Digests (1).docx

Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases on prohibited motions, meritorious motions, archiving of cases
 BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE G R NO. 137567 Facts: Meynardo Beltran and Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Conception Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City. On Feb. 7, 1997, after 24 years of marriage and four children, petitioner Meynardo Beltran filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In her answer, Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. She subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour. On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings including the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion. Issues: Whether or not the civil case for the nullity of marriage under psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question to the criminal case of concubinage. Ruling: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the

resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void. More importantly, parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumptions is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. ABUNDIO MERCED, petitioner, vs. HON. CLEMENTINO V. DIEZ. ETC. ET AL., respondents G.R. No. L-15315. August 26, 1960 FACTS: On January 30, 1958, Abundio Merced, already married to Eufrocina Tan, filed a complaint for annulment of his second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar on the ground that he was threatened and intimidated into signing an affidavit that he and Elizabeth had been living as husband and wife which was used by the Elizabeth in securing their marriage of exceptional character, without the need for marriage license; that he was again threatened by Elizabeth and her relatives to enter into the marriage on August 21, 1957; and that he never lived with her. Merced prays for annulment of the marriage and for moral damages in the amount of P2,000. In her answer to the civil case, Elizabeth Ceasar denied the allegations of the complaint and avers that neither she nor her relatives know of plaintiff’s previous marriage. According to her, it was Merced who insisted on the marriage. As a counterclaim she asked for P50, 000 for moral damages. She later on filed a criminal complaint for bigamy against Merced. Merced filed a motion to hold to trial of said criminal case in abeyance until final termination of the civil case on the ground that the latter involves facts which if proved will determine the innocence of the accused. This motion was granted, but upon a motion for reconsideration by the fiscal, the order for suspension was set aside and

denied on the ground that in People vs Mendoza, judicial declaration of nullity of a second and bigamous marriage is not necessary. ISSUE: Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question in a prosecution for bigamy. HELD: The civil case presents a prejudicial question which must first be resolved before the criminal case. The elements of prejudicial question are the following: (1) it must be determinative of the case before the court; (2) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal. For the first element, in order that the Merced be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the marriage which she contracted for the second time with Elizabeth Ceasar, must first be declared valid. But its validity has been questioned in the civil action. This civil action must be decided before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed. In order that a person may be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the second and subsequent marriage must have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. One of the elements is consent, without it, a marriage would be illegal and void. Since Merced claims that he was forced into the marriage, the validity of the second marriage is determinative of the guilt of Merced in the crime of bigamy. The denial of the suspension of the criminal case was based on the case of People vs. Mendoza. The same cannot be applied in this case because of different set of facts. In this case, Mendoza was first married with Josefa, then married Olga, and after the death of Josefa, married Carmencita. Olga filed a case of bigamy because of the third marriage. The Court held that he is not guilty of bigamy since the marriage with Olga was void, having been contracted when Josefa was still alive, whereas the marriage with Carmencita is valid because it was contracted when the first wife was already dead. For the second element, (NOTE: IN THIS CASE, THE CIVIL CASE AND THE CRIMINAL CASE WERE BOTH FILED IN THE SAME COURT) Spanish jurisprudence, requires that the essential element determinative of the criminal action must be cognizable by another court. This requirement is due to the fact that Spanish courts jurisdictions’ are exclusively divided into civil or criminal. In the Philippines, where our courts are vested with both civil and criminal jurisdiction, the principle of prejudicial

question is to be applied even if there is only one court before which the civil action and the criminal action are to be litigated. But in this case the court when exercising its jurisdiction over the civil action for the annulment of marriage is considered as a court distinct and different from itself when trying the criminal action for bigamy. DONATO V. LUNA FACTS: Leonilo Donato was charged for Bigamy. Before the arraignment of Donato, the private respondent filed a civil action for nullity of marriage. Said civil case was based on the ground that private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by their joint affidavit. Prior to the date set for trial of Criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to suspend on the ground that Civil case seeking his annulment of marriage raises a prejudicial question, which must be determined first before the criminal case may proceed. RTC: Denied the motion to suspend proceedings in Criminal case and the motion for reconsideration. ISSUES: Whether or not the civil case herein raises a prejudicial question RULING: The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit. Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and

intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent only sometime later when he was required to answer the civil action for anulment of the second marriage. Petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation. Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage. G.R. No. 161075 July 15, 2013 RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

JR., Petitioner,

An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused. Facts: Consing negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz various loans totaling ₱18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc.). The loans were secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-687599 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite registered under the name of de la Cruz. In accordance with its option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the property for a total consideration of ₱21,221,500.00. Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts due to Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing in the amount of ₱18,000,000.00 and paying an additional amount of ₱3,145,946.50. The other half of the property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. a joint venture partner of Unicapital. Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the title to the property was really owned by Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng.

Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of ₱41,377,851.48 but the latter ignored the demands. Consing filed for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against him for the collection of the ₱41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother. Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public document and for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed against Consing and De la Cruz an information for estafa through falsification of public document. Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati criminal case on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil cases. RTC – issued an order suspending the proceedings in the Makati criminal case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. CA - Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial to the Cavite and Makati criminal cases? We hold that it is. The resolution of the issue in the Pasig case, i.e. whether or not private respondent may be held liable in the questioned transaction, will determine the guilt or innocence of private respondent Consing in both the Cavite and Makati criminal cases. Plus Builders commenced its own suit for damages against Consing. Another information for estafa through falsification of public document was filed against Consing and De la Cruz in the RTC in Imus, CaviteConsing filed a motion to defer the arraignment on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question RTC - denied Consing’s motion. Later on, it also denied his motion for reconsideration. CA – granted Consing’ petition for certiorari and setting aside the January 27, 2000 order of the RTC, and permanently enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the arraignment and trial until the Pasig and Manila civil cases had been finally decided. In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case is whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in (the Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether

respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. The Pasig and Makati civil cases did not raise a prejudicial question that would cause the suspension of the Makati criminal case. Consing contended that the rulings of the court was not binding because it involved Plus Builders, which was different from Unicapital, the complainant in the Makati criminal case. He added that the decision did not yet become final and executory, and could still be reversed at any time, and thus should not control as a precedent to be relied upon; and that he had acted as an innocent attorney-in-fact for his mother, and should not be held personally liable under a contract that had involved property belonging to his mother as his principal. ISSUE: Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question that warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the Makati criminal case? Held: NO. Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm holding in the rulings in the first case to the effect that the proceedings in the criminal case could not be suspended because the Makati civil case was an independent civil action, while the Pasig civil case raised no prejudicial question. That was wrong for him to do considering that the ruling fully applied to him due to the similarity between his case with Plus Builders and his case with Unicapital.

A perusal of Unicapital’s complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that the action was predicated on fraud. As such, the action was one that could proceed independently of the criminal case pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code. Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. it was not improper for the CA to apply the ruling of plus builders to his case with Unicapital, for, although the Manila and Makati civil cases involved different complainants the civil actions Plus Builders and Unicapital had separately instituted against him were undeniably of similar mold, i.e., they were both based on fraud, and were thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code. Clearly, the Makati criminal case could not be suspended pending the resolution of the Makati civil case that Unicapital had filed. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document. Pimentel v Pimentel FACTS: On October 25, 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel. On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the RTC, for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide. RTC: Denied the petition on the ground of prejudicial question. The pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioners marriage with respondent is in question. CA: the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting. ISSUES: Whether or not prejudicial question arise in the civil case for nullity of marriage. RULING: The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide,[12] which punishes any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.[13] The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder[14] or homicide.[15] However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed

the victim. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent. G.R. No. 125646] City of Pasig vs. COMELEC and Municipality of Cainta [G.R. No. 128663] Municipality of Cainta vs. COMELEC and City of Pasig FACTS: Both petitions question the propriety of the suspension of plebiscite proceedings pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between Cainta and Pasig. G.R. 125646 involves proposed Brgy. Karangalan, while 128663 involves the proposed Brgy. Napico. Pasig claims both areas as part of its territory/jurisdiction while Cainta claims that the same encroached upon areas within its territory/jurisdiction. On April 22, 1996, Pasig City Council passed Ordinance No. 21, Series of 2016 creating Brgy. Karangalan, after the petition of said village’s residents. Plebiscite for its creation was set for June 22 the same year. It also issued Ordinance No. 52 on September 9, 1996, creating Brgy. Napico. Plebiscite was set for March 15, 1997. Cainta, upon learning of the Ordinances, immediately moved to suspend or cancel the scheduled on the ground that the proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of a pending case before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal. It filed Petitions with the COMELEC on June 19, 1996 (UND No. 96-2016) and March 12, 1997 (UND No. 97002). COMELEC approved the first petition but dismissed the second one for being moot because during the March 15 plebiscite, the creation of Brgy. Napico was already ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast therein. Hence, the filing of G.R. 128663 by Cainta. ISSUE: W/N the plebiscites should be suspended/cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute. HELD: YES. The pending civil case presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the barangays’ creation may be held. Although the general rule is that prejudicial question does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case, jurisprudence states that in the interest of good order, the Court can suspend action on

