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Roger Federeralism DA DA Shell Roger Federeralism DA....................................................................................................................................1 Federalism 1NC................................................................................................................................................2 Federalism 1NC................................................................................................................................................3 Federalism high now.........................................................................................................................................4 Federalism high now.........................................................................................................................................5 Coastal area federalism high now.....................................................................................................................6 New federalism high now.................................................................................................................................7 California maintaining federalism....................................................................................................................8 A2: Clean air act/fuel economy standards........................................................................................................9 Now is the key time........................................................................................................................................10 Federalism low now........................................................................................................................................11 Federalism low now........................................................................................................................................12 Federalism low now........................................................................................................................................13 Links...............................................................................................................................................................14 Links...............................................................................................................................................................15 Wind power link.............................................................................................................................................16 RPS link..........................................................................................................................................................17 Spillover..........................................................................................................................................................18 No link............................................................................................................................................................19 Model yes........................................................................................................................................................20 Model no.........................................................................................................................................................21 Federalism good – conflict.............................................................................................................................22 Federalism good – conflict.............................................................................................................................23 Federalism good – tyranny.............................................................................................................................24 A2: Race to the bottom...................................................................................................................................25 Federalism bad – conflict................................................................................................................................26 Federalism bad - conflict................................................................................................................................27 Federalism bad - tyranny................................................................................................................................28 Liberty impact.................................................................................................................................................29 Iraq federalism good – links...........................................................................................................................30 Iraq Federalism good – links..........................................................................................................................31 Iraq Federalism good – impacts......................................................................................................................32 Iraq Federalism good – impacts......................................................................................................................33 Iraq Federalism good – impacts......................................................................................................................34 Iraq Federalism good – impacts......................................................................................................................35 Iraq federalism good – solvency.....................................................................................................................36 Iraq federalism good – solvency.....................................................................................................................37 Iraq federalism good – solvency.....................................................................................................................38 Iraq federalism good – solvency.....................................................................................................................39 Iraq federalism bad – links.............................................................................................................................40 Iraq federalism bad – solvency.......................................................................................................................41 Iraq federalism bad – solvency.......................................................................................................................42 Iraq federalism bad – solvency.......................................................................................................................43 Indonesia federalism now...............................................................................................................................44 Indonesia federalism good - terrorism............................................................................................................45 Indonesia federalism good - hegemony..........................................................................................................46 Indonesia federalism bad................................................................................................................................47

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Federalism 1NC A. Uniqueness: A. Unique internal link – federalism is on the brink, but state rights are winning because of leadership over energy Raymond C, Scheppach, Executive director of the NGA, Stateline.org, “Will the 2008 election improve state-federal relations?” July 9, 2008 we are at a major turning point in the role of the states in our intergovernmental system. Essentially, the long-term trend of increased centralization of authority in Washington, D.C., may slow dramatically or even be reversed. Two reasons will drive this change. First, the next administration and Congress will have to focus more on international issues, ranging from the wars in Iraq and While it is always risky to look into the crystal ball, I sense that

Afghanistan, to terrorism, to Iran and North Korea and to global economic issues such as the price of oil and other commodities and the value of the dollar?all in an increasingly fragile international financial system. In short, the next administration and

Congress will face huge international challenges that could dominate the agenda. Second, on many of the domestic issues such as health care, energy and climate change, states and governors have been providing national leadership over the last decade.

B. Links: Preemption on climate change policy destroys federalism – now is the key time. Raymond A. Biering, JD Loyola Law School, and Brian S. Biering, University of Oregon School of Law, Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation, 2008 lexis As California and other states continue to develop and implement climate change programs, the inherent tension in our nation's particular form of federalism will necessitate compromise and coordination between the federal and state jurisdictions. At the heart of the issue of federalism is the argument over the perceived political advantages and disadvantages inherent in decentralized environmental decision making, as compared to centralized environmental decision making. The bases for the arguments for decentralized environmental decision making include the states' right to determine environmental protection measures based upon a balance between environmental protection and economic development; the potential for a greater range of environmental choices based upon local circumstances; the inherent differences between states in their natural and impacted environments and potential efficiencies resulting from the unique circumstances applicable to certain environmental measures; and the view that states are more nimble and can provide technological and regulatory innovation more flexibly than the federal government. 141 The bases for the arguments regarding centralized environmental decision making include concerns that states may adopt less stringent standards; inconsistent state actions may result in interstate and possibly even foreign policy impacts; centralized environmental decision making may be more efficient in terms of both research and development of regulatory standards and their effect on nationwide or multi-national industries; and, specific to climate change, its global [*66] consequences cannot be effectively addressed at the state and local level. 142 Beyond the policy choices inherent to federalism in the context of climate change initiatives, state and regional-level approaches to regulating greenhouse gases will likely raise broader constitutional concerns. The federal government has yet to comprehensively occupy the field of climate change initiatives, except arguably with regard to vehicular fuels under CAA section 202 143 and yet-to-be developed EPA regulations after Massachusetts. Thus, states are free to continue

implementing their own regulatory climate change initiatives, including some that may ultimately be inconsistent with the efforts of the federal government and other states, until the federal government effectively occupies that field. As previously mentioned, California's Clean Air Act provides that even local and regional air authorities "may establish additional, stricter standards than those set forth by law or by the state board for nonvehicular sources." 144 Depending on how the federal government ultimately responds to climate change after Massachusetts,

future comprehensive regulatory approaches addressing climate change may turn on questions of federal supremacy. The Supremacy Clause under the United States Constitution essentially invalidates state laws that "interfere with, or are contrary to" federal law. 145 Federal law can supersede state law through: (1) express preemption, i.e., where Congress preempts state law in express terms; 146 (2) nullification of a state law to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law; 147 and (3) implied preemption, i.e., where the federal regulatory scheme "is [*67] sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress "left no room' for supplementary state regulation." 148 At this juncture, Congress has not expressly preempted state action regarding climate change initiatives, except, perhaps, in the context of limited areas like vehicular fuels. Further, in the absence of comprehensive federal legislation addressing climate change, the states' initiatives, both regulatory and voluntary, are not yet conflicting with federal law. Finally, until the federal government acts definitively and

comprehensively, implied preemption will be limited to those areas where Congress has actually left no room for supplementary state regulation.

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Federalism 1NC C. Impact: Federalism preserves peace, preventing ethnic conflicts. Stephen Calebresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1983, Yale, “Reflections on United States v. Lopez” 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, Michigan Law Review, December, 1995 lexis Small state federalism is a big part of what keeps the peace in countries like the United States and Switzerland. It is a big part of the reason why we do not have a Bosnia or a Northern Ireland or a Basque country or a Chechnya or a Corsica or a Quebec problem. American federalism in the end is not a trivial matter or a quaint historical anachronism. American-style federalism is a thriving and vital institutional arrangement - partly planned by the Framers, partly the accident of history - and it prevents violence and war. It prevents religious warfare, it prevents secessionist warfare, and it prevents racial warfare. It is part of the reason why democratic majoritarianism in the United States has not produced violence or secession for 130 years, unlike the situation for example, in England, France, Germany, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, or Spain. There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that is more important or that has done more to promote peace, prosperity, and freedom than the federal structure of that great document. There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that should absorb more completely the attention of the U.S. Supreme Court.

Ethnic conflicts lead to global wars David Lake and Donald Rothchild, USC Political Science Profs, “The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict” 1999 new fears of state meltdown and ethnic cleansing have rippled across the international community. In this “new world disorder,” many worry that ethnic conflict is contagious, that conflict in one local can stimulate conflict elsewhere, and that initial outbreaks in the Balkans, the former Soviet Union and Africa, if not quarantined could set off an epidemic of catastrophic proportions. Even before fears of nuclear Armageddon could fully fade,

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Federalism high now States rights strong – greenhouse gas emissions policies are key. Thomas Elias, San Gabriel Valley Tribune (California), "California a key states' rights battleground" June 27, 2008 lexis There was a time when the phrase "states' rights" was code for trampling on the rights of individuals. That was during the great 20th Century civil rights battle, when many states asserted they had the right to prevent some citizens from enjoying rights like voting and eating in the restaurants of their choice. But the states' rights argument has been

essentially turned on its head under a U.S. Supreme Court decision and a series of federal administrations that have tried to allow citizens - and some wild animals - fewer rights than California and other states want to give them. Add in environmental issues, where this state leads the fight for tough cutbacks on greenhouse gas emissions and mitigation of worldwide climate change while the national government pushes the doctrine that federal laws and decisions should always take precedence over state decisions.

State policies and federalism are high now – thanks to flexibility efforts against the Federal Government. John Dinan, Publius, “The state of American Federalism 2007-2008: resurgent state influence in the national policy process and continued state policy innovation” June 22, 2008 lexis By any measure, state governments were at the forefront of domestic policy-making in 2007 and early 2008. Not only were state officials more successful than in any prior year of the Bush presidency in securing relief from burdensome federal directives regarding the National Guard, homeland security, education, and welfare policy, but they were also as active as ever in adopting policy innovations in areas such as illegal immigration, health care, and environmental protection. To be sure, state influence in the national policy process was not so strong as to bring an end to other contested requirements in the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program (TANF), and REAL ID Act or to fend off new federal directives in other areas. Nor were state officials free of federal constraints as they targeted illegal immigration, expanded health care coverage, and addressed climate change, given that state acts generated federal lawsuits and agency rulings preempting state authority in each of these areas. Nevertheless, states were more

influential than in recent years in gaining flexibility in implementing federal legislation, and they continued to be the main innovators in policy areas where the public was especially desirous of governmental action.

