Dcf Appellate Brief 2

Appellate Court of the State of Connecticut A.C. 28606

AIMEE DUTKIEWICZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THOMAS DUTKIEWICZ, Defendant-Appellant,

BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT Thomas M. Dutkiewicz, Sui Juris P.O. Box 9775 Forestville, CT 06011-9775 860-833-4127

Table of Contents Statement of Issues...............................................................................................................................iii Table of Authorities..............................................................................................................................iv PRO SE STANDARD OF REVIEW...................................................................................................vii STANDARD OF REVIEW................................................................................................................viii CLARIFICATION ON FILING WITH THE TRIAL COURT.............................................................1 GLOBAL IMPACT STATEMENT........................................................................................................1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................1 ARGUMENT.........................................................................................................................................6 It is unlawful and unconstitutional for the courts, DCF and the State of Connecticut to interfere with families just because a child witnesses events in the home...................................................................8 The Supreme Court ruled that there is a presumption that a fit parent acts in their children’s best interests, not DCF, not the courts nor the State of Connecticut...........................................................11 Is the State of Connecticut, DCF, juvenile and family courts subject to the 4th and 14th Amendment? ..............................................................................................................................................................16 Conclusion...........................................................................................................................................20

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Statement of Issues 1. Did the lower court without probable cause or due process impose a court order where there was no evidence that the Defendant was unfit or incapable to deal with any impact from a divorce proceeding? 2. Did the lower court fail to protect the constitutional rights of the Defendant where the state failed to prove with the requisite proof of parental unfitness in order to substitute the Defendant’s best interest decisions with that of the state’s? 3. Did the lower court fail to allow the Defendant to deal with his own family issues without government interference like other issues like death of a parent, sibling or favorite pet? 4. Did the court automatically deny the Defendant due process by issuing the automatic court order by allowing hearsay from the State Legislator to support the order? 5. Did the state Legislator make itself the hearer and trier of facts and unlawfully impose its will into the judicial process by becoming the driving force of the violations of due process? 6. Did the lower court and certainly the judiciary as a whole abdicate their constitutional duties as the trier and hearer of facts by issuing a court order without evidence that the Defendant is unfit to deal with family related issues? 7. Did the lower court as well as the State Legislator show that there was imminent “physical” danger to a child in order for the state to have jurisdiction?

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Table of Authorities Cases 7 James W. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 65.04[3] (2d ed. 1995).....................ix Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 745 F.2d 1015, 1025 (2d Cir. 1985)................................................viii Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982)..........................vi Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975)............................vii Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974)............................................................vii Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 743-44 (2d Cir. 2000)..........viii Brewer, 212 F.3d at 744........................................................................................................viii Buffalo Forge col. V. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 638 F.2d 568, 569 (2d Cir. 1981)................vii Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1999)..................................................................14 Calabretta v. Floyd, 9th Cir. (1999)..........................................................................................2 Cersosimo v. Cersosimo, 449 A.2d 1026 (1982)..................................................................vii Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 275 (2d Cir. 1985)................................................viii Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).............................vi Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004)...............6 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1972).................vi Doe et al, v. Heck et al (No. 01-3648, 2003 US App. Lexis 7144).........................................5 Drywall Tapers & Pointers Local 1974 v. Local 530, 954 F.2d 69, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1992).......ix Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)..........................vi F.K. v. Iowa district Court for Polk County, Id........................................................................20 Forest City Daly Housing, Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead, 175 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 1999)...................................................................................................................................ix

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Good v. Dauphin County Social Services (3rd Cir. 1989)......................................................19 Good v. Dauphin County Social Services., 891 F.2d 1087 (3rd Cir. 1989)............................14 Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972).........vi Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).................................vi Lenz v. Winburn (11th Cir. 1995)............................................................................................19 Lovan C. v. Department of Children and Family 86 Conn. App. 290 (2004)..................14, 16 Malik v.Arapahoe Cty. Dept. of Social Services, (10th Cir. 1999)..........................................20 McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996)..................................vi New York v. Toia, 560 F.2d 535, 538 (2d Cir. 1977)..............................................................vii Nicholson v. Williams, Case No.: 00-cv-2229.........................................................................8 Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 602.....................................................................................11 Poling v. K.Hovnanian Enterprises, 99 F.Supp.2d 502, 506-07 (D.N.J. 2000).....................vii Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 304.......................................................................................12 Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 162 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998).........................................................ix S.E.C. v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1582 (11th Cir. 1992)...........................................................vi Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 602 (2nd Cir. 1999)...................................................20 Then v. I.N.S., 58 F.Supp.2d 422, 429 (D.N.J. 1999).............................................................vi Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).............................................................................4, 12 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57; 120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000)......................................................14 U.S. v. Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243 (D.C.Cir. 1996).....................................................................vii United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992)............................................................vi United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3rd Cir. 1999).....................................................vi Vega v. Johnson, 149 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1998).....................................................................vii

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Vorbeck v. McNeal, 407 F. Supp. 733, 739 (E.D. Mo.), aff’d, 426 U.S. 943 (1976).............viii Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000)...................................................................14 Walsh v. Erie County Dept. of Job and Family Services, 3:01-cv-7588...............................16 White v. Bloom.......................................................................................................................vii White v. Bloom, 621 F.2d 276................................................................................................vi White v. Pierce County (797 F. 2d 812 (9th Cir. 1986).............................................................2

