Developmental Psychology Essay 22009

Developmental Psychology Assessment 2 – Reflective Essay Dominic Ward

Developmental psychology is a fascinating area of study. Although as a science its origins extend way back, as a distinct discipline within the vast knowledge-body that comprises science, it really only came into its own in the 20th Century. Since then many theories have been proffered in the attempt to describe, explain and optimise human development. Each theory has undoubtedly contributed something to the field. But is any one theory ‘better’ than another? The brief for this essay was to compare two of these competing theories of development within the context of personal experience. The first theory I have therefore selected to examine is the behaviourism of B.F. Skinner. I would like to juxtapose his theory against the cognitive-constructivist theory of Jean Piaget, which itself is one of the more famous theories of development. In approaching this discussion, I would firstly like to describe each theory separately. Following this, I shall present two detailed reports utilising my own experiences as a gauge: the former shall document the similarities between the two theories; and the latter shall reference the differences. In this way, it is hoped that the analysis of the two theories through the filter of the case study shall provide an indication as to the overall strengths and weaknesses of each theory.

B.F. Skinner’s behaviourism grew out of animal research conducted at Harvard University during the early part of his tenure there. His particular mechanism for

behaviourism, known as operant conditioning, emphasises the role of environment in shaping future behaviours and therefore development (Sigelman, 2009). Building on the theory of classical conditioning propounded by his predecessor, John B.Watson, Skinner’s theory likewise can be categorised as a learning model of development. Learning theory seeks to place the emphasis for development on nurture rather than nature. In this way, development is seen as having being ‘learnt’ from the environment, as opposed to hard-wired or programmed into the brain through gene codes. I think this ascribes then to behaviourism a largely reactive feel – development is trained through reactions to different stimuli. Skinner, in distinction to Watson, proposed that behaviour, influenced thus by environmental conditions, was contextual in nature (Ruiz, 1995; Malone & Cruchon, 2001). This prescribes a relationship between context – history – and behaviour. This is important to note, as it allowed Skinner to understand conditioning with an extra flexibility – it places the individual in society, and therefore bares some resemblance in character to the social-constructivist theories of Vygotsky and others (Ruiz, 1995). Let us wade deeper into Skinner’s behaviourism: (For Skinner) changed attitudes follow or accompany changed behaviour; changed behaviour follows changed reinforcement contingencies. Quoting William James, (Skinner) says that we do not run from the bear because we are afraid, but rather that the fear, set off by the higher adrenalin in our blood and faster heartbeat, is part of our running response. The fear follows or goes with the running behaviour (Platt, cited in Mowrer, 2001). This quote perhaps captures the essence of Skinner’s plan; he did not deny a role for the private events (the subjective properties associated with human experience, emotion for example), yet he felt they could be explained exclusively by behaviour, that is, operant conditioning (Malone & Cruchon, 2001). In fact, it is largely Skinner’s belief in an

inseparableness between public and private events that distinguishes his behaviourism from that of Watson and the classical or methodological behaviourists (32-33). The operation of conditioning itself can be understood in four parts: positive reinforcement; negative reinforcement; positive punishment; and negative punishment (Sigelman, 2009). Reinforcement, whether positive or negative, is the strengthening of a functional behaviour through exposure to either the addition of a pleasant stimulus (positive operation) or the withdrawal of a pleasant stimulus (negative operation). Conversely, punishment weakens the behaviour in the same way. Therefore, positive reinforcement encourages the development of those behaviours that were experienced as advantageous in some way. That is, the behaviour is encouraged because, when it was actioned, it elicited the return of a pleasant stimulus. In distinction, positive punishment discourages the behaviour by eliciting an unpleasant stimulus.

Like Skinner, Jean Piaget’s initial interest in human developmental theory grew out of animal studies - Piaget held a doctorate in biology. There is much conjecture in the literature as to when and how he became interested in psychology – it is only important here to note that he did at some point make the change between the two sciences, focussing then on the nature of development in children. His work with children convinced him that development must be a cognitive process, that is, conscious thoughts play the central role in determining development (Santrock, 2006). He further nominated a four-stage system to explain his cognitive theory in context. The first stage is the sensori-motor stage wherein an “infant constructs an understanding of the world by coordinating sensory experiences with physical actions” (46). The second, preoperational