Federalism increasing now. John Dinan, Publius, “The state of American Federalism 2007-2008: resurgent state influence in the national policy process and continued state policy innovation” June 22, 2008 lexis What is notable about state efforts to influence national policy-making in 2007-2008 is that state officials at one time or another employed each of these tactics and experienced notable success in persuading federal officials to take account of their concerns.

Not only did states persuade the new Democratic-controlled Congress to repeal a year-old provision that enhanced presidential power to federalize National Guard troops, but they also won major concessions in the drafting of a national disaster-response plan and gained varying degrees of flexibility in implementing REAL ID, NCLB, and TANF. It is true that state officials have additional grievances about each of these programs that went unaddressed, and so some of these were only partial victories and served mainly to recapture some of the ground lost in the first six years of the Bush presidency, which was characterized by an increasing centralization of power on many fronts (Conlan and Dinan 2007). Moreover, states remain unsatisfied with federal officials' responsiveness to complaints about other directives imposed during the year, such as flexibility under the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) and Medicaid. Additionally, state officials were uncertain at year's end about their ability to head off other proposed mandates, including some proposed by members of the new Democratic congressional majority and others that enjoyed bipartisan backing. Nevertheless, state officials in

2007-2008 enjoyed a string of successes that can be attributed to lobbying tactics that states pursued in an aggressive and skillful fashion and to federal officials' receptivity to the concerns of states and localities tasked with implementing federal directives.

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Federalism high now Federalism is shining due to federal inaction on climate change. Pam Doughman, Ph.D., University of Illinois, and Allison M. Chatrchyan, Ph.D, Cornell University, "State and Regional Efforts to Address a Global Environmental Issue: Climate Change Policies in California, New York, and the Northeast" March 2007 This paper argues that in the absence of mandatory federal action on climate change from the late 1990s, US states including CA, NY, Maine and others, and various regional climate change initiatives, took on a leading role in developing their own climate change policies, putting increasing pressure on the US government to address climate change at the federal level. The paper argues that federalism has played an essential role spurring state and regional leadership in the face of US inaction.

Carbon federalism high now. Christopher Berendt, Director of Environmental Market Services, Pace Energy Services, "Are We Reaching the Sum of Carbon Federalism" April 2007 The current state of carbon regulations in the United States is best described as “Carbon Federalism.” This term speaks to the fact that individual States and coalitions of States are currently the driving force behind carbon controls and the promotion of low-carbon technology. The States are acting as a laboratory to test a host of climate change policy approaches and identify best practices in advance of federal action – an effect that is often cited as a core aspect of federalism. While many of the results of these tests will not be known for some time, the very fact that the testing is planned is increasing the political pressure on Congress to legislate economy-wide carbon controls into federal law. This underscores the importance of maintaining a watchful eye on these experiments to gauge the viability of the risks and opportunities created by the momentum. The actions by various States to address climate change started years ago and have taken a diversity of forms from clean energy fund creation, renewable portfolio standards, and energy efficiency rebate programs to reforestation, HOV lane adoptions, and low-carbon technology tax incentives. However, the last three years have seen increased public pressures on the States to step up engagement of the climate issue. These pressures are a reflection of the strong consensus in the climatologist community regarding the science of, and the impacts resulting from, a changing climate. More so than the science, the

exponential increases in media attention and public awareness regarding the specter of climate change is likely responsible for the new climate of carbon urgency. Many States have responded to this urgency by adopting more rigorous carbon targets coupled with the planned adoption of mandatory or “compliance” carbon markets. The most notable efforts are in the Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic States surrounding the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and in California and the Western Governor’s Association (WGA). These States represent almost 35% of the U.S. population and almost a quarter of all the power consumed in the country. The efforts seek to implement cap-andtrade systems which create compliance carbon markets. Other regulatory schemes of note include low-carbon

automotive and fuel standards as well as greenhouse gas emissions generator performance standards applied to power purchase contracts.

States will continue increasing their role in climate change. Barry G. Rabe, professor of public policy at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at University of Michigan, "Second generation climate policies in the United States" January 2, 2008 all indicators suggest that climate policy has not only reached the agenda of most state capitals but is actively moving ahead with fairly broad political support. It appears reasonable to anticipate continued state climate policy engagement in coming years, giving a growing set of states a level of climate commitment and expertise that rivals the most aggressive nations pursuing Kyoto. All of Despite these potential impediments,

this suggests that the U.S. context for climate policy is far more complex—and far less fruitless—than many conventional depictions would suggest. Moreover, there are abundant precedents in other policy areas whereby states take the lead and remain active in long-term policy development and implementation. Consequently, there is ample reason to suspect that

states will remain central players in the evolution of U.S. climate policy, with considerable potential for achieving emission reductions and providing lessons and models worthy of consideration in Washington and around the world.

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Coastal area federalism high now Coastal areas are decentralized now. Rosty H. Russell, J.D., Harvard Law School, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2004 lexis Over the centuries, the American coastline has become a conflict waiting to happen. From colonial times, public trust concepts have accorded to private citizens the right to engage in a variety of commercial activities along the coast and in coastal waters. 61 During that early period, the states generally took the lead in regulating offshore fishing. 62 Not long after, the federal government developed an interest in maintaining shoreline integrity. 63 American federalism, augmented by a long tradition of

local land use control, continues to ensure that coastal oversight is a relatively decentralized, and therefore complex, task.

More ev – Coastal Zone Management Act locks in devolutionary action. Rosty H. Russell, J.D., Harvard Law School, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2004 lexis The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) 71 establishes the structure whereby competing demands and conflicts along the coast and in state waters are mediated among federal, state, and local agencies. 72 [*234] When it was enacted more than thirty years ago, the CZMA presaged a shift in regulatory authority from the federal government to the states--a trend that has accelerated over the past two decades. 73 The Act and state programs it promotes mark a period of intensifying and sometimes

incompatible public and private interest in coastal resources, both on land and in water. Unlike other legislation affecting the coast and ocean, 74 the CZMA is designed to be general and integrative in its application. Unlike many other major environmental laws, it openly embraces a devolutionary federalism. 75 It encourages states to take charge of their own coastal problems, often with little federal oversight and even less interference.

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New federalism high now New federalism continues – Lopez and Morrison still set the tone for state and federal powers. Christopher Banks, and John Blakeman, ASAP, Oxford University Press, Publius, June 22, 2008 lexis It is reasonable to think the appointments of Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr and Associate Justice Samuel Alito would continue the progress toward new federalism jurisprudence (1) in the "Roberts Court." In spite of a series of rulings reaffirming federal regulation near the end of the Rehnquist Court (Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs [2003], Tennessee v. Lane [2004], Gonzales v. Raich [2005]), the Court's sharp limits on Congress's power to regulate state activities in U.S. v. Lopez (1995), City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), and U.S. v. Morrison (2000) are still very much intact. Although the Rehnquist Court's singular impact in constraining the development of national public policy remains debatable (Clayton and Pickerill 2004), it is still renowned for its role in rearticulating states' interests (Dinan 2004, 39). While early Roberts Court rulings demonstrated uneven support for states' rights, the 20062007 term sheds more light on whether a conservative bloc will coalesce and aggressively protect the states in a manner reminiscent of the Rehnquist Court. In this light the change of personnel may also register another dynamic: Whether the justices purporting to favor the states are having trouble agreeing on basic anti-federalist principles, a tendency that increasingly typified later Rehnquist Court jurisprudence (Banks and Blakeman 2006).

The new Justices will continue new federalism. Christopher Banks, and John Blakeman, ASAP, Oxford University Press, Publius, June 22, 2008 lexis The appointments of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito probably will not appreciably reverse the recent trend of "counterrevolutionary" new federalism cases that impose fewer limits on federal authority. Many of the seminal states' rights decisions were set by the Rehnquist Court, and the new Chief Justice and the addition of Justice Alito are probably not going to reconfigure the basic voting blocs and push the Court further to the right on key federalism issues. As a result, Chief Justice Roberts, as a replacement for his mentor, is likely to "stay the course" in new federalism cases, using minimalist principles of judicial restraint and the rule of law as pragmatic guideposts to adjudicate federalism disputes. It is an open question whether Justice Alito, in replacing Justice O'Connor, will be any more conservative than she was in those types of cases. In any event, the "States' Rights Five," although now consisting of Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, are likely to remain intact as a solid bloc, Justice Kennedy--and not the Chief Justiceor Justice Alito --will probably assume the role Justice O'Connor played as a swing vote in crafting limits on federal power. It seems unlikely that Roberts and Alito will subscribe to the federalism of Thomas and Scalia, and their failure to do so--while not putting them in the same ideological camp as Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter--may well create a wider split among the conservatives on the Court. However, in this light the new justices will have a greater effect on the interpretative lines drawn by the five-justice coalition favoring state interests. Nothing in Chief Justice Roberts's or Justice Alito's records indicate they will fully adopt the ideological rigidity of Justice Thomas's originalism relative to new federalism; and, even if they did, Justices Scalia and Kennedy would have to go along in order to push the Court back toward a greater recognition of state sovereignty principles. While Justice Alito may prove to be more conservative than Justice O'Connor, he is likely to be more liberal than Justice Thomas on federalism issues. Similarly, the new Chief Justice's decision-making is likely to resemble more that of Chief Justice Rehnquist, or Justice Scalia; and, perhaps, Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas in certain cases. Aside from preemption cases, any constraints imposed on federal power will only develop in accordance with how well the coalition remains cohesive. In sum, the Court will continue to vindicate state power in federalism rulings but, in doing so, it remains uncertain if the justices are likely to speak with one voice in the most politically contentious cases.