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PRO SE STANDARD OF REVIEW Because Defendant is pro se, the Court has a higher standard when faced with a motion for injunctive relief, White v. Bloom, 621 F.2d 276 makes this point clear and states: A court faced with a motion for injunctive relief, a pro se motion, the court must read the complaint's allegations expansively, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972), and take them as true for purposes of deciding whether they state a claim. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1972). Pro se litigants' court submissions are to be construed liberally and held to less stringent standards than submissions of lawyers. If the court can reasonably read the submissions, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with rule requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992)(holding pro se petition cannot be held to same standard as pleadings drafted by attorneys); Then v. I.N.S., 58 F.Supp.2d 422, 429 (D.N.J. 1999). The courts provide pro se parties wide latitude when construing their pleadings and papers. When interpreting pro se papers, the Court should use common sense to determine what relief the party desires. S.E.C. v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1582 (11th Cir. 1992). See also, United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Court has

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special obligation to construe pro se litigants' pleadings liberally); Poling v. K.Hovnanian Enterprises, 99 F.Supp.2d 502, 506-07 (D.N.J. 2000). Defendant has the right to submit pro se briefs on appeal, even though they may be in artfully drawn but the court can reasonably read and understand them. See, Vega v. Johnson, 149 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1998). Courts will go to particular pains to protect pro se litigants against consequences of technical errors if injustice would otherwise result. U.S. v. Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243 (D.C.Cir. 1996). Moreover, "the court is under a duty to examine the complaint to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory." Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974)). Thus, if this court were to entertain any motion, this court would have to apply the standards of White v. Bloom. Furthermore, if there is any possible theory that would entitle the Defendant to relief, even one that the Defendant hasn't thought of, the court cannot dismiss or uphold the trial court’s ruling. Connecticut articulated a standard similar to that used in the federal courts. In Cersosimo the Supreme Court stated: It is “our established policy to allow great latitude to a litigant who, either by choice or necessity, represents himself in legal proceedings, so far as such latitude is consistent with the just rights of any adverse party . . . .” Cersosimo v. Cersosimo, 449 A.2d 1026 (1982) STANDARD OF REVIEW “[I]nterim injunctive relief is an ‘extraordinary and drastic remedy which should not be routinely granted.” Buffalo Forge col. V. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 638 F.2d 568, 569 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting Medical Society of New York v. Toia, 560 F.2d 535, 538 (2d Cir. 1977)). In

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addition, a federal court should grant injunctive relief against a state or municipal official “only in situations of most compelling necessity.” Vorbeck v. McNeal, 407 F. Supp. 733, 739 (E.D. Mo.), aff’d, 426 U.S. 943 (1976). In this circuit the standard for injunctive relief is well established. To warrant preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party “must demonstrate (1) that it will be irreparably harmed in the absence of an injunction, and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of the case to make them a fair ground for litigation, and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in its favor.” Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 743-44 (2d Cir. 2000). Where the moving party seeks a mandatory injunction, i.e., injunctive relief which changes the parties’ positions rather than maintains the status quo, or the injunction requested “will provide substantially all the relief sought, and the relief cannot be undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the merits,” the moving party must make a stronger showing of entitlement. Brewer, 212 F.3d at 744 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A mandatory injunction “should issue only upon a clear showing that the moving party is entitled to the relief requested” or where “extreme or very serious damage will result from a denial of preliminary relief.” Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 745 F.2d 1015, 1025 (2d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Although a showing that irreparable injury will be suffered before a decision on the merits may be reached is insufficient by itself to require the granting of a preliminary injunction, it is nevertheless the most significant condition that must be demonstrated. See Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 275 (2d Cir. 1985). To demonstrate irreparable harm, plaintiff must show an “injury that is neither remote nor speculative, but actual and

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imminent and that cannot be remedied by an award of monetary damages.” Forest City Daly Housing, Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead, 175 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 1999) (Quoting Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 162 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998)). Although a hearing is generally required on a properly supported motion preliminary injunction, oral argument and testimony are not required in all cases. See Drywall Tapers & Pointers Local 1974 v. Local 530, 954 F.2d 69, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1992). Where, as here, “the record before a district court permits it to conclude that there is no factual dispute which must be resolved by an evidentiary hearing, a preliminary injunction may be granted or denied without hearing oral testimony.” 7 James W. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 65.04[3] (2d ed. 1995).

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CLARIFICATION ON FILING WITH THE TRIAL COURT The Defendant-Appellant filed a Motion for Injunctive Relief as a Motion to Waive Parenting Classes in family court due to the fact that both the statute and the automatic court order were unconstitutional and lacked due process when anyone files for dissolution of marriage. The motion was filed inter alia, violations of due process and other constitutional protections in the 1st and 14th Amendment and life and liberty interests. GLOBAL IMPACT STATEMENT In resent United States Supreme Court opinions sited in this brief, the Supreme Court has overturned 30 plus years of state case law, juvenile and family court rulings as well as state laws and statutes. These rulings as well as this instant case that is before this tribunal will have not only a profound impact on every father, mother and child in the State of Connecticut. It will permanently change how the courts treat parents and children when they are before any judge or court and how investigations are handled. No longer can the courts or the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) deny parent their constitutional rights and no longer can the state, the courts and the legislators presume that parents as a class of people are unfit and that all children are presumed harmed. INTRODUCTION Historically, the State of Connecticut like most states for the last 30 plus years has not only violated the constitutional rights of both parent and child, they have refused to acknowledge that parents like non-parents are entitled to their constitutional rights. Likewise, DCF are government officials like the police and are subject to the same constitutional prohibitions because they are “government officials”. The State of Connecticut does not have a limitless ability to intrude in the lives of children and parents by just parroting the term “best interest of the child”, “risk of harm” or has been harmed in

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some undefined way. The following case illustrates that the State of Connecticut and DCF does NOT have an unrestricted right to intrude into Americans homes. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals case, Calabretta v. Floyd, 9th Cir. (1999) “involves whether a social worker and a police officer were entitled to qualified immunity, for a coerced entry into a home to investigate suspected child abuse, interrogation of a child, and strip search of a child, conducted without a search warrant and without a special exigency.” The court did not agree that the social worker and the police officer had “qualified immunity” and said, “the facts in this case are noteworthy for the absence of emergency.” No one was in distress.