stage involves the use of images and words to represent the world the child experiences. In the third stage, the concrete operational stage, a child becomes adept at using reason to explain experiences logically. The fourth, formal operational stage describes that stage of development wherein the child can involve ideals and abstract concepts in the cognitive process. Two essential mechanisms underpin this entire construct: organisation, whereby we sort and classify information gleaned from our experiences subjectively; and adaption, wherein our thinking behaviours must change to allow for any new information (Sigelman, 2009; Santrock, 2006). Borrowing heavily from his previous work in biology, Piaget further stated that there were two processes to adaption. The first was assimilation, the second accommodation. Assimilation is the incorporation of new knowledge into an existing body of knowledge. Accommodation is the direct adjustment to new knowledge. It would also at this point be prudent to note that Piaget’s theory of development is constructivist, that is, it seeks to represent development as a process wherein an individual is created as it were from the fabric of his or her experiences in manner that is entirely conscious and therefore, to some degree, self-directed. A child constructs his superego by coordinating his perceptions of his caretaking as he coordinates other perceptions in the operational period (Malerstein & Ahern, 1979). This stands in contrast to Skinner’s behaviourism; an analysis of this important distinction will be presented later in the paper.

It is now time to formally outlay the examination of the similarities between these two competing theories of development. As reported earlier, I shall be providing recollections of my own developmental history by way of providing a case study that can

actively illustrate the arguments herein offered. My first contention is that both developmental models rely on an essentially identical mechanism through which development is effected. In behaviourism, the mechanism is conditioning, effected through reinforcement and punishment. In cognitive-constructivism, the mechanisms are organisation and adaption. Both sets of mechanics may operate in different ways and for different reasons, but they operate to the exact same end – the synthesis of experience into development through behavioural or cognitive modification. Quintessentially, both models argue that it is the experience of our environment that shapes our development. Allow me to illustrate this point. In grade three, at the age of nine, I was struck down with glandular fever. The virus forced me from school with severe lethargy for a month, completing only half-days for a further month on my return. Consequently, I missed a lot of school, falling a long way behind my classmates. The ultimate impact was the depreciation of my self-value as I struggled to catch-up to my peers. Finally, I gave up, suffering for many further years as a result of this capitulation. Before I got sick, I was a bright, happy student with good study routines and positive, if somewhat compliant, behaviour. After my return to school, I was changed. A deep cynicism came to the fore and I took to self-destructive behaviours and ideals in order to protect myself from the fear of failure elicited by the rapid evaporation of my self-esteem. Both Skinner and Piaget would argue that, all things equal, it was the experience of the environmental stimulus of the illness that created, constructed or promoted my new developmental direction. Moreover, Skinner would have claimed that the overall temporal context in which I was situated at that time would have predisposed me to that new direction (Ruiz, 1995; Malone & Cruchon, 2001). At that juncture in my life, I would have qualified

under the rubric that describes the concrete operational stage in Piaget’s system (Sigelman, 2009; Malerstein & Ahern, 1979). Piaget may therefore have suggested that the new cynicism and self-destructive patterns that defined my exit from the viral illness and return to school were a product of the rational processing, through assimilation or accommodation, of that experience.

Similarly, and perhaps more importantly, both radical behaviourism and cognitiveconstructivism describe a developmental process that is essentially reactive. That is, the process of renewal within these behavioural and cognitive models is accepted as deriving from experience as opposed to informing or guiding experience. There is no claim for a developmental motivation in seeking out appropriate experiences. This is a necessary condition of both models in that they are, intrinsically, materialistic1. Again, allow me to illustrate this. I recently experienced a severe episode of depression. The final outcome of this episode was that I enrolled and began studying counselling as a means of fulfilling a strong need to be of service. Skinner would have explained it, firstly, contextually. Prior to the depression, I was working a job that could not have satisfied my needs. I had had previous experiences that predisposed me to be disinclined to that manner of work. Thus the stimulus of the job itself acted as positive reinforcement for my subjective context, and the depression was the manifestation of this. In this way, my behaviour informed the depression. Similarly, Piaget would have also contended that the depression arose reactively. Piaget might have understood the depression as the result of the 1

Though it is fair to say that this criticism could be levelled at all of science, I think that it is particularly pertinent to discuss this here. Why? Because if the end result of this study is that we all graduate as mindful counsellors, we should be prepared to disregard, as necessary, the materialistic side of our training. Clients will come with myriad issues that do not speak to a materialistic understanding of the world. The daemons of creativity that so often accompany altruistic forms of depression cannot be described, explained or optimised by any view of development that is reactive.

processing of new information. In this way, the experience of disenchantment with my job – the new information – once assimilated or accommodated, would have, as for the behaviourist model, manifested as depression, as the new information could not have been rationalised to fit with what was already in place.

