respondent on a year to year basis. Rentals were pegged at P1,200.00 plus real estate taxes. Desiring to develop and cultivate the fishpond herself, she notified respondent that she was terminating the contract. However, upon respondent’s request the lease contract was extended for another year. Petitioner demanded again the surrender of the property, but was ignored. Hence, the filing of the present case. Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the CFI had no jurisdiction over the case, which he argues should have been filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between the parties. However, this motion was denied. Defendant alleged that the fishpond was srcinally leased to him by petitioner’s father, for as long as defendant wanted, upon the condition that he would convert a major portion into a fishpond.

CFI-Pampanga: It has jurisdiction over the case.

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No tenancy relationship exists between the parties, since the lease contract is manifestly a civil lease governed by the Civil Code, not by R.A. 1199.

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Issue: Whether or not there was a tenancy relationship between the parties. SC: CFI decision AFFIRMED. In order that a leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act may exist, the following requisites must concur: o Land worked by tenant isagricultural land.  There is no doubt that the fishpond is agricultural land, as it is considered by R.A. 1199 as such. But this fact alone does not make respondent a leasehold tenant. o Land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his immediate farm household.  The question of whether such a big parcel of land (17 hectares) is susceptible of being worked by the respondent’s family was not raised. o Land must becultivated by the tenant either personally or with aid of labor from members of his immediate household.  Records of the case show that respondent eventually became ill and incapacitated. Records further show that not even the members of respondent’s immediate farm household worked the land in question. Laborers instead worked on the property. o Land belongs to another. o Use of the land by the tenant isfor a consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both. CFI-Pampanga was correct, therefore, when it assumed jurisdiction over the case.

Antonio EVANGELISTA y Lising vs COURT OF APPEALS, Luz Castaneda, and Heirs of Benedicto Sanchez G.R. No. L-37736 / 158 SCRA 41 February 23, 1988 Petitioner for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Facts: -

Private respondents own a parcel of land with an area of 5 hectares, situated at Lugam, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner filed a complaint for reinstatement, with damages, in the Court of Agrarian Relations in Bulacan, against Sanchez and Felipe Domingo. Petitioner claimed that he was the tenant of Sanchez, until he was illegally ejected from the land when Sanchez informed him to fix the amount of rental in accordance to R.A. No. 3844.

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Private respondents denied the forcible eviction, and claimed that petitioner occupied the land as lessee under a civil lease contract. They anchored their defense on 3 written contracts executed by Sanchez and petitioner. o Under the “Kasulatang Option”, the land was leased to petitioner for P2000.00, with Sanchez having the option to renew the lease. Under the “Kasulatan ng Buwisan 6”, petitioner was to pay 100 cavans o of rice as rent. Said contract also expressly stated that petitioner was not to be considered a tenant of the land, and that Sanchez would not have any share in the produce. Petitioner also paid a deposit of P2,500.00, to be returned after the expiration of the contract. “Kasulatan ng Buwisan 7” contained the same terms and conditions as o the previous “Kasulatan ng Buwisan 6”, except that the period of the contract was for one agricultural year, and rent for the use of landholding was reduced to 90 cavans of rice. Petitioner also paid P2,250.00 deposit, to be returned after expiration of the contract. Respondents then executed “Kasulatan ng Buwisan 8”, this time with one Felipe Domingo.

CAR: Petitioner was illegally ejected. The CAR considered petitioner as an agricultural lessee, and ordered Felipe Domingo to surrender possession of the land to petitioner. CA: CAR order REVERSED. When petitioner first took possession of the property, it was by virtue of a lease contract, admittedly, was given to him. The two most important conditions of a lease agreement was the deposit paid by petitioner and the stipulation that Sanchez will not have any share in the produce. Petitioner’s own witness admitted that petitioner used to hire plowers, harrowers, planters, and farm laborers. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is an agricultural lessee under R.A. 3844. SC: CA decision AFFIRMED. A share tenant under R.A. 1199, or an agricultural tenant under R.A. 38444, is entitled to security of tenure over the landholding he works at, and not even the d in the leasehold contract will cause the lessee’s expiration of any term fixe ejectment from the same. On the other hand, under a civil lease contract, the lessee does not enjoy security of tenure, and can be ejected from the land after expiration of the term. Petitioner cannot be considered a tenant. o Based on the evidence on record, the salient characteristic which would make the relationship between petitioner and Sanchez one of agricultural leasehold, is absent in this case, which is personal cultivation by the petitioner.Petitioner’s own witnesses admitted this fact. o The fact that contracts of lease signed by the parties did not stipulate that the land holding should be cultivated by petitioner indicates intent to establish only a civil lease relationship.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Jose MATIENZO vs Martin SERVIDAD G.R. No. L-28135 / 107 SCRA 276 September 10, 1981

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Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Facts: -

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Defendant Servidad is the owner of an agricultural land located in Sipocot, Camarins Sur. On April 16, 1961, plaintiff Matienzo executed an instrument handwritten in the dialect of the locality of defendant’s wife, Feliza, stating that: o Plaintiff and his spouse are instituted as head-overseer of the land of defendant and his spouse, and whoever resides in the premises will obey the head-overseers, as authorized by the defendant. o Plaintiff is allowed to build his house thereon and plant coconuts without being compensated nor sharing with the defendant. The parties entered into another agreement on January 1, 1963 regarding copra making and upland planting, stating that: Plaintiff and his wife are made “caretakers” of the land. o o Plaintiff was to receive 1/3 of the copra as payment. On January 30, 1964, defendant wrote letters to plaintiff ordering him not to interfere with the plants since they had no agreement for that year. Plaintiff sought the help of the Office of the Agrarian Counsel in Naga City, but efforts to settle the case amicably failed. Plaintiff then brought an action against defendant for illegal ejectment with the Court of Agrarian Relations, asking that he be paid reasonable compensation for his improvements on the land, as well as actual and moral damages.

Court of Agrarian Relations: Complaint DISMISSED. The CAR dismissed the case for lack of merit. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter certified the case to the High Court.

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Yolanda CABALLES vs DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Hon. Heherson Alvarez and Bienvenido Abajon G.R. No. 78214 / 168 SCRA 247 December 5, 198 Petition for Certiorari to Review the Order of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Facts: -

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Issue: Whether or not plaintiff was instituted as overseer by the defendant. SC: Petition DISMISSED. It is clear from the evidence that plaintiff was made an overseer of defendant, not a tenant. o The basic element ofsharing in agricultural tenancy was absent. Under the agreement, plaintiff “will share no percentage for the land”, and “all those coconuts that we are to plant no share will be taken for the land.” o The 1/3 share plaintiff received from copra-making constituted payments for processing of copra. He was likewise paid for clearing the coconuts. no tenancy relationship ever existed It is clear that absent a sharing agreement, between the parties.

What transpired was that plaintiff was made overseer of a piece of land, to supervise applications for loans from those residing therein, was allowed to build his own house upon the same land, and plant specified plants without being compensated. He was also free to clear and plant the land as long as he wished. He had no sharing agreement with defendant, nor was he obligated to pay any price certain to, nor share the produce with, the latter. Even though they were eventually considered “caretakers”, defendant still did not share in the produce of plaintiff’s plants.

In 1975, respondent Abajon constructed his house on a portion of land owned by one Andrea Millenes. He paid monthly rentals for the same. The latter also allowed respondent to plant on a portion of land, agreeing to a 50-50 share in the produce. In 1978, Spouses Caballes acquired a landholding from the same Andrea Millenes. The wife, Yolanda, is the petitioner herein. The land acquired by the spouses covered the portion upon which Abajon’s house was erected. The spouses informed respondent that they would be erecting a poultry near his house, and advised him to transfer his dwelling. Respondent counter-offered to pay rentals instead to them, but this was not accepted. Soon after, the spouses asked respondent to vacate the premises, saying that they needed the property. Respondent, however, refused to leave. A criminal case for malicious mischief was instituted by petitioner after alleging that respondent, after being reprimanded by her, cut down the banana plants on the property, the same plants planted by respondent. The trial court referred the case to the Regional Office of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, now the Department of Agrarian Reform, for a preliminary determination of relationship between the parties.

DAR Regional Office: Respondent is a tenant of the petitioners. The DAR explained that since the respondent was a tenant, the case was filed to patently harass and/or reject the same, which was prohibited by law. DAR: Regional Office certification REVERSED. The case was deemed proper for trial since the land involved is a residential lot consisting only of 60 square meters whereon the house of the accused is constructed and within the industrial zone of the town. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello DAR: Previous certification REVERSED. The DAR, under its new Minister, reversed its previous certification, and deemed the case not proper for trial, finding the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. During a summary investigation, Andrea Millenes testified that respondent did give her 50% share of the produce. Respondent further testified that the petitioner also received the same 50% share of the bananas.

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Issue: Whether or not respondent can be considered a ‘tenant’. Whether or not the DAR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding respondent as an agricultural tenant. SC: DAR order set aside. Criminal Case DISMISSED. size farm as “an area of farm land that permits RA 3844 defines an economic familyefficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm family and will produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet a farm family’s needs for food, clothing, shelter, and education, with possible allowance for payment of yearly installments on the land, and reasonable reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in income. o Respondent occupied only a miniscule portion of the 500-sq meter lot: 60 square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, and corn cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered an economic family-size farm. o Respondent himself admitted that he did not depend on the products of the land since it was too small, and that he took carpentry jobs on the side. The DAR was misled to believe, and eventually rule, that a tenancy relationship existed between respondent and Millares.By operation of RA 3844 (Sec 10), the new owners, herein petitioner, were subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the Millares. o The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:  The parties are the landowner and the tenant.  The subject is agricultural land.  There isconsent.  The purpose is agricultural production.  There ispersonal cultivation.  There issharing of harvests. All aforementioned requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship. o The fact that a landowner would accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants crops thereon was not unusual.  In fact, it was a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received.  This, however, does not create a tenancy relationship.  The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship.

o Agricultural production was absent in the arrangement, it can be concluded that respondent was not a tenant of petitioner. Private respondent cannot be held criminally liable for malicious mischief in cutting the banana trees. o As an authorized occupant or possessor of the land, and as planter of the trees, he owns said crops. o Respondent cannot be charged with malicious mischief when one of the elements of such crime is damage deliberately caused to the property of another.  Respondent merely cut downhis own plantings.

Graciano BERNAS vs COURT OF APPEALS and Natividad Bito-On Deita G.R. No. 85041 / 225 SCRA 119 August 5, 1993 Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Facts: -

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Respondent owns several parcels of land located in Panay, Capiz. She entrusted the lots by way of “dugo” to her brother, Benigno. The latter used the fruits of the lands to defray the cost of financing his children’s schooling in Manila. Benigno worked the land together with petitioner Bernas, where Benigno first provided for the expenses while Bernas worked the land. After the harvest, both deducted said expenses and divided the balance of the harvest. Respondent had no part in the arrangement as she was not privy to the same. Benigno eventually returned the lots to respondent when all his children had finished schooling. Respondent and her husband then sought to take over the lots, but petitioner refused to relinquish the property. Respondent then filed an action with the RTC for recovery of possession, ownership, and injunction with damages.

RTC: Petition DISMISSED. The trial court held in favor of petitioner Bernas, ruling that he was a leasehold tenant under RA 119, and an agricultural leasehold lessee under RA 3844, having been designated as such by Benigno. As such, his tenurial rights cannot be disturbed save for causes provided for by law. CA: RTC decision REVERSED. The CA ruled that the agreement between respondent and her brother was actually a contract of commodatum. Hence, Benigno, being the bailee, could neither lend nor lease the properties loaned, to a third person, since commodatum is personal in character. Bernas, then, had no better right than Benigno who admittedly was entrusted with the property only for a limited period. Respondent not being privy to the contract between Benigno and Bernas, she cannot be expected nor be bond to honor the same.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello

Issue: Whether or not the agricultural leasehold established by Benigno is binding upon respondent. SC: Petition GRANTED. CA decision REVERSED. RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389, is the governing law in this case, not the provisions of the Civil Code. o Leasehold tenancy was defined as one of the systems of agricultural tenancy. There was a leasehold tenancy present in this case, not commodatum. o Respondent granted possession of the properties by reason of her liberality. Benigno, then, became thelegal possessor of the property, and had authority and capacity to enter into an agricultural leasehold relation with petitioner Bernas, which now makes him an agricultural lessee.  Being an agricultural lessee, petitioner was vested by law with rights accruing thereto, including the right to continue working the landholding until such lease is legally extinguished, and the right to be protected in his tenure. Respondent did not raise substantial issues that could have been also resolved by the Court: o Whether or not petitioner really is an agricultural lessee of respondent. itioner’s o Whether or not respondent intend to validly terminate pet agricultural leasehold. o Whether or not petitioner planted crops and used the land in a manner contrary to what was agreed upon between respondent and her brother.  The alleged conversion of the land to riceland was necessary for the land to produce more and meet the needs of Benigno.  Benigno did not even object to the improper use, if such was the case. In any case, Benigno did not have any agreement with respondent on how to use the land anyway.  In any case, respondent cannot raise the same issue. It was Benigno who had an agricultural leasehold agreement with petitioner,not respondent. o Whether or not respondent authorized her brother Benigno to install an agricultural lessee.  Benigno, as the legal possessor, could install an agricultural lessee. Nothing in the law requires that the civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor have prior authorization from the landowner.  More notably, respondent did not expressly prohibit Benigno from doing the same.  Even if there was such a prohibition, it would only apply to Benigno.  A tenant is a person who by himself and/or with help from his immediate household cultivates the land belonging to

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another. As far as Bernas is concerned, that “another” is Benigno, not Natividad. Whether or not a judicial declaration is required for an agricultural leasehold to exist.  It is incorrect for an agricultural leasehold relationship to exist by operation of law when there is a concurrence of an agricultural lessor and agricultural lessee.  From the moment Benigno, the legal possessor, granted the cultivation and use of landholding in exchange for a sharing in the harvest, an agricultural relationship emerged between them by operation of law. Whether or not Bernas’ tenure lasted during the duration of Benigno’s possession only. Secs. 7, 10, and 36 all state that Bernas’ rights cannot be  prejudiced when Benigno returned possession of the land to Natividad.  The grounds for ejectment of an agricultural lessee are exclusive, and no other ground can justify termination of the lease.

Victor VALENCIA vs COURT OF APPEALS,e t al. G.R. No. 122363 / 401 SCRA 666 April 29, 2003 Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. Facts: -

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Petitioner acquired a 2 parcels of land, one of which initially had a tenant. Said tenant terminated the tenancy relationship voluntarily via a public instrument. Actual physical possession of the property then reverted back to petitioner. Petitioner then entered into a 10-year civil law lease over both parcels of land with one Henson. Before the same expired, and apparently without objection from Henson, petitioner leased the properties for 5 years to Fr. Andres Flores. The second lease was subject to a prohibition against subleasing or encumbering the land without petitioner’s written consent. This included installing a leasehold tenant. Prior to Fr. Flores’ lease, there was no such prohibition on Henson’s lease. Henson instituted private respondent Crescenciano Frias and Marciano Frias to work on the property. During the lease of Fr. Flores, he designated private respondent Francisco Obang as overseer, and, along with the Frias’, instituted other private respondents to cu ltivate the land. They all shared their produce with Fr. Flores. When the lease agreement with Valencia and Fr. Flores expired, petitioner demanded that private respondents vacate the premises. Respondents refused, and continued to occupy and cultivate the land. 1976: Petitioner then filed a protest with the Minister of Agrarian Reform. Meanwhile, without petitioner’s consent, respondents applied for Certificates of

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello

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Land Transfer (CLTs) under P.D. No. 27, claiming they were bona fide tenants of the property. Said CLTs were issued by the DAR. Upon issuance of the CLTs, petitioner filed a second protest, and requested an investigation and subsequent cancellation of the same. Sometime after, petitioner and one private respondent, Catalino Mantac, entered into a leasehold contract undertaking to have a profit-sharing agreement. No other respondent entered into any agreement or tenancy contract. Upon investigation of the DAR, 12 years after the first letter of protest, recommended that the CLTs issued be cancelled. However, the DAR Regional Office still dismissed petitioner’s protest, and held in favo r of respondents. Petitioner appealed to the Office of the President. Executive Secretary Guingona, Jr., affirmed the order of the DAR, with modification that the area acquired by petitioner as homestead be excluded from the coverage of P.D. No. 27.

CA: Case DISMISSED. The CA ruled that his petition was filed out of time, and that he should have filed a petition for review instead, within 15 days from receipt of the order of the DAR Secretary. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied. Issue: Whether or not a contract of civil law lease prohibit a lessee from employing a tenant on the land subject matter of the lease. SC: Petition GRANTED. CA decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Sec. 6 of R.A. 3844, as amended, does not automatically authorize a civil law lessee to employ a tenant without consent of the landowner. The lessee must be so specifically authorized. o The right to hire a tenant is basically apersonal right of the landowner, except as may be provided by law. o Nowhere in Sec. 6 does it say that a civil law lessee of a landholding is automatically authorized to install a tenant thereon. o A different interpretation would result in a situation where a person who wants to be a tenant asks a third person to become a lessee of the landowner. The tenant then would have a better right over the property than the landowner himself. o Moreover, Sec. 6 of R.A. 3844, in relation to Sec. 8 of R.A. 1199, simply states who are the parties to an existing contract of agricultural tenancy. It does not state those who furnish the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, are automatically authorized to employ a tenant. This presupposes that the civil lease agreement may be restrictive. o Not even the owner himself is free to install a tenant, as when his ownership or possession is encumbered or subject to a lien or condition prohibiting the same. o Tenancy relationship has been held to be of a personal character. Under express provision of Art. 1649 of the Civil Code, the lessee cannot assign the lease without consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.

In this case, not only was there no stipulation to the contrary, but the lessee was expressly prohibited from subleasing the land, which includes installing a leasehold tenant, since the right to do so is an attribute of ownership. o A civil law lease can prohibit a lessee from employing a tenant on the land. The fact that petitioner never extended the term of the lease shows that he precisely wanted to recover the property upon expiration of the contract, except from Mantac with whom he already entered into a tenancy contract. A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove the existence of the elements of tenancy (Matienzo vs Servidad). o Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. o Allegations that an agricultural tenant tilled the land does not make the case an agrarian dispute. o The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. o All the requisites must concur to create a tenancy relationship. The prohibition against subleasing the property, as between petitioner and Fr. Flores, must be upheld. o There is no tenurial security for private respondents, except for private respondent Mantac. o Due to this, and with exception to Mantac, all other private respondents are not entitled to CLTs, and are considered unlawful occupants of the property, and are ordered to immediately vacate the property. o

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Note (Caballes vs DAR): The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: o The parties are the landowner and the tenant. o The subject is agricultural land. o There is consent. o The purpose is agricultural production. o There is personal cultivation. o There is sharing of harvests.

Reyes v. Joson G.R. No 143111 June 7, 2007 Facts: In 1963, Hilarion Caragay hired herein petitioner Loreto Reyes, as caretaker/watcher of a fishpond somewhere in Balanga, Bataan. Caragay had been leasing the fishpond from its owner, Aguirre. In 1973, Caragay’s lease contract expired, and the son of the now-deceased Apolonio Aguirre leashed the fishpond to Joson from 1973 to 1982. Joson was appointed as the administrator of the fishpond.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello As administrator, Joson leased the property to Malibiran for five (5) years, and Reyes signed the contract in his capacity as ‘bantay palaisdaan.’ Upon expiration of Malibiran’s lease, the possession of the fishpond reverted to Joson. In 1989, former lessee Caragay re-entered the fishpond and harvested the contents with the assistance of Reyes, who was under the impression that a new lease contract had been executed between Joson and Caragay. Caragay then refused to vacate the premises. MTC Bataan: Joson filed a complaint for forcible entry. A compromise agreement was later entered, stating that Caragay and all persons working under him were to vacate the premises. However, they failed to do so, forcing the MTC to issue a writ of exection. RTC Bataan: Reyes filed a petition for injunction with a prayer for a temporary restraining order against spouses Joson. The RTC initially granted a TRO that enjoined the implementation of the writ of execution, but subsequently dismissed the petition for injunction. This was due to the failure of the petitioner to file before the DAR pursuant to Section 50 of RA 6657, which divested the RTC of jurisdiction to try cases featuring disputes over Agrarian Reform matters. MTC issued an alias writ of execution for forcible entry, which resulted in the ejectment of Reyes from the fishpond. PARAD: Reyes filed a complaint for maintenance of peaceful possession, claiming that he was an agricultural tenant, entitled to security of tenure, and that he was hired as a ‘bantay kasama’ or a caretaker-industrial partner, and that his status had ripened into a bona fide tenant by operation of law after his service of fourteen years. PARAD granted Reyes’ petition, finding that he was a lawful tenant entitled to peaceful

occupation of the property. DARAB affirmed the judgment of PARAD. CA: The Court of Appeals reversed DARAB’s decision, stating that Reyes had been hired by Caragay, not Joson, initially. Furthermore, during the successive leasehold agreements, Reyes held himself as a ‘bantay palaisdaan,’ which ran contrary to his claims that he already regarded himself as a tenant of Joson. Reyes also failed to prove his alleged sharing of the produce with any of the lessees or holders of the property, which is one of the essential requisites of tenancy. Issues: W/N petitioner Reyes is an agricultural tenant, and therefore, entitled to s ecurity of tenure.

purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. All of the elements must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship. It is clear in this case that the consent on the part of the landowner to a tenancy arrangement is clearly absent. Joson had only been holding onto the property as administrator. The owner, Aguirre, was never shown to have consented to a tenancy arrangement with Reyes. There was no intent on Aguirre’s part to enter into a tenancy agreement with petitioner Reyes. Mere occupation and cultivation of agricultural land does not automatically convert a tiller or worker into an agricultural tenant. Owing to the lack of evidence proving Reyes’ claim of being a tenant of the subject fishpond, the petition must be denied.

Tiongson v. CA G.R. No. L-62626 July 18, 1984 Facts: Sometime in 1946, the late Severino Manotok donated and transferred a 34-hectare lot in Quezon City, to his eight children and 2 grandchildren. At that time, no tenants or any other persons were occupying the lot. Subsequently, however, Teodoro Macaya pled with the Manotoks that he be allowed to live on the property in order to guard the property and prevent the entry of squatters. Manotok allowed Macaya to stay in the property as a guard, subject to conditions. It was stipulated orally that Macaya would leave the property any time that the owners needed or wanted to take over the administration of the property. Furthermore, Macaya may only raise animals and plant crops for personal needs, and that he was only allowed to use 3 hectares of the entire property. It was required that the owners would have no responsibility or liability for those actions. The Manotoks subsequently organized themselves into a corporation engaged in real estate known as Manotok Realty, Inc. Macaya did not pay any rentals as he was not required to do so for his occupancy. However, the corporation noted the increase in taxes over the property, and asked for a remittance of ten (10) cavans of palay every year to defray the costs. This was subsequently increased to twenty (20) cavans. Due to difficulties, Macaya requested for a year’s rest in 1967, claiming that the palay had dried

Held: No, he is not. The essential requisites to establish a tenancy relationship are: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the

up. He also requested that he be allowed to contribute 10 cavans of rice in subsequent years. The corporation said that he might as well not deliver anymore. On January 31, 1974, Manotok Realty executed a unilateral deed of conveyance of the property to Patricia Tiongson, and the Manotok siblings. The Manotoks informed Macaya that he needed

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello to vacate the property so that they may construct their houses. Macaya initially agreed to do so after he harvested his planted rice, but did not vacate even after. A second demand to vacate was made, but was ignored by Macaya, who brought the matter to the Department of Agrarian Reforms. Court of Agrarian Relations: Faced with the threat that his house was going to be bulldozed, Macaya filed an action for peaceful possession, injunction, and damages with preliminary injunction. CAR ruled in favor of herein petitioners. CA: Aggrieved, Macaya raised the issue to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the CAR, finding that there was a landowner-tenant relationship between the Manotoks and Macaya. Issues: W/N a tenancy relationship existed between Macaya and the Manotoks. Held: No, it did not exist. The essential requisites of tenancy relationship are: 1) the parties are the landholder and the tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural production; and 5) there is consideration. All these requisites are necessary in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. In this case, however, one must look at the property in question. The 34 hectare lot is NOT classified as agricultural land. Evidence indicates that the tax declarations of the real property and the annual receipts of the taxes paid have always classified the lot as ‘residential.’ The Court of Appeals erroneously ruled that due to the small portion of the property over which palay may be planted, that the same should be considered as agricultural. That is not the case. The City Engineer of Quezon City even certified that the property falls within the category of ‘Residential I Zone.’ Furthermore, no landholder-tenant relationship existed between the Manotoks and Macaya, as they have not agreed as to the contributions of certain items of productions with regard to expenses in the cultivation of the property. Furthermore, there was no consent regarding the tenancy contract. There being no intention to devote the property for agriculture, the fourth requisite is absolutely absent in this case. The produce had not been divided between the landowners and the alleged tenant, thus, negating any claims that the requisite of consideration was complied with.

Hilario v. IAC G.R. No. 70736 March 16, 1987 Facts: Salvador Baltazar filed a verified complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations alleging that he had been in continuous possession as a share tenant of a parcel of land in Bulacan since 1955. Baltazar also alleged that in 1980, spouses Hilario began to threaten him into desisting from entering and cultivating a portion of the property, and that the spouses committed acts which violated his security of tenure. Baltazar, claimed that he was a tenant of Vda de Balagatas by virtue of a kasunduan, and that he built his house and planted produce which was shared between himself and Balagtas, and later, Pengzon. It was only on 1980 that he came to know that the property was already owned by the Hilarios. Petitioner spouses, on the other hand, claimed that they acquired the property after it had been foreclosed by PNB and was sold. CAR: The Court of Agrarian Relations determined that Baltazar was not a tenant, and that the property in question was not an agricultural landholding, but rather, a plain ‘bakuran.’ CA: The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, remanded the case to the lower courts. The lower courts, however, ruled against Baltazar. IAC: Baltazar appealed to the IAC, which reversed the CAR’s decision, stating that herein private respondent was entitled to security of tenure as a leasehold tenant. Issues: W/N the IAC erred in disturbing the findings of the decision of the CAR in the case at hand. Held: Yes, it erred. Baltazar claimed that he was working on the land pursuant to a kasunduan between himself and Balagtas. It was also clear that when Balagtas died and she was succeeded by Corazaon Pengson, that no new contract was executed. He, however, claimed that the old contract continued in effect. This is untenable. Pengson claimed that Baltazar never fully explained the situation to her, and that he was living on a separate property, and that he never paid rent for his stay in her lot. She also claimed that she did not receive any share from the produce, and that she would have not received the same as she was aware that the lot had been purchased by the spouses Hilario. Mere cultivation by Baltazar does not confer upon him any legal right to work the land as tenant. Furthermore, the plot of land was inside a poblacion, which is presumed to be residential or commercial or non-agricultural in nature unless there is clearly preponderant evidence to it being agricultural. Furthermore, there was no proof of sharing of the harvest.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Bonifacio v. Dizon G.R. No. 79416 September 5, 1989

This is not the case. The term "personal cultivation" cannot be given a restricted connotation to mean a right personal and exclusive to either lessor or lessee. In e ither case, the right extends to the members of the lessor's or lessee's immediate family members.

Facts: CAR: Olimpio Bonifacio filed a complaint for ejectment of private respondent San Miguel from his agricultural land in Bulacan. He relied on the ground of personal cultivation under Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844. This was granted by the judge.

Petitioners are not only the heirs and successors-in-interest, but the immediate family members of the deceased landowner-lessor as well. The right to cultivate the landholding asserted in the CAR casenot being a purely personal right of the deceased landowner-lessor, the same was transmitted to petitioners as heirs and successors-in-interest. Petitioners are entitled to the enforcement of the judgment.

CA: San Miguel appealed to the Court of Appeals, which modified the judgment and ordered Bonifacio to pay her P1,376. The other aspects of the case were affirmed. Zamoras vs Su, Jr. Bonifacio died during the pendency of the petition elevating the case to the Supreme Court. The Court denied San Miguel’s petition. Subsequently, Rosalina Bonifacio, the surviving wife, and Olivio’s children moved for the

execution of the CAR decision before the RTC of Bulacan. A writ of execution was issued, and while San Miguel complied with it for the most part, he refused to vacate a portion of the property. San Miguel moved to quash the writ of execution. The petitioners moved for the issuance of a writ of demolition and an order declaring San Miguel in contempt of court for allegedly reentering the property. RTC ruled that the motion for demolition was null and void. Petitioners assailed this decision in the Court of Appeals, which was certified to the Supreme Court. Issues: W/N the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the decision could no longer be executed as the action is purely personal, and that the death of Olivio precluded his heirs from moving on the same. Held: Yes, he committed a grave abuse of discretion. Although this is an agrarian case for ejectment of an agricultural lessee, this does not operate to bar the general rule that ejectment cases survives the death of a party. Much of the problem lies in the term "personal cultivation" by which the ground for ejectment under Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844 was loosely referred. As it is, the term gave the impression that the ejectment of an agricultural lessee was allowed only if and when the landowner-lessor and no other opted to cultivate the landholding; thereby giving use to a bigger misconception that the right of cultivation pertained exclusively to the landowner-lessor, and therefore his personal right alone.

Issue: WON Victoriano Zamoras was an employee or tenant of Roque Su, Jr. Facts: Zamoras was hired by Su as overseerof his coconut land Zamoras was charged with the task of having the land titled in Su’s name and of assigning portions to be worked by tenants, supervising the cleaning, planting, care and cultivation of the land, harvesting of coconuts and selling of the copra. Su paid Zamoras a salary of P2,40/ month plus 1/3 of the proceeds of the sales of copra which occurs every 2 months, the other 1/3 of the proceeds went to the tenants and the other to Su In May 1981, Su informed Zamoras in writting that he obtained a loan from Anita Hortellano and had authorized her to harvest the coconuts from his property On May 29, 1981, Su sent a letter to Zamoras informing him that he’s being temporarily laid off until he could obtain a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines to pay Anita. Zamoras was no longer allowed to work as an overseer of the said property, without his consent, Anita harvested the coconuts w/o giving him his 1/3 sahre of the corpa sales. Zamoranos filed for illegal dismissal with the NLRC and Court of Agarian Relation Ruling: SC ruled that Zamoranos was an employee and not a tenant of Roque Su, Jr. SC stated that for one to be a tenant of a property, the 6 essenatial requisites should be present namely: Parties are the landlord and tenant Subject is the agricultural holding There is consent between the parties Purpose is agricultural production There is personal cultivation by the tenant There is sharing of harvest between landlord and tenant SC ruled that the element of personal cultivation of the land, or with aid of his farm household is absent for Zamoras did not cultivate any part of Su’s plantation either by himself or with the help of his household. He was hired as a mere overseer. Thus their relationship is indicative of an employer-employee relationship *** Since Zamoranos is an employee and not a tenant of Su, it is the NLRC and not the Court of Agrarian Relation who has jurisdiction to try and deceide on the said case.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Oarde vs CA Issue: WON Oarde are the tenant-tillers of the land in question. Facts: Zacharias Oarde testified that he began tilling the land in question on April 29,1964 when he got married to the Precentation Molar, daughter of Francisco Molar. Gregorio Magnaye, employee of Bureau of Lands testified that in preparing the summary lists of tenants-tillers, they conducted a barrio assembly, they arrived at the conclusion that certain persons were tilling certain properties owned by other persons based on the listings by the DAR technicians. They gathered the tenants together with the barangay officials and interviewed them if they’re the ones cultivating the property. Based on their survey, Zacharias was tilling 2 lots Precentacion Molar alleged that she is a tenant-lessee of the land in question, she allaged that she stated tilling the land inv1965, she caused the land to be worked on “pakyaw” basis, hiring different persons for different work, she also stated that she does not till the land. Zacharias Oarde, who testified on behalf of Precentacion, she began to till the land in 1968, that she was not married and she only hired labourers to till the land, Oarde manifested that it was Francisco Molatr who distributed to his children the land they are farming. Precentacion hired labourers to prepare and plant the land and does NOT actually till the land. TC and CA held that Oarde and Precentacion Molar were not lawful tenants Sps. Wilfredo, Sps. Rogelio and Vilmar Molar (respondents) Ruling: SC affirmed TC and CA decision that petitioners are not lawful tenant-tiller of the land ion question. SC ruled that the 6 essential requisites must be present. In this case, the element of personal cultivation was absent. TC and CA found that Precision Molar did not personally cultivated the land, nor did her immediate family or farm household, instead, she hired other people to do all phases of farm work, even Zacharias testified that she merely paid labourers to perform such task

Cornes vs Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc. Issue: WON there was tenancy relation that existed between the parties. Facts: In the 1st complaint filed by Rodlfo Cornes, et. al (pet) against Leal (res), Petitioners alleged that they had been farmers and full-pledged tenants for more than 30 year of an agricultural landholding which was previously owned and registered in the name of Josefina Omaña The said property consists of at least 21 hectares and is principally devoted to rice and sugar. The said property was covered by RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarain Reform Law of 1988), but Josefina sold the said property to Leal Realty in contravention of the law. Leal Realty then converted a portion of the property into a memorial park.

Leal Realty were aware of the tenancy relationship between Josefina and petitioners, Leal Realty then purportedly negotiated with petitioners to renounce their tenancy right under (CARL) in exchange for a compensation package as a form of disturbance compensation. Leal Realty failed to comply with the terms and conditions by admitting their inability to pay the balance in the compensation package drawn between them and advised petitioners to continue working on the subject property and to continue to appropriate for themselves the fruits until the complete payment has been made. Petitioners allaged that they were threatened to be ousted and evicted by Leal Realty, Petitioners sought for injuctiuon and prayed for the declaration of the property as subject to compulsory coverage of the CARL and their entitlement to the right and privileges, as well as payment for damages. On the 2nd and 3rd compliant filed by petitioners against respondents, Petitioners allaged that respondents violated RA 6657, by executing a Deed of Absolute Sale to Sps. Tugadi and Sps. Alcazaren w/o proper conversion of the lot from agricultural to non-agricultural, they also contented that respondents w/o proper authority caused the subdivision of the subject property into smaller lots. Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favour of Respondents, PA found that there was no tenancy relationship that existed between the parties, that there was no convincing evidence to establish to prove the tenancy arrangement other that petitioners’ self serving declaration. PA, basing on the statements of Jacinto Cornes (father and predecessor-in-intrest of petitioners Cornes) declared that he was a hired labourer Pablo Cornes, Francisco Gadiano, Domingo Pagarigan and Juanito Robles (other predecessorin-interest) were also found to have worked as hired hands. PA ruled that Rodolfomerely derived the relationship from their predecessors-in-i nterest who were hired workers. The fact that petitioners were seen working on the subject property did not raise an assumption of the existence of a tenancy relationship. Dept of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) reversed PA decision by ruling that petitioners are bona fide tenants of the subject property. DARAb held that the right to security of tenure does not only apply to bona fide tenants but also to actual tillers of the land, DARAB declared that there was an implied tenancy between the parties by ruling that petitioners were on the subject property for more than 30 years CA reversed DABAR decision and affirmed PA decision by ruling that for a tenancy relationship to exist, the 6 requirements must be present. CA held that the fact that petitioners had worked on the subject property does not give rise to the existence of a tenancy relationship, CA also stated that the compensation agreement package petitioners entered with Leal Realty must be respected. Ruling: SC ruled that there was indeed no tenancy relationship between the parties as the element of consent was missing. SC then defined a tenant as persons who in themselves and with the aid available from within their immediate farm household, cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter’s consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the sahre tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both under the lease-hold tenancy system.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello SC stated that petitioners came upon such tenancy based on self serving tetstimony of Cornes that his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the property for more than 30 years and had engaged in a 50-50 sharing scheme with Josefina. SC stated that self-serving testimonies are inadequate.