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California maintaining federalism California's policies are preserving federalism's existence. Thomas Elias, San Gabriel Valley Tribune (California), "California a key states' rights battleground" June 27, 2008 lexis Cooper then compromised, allowing some sonar use, and the exercises went forward. That case, too, will likely end up in the Supreme Court just like the greenhouse gas dispute. And it should. For if presidents can override state and federal

environmental laws for the sake of mere training exercises that hardly constitute emergency actions, they can declare almost anything a national security emergency, including things like overriding laws that now restrict oil drilling off the California coast. Under an administration willing to claim almost anything including an absurd assertion by Vice President Dick Cheney that his office is not part of the executive branch of government despite having assigned space in the White House - to increase its power, it is vital for states to fight back against

wrongheaded federal actions. That's why California is now a key battleground in an entirely new states' rights battle, one that will continue for many years if presidents keep wishing they were dictators.

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A2: Clean air act/fuel economy standards The clean air act is cooperative federalism - doesn't non unique the DA. Sara A. Colangelo, Environmental Law, "The politics of preemption: an application of preemption jurisprudence and policy to California Assembly Bill 1493" January 1, 2007 California not only outpaced the nation in terms of its air pollution abatement measures, but also forged advanced methods to control auto emissions through mobile source technology: "In 1960, the state established an emissions control board to oversee the development of emissions control equipment.... Installation was required on new and used cars, and ... the registration requirements went into effect in 1965, over the vigorous opposition of the automobile manufacturers." (28) Although modest federal regulation of air pollution did occur in the 1960s, the CAA Amendments of 1970 gave rise to CAA's current form. (29) The CAA's goal is to "[achieve] air quality levels throughout the country that protect the public health and welfare." (30) The

CAA adopted a cooperative federalism approach to attaining this goal, creating National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for a set of pollutants affecting public health, (31) while leaving states with the flexibility to decide how each standard could best be met in their state. Specifically, section 109 of the CAA charges the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator with establishing NAAQS "allowing an adequate margin of safety ... requisite to protect the public health," (32) while section 110 charges each state with the responsibility of creating a state implementation plan (SIP) for achieving the NAAQS. (33)

Fuel economy standards do not restrict carbon programs. Daniel A. Farber, Sho Sato Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the California Center for Environmental Law and Policy, University of California, Berkeley, "Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution" 2008 EPA finally argues that it cannot regulate carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles because doing so would require it to tighten mileage standards, a job (according to EPA) that Congress has assigned to DOT. But that DOT sets mileage standards in no way licenses EPA to shirk its environmental responsibilities. EPA has been charged with protecting the public’s “health” and “welfare,” a statutory obligation wholly independent of DOT’s mandate to promote energy efficiency. The

two obligations may overlap, but there is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both administer their obligations and yet avoid inconsistency.52 Obviously, this does not speak directly to the issue of state preemption, but it does suggest that the Court views fuel efficiency rules and limitations on CO2 emissions as two very different matters.

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Now is the key time Now is the key time to establish the direction of federalism in the future. Raymond C. Scheppach, Ph.D., executive director of the National Governors Association, Stateline.org, “Will the 2008 election improve state-federal relations?” July 9, 2008 lexis As the next president and Congress begin to set an agenda for 2009, it is critical that they understand both the shift in responsibilities that has taken place over the last decade on domestic issues, as well as the role states can play in helping move the country forward. They should build on states' leadership and expertise on the major domestic issues. The good news is that states have shown a real policy path on these domestic issues; the bad news is that states could become an obstacle if the federal government continues a coercive approach to federalism. Essentially, the federal government should establish the policy framework, then provide incentives for states to implement the policies with considerable flexibility. Such an approach would use state expertise and leadership to their full potential. Although this may mean less uniformity across states in policies and programs, it will result

in more adaptable solutions to domestic challenges and perhaps a stronger national consensus on policy. Most of all, it would help the next Congress and next administration actually deliver to the American people comprehensive legislation on health care, energy and climate change.

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Federalism low now Preemption and restrictions of states’ rights now. John Dinan, Publius, “The state of American Federalism 2007-2008: resurgent state influence in the national policy process and continued state policy innovation” June 22, 2008 lexis To highlight the ways that states gained flexibility from federal directives and served as policy innovators in 2007-2008 is not to discount the instances when they continued to encounter coercive mandates and constraints of the kind seen in the first six years of the Bushpresidency (Posner 2007). Even with the various successes states realized in securing relaxation of

federal directives, they are still tasked with implementing a number of existing requirements concerning NCLB, REAL ID, and TANF that were adopted from 2001 to 2006. In terms of new challenges to continued state innovation, federal judges issued rulings constraining state discretion regarding immigration, healthcare, election reform, and the death penalty. And federal agencies sought to preempt state innovation regarding greenhouse gas emissions.

The DA has been non-uniqued 57 times from 2001 to 2006. OMB Watch, "States Losing Ability to Protect Public Due to Federal Preemptions" June 13, 2006 A new compilation of congressional activity reveals that Congress has voted 57 times to preempt state law and regulations in the last five years, including preventing states from instituting health, safety, and environmental standards. According to a report released June 6 by House Government Reform Committee ranking member Henry Waxman (D-CA), those votes have resulted in 27 laws overriding state laws and regulations, including 39 preemption provisions.

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 gutted states rights. OMB Watch, "States Losing Ability to Protect Public Due to Federal Preemptions" June 13, 2006 Preemption of environmental law Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Pub. L. No. 109-58) scraps state and local government's authority over environmental and land use policy. For example, the act limits the extent to which states can require cleaner burning fuels in automobiles. The bill also takes the authority to approve the siting of transmission lines out of the hands of state and local government.

Recent trends have not been in favor of Federalism despite significant state action on climate change. Barry Rabe, ASAP, Oxford University Press, Publius, "Environmental policy and the Bush era" June 22, 2007 lexis One might assume from such a development that the decentralization mantra so pervasive in environmental policy in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s had reached a new level during the current decade. In some respects, such as climate change policy development and implementation, the American system of environmental federalism is more state-driven

than ever before. However, it would be a mistake to assume that this trend holds across various environmental policy areas or that some structured or cooperative set of intergovernmental negotiations have guided these transitions. Despite considerable initial expectation that the Bush administration would build seriously on recent decentralization experiments, the third-quarter mark of his Presidency was passed with a very different record, including a number of significant efforts to expand federal--and executive branch--authority. In turn, federal-state conflict over environmental policy may well have reached its highest level in at least two decades.

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Federalism low now State policies are still influenced by an expectation of federal preemption. Barry Rabe, ASAP, Oxford University Press, Publius, "Environmental policy and the Bush era" June 22, 2007 lexis Aside from some early federal efforts to provide technical support to state policy development that were launched in the George H.W. Bush administration and sustained during the Clinton years, all of this involves unilateral state action in the absence of any significant support or encouragement from the federal government. In fact, states have

designed a number of these programs so as to minimize the likelihood of possible federal opposition. State officials involved in RGGI development, for example, readily note that they would benefit handily from federal collaboration and would normally work with the administration and Congress to set up an interstate compact to support this regional effort. But their experience with Washington to date suggests that most federal engagement has been designed to derail their efforts, hence the focus on a loose structure of memoranda-of-understanding among states who then pledge to take identical but unilateral steps rather than a compact that would require federal government approval.

Federalism has been under severe stress for the last decade – the direction of federalism in the future will be determined by the NEXT administration and congress, not the plan. Raymond C. Scheppach, Ph.D., executive director of the National Governors Association, Stateline.org, “Will the 2008 election improve state-federal relations?” July 9, 2008 lexis Here's a crucial question for the presumed presidential nominees - Republican John McCain and Democrat Barack Obama - and all the candidates for the next Congress. Are you happy with the status quo in federal-state relations? States have long served as laboratories for creating and testing policies and programs that drive positive change nationally. Yet for more than a decade, the federal-state relationship has been under stress. Looking forward, the nation faces many challenges, and states can play a key role in providing leadership. However, whether governors and states provide separate,

independent leadership or leadership within a stronger federal-state partnership will depend on which brand of federalism the next administration and Congress adopt.

Non unique - state action continues to be preempted. John Dinan, Publius, “The state of American Federalism 2007-2008: resurgent state influence in the national policy process and continued state policy innovation” June 22, 2008 lexis States have long been the primary policy innovators in the US federal system, and as Dale Krane has noted, state policy activism "appears to be increasing at an accelerating pace" during the Bush presidency (Krane 2007, 462). State officials continued to take the lead on a number of issues in 2007-2008, at times acting when federal policy was not forthcoming, at times expressing disagreement with federal policy, and at times proceeding independently of federal policy-makers (Greenblatt 2007b; Tubbesing 2008). In fact, as John Kincaid and Richard Cole suggest in their article for this issue, public awareness and support for continued state policy innovation may well account for the post-2005 up tick in public support for state governments recorded in their annual opinion surveys. As Kincaid and Cole report, their 2007 survey saw a continued drop in the percentage of individuals responding that state governments "gave them the least for their money" and a notable increase in the percentage of survey respondents saying that state governments "need more power." Of particular significance in 2007-2008 were a series of aggressive

responses to this state innovation on the part of individuals seeking to preempt state action. On a number of occasions, particularly in response to state laws addressing immigration, climate change, and health care, individuals who oppose state policies sought to preempt state action by securing federal agency rulings or court decisions. The overall lesson to emerge from state policy-making this past year, therefore, is that states were as active as ever in adopting policy innovations, but they also confronted new challenges to continued innovation, especially as a result of federal lawsuits.