The differences that isolate behaviourism from cognitive-constructivism are myriad. Rather than go into a lengthy count of all those individual differences, I think it more beneficial to constructively outline the major theoretical unbalances between the two. This will entail an investigation of the concepts of learning theory and cognitiveconstructivist theory. Behaviourism is a learning theory. In no way does it correspond to the constructivist modes beyond what has already been discussed in prior paragraphs. Skinner opined that the behaviours are learned from the environment; behaviours that already have been adopted comprise the context through which an individual experiences his or her world, thereby stimulating the addition of further behaviours, or the subtraction of currently held, but inappropriate behaviours. Thus, this process of learning is largely (though not entirely) automatic (Ruiz, 1995; Malone & Cruchon, 2001), its apparatus working entirely in the external, material environment (Perez-Alvarez & Garcia-Montes, 2006). It is thus a deterministic philosophy in nature (453). At Kindergarten age I was still exclusively at home with my mother and brothers. My mother decided to trial a few mornings for me at a local kindergarten so that I might socialise with other children my own age. I spent the first morning crying so hard at the window of the kindergarten that my mother shortly thereafter returned and collected me. I did not attend kindergarten again. Skinner would not deny the quality of the private events in my experience of

kindergarten. But he would further claim that it was my behavioural reaction to the environment, learned through previous experiences, which produced my loneliness and tears (Mowrer, 2001). Where behaviour, and therefore development, is under the exclusive control of the environment, determinism in the only possibility. It was beyond my person, my individuality, to have developed my crying behaviour in any way. In contrast, constructivism understands development as a somewhat conscious, cognitive process. In this way, the agent has a direct and insoluble role in furthering his or her development. Returning to my earlier example of loneliness felt and crying expressed on my first and only day at kindergarten, Piaget might have seen this as a reaction to the experience of new information wherein the new information is counter to the conscious needs derived from the understanding of prior experiences or information. In this way, I was able to express a distinct preference for remaining at home with my mother and siblings. Here, the agent, through cognitive mechanisms, constructs the form of development. Whereas the determinism inherent in behaviourism ultimately denies the individual any real control of his or her development (Perez-Alvarez & Garcia-Montes, 2006), constructivism imbues the individual with the power to create their own developmental path.

In conclusion, as I have explored and critiqued the behavioural model of development along side the cognitive-constructivist model, what has become apparent is the obvious truth in both models. Both models represent the scientific method, and in such a format they both operate equally well in describing and then explaining the observations of their respective proponents. I would not select either in favour over the other. In fact, much

practice and the theory that underpins it within psychology and counselling has evolved directly out of concern for behavioural and cognitive-constructivist approaches. A good example is that of cognitive-behaviour therapy (Favre & Bizzini, 1995) which allies both models into a working unit, although it has been argued that the cognitivism of Bandura has had a larger direct impact on this development than has that of Piaget (Goldfried, 2003). On a personal note, I would suggest that at the purely descriptive level, the two models make equally relevant and honest observations of the process of human development. In this way, they both offer much in optimising development. But as a means of explaining human development, I believe they both fail. The full conceptualisation of human development lies beyond the realms of the material sciences. If the reactions that precipitate development can be described by Skinner and Piaget, what then of the events that cause these reactions? Are they all external and environmental or cognitive and conscious as Skinner and Piaget suggest? Since I was a teenager I have felt an unmistakable urge to write prose. This urge takes the form of the obsessive/compulsive need to represent the images that dwell in my sub-conscious through the written word. Along the way I have wanted to quit many times, so unhappy I have been with the results of my efforts. But I have not given it up, because I cannot. There is an undercurrent to the force that drives me that I doubt can be explained through either behavioural models or cognitive models. Nevertheless, the ideas of Skinner and Piaget have influenced much that works and much that otherwise can now no longer be undone. Both similar and dissimilar all at once, the two theories need not compete with each other; they are both tangible marvels of the subjective human experience.

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