“The police officer was there to back up the social worker’s

insistence on entry against the mother’s will, not because he perceived any imminent danger of harm.” And he should have known better. Furthermore, “had the information been more alarming, had the social worker or police officer been alarmed, had there been reason to fear imminent harm to a child, this would be a different case, one to which we have no occasion to speak. A reasonable official would understand that they could not enter the home without consent or a search warrant.” The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals defines the law and states “In our circuit, a reasonable official would have known that the law barred this entry. Any government official (DCF or police) can be held to know that their office does not give them unrestricted right to enter people’s homes at will. We held in White v. Pierce County (797 F. 2d 812 (9th Cir. 1986), a child welfare investigation case, that ‘it was settled constitutional law that, absent exigent circumstances, police could not enter a dwelling without a warrant even under statutory authority where probable cause existed.’ The principle that government officials cannot coerce entry into people’s houses without a search warrant or applicability 2

of an established exception to the requirement of a search warrant is so well established that any reasonable officer would know it.” (Emphasis added) And there we have it: “Any government official can be held to know that their office does not give them an unrestricted right to enter peoples’ homes at will. … The fourth Amendment preserves the ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses … ’ without limiting that right to one kind of government official.” (emphasis added) In this instant case, the trial court as well as the State of Connecticut acted outside the law when a parent is before ANY court. Without “due process”, the State of Connecticut acted as the hearer of facts without hearing any facts of a particular case and presumed that every single child is harmed whether they are one-day-old or 17-years old just because a parent files for a disillusion of marriage. Without any facts the state presumed that all parents are unfit and incompetent when the state, through the judge, issued an automatic court order of parenting classes. The judge abdicated his position as the hearer and trier of facts by accepting the states false presumption that all children are harmed and parents are unfit and incompetent to discuss family related issues. There was no facts or conclusion of law that determined that any child was harmed nor was their evidence that the Defendant was unfit or incompetent to handle the emotional needs of his family. As you will see, the Supreme Court as well as the Circuit Courts has ruled repeatedly that the intrusion on the lives of families is very narrow and restricted by the 1st, 4th, 6th and 14th Amendment. In recent rulings by the Supreme Court, both the child’s and parents constitutional rights are triggered when ANY arm of the state starts an investigation whether that be the police or DCF. It is does not effect the constitutional rights of parents and children just because the state, DCF and the Attorney General’s office wrongly attempt to circumvent, abrogate or abridge the rights of parents and children when in juvenile or 3

family court or in some administrative proceedings, constitutional protections are afforded to all Americans. The Supreme Court has recently overturned 30-years of state laws and statutes, rulings by juvenile and family judges and unconstitutional behavior by child protection. Not only did the Supreme Court reaffirm the constitutional rights of parents but they have spanked the state of Washington for violating the constitutional rights of parents and children. The court ruled that the “best interest of a child” standard is a constitutional right afforded parent’s, not a judicial discretion where the court or state can substitute their standard with the parents without due process. It is legally insufficient for the state, DCF or juvenile and family court to substitute the parent’s best interest standard without due process. The Defendant in this instant case is presumed fit, able and capable of handling the physical and emotional needs of his children and does not need parenting classes. The motivation or intention of the parenting class in the automatic court order is neither relevant nor probable cause. The issue is that only the parent has the legal right to determine if at all what needs he or she may need not the state. For the last 30 plus years every single state has presumed parents to be unfit to make decisions and presumed that children are harmed. Unlawfully, the State of Connecticut like all states unlawfully switches the burden of proof on to the parents when the burden has always been theirs. In the landmark Supreme Court ruling in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), the Supreme Court ruled that this presumption against parents was unconstitutional and that the state law as well as the lower court’s ruling in the State of Washington was unlawful and unconstitutional. Parents do not have to prove their fitness, innocence and this unconstitutional practice of presumption of guilt and unfitness must stop. The state of Washington and the court presumed that they could impose their best interest standard without the requisite proof of parental unfitness which is a due 4

process violation. Presently there is NO equal protection under the laws in Connecticut for parents. If you are a parent vs. a non-parent you are automatically denied your constitutional rights as a class of people by the mere fact you are a parent. These equal protection violations are worse then the centuries of the equal protection violations perpetrated on black Americans. If you become a parent in this country and it does not matter your race, you automatically loose your 4th, 6th and 14th Amendment rights. Like black Americans, the state in collusion with the Attorney Generals Office and DCF get to choose and cherry pick what rights you will and what Federal constitutional rights you will not get even though they lack the authority to deny, impinge, ignore, abrogate or abridge the rights of a class of Americans called parents. The decision in the case of Doe et al, v. Heck et al (No. 01-3648, 2003 US App. Lexis 7144) will affect the manner in which law enforcement, the State of Connecticut and DCF investigations of alleged child abuse or neglect are conducted. The decision of the 7 th Circuit Court of Appeals found that the practice of a “no prior consent” interview of a child will ordinarily constitute a “clear violation” of the constitutional rights of parents under the 4 th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

According to the Court, the investigative

interview of a child constitutes a “search and seizure” and, when conducted on private property without “consent, a warrant, probable cause, or exigent circumstances,” such an interview is an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the rights of the parent, child, and can include criminal trespassing by DCF and the police. Presently, by statute, DCF instructs their workers to violate the rights of parents and children saying they do not need consent to enter homes and speak with children. In these several cases it shows the State of Connecticut absent imminent “physical” danger” has no jurisdiction or right to interfere with the family. They like to use some vague