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Federalism low now State progress is limited by federal preemption now. John Dinan, Publius, “The state of American Federalism 2007-2008: resurgent state influence in the national policy process and continued state policy innovation” June 22, 2008 lexis To highlight the ways that states gained flexibility from federal directives and served as policy innovators in 2007-2008 is not to discount the instances when they continued to encounter coercive mandates and constraints of the kind seen in the first six years of the Bush presidency (Posner 2007). Even with the various successes states realized in securing relaxation of

federal directives, they are still tasked with implementing a number of existing requirements concerning NCLB, REAL ID, and TANF that were adopted from 2001 to 2006. In terms of new challenges to continued state innovation, federal judges issued rulings constraining state discretion regarding immigration, healthcare, election reform, and the death penalty. And federal agencies sought to preempt state innovation regarding greenhouse gas emissions.

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Links Restricting state flexibility crushes federalism. OMB Watch, "States Losing Ability to Protect Public Due to Federal Preemptions" June 13, 2006 Federal law and regulation is able to solve national problems through national solutions that impact and benefit all members of society. At the same time, states have long been pioneers in advancing groundbreaking social policies.

Allowing states the flexibility to meet particular local needs while requiring a basic level of public protection for all citizens has long been an important issue for the balance of power between federal and state governments. The answer has long been "floors, not ceilings"--turning to the federal government for the base level of protection, and allowing the states to offer their citizens more stringent safeguards. Without any sufficient showing of a compelling need for national uniformity, these acts of Congress and the White House turn the federal/state balance around, suppressing states’ abilities to provide services and protections that go above and beyond federal laws and regulations.

Preemption on energy policy threatens federalism. Sara A. Colangelo, Environmental Law, "The politics of preemption: an application of preemption jurisprudence and policy to California Assembly Bill 1493" January 1, 2007 Remarking on the difficulty of deciding questions of preemption, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that preemption lacks an "infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula." (4) Preemption jurisprudence illustrates a compromise between concerns for federalism and

states' rights, and concerns for uniformity in matters of the national economy. The current debate over domestic energy policy and climate change initiatives highlights the challenge in allocating power between the federal government and the states. Energy, environmental, and automotive regulations typify such concerns because they encompass traditional state domains of health and safety, and federal domains of national and transnational industries.

Thus, as states begin undertaking individual and collective action directed at the issue of climate change, questions of preemption surface to challenge the constitutionality of such action.

Federal leadership on climate change destroys federalism. Eileen Claussen, President, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Speech at the Pew Center State and Federal Workshop, February 25, 2008 Does this mean the states should step aside and cede the leadership role on the climate issue to Washington? No. The states can and should keep exploring ways to leverage their unique authorities in areas from energy regulation to building codes, smart-growth planning and more. States are doing important and valuable work in all of these areas, and that must continue at the same time that the federal government begins to fulfill its role in the partnership. In closing, I want to remind you of the vision of Justice Louis Brandeis. He saw the U.S. states as “laboratories of democracy” where policy innovations could take hold and perhaps provide models for other states, and for our national government as well. And I honestly believe we would not be where we are today in the climate debate – on the verge of adopting a national capand-trade program – if many of the states had not acted first to adopt their own targets and to pursue cross-border emission trading regimes. The U.S. states are acting in the best traditions of federalism by advancing an array of solutions to

climate change that address their specific concerns and that take advantage of their unique responsibilities in our federalist system of government. Today, the challenge is to create a more balanced state and federal partnership – a partnership that promises to bring much-needed certainty to the question of how we as a nation are going to address the most critical environmental issue of our time.

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Links Current federal environmental programs leave a role for the states – the plan reverses this, destroying federalism Robert B. McKinstry, Philadelphia lawyer, John C. Dernbach, Law Prof @ Widener, and Thomas D. Peterson, Exec. Dir. Center for Climate Strategies, 11-19-2007, “Federal Climate Change Legislation,” Widener Law, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1031552#PaperDownload Most major federal environmental laws preserve a significant role for state and sometimes local government. They create overarching federal goals and minimum standards and provide for implementation by states, often leaving the design of implementation mechanisms to the states. Preservation of a significant state role in federal programs reflects political reality in the United States. Constitutional limitations on federal power have been reinforced by long political tradition of local decision-making epitomized by the New England town meeting and concern that centralizing power would undermine political freedoms. There are also concrete advantages to giving state and local government a significant role in implementation of environmental policies. These are evident from consideration of the progress of climate change initiatives in the United States to date. As noted by Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), states have greater flexibility that allows them to innovate with less severe consequences and provide models for future federal legislation. State and local government programs can allow bottom-up decision-making with greater stakeholder involvement. This allows the development of more precisely focused targets and strategies that are tailored to local conditions and are more likely to succeed.

The federalism balance over alternative energy has decisively shifted to the states – it’s a key part of decentralizing government Steven Ferrey, Law Prof @ Harvard, Fall 2003, “Nothing But Net,” 14 Duke Envt’l. L. & Pol’y F. 1, ln With state governments at the barricades of federalism, an energy revolution has been launched. Perhaps usurping federal law, thirty-eight states recently mounted a statutory and regulatory charge to establish "net metering," a regulatory innovation to implement decentralized renewable power. This innovation fundamentally shifts the regulatory balance as well as the energy mix in America. Net metering profoundly reshapes the energy landscape, providing the most significant boost of any policy tool at any level of government - both qualitatively and quantitatively - to decentralize and "green" American energy sources. While only twelve states have passed statutory initiatives to implement renewable energy system benefit charges and eight have elected to implement renewable portfolio standards, n1 thirty-six states to date have implemented net metering. n2 Net metering enables consumers with small generating facilities, for example solar panels, fuel cells, or wind turbine systems, to offset their electric bills with any excess [*2] power produced at their facility, running the retail utility meter backwards when the renewable energy generator funnels power to the grid. Net billing, or net metering, is the cornerstone of state energy policies encouraging private investment in renewable energy sources. n3

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Wind power link Wind power is unique to coastal area federalism. Rosty H. Russell, J.D., Harvard Law School, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2004 lexis For the development of offshore wind power, the structure of the state coastal zone management system creates a potentially serious boundary, or spillover, problem. Wind energy provides significant benefits well beyond the borders of a given jurisdiction--for example, by addressing climate change and global security issues. But a relatively small percentage of those benefits are captured locally. Moreover, in at least some cases, the local benefits of wind energy will not outweigh the locally perceived detriment to coastal "character," aesthetics, other environmental values, and other uses of coastal resources. 117 Although this spillover, or externality, problem is not unique to wind development, 118 it presents itself here in an unusual posture, 119 given the continuing debate over the nature and significance of the local impacts of wind, and the equity issues that a shoreline headcount cannot adequately resolve. 120

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RPS link RPS is the classic case of federalism. The Electricity Daily, "Pew Scopes Spread of RPS" June 19, 2006 lexis The report, "1Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio Standards," was authored by Barry Rabe, a University of Michigan professor. Rabe characterized the growth of state-level RPS's as a "classic case in federalism," the Wall Street Journal reported. Rabe said, "These states have had very little contact with federal officials. There's this disconnect," the Journal reported.

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Spillover Each intrusion on federalism erodes the balance of power. James Lack, Senator NY, 7-11-1995, Serial No. J-104-31, p. 11 Every year Congress considers bills, federal agencies consider rules, and international agencies consider cases that would supplant state statutory or common law. Adverse decisions may result not only in nullifying state laws and court decisions, but also in narrowing the range of issues that legislatures may address. The threat is the steady, incremental, year-by-year erosion of the jurisdiction of state legislatures.

Single big federalism decisions are key – they send an important signal that shapes politics. Stephen G. Calabresi, professor of law @ Northwestern, Mar. 2001, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 574 Annals 24 When the Supreme Court decides a big federalism case like Lopez, it does a lot more than simply resolve the immediate case and issue at hand. In some fundamental sense, it sets up a symbol for the American people of the importance that is attached to a constitutional value or norm. Symbolism is terribly important in constitutions and in constitutional case law. Symbols help citizens organize their beliefs, reinforce core values, and provide a rallying point for those who believe in them, thus reducing the costs of organization. When powerful symbols issue from the Supreme Court of the United States, those symbols help to set the national agenda, and they affect the flow of our politics. Lopez, for example, caused devolution and federalism concerns to become more prominent in Congress than they otherwise might have been. This may well have played into the last Congress’s decision to devolve part of the federal welfare entitlement to the states.

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No link States are asking for federal action. Katherine Mangu-Ward, Reason associate editor, Reason Magazine, "Arnold Among the Lilliputians" April 22, 2008 One of Schwarzenegger's applause lines: "We don't wait for Washington, because I've always said Washington is asleep at the wheel." This newfound pride in federalism has its definite limits. For every states' rights rah rah, there was a wistful plea for more federal regulation on carbon production. Even states' rights revisionist Gov. Sebelius said she hoped that "the roles will be reversed in the next administration." A proposed cap and trade plan, Gov. Jon Corzine said, is something he'd "love to see globally, love to see nationally, but unfortunately narrowed to regional efforts."

The feds can regulate greenhouse emissions because of the commerce clause – the plan doesn’t hurt federalism Robert K. Huffman, lawyer, and Jonathan M. Weisgall, VP at MidAmerican Holdings,Winter 2008, “Climate Change and the States,” Sustainable Development Journal, http://www.wcl.american.edu/org/sustainabledevelopment/2008/winter08.pdf?rd=1 The United States’ system of federalism allows the federal and state governments to share power in certain areas, while each maintains exclusive areas where the other may not regulate. The power of the federal government is constrained by the Constitution and does not include general police powers, which are reserved to the states.46 State governments, however, may not regulate certain aspects of interstate and foreign commerce, foreign affairs, and other areas of reserved federal power. When states take actions to regulate greenhouse gases, it raises questions about the extent of state authority to regulate the economy and the environment. Linking emissions trading programs or enacting auto emissions regulations brings states to the far end of their regulatory authority, given the transborder nature of emission trading and carbon dioxide emissions generally. This section explores the constitutional issues that can potentially arise from state actions to reduce GHG emissions. Commerce Clause The Commerce Clause, Article I, § 8, cl. 3, gives the federal government the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States[.]”47 The Supreme Court has long considered the Commerce Clause to be “an implicit restraint on state authority, even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute.”48 This concept is known as the Dormant Commerce Clause—wherein the Constitution acts as a prohibition on certain types of state actions that affect interstate commerce, invalidating the state law by negative implication.49 Although the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has gained widespread acceptance, at least two current Supreme Court justices (Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas) reject it altogether. Regardless of these two justices, it is highly unlikely that a majority of the Court would reject the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Were the doctrine to be rejected by the Court, state actions would never be invalidated for conflicting with unexercised congressional power under the Commerce Clause, but would be subject to invalidation only for express or implied preemption by federal law.

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Model yes U.S. federalism is modeled worldwide. Chilbi Mallat, University of London Doctoral Candidate, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Winter 2003 lexis Laurence Tribe, in Constitutional Choices, summarized what he calls the underlying political ideas of the American system into a list of six categories: representative republicanism, federalism, separation of powers, equality before the law, individual autonomy and procedural fairness. America has shared many of these traits with other democracies for a long time, but two constitutional features stand out on a world level as typically American -- federalism and the Supreme Court. The American people deserve credit for both inventions which brought new dimensions to democracy and the rule of law for the rest of the planet. Perhaps America does not know it, but the world has been a consistently better

place wherever her two home-grown intellectual products have found anchor.

The world models US style federalism. Stephen Calebresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1983, Yale, “Reflections on United States v. Lopez” 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, Michigan Law Review, December, 1995 lexis At the same time, U.S.-style constitutional federalism has become the order of the day in an extraordinarily large number of very important countries, some of which once might have been thought of as pure nation-states. Thus, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Austria, the Russian Federation, Spain, India, and Nigeria all have decentralized power by adopting constitutions that are significantly more federalist than the ones they replaced. Many other nations that had been influenced long ago by American federalism have chosen to retain and formalize their federal structures. Thus, the federalist constitutions of Australia, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, for example, all are basically alive and well today.

US federalism is modeled worldwide. Stephen Calebresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1983, Yale, “Reflections on United States v. Lopez” 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, Michigan Law Review, December, 1995 lexis We have seen that a desire for both international and devolutionary federalism has swept across the world in recent years. To a significant extent, this is due to global fascination with and emulation of our own American federalism success story. The global trend toward federalism is an enormously positive development that greatly increases the likelihood of future peace, free trade, economic growth, respect for social and cultural diversity, and protection of individual human rights. It depends for its success on the willingness of sovereign nations to strike federalism deals in the belief that those deals will be kept. n233 The U.S. Supreme Court can do its part to encourage the future striking of such deals by enforcing vigorously our own American federalism deal. Lopez could be a first step in that process, if only the Justices and the legal academy would wake up to the importance of what is at stake.

The world is watching so the US must retain and strengthen federalism. Stephen Calebresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1983, Yale, “Reflections on United States v. Lopez” 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, Michigan Law Review, December, 1995 lexis World-wide interest in federalism is greater today than it ever has been before at any other time in human history. In section A, below, I discuss at some length why this is the case and what lessons the global federalism revolution might hold for the United States. I conclude that federalism is the wave of the future, that nationalism and the centralized nation-state have been discredited for good reasons, and that these reasons strongly suggest that the United States should retain and strengthen its federal structure.

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Model no U.S. federalism isn’t modeled abroad Newsweek, January 31, 2006 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6857387/site/newsweek/ American Democracy: Once upon a time, the U.S. Constitution was a revolutionary document, full of epochal innovations—free elections, judicial review, checks and balances, federalism and, perhaps most important, a Bill of Rights. In the 19th and 20th centuries, countries around the world copied the document, not least in Latin America. So did Germany and Japan after World War II. Today? When nations write a new constitution, as dozens have in the past two decades, they seldom look to the American model. When the soviets withdrew from Central Europe, U.S. constitutional experts rushed in. They got a polite hearing, and were sent home. Jiri Pehe, adviser to former president Vaclav Havel, recalls the Czechs' firm decision to adopt a European-style parliamentary system with strict limits on campaigning. "For Europeans, money talks too much in American democracy. It's very prone to certain kinds of corruption, or at least influence from powerful lobbies," he says. "Europeans would not want to follow that route." They also sought to limit the dominance of television, unlike in American campaigns where, Pehe says, "TV debates and photogenic looks govern election victories." So it is elsewhere. After American planes and bombs freed the country, Kosovo opted for a European constitution. Drafting a post-apartheid constitution, South Africa rejected American-style federalism in favor of a German model, which leaders deemed appropriate for the social-welfare state they hoped to construct. Now fledgling African democracies look to South Africa as their inspiration, says John Stremlau, a former U.S. State Department official who currently heads the international relations department at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg: "We can't rely on the Americans." The new democracies are looking for a constitution written in modern times and reflecting their progressive concerns about racial and social equality, he explains. "To borrow Lincoln's phrase, South Africa is now Africa's 'last great hope'."

Other countries don’t model United States federalism. Andrew Moravcsik, Newsweek, January 31, 2005 Once upon a time, the U.S. Constitution was a revolutionary document, full of epochal innovations--free elections, judicial review, checks and balances, federalism and, perhaps most important, a Bill of Rights. In the 19th and 20th centuries, countries around the world copied the document, not least in Latin America. So did Germany and Japan after World War II. Today? When nations write a new constitution, as dozens have in the past two decades, they seldom look to the American model.When the soviets withdrew from Central Europe, U.S. constitutional experts rushed in. They got a polite hearing, and were sent home. Jiri Pehe, adviser to former president Vaclav Havel, recalls the Czechs' firm decision to adopt a European-style parliamentary system with strict limits on campaigning. "For Europeans, money talks too much in American democracy. It's very prone to certain kinds of corruption, or at least influence from powerful lobbies," he says. "Europeans would not want to follow that route." They also sought to limit the dominance of television, unlike in American campaigns where, Pehe says, "TV debates and photogenic looks govern election victories."So it is elsewhere. After American planes and bombs freed the country, Kosovo opted for a European constitution. Drafting a post-apartheid constitution, South Africa rejected American-style federalism in favor of a German model, which leaders deemed appropriate for the social-welfare state they hoped to construct. Now fledgling African democracies look to South Africa as their inspiration, says John Stremlau, a former U.S. State Department official who currently heads the international relations department at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg: "We can't rely on the Americans." The new democracies are looking for a constitution written in modern times and reflecting their progressive concerns about racial and social equality, he explains. "To borrow Lincoln's phrase, South Africa is now Africa's 'last great hope'."Much in American law and society troubles the world these days. Nearly all countries reject the United States' right to bear arms as a quirky and dangerous anachronism. They abhor the death penalty and demand broader privacy protections. Above all, once most foreign systems reach a reasonable level of

affluence, they follow the Europeans in treating the provision of adequate social welfare is a basic right. All this, says Bruce Ackerman at Yale University Law School, contributes to the growing sense that American law, once the world standard, has become "provincial." The United States' refusal to apply the Geneva Conventions to certain terrorist suspects, to ratify global human-rights treaties such as the innocuous Convention on the Rights of the Child or to endorse the International Criminal Court (coupled with the abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo) only reinforces the conviction that America's Constitution and legal system are out of step with the rest of the world.

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Federalism good – conflict State-lead action will lead to cooperative federalism – that solves the case. Raymond A. Biering, JD Loyola Law School, and Brian S. Biering, University of Oregon School of Law, Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation, 2008 lexis the issue is not simply a choice between federal and state approaches to address climate change, but rather, whether federal and state approaches can be harmonized to complement each other. Most modern federal environmental laws contemplate concurrent federal and state roles. The relationship In the final analysis,

between the federal and state standards with regard to air pollution under the CAA was discussed above. 161 In view of the importance and immediacy of the climate change problem, and especially in view of the significant state and regional efforts that have occurred to date, it is neither necessary nor wise for federal law to completely preempt and prevent state and regional initiatives addressing climate change. While the global nature of the issue argues for a more uniform approach to its resolution, ultimately, a well-conceived federal and state "federalist" program that incorporates

coordination of the programs that work best and preempts those that either do not work or are better handled on a national level, is our most viable approach for effectively and expeditiously addressing climate change in our time. 162

Federalism preserves peace, presents ethnic conflicts. Stephen Calebresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1983, Yale, “Reflections on United States v. Lopez” 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, Michigan Law Review, December, 1995 lexis Small state federalism is a big part of what keeps the peace in countries like the United States and Switzerland. It is a big part of the reason why we do not have a Bosnia or a Northern Ireland or a Basque country or a Chechnya or a Corsica or a Quebec problem. American federalism in the end is not a trivial matter or a quaint historical anachronism. American-style federalism is a thriving and vital institutional arrangement - partly planned by the Framers, partly the accident of history - and it prevents violence and war. It prevents religious warfare, it prevents secessionist warfare, and it prevents racial warfare. It is part of the reason why democratic majoritarianism in the United States has not produced violence or secession for 130 years, unlike the situation for example, in England, France, Germany, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, or Spain. There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that is more important or that has done more to promote peace, prosperity, and freedom than the federal structure of that great document. There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that should absorb more completely the attention of the U.S. Supreme Court.

Ethnic conflicts lead to global wars David Lake and Donald Rothchild, USC Political Science Profs, “The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict” 1999 new fears of state meltdown and ethnic cleansing have rippled across the international community. In this “new world disorder,” many worry that ethnic conflict is contagious, that conflict in one local can stimulate conflict elsewhere, and that initial outbreaks in the Balkans, the former Soviet Union and Africa, if not quarantined could set off an epidemic of catastrophic proportions. Even before fears of nuclear Armageddon could fully fade,

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Federalism good – conflict Reducing federalism increases the probability of wars and conflict Stephen Calebresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1983, Yale, “Reflections on United States v. Lopez” 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, Michigan Law Review, December, 1995 lexis As one surveys the world in 1995, American-style federalism of some kind or another is everywhere triumphant, while the forces of nationalism, although still dangerous, seem to be contained or in retreat. The few remaining highly centralized democratic nation-states like Great Britain, France, and Italy all face serious secessionist or devolutionary crises. Other highly centralized nation-states, like China, also seem ripe for a federalist, as well as a democratic, change. Even many existing

federal and confederal entities seem to face serious pressure to devolve power further than they have done so far: thus, Russia, Spain, Canada, and Belgium all have very serious devolutionary or secessionist movements of some kind. Indeed, secessionist pressure has been so great that some federal structures recently have collapsed under its weight, as has happened in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Union.

Federalism helps prevent deadly civil wars and conflicts Stephen Calebresi, Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1983, Yale, “Reflections on United States v. Lopez” 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, Michigan Law Review, December, 1995 lexis As Lijphart emphasizes, social heterogeneity can pose a big threat to stable democratic government. Federalism sometimes can reduce this threat by giving minorities a level of government within which they are the geographical majority. If minorities are concentrated geographically to some degree and if the nation is willing to cede control over key issues to constitutionally established subunits of the nation, then federalism can help maintain social peace.

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Federalism good – tyranny Strong federalists system prevents government tyranny Ernest Young, professor of law at University of Texas, Texas Law Review, “The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms,” November 2004 lexis More fundamentally, our federalism has always been justified as a bulwark against tyranny. Madison extolled federalism as part of the "double security" that the new Constitution would provide for the people; just as the three branches of the central government were to check one another, the state governments would check the center. As Lynn Baker and I have discussed elsewhere, Madison's discussion in Federalist 46 emphasized worst case scenarios, in which the states would have to oppose the national government militarily, and this emphasis has sometimes distracted critics of federalism from more prosaic - but also more relevant - mechanisms by which federalism protects liberty. Even in the Founding period, however, state autonomy buttressed individual liberty in other, less dramatic ways. States may oppose national policies not only militarily but politically, and in so doing they may serve as critical rallying points for more widespread popular opposition. Madison and Jefferson, out of national power during the Federalist administration of John Adams, worked through the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures to oppose the Alien and Sedition Acts. The states thus, as Professor Friedman puts it, "serve as an independent means of calling forth the voice of the people." More recently, "Some state and local governments have proven themselves formidable lobbyists

and indefatigable litigants" on issues such as affirmative action, benefits for the disabled, and environmental policy

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A2: Race to the bottom Recent policies prove race-to-the-bottom is a myth - states make independent decisions. Barry Rabe, ASAP, Oxford University Press, Publius, "Environmental policy and the Bush era" June 22, 2007 lexis The state response to the Bush administration actions in environmental policy does not fit that pattern, however. One does see considerable variation among states and, in such instances as proposals for expanded logging on federal lands or joining lawsuits against the federal government, disagreements among states about appropriate next steps. But the overall state response entails considerable policy innovation among a wide range of states in a diverse set of areas, an aggressive response by organizations representing state agencies against anumber of federal actions, and exploration of litigative strategies to either protect state authority or prod the federal government to act in areas of environmental concern. This may reflect a perception in many state capitals that environmental protection coincides with larger state goals of fostering economic development and protecting public health. It may also underscore the assessment of political scientist Paul Teske that, contrary to anticipated races to the bottom thatwere propelled by dominant interest group pressure, "most areas of state regulations are actually characterized by contested interest group environments within which state institutional actors often make independent policy choices" (Teske 2004, 2005, 369; Rabe and Mundo 2007).

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Federalism bad – conflict State devolution promotes ethnic violence. D. Lake, Political Science Professor, The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, 1998 When central authority declines, groups become fearful for their survival. They invest in and prepare for violence, and thereby make actual violence possible. Whether arising incrementally out of competition between groups or from extremist factions actively seeking to destroy ethnic peace, state weakness is a necessary precondition for violent ethnic conflict to erupt.

Devolution caused ethnic conflicts that federalism could not solve in Yugoslovia. Carol Salnik Leff, professor of political science, World Politics, June 1999 By the period of multiple transitions in 1990, therefore, the center no longer held the cards to coordinate a policy of state maintenance. It was forced to rely on the constitutional courts for adjudication of republican sovereignty initiatives and helpless to enforce court decisions, which republics systematically flouted. The center had lost control of the agenda of constitutional revision. Instead those battles were increasingly fought directly between and among the republics, within the federal presidency, and bilaterally, as the framework of federal coordination broke down. It was the refusal of Milosevic of Serbia to negotiate a more confederal model as much as the resistance of the deadlocked federal government that set the stage for the Croatian and Slovenian exodus from the state in June 1991. Once again, the republics seized the initiative from the center in determining the course of negotiations, although in this case the outcome was a bargaining stalemate among the republics and violently contested secession.

Empirically, state devolution promotes ethno-nationalism. Valerie Bunce, US Peace Institute, Politics and Society, June, 1999 The formal end of the Yugoslav state, then, was preceded for at least a decade by a process in which the state, precisely and ironically in strict accordance with ideological precepts, had withered away. Economic, political, and cultural sovereignty, therefore, had been parceled, and all three forms of sovereignty resided n the republics that made up the Yugoslav confederation - or what Sabrina Rarnet aptly termed that time on the Yugoslav "international system." Thus, while struggles over power and reform immediately preceded, as well as caused, a sudden and rapid decentralization of the Czechoslovak and Soviet states, a decentralized political economy with full institutional expression was already in place by the time the Yugoslav regime and state came into serious question.

International federalism causes global ethnic conflicts David Lake and Donald Rothchild, Political Scientists, The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, 1999 p. 212 Although regional autonomy and federalism have been used as safeguards, they have had, in some instances, unintended consequences that have actually increased conflict. Despite efforts to decentralize power in South African and Ethiopia, the fiscal dominance of the political center has tended to undercut the significance of regional authorities. Moreover, efforts to delineate boundaries have increased conflict between ethno-regional identity groups. In contemporary Russia, the arbitrary way in which internal boundaries divide ethnic people has been a major source of tensions. In Ethiopia, the regional boundaries set up by the government appear to favor Tigray and the Afars, at the expense of the formerly dominant Amhara and the Somali Isaks in the Awash Valley.

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Federalism bad - conflict Federalism causes ethnic groups to capture political parties and spark secession demands Carol Salnik Leff, professor of political science, World Politics, June 1999 During a political opening in ethno federal states, by contrast, republican governments are available for capture and utilization as electorally and constitutionally legitimated platforms for pressing demands and pursuing authoritative negotiation with the center and with other republics. In the longer term the republican base facilitates the process of secession.

Sudan proves that federalism won’t ease ethnic tensions Edmond Keller, professor of political science, The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, 1998 p. 287 Federalism or regional autonomy are other approaches that can be used to build trust among groups that formally felt threatened. However, this approach is likely to fail unless leaders are willing to make credible commitments and to

demonstrate consistently that they respect all citizens. Sudan unsuccessfully attempted a regional autonomy strategy. It was undermined by what proved to be a hegemonic project on the part of Islamic fundamentalists.

Federalism failed to solve for ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia Carol Salnik Leff, professor of political science, World Politics, June 1999 By the period of multiple transitions in 1990, therefore, the center no longer held the cards to coordinate a policy of state maintenance. It was forced to rely on the constitutional courts for adjudication of republican sovereignty initiatives and helpless to enforce court decisions, which republics systematically flouted. The center had lost control of the agenda of

constitutional revision. Instead those battles were increasingly fought directly between and among the republics, within the federal presidency, and bilaterally, as the framework of federal coordination broke down. It was the refusal of Milosevic of Serbia to negotiate a more confederal model as much as the resistance of the deadlocked federal government that set the stage for the Croatian and Slovenian exodus from the state in June 1991. Once again, the republics seized the initiative from the center in determining the course of negotiations, although in this case the outcome was a bargaining stalemate among the republics and violently contested secession.

Federalism causes dangerous break-up - strong central power best. Manila Standard, Antonio C. Abaya, “Federalism No Panacea” July 28, 2005 lexis Federalism is more suitable for countries with large, contiguous land masses - such as Russia, Canada, the US, Brazil, Australia, India, Mexico and Germany - where centrifugal forces have less appeal. Yet even among these examples, there are separatist movements in Canada, Russia and India. Archipelagic countries (Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines) are better off with unitary states. The recent threat of certain Filipino mayors and governors, to secede from the Republic if President Arroyo is forcibly removed from power, may be dismissed as harmless political noise, but they may be aberrations of our personalistic culture, in the absence of a nationalistic one. In which case, federalism will just lead to the break-up of the Republic on the whim of regional political bosses.