Jeremias vs Estate of the Late Irene P. Mariano. Issue: WON there was tenancy relationship between the parties Facts: Irene Mariano is a wodow who owned 2 parcels of land with an area of 270,203 sqm which was divided into 2 areas (TCT 6886 and TCT 6887) TCT 6886 had an area of 209,422 sqm while TCT 6887 had an area of 60,781 sqm The said TCTs were placed under the Opearation Land Transfer program pursuant to PD 27 The tenated portion of the land were subdivided among identified tenat-beneficiaries and a subdivision plan was made On june 26, 1988, Irene died intestate and was succeeded by her 2 children, Jose and Erlinda. Helen Mariano, wife of Jose Mariano drafted an unsigned letter dated May 14, 1989, instituting Ruben Viñas as a tenant on Lot 25 and 48 under TCT 6886 despite the fact that estate remained unpartitioned and still under intestate proceedings. In 1991, Danilo Mariano was appointed as administrator of the respondent estate. In April 14, 1991, Danilo, as administrator filed before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAd), 2 separate complaints for ejecment against Leopoldo and Ruben. Danilo stated that Leopoldo planted various agricultural products on lots 1B3D, 1B3E, 1B3H and 1B3Q covered by TCT 6887 without his knowledge and consent. Danilo further alleged that Leopoldo was not a tenant of Irene, It was his Father, Santiago Jeremias who was Irene’s tenant. Leopoldo denied that he unlawfully entered the said property (1B3D, 1B3E, 1B3H and 1B3Q), he claimed that he cultivated and farmed the land upon the permission and tolerance of Irene, he also averred that as the son on Santiago, he has lawfully acquired the right to cultivate said lots by virtue of succession. On the case against Ruben, Danilo alleged that Ruben cultivated the land covered by TCT 6886 without his knowledge and consent. Danilo answered that his cultivation of the area was pursuant to the hand-written letter of Helen Mariano instituting him as a tenat of the said lots PARAd ruled in favour of Danilo and ordered Leopoldo and Ruben to vacate the said land. PARAd ruled that Leopoldo’s right to succeed his father as a tenant covered only specific lots (1B3F, 1B3G and 1B3R), since Leopoldo failed to show evidence that he obtained the consent of the owner to till lots 1B3D, 1B3E, 1B3H and 1B3Q, his occupation on the said lots was illegal. PARAd ruled in the case of Ruben that the alleged institution of Ruben was enough proof that he was authorized to cultivate lots 25 and 48 based on the following factors: 1st, the letter of authority did not state that Ruben was authorized to specifically till lots 25 and 48. 2nd, the letter contained a provision stating that Ruben will vacate the premise should the landowner will need the land Lastly, PARAd believed that the subject lots were not covered by PD 27

DARAB ruled in favour of Leopoldo and Ruben, DARAb belived that all the lots of the estate covered under TCTs 6886 and 6887 were tenanted. DARAB also stated that the said land exceeded tha 24 hectares limit under PD 27 CA revered DARAB decision and ruled in favour of respondent Ruling: SC ruled in favour of PARAd by ruling that there was no tenancy relationship between the parties. SC stated on the case of Leopoldo is a tenant on 3 lots (1B3F, 1B3G and 1B3R) by being a successor of his father, however, there is no evidence showing that he was also a designated tenant of lots 13BD, 1B3E, 13BH and 1B3Q, evidently his rights only embraces the 3 lots his father cultivated. On the case of Ruben, SC stated that an unsigned written letter could not be appreciated as proof that he was authorized to cultivate on the lots 25 and 48. Respondent, through administrator Danilo was able to present public documents which was signed and approved TCT 6886 and 6887 which are public documents stated that the lots occupied by Ruben and Leopoldo are untenanted which was classified by the Bureu of Lands.

Ceneze vs Ramos Issue: WON theres tenancy relationship between the parties Facts: Welfredo Ceneze filed an action for declaration as bona fide tenant-lessee of 2 parcels of agricultural land owned by Feliciana Ramos with an area of 12,000 hectares. Ceneze alleged that his father, Julian Ceneze, Jr. transferred to him his tenurial rights over the land with the consent and approval of Ramos, and that since then, he has been in actual and peaceful possession of the land until Ramos forcibly entered and cultivated the land for the purpose of dispossessing him of his rights as a tenant in April 12, 1991. Ramos denied that a tenancy relationship existed between her and ceneza, she alleged that she never instituted Ceneze as a tenant in any of her land. She manifested that Weldredo had never been in possession of the land, she admitted that it was Julian Sr. who was the tenant of the said land until he migrated to the US in 1985, She allowed Julian’s wife, to cultivate the land until she migrated to the US in 1988, she later allowed Welfredo to cultivate the land until he also migrated in the US in 1991 without informing her. Ramos then, after Welfrdo’s departure, took possession of the land, cultivated it and appropriated for herself the harvest, she reported on the Municispal Agrarian Reform Office (MACO) the abandonment of the land by Julian Sr, his wife and Welfredo. Provincial Adjudicator redered a decision in favour of Ceneza. PA based its decision on the following documents: Certification issued by the Baranagay Agrarian Reform Commission (BARC) Affidavit executed by Julian Sr., stating that he is transferring his rights to Weldfredo Joint Affidavit of the other tenants attesting that Welfredo was a tenant of the land since 1988 and that they helped in the harvesting of palay products and delivering to respondent her share of the harvest.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello DARAb affirmed PA decision CA reversed PA and DARAB decision

P1,500,000 as disturbance compensation. After receipt of the money, he executed a Katibayang Paglilipat ng Pagmamayari.

Ruling: SC sustained CA decision SC ruled that for a tenancy relationship to be present, all the 6 elements should be present, namely: Parties are the landowner and tenants Subject is agricultural land There is consent by the landowner Purpose is agricultural production There is personal cultivation, and There is sharing of the harvest Absence of one element does not make and occupant a de jure tenant. Sc stated that the certificate of the BARC is merely preliminary or provisional in character and does not bind the judiciary SC also ruled that the certificate and the affidavits (which were not notarized) do not show the elements of consent of the landowner and sharing of harvests

Petitioners, William Perez, Joseph Lim, Willy Lim, Winston Lim, Edgar Lim, and Jaime Lim established Milestone as incorporators, in order to acquire and develop the aforesaid property and the adjacent parcel, Lot No. 617 of the Malinta Estate. On July 30, 1992, Carolina Zacarias executed a deed of sale transfering the Lot No. 616 to petitioner Milestone for P7,110,000. TCT No. 26019 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 25433 was issued in the name ofMilestone. Milestone also acquired the adjoining lots, Lot Nos. 616 and 617 of the Malinta Estate with a total area of three (3) hectares. Development of the property then commenced. On October 13, 1992, Delia Razon Pea and Raymundo Eugenio filed a complaint against to declare as null and void the sale by Carolina to Perez and by the latter to Milestone, and to recognize and respect the tenancy of private respondents Delia and Raymundo. On July 28, 1993, the PARAD rendered a decision dismissing the complaint Delia Razon Pea and Raymundo Eugenio appealed from the PARADs decision to the DARAB.

[G.R. No. 135999. April 19, 2002] MILESTONE REALTY and CO., INC. and WILLIAM L. PEREZ vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA RAZON PEA and RAYMUNDO EUGENIO Facts: Spouses Alfonso Olympia and Carolina Zacarias and Spouses Claro Zacarias and Cristina Lorenzo were the co-owners of an agricultural land identified as Lot 616 of the Malinta Estate. Said lot has an area of 23,703 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 26019, located at Karuhatan, Valenzuela, Bulacan, now Valenzuela City. Eventually, Carolina became the owner of the property by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement executed on October 17, 1976 by the heirs of Alfonso Anacleto Pea who was a tenant of the property and a holder of a Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold issued on February 23, 1982, had a house constructed on the lot. He had several children on the first marriage, among whom are Emilio Pea and Celia Segovia, who also had their houses constructed on the property. On February 4, 1986, Anacleto, who was already 78 years old and a widower, married Delia Razon, then only 29 years old.

On September 5, 1995, the DARAB reversed the decision of PARAD. Court of Appeals affirmed the DARAB decision. Petitioners Milestone Realty & Co., Inc. (Milestone for brevity) and William Perez then sought the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether or not Delia Razon Pea has a r ight of first priority over Emilio Pea in s ucceeding to the tenancy rights of Anacleto over the subject landholding. Held: SEC. 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Death or Incapacity of the Parties. In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the leasehold shall continue between the agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor within one month from such death or permanent incapacity, from among the following: (a)the surviving spouse;

On February 17, 1990, Anacleto died intestate and was survived by Delia and his children in his first marriage, including Emilio. Emilio and Delia, the latter with the help of respondent Raymundo Eugenio, her son in law, continued tilling and cultivating the property.

(b) the eldest direct descendant by consanguinity;

On January 22, 1992, Emilio signed a handwritten declaration that he was the tenant in the land and he was returning the landholding to Carolina Zacarias in consideration of the sum of

Provided, That in case the death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee occurs during the agricultural year, such choice shall be exercised at the end of that agricultural year:

or (c) the next eldest descendant or descendants in the order of their age:

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Provided, further, That in the event the agricultural lessor fails to exercise his choice within the periods herein provided, the priority shall be in accordance with the order herein established. In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessor, the leasehold shall bind his legal heirs. The Court stated that agricultural leasehold relationship is not extinguished by the death or incapacity of the parties. In case the agricultural lessee dies or is incapacitated, the leasehold relation shall continue between the agricultural lessor and any of the legal heirs of the agricultural lessee who can cultivate the landholding personally, in the order of preference provided under Section 9 of Republic Act 3844, as chosen by the lessor within one month from such death or permanent incapacity. In applying Section 9 of Republic Act 3844,it is undeniable that respondent Delia Razon Pea, the surviving spouse of the srcinal tenant, Anacleto Pea, is the first in the order of preference to succeed to the tenancy rights of her husband because the lessor, Carolina Zacarias, failed to exercise her right of choice within the one month period from the time of Anacletos death. Petitioners cannot find succor in the declarations of Emilio Pea and the affidavit of Carolina Zacarias, stating that Emilio succeeded to the tenancy rights of Anacleto. In the first place, Carolinas affidavit and her Answer filed before the PARAD were both executed in 1992, or almost two years after the death of Anacleto on February 17, 1990, way beyond the one month period provided for in Section 9 of Republic Act 3844. Secondly, as found by the DARAB, a scrutiny of Carolinas declaration will show that she never categorically averred that she made her choice within the one (1) month period. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in is AFFIRMED in so far as it recognizes Delia Razon Pea as the successor of Anacleto Pea as the tenant, thereby allowing her to exercise her right of redemption over the land within the prescribed period granted by law.

G.R. No. L-19760 April 30, 1964 MARCELO VILLAVIZA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JUDGE TOMAS PANGANIBAN, ET AL., respondents. Review of the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Cabanatuan City, in its Case No. 2088NE-60 Facts: The lower court found that Villaviza, et. al. were tenants since 1944 in a riceland situated in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, and owned by Domingo Fajardo. Fajardo gave out the land for lease (civil lease) to the petitioner, Quirino Capalad, starting with the crop year 1955-56. The said lessee, in June, 1955, plowed the land by machinery, and installed, as his tenants, his above-named co-petitioners in this Court, so that when the Villaviza, et. al went back to their respective

landholdings to prepare them for planting they found the land already cultivated. The respondents-tenants demanded their re-instatement, but every time they did, which they did yearly until the present suit was filed, Quirino Capalad promised, but never fulfilled, to reinstate them for the agricultural year following said demands. Villaviza, et. al were ousted from their landholdings in June, 1955, and they filed the present action on 31 March 1960. Issue: Whether or not he period of limitation had not expired Held: The Court stated that a tenant's right to be respected in his tenure under Republic Act 1199, as amended, is an obligation of the landholder created by law and an action for violation thereof prescribes in ten years under No. 2 of Article 1144 of the Civil Code. The respondents were ousted from their landholdings in June, 1955, and they filed the present action on 31 March 1960; therefore, the period of limitation had not expired. Furthermore, it cannot be said that the respondents-tenants are guilty of laches for having unnecessarily delayed the filing of the case, because the delay was attributed to Capalad's promises to reinstate them. The decision under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners

RUPA vs CA Facts: On March 26, 1981, herein petitioner Gerardo Rupa filed an action for redemption with damages against Magin Salipot before the then Court of Agrarian Relations, Tenth Regional District, Branch IV, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, claiming that he was the agricultural share tenant for more than 20 years of a parcel of coconut land formerly owned by Vicente Lim and Patrocinia Yu Lim; that since he assumed tenancy over the questioned property, he was the one watching, taking care of and cleaning the coconut plantation; he also gathers coconuts every three months and processes them into copra which he shares with the Lim spouses under a 50-50% sharing basis; that aside from being a share tenant, he is also the overseer of four parcels of coconut land situated in the sitios of Minuswang and Comunal, Armenia, Uson, Masbate also owned by the Lim spouses; that the Lim spouses, however, sold the property to herein respondent Magin Salipot without any prior written or verbal notice to the petitioner in the sum of P5,000.00 sometime in January 1981 On February 16, 1981, petitioner came to know about the sale of the property to the respondent when he was informed in writing by the former landowner, and wanting to buy the property for himself, petitioner sought the assistance of the local office of Agrarian Reform at Masbate, Masbate, but no agreement was reached; that the petitioner manifesting his willingness to redeem the questioned property in the same amount of P5,000.00 bought by respondent, deposited the amount with the trial court (Annex “B,”— Petition). Petitioner, thus, prayed for judgment authorizing his right of redemption over the property including his shares of the harvest, damages and expenses arising herein. Magin Salipot filed his answer denying petitioner’s allegation of tenancy over the questioned

property and claimed that petitioner was hired every now and then to oversee the copra-

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello making of the laborers of spouses Lim, with remuneration based on the weight of copra produced

produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system (Sec. 5[a], RA 1199). A person who does not work or till the land is not a tenant

In his affirmative and special defenses, respondent claimed that he bought the registered parcel of land from the spouses Lim who in turn bought the same from the srcinal registered owner Diego Prieto, who was issued OCT-1853, and since both deeds of sale, one executed by Diego Prieto in favor of the Lim spouses and the second, by the Lim spouses to herein respondent, have not yet been registered or legally conveyed to respondent, the action for redemption filed by the petitioner against respondent is pre-mature; that petitioner had never been a tenant of spouses Lim over the land in question; that the right of redemption had already been lost by laches or non-use

Ratio: The Court agreed with the contentions of private respondent SALIPOT. The CA committed reversible error in relying mainly on statements made in a decision in another case, and, secondarily on the certificate of the Municipal Treasurer as basis for establishing the status of petitioner as share-tenant in the subject land.

Regional Trial Court of Masbate (which had taken over the Court of Agrarian Relations pursuant to BP 129) rendered a decision dated July 17, 1985, dismissing the complaint on the ground that RUPA was not a tenant of the subject property, thus, not entitled to exercise the right of redemption over the same. SALIPOT manifested that he was adopting the memorandum filed with the court a quo, while no memorandum was received from RUPA . 5 The decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the CA - Plaintiff RUPA, during the proceedings in the Criminal Case, admitted that he was the overseer and the administrator of five (5) parcels of land, one of which is this land in question, owned by the Lim spouses in Armenia, Uson Masbate. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact, may be given in evidence against him (Section 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court). At the time the plaintiff-appellant admitted that he was the administrator of Vicente Lim, he had already instituted the action for redemption with damages against Magin Salipot, wherein he alleged that he was the sharetenant of the Lim spouses. Knowing fully well that his right of legal redemption is based on his status as share-tenant, he still admitted, six months later, in Crim. Case 532-U, that he was the administrator of five (5) parcels of land owned by the Lim spouses in Armenia, Uson, Masbate. His admission, which is clearly adverse to his own interest, constitutes an admission receivable against him Aside from his own admission that he was the administrator of the Lim spouses, there is no clear and positive proof that Gerardo Rupa performed the duties of a tenant in personally tilling and cultivating the land which he allegedly tenanted. Prosecution witnesses Pablito Arnilla and Antonieta Rongasan admitted that they were the hired laborers of Gerardo Rupa in tilling the land in question (Under R.A. 1199, a share tenant must personally till the land, possibly with the aid of the immediate farm household). The aforenamed witnesses may not have been aware of the implication in admitting that they were the hired laborers of Gerardo Rupa. As to Gerardo Rupa’s claim of tenancy, Republic Act 1199, which governs the relations between

landholders and tenants of coconut lands, defines a tenant as a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by another with the latter’s consent for purposes of production and sharing the

A careful examination of the record reveals that, indeed, both the trial court, and the appellate court overlooked and disregarded the overwhelming evidence in favor of RUPA and instead relied mainly on the statements made in the decision in another case. A tenant is defined under Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter’s consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both under the leasehold tenancy system. Briefly stated, for this relationship to exist, it is necessary that: The parties are the landowner and the tenant; The subject is agricultural land; The purpose is agricultural production; There is consent; There is personal cultivation; and There is sharing of harvests. Upon proof of the existence of the tenancy relationship, RUPA could avail of the benefits afforded by RA 3844,11 as amended, particularly, Section 12 thereof which reads: “SEC. 12. Lessee’s right of redemption. In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration:Provided, That the entire landholding sold must he redeemed: Provided, further,That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within two years from the r right of legal redemption.” registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any othe As correctly pointed out by the CA, this right of redemption is validly exercised upon compliance with the following requirements: a) the redemptioner must be an agricultural lessee or share tenant; b) the land must have been sold by the owner to a third party without prior written notice of the sale given to the lessee or lessees and the DAR in accordance with sec. 11, RA 3844, as amended; c) only the area cultivated by the agricultural lessee may be redeemed; d) the right of redemption must be exercised within 180 days from notice; and e) there must be an actual tender or valid consignation of the entire amount which is the reasonable price of the land sought to be redeemed .12 However, as aforesaid, the CA failed to take into account the other material evidence on record to arrive at its finding that RUPA was not a tenant-farmer. The decision dated March 11, 1985 relied upon by the CA stemmed from Criminal Case No. 532-U for Malicious Mischief which was instituted upon a complaint filed by RUPA against one

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Mariano Luzong who happens to be the son-in-law of SALIPOT. According to RUPA, Mariano Luzong destroyed the banana and cassava plants in his farm in Armenia, Uson, Masbate. It was stated in the decision that RUPA “claimed that he is the administrator of the five parcels of land owned by Patrocinio Lim in Armenia, Uson, Masbate”; 13 and that the “prosecution witnesses, Pablito Arnilla, and Antonieta Bongasan, the alleged eyewitnesses to the destruction of the banana plants and cassava plants admitted being hired laborers of Gerardo Rupa in tilling the latter’s farm.” It is believed that the statements in the said decision are not sufficient basis to overcome the rights of RUPA as provided in the Constitution and agrarian statutes and upheld by this Court. The essence of agricultural tenancy lies in the establishment of owner-cultivatorship and the economic fam-ily-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture, and as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial development. The above statements in the Criminal case should not have been relied upon by the CA to conclusively disprove the tenancy relationship. Said statement was apparently made to prove RUPA’s standing to file the complaint and to prove how he could have witnessed the destruction made by said person. Second, in claiming that he was administrator of the property, RUPA, a farmer of limited education must have used the word “administrator”—in a loose sense to mean one taking care of a certain piece of property by clearing and planting on the same. As aptly pointed out by counsel for RUPA during the trial, with no objection from th e counsel of SALIPOT, “under common usage in the locality, the term administrator is used interchangeably with tenancy.” Third, the CA did not bother to explain its finding on the “inherent incompatibility”—between

being a tenant-farmer and an administrator or overseer. According to RUPA, he was tenant of one parcel of land belonging to the Lim spouses and administrator or overseer of the other four parcels of land owned by the said spouses. SALIPOT and his witnesses had interchangeably claimed RUPA to be an overseer and a copra agent or copra buyer. As overseer, he may have been receiving a fixed salary. As tenant under our legal definition, he may have been sharing the harvests with the landowner. This may well lead a person to find an incompatibility between the two. However, one could in fact be overseer of a parcel of land, supervising the laborers therein and receiving a fixed salary for one’s services, and at the same time, act as tenant farmer in another landholding. Fourth, the testimony of the pros ecution witnesses that they were “hired laborers”— should not have been given significant weight by the CA. The rule is well-settled that the rights of a person cannot be prejudiced by the declaration, act or omission of another, except as provided by the Rules of Court in cases of admission by a co-partner, agent, conspirator and privies. The said witnesses do not come under any of these exceptions .1 As regards the certificate issued by the Office of the Treasurer to the effect that RUPA was a copra buyer from May 19, 1978 to October 10, 1979, we find that this does not necessarily rule out RUPA’s claim that he was tenant-farmer since 1962. RUPA has satisfactorily explained that “pursuing two or three lines of work is nothing new. In coconut lands, harvest seasons come far and in between, and the tenant can always engage in the business of copra-buying in the interim.”18 Moreover, the dates indicated therein cover only a short period of time as against RUPA’s claim that he was tenant from 1963 until his ejectment sometime in 1981. The Court is therefore constrained to overturn the appealed judgment insofar as it ruled that the records do not establish RUPA’S status as an agricultural tenant.

G.R. No. L-26255 June 30, 1969 PABLO BASBAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. RUFINO ENTENA, FLAVIANO TIBAY and ANGELINA ENTENA (Spouses), and R. M. RESURRECCION as acting Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Laguna, defendants-appellees. Facts: That plaintiff Pablo Basbas (tenant) is the leasehold tenant of a 1-½ hectare parcel of riceland, known as Lot No. 1520 of the Sta. Rosa Estate Subdivision, located at Barrio Dila, Sta. Rosa, Laguna, formerly owned by defendant Rufino Entena and presently owned by spouses Flaviano Tibay and Angelina Entena, his co-defendants. On April 11, 1964, defendant Rufino Entena executed a deed of sale of the aforementioned lot in favor of defendant spouses Flaviano Tibay and Angelina Entena On May 25, 1964, defendant Rufino Entena sent a letter, that the landholding was being put up for sale at P13,000.00 per hectare and the tenant being given 90 days within which to communicate his intention to purchase the same: otherwise, the land would be offered to other Basbas replied to the landholder on June 4, 1964, accepting the latter's offer to sell the land, although disagreeing to the quoted price. The tenant (Basbas) in the same letter informed the landholder that he was enlisting the aid of the government in purchasing the land, as allowed by law. In a reply on June 22, 1964, the Acting Officer in Charge of the Land Authority, informed the tenant that his petition was already being processed and definite action thereon will be taken as soon as the Land Bank shall have been fully organized but the defendants have not been given copy or otherwise informed. On April 11, 1964, A sworn affidavit was executed by the spouses Rufino Entena and Aniceta Carapatan, attesting to the alleged fact that the tenant, Pablo Basbas, was fully notified of the sale of their land 90 days before said conveyance, and that the tenant had refused, or failed to exercise, the right of pre-emption granted him under the Agricultural Land Reform Code. The submission of this affidavit enabled the registration on May 26, 1964 of the deed of sale in favor of vendees Flaviano Tibay and Angelina Entena. Based upon the facts, the Agrarian Court dismissed the case, reasoning that as the plaintiff failed to make tender of payment and consignation of the purchase price the landowner cannot be compelled to sell the property to him. Basbas then sought an appeal. Issue: Whether or not tender of payment and judicial consignation of the purchase price are necessary before a tenant-lessee may avail himself of the right of pre-emption or of redemption.

Ratio: The Court ruled that tender of payment is necessary. Granting that sections 11 and 12 are operative, yet in Torres de Conejero, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-21812, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 775, the Court ruled that the timely exercise of the right of legal redemption requires either tender of the price or valid consignation thereof. Furthermore, the Court stated that in relation to redemption (and pre-emption) under sections 11 and 12 of the Land Reform Act, both under said law and under Article 1620 of the Civil Code,

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello the right of legal redemption must be exercised within specified time limits: and the statutory periods would be rendered meaningless and of easy evasion unless the redemptioner is required to make an actual tender in good faith of what he believed to be the reasonable price of the land sought to be redeemed. WHEREFORE, the appealed order granting the motion to dismiss the complaint is affirmed. No costs. G.R. No. 169472 January 20, 2009 FRANCISCO LANDICHO, FEDERICO LANDICHO AND BUENAVENTURA LANDICHO, vs. FELIX SIA, Respondent. Facts: The instant case involves three parcels of agricultural land located in Barangay Mateona, Tayabas, Quezon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 135953 - Lot No. 9297, TCT No. 135952 - Lot No. 9856, and TCT No. 135929 - Lot No. 9895, with an aggregate area of approximately 27,287 square meters. The subject parcels of land were srcinally owned by Loreanne Z. Aragon, Alberto Z. Aragon, Jr., and Alberto Z. Aragon III (Aragons). The agricultural land was tenanted by the late Arcadio Landicho from 1949 until his death in 19727after which his tenancy rights were succeeded by his son, petitioner Francisco Landicho. entura Landicho, Francisco Landicho’s son, and The other petitioners, Buenav Federico Landicho, Francisco’s brother, helped him cultivate the land. On January 31, 1976, Francisco Landicho voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights over the three parcels of land to Eloisa Zolota, married to Alberto Aragon, through a notarized "Kasulatan sa Pagsasauli ng Gawaing Palayan" (1976 Kasulatan), for a consideration of PhP1,000.00. Notwithstanding the execution of the 1976 Kasulatan, the petitioners continued cultivating the subject landholdings until 1987 when another notarized "Kasulatan ng Pagsasauli ng Gawaing Palayan" (1987 Kasulatan)was executed on July 2, 1987 by Francisco Landicho through which he surrendered his tenancy rights to the Aragons for a consideration of PhP3,000.00. On the same day as the execution of the 1987 Kasulatan, the three parcels of land were sold to respondent Felix L. Sia by the spouses Alberto P. Aragon and Eloisa Zolota Aragon by virtue of a general power of attorney executed in their favor by their children, the Aragons. A "Deed of Absolute Sale" was executed, whereby the three parcels of land mentioned above were sold, transferred and conveyed by way of an absolute sale for and in consideration of PhP50,000.00. Upon the sale of the subject land to respondent Felix Sia, he converted the same to a residential subdivision without a DAR Clearance and ejected the petitioners from the subject land. Aggrieved, the petitioners first sought the assistance of Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) Chairman Rosalio Cabuyao,who in turn brought the matter to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) of Quezon. Petitioners Federico Landicho and Buenaventura Landicho then filed a protest before the DAR PARO, Legal Division of Lucena Cityalleging that they are the tenants of the parcels of land owned by respondent Felix Sia and claimed that they are entitled to a disturbance compensation. During the mediation conference held at the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform

Office on July 22, 1992, it was admitted by Francisco Landicho that he voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights over the subject parcels of land in consideration of PhP3,000.00. It was held by the DAR Provincial Legal Officer that Francisco Landicho is the legal and bona fide tenant of the parcels of land but he cannot be awarded disturbance compensation because he voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights over the said properties twice, through the 1976 and the 1987 Kasulatan. In the case of Buenaventura and Federico Landicho, it was found that they are merely farm helpers of Francisco Landicho and are not entitled to disturbance compensation. Petitioners Buenaventura and Federico Landicho filed another Protest before the DAR Legal Division, Region IV, Pasig, Metro Manila. It also dismissed the protest of the petitioners. DAR Region IV Director Percival C. Dalugdug wrote a letter, dated April 25, 1994, stating that the results of an investigation that only Francisco Landicho who is the legitimate tenant of the land owned by the Aragons. However, he surrendered his tenancy rights by virtue of the 1976 and 1987 Kasulatan. The petitioners allege that they are tenants of the subject land since January 31, 1976 and that they were unlawfully ejected from the subject land by virtue of the 1976 and 1987 Kasulatan which they allege to be invalid, since they were executed by Francisco through the insidious words, undue influence and strategy employed by the Aragons, in connivance with respondent Sia. In their Answer dated July 7, 1994, the Aragons recognized only Francisco as their former tenant until he surrendered his tenancy rights through the 1976 Kasulatan and finally surrendered the land upon the execution of the 1987 Kasulatan. After the filing of the parties’ respective position papers, the DAR Provincial Adjudicator of Region IV rendered a decision on October 24, 1995, in favor of the petitioners. Provincial Adjudicator Oscar C. Dimacali ruled that against their will, the petitioners were dispossessed of the land that they have been cultivating. The Aragons and respondent Sia appealed the foregoing decision to the DARAB, which issued a decision on September 18, 2000 that affirmed in part the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator, and deleted the award of disturbance compensation on the basis of the finding that the petitioners are still bona fide tenants in their respective landholdings. The DARAB found that a tenancy relationship exists between the petitioners and the Aragons and that when Felix Sia became the owner of the subject land, he assumed to exercise the rights and obligations that pertain to the previous owners. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the DARAB and agreed with the ruling of the DAR PARO and the Region IV DAR Legal Division that only petitioner Francisco Landicho was the tenant of all of the three lots covered by TCT No. 135953, TCT No. 135952 and TCT No. 135929 and that he voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights upon the execution of the 1987 Kasulatan. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the PARO and the Region IV DAR that Federico and Buenaventura Landicho were merely farm helpers of Francisco. Hence, the Landichos sought a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Issues: 1) Whether or not the petitioners are bona fide tenants of the land purchased by the respondent 2) Whether or not the Agricultural Leasehold Relation is still in effect

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Held: Decision of CA affirmed against petitioners 1) Whether or not the petitioners are bona fide tenants of the land purchased by the respondent The Court noted that in determining the existence of a tenancy relationship between the petitioners and the respondent, it is necessary to make a distinction between petitioner Francisco Landicho and petitioners Buenaventura and Federico Landicho. With respect to Francisco, both the petitioners and the respondent agree that he was recognized by the Aragons as a bona fide tenant of the subject land when he continued the cultivation of the land after the death of his father Arcadio in 1972. The Court noted that a tenant is defined under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines, as: x x x a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. For a tenancy relationship to exist, all of the following essential requisites must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (6) there is sharing of the harvests between the parties. In the case at bar, the essential element of consent is absent because the landowners never recognized petitioners Federico and Buenaventura Landicho as legitimate tenants of the subject land. The 1976 and the 1987 Kasulatan only mentioned Francisco as the tenant of the subject parcels of land. The petitioners cannot rely on their self-serving statements to prove the existence of a tenancy relationship because independent and concrete evidence, aside from self-serving statements, is needed to prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvests, or consent of the landowner. Finally, a tiller or a farmworker does not automatically become an agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws by mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land. 2) Whether or not the Agricultural Leasehold Relation is still in effect With respect to petitioner Francisco Landicho, the Court of Appeals also correctly held that although Francisco was the legal tenant of the subject land, he voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights when he knowingly and freely executed the 1987 Kasulatan. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, to wit: — The agricultural leasehold SECTION 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. relation established under this Code shall be extinguished by: (1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor; (2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or (3) Absence of the persons under Section nine to succeed to the lessee, in the event of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee.

The petitioners also failed to supportheir t claim that the Aragons took advantage of Francisco’s old age and illiteracy and employed fraudulent schemes in order to deceive him into signing the Kasulatan. It has been held that "[a] person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. It is only when such age or infirmities impair the mental faculties to such extent as to prevent one from properly, intelligently, and fairly protecting her property rights, is she considered incapacitated." The petitioners’ contention that the Aragons employed fraud, aside from being unsubstantiated, is also contrary to the records of the case. Both the 1976 and the 1987 Kasulatan were also written in Tagalog, a language understood by Francisco Landicho. They were written in an uncomplicated manner and clearly stated that he is returning the land that he has been cultivating to the landowners because he is already old and could no longer work on the land. The 1987 Kasulatan also states that the contents of the document were read to him and that he understands the same. The 1976 and 1987 Kasulatan are duly notarized and are considered as public documents, were executed with all the legal formalities of a public document and thus the legal presumption of validity of the document. Strong evidence is required to prove a defect of a public instrument, and since such strong and convincing evidence was not presented in the instant case, the 1976 and the 1987 Kasulatan are presumed valid. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals under review are hereby AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.

Francisco ESTOLAS vs Adolfo MABALOT G.R. No. 133706 / 381 SCRA 702 May 07, 2002 Petition for Review on Certiorari of a Decision of the Court of Appeals. Facts: -

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Respondent acquired a Certificate of Land Transfer over a 5k-sq. meter lot located in Sta. Maria, Pangasinan. He later passed the subject land to petitioner for the amount of P5.8k and P200 pesos worth of rice via a verbal contract of mortgage. Petitioner contends, however, that it was a sale. DAR officials in the area surveyed the land and issued a TCT covering the land in favor of petitioner. Respondent then filed a complaint before the Baranggay Lupon to redeem the land. The case was then referred to the DAR regional office. Upon investigation, Atty. Peralta of the DAR Regional Office recommended that the CLT remain in the name of respondent, and that the money loan be returned to petitioner. However, in a letter, petitioner insisted that the land had been sold to him, and requested the DAR to cancel the CLT.

DAR Regional Office: Order in favor or PETITIONER.

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After another investigation, regional director Nuesa acted in favor of petitioner, finding that respondent had abandoned the land. Respondent appealed to the DAR Central Office.

DAR Central Office: Regional Office order REVERSED. It ordered petitioner to return the land to respondent. Petitioner then appealed to the Office of the President. OP: Petitioner’s appeal DISMISSED. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise dismissed. CA: Ruling in favor of RESPONDENT. It said that the land had been acquired by respondent under PD 27, which prohibits transfer of land acquired under said law except in favor of heirs via hereditary succession, or in favor of the government through other legal modes. There was also no effective abandonment since: o Respondent tried to redeem it, but failed when petitioner asked for P15k instead of the srcinal loan. o Respondent continuously held the CLT covering the land. o Respondent would not have even brought the action for recovery if he honestly believed he had already given it up in favor of petitioner.