one case pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first (Vidad v. RTC). A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identifies by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. While Pasig claims that the proposed Barangays are within its territory, it cannot deny that portions of the same are included in the boundary dispute case pending. The resolution of the pending case has material bearing to the creation of Karangalan and Napico. As to the second petition of Cainta which was dismissed for being moot, the Court held otherwise because the issues raised therein are still pending determination before the RTC. Therefore, the plebiscite for the creation of Karangalan should be held in abeyance pending resolution of the boundary dispute. The March 15 plebiscite ratifying the creation of Napico shall likewise be annulled and set aside. RENATO S.D. DOMINGO on his own behalf and on behalf of his coheirs of the late SPOUSES FELICIDAD DE DOMINGO and MACARIO C. DOMINGO, Petitioners vs. SPOUSES ENGRACIA D. SINGSON and MANUEL F. SINGSON, Respondents Facts: Spouses Macario and Felicidad Domingo are the parents of respondent Engracia Singson and petitioners Renato Domingo and his co-heirs whom he represents herein, namely: Consolacion, Borja, and Rafael, Ramon, and Rosario. The Spouses Domingo owned a parcel of land in San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3and the house built Macario died on February 1981, while Felicidad died on September 1997. 2006, Engracia filed with the MTC a complaint for ejectment/unlawful detainer, Consolacion, Rosario, Rafael, and Ramon. Engracia claimed, she is the absolute owner of the subject property, having bought the same from the Spouses Domingo as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale dated 2006 and the TCT was cancelled and TCT No. 12575 covering the subject property was already issued under her name. The petitioners only learned of the supposed sale of the subject property when they received the summons and a copy of the complaint.

Petitioners filed a complaint which sought the nullity of the sale. They alleged that the Absolute Deed of Sale was a nullity since the signatures of their parents appearing thereon as the supposed vendors were forged. Renato, Consolacion, and Ramon filed a Joint Affidavit Complaint, claiming that Engracia falsified the signatures of their parents in charging her with the crimes of falsification of public document, estafa, and use of falsified documents. Spouses Engracia and Manuel Singson were charged with the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. On July 11, 2008, the Spouses RTC granted the motion to suspend the proceedings filed by the Spouses Singson. APPEAL: RTC gravely abused its discretion when it directed the suspension of the proceedings in the Criminal Case on the ground of prejudicial question. claimed that where both a civil and criminal case arising from the same facts are filed in court, the criminal case takes precedence. CA all the elements of a prejudicial question under sections 6 and 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are present, no abuse on the part of RTC Engracia moved that Rafael be substituted by his heirs since he had already died. Petitioners filed a motion, which sought to exclude Rafael as being represented by Renato. They averred that they were unable to effect a substitution of the heirs of Rafael as plaintiffs in the case since they could not locate them. When the case was called, the petitioners and their counsel failed to appear, which thus prompted Engracia's counsel to move for the dismissal of the complaint and be given time to file the proper pleading. The RTC gave Engracia's counsel 10 days within which to file a motion to dismiss. On July 29, 2011, the RTC issued an Orders' in Civil Case No. 70898, dismissing the petitioners' complaint due to their and their counsel's repeated failure to appear during the scheduled pre-trial hearing dates.

petitioners: the RTC erred in dismissing their complaint on a mere technicality. They also claimed that Engracia's motion to dismiss is but a mere scrap of paper since the same did not comply with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The CA, affirmed the RTC

on the first criminal case, should it be allowed to proceed ahead, would be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in the civil case that indeed the signatures of the Spouses Domingo were authentic.

Issues: 1st: whether the proceedings were properly suspended on the ground of prejudicial question; 2nd: whether the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. 70898 due to failure to prosecute was proper – YES

Section 3 provides that a civil action for damages in cases provided under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which may also constitute criminal offenses, may proceed independently of the criminal action. In instances where an independent civil action is permitted, the result of the criminal action, whether of acquittal or conviction, is entirely irrelevant to the civil action.