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undefined term like harm when in fact the more accurate term would be impact. In filing for dissolution of marriage, there is NO perpetrator of a crime and NO abuse or neglect. ARGUMENT This constitutional challenge came out of the automatic court order issued by the state legislator through the family court using the state judiciary system to compel any parent and force parents with pains of contempt charges to take parenting classes even though C.G.S. §§ 46b-69b lacks any due process. The state legislator had presumed that every single child is harmed by parents getting a divorced without any proof such a claim whether that child is 1-day-old or is 17years-old. The lower court quotes Representative John W. Thompson which is says in part, “…Mr. Speaker, every year more than one million children are affected by divorce…” The lower court failed to show how the Defendant’s 14-year-old twins is affected by the divorce if at all, or how parenting class will ameliorate any perceived impact. The only thing the lower court has to offer is hearsay on some arbitrary number to support a legal court order where no evidence was presented. There is also no evidence to show to what effect if any these parenting have on children.

Hearsay statements inadmissible in family, Juvenile and Superior Court proceedings involving children. A.G.G. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky vacated and remanded a decision by the Barren Circuit Court which terminated parental rights because of sexual abuse. The court found that a child's statements to a counselor during therapy and a physician during a physical examination were hearsay and inadmissible at trial under the U.S. Supreme Court case, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), because 6

the child did not testify at trial and there was no opportunity for cross-examination of the child. Because the child's statements were inadmissible, the child welfare agency failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the child had been sexually abused. Cite: NO. 2004-CA-001979-ME and NO. 2004-CA-002032-ME, 2005 Ky. App. LEXIS 163 (Ky. Ct. App 2005) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: In re TY.B & In re TI.B The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed a lower court's order terminating a father's parental rights to his children, based on that court's finding of neglect; the appeals court holding that the erroneous termination order was based on inadmissible hearsay testimony. The Court of Appeals concluded that the father adequately preserved his objection to admission of the testimony, and consequently reversed the termination order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Cite: No. 01-FS-1307; No. 01-FS-1320; 2005 D.C. App. LEXIS 390 (D.C. July 21, 2005) The lower court continues and states, “…Further, the statute achieves a compelling state interest in that it aims to maintain familial harmony through a difficult transition, a goal articulated in Roth”. The lower court’s legal reasoning on the compelling state interest failed to show the state has the legal right to interfere in family matters just because children have to cope with situation like divorce, the death of a parent or some type of serious illness within the immediate family. It’s not the state function or job to ensure and maintain familial harmony through difficult transitions. It is the parent’s responsibility to maintain his own family despite what the state thinks. Parents do not want the state’s unsolicited help. They want the state to mind their own business. I am sure the lower court would make the same argument that it would not be a constitutional violation if a child was removed from a home just because the child witnesses domestic violence. The problem would be the court would be wrong, DCF would be wrong 7

along with the State Legislator would also be wrong and such interference would be unlawful and unconstitutional. It is unlawful and unconstitutional for the courts, DCF and the State of Connecticut to interfere with families just because a child witnesses events in the home. Yes it is unlawful and an unconstitutional practice to remove children which results in punishing the children and the non-offending parent as stated. In a landmark class-action suit in the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York, U.S. District Judge Jack Weinstein ruled on Nicholson v. Williams, Case No.: 00-cv-2229, and upheld by the Second Circuit Court of Appeal. The suit challenged the practice of New York’s City’s Administration for Children’s Services of removing the children of battered mothers solely because the children saw and experienced their mothers being beaten by husbands or boyfriends. Judge Weinstein ruled that the practice is unconstitutional and he ordered it stopped. Are parents guilty of maltreatment or emotional neglect if the child witnesses domestic violence? “Not according to Judge Weinstein’s and medical experts from Yale New Haven.” During the trial, several leading national experts testified on the impact on children of witnessing domestic violence, and the impact on children of being removed from the nonoffending parent. Views of Experts on Effects of Domestic Violence on Children, and defining witnessing domestic violence by children as maltreatment or emotional neglect is a mistake. A “great concern [regarding] how increased awareness of children’s exposure [to domestic violence] and associated problems is being used. Concerned about the risk adult domestic violence poses for children, some child protection agencies in the United States appear to be defining exposure to domestic violence as a form of child maltreatment… Defining witnessing as maltreatment is a mistake. Doing so ignores the fact that large 8

numbers of children in these studies showed no negative development problems and some showed evidence of strong coping abilities. Automatically defining witnessing as maltreatment may also ignore battered mother’s efforts to develop safe environments for their children and themselves.” Ex. 163 at 866. Effects of removals on children and the non-offending parent. Dr. Wolf testified that disruptions in the parent-child relationship might provoke fear and anxiety in a child and diminish his or her sense of stability and self. Tr. 565-67. He described the typical response of a child separated from his parent: “When a young child is separated from a parent unwillingly, he or she shows distress … At first, the child is very anxious and protests vigorously and angrily. Then he falls into a sense of despair, though still hyper vigilant, looking, waiting, and hoping for her return …” A child’s sense of time factors into the extent to which a separation impacts his or her emotional well-being. Thus, for younger children whose sense of time is less keenly developed, short periods of parental absence may seem longer than for older children. Tr 565-65. See also Ex. 141b. For those children who are in homes where there is domestic violence, disruption of that bond can be even more traumatic than situations where this is no domestic violence. Dr. Stark (Yale New Haven Hospital researcher) asserted that if a child is placed in foster care as a result of domestic violence in the home, then he or she may view such removal as “a traumatic act of punishment … and [think] that something that [he] or she has done or failed to do has caused this separation.” Tr. 1562-63. Dr. Pelcovitz stated that “taking a child whose greatest fear is separation from his or her mother and in the name of ‘protecting’ that child [by] forcing on them, what is in effect, their worst nightmare, … is tantamount to pouring salt on an open wound.” Ex. 139 at 5. Another serious implication of removal is that it introduces children to the foster care system, which can be much more dangerous and debilitating than the home situation. Dr. 9