Such prohibition was placed to insure their continuous possession and enjoyment, to achieve a dignified existence for small farmers, and to make them more independent, self-reliant, and responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society. Petitioner cannot, by himself, take over a farmer-beneficiary’s landholding. o The proper procedure forreallocation must be followed to ensure that there was indeed an abandonment, and that subsequent beneficiary is a qualified farmer-tenant under the law. o It is the government who can effect such reallocation. Hence, the land must first be transferred back in favor of the government. o

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Verde v. Macapagal G.R. No. 151342 June 23, 2005 Facts: One Vicente Macapagal and one Irenea Estralla were the owners of 2.5 hectare parcel of agricultural land in Bulacan. After their demise, their children, herein petitioners, inherited the property as pro-indiviso owners of the same. Petitioner Verde is a second-generation leasehold tenant, having had succeeded his father in tenancy of the same property that the Macapagals owned.

Issue: Whether or not respondent abandoned the property. SC: Petition DENIED. For abandonment to exist, the following requisites must be proven: o A clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim, or to desert a right or property. o An external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect. There must be an actual, not projected, relinquishment; otherwise, the right or claim is not vacated or waived. o Administrative Order No. 2 defines abandonment or neglect as a willful failure of the agrarian reform beneficiary, together with his farm household, to cultivate, till, or develop his land to produce any crop, or to use the land for any specific economic purpose continuously for a period of two years. In the present case, no such willful failure has been demonstrated. Quite the contrary, and as correctly opined by the CA, respondent has not abandoned subject land. Even if respondent indeed abandon the land, any transfer of the property may only be made in favor his heirs or the government. o Respondent acquired the land under Presidential Decree 27, which prohibits transfer of land granted to tenant-farmers / farmerbeneficiaries (in this case, respondent) except in favor of heirs via hereditary succession, or in favor of the government through other legal modes.

PARAD: The respondents initiated an action for ejectment against Verde before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, alleging that respondent mortgaged the property to one dela Cruz without their knowledge or consent. This was upon the condition that dela Cruz would be the one to work half of said property. They also claimed that Verde also admitted to the same when confronted, and even asked for forgiveness from them. He also guaranteed to redeem the mortgage, but failed to do so. Dela Cruz still farmed the property in 1994. The respondents went on to claim that the act of mortgaging the property to dela Cruz constituted abandonment, which was a ground for termination of agricultural leasehold relation under Section 8 of RA 3844. A joint sworn statement evincing dela Cruz’s actions of farming the land presented by the respondents. Efforts to reach an amicable settlement before the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council failed. Verde, on the other hand, denied the material allegations of the complaint, claiming that he only hired the services of dela Cruz and the latter’s carabao during the period. He also upended sworn statements from two parties that dela Cruz was only hired. The Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the case for lack of merit, stating that Verde never actually gave up his tenancy over the subject land absolutely, as he still cultivated half of the property. There was no showing of intentional abandonment. Motion for reconsideration was denied. DARAB: Affirmed the PARAD.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello CA: The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the DARAB, stating that Section 24 of RA 1199 prohibits a share-tenant from employing a subtenant to work or furnish labor on the land subject of a tenancy agreement. Moreover, jurisprudence dictates that there should be personal cultivation by the tenant or by his immediate farm household or members of the family of the lessee or other persons who are dependent upon him for support or who usually help him in his activities.[ Dela Cruz is not a member of Verde’s immediate farm household, nor did he depend on the

same for support. Thus, the requirement of personal cultivation is lacking. Hence this petition. Issues: W/n the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that petitioner Verde was not personally cultivating the land, and thus, was properly ejected by the Macapagals? Held: Yes, the Court of Appeals erred. Section 166(2) of RA 3844 defines an agricultural lessee as follows: Sec. 166.Definition of Terms.(2) Agricultural lessee means a person who, by himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another with the latters consent for purposes of production, for a price certain in money or in produce or both. It is distinguished from civil law lessee as understood in the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Dela Cruz vs Quiazon FACTS:  Estela Dizon-Garcia, mother of respondent Amelia G. Quiazon, was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 107576, situated in Sto. Domingo II, Capas, Tarlac. The property was brought under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.  On June 8, 1981, Feliciano dela Cruz, a tenant-farmer, was issued CLT No. 0036207 over a 3.7200-hectare portion of the said property.  On March 9, 1992, the heirs of Estela Dizon-Garcia executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Admission and Partition with Waiver adjudicating among themselves all the properties left by both of their parents, except for the subject property, which was adjudicated solely in favor of respondent.  On May 15, 1993, respondent filed a Complaint with the Provincial Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) against petitioner Ferdinand dela Cruz, alleging that in he entered into a leasehold contract with respondent, by virtue of which he bound himself to deliver 28 cavans of palay as rental. Since 1991, petitioner Ferdinand dela Cruz allegedly failed to deliver the stipulated rental because he had already abandoned the landholding. For this reason, respondent prayed for his ejectment from the 

Personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee is one of the 6 requisites in an agricultural lease relationship. The law defines the same as cultivation by the lessee or lessor in person and/or with the aid of labor from within his immediate household, i.e., members of the family of the lessee or lessor and other persons who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him in his activities. It is clear that dela Cruz is not a member of Verde’s family. Does the hiring of dela Cruz’s services

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and his carabao substantiate the claim that Verde is guilty of abandoning his agricultural lease? No, it does not. The use of the carabao was only one phase of farm labor that a tenant is supposed to be rendered. The fact that a tenant or an agricultural lessee for that matter employs farm laborers to perform some aspects of farm work does not preclude the existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship provided an agricultural lessee does not leave the entire process of cultivation in the hands of hired helpers. A tenant or an agricultural lessee hiring of farm laborers on a temporary or occasional basis does not negate the existence of the element of personal cultivation essential in a tenancy or agricultural leasehold relationship. Verde’s lack of resources to secure a carabao for himself constitutes incapac ity under Section

27(2) of RA 3844, which permits the agricultural lessee, in case of illness or temporary incapacity, to avail himself of the services of laborers, incapacity being anycause or circumstance which prevents the lessee from fulfilling his contractual and other obligations. Thus, he may be allowed to hire dela Cruz without prejudice to his tenancy.

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property and the termination of their tenancy relationship. In his Answer, petitioner Ferdinand dela Cruz, through petitioner Renato dela Cruz, alleged that the execution of the leasehold contract was erroneous considering that a CLT had already been issued in favor of his father. He contended that by virtue of the CLT, they became the owners of the landholding, without any obligation to pay rentals to respondent but only to pay amortizations to the Land Bank of the Philippines. He claimed that they paid the rentals until 1992, which rentals should now be considered as advance payments for the land. Respondent amended the by alleging that petitioners Ferdinand and Feliciano dela Cruz were already US immigrants and that petitioner Renato dela Cruz, the actual tiller of the land, was a usurper because his possession of the land was without the consent of the landowner. Respondent argued that by migrating to USA, Feliciano was deemed to have abandoned the landholding, for which reason his CLT should now be cancelled. Petitioners averred that their father was just temporarily out of the country and that Renato’s possession and cultivation of the land did not need the consent of the landowner because it was done in aid of their fathers cultivation of the land. On November 8, 1993, petitioners began paying amortizations to the Land Bank of the Philippines. On December 21, 1993, Provincial Adjudicator Romeo B. Bello dismissed the complaint based on his finding that the landholding had not been abandoned by Feliciano considering that petitioner Renato dela Cruz, a member of Felicianos immediate family, was in actual and physical possession thereof.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello 

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Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Provincial Adjudicator denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and directed the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of Capas, Tarlac, to determine whether the amortizations had been fully paid and, if so, to issue an Emancipation Patent. Unknown to petitioners, respondent and her siblings, as heirs of Estela DizonGarcia, had filed an Application for Retention before the DAR Regional Office for Region III, as early as June 1, 1994. The application was granted on February 8, 1996 stated the following:

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GRANTING theapplication forretention ofthe Heirs of Estela Dizon-Garcia over a landholding covered by TCT No. 107576, with a total area of 12.5431, located at Sto. Domingo, Capas, Tarlac, to be divided among the heirs as follows:

ISSUE: W/N Petitioners have abandoned the landholding. RULING: 

Rosita Garcia - 3.9641 has. Buena Garcia - 2.5796 has. Bella Garcia - 3.0000 has. Estellita Garcia - 3.0000 has. 2.

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ORDERING the herein landowners-applicant to maintain in peaceful namely: possession the dela tenants the subject landholding, Renato Cruz,ofCarlos Aquino and Francisco Manayang as leaseholders; and

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DIRECTING the herein landowners-applicant to cause the segregation of the retained area at their own expense and to submit report to this Office within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof.

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In a letter dated April 15, 1996, the heirs of Feliciano dela Cruz prayed for the setting aside of the said order. DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao treated the letter as an appeal but was denied in an Order dated May 13, 1997. On July 7, 1999, the DARAB finally dismissed respondents and the decision became final and executory. On October 19, 1999, respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, claiming that she just arrived from the U.S.A. on September 10, 1999 and it was only then that she found out about the DARAB Decision. She purportedly tried to contact her counsel only to discover that he died. Respondent insisted that petitioners had already abandoned the landholding and failed to pay the lease and amortization payments the cancellation of their CLT was justified. She argued that the CLT was rendered moot by the DARs grant of their application for retention of their property which included the subject landholding. In its Resolution dated February 7, 2001, the DARAB granted the petition for relief from judgment. The DARAB set aside its July 7, 1999 Decision primarily

based on the DAR Order granting the application for retention, as well as its finding that Ferdinand and Feliciano dela Cruz abandoned the subject landholding when they went to the U.S.A. On August 7, 2002, the DARAB denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. On November 27, 2003, the DARAB likewise denied petitionersExParte Manifestation with Motion and Comments and Manifestation. Petitioners thereafter filed a petition for review with the CA. Pending the resolution of the appeal, Feliciano dela Cruz passed away. On January 19, 2006, the CA denied the petition. On March 21, 2006, the CA also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

SC reversed CA rukling and reinstated DARAB July 7, 1999 decision. SC agree with petitioners that they have not abandoned the subject landholding, as in fact they have continuously cultivated the property. Abandonment requires o (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or property; and o (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect. The intention to abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never returning, resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned. The immigration of the srcinal farmer-beneficiary to the US did not necessarily result in the abandonment of the landholding, considering that one of his sons, petitioner Renato dela Cruz, continued cultivating the land. Personal cultivation, as required by law, includes cultivation of the land by the tenant (lessee) himself or with the aid of the immediate farm household, which refers to the members of the family of the tenant and other persons who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him in the agricultural activities.

CLEMENTE DEQUITO V. VICTORIA LLAMAS G.R. No. L-28090 (SEPT 4, 1975) FACTS 1.

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On July 3, 1962, petitioner filed a complaint for "Reliquidation and Damages" (CAR Case No. 3469) against private respondent Victoria Llamas in the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch 1, Bacolod City. Plaintiff Dequito alleged that: he was an agricultural share tenant for a period of nine (9) years of a onehectare piece of land, and in the crop year 1959-1960, an additional landholding of one-half (½) hectare was given him by defendant Llamas;

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that the produce of the same land was divided 50-50, tenant- plaintiff furnishing all items of production and his labor, while defendant contributed only her land; that plaintiff cultivated 500 clumps of bamboos planted along his tenancy landholding on the agreement that plaintiff gets as his share 10% of the gross sale of said bamboos; and that from crop year 1964, plaintiff was not paid 10% that after the crop year 1961-62 defendant dispossessed tenant-plaintiff from the ½ hectare landholding that for many times plaintiff had demanded from defendant a change in the illegal sharing basis of 50-50 to 70-30 and his 10% share of the gross sales of bamboos, but defendant did not heed said demands; that plaintiff obtained cash loans from defendant in the crop year 1961 to 1967, and that he had to pay usurious interests for said loans in the form of palay; that he suffered "mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation", thus entitling him to moral damages; The plaintiff prayed that the defendant be ordered to pay plaintiff “short sharing," due him for 6 years; to order defendant to pay him the cost of 120 cavans of palay representing plaintiff's failure to plant during crop years 196263 to 1966-67; to order defendant to pay plaintiff 10% of the gross sale of bamboos; to order defendant to return the excess of one (1) cavan of palay as

The Court was convinced that petitioner never waived any of his rights as a tenant contrary to law, but rather he declared under oath that the "sharing basis was in accordance with law", a plain and clear declaration of facts made in a public document.  Petitioner never questioned the authenticity of his affidavit of June 1, 1967, and did not for a moment raise any question on the voluntariness of its execution.  The respondent Court observed the petitioner to be a literate person and one who could not have been deceived by the contents of the affidavit which was written in a dialect he knows and understands and it could safely be presumed that when petitioner signed the sworn statement he knew the meaning and import of all its contents.  What clearly appear in the affidavit are admissions or declarations against his own interest made by the petitioner when he stated under oath.  Petitioner himself, in his voluntary executed sworn statement, the contents of which he fully understood, stated as a fact that the sharing basis was in accordance with law. If petitioner now contends that it was not so, thus reneging on his own sworn admission of the existence of a fact, then he must have perjured himself when he voluntarily and knowingly stated under oath that the sharing basis was in accordance with law. We will not allow such perfidy to prevail because a party to a litigation must always come to court in good faith and with clean hands.  If the petitioner miscalculated on the advantages and disadvantages of voluntary surrender of his landholding for an agreed consideration, he must assume the

overpayment of cash loan from crop year 1966-67,1963-64 to 1965-66,196162 to 1962-63, All amount plus "8% legal interest” computed from the time the amount became due; to order defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as corrective or exemplary damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages, plus P1,000.00 as attorney's fees;

consequences of and his error.After executing theown affidavit voluntarily he made admissions declarations against his interest under thewherein solemnity of an oath, he cannot be allowed to spurn them and undo what he has done. He cannot, even "with great repentance, retrieve the body he forsook and now wishes to live." He ought to know that if he has rights to protect as a tenant, the landowner has also rights under the law. The protective mantle of social justice cannot be utilized as an instrument to hoodwink courts of justice and undermine the rights of landowners on the plea of helplessness and heartless exploitation of the tenant by the landowner. False pretenses cannot arouse the sentiment of charity in a compassionate society. The matter of loans with alleged usurious interest mentioned in petitioners' complaint, the same could be the subject matter of a separate action if the claim is supported by signed memorandum or receipt of the loans as required by Sec. 20 of Act 3844 and the provisions of the Usury Law.

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Defendant Llamas filed a motion to dismiss on the principal ground that plaintiff had already voluntarily surrendered his landholding to defendant; that he admitted in his sworn affidavit dated June 1, 1967, "that the liquidation and the sharing basis was in accordance with law; that all the improvements, rights and interest were sold by the plaintiff to the defendant in the amount of P700.00" 

COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS: The Court of Agrarian Relations dismissed the Petition for Reliquidation and Damages. The defendant’s Motion to Dismiss was as held "tenable and meritorious" on the following

grounds: (1) that plaintiff (petitioner Dequito) already voluntarily surrendered his landholding to the defendant (private respondent Llamas) which is a lawful ground for termination of tenancy relationship underSec. 9, of Republic Act No. 1199; (2) that plaintiff Dequito had sworn under oath in an affidavit that the liquidation and the sharing basis was in accordance with law; and (3) that all the improvements, rights and interests were sold by the plaintiff to the defendant in the amount of P700.00. ISSUE: Did the petitioner voluntarily surrender the landholding to the defendant? HELD:

Petition is dismissed, and the Orders dated July 24, 1967, and September 1, 1967, of the respondent court dismissing petitioner's complaint are AFFIRMED. NOTE: Section 9. Severance of Relationship.- The tenancy relationship is extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the land by, or the death or incapacity of, the tenant, but his heirs or the members of his immediate farm household may continue to work the land until the close of the agricultural year. The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the parties, and the sale or alienation of the land do not of themselves extinguish the relationship. In the latter case, the purchaser or transferee shall assume the rights and obligations of the former

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello landholder in relation to the tenant. In case of death of the landholder, his heir or heirs shall likewise assume his rights and obligations.

POLICARPIO NISNISAN AND ERLINDA NISNISAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PACITA respondents. MANCERA, WENCESLAO MANCERA and SILVESTRE POLANCOS, G.R. No. 126425 12 August 1998 J. Martinez Facts: Spouses Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan are the owners of a parcel of land denominated as Lot No. 2510, Cad 275 located at Dolo, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, with an area of 4.9774 hectares, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (P-11676)-2151. Petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan, son of Gavino Nisnisan, has been cultivating one hectare of the aforesaid land since 1961. On April 1, 1976, Gavino Nisnisan and petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan entered into a leasehold tenancy contract which stipulates a sharing arrangement of 1/3:2/3 of the harvest, the bigger share being given to the latter. On December 28, 1978, Gavino Nisnisan sold two hectares of their land, including the land tenanted by petitioners-spouses Policarpio and Erlinda Nisnisan, to private respondentsspouses Wenceslao Mancera and Pacita H. Mancera. As a result of the sale, petitioners-spouses were ousted from their landholding. Hence, on November 24, 1982, petitioners-spouses instituted an action for reinstatement of tenancy holding against private respondent spouses Wenceslao and Pacita Mancera before the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) in Davao City. no cause The private respondents Mancera spouses countered that the Nisnisan spouses have of action, the latter having voluntarily surrendered their landholding. On June 25, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint ruling that the petitioners-spouses allegation of tenancy is repudiated by the affidavit executed by Gavino Nisnisan to the effect that the subject land is not tenanted. The trial court ratiocinated in this wise: As to the claim of reinstatement by Policarpio Nisnisan, it appears from the affidavit of Gavino Nisnisan which was executed and filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur, and recorded as Entry No. 117718, per memorandum of encumbrances of Original Certificate of Title No. (P-11676)-2151 (Exhibit A/5-C) that the said land is not tenanted

The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals Issue: Whether or not petitioners Spouses Policarpio and Erlinda Nisnisan voluntarily surrendered their tenancy holding.

Ruling: Petition meritorious The finding of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners-spouses are not tenants of the subject land holding is erroneous. While there are annotations in Gavino Nisnisan’s certificate of title (Entry No. 72086 for Affidavit of Non-Tenancy under Justice Circular No. 31 and Entry No. 117718 for Affidavit of Non-Tenancy executed by Gavino Nisnisan) that the subject land is not tenanted, said annotations are not conclusive proof of the real relationship between Gavino Nisnisan and petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan and are not binding upon the court. Moreover, petitioners-spouses have sufficiently shown that they are the tenants of the spouses Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan as evidenced by a document entitled Panagsabutan Sa Abang Sa Yuta (Exhibit D), executed by Gavino Nisnisan and Policarpio Nisnisan on April 1, 1976, acknowledged before the Municipal Trial Court Judge Mariano C. Tupas of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, and registered before the Municipal Treasurers Office. The above-quoted document evidences the leasehold tenancy relationship between Gavino Nisnisan and petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan. It clearly shows that the subject land is agricultural; that petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan is obligated to cultivate the same by planting rice thereon; and, that there is sharing of the harvests between the said parties. It is clear that essential elements of tenancy relationship are present in this case, namely: 1. the parties are the landowner and the tenant 2. the subject matter is agricultural land 3. there is consent 4. the purpose is agricultural production 5. there is personal cultivation by the tenants 6. there is sharing of harvests between parties Significantly, this documentary evidence of leasehold tenancy relationship was never rebutted by the private respondents-spouses. Furthermore, this leasehold tenancy contract cannot be defeated by the aforementioned affidavit of non-tenancy executed by Gavino Nisnisan, which is obviously self-serving. Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3844 , voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishing agricultural leasehold tenancy relations, must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The tenant’s intention to surrender the landholding cannot be presumed, much less determined by mere implication. Based on the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that petitioners-spouses are agricultural lessees and are therefore entitled to security of tenure as mandated by Section 10 of Republic Act 3844: Section 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc.- The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholdings, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello BIENVENIDO T. BUADA ET.AL. , petitioners, vs. CEMENT CENTER, INC.respondents. G.R. No. 180374 22 January 2010 J. Del Castillo

Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely erred in making an inference that the compromise agreement was not subject tointerpretati on. Ruling: The Petition was impressed with merit

Facts: It is the policy of the State to promote the Security of Tenure of Farmers over their leasehold. Petitioners Bienvenido T. Buada, Isaias B. Quinto, Nemesio Bautista, Orlando T. Bautista, Freddie R. Bautista, Carlito O. Buada, Gerardo O. Buada, Armando M. Oliva, Rogelio F. Rapajon, and Eugenio F. Flores were Republic Act (RA) No. 3844 (1963), otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, declares it to be tenant-farmers cultivating three parcels of agricultural land owned by respondent Cement Center, Inc.the policy of the State to make small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society. On March 13, 1998, respondent filed a Complaint for Confirmation of Volunt ary Surrender and Damages against petitioners with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Region As 1 an exception to the security of tenure, under the law, Section 8 of RA 3844 specifically enumerates the in Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. It claime d that on June28, 1995, petitioners enter ed into a Compro mise grounds for the extinguishment of agricultural leasehold viz: relations, Agreement with respondent whereby the former, for and in consideration of the sum of P3,000.00 each, voluntarily surrendered their respective landholdings. However, despite respondents repeated demands, Section 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. The petitioners refused to vacate subject landholdings. agricultural leasehold relation established under this Code shall be extinguished by: In their Answer, petitioners alleged that their consent to the Compromise Agreement was obtained through fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation. They claimed that sometime in 1995, respondent induced them to sign a Compromise Agreement by representing that the subject landholdings are no longer viable for agricultural purposes. Petitioners alleged that respondent assured them that they would only apply for the conversion of the land and that they would have to surrender the land only upon the approval of said application and that thereafter, they will be paid a disturbance compensation of P3,000.00 each. Petitioners also claimed that respondent promised to hire them to work on the project that was planned for the converted land. But, should the application for conversion be denied, petitioners will continue to be tenants and could later become beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor; (2) Voluntary surrender of the landholdi ng by theagricultural lessee , written notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or (3) Absence of the persons under Section nine to succeed to the lessee, in the event of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee. (Emphasis supplied)

On March 9, 1999, the Regional Adjudicator rendered a ecision d in favor of the tenant-fa rmers.The The Compromise Agreement did not constitute the voluntary surrender contemplated by law. Regional Adjudicator held that the Compromise Agreement was not enforceable because it violated the provisions of Administrative Order No. 12, Series.[10] ofSaid 1994administrative order requires the payment As earlier stated, vital to these contentions is the resolution of the basic issue of whether or not petitioners of disturbance compensation which should not be less than five times the average of the annual gross value as tenants-farmers intended to absolutely and voluntarily surrender their tenancy rights over the subject of the harvest on their actual landholdings during the last five preceding calendar years. landholdings. Aggrieved, respondent appealed to DARAB who affirmed the Decision of the Regional Adjudicator, In the Talavera v. Court of Appeals said case, found that the evidence on record and therein petitioners' DARAB found that respondent failed to prove that petitioners voluntarily surrendered their tenancy rights arguments were not enough to overcome the rights of the private respondent as provided in the over the subject landholdings. It held that since the application for conversion was denied, then Constitution the and the agrarian statutes. In this case [K]asunduan the was taken into consideration wherein Compromise Agreement is not a perfected obligation; it is as if the petitioners voluntary surrender never the leasehold tenant allegedly surrendered his tenancy rights voluntarily for the sum of P1,000.00, did not existed. constitute voluntary surrender as contemplated by law, and reinstated the tenant in the landholding. Alleging that the DARAB gravely erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing its appeal, On the other hand,Levardo in v. Yatco , the Court upheld the waiver of tenancy rights and ruled that: respondent thereafter filed a Petition for Review with the CA. The CA found the appeal meritorious. Alleging that the DARAB gravely erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing its appeal, respondent Based on the evidence on record, respondents paid thereafter filed a Petition for Review with the CA. AguidoP2,000,000.00 and HernandoP2,417,142.00 as disturbance compensation. A reading of Pinanumpaang the Salaysay executed by petitioners The CA found the appeal meritorious. show that they gave up their leasehold rights dahil sa " aming kagustuhang umiba ng hanap buhay ng higit ang pagkikitaan kaysa panakahan. " The money given by respondents as disturbance compensation was indeed advantageous to the

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello families of petitioners, as it would have allowed them to pursue other sources of livelihood.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. They also did not answer the petition, hence they were declared in default.

A perusal of the subject Compromise Agreement reveals that the parties considered the amount Over seven months later, or on June 27, 1957, two (2) of said respondents moved for the lifting of P3,000.00 together with the income from a single cropping as comprising the disturbance compensation of the order of default. Subsequently, eleven (11) other respondents filed a similar motion, package,viz: which like the first, was granted. After the submission of respondents' answer and subsequent appropriate proceedings the court rendered a decision annulling the orders lifting the 4. The aforeindicated income derived from the properties and the declaration of default, finding that the tracts of land involved in this case had not been proven financial assistance of P3,000.00 hall s be considered as the disturbance to be within the perimeter recommended by the Bureau of Soil Conservation for conversion compensation package in favor of the SECOND PARTY by reason or as a result of into grazing land, that non-payment of the rentals due to petitioner was not deliberate on the their vacating the premises in accordance with Administrative Order No. 1, Series part of said respondents, apart from the circumstance that the amount of rental charged by of 1990 of the Department of Agrarian Reform. (Emphasis supplied) petitioner might be excessive, and, hence, illegal, and that the alleged failure of respondents to observe proven farm practices had not been established. Petitioners, however, assail the disturbance compensation package provided in the Compromise Agreement as insufficient and contrary to Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 2004. They claim that ISSUE: they Whether the land occupied by said respondents forms part of the area found by the would not have acceded to such a measly amount were it not for the agreement that respondent will Bureau hire of Soil Conservation to be suitable for pasture. them as workers on the planned project on the subject land. HELD: Despite the above contentions of petitioners, respondent failed to present evidence to show that Itthe appears from the soil conservation report that the land involved in this case is "characterized disturbance compensation package corresponds with the compensa tion required by the said Administrative by the presence of stony sections . . . and rock outcrops of boulders and gully formations" and Order. Neither was there any showing that said disturbance compensation is not less than five timesthat the its "soil fertility has become actually low . . . because of the loss of the topsoil due to soil average annual gross value of the harvest on petitioner’s actual landholdings during the precedingerosion.” five calendar years. Indeed, the lower court took on its face value the testimony of Atty. Fabricante to the effect Moreover, it was not shown why petitioners as tenant-farmers would voluntarily give up their sole source that said land can hardly yield three (3) to five (5) cavans of palay per hectare, thus There was likewise no showing that the money was indeed advantageous to petitioner’s corroborating the conclusion, reached in the aforementioned soil conservation report, to the of livelihood. families as to allow them to pursue other sources of livelihood. To stress, tenancy relations cannot effect be that the land should be "utilized for pasture and not for crops". We are satisfied, bargained away except for the strong reasons provided by law which must be convincingly showntherefore, by that the land in question is appropriate for grazing purposes, not for agriculture. evidence in line with the State's policy of achieving a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices. As to the non-payment of rentals, if the non-payment of rentals were due to as poor harvest owing to anextraordinary event or in unusual act of God, the refusal of respondent Judge, to order the ejectment of the other respondents upon the ground that their omission was not GARCHITORENA v PANGANIBAN deliberate would be justified. However, when said omission takes place for several years and G.R. No. L-17784 October 30, 1962 the landnormally has a poor yield, by reason of the condition of its soil, as it is in the case at bar, said refusal has the effect of authorizing the respondents to hold the land for life, or, at FACTS: least, indefinitely, without giving the owner or landowner any share in its produce, thus Petitioner is the owner and landholder of a farm land of about 138 hectares located virtually depriving him of one of the attributes of ownership, which is the enjoyment of the in Camarines Sur. Different portions of this land, with an aggregate area of over 77 hectares, possession and use of the thing owned, as well as of the products thereof. are held by said thirty-four (34) respondents, as tenants or lessees of the petitioner. Our Constitution and tenancy laws do not countenance such result. To begin with, the same On May 9, 1956, Petitioner commenced this proceedings in the Court of Agrarian Relations, amounts to a taking of private property for private use and without compensation. Sixth Regional District, Naga, with a petition for permission to effect the transfer aforementioned, or, else, to eject the aforementioned respondents, because petitioner wishes Secondly, the principle of social justice cannot and should not be so construed as to violate the to convert said portion of about 77 hectares from palay land to pasture land, and because said elementary principles of justice and bring about a patent injustice. chanro respondents had not paid the rentals respectively due from them, aside from having failed to follow proven farm practices. Thirdly, if the land in dispute is as poor for agricultural purposes as it is, the continuance thereon of respondents herein would tend to perpetuate their precarious condition, instead of

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello promoting their well-being and economic security, which is the immediate objective of social justice. It is to the best interest, therefore, of said respondents that they be transferred to lands that may offer them and their families a better future. c The judgement appealed from is reversed and another shall be entered, authorizing petitioner herein to convert the land in dispute, into a pasture land. Let the record of this case be remanded to the lower court for determination of the feasibility of transferring respondents herein to other portions of petitioner's land which are suitable for agricultural purposes and the adoption of such measures as may be appropriate to carry out the corresponding transfer or transfers

Felisa FERRER vs Domingo CARGANILLO, Sergio Carganillo, Soledad Agustin and Marcelina Solis G.R. No. 170956 / 620 SCRA 493 May 12, 2010

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Petitioner’s evidence was not conclusive. Herein petitioner failed to prove that

there was subleasing or mortgage of the property by respondent. DARAB: PARAD ruling AFFIRMED. Petitioner asserted that the PARAD erred in failing to give credence to the Investigation Report of the MARO legal officer. The PARAD did not consider the sub-lease, but considered that Sergio was merely helping his brother, as an immediate member of Domingo’s family, to cultivate the land, and is not in any way prejudicial to petitioner’s interest. CA: DARAB decision AFFIRMED. Petitioner failed to prove with sufficient evidence neither the fact of the sub-leasing nor the mortgaging of possessory rights to Sergio. The document presented by petitioner, denominated as “Katulagan” is merely a promissory note, which is a proof of indebtedness and not as evidence to prove mortgage. Issue: Whether or not the lease tenancy relationship can be terminated. Whether or not there was a sub-lease between respondent and his brother.

Petition for Review on Certiorari of a Decision of the Court of Appeals. DARAB Case No. 7862 Facts: In her complaint, petitioner alleged that she owned a 6000-sq. meter lot located in Tayug, Pangasinan, and tenanted by respondent Domingo. She further alleged that without her knowledge, respondent subleased the land to his brother, Sergio. She knew of this fact when she visited the place and found Sergio in actual possession and cultivation of the land. o Petitioner prayed that the lease tenancy relationship between her and respondent In his answer, respondent denied that he mortgaged his possessory rights to Sergio, and asserted that he was still in actual, continuous and peaceful possession of subject property. An investigation report by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) legal officer Estimada that based on the testimony, the cultivation and possession of the land was subleased by Domingo to Sergio as the former was applying for work abroad. In fact, Domingo admitted the existence of the sublease. o Estimada recommended that Domingo and Sergio be ejected from the subject landholding. o An affidavit by Clarion was also used to corroborate the Investigation Report, averring that Domingo mortgaged his tenancy rights over subject land, and that the latter is presently cultivating said land by virtue of such mortgage. PARAD: Decision AGAINST PETITIONER. Complainant has the burden of proof to show proof by convincing evidence the truth of her allegations.

SC: Petition GRANTED. The High Court disagreed with the findings of the lower court and the agencies in finding that petitioner failed to prove her case. Petitioner submitted the following: o Exhibit 1 – Photocopy of Investigation Report, wherein findings state that respondent Domingo admitted the fact that he subleased the land to another, and such is a clear and blatant violation against the landowner and co-owner for that matter. o Exhibit 2 – Affidavit of one Clarion stating that she knew of the fact that respondent mortgaged his tenancy rights to his brother Sergio. Meanwhile, respondent submitted the following: o Exhibit 1 – Sergio’s affidavit, denying that the land was mortgaged to him by his brother, the respondent. o Exhibit 2 – Affidavit by one Orina, stating that he was a tenant in the adjoining land, declaring that he knows respondent Domingo was always present doing or supervising the activities. o Exhibit 3 – Sworn statement by one Costales, incumbent Barangay Agrarian Reform Council Chairman (BARC), attesting that respondent never violated any agrarian laws. o Exhibit 4 – Sworn statement issued by one of the kagawads stating the same fact in Exhibit 3. Petitioner sufficiently proved her case. o The investigation report and affidavit showed that respondent admitted the sublease to Sergio. o Petitioner contended that respondent subleased the land to Sergio for P15k.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello The Katulagan showed that Domingo was indebted to Sergio for the amount of P15k. The affidavit of Clarion, a resident of the area, corroborated the same facts. o Respondent did not affirm nor deny in his answer that an investigation was conducted, wherein he admitted that he subleased the landholding.  It is totally against our human nature to just remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false accusations. Such silence is almost always construed as implied admission of the truth. In view of the sublease, respondent and his brother should be dispossessed of the land. o Section 24 (2) of Republic Act No. 3844, it shall be unlawful for a sharetenant to employ a sub-tenant to furnish labor or any phase of the work required of him, except in cases of illnesses or any temporary capacity on his part, in which eventuality the tenant or any member of his immediate farm household is under obligation to report such illness or incapacity to the landholder. In this case, respondent’s sublease to Sergio is prohibited. Hence they o should be dispossessed of the land. o

o

o

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DARAB Case No. 7863 Facts: Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land with an approximate area of 4,667 sq. meters. She alleged that the duly instituted lessee of the agricultural land is the late Isabelo Ramirez, who, during his lifetime, subleased the same land to respondent Soledad Agustin, without petitioner’s knowledge and consent. Petitioner argues that the said act of her now deceased tenant is a ground for ejectment of Soledad, who is a mere sublessee. Soledad filed her answer, wherein she affirmed that Isabelo was the duly instituted tenant of the land, and upon his death, possessory rights transferred on to his surviving spouse (not named). She also alleged that the surviving spouse continued to cultivate the land. An investigation report submitted by Estimada, and a corroborating affidavit by one Gano was attached to petitioner’s position papers on all four cases. o The report stated that the lawful tenant was indeed Isabelo. o In the affidavit, Gano said that he knew Isabelo had mortgaged his tenancy rights and possession to Soledad, and further averred that Soledad was presently cultivating the land. Soledad,, however, submitted the following: tenant, and o Her own affidavit wherein she denied that she petitioner’s is contended that the true tenant is her sister-in-law Marina Ramirez, the widow of Isabelo. o Affidavit of Marina, who affirmed the same. o Affidavit of BARC Chairman Costales, who declared that Soledad is not the registered tenant of the petitioner, nor has Soledad managed the activities of the land.

o

o

Affidavit of the previously aforementioned Orina, owner of the adjacent land, who attested that Soledad never became a tenant, tiller, or manager. Affidavit of one Bugayong, incumbent Barangay Kagawad, who stated that Marina continued tilling the land. Leasehold contract (Tulag ti Panagabang ti Talon), stating that the leasehold held by the deceased Isabelo is now with Marina, his widow.