Held: YES. A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can proceed. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflict decisions. For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must -be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal. Based on the issues there indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar. The defense of the Spouses Singson in the civil case for annulment of sale is that Engracia bought the subject property from her parents prior to their demise and that their signatures appearing on the Absolute Deed of Sale are true and genuine. Their allegation in the civil case is based on the very same facts, which would be necessarily determinative of their guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case. If the signatures of the Spouses Domingo in the Absolute Deed of Sale are genuine, then there would be no falsification and the Spouses Singson would be innocent of the offense charged. Otherwise stated, a conviction

The concept of independent civil actions finds no application in this case. To stress, the main issue raised in Civil Case No. 70898, i.e., the genuineness of the signature of the Spouses Domingo appearing in the Absolute Deed of Sale, is intimately related to the charge of estafa through falsification of public document in Criminal Case No. 137867; the resolution of the main issue in Civil Case No. 70898 would necessarily be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the Spouses Singson. Accordingly, the RTC Branch 264 correctly suspended the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 137867 on the ground of prejudicial question since, at the time the proceedings in the criminal case were suspended, Civil Case No. 70898 was still pending. PresumptiveCivilPersonality,Art.40.NCC CARMEN QUIMIGUING vs. FELIX ICAO FACTS: Carmen Quimiguing sued Felix Icao in CFI Zamboanga . In her complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees. Defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing

arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint. Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court. ISSUE: Can the plaintiff-appellants ask for support and damages from defendant despite failure to allege fact of birth in complaint? RULING: YES. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee , even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code). Additionally, “for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused” per Article 21 of the Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219, which provides moral damages for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts. Birth,Art.41,NCC Geluz vs CA FACTS: Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter’s daughter Lucida at Geluz’ clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez

Street. Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesn’t have any idea nor given his consent on the abortion. It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari CA and RTC: Predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines ISSUE: Can Oscar, who voluntarily procured her wife’s abortion, recover damages from the physician who caused the same? HELD: No. The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which trial court and Court of Appeals predicated. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb. This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of

their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230) Both trial court and CA wasn’t able to find any basis for an award of moral damages evidently because Oscar’s indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wife’s indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only he but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It shows that he’s after obtaining a large money payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorney’s fees that serves as indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated. Restrictions or Modification on capacity to act, Art. 38-39, NCC FELICIANO CATALAN, petitioners, vs. JESUS BASA, respondents G. R. No. 159567. July 31, 2007. FACTS: On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active military service. The Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service due to his mental disorder (schizophrenia). On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. On June 16, 1951, Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister Mercedes one-half of the real property through the execution of a document, titled, “Absolute deed of Donation”. On December 11, 1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings to declare Feliciano incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its Order of Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance of Feliciano. Thus, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), which is formerly the People’s Bank and Trust Company, was appointed to be his guardian by the trial court. On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property donated by Feliciano to her in issue in her children Delia and Jesus Basa. On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as damages against herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation of Mercedes was void ab initio, as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving

valid consent. On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. Both the lower court and Court of Appeals dismissed the case because of insufficient evidence presented by the complainants to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan. ISSUE: Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the donation HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and denied the petition of the petitioners. A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. The parties’ intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable. A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging the existing of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental facilities. Thus, the lower court correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. Since the donation was valid. Mercedes has the right to sell the property to whomever she chose. Not a shred of evidence has been presented to prove the claim that Mercedes’ sale of property to her children was tainted with fraud or falsehood. Thus, the property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa. The Supreme Court notes the issue of prescription and laches for the first time on appeal before the court. It is sufficient for the Supreme Court to note that even if it prospered, the deed of donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained binding as it was not annulled in a proper action in court within four years. DOMINGO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Paulina Rigonan owned three (3) parcels of land. She allegedly sold them to private respondents, the spouses Felipe and Concepcion Rigonan, who claim to be her relatives. In 1966, herein petitioners Eugenio Domingo, Crispin Mangabat and Samuel Capalungan, who claim to be her closest