Stark testified that foster homes are rarely screened for the presence of violence, and that the incidence of abuse and child fatality in foster homes is double that in the general population. Tr 1596; Ex. 122 at 3-4. Children in foster care often fail to receive adequate medical care. Ex. 122 at 6. Foster care placements can disrupt the child’s contact with community, school and siblings. Ex. 122 at 8. The state and the courts do not have a limitless undefined ability that they can interfere with and intrude in the family arrangement just because a child feels bad. The State of Connecticut and the courts as ruled by the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts are compelled by the Federal Constitution to give parents their due process rights prior to such intrusion. What is notable in Nicholson, the medical experts say from Yale who knows more than DCF, the Legislators and the courts, “Automatically defining witnessing as maltreatment may also ignore battered mother’s efforts to develop safe environments for their children and themselves.” Ex. 163 at 866. This parallels the Defendant’s argument that defining witnessing a divorce is harm to a child without due process ignores the Defendant’s efforts to develop coping skills to offer his children. Even though the Second Circuit has ruled on the removal of children, the State of Connecticut and DCF still violate the rights of both child and parent by removing children unlawfully. Coping skills in children are important and a safe guard for children as they become adults. What is absent in this case is the fact there is no perpetrator of abuse or neglect nor is there evidence showing any harm. When any parent is before any court they are entitled to due process and the State of Connecticut must make their case in a case by case basis. Painting with a broad brush about a class of people called children on its face lacks due process especially when that brush is not based on any medical facts or specific child. You can’t say all crows are black if half of them are white. Also presuming that all

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parents lack the knowledge and are not fit to handle issues that may come up as a matter of the human condition is also unconstitutional for it also lacks due process. Parents are already presumed to take care of all of the child’s medical, emotional and psychological needs. The Defendant has done fine without the help of the government and does not need them to assist him in the care of his children. The Defendant did not need assistant from the State of Connecticut when he had thyroid cancer. The Defendant did not need the state’s help when his daughter died of SIDS (Sudden Infant Death Syndrome) when his son was present. The Defendant did not need help when his twins were born 4-months early where his son was 15 oz. and was born dead and died a second time and brought back to life. The Defendant did not need the states help when the other twin needed a heart operation at this premature state. The Defendant didn’t need the state’s interference when the mother of the twins almost died twice due to the incompetence of UCONN Medical Center. The state feels it has the right to circumvent and abridge the rights of parents to handle their own issues in a loving and caring environment. Merely parroting the term “compelling state interest” is legally insufficient because there is a constitutional protection like the 4th and 14th Amendment for which the state is compelled to legally overcome and they must meet this burden. For the last 30 plus years the state has been getting away with denying the constitutional rights to parents and children with junk science and bad rulings by the courts. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a presumption that a fit parent acts in their children’s best interests, not DCF, not the courts nor the State of Connecticut. The United States Supreme Court has stated: "There is a presumption that fit parents act in their children's best interests, Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 602; there is normally no reason or compelling interest for the State to inject itself into the private realm 11

of the family to further question fit parents' ability to make the best decisions regarding their children. Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 304. The state may not interfere in child rearing decisions when a fit parent is available. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). Consequently, the State of Connecticut can not use the “best interest of the child” standard to substitute its judgment for a fit parent and parroting that term is “legally insufficient” to use in the court to force parents to follow some arbitrary standard, case plan or horse and pony show. The State cannot usurp a fit parent’s decision making related to parental spending for their children, i.e. child support without either a demonstration the parent is unfit or there is proven harm to the child. In other words, the state and Child Protective Services can not impose a standard of living dealing with the rearing of children. When they violate this fundamental right, they would be intruding on the family’s life and liberty interest. The 1st Amendment bars such action because the rearing of children and the best interest of children is often based on ones religious beliefs, i.e. the separation of church and state. By the state imposing any standard of living or the rearing of children, they are putting forth a religious standard by their actions i.e. how you act, what to feed the child, how to dress the child, whether or not to home school and so on. The courts and the state lack jurisdiction on what goes on in the house even though they disagree with the choices made by parents, the Defendant terms this “parental immunity.” It’s none of the state’s business on how you are to raise your children. In other words, they can not falsely accuse parents of abuse or neglect just because they disagree with the method of child rearing or the standard in which they live. State Law provisions mandate that the State invade the family, through the judiciary, to examine, evaluate, determine and conclude the terms and nature of the interpersonal relationship, spousal roles, spousal conduct, parental decision making, parenting conduct, parental spending, economic standard of living, occupations, education, savings, assets, 12

charitable contributions and most importantly the intimate emotional, psychological and physical details of the parties and family during their marriage granting the judiciary a broad range of discretion to apply a property stripping statute with a standard of equity. This would be an abuse of the judicial power and the judicial system to intrude into U.S. citizen’s lives and violate their privacy rights. It is not the state’s right or jurisdiction to examine the day to day decisions and choices of citizens and then sit there in judgment and then force parents to follow conflicting standards with threat of harm for noncompliance i.e. abduction of children. The United States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment contains a recognized Right to Privacy. This fundamental Right to Privacy encompasses the Privacy Protected Zone of Parenting. The Plaintiff asserts that DCF policy and Connecticut General Statutes impermissibly infringe the Federal Right to Privacy to the extent they mandate the parent to support his or her children beyond a standard to prevent harm to them. They substitute the State s judgment for the parent’s judgment as to the best interest of his or her children. The challenged statutes do not mandate a review to determine if demonstrable harm exists to the children in determining the amount of support that the parent must provide. The State is not permitted and lacks jurisdiction to determine care and maintenance, i.e. spending, i.e. child discipline, decisions of a fit parent based on his or her income in an intact marriage other than to prevent harm to a child. There is no basis for the State to have a statute that mandates a fit divorced parent should support their child to a different standard, i.e. the standard of the best interests of a child. Furthermore, the State must not so mandate absent a demonstration that the choice of support provided by the parent has resulted in harm to his or her children. The U.S. Supreme Court has mandated that the standard for the State to intrude in parenting decisions relating to grandparent visitation is no longer best interests of the child. 13