PARAD: Complaint DISMISSED. DARAB: Appeal DISMISSED. CA: DARAB decision AFFIRMED. Issue: Whether or not there was an existing sub-lease between Isabelo and Soledad. SC: Petition DENIED. Petitioner has not established her claim of sublease. o The investigation report stated that the lawful tenant was Isabelo and not Soledad. o However, the affidavit of Gano stated only the same facts, and that the same was common knowledge in the barangay. The High Court ruled that the evidence presented by petitioner was uncorroborated and unsubstantial. DARAB Cases No. 7864 and 7865 Facts: In Case No. 7864, petitioner, in representation of landowners Pajarito, Madolora, and Lagado, alleged that her tenant, Pedro Solis, died and was survived by his wife, respondent Marcelina. She further alleged that Marcelina took over the cultivation of the 14k sq. meter landholding without her knowledge and consent, and that during his lifetime, pedro failed to pay lease rentals for 3 consecutive years (95 to 97). In Case No. 7865, petitioner co-owned (with one Irene Aguinaldo) a 6830.5-sq. meter landholding tenanted by Marcelina, who allegedly has not fully paid the rental for the use of the land on the third cropping season. Both cases are for ejectment against Marcelina. Respondent Marcelina, in her answer, specifically denied the allegations of arrears in lease rentals in the first case. In the second case, however, she admitted that there were times that the land was planted with palay on third cropping, though this was not regular. She further averred that if ever the palay yielded produce, petitioner was given her due share. PARAD: Both cases DISMISSED. DARAB: PARAD decision AFFIRMED.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello CA: DARAB decision AFFIRMED. Issue: Whether or not petitioner s ufficiently proved her allegations against respondent. SC: Petition DENIED. As agricultural lessor, petitioner has the burden of proof to show existence of a lawful cause for ejectment of an agricultural lessee. In the first case, petitioner failed to establish her principals’ claim. o Petitioner failed to establish by sufficient evidence that respondent failed to pay the lease rentals. o Respondent, in fact, sufficiently rebutted the allegation when she presented 5 pieces of evidence, all of which show receipts issued by Irene Aguinaldo evidencing receipt of their share in the produce of the land. In the second case, petitioner also failed to establish her allegation of non-delivery of her share in the third cropping. o Respondent sufficiently rebutted the allegation by providing sufficient evidence to the contrary, which included:  Receipts by Aguinaldo acknowledging receipts of their shares in the produce.  Notice sent to Aguinaldo that, for unreasonably refusing to accept the shares due them, the same was sold and the proceeds deposited in the bank.  Notices of reaping and threshing, to prove that the landowner was duly notified.  The name of the bank, and the passbook containing the deposited amounts.

Zurbano v. Estrella (1989) FACTS: under a Letter of Instruction dated October 21, 1976, the President directed the then Secretary, now Minister of Agrarian Reform, to "undertake to place under the Land transfer Program of the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares ill aggregate areas or lands used for residential commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families.” It is the validity of such Letter of Instruction that is assailed in this prohibition proceeding on the ground that it is class legislation and, therefore, violative of the equal protection guarantee; that it is "a form of tyrannical imposition by a strong and powerful state" and, as such, violative of the due process clause; and that it would as applied to petitioners, be a taking of private property without just compensation. Petitioners-spouses in this prohibition proceeding alleged that they are the owners of agricultural lands, with 6 parcels planted to coconuts and 2 parcels of riceland. It is further alleged that said "coconut lands which are scattered in different barrios are very far from the

poblacion of Labo where petitioners reside which they could not even visit due to the unsettled peace and order conditions," resulting in their only productive property being the ricelands. On August 10, 1982, "petitioners received a communication from respondent Director Pejo of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, informing them that the processing of the land transfer had been initiated and requiring them to submit to the Regional Office all the necessary documents pertinent to their claim" otherwise, the farmer-beneficiaries would be issued the corresponding emancipation patents. When they asked why a small piece of property of only 1.86 hectares of riceland should be under Presidential Decree No. 27, they were informed that the text of the letter of Instruction No. 474 calls for the two parcels of ricelands being included in the Land Transfer Program. ISSUES: Whether the LOI is constitutional HELD: YES. The Constitution decrees no less than the emancipation of tenants, and there are safeguards therein to assure that there be no arbitrariness or injustice in its enforcement. There are, moreover, built-in safeguards to preclude any unlawful taking of private property. There is no merit to the contention that Letter of Instruction No. 474 denies equal protection. The history of land tenancy, especially in Central Luzon, is a dark spot in the social life and history of the people. There is no merit to the contention that the Letter of Instruction No. 474 amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law. All that it provides is that the Secretary then, now the Minister, of Agrarian Reform, is to take charge of Land Transfer Program pursuant to the Presidential Decree No. 27. Landholders with tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less are included if they own other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families. There is no departure from constitutional restraints. In language, scheme, and framework, this Letter of Instruction reveals the plan and purpose to attain the goal envisioned by the Constitution but with due regard to the landowners affected. There is a saving clause. They are exempt from its operation if it be shown that from the other lands owned by them of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas if agricultural, or other areas, whether residential, commercial, or industrial, or lands devoted to other urban purposes, they are unable to derive adequate income to support themselves and their families. Neither is there any merit to the contention that there would be the taking of property for public use without just compensation. The Constitution itself imposes the duty on the State to emancipate the tenants from the bondage of the soil.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Castro v. CA (1980) FACTS: Petitioners Benigno Castro, Fortunato Lagman, Ruperto Garamonte, Arsenio Torres and Domingo Manalo started cultivating different parcels of land owned by respondent Candido Baron and which are located at Barrio San Bartolome, Concepcion, Tarlac. Petitioners Garamonte, Manalo and Torres started working on said landholdings in 1963 while petitioners Castro and Lagman were employed sometime in 1969 and 1970, respectively. Petitioners (then plaintiffs), on April 2, 1973, filed their complaint against private respondent (then defendant) Candido Baron with the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch III in Tarlac, Tarlac to nullify their contracts for hired services and to affirm the existence of a tenancy relationship. On June 21, 1973, defendant (private respondent) filed his answer with counter-claim praying for the issuance of an interlocutory order immediately restraining the petitioners from disturbing the peaceful possession, enjoyment and administration of defendant's landholding and after hearing on the merits, for permanency of said injunction. On July 15, 1975, the trial court dismissed the petitioners’ complaint and declared them as

more than preponderantly proven to be mere hired laborers of defendant over their respective farm holdings under administration. It upheld the contracts of hired services being sought to be annulled for having been voluntarily and intelligently entered into, the validity, legality and due execution of which from both evidence had been shown to the Court's satisfaction. The CA upheld the lower court’s decision and held that: “Plaintiffs testified that they used to sign the contracts they executed 'together' at the place of

defendant and this fact is supported by the contracts they executed all dated May 15, 1972, which they admitted to have signed. This proves that the contracts were being executed with their full knowledge and awareness knowing they represented their agreement. There was no evidence adduced by any or all of the herein plaintiffs that they objected to the terms and conditions of the contracts they signed, nor of the fact that they were signing from year to year contracts in name only, and which allegedly were never enforced because the 50-50 sharing arrangement was followed. it is unthinkable to this Court that a landowner whose land is under administration and mechanization would ever agree to subvert his own contracts to his prejudice and actual loss. Evidently, defendant, who had ejected some of the plaintiffs could not have intended them to become tenants again after they agreed in writing to be mere hired laborers. The assertions that their written agreements were simulated, pro forma, and ineffective, are left alone, serious charges which were aired to discredit the contracts sought to be revoked, for the tenants having been benefitted by their contracts to remain in the landholding as hired laborers are estopped from impugning their validity. the two-pronged evidence of plaintiffs all but confirmed their relationship with the defendant, when they motu propio admitted that their actual relationship was governed not only by the written contracts of hired of services, but also by their actual practice of 50-50 share tenancy, which had been abolished years before. The excuses for their share tenancy relationship side-by-side with the presumption of legality of the contracts for services became lame, and inadmissible and are hereby considered as vain efforts to show a non-existent relationship which plaintiffs have tried hard to inject into their testimony which the court cannot accept nor consider for being wanting in substance, truth and logic. At this point, the Court, sad to state, noticed that plaintiffs soaring

ambitions outstretched their ability to produce in court the necessary evidence material to their cause.” In this petition, petitioners allege that they are tenants on a 50-50 sharing basis on the net palay produce from their respective palay landholdings owned by private respondents; that pursuant to their verbal arrangement, the landowner merely provides the land and the expenses for seedling, while petitioners shoulder without reimbursement the expenses for reaping and all other items for production; that such verbal agreement had been faithfully observed by both parties up to the agricultural year 1972-73; that they were induced to sign the written of, hired agricultural workers; that said contracts were never observed nor actually executed into practice as they actually continued to observed their verbal tenancy agreement earlier alleged. Private respondent, upon the other hand, alleges that the lands subject of the action are absolutely untenanted and are farmed by administration and mechanization; that petitioners are not tenants, but were mere hired agricultural workers; that it is clearly provided by Pres. Decree No. 27 that there should be a showing that the action involves tenants; that refuting petitioners' allegation, injunctions are not proper where those affected are tenants and this matter again requires a looking into the question of whether or not petitioners are tenants; that the instant petition is bereft of merit since the lands involved are not embraced within Operation Land Transfer under Pres. Decree No. 27 which only applies to tenanted lands; that Pres. Decrees Nos. 316 and 946 apply only to ejectment and harassment cases involving tenants; that the decrees specify and use only the terms tenant-farmer, tenant-tiller and tenant; that Pres. Decrees Nos. 27, 316 and 946 should be applied prospectively and the same are inapplicable to cases in the appellate courts. ISSUE/S: Whether petitioners are tenants of private respondent on the landholdings they have been cultivating for years HELD: NO. CA was correct. It must be observed that the questioned contracts were executed between petitioners and private respondent annually, before the start of each agricultural season. In the case of petitioner Castro, it should be noted that it took him three contracts in a span of three successive years (1970, 1971 and 1972) before he started questioning said contracts. Inevitably, the question that comes to mind is: What took him and the others so long'? Certainly, a person can forget the first incident or experience, perhaps tolerate the second, but will not go through a third time when he is well aware of the odds. Time and again, this Court has consistently issued pronouncements upholding the validity and effectivity of contracts. This Court finds merit in private respondent's contention that for the lands subject of the action to come under Operation Land Transfer under Pres. Decree No. 27, there must first be a showing that they are tenanted lands and for the action to come within the referral provisions of Pres. Decrees Nos. 316 and 946, it must first be established that the action involves tenants. The aforecited decrees specifically speak of "tenant-farmer", "sharecrop or lease tenancy", "tenant", and "tenant-tiller ".

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello On petitioners' flimsy claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain their own appeal and that this case should have been referred to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, private respondent aptly refuted the same by insisting that Presidential Decrees Nos. 316 and 946 apply only to ejectment and harassment cases involving tenants. It must be borne in mind that herein petitioners are found to be mere hired farm laborers and this case was instituted to seek the nullity of subject contracts and declare petitioners as tenants and hence, This is neither an action for ejectment nor harassment of tenants. The purpose for referral to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform under the aforesaid decrees is to enable said ministry to determine if the case is intended to harass tenant-farmers. Oddly enough, the case in the lower court and in the appellate court were initiated by petitioners themselves and hence, there is no case of harassment nor ejectment involved. On the contrary, it may even be stated that they have intended to harass private respondent when they brought "Commander Pusa" to the lower court and when they wrote a deceptive letter to the President during the lower court proceedings. Moreover, petitioners have made the fatal error of invoking the provisions of Presidential Decrees Nos. 27, 316 and 946; for, this Court has already ruled that said decrees cannot be applied retroactively and that they can only apply to bona fide tenants.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989 Facts: (Note: Several petitions were filed but I only digested the one related with the topic in Agra)  The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27: No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27. The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules. Issue: Whether or not the aforementioned PD No. 27 is constitutional.

Held: YES. The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrellaand we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized. The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section declares: no person Retention Limits.— Except as otherwise provided in this Act, may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the but in Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, no case shall retention by the landowner ex ceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area srcinally retained by them thereunder, further, That srcinal homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the srcinal homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent. G.R. No. 86889, December 4, 1990 Facts: On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied inSections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657. Thereafter, the Secretary Section 11 of R.A. No. of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing 6657 (Commercial Farms). Luz Farms, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it: (a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity." (b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ." (c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan. (d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. (e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13 — ". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determine a lower ceiling. In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year . . ."

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional.

CONTENTION OF LUZ FARM: Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety. In fact, it acknowledges the correctness of the decision of this Court in the case of the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform affirming the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It, however, argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.

In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, a livelihood program called “Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program” under which the land resources of the University were leased to its faculty and

CONTENTION OF DAR SECRETARY: Public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. Issue: Whether or not the Implementing Rules and Regulations are constitutional. Held: NO. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionallymandated agrarian reform program of the Government. There is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process.

Central Mindanao University vs. DARAB G.R. No. 100091 Facts: Petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural education institution owned and run by the state located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon province. It started as a farm school at Marilang, Bukidnon, in early 1910, in response to the public demand for and agricultural school in Mindanao. In 1960’s it was converted into a college with campus in Musuan, and became known as the

CMU. Primarily an agricultural university, the school was the answer to the need for training people in order to develop the agricultural potential of the island of Mindanao. On January 16, 1958 the late president Carlos P. Garcia, issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future campus of what is now the CMU.

employees. This arrangement was covered by a written contract. Under this program, the faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU provided technical know-how, practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4-5 hectares of land for the lowland rice project. The contract prohibits participants and their hired workers to establish houses or live in the project area and to use the cultivated land as a collateral for any kind of loan. It was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or employees. Among the participants in this program were Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao, Joven Caballero, Nestor Pulao, Danilo Vasquez, Aronio Pelayo and other complainants. Obrique was a Physics Instructor at the CMU while the others were employees in the lowland rice project. The other complainants, who were not members of the faculty or non-academic staff of the CMU, were hired workers or laborers of the participants in this program. When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua became President of the CMU in July 1986, he discontinued the agri-business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar cane known as Agri-Business Management and Training Project, due to losses incurred while carrying on the said project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when this project was discontinued. As Assistant Director of this agri-business project, Obrique was found guilty of mishandling the CMU funds and was separated from service by virtue of Executive Order No. 17, the re-organization law of the CMU.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Sometime in 1986, under Dr. Chua as President, the CMU launched a self-help project called CMU-Income Enhancement Program (CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and technical training in actual field project implementation and augment the income of the faculty and the staff.

position was separated from the service on account of certain irregularities he committed while Assistant Director of the Agri-Business Project of cultivating lowland rice. Others may, at the moment, own no land in Bukidnon but they may not necessarily be so destitute in their places of srcin. No proof whatsoever appears in the record to show that they are landless peasants.

Under the terms of a 3-party Memorandum of Agreement 2 among the CMU, the CMUIntegrated Development Foundation (CMU-IDF) and groups of "seldas" of 5 CMU employees, the CMU would provide the use of 4 to 5 hectares of land to a selda for one (1) calendar year.

The evidence on record establish without doubt that the complainants were srcinally authorized or given permission to occupy certain areas of the CMU property for a definite purpose to carry out certain university projects as part of the CMU's program of activities pursuant to its avowed purpose of giving training and instruction in agricultural and other related technologies, using the land and other resources of the institution as a laboratory for these projects. Their entry into the land of the CMU was with the permission and written consent of the owner, the CMU, for a limited period and for a specific purpose. After the expiration of their privilege to occupy and cultivate the land of the CMU, their continued stay was unauthorized and their settlement on the CMU's land was without legal authority. A person entering upon lands of another, not claiming in good faith the right to do so by virtue of any title of his own, or by virtue of some agreement with the owner or with one whom he believes holds title to the land, is a squatter. Squatters cannot enter the land of another surreptitiously or by stealth, and under the umbrella of the CARP, claim rights to said property as landless peasants. Under Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing prohibited acts of forcible entry or illegal detainer do not qualify as beneficiaries and may not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian reform. Any such person who knowingly and willfully violates the above provision of the Act shall be punished with imprisonment or fine at the discretion of the Court. Therefore, private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to be landless peasants, cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP.

The participants agreed not to allow their hired laborers or members of their family to establish any house or live within the vicinity of the project area and not to use the allocated lot as collateral for a loan. It was expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship would exist as a result of the Agreement. Initially, participation in the CMU-IEP was extended only to workers and staff members who were still employed with the CMU and was not made available to former workers or employees. In the middle of 1987, to cushion the impart of the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project on the lives of its former workers, the CMU allowed them to participate in the CMU-IEP as special participants. The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some contracts were renewed. Those whose contracts were not renewed were served with notices to vacate. The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar can project, the loss of jobs due to termination or separation from the service and the alleged harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of, the complaint. On the basis of the above facts, the DARAB found that the private respondents were not tenants and cannot therefore be beneficiaries under the CARP. At the same time, the DARAB ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to qualified beneficiaries. Issue/s: Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No. 005 for Declaration of Status of Tenants and coverage of land under CARP. Held: Petition is meritorious. We agree with the DARAB's finding that Obrique, et. al. are not tenants. Under the terms of the written agreement signed by Obrique, et. al., pursuant to the livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program", it was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and staff (participants in the project). The CMU did not receive any share from the harvest/fruits of the land tilled by the participants. What the CMU collected was a nominal service fee and land use participant's fee in consideration of all the kinds of assistance given to the participants by the CMU. In the same paragraph of their complaint, complainants claim that they are landless peasants. This allegation requires proof and should not be accepted as factually true. Obrique is not a landless peasant. The facts showed he was Physics Instructor at CMU holding a very responsible

It is our opinion that the 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated August 20, 1990, is not covered by the CARP because (1) It is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific limits as determined by Congress; (3) It is private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the CMU; (4) It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657 because the lands are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for school site and campus, including experimental farm stations for educational purposes, and for establishing seed and seedling research and pilot production centers.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello ENGRACIA VINZONS-MAGANA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE CONRADO ESTRELLA IN HIS CAPACITY AS MINISTER OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SALVADOR PEJO, AS REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MINISTRY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, and JUANA S. VDA. DE PAITAN, respondents.

FACTS: Magana is the owner of a parcel of riceland situated in the barrio of Talisay, Camarines Norte. The said riceland was tenanted by the late Domingo Paitan, husband of private respondent herein, Juana Vda. de Paitan, under an agricultural leasehold agreement. On October 20, 1977, Magana filed a petition for the termination of the leasehold agreement allegedly due to (1) non-payment of rentals; (2) inability and failure of Domingo Paitan to do the tilling and cultivation of the riceland due to his long illness; and (3) subleasing of the landholding to third parties. Presiding Judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Judge Juan Llaguno, referred the case to the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for certification as to whether or not it was proper for trial in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 316, but said office failed to act upon the request for certification, for a period of more than three years. Instead on July 10, 1980, the riceland was placed under the Land Transfer Program by virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1978, implemented Letter Instructions 474, which placed all tenanted ricelands with which areas of seven hectares orofless belongingNo. to landowners who own agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas under the Land Transfer Program of the government. A certificate of Land Transfer was finally awarded in favor of Domingo Paitan. As a consequence thereof, the rentals were no longer paid to Magana but were deposited instead with the Land Bank and credited as amortization payments for the riceland. Apparently aggrieved by this turn of events, Magana took the present recourse. ISSUE: WON the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer to Domingo Paitan is invalid and unconstitutional. HELD: Yes. The issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer to Domingo Paitan without first expropriating said property to pay petitioner landowner the full market value thereof before ceding and transferring the land to Paitan and/or heirs, is invalid and unconstitutional as it is confiscatory and violates the due process clause of the Constitution. The mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. At most, the certificate merely evidences the government's recognition of the grantee as the party qualified to avail of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land titled by him as provided under Presidential Decree No. 27. Neither is this recognition permanent nor irrevocable. Thus, failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply with his obligation to pay his lease rentals or

amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner or agricultural lessor is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer. Should Magana fail to agree on the price of her land as fixed by the DAR, she can bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction. Likewise, failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments for a period of two (2) years is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer.

[G.R. No. 127876. December 17, 1999] ROXAS & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR REGION IV, MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS and DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, respondents. This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the acquisition of these haciendas by the government under Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Hacienda Palico is 1,024 hectares in a rea and is registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 985. Hacienda Banilad is 1,050 hectares in area, registere d under TCT No.924 .Hacienda Caylaway is 867.4571 hectares in area and is registered under TCT Nos. T-44662, T44663, T-44664 and T-44665. The events of this case occurred during the incumbency of then President Corazon C. Aquino. In February 1986, President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 promulgating a Provisional Constitution. As head of the provisional government, the President exercised legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution. In the exercise of this legislative power, the President signed on July 22, 1987, Proclamation No. 131 instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and Executive Order No. 229 providing the mechanisms necessary to initially implement the program. On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the President This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988. Before the laws effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Hacienda Palico On September 29, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice entitled Invitation to Parties to petitioner. The Invitation was addressed to Jaime Pimentel, Hda. Administrator, Hda. Palico. MARO invited petitioner to a conference on October 6, 1989 at the DAR office in Nasugbu to discuss the results of the DAR investigation of Hacienda Palico, which was scheduled for compulsory acquisition this year under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. On October 25, 1989, MARO completed three (3) Investigation Reports after investigation and ocular inspection of the Hacienda. In the first Report, the MARO found that 270 hectares under Tax Declaration Nos. 465, 466, 468 and 470 were flat and actually occupied and cultivated by 34 tillers of sugarcane. In the second Report, MARO identified as flat approximately 339 hectares under Tax Declaration No. 0234 which also had several actual occupants and tillers of sugarcane; while in the third Report, the MARO found approximately 75 hectares under Tax Declaration No. 0354 as flat with 33 actual occupants and tillers also of sugarcane. On October 27, 1989, a Summary Investigation Report was submitted and signed jointly by the MARO, representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), and by the Provincial Agraria n Reform Officer (PARO). The Report recommended that 333.0800 hectares of Hacienda Palico be subject to compulsory acquisition at a value of P6,807,622.20. The following day, October 28, 1989, two (2) more Summary Investigation Reports were submitted by the same officers and representatives. They recommended that 270.0876 hectares and 75.3800 hectares be placed under compulsory acquisition at a compensation of P8,109,739.00 and P2,188,195.47, respectively. On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR through then Department Secretary Miriam D. Santiago sent a Notice of Acquisition to petitioner. The Notice was addressed as follows: Roxas y Cia, Limited Soriano Bldg., Plaza Cervantes Manila, Metro Manila. Petitioner was informed that 1,023.999 hectares of its land in Hacienda Palico were subject to immediate acquisition and distribution by the government under the CARL; that based on the DARs valuation criteria, the government was offering compensation of P3.4 million for 333.0800 hectares; that whether this offer was to be accepted or rejected, petitioner was to inform the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD) of the DAR; that in case of petitioners rejection or failure to reply within thirty days, respondent DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings with notice to petitioner to determine just compensation for the land; that if petitioner accepts respondent DARs offer, or upon deposit of the compensation with an accessible bank if it rejects the same, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land. Almost two years later, on September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land Valuation Manager three (3) separate Memoranda entitled Request to Open Trust Account.

Each Memoranda requested that a trust account representing the valuation of three portions of Hacienda Palico be opened in favor of the petitioner in view of the latters rejection of its offered value. Meanwhile in a letter dated May 4, 1993, petitioner applied with the DAR for conversion of Haciendas Palico and Banilad from agricultural to non-agricultural lands under the provisions of the CARL. On July 14, 1993, petitioner sent a letter to the DAR Regional Director reiterating its request for conversion of the two haciendas. Despite petitioners application for conversion, respondent DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the two Haciendas. The LBP trust accounts as compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by respondent DAR with cash and LBP bonds. On October 22, 1993, from the mother title of TCT No. 985 of the Hacienda, respondent DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 6654. On October 30, 1993, CLOAs were distributed to farmer beneficiaries. Hacienda Banilad On August 23, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent MARO of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice to petitioner addressed as follows: Mr. Jaime Pimentel Hacienda Administrator Hacienda Banilad Nasugbu, Batangas The MARO informed Pimentel that Hacienda Banilad was subject to compulsory acquisition under the CARL; that should petitioner wish to avail of the other schemes such as Voluntary Offer to Sell or Voluntary Land Transfer, respondent DAR was willing to provide assistance thereto On September 18, 1989, the MARO sent an Invitation to Parties again to Pimentel inviting the latter to attend a conference on September 21, 1989 at the MARO Office in Nasugbu to discuss the results of the MAROs investigation over Hacienda Banilad. On September 21, 1989, the same day the conference was held, the MARO submitted two (2) Reports. In his first Report, he found that approximately 709 hectares of land under Tax Declaration Nos. 0237 and 0236 were flat. On this area were discovered 162 actual occupants and tillers of sugarcane. In the second Report, it was found that approximately 235 hectares under Tax Declaration No. 0390 were flat, on which were 92 actual occupants and tillers of sugarcane. The results of these Reports were discussed at the conference. Present in the conference were representatives of the prospective farmer beneficiaries, the BARC, the LBP, and Jaime Pimentel on behalf of the landowner. After the meeting, on the same day, September 21, 1989, a Summary Investigation Report was submitted jointly by the MARO, representatives of the BARC, LBP, and the PARO. They recommended that after ocular inspection of the property, 234.6498 hectares under Tax Declaration No. 0390 be subject to compulsory acquisition and distribution by CLOA. The following day, September 22, 1989, a second Summary Investigation was submitted by the same officers. They recommended that 737.2590 hectares under Tax

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Declaration Nos. 0236 and 0237 be likewise placed under compulsory acquisition for distribution. On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Department Secretary, sent to petitioner two (2) separate Notices of Acquisition over Hacienda Banilad. These Notices were sent on the same day as the Notice of Acquisition over Hacienda Palico. Unlike the Notice over Hacienda Palico, however, the Notices over Hacienda Banilad were addressed to: Roxas y Cia. Limited

Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. In a letter dated September 28, 1992, respondent DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a reclassification of the land would not exempt it from agrarian reform. Respondent Secretary also denied petitioners withdrawal of the VOS on the ground that withdrawal could only be based on specific grounds such as unsuitability of the soil for agriculture, or if the slope of the land is over 18 degrees and that the land is undeveloped.

7th Floor, Cacho-Gonzales Bldg. 101 Aguirre St., Leg. Makati, Metro Manila. Respondent DAR offered petitioner compensation of P15,108,995.52 for 729.4190 hectares and P4,428,496.00 for 234.6498 hectares. On September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land Valuation Manager a Request to Open Trust Account in petitioners name as compensation for 234.6493 hectares of Hacienda Banilad. A second Request to Open Trust Account was sent on November 18, 1991 over 723.4130 hectares of said Hacienda. On December 18, 1991, the LBP certified that the amounts of P4,428,496.40 and P21,234,468.78 in cash and LBP bonds had been earmarked as compensation for petitioners land in Hacienda Banilad. On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad. Hacienda Caylaway Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale to the government on May 6, 1988 before the effectivity of the CARL. The Hacienda has a total area of 867.4571 hectares and is covered by four titles. On January 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Regional Director for Region IV, sent to petitioner two (2) separate Resolutions accepting petitioners voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway. The Resolutions were addressed to: Roxas & Company, Inc. 7th Flr. Cacho- Gonzales Bldg. Aguirre, Legaspi Village Makati, M. M. On September 4, 1990, the DAR Regional Director issued two separate Memoranda to the LBP Regional Manager requesting for the valuation of the land. On the same day, respondent DAR, through the Regional Director, sent to petitioner a Notice of Acquisition over 241.6777 hectares and 533.8180 hectares. Like the Resolutions of Acceptance, the Notice of Acquisition was addressed to petitioner at its office in Makati, Metro Manila. Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda

Despite the denial of the VOS withdrawal of Hacienda Caylaway, on May 11, 1993, petitioner filed its application for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad. On July 14, 1993, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo Roxas, reiterated its request to withdraw the VOS over Hacienda Caylaway in light of the following: 1) Certification issued by Conrado I. Gonzales, Officer-in-Charge, Department of Agriculture, Region 4, 4th Floor, ATI (BA) Bldg., Diliman, Quezon City dated March 1, 1993 stating that the lands subject of referenced titles are not feasible and economically sound for further agricultural development. 2) Resolution No. 19 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas approving the Zoning Ordinance reclassifying areas covered by the referenced titles to non-agricultural which was enacted after extensive consultation with government agencies, including [the Department of Agrarian Reform], and the requisite public hearings. 3) Resolution No. 106 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas dated March 8, 1993 approving the Zoning Ordinance enacted by the Municipality of Nasugbu. 4) Letter dated December 15, 1992 issued by Reynaldo U. Garcia of the Municipal Planning & Development, Coordinator and Deputized Zoning Administrator addressed to Mrs. Alicia P. Logarta advising that the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas has no objection to the conversion of the lands subject of referenced titles to non-agricultural. On August 24, 1993, petitioner instituted Case No. N-0017-96-46 (BA) with respondent DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying for the cancellation of the CLOAs issued by respondent DAR in the name of several persons.Petitioner alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are located, had been declared a tourist zone, that the land is not suitable for agricultural production, and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the land to non-agricultural. In a Resolution dated October 14, 1993, respondent DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial question of whether the property was subject to agrarian reform, hence, this question should be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for determination. On October 29, 1993, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. SP No. 32484. It questioned the expropriation of its properties under the CARL and the denial of due process in the acquisition of its landholdings. Meanwhile, the petition for conversion of the three haciendas was denied by the MARO on November 8, 1993.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Petitioners petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on April 28, 1994. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied on January 17, 1997 by respondent court

ISSUE: W/N the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas were valid and in accordance with law RULING: SC granted the petition in part and the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas are nullified for respondent DAR's failure to observe due process. C explained the following: MODES OF LAND ACQUISITION: Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), provides for two (2) modes of acquisition of private land: compulsory and voluntary. The procedure for the compulsory acquisition of private lands is set forth in Section 16 of R.A. 6657, a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a corresponding value in accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent provisions hereof. b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay the landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the Government and surrenders the Certificate of Title and other muniments of title. d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision. e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in

LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries. f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation. In the compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and the farmer beneficiaries must first be identified.After identification, the DAR shall send a Notice of Acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a

conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Within thirty days from receipt of the Notice of Acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner rejects the DARs offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP representative and other interested parties may submit evidence on just compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from submission, the DAR shall decide the case and inform the owner of its decision and the amount of just compensation. Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall deposit the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR shall immediately take possession of the land and cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shall then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party may question the decision of the DAR in the regular courts for final determination of just compensation. The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land acquisition to hasten the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Under Section 16 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition is the identification of the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on how the identification process must be made. To fill in this gap, the DAR issued on July 26, 1989 Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989, which set the operating procedure in the identification of such lands. OPERATING PROCEDURE: A. MARO with the assistance of BARC shall: 1. Update the masterlist of all agricultural lands covered under the CARP in his area of responsibility. The masterlist shall include such information as required under the attached CARP Masterlist Form which shall include the name of the landowner, landholding area, TCT/OCT number, and tax declaration number. 2. Prepare a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title (OCT/TCT) or landholding covered under Phase I and II of the CARP except those for which the landowners have already filed applications to avail of other modes of land acquisition. A case folder shall contain the following duly accomplished forms: a) CARP CA Form 1MARO Investigation Report b) CARP CA Form 2-- Summary Investigation Report of Findings and Evaluation c) CARP CA Form 3Applicants Information Sheet d) CARP CA Form 4Beneficiaries Undertaking e) CARP CA Form 5Transmittal Report to the PARO ***MARO/ BARC shall certify that all information contained in the above-mentioned forms have been examined and verified by him and that the same are true and correct.*** 3. Send a Notice of Coverage and a letter of invitation to a conference/ meeting to the landowner covered by the Compulsory Case Acquisition Folder. Invitations to the said conference/ meeting shall also be sent to the

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the BARC representative(s), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) representative, and other interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property. He shall discuss the MARO/ BARC investigation report and solicit the views, objection, agreements or suggestions of the participants thereon. The landowner shall also be asked to indicate his retention area. The minutes of the meeting shall be signed by all participants in the conference and shall form an integral part of the CACF. 4. Submit all completed case folders to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). B. The PARO shall: 1. Ensure that the individual case folders are forwarded to him by his MAROs. 2. Immediately upon receipt of a case folder, compute the valuation of the land in accordance with A.O. No. 6, Series of 1988. The valuation worksheet and the related CACF valuation forms shall be duly certified correct by the PARO and all the personnel who participated in the accomplishment of these forms. 3. In all cases, the PARO may validate the report of the MARO through ocular inspection and verification of the property. This ocular inspection and verification shall be mandatory when the computed value exceeds 500,000 per estate. 4. Upon determination of the valuation, forward the case folder, together with the duly accomplished valuation forms and his recommendations, to the Central Office. The LBP representative and the MARO concerned shall be furnished a copy each of his report. C. DAR Central Office, specifically through the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD), shall: 1. Within three days from receipt of the case folder from the PARO, review, evaluate and determine the final land valuation of the property covered by the case folder. A summary review and evaluation report shall be prepared and duly certified by the BLAD Director and the personnel directly participating in the review and final valuation. 2. Prepare, for the signature of the Secretary or her duly authorized representative, a Notice of Acquisition (CARP CA Form 8) for the subject property. Serve the Notice to the landowner personally or through registered mail within three days from its approval. The Notice shall include, among others, the area subject of compulsory acquisition, and the amount of just compensation offered by DAR. 3. Should the landowner accept the DARs offered value, the BLAD shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for approval the Order of Acquisition. However, in case of rejection or non-reply, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) shall conduct a summary administrative hearing to determine just compensation, in accordance with the procedures provided under Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1989. Immediately upon receipt of the DARABs decision on just compensation, the BLAD shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for approval the required Order of Acquisition. 4. Upon the landowners receipt of payment, in case of acceptance, or upon deposit of payment in the designated bank, in case of rejection or non-

response, the Secretary shall immediately direct the pertinent Register of Deeds to issue the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Once the property is transferred, the DAR, through the PARO, shall take possession of the land for redistribution to qualified beneficiaries. DAR A. O. No. 12, Series of 1989, from whence the Notice of Coverage first sprung, was amended in 1990 by DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and in 1993 by DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993. The Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to the conference meeting were expanded and amplified in said amendments. DAR A. O. No. 9, Series of 1990 entitled Revised Rules Governing the Acquisition of Agricultural Lands Subject of Voluntary Offer to Sell and Compulsory Acquisition Pursuant to R. A. 6657, requires that: MARO 1. Receives the duly accomplished CARP Form Nos. 1 & 1.1 including supporting documents. 2. Gathers basic ownership documents listed under 1.a or 1.b above and prepares corresponding VOCF/ CACF by landowner/ landholding. 3. Notifies/ invites the landowner and representatives of the LBP, DENR, BARC and prospective beneficiaries of the schedule of ocular inspection of the property at least one week in advance. 4. MARO/ LAND BANK FIELD OFFICE/ BARC a) Identify the land and landowner, and determine the suitability for agriculture and productivity of the land and jointly prepare Field Investigation Report (CARP Form No. 2), including the Land Use Map of the property. b) Interview applicants and assist them in the preparation of the Application For Potential CARP Beneficiary (CARP Form No. 3). c) Screen prospective farmer-beneficiaries and for those found qualified, cause the signing of the respective Application to Purchase and Farmers Undertaking (CARP Form No. 4). d) Complete the Field Investigation Report based on the result of the ocular inspection/ investigation of the property and documents submitted. See to it that Field Investigation Report is duly accomplished and signed by all concerned. 5. MARO a) Assists the DENR Survey Party in the conduct of a boundary/ subdivision survey delineating areas covered by OLT, retention, subject of VOS, CA (by phases, if possible), infrastructures, etc., whichever is applicable. b) Sends Notice of Coverage (CARP Form No. 5) to landowner concerned or his duly authorized representative inviting him for a conference. c) Sends Invitation Letter (CARP Form No. 6) for a conference/ public hearing to prospective farmer-beneficiaries, landowner,

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello representatives of BARC, LBP, DENR, DA, NGOs, farmers organizations and other interested parties to discuss the following matters: Result of Field Investigation, Inputs to valuation, Issues raised, Comments/ recommendations by all parties concerned. d) Prepares Summary of Minutes of the conference/ public hearing to be guided by CARP Form No. 7. e) Forwards the completed VOCF/CACF to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) using CARP Form No. 8 (Transmittal Memo to PARO). The Compulsory Acquisition of Haciendas Palico and Banilad DAR claims that it, through MARO Leopoldo C. Lejano, sent a letter of invitation entitled Invitation to Parties datedSeptember 29, 1989 to petitioner corporation, through Jaime Pimentel, the administrator of Hacienda Palico. The invitation was received on the same day it was sent as indicated by a signature and the date received at the bottom left corner of said invitation. With regard to Hacienda Banilad, respondent DAR claims that Jaime Pimentel, administrator also of Hacienda Banilad, was notified and sent an invitation to the conference. Pimentel actually attended the conference on September 21, 1989 and signed the Minutes of the meeting on behalf of petitioner corporation. The Minutes was also signed by the representatives of the BARC, the LBP and farmer beneficiaries. No letter of invitation was sent or conference meeting held with respect to Hacienda Caylaway because it was subject to a Voluntary Offer to Sell to respondent DAR. When respondent DAR, through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), sent to the various parties the Notice of Coverage and invitation to the conference, DAR A. O. No. 12, Series of 1989 was already in effect more than a month earlier. The Operating Procedure in DAR Administrative Order No. 12 does not specify how notices or letters of invitation shall be sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, the LBP, the farmer beneficiaries and other interestedparties. The procedure in the sending of these notices is important to comply with the requisites of due process especially when the owner, as in this case, is a juridical entity. Petitioner is a domestic corporation, and therefore, has a personality separate and distinct from its shareholders, officers and employees.

The Notice of Acquisition in Section 16 of the CARL is required to be sent to the landowner by personal delivery or registered mail. Whether the landowner be a natural or juridical person to whose address the Notice may be sent by personal delivery or registered mail, the law does not distinguish.The DAR Administrative Orders also do not distinguish. In the proceedings before the DAR, the distinction between natural and juridical persons in the sending of notices may be found in the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Service of pleadings before the DARAB is governed by Section 6, Rule V of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure.

Summonses, pleadings and notices in cases against a private domestic corporation before the DARAB and the regular courts a re served on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors. These persons are those through whom the private domestic corporation or partnership is capable of action. Jaime Pimentel is not the president, manager, secretary, cashier or director of petitioner corporation. Is he, as administrator of the two Haciendas, considered an agent of the corporation? The purpose of all rules for service of process on a corporation is to make it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it. Service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation as to make ait priori supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers served on him and bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action. Petitioners evidence does not show the official duties of Jaime Pimentel as administrator of petitioners haciendas. The evidence does not indicate whether Pimentels duties is so integrated with the corporation that he would immediately realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers served on him. At the time the notices were sent and the preliminary conference conducted, petitioners principal place of business was listed in Cervantes, Manila, and Aguirre St., Makati. Pimentel did not hold office at the principal place of business of petitioner. Neither did he exercise his functions in Makati. He performed his official functions and actually resided in the haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas, a place over two hundred kilometers away from Makati. The Voluntary Acquisition of Hacienda Caylaway Petitioner was also left in the dark with respect to Hacienda Caylaway, which was the subject of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS). The VOS in the instant case was made on May 6, 1988, before the effectivity of R.A. 6657 on June 15, 1988. VOS transactions were first governed by DAR Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, and under this order, all VOS filed before June 15, 1988 shall be heard and processed in accordance with the procedure provided for in Executive Order No. 229, thus: III. All VOS transactions which are now pending before the DAR and for which no payment has been made shall be subject to the notice and hearing requirements provided in Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989, dated 26 July 1989, Section II, Subsection A, paragraph 3. All VOS filed before 15 June 1988, the date of effectivity of the CARL, shall be heard and processed in accordance with the procedure provided for in Executive Order No. 229. Sec. 9. Voluntary Offer to Sell . The government shall purchase all agricultural lands it deems productive and suitable to farmer cultivation voluntarily offered for sale to it at a valuation determined in accordance with Section 6. Such transaction shall be exempt from the payment of capital gains tax and other taxes and fees. Executive Order 229 does not contain the procedure for the identification of private land as set forth in DAR A. O. No. 12, Series of 1989. Section 5 of E.O. 229 merely reiterates the procedure of acquisition in Section 16, R.A. 6657. In other words, the E.O. is silent as to the procedure for the identification of the land, the notice of coverage and the preliminary conference with the landowner, representatives of the BARC, the LBP and farmer beneficiaries.Does this mean that

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello these requirements may be dispensed with regard to VOS filed before June 15, 1988? The answer is no.

Ordinance for Adoption and Approval of the Provincial Governor, Honorable Priscilla L. Chiongbian, Thru The Honorable Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani Province."

First of all, the same E.O. 229, like Section 16 of the CARL, requires that the land, landowner identified before the notice of and beneficiaries of the land subject to agrarian reform be acquisition should be issued. Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale in 1989. The Hacienda has a total area of 867.4571 hectares and is covered by four (4) titles. In two separate Resolutions both dated January 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Regional Director, formally accepted the VOS over two of these four titles. The land covered by the two titles has an area of 855.5257 hectares, but only 648.8544 hectares thereof fell within the coverage of R.A. 6657. Petitioner claims it does not know where these portions are located.

On January 30, 1998, pursuant to Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 08, Series of 1997, and to accelerate the development and urbanization of Alabel, the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution No. 98-03 reclassifying lots that were located within the built-up areas, based on the 1995-2005 Land Use Plan of the municipality, from agricultural to non-agricultural uses.

Respondent DAR, on the other hand, avers that surveys on the land covered by the four titles were conducted in 1989, and that petitioner, as landowner, was not denied participation therein. The results of the survey and the land valuation summary report, however, do not indicate whether notices to attend the same were actually sent to and received by petitioner or its duly authorized representative. To reiterate, Executive Order No. 229 does not lay down the operating procedure, much less the notice requirements, before the VOS is accepted by respondent DAR. Notice to the landowner, however, cannot be dispensed with. It is part of administrative due process and is an essential requisite to enable the landowner himself to exercise, at the very least, his right of retention guaranteed under the CARL.

On March 2, 1998, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani approved Resolution No. 98-018 or the "Resolution Adopting the Ten-Year Municipal Comprehensive Development Plan (MCDP 1995-2205) and the Land Use Development Plan and Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of Alabel, Sarangani Per Resolution No. 97-08 and Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08, S. of 1997 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel." A portion of the area involving 376.5424 hectares, however, was covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657) commercial farms deferment scheme. The Zoning Certification issued by the office of the Municipal Planning and Development Council (MPDC) showed that respondents’ properties located at Barangay Maribulan, Alabel were among those reclassified from agricultural and pasture land to residential, commercial institutional, light industrial and open space in the 1995-2005 land use plan of Alabel. On July 2, 1998, respondent Sarangani Agricultural Company, Inc. (SACI) filed an application for land use conversion of the following parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,005 hectares Accompanying SACI’s application for conversion were the documents required under the

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1997. G.R. No. 165547 January 24, 2007 DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by its Secretary, RENE C. VILLA, Petitioner, vs. SARANGANI AGRICULTURAL CO., INC., ACIL CORPORATION, NICASIO ALCANTARA and TOMAS ALCANTARA, Respondents. FACTS: Respondents are the owners of the lands in question which have been reclassified from agricultural into non-agricultural uses by virtue of a municipal zoning ordinance, and are included in the comprehensive land use plan of the Municipality of Alabel. The Province of Sarangani was created pursuant to Republic Act No. 7228 on March 16, 1992, composed of seven (7) municipalities, namely, Alabel, Glan, Maasin, Maitum, Malapatan, Malungon and Kiamba which were segregated from the Province of South Cotabato. Under said Act, the Municipality of Alabel was made the capital of the new province where the capitol building and all other national and provincial offices shall be established. On February 14, 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution No. 97-08 or "Resolution Adopting and Endorsing the Ten-Year Municipal Comprehensive Development Plan (MCDP 1995-2005) of the Municipality of Alabel and Its Land Use Development Plan and Zoning

Subsequently, a Site Inspection Report was prepared by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) Regional Office (Region XI) and was indorsed to DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. On March 16, 1999, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) and the Provincial Land Use Technical Committee (PLUTC) conducted an inspection of the subjec t properties. In a Memorandum dated July 9, 1999, the PLUTC recommended that SACI’s application be made subject to the following conditions: 1) presentation by SACI of its development plan; 2) submission of the lacking documents; 3) re-survey and segregation of the property according to use or project in coordination with the DAR Regional Office; and, 4) submission of the resulting map indicating the technical description of the area per actual use/project attested by the Regional Director. Meanwhile, on March 22, 1999, members of the Sarangani Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (SARBAI) sent a letter-petition to the DAR Secretary oppposing the application for land use conversion filed by SACI. SARBAI alleged that its members were merely forced to sign the waiver of rights, considering that the commercial farm deferment period ended on June 15, 1998. Later, an "Urgent Petition for the Denial of Land Use Conversion Application of

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Banana Commercial Farm of SACI" was filed by SARBAI and was received by the PARC Secretariat on July 14, 1999. In the March 30, 2000 deliberation of the PLUTC, the committee agreed to recommend the disapproval of 158.0672 hectares that had been planted with bananas and coconuts. The committee noted that said portion of the property was still viable for agriculture, irrigated, with Notice of Coverage, and under protest or with opposition from SARBAI. It likewise recommended that the decision as to the rest of the area applied for conversion shall be deferred subject to the submission of the following within a period of thirty (30) days: 1) a fiveyear comprehensive development plan; 2) a survey plan signed by the Regional Technical Director of Land Management Service and noted by the DAR Regional Director (Region XI); 3) SACI’s proof of undertaking, which will contain the package of benefits it intends to give to the affected farm workers except those working in the banana plantation; 4) the concurrence of all the workers who would be affected by the proposed conversion, which concurrence should be noted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) and acknowledged by a notary public. On its part, SACI contended that 1) its projects were aligned to address the current and anticipated commercial and residential needs of Sarangani province, and the removal of any portion of its property included in its comprehensive development plan will affect the viability of the plan; 2) the banana plantations will be transformed into a socialized housing subdivision which will be made available to the displaced workers and the other low income earners of Alabel; 3) the company will construct and install power generation facilities in the entire area; 4) at the time the application for land use conversion was filed, no Notice of Coverage was ever issued by DAR, and the subsequent issuance of such notice was highly irregular because the same may be issued only after the final resolution of the application for land use conversion; and 5) the previous Order of Deferment cannot be a legal barrier to the filing of an application for land use conversion.

…The Committee acceded to the request of SACI and deferred its recommendation to deny

conversion of that portion of the property planted to banana[s] and coconut[s] pending submission of a manifesto or SACI’s proof of undertaking that it will compensate farm workers affected by showing, among others, the schedule of development by phase, the specific lots involved and the corresponding proposed use [of] the conversion, concurred by the workers/oppositors, noted by the MARO and duly notarized. The Committee also requested SACI to submit details of the pomelo farm in Malandag being offered as a replacement farm for the relocation of the farm workers. SACI was given a 30-day period to submit these documents. SACI, however, failed to submit the oath of undertaking to pay disturbance compensation to affected workers being required by the Committee and as provided under DAR Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1999. Instead, SACI submitted an undertaking executed by the affected workers stating that they are amenable to the package of benefits offered by the company. Nevertheless, those who executed the deed of undertaking did not represent the majority of the farm workers. Out of the 95 regular banana workers only 45 and eight (8) supervisors including four (4) workers who were not included in the workers’ master list of SACI executed a deed of undertaking. As regards the 105-hectare pomelo farm, SACI failed to affirm whether they are going to pursue their offer. Likewise, DAR Region XI reported that coverage of the same area is on-going, and a different group of potential beneficiaries have already been identified. Therefore, it could no longer be offered as a relocation site. Foregoing considered, the Committee, during its 18 August 2000 Meeting, sustained its earlier recommendation to deny the conversion of that portion of the property planted to bananas and coconuts. With regard to the rest. of the area, the Committee deferred its decision subject to the delineation by the SACI of the total area that they can develop within the allowed five-year period. Likewise, the PLUTC is requesting the SACI to submit a revised five-year development plan that will show the schedule of development by phase, by year, and the proposed use for each parcel of land.

On November 9, 2000, DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. denied SACI’s application for land

use conversion. The pertinent portion of the Order reads: … The proponent also submitted another DA certification stating that 12 parcels of land (Lot Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 807, 53, 10, 39 and 806) with an area of 816.7401 hectares, located at Maribulan, Alabel, Sarangani are part of expansion for urbanizing areas. Though discussed on several meetings, no decision was made on the application since the applicant was not able to comply with the documentary requirements and clarify the issues raised by the Committee. [I]n [the] 30 March 2000 Meeting of the PLUTC, the Committee deliberated again [on] the subject application and agreed to recommend the disapproval of 158.0672 hectares area planted to banana[s] and coconuts. The Committee noted that said portion of the property is still viable for agriculture, irrigated, with Notice of Coverage and with protest or opposition from SARBAI. The Committee also agreed to request the DAR to determine the metes and bounds of the area planted to banana[s] and coconuts vis-à-vis areas devoted to other enterprises. Relative to the rest of the area applied for conversion, the committee deferred its decision subject to the submission of a 5-year comprehensive development plan, showing among others, the schedule of development by phase, the specific lots involved and the corresponding proposed use.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above decision but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution, dated September 24, 2004. Their Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order having been denied, In a Decision dated June 30, 2003, the Office of the President through dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the challenged DAR Orders. Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was denied, they filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review raising substantially the same issues. On July 19, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the petition ISSUE: CA ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE JUNE 16, 1998 NOTICE OF COVERAGE WAS ILLEGAL AS DAR ALLEGEDLY FAILED TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS. RULING: SC ruled that notice of coverage is not an indispensable requirement before DAR can acquire the subject lots or commercial farms, which are covered by a deferment period under the

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or R.A. No 6657 upon its effectivity on June 15, 1998. The pertinent provision of the law states: Sec. 11. Commercial Farming.– Commercial farms, which are private agricultural lands devoted to saltbeds, fruit farms, orchards, vegetables and cut-flower farms, cacao, coffee and rubber plantations, shall be subject to immediate compulsory acquisition and distribution after ten (10) years from the effectivity of this Act. In the case of new farms, the ten-year period shall begin from the first year of commercial production and operation, as determined by the DAR. During the ten-year period, the Government shall initiate steps necessary to acquire these lands, upon payment of just compensation for the land and the improvements thereon, preferably in favor of organized cooperatives or associations, which shall thereafter manage the said lands for the workers-beneficiaries. (AS amended by R.A. 7881; Rules and regulations on the acquisition, valuation compensation and distribution of deferred commercial farms – DAR AO No. 09, s. 1998) DAR Administrative Order No.9, Series of 1998, on the Rules and Regulations on the Acquisition, Valuation, Compensation and Distribution of Deferred Commercial Farms applies to all commercial farms as defined under Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657: SEC. 2. Statement of Policies.– The acquisition, valuation, compensation, distribution, operation and management of deferred commercial farms shall be governed by the following policies: (a) All commercial farms whose deferment expired as of June 15, 1998 shall be subject to immediate acquisition and distribution under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Those whose deferments have yet to expire will be acquired and distributed only upon expiration of their respective deferment period as srcinally determined by the Department of Agrarian reform (DAR), or earlier if the DAR determines that the purpose for which it was deferred no longer exists and revokes its deferment; The process of acquisition of these commercial farms by DAR is specifically provided under Article III, Section 9 of the above administrative order, to wit: SEC. 9. Procedure for Acquisition. —The acquisition of deferred commercial farms shall be governed by the following procedures: (a) Voluntary Offer to Sell/Compulsory Acquisition 1) The Order of Deferment previously issued over the landholding shall serve, upon expiration of the deferment period of the subject commercial farm, as the Notice of Coverage, supported by the Compliance Work Program and Summary of Exceptions (Form A) srcinally submitted with the approved deferment application. However, for record purposes, the landowner shall be served a Notice of Expiration of Deferment (Annex 2) which shall contain a reminder of his right of retention, should he wish to exercise the same; 2) In general, the procedure for acquisition shall follow DAR Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1998, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1996, entitled "Revised Rules and Procedures governing the Acquisition of Agricultural Lands subject of Voluntary offer to Sell and Compulsory Acquisition Pursuant to Republic

Act No. 6657," subject to certain modifications intended to expedite the process as provided herein.

SC stated that it was unnecessary for petitioner to issue a notice of co verage to respondents in order to place the properties in question under CARP coverage. Hence, the contention by respondents that due process was not duly observed by petitioner must fail. Accordingly, the denial of the application for conversion must be upheld.

G.R. No. 78517 February 27, 1989 GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN, JR., JESUS JULIAN, SR., PEDRO RICALDE, VICENTE RICALDE and ROLANDO SALAMAR, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE M. REYES, PAZ M. REYES and FE M. REYES, respondents. Facts: The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land, acquired by private respondents' predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Said lands are situated at Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and appurtenant regulations issued by the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (DAR for short), now Department of Agrarian Reform (MAR for short). On June 18, 1981, private respondents (then plaintiffs), instituted a complaint against Hon. Conrado Estrella as then Minister of Agrarian Reform, P.D. Macarambon as Regional Director of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners (then defendants) for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands. Defendants filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses of July 8, 1981. Subsequently, on July 19, 1982, plaintiffs filed an urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring the lands in litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being issued land transfer certificates to which the defendants filed their opposition dated August 4, 1982. On November 5, 1982, the Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch XVIII rendered its decision dismissing the said complaint and the motion to enjoin the defendants was denied. On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which defendants filed their opposition on January 10, 1983. Thus, on April 29, 1986, the Regional Trial Court issued the aforequoted decision prompting defendants to move for a reconsideration but the same was denied in its Order dated June 6, 1986.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello

On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the same was sustained in its judgment ISSUE: W/N lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27. RULING: SC ruled in the negative. SC agrees with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus, “The Homestead Act hasbeen enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right.” In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. In point is Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides: “Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.” Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question, reading, Section 6. Retention Limits. ... ... Provided further, That srcinal homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the srcinal homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead .' G.R. No. 133507 February 17, 2000 EUDOSIA DAEZ AND/OR HER HEIRS, REP. BY ADRIANO D. DAEZ,petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS MACARIO SORIENTES, APOLONIO MEDIANA, ROGELIO MACATULAD and MANUEL UMALI, respondents. FACTS: Eudosia Daez, now deceased, was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare Riceland which was being cultivated by respondents MacarioSoriente, Rogelio Macatulad, ApolonioMediana and Manuel Umali under a system of share-tenancy.

On May 31, 1981, private respondents signed an affidavit, allegedly under duress, stating that they are not share tenants but hired laborers. Armed with such document, EudosiaDaez applied for the exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents. DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina issued an Order denying EudosiaDaez's application for exemption upon finding that her subject land is covered under LOI No. 474, petitioner being owner of the aforesaid agricultural lands exceeding seven (7) hectares. DAR Secretary Leong affirmed the assailed order upon finding private respondents to be bonafide tenants of the subject land. Court of Appeals sustained the order of Secretary Leong. DAR issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) to private respondents. Thereafter, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs). ISSUE: WON CA ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXEMPTION FROM AGRARIAN REFORM COVERAGE AND THE RIGHT OF RETENTION OF LANDOWNERS IS ONLY A MATTER OF SEMANTICS THAT AN ADVERSE DECISION IN THE FORMER WILL FORECLOSE FURTHER ACTION TO ENFORCE THE LATTER CONSIDERING THAT THEY CONSTITUTE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT CAUSES OF ACTION AND, THEREFORE, ENFORCEABLE SEPARATELY AND IN SEQUEL. HELD: Yes. Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts. P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program, covers tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a landowner may apply for exemption. If either of these requisites is absent, the land is not covered under OLT. Hence, a landowner need not apply for retention where his ownership over the entire landholding is intact and undisturbed. P.D. No. 27 grants each tenant of covered lands a five (5)-hectare lot, or in case the land is irrigated, a three (3)-hectare lot constituting a family size farm. However, said law allows a covered landowner to retain not more than seven (7) hectares of his land if his aggregate landholding does not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares. Otherwise, his entire landholding is covered without him being entitled to any retention right. Consequently, a landowner may keep his entire covered landholding if its aggregate size does not exceed the retention limit of seven (7) hectares. In effect, his land will not be covered at all by the OLT program although all requisites for coverage are present. LOI No. 474 clarified the effective coverage of OLT to include tenanted rice or corn lands of seven (7) hectares or less, if the landowner owns other agricultural lands of more than seven (7) hectares. The term "other agricultural lands" refers to lands other than tenanted rice or corn lands from which the landowner derives adequate income to support his family. Thus, on one hand, exemption from coverage of OLT lies if: (1) the land is not devoted to rice or corn crops even if it is tenanted; or (2) the land is untenanted even though it is devoted to rice or corn crops.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello On the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of retention are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein; and (3) the size of the landholding must not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares, or it could be more than twenty-four (24) hectares provided that at least seven (7) hectares thereof are covered lands and more than seven (7) hectares of it consist of "other agricultural lands". Clearly, then, the requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of OLT and those for the grant of an application for the exercise of a landowner's right of retention, are different. Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment to the application filed by EudosiaDaez for the retention of the subject 4.1865-hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became final and executory.

Santiago vs. Ortiz-Luis (2010) FACTS Spouses Juan and Amada Ortiz Luis (SPOUSES) owned 7.1 hectares of tenanted rice lands in Nueva Ecija. Despite inclusion of the property under the OLT, the SPOUSES transferred the property via a Deed of Absolute Sale to their children Rosario, Teresita, Simplicio and Antonio. The children were able to secure a TCT issued under their names. The children later filed an Application for Retention under P.D. No. 27 before the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Office (DARRO) but were denied on the ground that the transfer was made “after October 21, 1972 which is a clear violation of agrarian laws, rules and regulations.” Separately, Amada applied for retention. Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) Rogelio M. Chavez recommended the denial of Amada’s application upon the ground that “an owner of tenanted rice and corn lands may not retain those lands if he, as of October 21, 1972, owned more than 24 hectares of tenanted rice or corn lands.” It appears that Spouses Ortiz Luis owned 178.8 hectares, only 88.5 of which were placed under OLT. In 2000, Amada’s application for retention was granted. The PARO held that her failure to

exercise her retention rights under PD 27 entitled her to the benefit of retention under RA 6657. This was contested by the farmer-beneficiaries who received emancipation patents over portions of the property, namely Santiago and Gutierrez. Upon appeal with the DAR, Secretary Pagdanganan upheld the decision of PARO holding that Amada was entitled to retention. His successor, Sec. Pangadaman however reversed relying on LOI 474 stating that having established that the landowners own other agricultural lands 7 hectares, they are not entitled to retention under PD 27.

On appeal to the Office of the President (OP), the Order of PAGDANGANAN was upheld granting Amada retention rights. This decision was upheld by the CA, with the clarification that the farmer-beneficiaries should still be accorded their rights under RA 6657 Section 6 and DAR Admin Order No. 05-00. ISSUE: WON Amada is entitled to retention rights HELD: NO. SEC. PANGADAMAN’S ORDER IS REINSTATED . RATIO The legislative standards are set forth in Section 6 of R.A. 6657, thus: Section 6. Retention Limits.– Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own, or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, xxx but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares.xxx The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner. Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. Section 6 implies that the sole requirement in the exercise of retention rights is that the area chosen by the landowner must be compact or contiguous. In the recent case of Heirs of Aurelio Reyes v. Garilao, however, the Court held that a landowner’s retention rights under R.A. 6657 are restricted by the conditions set forth in Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. which provided the following restrictions to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform: "1. You shall undertake to place under the Land Transfer Program of the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families.” (underscoring supplied) DAR Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1978[18] provided for the implementing guidelines of LOI No. 474: Tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less shall be covered by Operation Land Transfer if those lands belong to the following landowners: a.) Landowners who ownother agricultural landsof more than seven hectares in aggregate areas, whether tenanted or not, cultivated or not, and regardless of the income derived therefrom; b.) Landowners who own landsused for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive an annual gross income of at least five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos. (underscoring supplied) In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the Court held that landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to “new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657 . . .” In Heirs of Aurelio

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Reyes v. Garilao, however, the Court held that the limitations under LOI No. 474 still apply to a landowner who filed an application under R.A. 6657.

Subdivision cannot be considered as agricultural lands for this land was intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural land by virtue of the Presidential Proclamation No. 1637.

Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474 amended P.D. No. 27 by removing “a ny right of retention

from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares, or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purpose from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families.”

DAR v Sutton G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005

Section 9 (d) of DAR Administrative Order No. 05, on which the Court of Appeals in part anchored its ruling, is inconsistent with P.D. No. 27, as amended by LOI No. 474, insofar as it removed the limitations to a landowner’s retention rights.

Facts: The case at bar involves a parcel of land in Masbate, inherited by respondents. This property was devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to thenexisting agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS)the land to DARin order to avail ofcertain incentives.

Natalia Realty, Inc. and Estate Developer and I nvestors Corp vs DAR GR No 103302 August 12, 1993 Facts: Natalia is the owner of 3 contiguous parcels of land with an area of 120.9793 hectares, 1.3205 hectares and 2.7080 hectares or a total of 125.0078 hectares, which are covered by TCT No. 31527. Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the LungsodSilanganTownsite. The Natalia properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation. Since private landowners were allowed to develop their properties into low-cost housing subdivisions with the reservation, petitioner EDIC as developer of Natalia applied for and was granted preliminary approval and location clearances by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, which Natalia thereafter became Antipolo Hills Subdivision. On June 15 1988, Ra 6657 went to effect. Respondent issed a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Natalia and EDIC immediately registered its objection to the notice of coverage and requested the cancellation of the Notice of Coverage. Natalia and EDIC both argued that the properties ceased to be agricultural lands when they were included in the areas reserved by Presidential Proclamation for the townsite reservation. DAR then contended that the permits granted were not valid and binding since they did not comply with t he implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree), and that there was no valid conversion of the properties. Issue: Whether or not lands not classified for agricultural use, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and its agencies prior to June 15, 1988 covered by RA 6657. Ruling: No. Sec. 4 of RA 6657 provides that CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands. And agricultural lands is referred to as land devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forst, residential, commercial or industrial land. Thus, the underdeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills

On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, RA 6657, also known as the Comprehension Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, too effect, which included farms used for raising livestock, poultry, and swine. In the decision of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR(1990), the Supreme Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry are not included in the definition of agricultural land, and the provision for the same in the CARL was deemed unconstitutional. Responders filed a request to withdraw their VOS, as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising, and thus, exempted from the coverage of CARL. They reiterated the same, but was ignored by the DAR. On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993 which provided that only portions of private agricultural land used for raising livestock as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL. Respondents subsequently wrote to the DAR Secretary and used the Luz Farms doctrine to justify their exemption from CARL. DAR Secretary Garilao granted the application for exemption, but imposed the retention limits outlined in A.O. No. 9, and ordered the rest of the landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition. Respondents moved to reconsider, but such motion was denied. Office of the President: The Office of the President affirmed the order of the DAR stating that the A.O does not run counter to Luz Farms, and that it provided the guidelines to determine whether or not a certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising. CA: The Court of Appeals reversed the DAR decision, stating that it was void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Convention. It stated that the intention was to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the government.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Issues: W/N A.O. No. 9 is constitutional in prescribing a maximum retention limit for owners of land devoted to livestock raising.

Petitioner Milestone applied for the exemption of its property in Pinugay, Rizal from the coverage of the CARL.

Held: Yes, it is unconstitutional.

The DAR subsequently released A.O. No. 9 which set forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP coverage. The property applied for exemption was eventually exempted by DAR Regional Director Dalugdug.

Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to make rules and regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. However, while administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review. The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations. In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising. Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.

Milestone Farms v. Office of the President G.R. No. 182332 February 23, 2011 Facts: Petitioner Milestone Farms was duly incorporated with the SEC, and among its secondary purposes are to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and other acts which are incidental to the same. Under the new agrarian reform law, RA 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), the raising of livestock, poultry and swine was included under the ambit of agricultural acts. However, the Supreme Court ruled subsequently in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising were excluded from the CARP.

The Southern Pinugay Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative (Pinugay Farmers) represented by one Balajadia moved for reconsideration, but was denied. MCTC Rizal: Milestone filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and others, which was granted. (Reversed in RTC, MCTC Decision reinstated in CA and became final and executory.) RA 6657 was eventually amended by RA 7881 wherein private agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising were excluded from the coverage of the CARL. DAR Secretary: Secretary Garilao exempted on 240.9776 hectares as exempted. 75.0646 was not by applying the animal-and ratio of A.O. No. 9 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Office of the President: DAR Secretary’s decision was upheld.

CA: The Court of Appeals found that, based on the documentary evidence presented, the property subject of the application for exclusion had more than satisfied the animal-land and infrastructure-animal ratios under DAR A.O. No. 9. However, six months earlier, without knowledge of the CA, DAR Secretary Villa issued a Conversion Order which allowed a portion of the agricultural property into a residential lot wherein Milestone developed the same as a leisure-residential-commercial estate known as Palo Alto leisure and Spa Complex. Several farms filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision on such grounds. The CA amended the exemption of the subject landholding, and declared that 162.7373 hectares of the agricultural portion was declared as covered by the CARP. Motion for Reconsideration denied. Hence this petition. Issues: W/N the CA erred when it held that lands devote to livestock farming within the meaning of the Luz Farms and Sutton doctrines are subject to DAR’s continuing verification as to use,, and on the basis of such verification, may be ordered reverted to agricultural classification and compulsory acquisition. Held: No, the CA did not err.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello According to the case of Sutton, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultryraising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. The instant case does not rest on facts parallel to those of Sutton because, in Sutton, the subject property remained a livestock farm. Petitioner’s admission that, since 2001, it leased another ranch for its own livestock is fatal to its cause. Finally, it is established that issues of Exclusion and/or Exemption are characterized as Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) cases which are well within the DAR Secretary’s competence and jurisdiction, as provided for by Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board Rules of Procedure. Thus, the Supreme Court cannot, without going against the law, arbitrarily strip the DAR Secretary of his legal mandate to exercise jurisdiction and authority over all ALI cases. To succumb to petitioner’s contention that when a land is declared exempt from the CARP on the ground that it is not agricultural as of the time the CARL took effect, the use and disposition of that land is entirely and forever beyond DARs jurisdiction is dangerous, suggestive of selfregulation.

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) vs Department of Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS) G.R. No. 158228 / 426 SCRA 217 March 23, 2004 Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. Facts: -

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The late Esteban Jalandoni donated 2 parcels of land (Lot Nos. 2509 and 817-D, total aggregate area of 189.2462 hectares), both located in Negros Occidental, to respondent. Consequently, titles thereto were transferred in the name of DECS under one TCT (No. 167175). On July 1985, respondent leased the same to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years, from crop year 1984-1985 to 1993-1994. The lease was subsequently renewed to last up to crop year 2004-2005. On June 1993, Eugenio Alpar, along with several others, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of Escalante. They claimed to be permanent and regular farm workers of the lands leased by DECS. After investigation, officer Piosa sent a Notice of Coverage to respondent, stating that the lands are now covered by CARP. The recommendation was approved by the DAR Regional Director. Respondent sought exception from CARP coverage on the ground that all income derived from its contract of lease were, actually, directly, and exclusively used for educational purposes (repairs and renovations of nearby schools).

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Petitioner, on the other hand, argued that the lands subject hereof were not exempt from CARP since they are not actually, directly, nor exclusively used as school sites or campuses, and are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural Corp. To be exempt from coverage, it is the landper se, not the income derived, that must be actually, directly, and exclusively used for educational purposes.

Secretary of Agrarian Reform: DAR Regional Director decision AFFIRMED. Respondent appealed the approval of the regional director to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, who upheld the approval. CA: DAR decision REVERSED. Issue: Whether or not the properties are exempt from the coverage of R.A. No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998). SC: DAR Secretary decision REINSTATED. CA decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The general policy under CARL is to cover as much lands suitable for agriculture as possible. o Sec. 4: The program shall over, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. o More specifically, the following lands are covered:  All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account, ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain;  All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;  All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and  All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon. o Sec. 3 defined ‘agricultural land’ as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Actand not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. o Sec. 10 enumerated which lands are exempted from the CARP, subsection C of which states:  Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense,school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stationsoperated by public or private schools for educational purposes, shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello

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o The words of the law are clear and unambiguous. Anent the issue of whether the farmers are qualified beneficiaries, the SC ruled that they are, contrary to the CA decision saying that they were not. o Sec. 15 – Registration of Beneficiaries: The DAR, in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) as organized in this Act, shall register all agricultural lessees, tenants and farmworkers who are qualified to be beneficiaries of the CARP. These potential beneficiaries shall provide the following data:  Names and members of their immediate farm household;  Owners or administrators of the lands they work on and the length of tenurial relationship;  Location and area of the land they work;  Crops planted; and  Their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid or wages received. o In the case at bar, the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee certified that they were. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion of social justice of poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth, and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy. To those who seek its benefit, it is the means towards a viable livelihood and, ultimately, a decent life. The objective of the State is no less certain: landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move the nation toward sound rural development and industrialization.

Republic of the Philippines (RP), represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform vs COURT OF APPEALS (CA) and Green City Estate & Development Corporation G.R. No. 139592 / 342 SCRA 189 October 05, 2000 Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. Facts: -

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Private respondent Green City Estate & Development Corp. owned 5 parcels of land, with a combined area of 112.0577 hectares, located in the Municipality of Jala-Jala, Rizal Province. It acquired these lands by purchase from one Marcela Borja vda. De Torres. All were classified as agricultural lands. On June 16, 1994, petitioner DAR issued a Notice of Coverage over the same, under compulsory acquisition pursuant to Chapter II, Sec. 7 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), or CARL. o It argued that the properties are not wholly agricultural, and that they lie mostly within the residential and forest conservation zones of Jala-Jala. On July 21, 1994, private respondent filed an application for exemption with the DAR Regional Office.

DAR Regional Office: Application recommended DENIED. It held that private respondent failed to substantiate their allegation that the lands are part of the municipality’s residential and forest conservation zone , and that portions of the properties are not irrigated nor irrigable. o Private respondent submitted a Certification of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of the Office of the Mayor of Jala-Jala, as well as a Certification from the National Irrigation Administration. Private respondent filed an Amended Petition for Exemption/Exclusion from CARP Coverage, now alleging that the properties should be exempted since it is within the residential and forest conservation zones. It submitted certifications from the HLURB confirming such fact, and an undertaking that it is ready and willing to pay disturbance compensation, if any. It also maintained that the lands had already been classified as agricultural, based on tax declarations. It argued that lands, once determined by law, may not be varied or altered by the results of a mere ocular or aerial inspection. DAR Regional Office: Application STILL DENIED. It ruled that: o The land use plan of Jala-Jala was different from its land use map; o The certification from the HLURB was not definite and specific; o The certification from the National Irrigation Authority was not conclusive on the DAR. CA: DAR decision REVERSED. The CA created a commission composed of 3 members, tasked to conduct an ocular inspection and survey of the lands, and found in favor of private respondent. Issue: Whether or not the lands are exempt from CARP. SC: Petition DENIED. The CA was constrained to resort to an ocular inspection of said properties through the commission it created, considering that the opinion of the DAR conflicted with the land use map submitted by private respondent. The survey was the judicious and equitable solution to finally resolve the issue of land classification and delineation. o DAR did not object to the creation of a team of commissioners. o In the absence of any irregularity in the survey and inspection of the properties, the report of the commissioners deserve full faith and credit, and no reversible error was made by the CA in relying on such report . The commissioners’ report confirmed the fact that the properties were not wholly agricultural. o The land apparently consisted of:  A mountainous area, with an average 28° slope containing 66.5 hectares.  A level, unirrigated area of 34 hectares, of which 5-6 hectares are planted to palay.  A residential area of 8 hectares.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Under Sec. 10 of R.A. 6657, all lands with 18% slope or over, except those already developed,shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.  The fact that 66.5 hectares had an average slope of 28° slope makes a clear case that the lands should be exempt. There is no law nor jurisprudence that holds that the land classification in the tax declarations is conclusive and final, nor would proscribe any further inquiry. o Tax declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of the land. o In this case, the ocular inspection conducted by the commission created by the CA was given more weight than what was stated in the tax declarations. o

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G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993 PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines Sur, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN JOAQUIN, respondents. In this appeal bycertiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 20551 entitled "Ernesto N. San Joaquin, et al., v. Hon. Benjamin V. Panga, et al.," this Court is asked to decide whether the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject, to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementator of the agrarian reform program. On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees. Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin. The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order dated December 6, 1989, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December 6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying

the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction. In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose. Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project. It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), particularly Section 65 thereof, which requires the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an agricultural to a nonagricultural land. The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the Solicitor General, held that the Province of Camarines Sur must comply with the provision of Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins. Issue: Whether or not the power of eminent domain can be curtailed by CARL Ruling: NO. It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 28l US 439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 SCt. 360). It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations. Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication (Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241).

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Otilia STA. ANA vs Spouses Leon and Aurora CARPO G.R. No. 164340 / 572 SCRA 463 November 28, 2008 Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Facts: -

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Respondent Leon and his brother are registered co-owners of a parcel of land located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna (Santa Rosa Estate Subdivision), with an area of 91.337k sq. meters. 3.5 hectares of the aforementioned land was pertained to Leon and his wife, corespondent Aurora, and was devoted to rice and corn production. It was tenanted by one Domingo Pastolero, husband of Adoracion. When Domingo passed, his wife and son, Eplidio, assumed tenancy rights. On December 29, 1983, Adoracion executed a notarized Pinanumpang Salaysay, with Leon’s conformity and for a consideration of P72.5k, wherein Adoracion transferred to herein petitioner Otillia her tenancy rights. Petitioner (together with her husband, Marciano) became the new tenant of the land. After some time, and when the tenancy relationship between respondents and petitioner went sour,respondents filed a complaint for ejectment due to nonpayment of lease rentals, where they alleged that: o It was agreed upon that existing rentals would be increased from 36 to 45 cavans. o If respondents wanted to reposses the property, they had to pay back the petitioner P72.5k. o Despite repeated demands, petitioner refused to pay actual rentals from July 1985 to September 1989. o The land had been declared suitable for commercial and industrial purposes, as per Zoning Ordinance of 1981 of the Municipality of Sta. Rosa. Petitioners, in their answer, argued that: o The existing rental was fixed at 36 cavans of palay, once or twice a year, depending on availability of irrigation water. o There was no agreement as to the future surrender of land in favor of respondents. o They sent verbal and written notices to respondents, advising them to accept rental payments. o When respondents refused to accept rental payments, they were compelled to sell the harvest and deposit the proceeds thereof to Universal Savings Bank, in the name of respondents. o They are farmer-beneficiaries of the land pursuant to P.D. 27, and wanted the courts to declare Marciano as full owner of the same.

PARAD: Ruling in favor of RESPONDENTS. Petitioners deliberately defaulted in the payment of their rentals, when PARAD found an account under petitioner’s and her husband’s names with Republic Planters Bank, in which the rentals were deposited.

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It was only during the hearing that the amount of P40k was deposited with Universal Savings Bank for unpaid rentals.

DARAB: PARAD decision SET ASIDE. For a valid ouster of a farmer-tenant, the willful and deliberate intent not to pay lease rentals must be present and/or ascertained. DARAB concluded that it petitioners cannot have deliberately failed nor refused to pay their lease rentals when respondents “turned a deaf ear” to the notices sent to them. CA: PARAD decision AFFIRMED. Petitioner’s failure to pay was tainted with bad faith and deliberate intent. Hence, they did not legally comply with their duties as tenants. Subject land wasnot covered by P.D. 27, R.A. No. 6657, and E.O. No. 228, since the same land had become a residential, commercial, and industrial land. o The vicinity map of the land shows that it is almost beside Nissan Motors Technopark, and surrounded by the South Expressway, and several other companies such as Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., and Toyota Motors. o As such, it became exempt from the aforementioned statutes. ISSUES: -

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Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the subject land had already become residential, commercial, and/or industrial, and thus excluded from coverage of agrarian reform laws. Whether or not petitioner, as agricultural tenant, failed to pay her lease rentals on time. o Her husband died during the pendency of the case.

SC: CA decision REVERSED. DARAB decision REINSTATED. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged in an administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the DAR, specifically the DARAB and PARAD. Issues of retention and non-coverage of a land under agrarian reform, are within the domain of the DAR Secretary, since they are Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) cases. o Initially, the case was filed over the issue of non-payment of lease rentals, which is an agrarian dispute cognizable by the PARAD and DARAB. o However, it was wrong for the DARAB to decide on the issue of retention and non-coverage of land, an issue which it had no jurisdiction over. o The CA also prematurely ruled on the same issue, since the DARAB and PARAD had no jurisdiction to rule upon it. o The SC refrained from ruling on the same issue. The burden of proof to show existence of a lawful cause for ejectment of an agricultural lessee rests upon respondents as agricultural lessors.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello o

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ultural tenant’s Petitioners FAILED to discharge such burden. The agric failure to pay lease rentals was not proven to be willful and deliberate. Mere failure of a tenant to pay the landholder’s share does not necessarily give the lessor a right to eject the lessee when there is lack of deliberate intent on the part of the tenant-lessee to pay. Deliberate – characterized by, or results from slow, careful, thorough calculation and consideration of effects and consequences. Willful – one governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason. The DARAB was correct in ruling that it was not the fault of petitioner, and that there was good faith upon petitioners when respondents refused to accept payment.  Marciano wrote Leon two letters informing him of the availability of lease rentals.  DAR intervention and mediation was sought by Marciano, but respondents failed to attend.

Ferdinand and Renato DELA CRUZ vs Amelia QUIAZON G.R. No. 171961 / 572 SCRA 681 November 28, 2008 Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Facts: -

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The mother of respondent, Estela, was the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Sto. Domingo II, Capas, Tarlac. Said property was brought under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27. Tenant-farmer Feliciano dela Cruz was issued a CLT over a 3.72hectare portion of the property. On March 1992, the heirs of Estela, including respondent, soon executed a Deed of Executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Admission and Partition with Waiver, adjudicating among themselves all properties left by both of their parents, except the subject aforementioned property, which was adjudicated solely in favor of respondent. Respondent then filed a complaint with the Provincial Adjudication Board of the DAR, against petitioner Ferdinand, alleging that: o Ferdinand entered into a leasehold contract with respondent, wherein he bound himself to deliver 28 cavans of palay as rental. o Petitioner failed to deliver the same since he already abandoned the landholding when he already migrated to the USA. Respondent amended the complaint to implead Renato, and further alleged that: o Petitioners were already immigrants to the USA, and that Renato, the actual tiller of the land, was a usurper since his possession was without the consent of the landowner. In his Answer, petitioner alleged that: o The execution of the leasehold contract was erroneous considering that a CLT had already been issued in favor of his father, Feliciano.

By virtue of the same, they became owners of the landholding, without obligation to pay rentals to respondent, but only to pay amortizations to Land Bank. o They had already paid rentals until 1992, which should be considered as advance payments for the land. After the case was filed, petitioners began paying amortizations to the Land Bank of the Philippines. o

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DAR Provincial Adjudication Board: Complaint DISMISSED. Provincial Adjudicator Bello dismissed the complaint based on his finding that the landholding had not been abandoned, considering that Renato, a member of Feliciano’s immediate fa mily, was in actual and physical possession thereof He also directed the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office to determine whether amortizations had been fully paid and, if so, to issue an Emancipation Patent. During appeal, respondent executed a Deed of Conveyance and Waive of her rights over the subject property in favor of her siblings. Unknown to petitioners, respondent and her siblings filed an Application of Retention before the DAR Regional Office. Said application was granted, where it was ordered that: o The land was to be divided among the heirs. o The leaseholders (petitioners) maintain a peaceful landholding of the property. o The landowners-applicant (heirs of Estela) cause segregation of the retained area. aside of said order. Said ‘appeal’ was The heirs of Feliciano prayed for the setting dismissed by DAR Secretary Garliao. DARAB: Respondent’s appeal DISMISSED (1 st decision). Respondent then filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, claiming that she just arrived from the USA, and that she found out about the DARAB decision late. DARAB: Petition for Relief from Judgment GRANTED. Previous decision REVERSED (2 nd decision). This time, the DARAB found for respondent, finding that petitioners indeed had abandoned the subject landholding. CA: Petitioner’s appeal DENIED. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners had abandoned the landholding. Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the DARAB decision. o Petitioners assert that they have not abandoned the landholding since Renato still cultivated the land. SC: CA decision REVERSED. DARAB’s 1st decision REINSTATED. Abandonment requires: o A clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim, or to desert a right or property.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello An external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect.  The intention to abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never returning, resuming, or claiming the rights and the interests that have been abandoned. Petitioners did not abandon the subject landholding, as in fact they have continuously cultivated the property. o The immigration of the srcinal farmer-beneficiarydid not necessarily result in the abandonment of the landholding, considering that one of his sons (namely Renato) continued cultivating the land. o Personal cultivation, as required by law, includes the cultivation of the land by the tenant himself, or with the aid of the immediate farm household, which refers to members of the family of the tenant, and other persons dependent upon him for support, and who usually help him in the agricultural activities. The DARAB erred in a number of events. o It erred in granting the petition for relief from judgment when respondent was negligent in filing her motion for reconsideration or appeal to the CA. o She cannot claim that she was belatedly informed of thest1DARAB decision when a helper handed her the same. o

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July 22, 1987 provides that "... the provisions of RA 3844 and other agrarian laws not inconsistent with this order shall have suppletory effect." We see no inconsistency between RA 3844 and E.O. No. 229 with respect to the jurisdiction of the trial court over the cause of action of the private respondent who desires to adopt a leasehold system pursuant to RA 3844. E.O. No. 229 vests quasi-judicial powers on the DAR to determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" subject of Proclamation No. 229.8 We hold that the right of private respondents to adopt a leasehold system under RA 3844 is distinct and separate and not affected by the enactment of E.O. No. 229 and, hence, may be enforced pursuant to the judicial mechanism provided for by RA 3844. Quismundo’s contention is that the RTC of Angeles City has no jurisdiction to try the said case considering that the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate agrarian cases has already been vested to the Dept of Agrarian by EO 229.

ISSUE: W/N RTC has jurisdiction to try the said case. RULING:   

SC found Quismundo’s petition justifiable SC granted petition and reversed CA’s decision SC also declared the lower court’s decisions dated March 3, 1988, June 2, 1988 and

December 6, 1988 as Null and Void Quismundo vs CA FACTS:  On feb 19, 1988, felicisimo ocampo, catalino ocampo, pedro marquez, romeo enriquez and herminio yuson, tenatnts of nina quismuno filed a complaint with the trail court praying that their relationship with petitioner be changed from share tenancy to a leasehold system, pursuant to section 4 of republic act no. 3844, their request therefore having been denied by Quismundo.  On March 2, 1988 ocampo, et. Al filed a motion for the issuance of an order authorizing the supervision of the deputy sheriff of the court of the harvesting and liquidation of the 19871988 sugarcane crops, motion was granted by the trial court in an order dated March 3, 1988.  On March 16, 1988, Quismundo filed a Motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action, trial couyrt denied the motion.  On june 1988, Quismundo filed an MR invoking that the court lack jurisdiction over the case.  On November 9, 1988, While the MR is pending, ocampo then filed another motion for the suspension of hervesting.  On December 6,1988, Trial court granted the motion of ocampo and denied the MR of Quismundo. Quismundo raised the case to CA , CA upheld the TC’s decision which stated,  “The right of the private respondents to choose leasehold tenancy is governed by RA 3844. We find nothing in Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229 and RA 6657 divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over the case. To be sure, RA 6657 was enacted on June 10, 1988 or later than the filing of the Complaint in AGRA Case No. 5174 on February 13, 1988. On the other hand, sec. 27 of E.O. 229 approved on

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Executive Order No. 229, which Reform provides for the instituted mechanism the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Program byfor Proclamation No. 131, dated July 22, 1987, vests in the Department of Agrarian Reform quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters. The pertinent provision of said executive order reads as follows: SECTION 17.Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusive srcinal jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive srcinal jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture (DA). The DAR shall have powers to punish for contempt and to issue subpoena, subpoenaduces tecumand writs to enforce its order or decisions. The decisions of the DAR may, in proper cases, be appealed to the Regional Trial Courts but shall be immediately executory notwithstanding such appeal. SC ruled that the above quoted provision should be deemed repealed. Upon the enactment of EO 229, which took effect on August 29, 1987, the RTC are removed of the jurisdiction to try agrarian cases, said jurisdiction is now bestowed to the DAR.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Rufinda vda de Tangub vs CA FACTS:  Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres (deceased), filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in March, 1988, "an agrarian case for damages by reason of the unlawful dispossession, they were tenants from the landholding owned by the Spouses Domingo and Eugenia Martil, they also included PNB by alleging that the bank, holder of the mortgage of the land involved, has caused the foreclosure of the property resulting to the acquisition of the bank as the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale  Tangub prayed that the mortgage and transactions made in relation to such be annulled and voided  Complaint was dismissed in the Order dated August 24, 1988  Tangub spouses filed a petition for certiorati with the SC, SC found no special and important reason to take congnizaznce of the action, SC referred the case to CA  CA dismissed petition finding that the jurisdictional question had been correctly resolved by the trial court by ruling that agrarian cases are no longer heard by the RTC’s by rather by DAR adjudication board, ruling was based on EO229.  Rufina once again contended with the SC the trial court’s order of dismissal dated August 26, 1988 and the decision of the CA are patently illegal and unconstitutional. Issue: W/N RTC has jurisdiction to hear and try agrarian cases. Ruling: 

SC dismissed petition for lack of merit and affirmed CA decision.

DAR VS CUENA III. Private respondent Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in La Carlota City and devoted principally to the planting fo sugar cane. Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of La Carlota City issued and sent a NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private respondent Cuenca placing the above-described landholding under the compulsory coverage of R.A. 6657. The notice also stated that the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) will determine the value of the subject land pursuant to E.O No. 405. Private respondent Cuenca filed with the RTC for Annulment of Notice of Coverage and Declaration of Unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 405.

assailing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Stressing that the issue was not simply the improper issuance of the Notice of Coverage, but was mainly the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 405, the CA ruled that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had jurisdiction over the case. Consonant with that authority, the court a quo also had the power to issue writs and processes to enforce or protect the rights of the parties. Issue: Whether the complaint filed by the private respondent is an agrarian reform and within the jurisdiction of the DAR, not with the trial court Ruling: Yes. A careful perusal of respondent’s Complaint shows that the principal averments and reliefs

prayed for refer -- not to the "pure question of law" spawned by the alleged unconstitutionality R’s Notice of Coverage. Clearly, the main thrust of of EO 405 -- but to the annulment of the DA the allegations is the propriety of the Notice of Coverage, as may be gleaned from the following averments. We stress that the main subject matter raised by private respondent before the 27 trial court was not the issue of compensation (the subject matter of EO 405 ). Note that no amount had yet been determined nor proposed by the DAR. Hence, there was no occasion to invoke the court’s function of determining just compensation. 29 To be sure, the issuance of the Notice of Coverage constitutes the first necessary step towards the acquisition of private land under the CARP. Plainly then, the propriety of the Notice relates to the implementation of the CARP, which is under the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DAR could not be ousted from its authority by the simple expediency of appending an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an issue that is clearly agrarian.

UALAT VS JUDGE RAMOS In this case, complainant Sabio claims that he is an agricultural lessee of an agricultural land. Complainant Ualat, on the other hand, alleges that he is Sabios caretaker. It appears from 2 complaints Sabio filed with the DARAB a complaint for Recovery of Possession against the landowner and Raymundo Sabio, brother of complainant Sabio.

He alleged that the implementation of CARP in his landholding is no longer with authority of law considering that, if at all, the implementation should have commenced and should have been completed between June 1988 to June 1992; that EO No. 405 amends, modifies and/or repeals CARL and, therefore, it is unconstitutional considering that then President C.Aquino no longer had law-making powers; that the NOTICE OF COVERAGE is a gross violation of PD 399.

On August 30, 1990, the landowner filed against herein complainants a case for Illegal Detainer with respondents sala. the DARAB ruled in favor of complainant Sabio declaring that the right of the complainant as the tenant-tiller to peaceful possession and cultivation should not be disturbed. On November 5, 1990, however, respondent Judge rendered a decisio n[4] in favor of the landowner ordering the complainants, among others, to vacate the property.

Cuenca prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared null and void ab initio.The respondent Judge denied MARO Noe Fortunados motion to dismiss and issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction directing Fortunado and all persons acting in his behalf to cease and desist from implementing the Notice of Coverage, and the LBP from proceeding with the determination of the value of the subject land. The DAR thereafter filed before the CA a petition for certiorari

Complainants now contend that, notwithstanding knowledge of the DAR resolution, and the fact that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR, respondent Judge, using his power and authority, took cognizance of the case because of personal interest and motive. They claim that during the pendency of the case, respondent Judge, thru his son and brother, cultivated a portion of the land subject matter of the case.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Complainant Ualat, on the other hand, alleges that as the result of the unjust decision, his residential house which is not the subject of the lease was levied upon by the sheriff, and argued that as mere caretaker, he could not be held jointly and severally liable to pay the obligations of Quirino Sabio as agricultural tenant. Respondent judge denied the allegations and stated in his comments that he was without knowledge or information about the complaint with the DAR, nor was he made aware of the DAR resolution because nothing of this sort was stated by the parties in their pleadings, nor were these brought out during the proceedings. Thus, on the basis of the evidence presented, he ruled that the relationship between the landowner and herein complainants is that of civil lease. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the case. Ruling: Knowledge of existing agrarian legislation and prevailing jurisprudence on the subject, together with an ordinary degree of prudence, would have prompted respondent Judge to refer the case to the DAR for preliminary determination of the parties relationship, as required by law. As can be readily seen from the answer filed by complainants Sabio and Ualat in the civil case, they alleged the existence of an agrarian tenancy relationship between themselves and the landowner. Additionally, in the proceedings before respondent judge, complainants were even represented by a lawyer from the DAR. These matters should have been sufficient to put respondent Judge on notice that complainants were claiming protection under our agrarian laws. At that point, he ought to have realized that there existed a genuine issue involving agricultural tenancy among the parties with respect to the subject property. At the very least, as suggested by the Investigating Judge, respondent could have himself conducted a clarificatory hearing to determine such relationship. However, DARAB has no jurisdiction with respect to agrarian matters involving the prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA 6657 and the determination of just compensation for landowners (Rep. Act No. 6657 (1988), Sec. 57). Jurisdiction over said matters are lodged with the Special Agrarian Courts (SACs). The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court maintain their appellate jurisdiction over agrarian cases decided by DARAB. (Vda. de Tangub vs. Ca, 191 SCRA 885 (1990).

Napoleon Magno v Gonzalo Francisco and Regina Vda de Lazaro G.R. No. 168959 March 25 2010 Facts: Petitioner is the owner of a 5.3hectare lot which is a portion of an agricultural land identified as Lot No. 593 situated in Nueva Ecija. Petitioners lot is part of the 13 parcels of land registered in the name of petitioner's mother, Maria Talens (Talens). Talens landholding totals 61 hectares, more or less. Petitioner acquired the lot through a Deed of Sale executed by Talens on 28 July 1972 but the sale was only registered on 3 September 1986 At the time of the sale, Gonzalo Francisco and Manuel Lazaro tenanted the land and their separate areas of tillage were 2.8 and 2.5 hectares, respectively. Petitioner entered into a written contract of agricultural leasehold with Manuel

Lazaro on 5 October 1972 and with Gonzalo Francisco on 7 August 1980. In the leasehold contract, Manuel Lazaro was obliged to pay a lease rental of 35 cavans during the regular season, and 20 cavans during dayatan cropping season. Gonzalo Francisco, on the other hand, was required to pay a lease rental of 35 cavans during the regular season and 25 cavans during the cropping season. Gonzalo Francisco and Manuel Lazaro (who was succeeded by his surviving spouse Regina Vda. De Lazaro upon his death) complied with the conditions of the agricultural leasehold until the regular season of April 1991 when they stopped paying rentals despite petitioners repeated demands. Respondents believed that they have fully paid the price of the lot under the Barangay Committee on Land Productions (BCLP) valuation. On 10 January 1990, Gonzalo Francisco was issued Emancipation Patent (EP) No. 416156 covering an area of 27,284 square meters. On the same date, Manuel Lazaro was also issued EP No. 416157 covering an area of 25,803 square meters. On 19 May 1993, petitioner filed with PARAD of Cabanatuan City a complaint for ejectment and collection of lease rentals against respondents. At the time of filing of the complaint, respondent Francisco and respondent Lazaro were already in arrears of 155 cavans and 145 cavans, respectively. Ruling of DARAB: DARAB rendered a decision declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioner and Talens as binding upon the respondents. The DARAB also declared that the agricultural leasehold relationship between petitioner and respondents still subsists. The DARAB ordered respondents to pay the lease rentals from April 1991 until the proper reinstatement of the lease contracts. Issue: Whether unregistered EPs issued to agricultural lessees which appear to be irregular on their face c an defeat the landowners rights to agricultural leasehold rentals. Held: No. In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Abdulwahid, the Court, quoting Centeno v. Centeno, held: The DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. The DARAB has primary, srcinal and appellate jurisdiction "to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under RA No. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844 as amended by R.A. No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations." Agrarian dispute as defined in Section 3(d) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 refers "to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee." It is undisputed that petitioner and respondents have an established tenancy relationship, such that the complaint for collection of back rentals

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello and ejectment is classified as an agrarian dispute and under the jurisdiction of the PARAD and thereafter by the DARAB. However, in view of the conflicting claims where petitioner asserted ownership over the lot and respondents emphasized that the lot is subject to OLT coverage, there is a need to ascertain if the lot is under the agrarian reform program. Since the classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the agrarian reform program are Agrarian Law Implementation cases, the DAR Secretary should first resolve this issue. Verily, there is an established tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents in this case. An action for Ejectment for Non-Payment of lease rentals is clearly an agrarian dispute, cognizable at the initial stage by the PARAD and thereafter by the DARAB. But issues with respect to the retention rights of the respondents as landowners and the exclusion/exemption of the subject land from the coverage of agrarian reform are issues not cognizable by the PARAD and the DARAB, but by the DAR Secretary because, as aforementioned, the same are Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases. Therefore, the PARAD of Cabanatuan City had no authority to render a decision declaring the lot under OLT coverage. In fact, when the case was appealed, the DARAB acknowledged that it had no jurisdiction on the OLT coverage. In an Order dated 10 October 2002, the DARAB suspended the case proceedings until the submission of the result of the administrative determination of the lot and thus submitted the entire records to the DAR Secretary. Respondents themselves admitted in their Memorandum that the DAR has not submitted the result of its administrative determination of the lot to the DARAB. It is therefore essential that the DAR Secretary should first resolve the issue on the lots inclusion or exclusion from OLT coverage before a final determination of this case can be had. Proof necessary for the resolution of the issues on OLT coverage and petitioners right of retention should be introduced in the proper forum. The Office of the DAR Secretary is in a better position to resolve these issues being the agency lodged with such authority since it has the necessary expertise on the matter.

Jaime P. Corpin v Amor S. Vivar GR No. 137350 June 19, 2000 Facts: Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Tabang, Bulacan covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-299732 issued by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Private respondent Amor S. Vivar is in possession of said parcel of land. On March 16, 1996, petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan a complaint for ejectment against private respondent. The latter refused to vacate the said lot, claiming that he is a tenant of petitioner. In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, private respondent averred that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case since it involved a landlord-tenant relationship. Hence, the same should have been filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform instead. However, since the Answer was filed out of time, the municipal trial court issued an Order, dated October 17, 1996 declaring that the case was deemed submitted for judgment as may be warranted by the allegations in the complaint. Decision of MTC: Municipal Trial Court rendered a Decision ordering private respondent to vacate the land in dispute.

Decision of the RTC: The Regional Trial Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, rendered its Decision reversing the judgment of the municipal trial court and dismissing petitioner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Ruling of the CA: The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. Issue: Whether or not the MTC should gave disregarded respondent's answer for having been filed out of time. Held: We find that the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the municipal trial court should not have disregarded private respondents Answer but should have proceeded to determine whether or not it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case: It was error for the municipal trial court to disregard the answer of respondent on the sole premise that it was belatedly filed. The answer raised the issue of jurisdiction which the court could not just gloss over because, if, after hearing, it turned out that it really did not have jurisdiction over the case because it involved an agrarian dispute, then its decision excluding and ejecting respondent from the premises would have been a complete nullity. In the case of Bayog vs. Natino which the appellate court cited, we held that the metropolitan circuit trial court, which dismissed defendants Answer for having been filed out of time and decided the case based on the allegations in the complaint, should not have disregarded defendants Answer and should have heard and received the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not it had jurisdiction over the case. The Bayog case also involved a complaint for ejectment. Defendant therein filed his Answer beyond the reglementary period, but alleged in said pleading that the metropolitan circuit trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the lot in question involved an agricultural lot owned by plaintiff and tenanted by defendant. Defendant therein attached to his Answer the Agricultural Leasehold Contract between him and plaintiff and the Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold issued in his favor. This Court considered said documents as sufficient to show the municipal circuit trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the case. In the case at bar, however, we do not find the documents submitted by the parties as sufficient to have enabled the Regional Trial Court to thoroughly resolve the issue of whether or not the municipal trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court notes that the following documents attached by private respondent to the memoranda which he submitted to the Regional Trial Court were not even submitted to the municipal trial court: (1) Letter dated March 25, 1995 written by the Junior Statistician of the Department of Agrarian Reform in Guiguinto and Balagtas, Bulacan addressed to the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Balagtas, Bulacan;(2) Patunay dated March 24, 1997 issued The BARC Chairman of Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan; (3) Certification dated June 07, 1994 issued by the Barangay Chairman of Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan; and (4) Certification dated February 23, 1995 issued by the Barangay Chairman of Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan. The Regional Trial Court should not have considered the aforementioned in rendering its Decision since said documents were only presented before it on appeal, and were not previously filed with the municipal trial court in the srcinal case. What were presented to the municipal trial court were limited to the following: (1) Pagtitibay dated February 21, 1996 signed by Angel Torres, Chairman of the BARC of Tabang; (2) Affidavit of Dr. Teodoro Placido dated April 22, 1996; (3) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Ambrosio T. Mendoza dated April 22, 1996;and (4) Sinumpaang Salaysay of private respondent dated April 22, 1996. Considering the foregoing, it

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello is clear that there is a need to conduct a hearing whereby both parties may present evidence which may shed light on the issue of the municipal trial courts jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts finding that there exists a landlord-tenant relationship between petitioner and respondent, which was based on the documents attached by private respondent to his memoranda in the Regional Trial Court but not presented to the municipal trial court, must be set aside due to insufficiency of evidence.

HEIRS OF HERMAN REY SANTOS. OF SANTOS V. CA G.R. No. 109992. March 7, 2000 Facts: Herman Rey Santos, who is now substituted by his heirs, obtained the subject land thru a public auction. Santos then registered the deed of sale in the register of deeds, after Garcia failed to exercise his right of redemption. Private respondent filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages with an application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), praying that petitioner be enjoined from preventing private respondent from gathering the mango fruits. DARAB granted the petition. Private respondent filed a Petition for Consignation before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, in an apparent attempt to redeem his land. This petition was dismissed. Meanwhile, one Pantaleon Antonio filed on May 18, 1992 a motion to interven e[5] with the DARAB claiming that "he is affected in his rights and interests private respondent filed a complaint for Annulment/Cancellation of Sale and Document, Redemption with Damages and Preliminary Writ of Injunction against Herman Rey Santos. Adjudication Board suspended the hearing on Pantaleon Antonio’s motion for intervention. Intervenor Pantaleon Antonio filed with the DARAB a Motion to Withdraw Intervenor’s [8]

deposited share. The motion was granted and intervenor Pantaleon Antonio was allowed to withdraw harvest proceeds.DARAB then recognized Pantaleon Antonio as the duly constituted agricultural tenant of the subject land. As appealed, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Orders of DARAB. Hence, this petition. Issue: W/N PARAD has jurisdiction over the matters raised by the intervenor. Held: No, PARAD has no jurisdiction. Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides: Section 1.Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both srcinal and appellate, to determine and adjudicate allagrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or

incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. (Italics supplied) "Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP Law), as: (d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. Tenancy relationship is needed for DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case. Court held that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform is limited to the following: a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and c) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses. Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws. Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the controversy.

DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES INC. EMPLOYEES AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES COOPERATIVE (DEARBC). Petitionervs. JESUS SANGUNAY and SONNY LABUNOS, respondents G.R. No. 180013 January 31, 2011 Doctrine: Under Sec. 50 of RA 6657, DARAB is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform maters and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all matter involving implementation of CARP. Hence, at first instance, only DARAB can determine and adjudicate agrarian disputes. Facts: 1. A 2M sq. m. landholding, covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award, was awarded to petitioner DEARBC, an agrarian cooperative and beneficiary under the CARP. 2. DEARBC claimed that: a. Respondent Sangunay illegally entered a portion of its property called “Field 34” and utilized a portion of 1.5 hectares of such property wherein he planted corn, built a house and resided in such from 1986 to present.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello b.

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Respondent Labunos also illegally entered same portion and tilled 8 hectares wherein he planted trees, gmelina, mahogany andother crops as a source of his livelihood. c. Both respondents failed to return the lands despite demand and such illegal occupation resulted in deprivation of use of land and damages. DEARBC filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Specific Performance with Damages with DARAB Region Office against several people, among them were respondents. The Adjudicator ruled in favor of DEARBC on the ground that respondents failed to prove ownership of such portions of the landholding. Respondents elevated the case toDARAB Central Office. They argued that: a. Sangunay’s and Labunos’ position: i. Land was an accrual deposit he inherited from his father in which he had been in open, public, adverse, actual, physical and continuous possession of land as an owner. ii. He cultivated such land with the knowledge of DEARBC. He presented Tax Declaration and Real Property Historical Ownership issued by Municipal Assessor, showing that he declared property for taxation even before DEARBC acquired it. iii. He was a qualified farmer-beneficiary entitling him to security and tenure under CARP DARAB dismissed DEARBC’s case for lack of jurisdiction as such issue of ownership of subject land is a regular case which falls within the jurisdiction of regular courts and not as an agrarian dispute. a. The dispute does not relate to any tenurial agreement. DEARBC appealed to the CA. CA dismissed the petition for procedural infirmities in it verification, certification and attachments. Hence, this petition. DEARBC claims that DARAB has jurisdiction because it partakes of a boundary dispute or an ouster of an intruder found under DARAB Rules of Procedure and AO 03. Respondents argue that jurisdiction of DARAB is limited to agrarian disputes and implementation of CARP. Issues of possession may be dealt with by DARAB only when they relate to agrarian disputes.