surviving relatives, allegedly took possession of the properties by means of stealth, force and intimidation, and refused to vacate the same. Consequently, on February 2, 1976, herein respondent Felipe Rigonan filed a complaint for reinvindicacion against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. They alleged that they were the owners of the three parcels of land through the deed of sale executed by Paulina Rigonan; that since then, they had been in continuous possession of the subject properties and had introduced permanent improvements thereon; and that defendants (now petitioners) entered the properties illegally, and they refused to leave them when asked to do so. Herein petitioners, as defendants below, contested plaintiffs claims. According to defendants, the alleged deed of absolute sale was void for being spurious as well as lacking consideration. They said that Paulina Rigonan did not sell her properties to anyone. As her nearest surviving kin within the fifth degree of consanguinity, they inherited the three lots and the permanent improvements thereon when Paulina died in 1966. They said they had been in possession of the contested properties for more than 10 years. Defendants asked for damages against plaintiffs. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents by virtue of intestate succession and stating that the deed of absolute sale was fake and void. The CA reversed the decision.

In the present case, at the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced age and senile. She died an octogenarian on March 20, 1966, barely over a year when the deed was allegedly executed on January 28, 1965, but before copies of the deed were entered in the registry allegedly on May 16 and June 10, 1966. The general rule is that a person is not incompetent to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities.[27]However, when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the person from properly, intelligently, and firmly protecting her property rights then she is undeniably incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony of Zosima Domingo shows that at the time of the alleged execution of the deed, Paulina was already incapacitated physically and mentally. She narrated that Paulina played with her waste and urinated in bed. Given these circumstances, there is in our view sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she consented to the sale of and the price for her parcels of land. Moreover, there is no receipt to show that said price was paid to and received by her. Thus, we are in agreement with the trial courts finding and conclusion on the matter: The whole evidence on record does not show clearly that the fictitious P850.00 consideration was ever delivered to the vendor. Undisputably, the P850.00 consideration for the nine (9) parcels of land including the house and bodega is grossly and shockingly inadequate, and the sale is null and void ab initio.

ISSUE: Is the sale valid despite the lack of consideration?

G.R. No. 143370 February 6, 2002 MARIO J. MENDEZONA, et vs. JULIO H. OZAMIZ, et al., respondents.

HELD: NO. The sale was null and void ab initio due to lack of consideration, being grossly and shockingly inadequate. Consideration is the why of a contract, the essential reason which moves the contracting parties to enter into the contract. On record, there is unrebutted testimony that Paulina as landowner was financially well off. She loaned money to several people. We see no apparent and compelling reason for her to sell the subject parcels of land with a house and warehouse at a meager price of P850 only. In Rongavilla vs. CA, 294 SCRA 289 (1998), private respondents were in their advanced years, and were not in dire need of money, except for a small amount of P2,000 which they said were loaned by petitioners for the repair of their houses roof. We ruled against petitioners, and declared that there was no valid sale because of lack of consideration.

al.

petitioners,

FACTS: The case is a suit for quieting of title. It was instituted on 1991 by petitioner spouses Mario and Teresita Mendezona as initial plaintiffs and spouses Luis, Maricar and Teresita Mendezona joined as coplaintiffs. In their complaint, the petitioners, alleged that the Mendezona spouses, et al. own a parcel of land each in the Banilad Estate, Lahug, Cebu City with almost similar areas, covered and described in TCTs of the Registry of Deeds of Cebu City. They ultimately traced their titles of ownership over their respective properties from a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989

executed in their favor by Carmen Ozamiz for and in consideration of the sum (₱1,040,000.00) The petitioners initiated the suit to remove a cloud on their said respective titles caused by the inscription thereon of a notice of lis pendens, which came about as a result of an incident in Special Proceeding No. 1250 of the RTC of Oroquieta City, a proceeding for guardianship over the person and properties of Carmen Ozamiz initiated by the respondents Julio H. Ozamiz, et al. It appears that on January 1991, the respondents instituted the petition for guardianship with the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, alleging that Carmen Ozamiz, then 86 years old, after an illness in July 1987, had become disoriented and could not recognize most of her friends; that she could no longer take care of herself nor manage her properties by reason of her failing health, weak mind and absent-mindedness. Mario Mendezona and Luis Mendezona, herein petitioners who are nephews of Carmen Ozamiz, and Pilar Mendezona, a sister of Carmen Ozamiz, filed an opposition to the guardianship petition. Paz O. Montalvan was designated as guardian over the person of Carmen Ozamiz while petitioner Mario J. Mendezona, respondents Roberto J. Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamiz were designated as joint guardians over the properties of the said ward. Roberto J. Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamiz filed with the guardianship court their "inventories and Accounts", listing therein Carmen Ozamiz’s properties, cash, shares of stock, vehicles and fixed assets, including a 10,396 square meter property known as the Lahug property. Said Lahug property is the same property covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 executed by Carmen Ozamiz in favor of the petitioners. Respondents Roberto J. Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamiz caused the inscription on the titles of petitioners a notice of lis pendens, regarding Special Proceeding No. 1250, thus giving rise to the suit for quieting of title. Respondents opposed the petitioners’ claim of ownership of the Lahug property and alleged that the titles issued in the petitioners names are defective and illegal, and the ownership of the said property was acquired in bad faith and without value inasmuch as the consideration for the sale is grossly inadequate and unconscionable and at the time of the sale Carmen Ozamiz was already ailing and not in full possession of