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57; 120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000). This court should recognize the changed standard of State intrusion in parenting should also apply to the context of parents care, control, and maintenance, i.e. spending, i.e. child discipline decisions, on behalf of his or her children. This court made a correct ruling in Lovan C. v. Department of Children and Family 86 Conn. App. 290 (2004) and is supported by the 9th Circuit where the court ruled that bruises were legally insufficient to establish special exigency. Another recent 9th Circuit case also held that there is no exception to the warrant requirement for social workers in the context of a child abuse investigation. ‘The [California] regulations they cite require social workers to respond to various contacts in various ways. But none of the regulations cited say that the social worker may force her way into a home without a search warrant in the absence of any emergency.’ Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1999) Calabretta also cites various cases form other jurisdictions for its conclusion. Good v. Dauphin County Social Servs., 891 F.2d 1087 (3rd Cir. 1989) held that a social worker and police officer were not entitled to qualified immunity for insisting on entering her house against the mother’s will to examine her child for bruises. Good holds that a search warrant or exigent circumstances, such as a need to protect a child against imminent danger of serious bodily injury, was necessary for an entry without consent, and the anonymous tip claiming bruises was in the case insufficient to establish special exigency. The 9th Circuit further opined in Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000), that ‘[b]ecause the swing of every pendulum brings with it potential adverse consequences, it is important to emphasize that in the area of child abuse, as with the investigation and prosecution of all crimes, the state is constrained by the substantive and procedural guarantees of the Constitution. The fact that the suspected crime may be heinous – 14

whether it involves children or adults – does not provide cause for the state to ignore the rights of the accused or any other parties. Otherwise, serious injustices may result. In cases of alleged child abuse, governmental failure to abide by constitutional constraints may have deleterious long-term consequences for the child and, indeed, for the entire family. Ill-considered and improper governmental action may create significant injury where no problem of any kind previously existed.’ Id. at 1130-1131.” There you have it, the failure of the juvenile and family courts as well as DCF and the Legislators to abide to ALL constitutional constraints can harm both the child and family. The lower court in this instant case failed to show by what authority does the State of Connecticut, DCF, juvenile and family court are allowed to violate the Federal constitutional rights of children and parents. The only thing the court has to offer is bad rulings which support the violation of the constitutional rights of parents. The court also parrots that the state has a compelling interest which is legally insufficient to abrogate or abridge the constitutional rights of children and parents. There is something called due process before the state can interfere with any child or the parent’s ability to deal with any situation that occurs within the family arrangement. The state can not influence what a parent is what to say, how to say it or what to think. Doing so is a 1st Amendment violation. This compelling interest that is quoted must be supported by evidence that a child in the case of the Defendant was a victim of a crime of abuse or neglect and neither took place. Under the Constitution, the court must presume that the child was never harmed and that the parent is fit and innocent. There is no compelling interest by the state if there is no evidence that a child has been harm and in the case of the Defendant no evidence has been presented. Connecticut General Statute §§ 46b-69b fails to show exactly how a child is harmed whether that child be 1-day-old or 17-years-old or that a child is ever harmed at all. 15

There is the hundred thousand dollar question, where does this compelling interest by the state start and stop? According to the lower court there is no definition on what is or is not a compelling interest. This court correctly stated in Lovan C. v. Department of Children and Family 86 Conn. App. 290 (2004) that there is no definition on harm. The state likes it that way so they can make it up as they go along. Even if they can prove there is a compelling state interest, the U.S. Supreme Court clearly states that the state, DCF and juvenile and family court have the full weight of the Constitution upon them. Is the State of Connecticut, DCF, juvenile and family courts subject to the 4th and 14th Amendment? Yes they are as well as other constitutional prohibitions. The Fourth Amendment is applicable to DCF investigators in the context of an investigation of alleged abuse or neglect as are all “government officials.” This issue is brought out best in Walsh v. Erie County Dept. of Job and Family Services, 3:01-cv-7588. If it is unlawful and unconstitutional for the police who are government officials, likewise it is for DCF employees who are also government officials. The social workers, Darnold and Brown, argued that “the Fourth Amendment was not applicable to the activities of their social worker employees.” The social workers claimed, “entries into private homes by child welfare workers involve neither searches nor seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and thus can be conducted without either a warrant or probable cause to believe that a child is at risk of imminent harm.” The court disagreed and ruled: “Despite the defendant’s exaggerated view of their powers, the Fourth Amendment applies to them, as it does to all other officers and agents of the state whose request to enter, however benign or well-intentioned, are met by a closed door.” The Court also stated “The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures 16

applies whenever an investigator, be it a police officer, a DCF employee, or any other agent of the state, responds to an alleged instance of child abuse, neglect, or dependency.” (Emphasis added) Darnold and Brown’s first argument, shot down by the court. The social workers then argued that there are exceptions to the Fourth Amendment, and that the situation with the Walsh children was an “emergency.” Further, the “Defendants argue their entry into the home, even absent voluntary consent, was reasonable under the circumstances.” They point to the anonymous complaint about clutter on the front porch; and the plaintiff’s attempt to leave. These circumstances, the defendants argue, created an ‘emergency situation’ that led Darnold and Brown reasonably to believe the Walsh children were in danger of imminent harm. (This is the old “emergency” excuse that has been used for years by social workers.) The Court again disagreed and ruled: “There is nothing inherently unusual or dangerous about cluttered premises, much less anything about such vaguely described conditions that could manifest imminent or even possible danger or harm to young children. If household ‘clutter’ justifies warrantless entry and threats of removal of children and arrest or citation of their parents, few families are secure and few homes are safe from unwelcome and unjustified intrusion by state officials and officers.” The Court went on to rule, “They have failed to show that any exigency that justifies warrantless entry was necessary to protect the welfare of the plaintiff’s children. In this case, a rational jury could find that ‘no evidence points to the opposite conclusion’ and a lack of ‘sufficient exigent circumstances to relieve the state actors here of the burden of obtaining a warrant.’ The social workers’ second argument, shot down by the court. The social workers, Darnold and Brown, then argued that they are obligated under law to investigate any reported case of child abuse, and that supersedes the Fourth 17

Amendment. The social workers argued, “Against these fundamental rights, the defendants contend that Ohio’s statutory framework for learning about and investigation allegations of child abuse and neglect supersede their obligations under the Fourth Amendment. They point principally to § 2151.421 of the Ohio Revised code as authority for their warrantless entry into and search of the plaintiff’s home. That statute imposes a duty on certain designated professionals and persons who work with children or provide child care to report instances of apparent child abuse or neglect.” This is the old “mandatory reporter” excuse. The Court disagreed and ruled: “The defendant’s argument that the duty to investigate created by § 2151.421(F)(1) exempts them from the Fourth Amendment misses the mark because, not having received a report described in § 2151.421(A)(1)(b), they were not, and could not have been, conducting an investigation pursuant to § 2151.421(F)(1).” The social worker’s third argument, shot down by the court. The Court continues with their chastisement of the social workers: “There can be no doubt that the state can and should protect the welfare of children who are at risk from acts of abuse and neglect. There likewise can be no doubt that occasions arise calling for immediate response, even without prior judicial approval. But those instances are the exception. Otherwise child welfare workers would have a free pass into any home in which they have an anonymous report or poor housekeeping, overcrowding, and insufficient medical care and, thus perception that children may be at some risk.” The Court continues: “The anonymous phone call in this case did not constitute a ‘report’ of child abuse or neglect.” The social workers, Darnold and Brown, claimed that they were immune from liability, claiming qualified immunity because “they had not had training in Fourth Amendment law.” In other words, because they thought the Fourth Amendment did not bind them, they could not be sued for their “mistake.” 18

The police officers, Chandler and Kish, claimed that they could not be sued because they thought the social workers were not subject to the Fourth Amendment, and they were just helping the social workers. The Court disagreed and ruled: “That subjective basis for their ignorance about and actions in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not relieve them of the consequences of that ignorance and those actions.” The Court then lowers the boom by stating: “The claims of defendants Darnold, Brown, Chandler and Kish of qualified immunity are therefore denied.” A police officer and a social worker may not conduct a warrantless search or seizure in a suspected child abuse case absent exigent circumstances. Defendants must have reason to believe that life or limb is in immediate jeopardy and that the intrusion is reasonable necessary to alleviate the threat. Searches and seizures in investigation of a child neglect or child abuse case at a home are governed by the same principles as other searches and seizures at a home. Good v. Dauphin County Social Services (3rd Cir. 1989) The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extends beyond criminal investigations and includes conduct by social workers in the context of a child neglect/abuse investigation. Lenz v. Winburn (11th Cir. 1995) In this instant case, the State of Connecticut, DCF and the juvenile and family courts do have an exaggerated view of their powers and have acted outside the law and jurisdiction interfering in family matters. The state does not have a compelling interest in violating the rights of family every time a child feels bad or bumps their knee. The State of Connecticut’s argument that parental classes are needed becomes a moot point and a non issue because if both parents agree parenting classes are not needed the judge can waive the classes. The court can also determine that participation is not necessary. Even if parents are forced to take the class, they can just throw out the

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garbage put out by those who promote the classes for profit and raise their children the way they want. The classes are a waste of money and the time parents put into it. In C.G.S. §§ 46b-69b, there is another constitutional violation where it states that the court is authorized to require an investigation by DCF in any family relations case. The state can’t authorize the unlawful entry into American’s home just because a parent files for dissolution of marriage. This fishing expedition into the private lives of families has already been ruled unconstitutional. Unless the child is in imminent “physical” danger, such an order is unlawful and unconstitutional. As stated in previous case law, the judge is confined to the 4th and 14th Amendment to enter any home regardless how benign it may appear and unless he or she can legally overcome the 4th and 14th Amendment, the warrant can not go forth. C.G.S. §§ 46b-69b clearly instructs judges to abrogate and abridge the 4th and 14th Amendment of both child and parent. Parents may assert their children’s 4th Amendment claim on behalf of their children as well as asserting their own 14th Amendment claim. Malik v.Arapahoe Cty. Dept. of Social Services, (10th Cir. 1999) “[I]n context of a seizure of a child by the State during an abuse investigation . . . a court order is the equivalent of a warrant.” (Emphasis added) Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 602 (2nd Cir. 1999). F.K. v. Iowa district Court for Polk County, Id.” Conclusion It is with no doubt the State of Connecticut needs to intervene on behalf of children who are physically abuse and physically neglected. As ruled by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Circuit Courts of Appeal, government intrusion is very narrowly defined and subject to the 4th and 14th Amendment. The state does not have lawful right to push parent’s constitutional rights into the gutter just because they are parents and that the end justifies the means. Clearly there are events that happen in families like deaths of loved ones and

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other serious issues where the state has no right to cross into. The Defendant calls this “parental immunity” from government interference. The issue before the Supreme Court was not what was in the best interest of the child, but who had the lawful right to define that best interest standard and the court concluded that the parent was, not the state. And the court continued saying that if the state were to intervene, there was a constitutional threshold called the 4th and 14th Amendment. It’s one thing for the state to implement safety equipment like car seats, seat belt and other safety devices. It’s totally another thing to deny the constitutional rights of parents when their in court or subject to an investigation. So to say the state has the right to do both is in opposition to the constitution the federal rulings. For 30 plus years the courts, DCF and the State Legislators wrongfully assumed that parents were not entitled to their constitutional rights as long as there was a child in the home. Well, they assumed wrong. There is clearly an equal protection violation when you tell one government official like the police that they need a lawful warrant and then tell another government official like DCF or the juvenile and family courts they do not have to recognize the constitutional protections afforded a parent. In the cases sited as well as the ones in the Appendix turned on the fact the States failed to prove their case. The courts also ruled that the states along with child protection violated the constitutional rights of both child and parents regardless if the case was in family or juvenile court. The states also failed to overcome their burden in the search and seizures requirements. The state along with child protection is not given a pass on overcoming the parent’s constitutional rights. If it’s unconstitutional for the police, likewise it is unconstitutional for DCF and the Legislators.

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Legislators and Child Protection love to connect dots that can never be connected or in other words, cause and effect. Such was the case in every case sited where they attempted to say all children were harmed because . . . fill in the blank. This fraudulent attempt even occurred in the case called State of Connecticut v. Judith Scruggs were the state and DCF very fraudulently attempted to connect a messy home with the suicide and harm to Judith’s son Daniel who hung himself due to bullying. The Appellate court got that right and overturned that conviction because the State of Connecticut and DCF had NO experts that could support their erroneous fabricated opinion. The undersign filed an Amicus brief with the court pointing out DCF’s fraudulent attempt to sway the court without showing proof how a messy home harms a child. To say that a child was impacted or harmed requires an expert opinion in a specific case. For legislators to support a statute with baseless opinions as medical fact when in fact it is a medically baseless opinion, it is fraud upon the court. In fact it is and was medical malpractice on the part of the state whether from DCF or the legislator when they generalize or make broad sweeping statements. The judicial system must continually challenge the opinions of DCF and the Legislators and not accept them as medical fact because none are experts and unqualified to give an expert opinion. Parents are entitled to their due process along with their rights covered by the “confrontation clause” under the 6th Amendment. It’s very simple, unless the child is in imminent “physical” danger the state and DCF has NO jurisdiction to violate the rights of parent and children. Nor do they have the right to question children or force parents to do something against their will. The mere possibility or risk of harm does not constitute an emergency or exigent circumstance that would justify a forced warrantless entry and a warrantless seizure of a child. Hurlman v. Rice, (2nd Cir. 1991) 22

Like adults, children cope and adjust with all kinds of tragedies, hardships and events that occur within the family and most children overcome these events in their lives and they use these coping skills as they grow older. Parents decide if any intervention of classes or therapy are needed for the family or children not some heartless government statute. These unlicensed social workers at DCF would have you believing and going to therapy for every live problem you may have because their social agenda is to fix the world according to them. WHEREFORE, the Defendant-Appellant constitutional challenge of C.G.S. §§ 46b69b be AFFIRMED in that C.G.S. §§ 46b-69b is unconstitutional for it lacks many things inter alia the lack of due process, 4th and 14th Amendment violations and what is contained in the Statement of the Issues. The State of Connecticut needs to bring their present day statutes and law in line with the U.S. Supreme Court opinions as well as the Circuit Courts. The Defendant knows that the cases sited as well as this ruling will significantly change the way courts view parents and children rights and the way courts rule. This ruling will compel the lower courts to hold the state and DCF accountable for violating the constitutional rights of both child and parent. That the state has the right to initiate an investigation but the Federal Constitution dictates how that investigation is to be executed. It will also compel the state to prove that a child was in deed harmed. All of the Table of Authorities comes from Appendix. The Appendix is a parental rights handbook that has been circulated throughout the United States to attorneys and their clients.

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DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

______________________________ Thomas Dutkiewicz, Pro Se P.O. Box 9775 Forestville, CT 06011-9775 (860) 833-4127

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE PURSUANT TO §62-7 This is to certify that the Defendant has caused a copy of the above-named document was mailed by first class mail to the following interested persons on April 28, 2007. Aimee Dutkiewicz, Pro Se P.O. Box 3005 Bristol, CT 06011-3005 860-585-1136

APPELLATE CLERK’S OFFICE APPELLATE COURT 231 Capitol Avenue Hartford, CT 06106-1548

State of Connecticut At New Britain Superior Court 20 Franklin Square New Britain, CT 06050

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

______________________________ Thomas Dutkiewicz, Pro Se P.O. Box 9775 Forestville, CT 06011-9775 (860) 833-4127

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CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO §66-3 I certify that the foregoing document complies with the provisions of P.B. §66-3 in that the type size is Arial and 12 point. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

______________________________ Thomas Dutkiewicz, Pro Se P.O. Box 9775 Forestville, CT 06011-9775 (860) 833-4127 CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH PRACTICE BOOK § 67-2 I hereby certify that the foregoing Brief of the Defendants-Appellants complies in all respects with the requirements of Practice Book § 67-2.

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

______________________________ Thomas Dutkiewicz, Pro Se P.O. Box 9775 Forestville, CT 06011-9775 (860) 833-4127

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