Issue: W/N DARAB has jurisdiction over the case of DEARBC Held: No! DARAB does not have jurisdiction. 1. Jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial office or government agency, is determined by allegations and relief prayed for. 2. Under Sec. 50 of RA 6657, DARAB is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform maters and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all matter involving implementation of CARP. 3. Hence, at first instance, only DARAB can determine and adjudicate agrarian disputes.

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According to RA 6657, “agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and otherterms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.” Clearly, no agrarian dispute exists as DEARBC only prays for ejectment and does not involve tenurial agreements. Both parties werecontending for the ownership of parcels of land. The ruling of DAR v Abdulwahidis inapplicable as the dispute involved in such case was the “terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landlord to agra beneficiaries. DEARBC’s complaint lacks allegations to persuade Court in considering it as an agrarian dispute.

PETITION IS DENIED.

G.R. No. 176838 June 13, 2013 DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by Fritzi C. Pantoja, in her capacity as the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, DAR-Laguna, Petitioner, vs.PARAMOUNT HOLDINGS EQUITIES, INC., JIMMY CHUA, ROJAS CHUA, BENJAMIN SIM, SANTOS C. TAN, WILLIAM C. LEE and STEWART C. LIM, Respondents. Facts: The case stems from the petitio n4 docketed as DARAB Case No. R 0403-0009-02, filed with the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) by the DAR through Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) Felixberto Q. Kagahastian. The petition sought to nullify the sale to the respondents of several parcels of land. The PARO argued that the properties were agricultural land yet their sale was effected without DAR Clearance as required under Republic Act No. 6657 (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). The respondents opposed the petition, contending that since the matter involves an administrative implementation of R.A. No. 6657, the case is cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, not the DARAB. Issue: The main issue for the Court’s resolution is: Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the dispute that seeks the nullification of the subject properties’ sale. Ruling: The Court answers in the negative. The jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited under the law, as it was created under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 129-Aspecifically to assume powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases under E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A .22 Significantly, it was

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello organized under the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. The limitation on the authority of it to mere agrarian reform matters is only consistent with the extent of DAR’s quasi-judicial powers under R.A. No. 6657 and E.O. No. 229, which read:

G.R. No. 123417. June 10, 1999 JAIME MORTA, SR. and PURIFICACION PADILLA, petitioners, vs. JAIME OCCIDENTAL, ATTY. MARIANO BARANDA, JR., and DANIEL CORRAL, r espondents.

—The DAR is hereby v ested SECTION 50 [of R.A. No. 6657]. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive srcinal jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

Facts: On January 10 and 21, 1994, [3] petitioners Jaime Morta, Sr. and Purificacion Padilla filed two (2) cases [4] for damages with preliminary injunction, with the Municipal Trial Court, Guinobatan, Albay, against respondents Jaime Occidental, Atty. Mariano Baranda, Jr. and Daniel Corral, which were consolidated pursuant to Rule 31 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the complaints, petitioners alleged that respondents through the instigation of Atty. Baranda, gathered pilinuts, anahaw leaves, and coconuts from their respective land, delivered the produce to Atty. Mariano Baranda, Jr., and destroyed their banana and pineapple plants. In Civil Case No. 481, petitioners claimed damages amounting to P8,930.00, plus costs of suit; in Civil Case No. 482, petitioners claimed P9,950.00, as damages. The court considered the cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure and ordered respondents to file their answer.

—The DAR is hereby vested SECTION 17 [of E.O. No. 229]. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusive srcinal jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive srcinal jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture (DA).

It is understood that the aforementioned cases, complaints or petitions were filed with the DARAB after August 29, 1987. Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR. Consistent with the aforequoted legal provisions, we emphasized in Heirs of Candido Del Rosario v. Del Rosario23 that the jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB is only limited to cases involving agrarian disputes, including incidents arising from the implementation of agrarian laws. Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute in this manner: (d) Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under R.A. 6657 and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. Specifically, the PARO’s petition failed to sufficiently allege any tenurial or agrarian r elations

that affect the subject parcels of land . Although it mentioned a pending petition for coverage filed with DAR by supposed farmers-tillers, there was neither such claim as a fact from DAR, nor a categorical statement or allegation as to a determined tenancy relationship by the PARO or the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.

In their answer, respondents claimed that petitioners were not the owners of the land in question. They alleged that the torrens titles of the land indicated a certain Gil Opiana as the registered owner. Gil Opiana was the father of Josefina Opiana-Baraclan who inherited the lots upon the former's death. Respondent Jaime Occidental contended that he was a bona fide tenant of Josefina Opiana-Baraclan. Respondents stated that there was no annotation on the titles establishing petitioners' right over the land. They denied harvesting the anahaw leaves and coconuts, as well as delivering the produce to Atty. Baranda, Jr. Issue: Petitioners claim that Morta is not a tenant of either Jaime Occidental or Josefina Opiana-Baraclan, as shown by the MARO certification. They argue that the civil actions for damages are not tenancy-related, and, hence, are properly cognizable by the trial court, not the DARAB. Ruling: We resolve to grant the petition. It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. [14] "Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon a claim asserted therein - a matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Neither can the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses made by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant. [15] The complaint filed by petitioners before the Municipal Trial Court is an action for damages for illegal gathering of anahaw leaves, pilinuts and coconuts, and the destruction of their banana and pineapple plantations. The respondents did not question the municipal trial court's jurisdiction in their answer. The issue of jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal. For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. [16] In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals, [17] we held that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reforms is limited to the following: a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land-tenure related problems; and c) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses. The regional trial court ruled that the issue involved is tenancy-related that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. It relied on the findings in DARAB Case No. 2413 that Josefina Opiana-Baraclan appears to be the lawful owner of the land and Jaime Occidental was her recognized tenant. However, petitioner Morta claimed that he is the owner of the land. Thus, there is even a dispute as to who is the rightful owner of the land, Josefina OpianaBaraclan or petitioner Morta. The issue of ownership cannot be settled by the DARAB since it is definitely outside its jurisdiction. Whatever findings made by the DARAB regarding the ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle the matter. The issue of ownership shall be resolved in a separate proceeding before the appropriate trial court between the claimants thereof. At any rate, whoever is declared to be the rightful owner of the land, the case can not be considered as tenancy-related for it still fails to comply with the other requirements. Assuming arguendo that Josefina Opiana-Baraclan is the owner, then the case is not between the landowner and tenant. If, however, Morta is the landowner, Occidental can not claim that there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship between him and Morta. Thus, for failure to comply with the above requisites, we conclude that the issue involved is not tenancy-related cognizable by the DARAB.

Rodrigo and Ana ALMUETE vs Marcelo ANDRES and the Court of Appeals G.R. No. 122276 / 369 SCRA 619 November 20, 2001 Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. Facts: -

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In 1957, the then National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) awarded petitioner Rodrigo a parcel of agricultural land located in San Vicente, Isabela, measuring approximately 72.587 sq. meters. Since then, he has exercised exclusive possession of the property. However, in 1979, an Agrarian Reform Technologist, Gragasin, filed a field investigation and inspection report stating that: o The whereabouts of Rodrigo was unknown, and that he had waived all his rights as a NARRA settler due to his poor health beyond his control and financial hardship.

The actual occupant of the land is respondent Andres since 1967. Recommended that the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) cancel the award, and that the land be awarded instead to Andres. Andres filed his homestead application, and represented that Rodrigo sold the land to one Masiglat, in consideration of a radiophono. However, Masiglat was disqualified from acquiring the land since he was also a NARRA awardee, so he transferred the land to Andres in exchange for one carabao and P600. The tranfers were not covered by written contracts between parties. o o

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MAR: Homestead application GRANTED. Meanwhile, Rodrigo and his daughter, Ana, continued to cultivate the land. Their house was built thereon in 1982. From time to time, he would visit the farm to deliver supplies and pay wags to the laborers who worked therein. The DAR regional director recommended the transfer of ownership of the land to Andres. In 1988, an OCT was issued in favor of respondent. Shortly thereafter, Andres, accompanied by 10 other persons armed with bolos, entered the property, claiming exclusive right of ownership and possession. They felled narra trees and converted the same to lumber, and destroyed the mongos planted by petitioners. Andres gained control of approximately half of the property. When he complained to the DAR, it was only then that he learned of the cancellation of his award in favor of Andres. They then filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of possession with the TC. RTC – Isabela: Decision in favor of PETITIONERS. The RTC found that Andres did not acquire any right over the property which he bought from Masiglat since the latter never acquired ownership from Rodrigo. Andres could not present any valid document to prove his acquisition of the land. It was found that Rodrigo never abandoned the same. Gragasin made false assertions, misleading the Regional Director into cancelling Rodrigo’s award. Andres failed to appeal, rendering the RTC decision final and executory. A writ of execution was issued, but Andres filed a motion to quash the same. The RTC did not act on it since it had no more jurisdiction over the case. CA: RTC decision declared NULL AND VOID. Respondent argued that since the property as agricultural land covered by a homestead patent, exclusive jurisdiction was with the DARAB and not with the regular courts. ISSUE: Whether or not RTC had jurisdiction over the case. SC: CA decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The action filed by petitioners was for recovery of possession and reconveyance of title, in which the issue to be resolved was who between the parties had better right to the property. It was acontroversy relating to ownership of the land, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in fixing, negotiating, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. o It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under R.A. 6657 and other terms and condition of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers. o The jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to cases involving tenancy relationship, which has the following indispensable elements:  The parties are the landowner ad tenant.  The subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land.  There is consent between the parties.  The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production.  There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant.  The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant. The CA gravely erred when it granted the petition for certiorari and held that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. o The action filed was cognizable by regular courts. o While the caption of the complaint includes ejectment, it is the allegations therein that determine the nature of the action.  Petitioners prayed for the cancellation of the OCT in the name of respondent, and that petitioners instead be declared absolute owners of the land. The CA also gravely erred when it gave due course to the special civil action for certiorari. o Certiorari is a remedy of last recourse, when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. o It cannot be used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. Herein respondent lost that remedy by his failure to appeal. o

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Machete vs CA Issue: W/N RTC’s are vested with jurisdiction over cases for collection of back rentals from leasehold tenants? FACTS:  Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and damages before the RTC of Tagbilaran City against Lope Machete et, al.  The complaint alleged that the parties entered into a leasehold agreement with respect to Villalon’s landholdings at Carmen, Bohol, they agreed that Machete, et al were to pay Villalon a certain percent of the harvest.  Despite demands made by Villalon, Machete, Et al, with no valid reason failed to pay their respective rentals.  Machete et al moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jursudiction of the TC over the subject matter, they also contented that the case is connected

 

with the agrarian relations, which falls squarely to the jurisdiction of DAR in excerise of its quasi judicial powers under therevised riled of the DARAB. On August 22, 1989, TC granted the motion to dismiss and denied the MR Villalon seeked for the annulment of the orders before CA which then reversed the TC decision and directing TC to assume jurisdiction of the case, CA also rejected Machete’s MR.

RULING:   

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SC reversed CA’s decision

SC reinstanted RTC decision dated August 22 and September 28 SC stated that the case which is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB. The failure of petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract with private respondent is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal competence of the trial court to resolve. Thedoctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. SC also stated that CA made an error by directing TC to assume jurisdiction over the case, he resolution by the DAR is to the best advantage of the parties since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the administrative agency presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. Further, the proceedings therein are summary in nature and the department is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding

Hon. Antonio M. Nuesa v CA GR No. 132048 March 6, 2002 Facts: On May 25, 1972, then Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued an Order of Award in favor of Jose Verdillo over two (2) parcels of agricultural land, Lots 1932 and 1904 of the Buenavista Estate, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, covering 14,496 and 19,808 square meters, respectively, under the following conditions: That within a period of six (6) months from receipt of a copy, the awardee(s) shall personally cultivate xxx or otherwise develop at least one-fourth of the area xxx or occupy and construct his/her house in case of residential lot and pay at least the first installment xxx; failure on his/her part to comply with this requirement shall be sufficient cause for cancellation of this order and for allocation xxx in favor of any qualified xxx applicant; and that in no case shall an agreement to sell or deed of sale, as the case may be, issued in favor of the awardee(s) covering the lots without a certification issued by the Land Reform Project Team Leader of Land Settlement Superintendent that the awardee(s) has/have developed or devoted to some productive enterprise at least one-half of the area thereof, or constructed his/her/their house therein in case of residential land On August 26, 1993, or after twenty-one years, private respondent filed an application with the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform for the purchase of said lots claiming that he had complied with the conditions set forth in the Order. Restituto Rivera, herein petitioner, filed a letter of protest against private respondent claiming that contrary to the manifestation of private respondent, it is petitioner who had been in possession of the land and had been cultivating the same. Petitioner had filed his own application for said parcels in opposition to that of private respondent. On December 27, 1993, a representative of the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Office undertook an

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello investigation to look into the conflicting claims of the petitioner and the private respondent. Based on said investigation, it was found that: xxx the subject lots were previously tenanted by other persons namely, Agapito Garcia and Pablo Garcia for almost sixteen years prior to the entry of Restituto Rivera in 1972 for Lot 1904 and in 1986 for Lot 1932. Restituto Rivera at the time of investigation is still in possession/cultivation of the lots in question. These facts have never been refuted by Jose Verdillo who further testified that Restituto Rivera used to pay annual rental of 25 cavans for Lot 1932 and 15 cavans of palay for Lot 1904. In the investigation, it was undoubtedly established that Lots 1932 and 1904, Psd-52045, were in possession/cultivation of tenants or other persons exclusive of Jose Verdillo. It is crystal clear that Jose Verdillo has culpably violated the terms and conditions of the Order of Award issued in his favor for lots covered thereby. Petitioner, the Regional Director of DAR, Antonio M. Nuesa, promulgated an Order cancelling the order of award in favor or Jose Verdillo. The DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, however, chose to resolve the case on the merits and promulgated a Decision reversing the Order of the Regional Director. Issue: Whether or not the Board (DARAB) acted in grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of its jurisdiction. Held: P.D. 946 provides that matters involving the administrative implementation of the transfer of the land to the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27 and amendatory and related decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations, shall be exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, including: xxx (5) issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer in cases outside the purview of P.D. No. 816. The revocation by the Regional Director of DAR of the earlier Order of Award by the Secretary of Agriculture falls under the administrative functions of the DAR. The DARAB and its provincial adjudicator or board of adjudicators acted erroneously and with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the case, then overturning the decision of the DAR Regional Director and deciding the case on the merits without affording the petitioner opportunity to present his case. As held by this Court in Centeno vs. Centeno, the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. The DARAB has primary, srcinal and appellate jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Under Section 3(d) of R.A. 6657 (CARP Law), agrarian dispute is defined to include (d) ...any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent had no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy between them within the ambit of the abovecited provision. Consequently, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the controversy and

should not have taken cognizance of private respondents petition in the first place. Note that Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1990, governs the distribution and titling of lots in landed estates administered by the DAR. This Order explicitly provides that since land has a social function, there is a concomitant social responsibility in its ownership and should, therefore, be distributed to the actual occupant/tillers thereof. In the investigation on December 27, 1993, conducted by the Regional Officer of DAR, it was established that the subject lots were in the possession and cultivation of persons other than the awardee Verdillo. Clearly, this constituted a violation of the terms of the Order of Award issued in favor of private respondent as an awardee, aside from contravening the underlying principles of agrarian reform as a social justice measure. Given these circumstances, we find petitioner Restituto Riveras plea to overturn the ruling of the Court of Appeals meritorious. While it bears emphasizing that findings of administrative agencies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts, care should be taken that administrative actions are not done without due regard to the jurisdictional boundaries set by the enabling law for each agency. In this case, respondent DARAB officials and boards, provincial and central, had overstepped their legal boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy between petitioner Rivera and private respondent Verdillo as to who should be awarded Lots 1932 and 1904 of the Buenavista Estate. Respondent appellate court erred in sustaining DARABs unjustified action taken with grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or excess of its jurisdiction.

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK vs COURT OF APPEALS, DAR Secretary, DARAB – Davao City, and Land Bank of the Philippines G.R. No. 132767 / 322 SCRA 139 January 18, 2000 Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Facts: -

Petitioner owns 4 parcels of land in Tagum, Davao. The same were taken by the DAR for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to R.A. No. 6657. Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land made by respondent LBP and DARAB – Davao, petitioner filed a petition for a determination of just compensation for its property with the RTC-Davao.

RTC-Davao: Petition DISMISSED. The court dismissed the petition (actually an appeal from the DARAB decision determining the valuation of the land) for being filed out of time. o Section 51 of R.A. No. 6657 states that:  Any case or controversy before the DAR shall be decided within 30 days after it is submitted for resolution. Only one Motion for Reconsideration shall be allowed. Any order, ruling, or decision shall be final after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of a copy thereof. CA: RTC decision AFFIRMED.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello -

The CA ruled that jurisdiction over land valuation cases belongs to the DARAB, as provided for in Rule II of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure.

ISSUE: Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction over actions for fixing just compensation. SC: CA decision AFFIRMED. R.A. No. 6657 provides: o Sec. 50. Quasi-Judicial Power of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive srcinal jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); o Sec. 57. Special Jurisdiction. - The Special Agrarian Courts shall have srcinal and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act. The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision. There is nothing in contradictory between: o The provision of Sec. 50 granting the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate “agrarian reform matters” and exclusive srcinal jurisdiction over “all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform”, including determination of just compensation, and; Sec. 57 granting RTCs “srcinal and exclusive jurisdiction” over all o petitions for determination of just compensation to landowner and prosecutions of criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657. o Sec. 50 refers toadministrative proceedings, while Sec. 57 refers to judicial proceedings. Under R.A. No. 6657, the Land Bank is charged with the preliminary determination of value of lands under the land reform program, and the compensation to be paid. o In the event the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held by the PARAD (provincial), RARAD (regional), or the DARAB (central) adjudicator, as the case may be. To implement Sec. 50, Rule XIII, 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure states: o Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. - The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.  This rule is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the power but to decide just compensation cases is vested in the courts, the primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an

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administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts. As the petition in the RTC was filed out of time, the trial court correctly dismissed the case and the CA correctly affirmed the order.

LBP v. Suntay FACTS: Federico Suntay (married to Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay), herein respondent, represented by his assignee, Josefina Lubrica, is the registered owner of a parcel of land hectares in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro. In 1972, the DAR, pursuant to PD 27 expropriated 948.1911 hectares of respondent's property. The portion expropriated consisted mostly of lowland and non-irrigated riceland. LBP and the DAR fixed the value of the expropriated land at P4,251,141.68 or P4,497.50 per hectare. Respondent rejected petitioner's valuation as being unconscionably low and tantamount to taking his property without due process. He then filed with the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD), Region IV, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), a petition for the determination of just compensation against petitioner and the DAR. On January 24, 2001, after conducting summary administrative proceedings, the RARAD rendered a Decision fixing the just compensation for the expropriated land at P157,541,951.30 and directing petitioner to pay respondent the said amount. On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, a Petition for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation against respondent and the RARAD and prayed that the just compensation for respondent's expropriated land be fixed at P4,251,141.67 only. ISSUE: whether the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Bank's petition for the determination of just compensation HELD: YES. The Land Bank is charged with the responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking under the voluntary offer to sell or compulsory acquisition arrangement. The DAR, relying on the Land Bank's determination of the land valuation and compensation, then makes an offer through a notice sent to the landowner. If the landowner accepts the offer, the Land Bank shall pay him the purchase price of the land after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the government. In case the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR adjudicator conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the Land Bank and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land. A party who disagrees with the Decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Agrarian Court for the determination of just compensation. In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657. It is clear that the RTC treated the petition for the determination of just compensation as an appeal from the RARAD Decision in DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00. In dismissing the petition for being filed out of time, the RTC relied on Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure which provides: Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. – The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board [Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)] but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. The RTC erred in dismissing the Land Bank's petition. It bears stressing that the petition not is an appeal from the RARAD final Decision but ansrcinal action for the determination of the just compensation for respondent's expropriated property, over which the RTC has srcinal and exclusive jurisdiction. This is clear from Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 which provides: Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Courts [the designated Regional Trial Courts] shall havesrcinal and exclusive jurisdiction overall petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act. The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision. Section 50 must be construed in harmony with Section 57 by considering cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred upon the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain and over criminal cases. Valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies.

LBP v. Martinez FACTS: After compulsory acquisition by the DAR of respondent Martinez’s 62.5369-hectare land in Barangay Agpudlos, San Andres, Romblon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered ₱1,955,485.60 as just compensation. Convinced that the proffered amount was unjust and confiscatory, respondent rejected it. DARAB conducted summary administrative proceedings for the preliminary determination of just compensation.

PARAD Sorita, finding some marked inconsistencies in the figures and factors made as bases by LBP in its computation and ordered the DAR to pay Php12,179,492.50 instead. A petition for filed by LBP’s the fixing of just compensation docketed as Agrarian Case No. 696 was n the counsel before the Special Agrarian Court (SAC), the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 82. After filing her answer to the said petition, respondent, contending that the orders, rulings and decisions of the DARAB become final after the lapse of 15 days from their receipt, moved for the dismissal of the petition for being filed out of time. Petitioner opposed the motion. ISSUE: whether or not petitioner could file its appeal solely through its legal department HELD: NO. The Court reiterates its ruling in this case that the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules. The petition for the fixing of just compensation should therefore, following the law and settled jurisprudence, be filed with the SAC within the said period. Formerly, the court ruled that the trial court correctly dismissed the petition for the fixing of just compensation because it was filed beyond the 15-day period provided in the DARAB Rules. This ruling, however, as correctly pointed out by petitioner, runs counter to the Co urt’s recent decision in Suntay [the motions for reconsideration in Suntay were denied with finality in the January 30, 2008 Resolution of the Court, in which the Court ruled that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition for determination of just compensation on the ground that it was filed out of time. The Court in that case stressed that the petition was not an appeal from the adjudicator’s final decision but an srcinal action for the determination of just compensation. We, however, promulgated our decision in this case ahead of Suntay. To reiterate, this case was decided on August 14, 2007, while Suntay was decided two months later, or on October 11, 2007. Suntay should have then remained consistent with our ruling, and with the doctrines enunciated in Philippine Veterans Bank and in Lubrica, especially considering that Lubrica was the representative of Suntay in the Suntay case. The Court notes that the Suntay ruling is based on Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, decided in 1996 also through the pen of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza. In that case, the Court emphasized that the jurisdiction of the SAC is srcinal and exclusive, not appellate. Republic, however, was decided at a time when Rule XIII, Section 11 was not yet present in the DARAB Rules. Further, Republic did not discuss whether the petition filed therein for the fixing of just compensation was filed out of time or not. The Court merely decided the issue of whether cases involving just compensation should first be appealed to the DARAB before the landowner can resort to the SAC under Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657. To resolve the conflict in the rulings of the Court, we now declare herein, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, that the better rule is that stated in Philippine Veterans Bank, reiterated in Lubrica and in the August 14, 2007 Decision in this case. Thus, while a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision but an srcinal action, the same has to be filed within the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules; otherwise, the adjudicator’s decision will attain finality. This rule is not only in

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello accord with law and settled jurisprudence but also with the principles of justice and equity. Verily, a belated petition before the SAC, e.g., one filed a month, or a year, or even a decade after the land valuation of the DAR adjudicator, must not leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of uncertainty as to the true value of his property.

Ros, et al. vs DAR, et al. G.R. No. 132477, August 31, 2005 FACTS: Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land. By virtue of a Municipal Ordinance, these lands were reclassified as industrial lands. As part of their preparation for the development of the subject lands as an industrial park, petitioners secured all the necessary permits and appropriate government certifications. However, the DAR disallowed the conversion of the subject lands for industrial use and directed the petitioners to cease and desist from further developments on the land. Petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for Injunction with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.However, the RTC, ruling that it isthe DAR which has jurisdiction, dismissed the complaint.

Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 6657 provides: SEC. 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference.– No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program. NOTE: Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, where it was held that reclassification of land does not suffice In the case at bar, there is no final order of conversion. The subject landholding was merely reclassified. Conversion is different from reclassification. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion. Accordingly, a mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use and thus cause the ejectment of the tenants. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes.

When the case was brought to the SC, it was referred to the CA. However, the CA affirmed the dismissal of the case. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the DAR has the primary jurisdiction over the case. After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to “approve or disapprove applications for conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into nonagricultural uses,”

pursuant to Section 4(i) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987. Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, likewise empowers the DAR to authorize under certain conditions, the reclassification or conversion of agricultural lands. It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in the DAR, the complaint for injunction was correctly dismissed by the trial and appellate courts under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). 2. Whether or not the RTC can issue a writ of injunction against the DAR.

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA), vs. THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM G.R. No. 183409 June 18, 2010 FACTS: The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97,3 entitled "Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to NonAgricultural Uses," which consolidated all existing implementing guidelines related to land use conversion. The aforesaid rules embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988. Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 01-99, entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Nonagricultural Uses," amending and updating the previous rules on land use conversion. Its coverage includes the following agricultural lands, to wit: (1) those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond ─ the effect of which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other nonagricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello

Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled "2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion," which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to nonagricultural uses or to another agricultural use. To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications. By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of housing projects, which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the whole nation. ISSUE: WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION OVER LANDS THAT HAVE BEEN RECLASSIFIED AS RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, OR FOR OTHER NONAGRICULTURAL USES. HELD: Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" have been included in the definition of agricultural lands. In so doing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely acted within the scope of his authority stated in the aforesaid sections of Executive Order No. 129-A, which is to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian reform implementation and that includes the authority to define agricultural lands for purposes of land use conversion. Further, the definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers to the category of agricultural lands that may be the subject for conversion to non-agricultural uses and is not in any way confined to agricultural lands in the context of land redistribution as provided for under Republic Act No. 6657.

longer require any DAR conversion clearance or authority. Thereafter, reclassification of agricultural lands is already subject to DAR’s conversion authority. Reclassificatio n alone will not suffice to use the agricultural lands for other purposes. Conversion is needed to change the current use of reclassified agricultural lands.It bears stressing that the act of reclassifying agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses simply specifies how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses and does not automatically convert agricultural lands to nonagricultural uses or for other purposes.

Fortich vs. Corona G.R. No. 131457 | August 19, 1999 | Ynares-Santiago, J. Petitioners: Carlos Fortich (Governor of Bukidnon), Rey Baula (Mayor of Sumilao, Bukidnon), NQSR Management and Development Corporation Respondents: Deputy Executive Secretary Renato Corona, Agrarian Reform Secretary Ernesto Garilao Facts: On October 1997, alleged farmer-beneficiaries commenced a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City. They protested the decision of the Office of the President (OP) dated March 29, 1996 which approved the conversion of a 144hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. This decision already became final and executory. The land is located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by NQSRMDC (Norberto Quisumbing Sr. Management and Development Corp). It was leased as a pineapple plantation to Del Monte. The Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon became interested in the property, and enacted an ordinance converting the said land to industrial/institutional with a view to attract investors in order to achieve economic vitality.

More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which Opinion has been recognized in many cases decided by this Court, clarified that after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 the DAR has been given the authority to approve land conversion. Concomitant to such authority, therefore, is the authority to include in the definition of agricultural lands "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other nonagricultural uses before 15 June 1988" for purposes of land use conversion.

Apparently, land conversion issues need to go through the Department of Agrarian Reform. The DAR rejected the land conversion and instead opted to put the same under CARP and ordered the distribution of the property to the farmers. The case reached the Office of the President (OP). The OP rendered a decision reversing the DAR and converting the land to agro-indusrial area, which became the subject of the strike of the farmers.

It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and conversion that agricultural lands though reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial or other nonagricultural uses must still undergo the process of conversion before they can be used for the purpose to which they are intended.

The hunger strike was dramatic and well-publicized which commanded nationwide attention that even church leaders and some presidential candidates tried to intervene for their “cause”.

Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DAR’s conversion authority can only be

exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988. The said date served as the cut-off period for automatic reclassification or rezoning of agricultural lands that no

These events led the OP, through then Deputy Exec. Sec. Corona, to issue the called so- “WinWin” Resolution, substantially modify ing its earlier Decision (see decision dated March 29, 1996) after it had already become final and executory.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello It modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries. The Supreme Court, in their decision dated April 24, 1998, ruled for Fortich and company and declared that the “Win-Win” Resolution is VOID and of no legal effect considerin g that the March 29, 1996 resolution of the OP already became final and executory. Aggrieved, respondents Corona and Garilao filed [separate] motions for reconsideration for the said ruling (separate MRs were filed but was resolved by the Court through one resolution). The Court, in their Resolution dated Nov. 17, 1998, voted TWO-TWO on the separate MRs filed by Corona and Garilao assailing the April 24, 1998 Decision. Hence, the instant motion. The respondents pray that this case be referred to the Court en banc. They contend that inasmuch as their earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision dated April 24, 1998) were resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision, i.e., three, was not met.Consequently, the case should be referred to and be decided by this Court en banc, relying on the following constitutional provision: o Art. 8, Sec. 4 (3) - Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc. Issue/Held: Whether or not the aforementioned resolution of the Court (the resolution addressing the MR, wherein the justices voted 2-2) should be referred to the Court en banc. Held: NO. Ratio: • A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the intention of the framers to draw a distinction between CASES and MATTERS. o CASES are “decided”. MATTERS, which include motions, are “resolved”. o • Otherwise put, the word “decided” must refer to “ cases”; while the word “resolved” must refer to “matters”, applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis. o This is true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions of the Constitution where these words appear. • With the aforesaid rule of constructionin mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. • Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not obtained inthe resolution of a motion forreconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of “case” and not “matter”. • The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a division.If there is a tie inthe voting, there is no decision.The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc.

o On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. • Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998. • Respondents further argue that the issues submitted in their separate motions for reconsideration are of first impression. They are arguing that the local government unit concerned still needs to obtain the approval of DAR when converting land. However, this was rebutted in the resolution dated November 17, wherein it was expressed that: “Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no o extraordinary import to merit the attention of the Court en banc. In the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of Appeals wherein we held that local government units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to nonagricultural use.” o The Court voted unanimously in that case, hence, the argument of the petitioners that their MRs are motions involving first impression is flawed. • Moreover, a second motion for reconsideration is generally prohibited, unless there is a showing of extraordinary persuasive reasons and a leave of court is filed. In this case, there was none. • Remember that the Court, in its Decision, upheld the March 29, 1996 ruling of the OP because it was already final and executory thus the Win-Win resolution cannot be implemented anymore? Well, because of this, there was a litany of protestations on the part of respondents and intervenors including entreaties for a liberal interpretation of the rules. The sentiment was that notwithstanding its importance and far-reaching effects, the case was “disposed of on a mere technicality”. o The Court however said that it was not a “mere technicality” because the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly vested appurtenant rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be benefited by the development of the property. • Lastly, the Court determines whether or not the farmer-intervenors have standing to intervene in this case. The Court said there was none, because the source of their “standing to file” is the “Win -Win Resolution” o Why was there no standing on the part of the farmer-intervenors who derived their rights from the Win-Win resolution? The issuance of the Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to them does not grant them the requisite standing in view of the nullity of the “WinWin” Resolution. No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and void.

Reynaldo CHUA, doing business under the name & style Prime Mover Construction Development vs The COURT OF APPEALS, Social Security System, Andres Paguio, et al. G.R. No. 125837 / 440 SCRA 121 October 6, 2004 Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello o

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On August 1985, private respondents filed a Petition with the Social Security Commission for SSS coverage and contributions against herein petitioner Chua, claiming that: o They were regular employees of Chua; o They were assigned by him in various construction projects continuously; o They were dismissed without justifiable grounds and without notice to them; o Chua did not report them to the SSS for compulsory coverage. Petitioner Chua filed his Answer, averring: o That private respondents had no cause of action against him; o That assuming they had any, they were barred by prescription and laches; o That private respondents were not regular employees, but merely project employees whose work had been fixed for a specific project. Hence, they were not entitled to coverage under the Social Security Act. The SSS filed a Petition in Intervention, alleging that it has an interest in the petition filed by private respondents. It stated that it is a mandatory obligation of every employer to report its employees to the SSS for coverage and to remit the required contribution, including penalties for late premium remittances.

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SSC: Order in favor of RESPONDENTS. The SSC declared private respondents to be regular employees of petitioner, and ordered the payment of the unpaid SSS contributions plus penalties.

Despite petitioner’s contentions, the CA correctly held that private

respondents were regular employees.  They were employed as masons, carpenters, and fine graders in petitioner’s various construction projects.  The work they performed werenecessary and desirable to petitioner’s business, which usually involves the construction of roads and bridges.  Moreover, employment ceases to be co-terminus with various projects when the employee iscontinuously rehired due to the demands of the employer’s business, and reengaged for many more projectswithout interruption. Regardless of the nature of their employment, whether it is regular or project, private respondents are subject of the compulsory coverage under the SSS Law, their employment not falling under the exceptions provided for by law (Sec. 8.j). Private respondents’ right to file their claim had not yet prescribed at the time of filing, considering that a mere 8 years had passed from the time delinquency was discovered, or the proper assessment was made. o Under R.A. 1161, as amended, the prescriptive period 20 is years. The principle of‘laches’ does not apply to private respondents. o The principle ordains that failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained amount of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. o In the instant case, there was no proof that private respondents failed or neglected to assert their right.

CA: SSC order AFFIRMED. Issue: Whether or not private respondents were regular employees of petitioner, and therefore should be included in the SSS coverage. SC: Petition DENIED. CA decision AFFIRMED. It is clear that private respondents are employees of petitioner, the latter having control over the results of the work done, as well as the means and methods by which the same were accomplished. o Petitioner himself admitted that they worked in his construction projects, although the period of their employment was co-terminus with their phase of work. o The existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties can be determined by the application of the control test. The essential requisites of an employer-employee relationship are as follows:  Selection and Engagement of the Employee;  Payment of Wages;  Power of Dismissal;  Power of Control, with regard to the means and methods by is the most which the work is to be accomplished this ( determinative factor).

Social Security System (SSS) vs Rosanna Aguas, et al. G.R No. 165546 / 483 SCRA 383 February 27, 2006 Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. Facts: -

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Pablo Aguas, a member of the SSS and a pensioner, died on December 1996. He was survived by herein respondents, who filed a claim for death benefits. The claim for monthly pension was settled on February 1997. Shortly after, on April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter from one Leticia AguasMacapinlac, Pablo’s sister, contesting respondent’s claim for death benefits, where she alleged the following: o Rosanna abandoned the family home more than 6 years before; o Rosanna lived with another man on whom she had been dependent for support; o Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna, but the latter had several with a certain Romeo dela Pena.  Enclosed was notarized copy of the srcinal birth certificate of one Jefren dela Pena, showing that he was born on

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello

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November 1996, and that the parents were Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela Pena, and that both ‘parents’ were married on November 1, 1990. SSS then suspended payments of Rosanna’s monthly pensions, and conducted an investigation to verify Leticia’s allegations. Upon investigation, the SSS found: o Rosanna had no children with Pablo; Jeylnn and Jefren were Rosanna’s children with Romeo; o o Rosanna left Pablo 6 years before his death, and lived with Romeo while she was pregnant with Jeylnn; o Pablo was not capable of having a child since he was under treatment (infertile). SSS denied respondent’s request to resume payment of pensions, and advised the same to refund within 30 days P10, 350.00, the amount released to her as pensions. Respondents filed with the Social Security Commission (SSC) a claim/petition for Restoration/Payment of Pensions, where they presented photocopies of: Pablo and Rosanna’s marriage certificate; o Janet’s certificate of live birth; o Jeylnn’s certificate of live birth; o o Pablo’s death certificate. Respondents claimed that Jeylnn was the legitimate child of Pablo, and asserted that Rosanna never left Pablo, and that they lived as husband and wife under one roof. The SSS also secured confirmation reports from civil registers confirming respondents’ allegations. Among the testimonies presented, it was found that Jeylnn was the legitimate child of Rosanna and Pablo, and that Janet was merely adopted. Jefren’s parentage was never cleared.

SSC: Petition DENIED. The SSS denied respondents’ claims and demanded a refund of the pensions previously paid out to Rosanna. It ruled that Rosanna was no longer a qualified beneficiary since she contracted marriage with Romeo during the subsistence of her marriage to Pablo. CA: SSC Order REVERSED. The CA relied on the birth certificates of Janet and Jeylnn showing that they were children of Pablo, and the same were binding upon the parties, including the SSS. The CA also found no evidence showing that Rosanna ceased to receive support from Pablo before his death. The CA also ruled that the alleged affair with Romeo dela Pena was not properly proven. And even if Rosanna was married to him, it would have been a void marriage. Issue: Whether or not respondents are entitled to SSS pensions. SC: Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. CA Decision AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Only Jeylnn Aguas is declared ENTITLED to benefits accruing from Pablo’s death.

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The following were defined under Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 735:  Death Benefits (Sec. 13) – Upon death of the covered employee, his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to basic monthly pension, and his dependents to the dependent’s pension.  Dependent (Sec. 8.e)– The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over 21 years of age, provided that he is congenitally incapacitated and incapable of self-support physically or mentally; thelegitimate spouse dependent for support upon the employee; and thelegitimate parents wholly dependent upon the covered employee for regular support.  Beneficiaries (Sec. 8.k) – The dependent spouse until he/she remarries, and the dependent children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries. Whoever claims entitlement to such benefits should establish his or her right by substantial evidence. As per the records,only Jeylnn sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension.  She submitted a photocopy of her birth certificate bearing the signature of Pablo. The same was authenticated by the Civil Registry, that she was born on October 1991. A birth certificate signed by the father is a competent evidence of paternity.  Given that the records show that Rosanna and Pablo were married in 197, and that their marriage subsisted until Pablo’s death in 1996, it was evident that Jeylnn was born during the marriage.  Leticia cannot impugn the legitimacy of Jeylnn since that right is strictly personal to the husband, and in some exceptional cases, the heirs.  The presumption of legitimacy cannot extend to Janet since her date of birth was not substantially proven. She, therefore, cannot claim for benefits.  The birth certificate she submitted was not verified in any way by the civil register. It is a mere photocopy which was not confirmed by the civil register.  Moreover, the witnesses were unanimous in saying that Janet was not the real child since her adoption by Rosanna and Pablo did not undergo any legal proceedings.  Rosana also cannot claim for benefits.  For the spouse to qualify as primary beneficiary, she must prove the following: o She is the legitimate spouse; and

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello o

She is dependent upon the member for support.

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Rosanna’s presentation of a verified marriage

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certificate merely established the fact that she was the legitimate spouse of Pablo,but it did not establish her dependency on him. A wife who is already separatedde facto from her husband cannot be said to be dependent for support upon the husband, unless otherwise proven.

Dycaico v. SSS G.R. No. 161357 November 30, 2005 Facts: Bonifacio Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980, and he named herein petitioner Elena Dycaico and their eight children as his beneficiaries. At the time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together with the benefit of marriage. In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and began to receive his monthly pension from SSS, and continued to receive the same until his deal on June6, 19, 1997. A few months prior to his death, Bonifacio married the petitioner on January 1997. Petitioner Elena filed an application for survivor’s pension, which was denied under Section 12 -

B(d) of RA 8282 or the Social Security law. This was because the primary beneficiaries as of the date of the retirement of the pensioner should be the ones entitled to receive the monthly pension. The fact that they had not been married at the time Bonifacio’s retirement meant that she could not be a primary beneficiary. Elena filed with the Social Security Commission (SSC) a petition that alleged that the denial of her survivors’ pension was unjustified, and that Bonifacio had designated her and their children as primary beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS-1. There was also no indication that only legitimate family members could be made beneficiaries, and that the SSS was bound to respect the designation. The SSC affirmed the denial of the claim, however. The SSC ruled that entitlement to the survivor’s pension in one’s capacity as primary beneficiary is premised on the legitimacy of the relationship with and dependency for support upon the deceased SSS member during their lifetime.

Issues: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the SSC wherein legitimacy of relationship is necessary in order for one to avail of the survivors’ pension as the primary beneficiary. Held: Yes, the Court of Appeals erred. The outright disqualification of Elena without her having had been given the opportunity to prove the fact that she was Bonifacio’s bona fide legal spouse is untenable. Retirement benefits are property interest of a retiree, and these employees have vested rights in the pension they are to receive. Thus, the dependent spouse of such employees are entitled to their survivorship pension under RA 8282. Section 12-B(d) of RA 8282 is VOID, violating the due process clause by depriving those surviving spouses of retired SSS members who contracted their marriages after the retirement of the later. These is clear and outright confiscation of benefits due to the same and they are deprived of their opportunity to be heard.

GSIS v. Zarate G.R. No. 170847 August 3, 2010 Facts: The deceased Henry Zarate was a Senior Fire Officer who died in a vehicular accident while on off-duty status. His wife, Felicitas filed a claim for death benefits wit hthe GSIS under PD 626, which was denied due to the fact that Henry had died from a cause that did not arise out of nor was in the course of his employment. Felicitas appealed the ruling to the ECC, which was dismissed. The ECC affirmed the findings that Henry’s death was not work-related and thus, not compensable. Henry had gone to La Union to visit his mother, and thus, was not in the actual performance of his duty as a fireman. CA: The Court ofAppeals reversed the decision of theECC. The court found that that therewas reasonable work connection in Henry’s death and that the policy of the late extends state insurance benefits to as many qualified employees as possible. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in granting the claim for death benefits of respondent Zarate under PD 626, despite the fact that the cause of Henry Zarate’s death did not arise out of or in the course of employment. Held: No, it did not.

titioner Elena’s petition, declaring that as the commonCA: The Court of Appeals dismissed pe law wife of Bonifacio at the time of his retirement, the designation done by the latter was void. Furthermore, none of their illegitimate children could qualify as primary beneficiaries, as all of them had reached the age of twenty-one (21) years old.

It is not disputed that Henry visited his mother because of her illness, and that he had asked his superior’s permission to do the same. However, this leave was granted on the condition that he returned the next day. The grant of death benefits is reasonable, due to the fact that he had died on his way back to his work station, in compliance with the timeline his superior gave him.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Henry should already be deemed en route to the performance of his duty when his accidental death occurred. He was on his way back to Manila in order to be on time and be ready for work the next day as Senior Fire Officer of the Pinagkaisahan Fire Substation in Cubao. He was traveling with his superiors’ permission and was complying with the condit ion that he return the next day. Under these facts, Henry was in the course of complying with his superiors order when he met his fatal accident.

(b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed within twenty-four (24) hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship.

Gatus v. SSS G.R. No. 174725 January 26, 2011

Gatus failed to submit substantial evidence, as required under PD 626, that might have shown he was entitled to the benefits he applied for.

Facts: Petitioner Gatus worked at the Central Azucarera de Tarlac and was a covered member of the SSS. He optionally retired from the same upon reaching 30 years of service on January 2002 at the age of 62 years old. Over the course of his retirement, he had been certified fit to work in 1975. In 1995, however, he had been diagnosed with Coronary Artery Disease (CAD), and his medical records showed him to be hypertensive for 10 years and a smoker. On account of hisCAD, he was given permanent partial disability benefits . In 2002, he became a retired pensioner. In 2003, however, an SSS audit revealed the need to recover the EC benefits already paid to Gatus due to his CAD being attributed to his chronic smoking and not his work. He was notified of the same.

Republic v. Asiapro Cooperative

Gatus assailed the decision, but the SSS denied the same, and subsequently denied his motion for reconsideration. He elevated the matter to the ECC, which held that though CAD was an occupational disease under Annex A of the Implementing Rules on Employees’ Compensation, there was nothing on record to establish the presence of the qualifying circumstances for responsibility. Gatus had failed to prove that the conditions at his former workplace and the nature of his previous employment increased the risk of contract his CAD. Thus, his appeal was denied. CA: The Court of Appeals held that Gatus was not entitled to compensation benefits under PD 626, affirming the ECC. It found that the petitioner, a chronic smoker and hypertensive for 10 years, could have contracted the CAD due to his habits. Issues: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Gatus was not entitled to compensation benefits despite the presence of an occupational disease (CAD). Held: No, the CA did not err. The burden of proof was on Gatus to show that his CAD was occupational by proving any of the following conditions: (a) If the heart disease was known tohave been present during employment there must be proof that an acute exacerbation clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work.

(c) If a person whowas apparently asymptomatic before subjecting himself to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship

FACTS: Respondent Asiapro, as a cooperative, is composed of owners-members. Under its bylaws, owners-members are of two categories, to wit: (1) regular member, who is entitled to all the rights and privileges of membership; and (2) associate member, who has no right to vote and be voted upon and shall be entitled only to such rights and privileges provided in its bylaws. Its primary objectives are to provide savings and credit facilities and to develop other livelihood services for its owners-members. In the discharge of the aforesaid primary objectives, respondent cooperative entered into several Service Contracts with Stanfilco - a division of DOLE Philippines, Inc. The owners-members do not receive compensation or wages from the respondent cooperative. Instead, they receive a share in the service surplus which the respondent cooperative earns from different areas of trade it engages in, such as the income derived from the said Service Contracts with Stanfilco. The owners-members get their income from the service surplus generated by the quality and amount of services they rendered, which is determined by the Board of Directors of the respondent cooperative. In September 2006, petitioner SSS sent a letter to the respondent cooperative, addressed to its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and General Manager Leo G. Parma, informing the latter that based on the Service Contracts it executed with Stanfilco, respondent cooperative is actually a manpower contractor supplying employees to Stanfilco and for that reason, it is an employer of its owners-members working with Stanfilco. Thus, respondent cooperative should register itself with petitioner SSS as an employer and make the corresponding report and remittance of premium contributions in accordance with the Social Security Law of 1997. Petitioners claim that SSC has jurisdiction over the petition-complaint filed before it by petitioner SSS as it involved an issue of whether or not a worker is entitled to compulsory coverage under the SSS Law. Petitioners contend that there is an employer-employee relationship between the respondent cooperative and its owners-members. The respondent cooperative is the employer of its owners-members considering that it undertook to provide services to Stanfilco, the performance of which is under the full and sole control of the respondent cooperative. Respondent cooperative alleges that its owners-members own the cooperative, thus, no employer-employee relationship can arise between them. The persons of the employer and the employee are merged in the owners-members themselves. Likewise, respondent

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello cooperatives owners-members even requested the respondent cooperative to register them with the petitioner SSS as self-employed individuals. Hence, petitioner SSC has no jurisdiction over the petition-complaint filed before it by petitioner SSS. ISSUE: whether the social security c ommission has jurisdiction HELD: Yes. since the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the respondent cooperative and its owners-members was put in issue and considering that the compulsory coverage of the SSS Law is predicated on the existence of such relationship, it behooves the petitioner SSC to determine if there is really an employer-employee relationship that exists between the respondent cooperative and its owners-members. The question on the existence of an employer-employee relationship is not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Article 217 of the Labor Code enumerating the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC provides that: ART. 217. JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS AND THE COMMISSION. - (a) x x x. xxxx 6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. Hence, the question on the existence of an employer-employee relationship for the purpose of determining the coverage of the Social Security System is explicitly excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC and falls within the jurisdiction of the SSC which is primarily charged with the duty of settling disputes arising under the Social Security Law of 1997. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following elements are considered: (1) the selection and engagement of the workers; (2) the payment of wages by whatever means; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the worker's conduct, with the latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration. The most important element is the employer's control of the employee's conduct, not only as to the result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish. All the aforesaid elements are present in this case. It is true that the Service Contracts executed between the respondent cooperative and Stanfilco expressly provide that there shall be no employer-employee relationship between the respondent cooperative and its owners-members. This Court, however, cannot give the said provision force and effect. First. It is expressly provided in the Service Contracts that it is the respondent cooperative which has the exclusive discretion in the selection and engagement of the owners-members as well as its team leaders who will be assigned at Stanfilco. Second. Wages are defined as remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained, on a time, task, piece or

commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for service rendered or to be rendered. In this case, the weekly stipends or the socalled shares in the service surplus given by the respondent cooperative to its owners-members were in reality wages, as the same were equivalent to an amount not lower than that prescribed by existing labor laws, rules and regulations, including the wage order applicable to the area and industry; or the same shall not be lower than the prevailing rates of wages. It cannot be doubted then that those stipends or shares in the service surplus are indeed wages, because these are given to the owners-members as compensation in rendering services to respondent cooperatives client, Stanfilco. Third. It is also stated in the above-mentioned Service Contracts that it is the respondent cooperative which has the power to investigate, discipline and remove the owners-members and its team leaders who were rendering services at Stanfilco. Fourth. As earlier opined, of the four elements of the employer-employee relationship, the control test is the most important. In the case at bar, it is the respondent cooperative which has the sole control over the manner and means of performing the services under the Service Contracts with Stanfilco as well as the means and methods of work. Also, the respondent cooperative is solely and entirely responsible for its owners-members, team leaders and other representatives at Stanfilco. All these clearly prove that, indeed, there is an employeremployee relationship between the respondent cooperative and its owners-members.

Bunao vs. SSS FACTS: Artus E. Bunao (Artus), husband of petitioner, was employed by Ocean Tanker Corporation as an acting Second Marine Engineer on board the vessels M/T Palawan, M/T Guimaras and M/T Buenavista from 20 July 1995 until 06 August 1999. Per Job Description from Ocean Tanker Corporation, Artus was tasked with the duties enumerated hereunder: 1. Plans and implements properoperation, maintenance andrepairs of all deck and engine room machinery and equipment subject to the approval of the Chief Engineer. 2. Conducts routine check-up of all engine room machinery and advises Chief Engineer regarding malfunctions and operational defects particularly with regard to critical vessel operations relating to safety or pollution as detailed in the Shipboard Management Manual and recommends subsequent repairs needed. 3. Accomplishes monthlyreports on all engine operational performance,maintenance and repairs conducted on all machinery. 4. Conducts meetingsand submitsconfidential andother writtenreports uponthe discretion of the Chief Engineer. 5. Keeps log of performance of other machinery andconscientiously maintainsonboard engine room maintenance and operational records and furnishes same to Chief Engineer for inclusion in vessel machinery records and reports. 6. Ensures theupkeep andmaintenance ofthe Engine Roomby arranging, monitoring and controlling day to day engine room maintenance activities in coordination with Chief Engineer. 7. Ensures thesmooth operation ofthe vessel main and auxiliary machinery.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello 8. Transfers and/or fills upfuel oil and lube oil settling anddry tanks, ifnecessary. 9. Sees to it that work is carried out safely and efficiently, andin accordance with good engineering and work practices at all times. 10. Assumes engineering watch in port or underway. 11. Acts as the Chief Engineer in his absence. 12. Performs other duties as may be assigned. On 23 September 1999, Artus was rushed to the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, because of body weakness. The diagnostic procedures revealed an impression of Renal Cell Cancer with Liver Metastasis. He was later discharged. On 15 October 1999, the occurrence of Artuss sickness was reported to the Social Security System. On 14 November 1999, Artus was again admitted at the same hospital due to loose bowel movement and body weakness. He was discharged after two days. Artus died on 29 November 1999. According to the certificate of death, the cause of death was Hepatic Encephalopathy, Renal Cell Cancer. Petitioner filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626, as amended, before the SSS. The SSS, however, denied the claim on the ground that her husband’s ailment, which caused his death, is not included in the list of occupational diseases, and that the same has no causal relationship with the nature of her husband’s work.

substantial evidence, the causal relationship between her husband's illness and his working conditions. Petitioner alleged that in the performance of her husband's duties as 2nd Marine Engineer, the latter was exposed to leaded petrol and petroleum products that contain various chemicals like hydrogen, benzene and lead which are health hazards because of their carcinogenicity. She claims that most of these chemicals precipitate kidney disease, kidney cancer and liver cancer. Unfortunately, such bare allegations and vague excerpts on cancer do not constitute such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion that there is indeed a causal relationship between the illness of the deceased and his working conditions. Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions. There is no showing that the progression of the disease was brought about largely by the condition. Petitioner did not present medical history, records or physician's report in order to substantiate her claim that the working conditions on board the vessels M/T Palawan, M/T Guimaras and M/T Buenavista increased the risk of contracting renal cell cancer. Certainly, cancer is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person's employment appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the deep bowels of the earth. It makes no difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.

The Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), upon appeal, affirmed the SSS decision. Petitioner maintains that that the risk of contracting the fatal ailment that resulted in Artuss death was increased by the working environs to which the latter was exposed as 2nd Marine Engineer in Ocean Tanker Corporation from 20 July 1995 to 06 August 1999. She concluded that the renal cell cancer which caused Artuss demise developed and was brought largely by the conditions present in the nature of his job. The SSS, on the other hand, mainly argues that Artuss ailment is not included in the list of occupational diseases and that petitioner failed to submit proof that would constitute a reasonable basis for concluding either that the condition of Artuss employment and nature of work caused the disease or that such working conditions aggravated the risk of contracting the same. ISSUE: whether petitioner is entitled to c ompensation benefits under PD 626 HELD: NO. For the beneficiaries of an employee to be entitled to death benefits under the system, the cause of death of the employee must be a sickness listed as an occupational disease by ECC; or any other illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions. There is no dispute that renal cell cancer is not listed as an occupational disease under Annex A of the Rules on Employees Compensation. As such, petitioner has the burden of proving, by

GSIS v. Angel G.R. No. 166863 FACTS: On 3 March 1998, Sgt. Angel was invited from his post by a certain Capt. Fabie M. Lamerez to shed light on his alleged involvement in a "pilferage/gunrunning" case being investigated by the Philippine Army. He was placed inside a detention cell to await further investigation. The following day, the lifeless body of Sgt. Angel was found hanging inside his cell with an electric cord tied around his neck. Respondent, the wife of the late Sgt. Angel, filed a complaint before the PNP Criminal Investigation Command, alleging that her husband was murdered. On 8 April 1998, upon investigation, The Provost Marshal concluded that foul play may have been committed against Sgt. Angel and recommended that the case be tried by a court martial. On 25 April 1998, the Inspector General, upon referral of the case, held that there is no evidence suggesting foul play. It could have triggered a mental block that caused him to hang himself. On 3 December 1999, Judge Advocate General Honorio Capulong in his report recommended that Sgt. Angel be declared to have died in line of duty. By reason thereof, respondent, as widow of Sgt. Angel, filed a claim for death benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. On 29 September 1999, the GSIS denied the respondent’s claim on the ground that Sgt. Angel’s death did not arise out of and in the course of employment.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello

ECC Ruled in favour of GSIS - the deceased was not performing his official duties at the time of the incident. CA: REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the GSIS ORDERED to pay the death benefits due the petitioner as widow of Sgt. Angel The soldier on active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, seven (7) days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status. Thus, a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by going on an approved vacation leave. ISSUE: WON the declaration by the Philippine Army that the death of Sgt. Angel was "in line of duty status" confers compensability under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626 otherwise known as "Employees’ Compensation and State Insurance Fund. SC: Pertinent jurisprudence outline that the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following: 1) the employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; 2) the employee must have been performing his official functions; and 3) if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer. It is important to note, however, that the requirement that the injury must arise out of and in the course of employment proceeds from the limiting premise that the injury must be the result of an accident. An accident is an event which happens without any human agency or, if happening through human agency, an event which, under the circumstances, is unusual to and not expected by the person to whom it happens. It has also been defined as an injury which happens by reason of some violence or casualty to the insured without his design, consent, or voluntary cooperation.

pilferage/gunrunning case when he was found dead in his cell, an activity which is foreign and unrelated to his employment as a soldier. Thus, the protective mantle of the law cannot be extended to him as the documents appear bereft of any showing to justify causal connection between his death and his employment. Death in line of duty is not equivalent to a finding that the death resulted from an accident and was not occasioned by the sergeant’s willful intention to kill himself. It is not enoug h, as erroneously pointed out by the Court of Appeals, that there is evidence to support the conclusion that the sergeant died while in the performance of his duties since he was not arrested but was merely invited to shed light on the investigation which was "part of official duties to cooperate with the inquiry being conducted by the Philippine Army." There must be evidence that the sergeant did not take his own life considering the fact that he was "found hanging inside his cell with an electric cord tied around his neck." From what is extant in the records, though, we rule in favor of the positive finding that there is no evidence of foul play over the inference that foul play may have been committed. The circumstances of Sgt. Angel’s death – his lifeless body was found hanging inside his cell with an electric cord tied around his neck − taken together with the unrebutted finding that there is no evidence of foul play – negate respondent’s claim of murder of her husband and of compensability of such death. It was not accidental death that is covered by Presidential Decree No. 626.

GSIS v. Manuel Besitan G.R. No. 178901 FACTS: Respondent Besitan was employed by the Central Bank of the Philippines (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) on January 21, 1976 as a Bank Examiner.7 Subsequently, he was promoted as Bank Officer II and eventually as Bank Officer III. In October 2005, Besitan was diagnosed with End Stage Renal Disease secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis and thus, had to undergo a kidney transplant at the National Kidney and Transplant Institute (NKTI), for which he incurred medical expenses amounting to ₱817,455.40.

Art. 172. Limitation of liability– The State Insurance Fund shall be liable for compensation to the employee or his dependents, except when the disability or death was occasioned by the employee’s intoxication, willful intention to injure or kill himself or another, notorious negligence or otherwise provided under this title.

Believing that his working condition increased his risk of contracting the disease, Besitan filed with the GSIS a claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 626,11 as amended. The GSIS, however, denied the claim. The GSIS Decision was affirmed by the Employees Compensation Commission but reversed by the Court of Appeals.

With the law upon the facts, we conclude that the death of Sgt. Angel did not result from an accident which is compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626. It was on the contrary occasioned by an intentional or designed act which removes the resulting death from the coverage of the State Insurance Fund.

GSIS contends that Besitan’s ailment, Glo merulonephritis, is not an occupational disease;

Clearly the deceased was not performing his official duties at the time of the incident. On the contrary, he was being investigated regarding his alleged involvement on a

hence, it is incumbent upon him to prove that the risk of contracting the said disease was increased by his employment and working condition. And since he failed to show that there is a causal relationship between his employment and his ailment, he cannot claim compensation benefits under PD No. 626, as amended.

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello Besitan admits that his ailment is not listed as an occupational disease under PD No. 626, as amended. He, however, insists that he was able to prove by substantial evidence that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by his working condition. He maintains that in claiming compensation benefits, certainty is not required, only probability. He points outthat he was in good health when he was employed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas in 1976 and that it was only in 2004 that he contracted his kidney ailment. ISSUE: Whether Besitan is entitled to compensation benefits under PD No. 626, as amended HELD: Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation provides that for the sickness or resulting disability or death to be compensable, the claimant must prove either: A. that the employee's sickness was the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, or B. That the risk of contracting the disease was increased by his working conditions. Under the increased risk theory, there must be a reasonable proof that the employee’s working

condition increased his risk of contracting the disease, or that there is a connection between his work and the cause of the disease. Only a reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation, however, is required to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease. Probability, and not certainty, is the yardstick in compensation proceedings; thus, any doubt should be interpreted in favor of the employees for whom social legislations, like PD No. 626, were enacted. Moreover, direct and clear evidence, is not necessary to prove a claim. Strict rules of evidence do not apply as PD No. 626 only requires substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In this case, since Besitan’s ailment, End Stage Renal D isease secondary to Chronic

Glomerulonephritis is not among those listed under Annex "A," of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, he needs to show by substantial evidence that his risk of contracting the disease was increased by his working condition.

On 4 January 1985, Nicolas filed with the GSIS an application for retirement benefits effective 18 February 1985 under PD 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977. In his retirement application, Nicolas designated his wife Milagros as his sole beneficiary. Nicolas' last day of actual service was on 17 February 1985. On 31 January 1986, GSIS approved Nicolas application for retirement effective 17 February 1984, granting a lump sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a monthly annuity thereafter. Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146. On 8 June 1992, GSIS denied the claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of retirement on 17 February 1984. On 2 October 1992, Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for declaratory relief questioning the validity of Section 18 of PD 1146 disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension. Issue: Whether or not Section 18 of PD 1146 is valid insofar as it prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. Held: INVALID. The proviso which was the sole basis for the rejection by GSIS of Milagros claim, is unconstitutional because it violates the due process clause. The proviso is also discriminatory and denies equal protection of the law. Retirement Benefits as Property Interest

After a careful study of the instant case, we find that Besitan has sufficiently proved that his working condition increased his risk of contracting Glomerulonephritis, which according to GSIS may be caused by bacterial, viral, and parasitic infection (i.e. Typhoid fever, Syphilis, Leptospirosis, Toxoplasmosis, Varicella, Mumps, Measles, Schistosomiasis, Hepatitis B and C infection, etc.).

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Cebu City Branch, petitioner, vs. MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS, respondent. [G.R. No. 146494. July 14, 2004] Facts: Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros (Nicolas) married Milagros Orbiso (Milagros) on 10 July 1983. Nicolas was a 72- year old widower when he married Milagros who was then 43 years old.

Under Section 5 of PD 1146, it is mandatory for the government employee to pay monthly contributions. PD 1146 mandates the government to include in its annual appropriation the necessary amounts for its share of the contributions. It is compulsory on the government employer to take off and withhold from the employees monthly salaries their contributions and to remit the same to GSIS. The government employer must also remit its corresponding share to GSIS. Considering the mandatory salary deductions from the government employee, the government pensions do not constitute mere gratuity but form part of compensation. In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of employment. The reason for providing retirement benefits is to compensate service to the government. Retirement benefits to government employees are part of emolument to encourage and retain qualified employees in the government service. Retirement benefits to

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello government employees reward them for giving the best years of their lives in the service of their country. Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as provided under the terms of the public employees pension statute. No law can deprive such person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard. In addition to retirement and disability benefits, PD 1146 also provides for benefits to survivors of deceased government employees and pensioners. Under PD 1146, the dependent spouse is one of the beneficiaries of survivorship benefits. A widows right to receive pension following the demise of her husband is also part of the husbands contractual compensation. Denial of Due Process The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period. There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard. The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance benefits to government employees and their dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the government employees. PD 1146 has the following purposes: a. to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System;

The law extends survivorship benefits to the surviving and qualified beneficiaries of the deceased member or pensioner to cushion the beneficiaries against the adverse economic effects resulting from the death of the wage earner or pensioner. Violation of the Equal Protection Clause The surviving spouse of a government employee is entitled to receive survivors benefits under a pension system. However, statutes sometimes require that the spouse should have married the employee for a certain period before the employees death to prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary gain. A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another. The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the pensioners death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent deathbed marriages, then we do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits.

b. to guarantee to the government employee all the benefits due him; and c. to expand, increase, and improve the social security and insurance benefits made available to him and his dependents such as: increasing pension benefits

Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the reason Congress deleted the proviso in Republic Act No. 8291 (RA 8291), otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance Act of 1997, the law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD 1146). Under the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse who married the member immediately before the members death is still qualified to receive survivorship pension unless the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse contracted the marriage solely to receive the benefit.

expanding disability benefits introducing survivorship benefits introducing sickness income benefits extending compulsory membership to all government employees irrespective of status.

Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted within three years before retirement or death of a member are sham marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of the surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within three years before the members retirement or death. The law acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello law no longer prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, vs JEAN E. RAOET, Respondent. G.R. No. 157038 December 23, 2009 Facts: The respondents husband, Francisco M. Raoet entered government service on July 16, 1974 as an Engineer Trainee at the National Irrigation Administration (NIA). On July 5, 1978, he was appointed as Junior Civil Engineer, and on April 22, 1981, he rose to the rank of Irrigation Engineer B. On August 1, 1998, he was promoted to the position of Engineer A the position he held until his death on May 5, 2001. As Engineer A, Francisco supervised the implementation of construction activities of Lateral E and E-1. He was also tasked to review and check the structural plan and the facilities. In 2000, Francisco was diagnosed with Hypertension, Severe, Stage III, Coronary Artery Disease, and he was confined at the Region I Medical Center from July 16 to July 25, 2000. As the GSIS considered this a work-related condition, Francisco was awarded 30 days Temporary Total Disability benefits, plus reimbursement of medical expenses incurred during treatment. On May 5, 2001, Francisco was rushed to the Dr. Marcelo M. Chan Memorial Hospital because he was vomiting blood. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The respondent, as widow, filed with the GSIS on May 24, 2001 a claim for income benefits accruing from the death of her husband, pursuant to PD 626. On August 31, 2001, the GSIS denied the claim on the ground that the respondent did not submit any supporting documents to show that Franciscos death was due to peptic ulcer. On appeal, the ECC affirmed the findings of the GSIS in its decision of July 24, 2002. According to the ECC, it could not determine if Franciscos death was compensable due to the absence of documents supporting the respondents claim. Since Francisco had no prior history of consultation relating to peptic ulcer and no autopsy was performed to ascertain the cause of his death, the ECC could not conclude that Bleeding Peptic Ulcer Disease was the reason for his demise.

and pressures inherent in an occupation. This was what the GSIS acknowledged in recognizing Franciscos total temporary disability. Francisco worked as Engineer A with the NIA, a job with enormous responsibilities. He had to supervise the construction activities of Lateral E and E-1, and review the structural plan and facilities. The stresses these responsibilities carried did not abate for Francisco when he returned from his Temporary Total Disability; he occupied the same position without change of responsibilities until his death on May 5, 2001. Thus, Francisco had continuous exposure to prolonged emotional stress that would qualify his peptic ulcer a stress-driven ailment as a compensable cause of death. In arriving at this conclusion, we stress that in determining the compensability of an illness, we do not require that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development, or acceleration of a claimants illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment contributed, even if only in a small degree, to the development of the disease. It is well-settled that the degree of proof required under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmans claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection. Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone. It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of a claimants illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment contributed, even if to a small degree, to the development of the disease. In this case, the chain of causation that led to the peptic ulcer is too obvious to be disregarded. The pressures of Franciscos work constant, continuing and consistent at his level of responsibility inevitably manifested their physical effects on Franciscos health and body; the initial and most obvious were the hypertension and coronary artery disease that the GSIS itself recognized. Less obvious, but nevertheless arising from the same pressures and stresses, were the silent killers, like peptic ulcer, that might not have attracted Franciscos attention to the point of driving him to seek immediate and active medical intervention. Ultimately, when the ulcer-producing stresses did not end, his ulcer bled profusely, affecting his heart and causing its arrest. In this manner, Francisco died. That his widow should now be granted benefits for Franciscos death is a conclusion we cannot avoid and is, in fact, one that we should gladly make as a matter of law and social justice.

Issue: Did Franciscos occupation involve prolonged emotional or physical stress to make his death due to peptic ulcer compensable? Held: YES. Based on the GSIS own records, Francisco was diagnosed with Hypertension, Severe, Stage III, Coronary Artery Disease, and confined at the Region I Medical Center in July 2000. The GSIS found this ailment work-connected and awarded Francisco 30 days Temporary Total Disability benefits. This finding assumes importance in the present case because the established underlying causes of the combination of these diseases are, among others, the stressful nature

[G.R. No. 141707. May 7, 2002] CAYO G. GAMOGAMO, petitioner, vs. PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORP., respondent. FACTS: Herein petitioner was first employed for fourteen years with Department of Health after his resignation on November 2 1977. After which he was hired as company dentist by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LUSTEVECO), a private domestic corporation which was subsequently taken over by herein respondent PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation. Petitioner was

AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1 ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018) Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello among those who opted to be absorbed by the Respondent and continued to work as company dentist. Respondent implemented a Manpower Reduction Program, wherein retrenched employees shall receive a two-month pay for every year of service. Petitioner resigned from PNOC upon reaching 60 years old wherein he received a retirement pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service and other benefits. Later, the president of said company was replaced by Dr. Nemesio E. Prudente who implemented significant cost-saving measures and later two employees were retrenched and were paid a 2-month separation pay for every year of service under Respondents Manpower Reduction Program. Due to this, petitioner filed a complaint at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for the full payment of his retirement benefits wherein he argued that his service with the DOH should have been included in the computation of his years of service. The Labor Arbiters dismissed his complaint however, NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Respondent dismayed, filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari, and was granted. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s years of service with the DOH must be considered as creditable service for the purpose of computing his retirement pay. HELD: No. The Supreme Court did not uphold petitioners contention that his fourteen years of service with the DOH should be considered because his last two employers were government-owned and controlled corporations, and fall under the Civil Service Law. Article IX(B), Section 2 paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution states that-“Sec. 2. (1) T he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with srcinal charters. It is not at all disputed that while Respondent and LUSTEVECO are government-owned and controlled corporations, they have no srcinal charters; hence they are not under the Civil Service Law. In addition, petitioner also signed and delivered to Respondent a Release and Undertaking wherein he waives all actions, causes of actions, debts, dues, monies and accounts in connection with his employment with Respondent. This quitclaim releases Respondent from any other obligation in favor of petitioner. While quitclaims executed by employees are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and are ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the employee’s legal rights , there are legitimate waivers that represent a voluntary and reasonable settlement of laborers claims which should be respected by the courts as the law between the parties.