her mental faculties; and that her properties having been placed in administration, she was in effect incapacitated to contract with petitioners. Carmencita Cedeno and Martin Yungco, instrumental witnesses to the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989, and, Atty. Asuncion Bernades, the notary public who notarized the said document, testified that on the day of execution of the said contract that Carmen Ozamiz was of sound mind and that she voluntarily and knowingly executed the said deed of sale. For the defendants, the testimonies of respondent Paz O. Montalvan, a sister of Carmen Ozamiz; Concepcion Agac-ac, an assistant of Carmen Ozamiz; respondent Julio Ozamiz; Carolina Lagura, a househelper of Carmen Ozamiz; Joselito Gunio, an appraiser of land; Nelfa Perdido, a part-time bookkeeper of Carmen Ozamiz, and the deposition of Dr. Faith Go, physician of Carmen Ozamiz, were offered in evidence. The petitioners presented as rebuttal witnesses petitioners Mario Mendezona and Luis Mendezona, to rebut the testimony of respondent Julio H. Ozamiz; and, Dr. William Buot, a doctor of neurology to rebut aspects of the deposition of Dr. Faith Go on the mental capacity of Carmen Ozamiz at the time of the sale. RTC: 1. The property described in the complaint was sold, with reservation of usufructuary rights by Carmen Ozamiz to the plaintiffs under a valid contract, voluntarily and deliberately entered into while she was of sound mind, for sufficient and good consideration, and without fraud, force, undue influence or intimidation having been exercised upon her, and consequently, the Court orders the defendants herein to acknowledge and recognize the plaintiffs’ title to the aforecited property and to refrain from further clouding the same CA: reversed the factual findings of the trial court and ruled that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 was a simulated contract since the petitioners failed to prove that the consideration was actually paid, and, furthermore, that at the time of the execution of the contract the mental faculties of Carmen Ozamiz were already seriously impaired. Thus, the appellate court declared that the Deed of Absolute Sale of April 28, 1989 is null and void. It ordered the cancellation of the certificates of

title issued in the petitioners’ names and directed the issuance of new certificates of title in favor of Carmen Ozamiz or her estate. Petitioners alleged that Judge Durias’s testimony is a newly-discovered evidence which could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the exercise of due diligence. Issue: whether to consider the testimony of Judge Durias as newly discovered evidence. Held: NO. A motion for new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence is properly granted only where there is concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (a) the evidence had been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted, would probably alter the result. All three (3) requisites must characterize the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial. We find that the requirement of reasonable diligence has not been met by the petitioners. As early as the pre-trial of the case at bar, the name of Judge Durias has already cropped up as a possible witness for the defendants, herein respondents. That the respondents chose not to present him is not an indicia per se of suppression of evidence, since a party in a civil case is free to choose who to present as his witness. Neither can Judge Durias’ testimony in another case be considered as newly discovered evidence since the facts to be testified to by Judge Durias which were existing before and during the trial, could have been presented by the petitioners at the trial below.1The testimony of Judge Durias has been in existence waiting only to be elicited from him by questioning. It has been held that a lack of diligence is exhibited where the newly discovered evidence was necessary or proper under the pleadings, and its existence must have occurred to the party in the course of the preparation of the case, but no effort was made to secure it; there is a failure to make inquiry of persons who were likely to know the facts in question, especially where information was not sought from co-parties; there is a failure to seek evidence available through public records; there is a failure to discover evidence that is within the control of the complaining party; there is a failure to follow leads contained in other evidence; and, there is a failure to utilize available discovery procedures

Thus, the testimony of Judge Durias cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial.