Divya.docx

FREEDOM OF SPEECH K. A. Abbas vs The Union Of India & Anr on 24 September, 1970 Equivalent citations: 1971 AIR 481, 1971 SCR (2) 446 Author: M Hidayatullah Bench: Hidayatullah, M. (Cj), Shelat, J.M., Mitter, G.K., Vaidyialingam, C.A., Ray, A.N. PETITIONER: K. A. ABBAS Vs. RESPONDENT: THE UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

Facts The petitioner was a journalist, playwright, writer and film producer. He produced a short film called A Tale of Four Cities, which depicted the contemporary realities of life in Bombay (present-day Mumbai), Calcutta (present-day Kolkata), Delhi and Madras (present-day Chennai). The film contrasted the luxurious lives of the rich with the squalor of poverty. He sought a U certificate from the Censor Board for unrestricted public viewing. For granting a U certificate, the Censor Board’s Examining Committee recommended a certificate that restricted public viewing to an audience of adults. This decision was confirmed by the Revising Committee. On appeal, the Central Government recommended a U certificate if a scene set in the red-light district was removed. The scene suggestively portrayed immoral trafficking, prostitution,and economic exploitation by pimps. The scene was considered unsuitable for children. The petitioner filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court, arguing that his right to freedom of expression was violated because, firstly, prior-censorship itself cannot be tolerated in freedom of speech and expression, and secondly, if any censorship is allowed, it must be on non-arbitrary grounds. The petitioner also asked for directions for a fixed time-limit for a decision of the Censor Board as well as an alternative appellate mechanism to approaching the Central Government; these were granted by the government and so were not discussed by the Supreme Court.

Decision Overview Chief Justice Hidayatullah delivered the Court’s opinion, on behalf of justices Shelat, Mitter, Vidyialingam and Ray. The Court did not accept the distinction between prior censorship and censorship in general and considered both to be governed by the standards of reasonable restrictions within Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution. The Constitution recognized that freedom of speech and expression was not an unrestricted right and therefore, reasonable restrictions could be imposed. The absence of the word ‘reasonable’ in the Cinematograph Act was considered inconclusive in this regard. Prior censorship was permitted under the Constitution for public order or tranquility. The Court referred to the guardianship role of the Courts as the legal protector of citizens in preserving public interest.

S. Rangarajan Etc vs P. Jagjivan Ram on 30 March, 1989 Equivalent citations: 1989 SCR (2) 204, 1989 SCC (2) 574 Author: K Shetty Bench: Shetty, K.J. (J) PETITIONER: S. RANGARAJAN ETC Vs. RESPONDENT: P. JAGJIVAN RAM

In an appeal before the Supreme Court the decision of the Madras High Court was challenged for revoking the ‘U-Certificate’ issued to a Tamil film called Ore Oru Gramathile (In One Village). As the film criticized the reservation policy of the Tamil Nadu Government, it was held that the reaction to the film in Tamil Nadu is

bound to be volatile[24]. But the Supreme Court overturned the High Court decision while upholding the freedom of speech and expression. In doing so, the Court did acknowledge to have a compromise between the interest of freedom of expression and social interests. However, it went on to observe that the anticipated danger should not be remote, conjectural or far fetched but have proximate and direct nexus with the expression and equivalent of a spark in a powder keg. The Court criticized the State and emphasized that freedom of expression cannot be suppressed on account of threat of demonstration and processions or threats of violence. It is the duty of the State to protect the freedom of expression since it is a liberty guaranteed against the State. The State cannot plead its inability to handle the hostile audience problem. (Emphasis added). As censorship is permitted only on the grounds under Article 19(2), the standard to be applied by the board or courts for judging the film should be that of an ordinary man of common sense and prudence and not that of an out of the ordinary or hypersensitive man.[25]

movie is the legitimate and the most important medium in which issues of general concern can be treated. Moreover, they are not openly screened for everyone. It is available to only those people who are willing to buy tickets, go to the theatres and watch them. Unwilling people can easily choose to stay away from the movies. The director or producer has a right to project his own messages which the others may not approve of. But that does not deter his right to ‘think out’ and give shape through his creations. ‘Free debate’ and ‘open discussion’ has been considered as an integral part of a democracy in both Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Rangarajan case [37]. Otherwise, democracy has no value and it is equivalent to a totalitarian regime.\ The standard to be applied by the Board or courts for judging the film should be that of an ordinary man of common sense and pru- dence and not .that of an out of the ordinary or hypersensi- tive man. We, however, wish to add a word more. The Censors Board should exercise considerable circumspection on movies affecting the morality or decency of our people and cultural heritage of the country. The moral values in

particular, should not be allowed to be sacrificed in the guise of social change or cultural assimi-LATION 1 the Supreme Court has clearly laid down, in the 1989 judgment in the case of S. Rangarajan v. Jagjivan Ram involving the film Ore Oru 1 https://indiankanoon.org/doc/341773/

Gramathile (which too dealt with the issue of reservation), that “freedom of expression cannot be suppressed on account of threat of demonstration and processions or threats of violence.” That, the court noted, would be tantamount to “negation of the rule of law and a surrender to blackmail and intimidation.” The competent authority for clearing a film for public release is the Central Board of Film Certification, and politicians and communal or sectarian pressure groups cannot arrogate to themselves the right to decide what films others should watch. Taking the easy or opportunist way out by banning a movie is anathema to any functioning democracy. 1989 judgment, “The producer may project his own message which the others may not approve of. But he has a right to ‘think out' and put the counterappeals to reason. It is a part of a democratic give-and-take to which no one could complain. The State cannot prevent open discussion and open expression, however hateful to its policies.” The real danger to the public interest springs not

from the public screening of the movie, but from state-imposed restrictions on freedom of expression on indefensible grounds PADMAVAT JUDGEMENT OF DIPAK MISHRA Freedom of speech and expression is sacrosanct and the right should not be ordinarily interfered with,” a three-judge bench led by Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra said. “The right of a filmmaker can’t be curtailed. Courts are to be extremely slow to pass any kind of restraint order in such a situation and should allow the respect that a creative man enjoys in writing a drama, a play, a book on philosophy, or any kind of thought that is expressed on the celluloid or theatre etc,” the bench sai .. Read more at: //economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/61679811.cms?utm_source=conte ntofinterest&utm_medium =text&utm_campaign=cppst

Various judgments of the Supreme Court have referred to the importance of freedom of speech and expression both from the point of view of the liberty of the individual and from the point of view of our democratic form of government. For instance, in the early case of Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras91 , the

Supreme Court stated that “freedom of speech lay at the foundation of all democratic organizations”.

In Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India92 , a Constitution Bench of the apex Court said freedom of speech and expression of opinion is of paramount importance under a democratic constitution which envisages changes in the composition of legislatures and governments and must be preserved. In a separate concurring judgment, Justice Beg, in Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India93 , said that “the freedom of speech and of the press is the „Ark of the Covenant of Democracy‟ because public criticism is essential to the working of its institutions.” Equally, in S. Khushboo v. Kanniamal94, the Court stated that “the importance of freedom of speech and expression though not absolute was necessary as we need to tolerate unpopular views. This right requires the free flow of opinions and ideas essential to sustain the collective life of the citizenry.” While an informed citizenry is a pre-condition for meaningful governance, the culture of open dialogue is generally of great societal importance.