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Federalism bad - tyranny Federalism doesn’t protect against tyranny or always uphold liberty H. Geoffrey Moulton, professor of law at Widener University, Minnesota Law Review April 1999 lexis Justice O'Connor in Ashcroft described the other category of federalism's virtues as protecting "our fundamental liberties." She explained that like the separation of powers between the branches of government, "a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." Federalism's track record as liberty enhancer, however, has been mixed at best. Critics have rightly pointed out that states, left to their

own devices, have been more threat than protection for individual and group rights. Slavery, followed by persistent, state-sponsored race discrimination, tops a list of federalism's threats to individual liberty that includes examples in the areas of free speech and freedom of religion, criminal procedure, reproductive rights and civil rights. National intervention has been and will continue to be necessary where states make choices that the national polity deems fundamentally unjust. Protecting states from national intervention, in other words, is an unreliable tool for protecting liberty. If restraining the national government prevents tyranny, it does so based on the principle of limited government, not federalism. If federalism promotes liberty, it does so by promoting citizen choice, not by setting state against federal power.

Strong national government is key to uphold liberty James Gardner, professor of law, Georgetown Law Journal, June 2003 lexis State power is a vital element in federalism's design. To put the exercise of state power in context, however, I begin by examining the ways in which federalism contemplates that national power may be deployed to protect liberty. In conducting this analysis, I shall use the term "liberty" in a broad sense. The concept of "liberty" is often equated with the restraint of government power--the kind of "negative" liberty that Isaiah Berlin defined as freedom from government interference with private decisionmaking. Although this understanding of liberty captures much of what federalism operates to protect, it is incomplete. If private decisionmaking were the sine qua non of collective life, no government would be necessary whose powers would then require restraint. Government is created and granted powers in the first instance to help citizens achieve some kind of good life, a good life they are by hypothesis incapable of achieving on their own, either individually or collectively, in the absence of governmental organization. n To fulfill this function, government needs affirmative powers, not only restraints on its powers. Thus, although federalism contemplates the division of power to protect "liberty," I shall treat this conventional use of the word as a kind of synecdoche that names only one part of the broader notion of achieving, or creating the conditions that enable citizens to achieve, a substantively desirable way of life. Under this broad definition of liberty, the national government of the United States contributes to and protects the liberty of American citizens in at least three distinct ways: (1) by using its affirmative powers in pursuit of the good, (2) by practicing self-restraint, and (3) by restraining state governments from impairing the ability of citizens to achieve the good. First and foremost, the national government protects liberty by using its affirmatively granted powers for the good of the citizenry. This conception of governmental power is broad enough to embrace any conception of the state, from a minimalist, night-watchman state to the contemporary European-style social welfare state. Whatever version of the state a society chooses to adopt, a government must exist and must possess certain powers that enable the polity collectively to achieve the goals that it sets for itself. Under the U.S. Constitution, the national government has many powers that fit this description. The commerce power, spending power, and various military powers have all been used many times to achieve through direct action by the national government objectives that the American polity has collectively decided will make it better off. The commerce power alone, for example, has given us environmental regulation; social, health, and welfare programs; most of the administrative state; and even much of our civil rights legislation, to name only a few of its principal uses.

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Liberty impact Every violation of liberty must be rejected. Sylvester Petro, Professor of Law at Wake Forest University, Toledo Law Review, 1974 lexis It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once. Thus it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhensyn. Ask Milovan Dijilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be empathically identified and resisted with an undying spirit.

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Iraq federalism good – links Now is the key time for Iraq. Michael Broning, director of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Amman, Jordan, The Japan Times, "Exposing the myth of the Shiite Crescent" May 28, 2008 lexis what we are witnessing in Iraq today is not ever increasing friction between religious communities but escalating internal power struggles within the Sunni and Shiite communities. Ongoing violence in Basra and the fighting between Sunni "Awakening Councils" and al-Qaida in Iraq demonstrate this. In fact, the current escalation points to an increasing political struggle between the federalist position of Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the centralist position of Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. This struggle will ultimately define the political structure of Iraq. Instead,

Generally, Iraq is modeling US federalism now. Amitai Etzioni, The National Interest, “Plan Z for Iraq” December 2007 lexis But having outsiders work out these details and the United States and its allies impose them is not a solution. The specific features of a loose federation in Iraq can be developed best by regional representatives-perhaps drawn from each of Iraq's provinces. (Most likely, several provinces would combine to form regional governments united by ethnicity or confessional links.) And while a new Iraqi Federation might follow the U.S. federal model for some matters, it would also quite likely have a number of features far beyond what even the most vocal proponents of "states' rights" find attractive in the American context. For instance, the bulk of tax revenues would probably be collected by local and provincial entities rather than the national government, and the bulk of Iraqi security affairs would be handled by territorial defense units drawn from the local population rather than by national forces.

US federalism model key to Iraq transition. Sam Brownback, member of the Senate Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, States News Service, October 3, 2007 lexis "I am pleased that President Talabani strongly supports the idea of a federal Iraq," said Brownback. "I agree with President Talabani that federal models, like the United States, provide examples that Iraq can follow to unify its people and keep the country intact." Brownback last week joined Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) to introduce an amendment to the Defense Authorization bill that called for Iraqis to reach a comprehensive political settlement based on the federal principles in the Iraqi constitution. The amendment passed the Senate by a vote of 75-23. Brownback continued, "The Kurdish region of Iraq is largely stable. We have seen progress in the Sunni-dominated Anbar province. The time is right for Iraqis to decentralize power so that Iraqis can live together peacefully within a unified Iraq. The United States Senate reached a broad, bipartisan agreement endorsing federalism because employing a federal model is the best chance for Iraqis to resolve their differences while living in a united country."

Now is the key time for Iraq federalism to take hold – it appears federalism is coming now. Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Fox News, "Burdensome Weight of Unity Could Force Iraq Break-Up" September 20, 2006 the Iraqi constitution, passed in October 2005, which calls for a federalist model of government but left open for debate the details on how it would work and how autonomous the regional governments would be. That debate is clearly hot. Parliamentary factions representing the Sunnis — who are a minority in Iraq and stand to lose in a breakHe pointed to

up because their land in the west has none of the oil resources of the Shiite south — joined secular representatives and those loyal to radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in threatening to walk out if the parliament took up the most recent proposal to codify the separate states. "Federalism is a preliminary step to dividing and separating Iraq," said Adnan al-Dulaimi, head of the Iraqi Accordance Front, the largest Sunni bloc in the parliament. "I call on Iraqis to confront this draft." But Michael Rubin, a Middle East expert at the American Enterprise Institute who served as a consultant for the U.S.-led transitional government after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, said a federalist system with powerful regional forces may be inevitable.

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Iraq Federalism good – links Iraq models the United States federalist system. George Clark, Executive Editor, United States Government Information, February 2005 If Iraq

faces challenges similar to those of other nations, it also must address its own unique history. The January elections, however difficult to conduct, were a milestone on the path to building these vital institutions of freedom. But the elections-if any indication show the strong faith Iraqis have in establishing a democratic system equivalent to that of the United States. "Real politics, much like that of America, will take place after the election, in the assembly," predicts Laith Kubba, an official at the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy and president of the Iraq National Group. "New coalitions and parties will form as the election coalitions fall apart."

Iraq models American federalism. John Hulsman, Ph.D., Research Fellow in European Affairs, The Heritage Foundation, “Forging a Durable Post-War Political Settlement in Iraq” 2003 A good political model for such a successful post-war Iraqi federation already exists--the so-called Great Compromise of 1787 that enabled the creation of America's constitutional arrangement among the states. In Iraq's case, this type of system would give each of the country's three major sub-groups equal representation in an upper house of the legislature in order to protect each group's interests at the national level. These political outcomes--an Iraq that can control its own political destiny and that does not threaten that of its neighbors--are critical if an Iraqi settlement is to be judged a success.

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Iraq Federalism good – impacts Failure of Iraqi federalism leads to civil war and government fallout. Ilya Somin, Assistant Professor at George Mason University School of Law, “Iraqi Federalism II Answering Three Common Objections” 2006 Critics of decentralized federalism often claim that it will lead to partition. Some, like Cordesman in his NY Times piece, do not even seem to distinguish between the two. It is in fact the fear of a dominant central government dominated by one's enemies that leads to pressure for partition. Implementation of a strong form of federalism would dampen these fears, though probably not completely eliminate them. Realistically, the Kurds will not accept a highly centralized government of any kind (and I don't blame them). The Sunnis will not accept one dominated by the Shia, as is likely to be case if the government continues to be democratically elected (the Shiites are 60% of the population). By removing the threat of nation-wide domination by one group, decentralized federalism will reduce pressures for partition rather than increase it. This is especially likely in light of

the fact that partition would leave all three major Iraqi groups vulnerable to the depradations of Iraq's unscrupulous and rapacious neighbors. Federalism is a way to capture the main benefits of partition, while mitigating its dangers. Decentralized federalism is not a panacea for Iraq's many problems, but it does have important advantages over the alternatives of centralization, partition, and civil war.

That causes violent Middle East conflict. Detroit News, Antony T. Sullivan, “Possible upheavals might create problems hurting U.S. interests; Would ousting Iraq's Hussein destabilize Mideast?” 2002 lexis Ousting Saddam Hussein might have more far-reaching consequences than most people imagine. The possible splintering of Iraq as a result of U.S. military action might radically destabilize the Middle East. Such an outcome would do nothing to promote American national interests. Iraq is divided into three parts: the Shiite south, the Sunni center and the Kurdish north. These three constituent parts were soldered together after World War I. Historically, they possessed little in common. During most of the last 75 years, they have been held together only through the heavy hand of the Sunni center. Hussein is very much in that Sunni dictatorial tradition. Of course, what he has done to Kuwait, and to his own people, is abominable. Nevertheless, one may argue that without the "rigor" imposed from Baghdad, Iraq might dissolve, briefly, into three independent statelets. But such statelets would probably not be independent for long. Much larger and more powerful

neighbors would likely gobble each of them up soon enough. A fragmented Iraq would introduce radical instability into the Middle East political system. Upheavals would probably metastasize, with unpredictable results. None would foster American national interests.

Middle East war goes global and nuclear. John Steinbach, Israeli Nuclear weapons: a threat to piece, March 3, 2002 http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/mat0036.htm Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration."

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Iraq Federalism good – impacts Federalism is key to prevent the implosion of Iraq due to ethnic warfare Kurdistan Observer, Baqi Barzani, “Federalism and the Question of Ethnicity in Future Iraq” March 26, 2005 The United States secured a vital military victory in Iraq, but structuring a stable, democratic, pro-American Iraqi government will be more complex than winning the war. To achieve its postwar goals, the United States will have to prevail over the resistance of hostile Iraqi political forces, referee the deadly factional struggles of bitter political rivals, and minimize the interfering of Syria and Iran, both of which seek to hijack Iraq's political future and drive out American influence. Ethnic disparity can impact lives in ways that both alienate and bring people together. As with many countries in Africa and the Middle East, Iraq’s borders were not decided by the peoples of the region, but by outside forces. The differences among these groups vary from slight to severe, and competing interests threaten to complicate the formation of Iraq’s post-Saddam government. Within Iraq, there is a clear conflict between secular Kurdish nationalism, fostered by the 12 year long autonomous existence of the Kurdish Autonomous Region under an Anglo-American air umbrella while Saddam Hussein ruled the rest of the country, and the aspirations of the recently empowered, deeply religious Shia majority to establish a centralized Islamic republic in Iraq through the ballot box. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani has made clear his fears that the Kurdish "veto" provided by the interim constitution will result in drafts of a permanent constitution bouncing back and forth indefinitely while the interim constitution hardens into permanency. Relation between Arabs and Kurds have historically proven a greater source of tension in Iraq. The Iraqi government has not only always excluded Kurds from position of powers but also tried to assimilate them in to the country. The situation in Kurdish Iraq warns to draw various regional powers into conflict. For example, the potential for an expansive Kurdish-Shia conflict has been noted by Israel's top leaders, who have been increasingly worried about the rising power of Shias in a region where Iraq and Iran are Shia-majority countries and Syria is ruled by an Alawi, a sub-sect within Shia Islam. Success of Iraqi Kurdistan provides a model for post-Saddam reconstruction, based on a federalist

structure with locally autonomous provinces presided over by a weak central government in Baghdad that would still control defense, foreign affairs, oil, and national infrastructure. Although some Kurds talk about a tripartite federalism splitting Iraq into Shi‘i Arab, Sunni Arab, and Kurdish states, such a division would be in the interest of most parties. Federalism based on ethnicity rather than administrative divisions would best ensure stability in postSaddam Iraq. In simplest terms, federalism implies a system in which power is divided between national and local units of government that operate under independent legal or constitutional authority. Some whose ideas are still governed by a chauvinist devotion to the Iraqi state still present the issue of federalism in Iraq as if it were a first step toward dividing the country, and behave as if such a division had already happened. We have seen this in a number of newspapers. The Kurds call for a federal system, their own flag, army, and government. Establish a governmental system that can accommodate Iraq’s different ethnic

groups by giving groups greater control over their political, social and economic affairs, federalism offers the only viable option for thwarting ethnic conflict and secessionism as well as instituting a stable democracy in Iraq. Federalism can strike a reasonable balance. Such a balance would ensure that the provinces have sufficient autonomy to feel confident that they will not be oppressed by the national government. It would also ensure that the national government has sufficient strength that it will not collapse. For years the Kurds have had the idea of federalism for Iraq. They have insisted on this plan and in 1994 the Kurdish parliament agreed on the plan for a federal Iraq. They also tried to convert other factions in the Iraqi opposition to this idea of federalism. The Kurds have said quite frankly that they do not want to see Iraqi security forces return to Kurdistan. The Kurds have had a long history of conflict with Iraqi security forces and they do no want these forces to return and control Kurdish cities and areas. The Kurds have demanded that army units garrisoned in Kurdistan be made up of Kurds. As far as Peshmarga is concerned , " If Kurdistan faces an outside threat or a threat that exceeds the capabilities of Kurdistan's domestic security forces, then the Iraqi army will certainly be able to help and to enter" Kurdistan, Barzani said. "Peshmarga forces will always remain but their task has changed ". Federalism is not a new concept for Iraq.

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Iraq Federalism good – impacts Implosion of Iraq would cause region-wide wars-loss of U.S. hegemony, and a drastic increase in terrorism and oil prices J. Brian Atwood, Univ. of Minnesota Dean of Public Affairs Institute, “Iraq: One Year After,” March 2004 Civil conflict in Iraq, the alternative to peaceful political competition, would risk intervention by and competition for influence among, Iraq’s neighbors, long-term instability in the production and supply of oil, and the emergence of a failed state that could offer a haven to terrorists. It would also represent a monumental policy failure for the United States, with an attendant loss of power and influence in the region.

US Leadership decline causes global nuclear war Zalmay Khalilzad, Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995, lexis Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing

cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

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Iraq Federalism good – impacts Failing to design federalism and establish democracy in Iraq will create a civil war in Iraq that will draw in other countries with nuclear weapons such as Iran and Turkey. Dawn Brancati, Center for the Study of Deomcratic Politics, Princeton, The Washington Quarterly, “Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq” 2004 The potential consequences of failing to design federalism properly and to establish a stable democracy in Iraq extend far beyond Iraqi borders. Civil war in Iraq may draw in neighboring countries such as Turkey and Iran, further destabilizing the Middle East in the process. It may also discourage foreign investment in the region, bolster Islamic extremists, and exacerbate tensions between Palestinians and Israelis. A civil war in Iraq may even undermine support for the concept of federalism more generally, which is significant given the number of countries also considering federalism, such as Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, to name just two. Finally, the failure to design and implement the kind of federalism that can establish a stable democracy in Iraq might undermine international support for other U.S. initiatives in the region, including negotiations for Arab-Israeli peace. Iraq’s federal government must therefore be designed carefully so as to give regional governments extensive political and financial autonomy, to include Kirkuk in the Kurdish region that is created, and to limit the influence of identity-based political parties. The short- and long-term stability of Iraq and the greater Middle East depend on it.

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Iraq federalism good – solvency Federalism solves for a democratic and stable Iraq Adeed Dawisha, Miami Univ. Political Science Prof, and Karen Dawisha, Miami Univ. Russian Studies Prof, Foreign Affairs, “How to Build a Democratic Iraq” May/June 2003 lexis Let’s get federal Iraq's ethnic and sectarian diversity -- the splits between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen, and between Shi'ites and Sunnis -- is usually seen as an impediment to building a stable democracy there. The fact is, however, that

all this antagonism could serve a constructive purpose: having factions zealously check each others' power could actually promote democracy at the expense of rigid communal particularism. The trick is to work out a constitutional arrangement that makes sense of Iraq's social and cultural mosaic, transforming diversity into an agent for positive change. For that reason, democratic Iraq must have a federal system of government. Already, the Kurds -- who have enjoyed freedom from Baghdad's control since the establishment of the northern nofly zone -- have been adamant in demanding such a system. But all Iraqis would benefit from federalism, as the example of other current federal states -- the United States, Germany, Russia, and now the United Kingdom -- suggests. In a federal Iraq, both Baghdad and the regions should be equal guardians of the constitution. Monitoring the rights and arbitrating disputes between these power bases should be the responsibility of a strong federal judiciary. As other federal states have shown, constitutional amendments to change this arrangement should be allowed only with the concurrence of both houses of the legislature, the head of state, and all federal units. Allowing the center to bypass the regions in amending the constitution quickly dilutes local rights and increases regional antipathy to central control -- as occurred in Russia before the December 1993 referendum imposed a new federal constitution. Successful federal systems also divide power to raise and distribute revenues between the capital and the periphery. Central revenues can be used to redistribute resources from rich to poor regions, whereas local revenues support local economic and cultural initiatives. Such revenue-sharing arrangements are critical because power follows resources; when the central government denies regions the right to raise and spend money, it is tantamount to denying them authority. Revenue-sharing, on the other hand, can also decrease the temptation for one ethnic group to either capture the state or seek separation. That said, as in other federal states, certain strategic assets such as Iraq's petroleum must remain in the hands of the central government. Local governments should in general have widespread control over their territories. This includes responsibility for all citizens in a given region, not just those of a given ethnicity. The now-collapsed Israeli efforts to give the Palestinian Authority control over some Arab activity in the West Bank and Gaza, while Jerusalem retained sovereignty over Jews in the territories, was a doomed formula: modern states, with their massive infrastructures, must be organized territorially and can function only in that manner. Limiting authorities to caring for their own kind only reinforces tribal, ethnic, and religious divisions, which can undermine democracy. For these reasons, any attempts on the part of Iraq's Arab elites to once again grant the Kurds autonomy -- without also giving them substantial control over their territory as a unit in the federal structure -- will likewise be doomed to fail. Admittedly, federalism does not always satisfy the aspirations of groups bent on independence, as demonstrated by the conflicts in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, and Chechnya. At the same time, devolution of power has succeeded in stemming the rise of separatism in the other ethnic republics of Russia, in Scotland, and in Montenegro -and could do the same for Iraq, if properly handled.

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Iraq federalism good – solvency Federalism is vital to solving ethnic tensions in Iraq Chilbi Mallat, University of London Doctoral Candidate, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Winter 2003 lexis This might sound bizarre, but I think this is one of the major elements that explain why the Middle East federal experiment is lacking. There is no recognizable dimension in which the legal profession can identify with federalism in order to project it on their own selves. And how needed that is! Let us take the example of Iraq. As you know, Iraq is one of those typical countries

where "national unity" is lacking. National unity is lacking because of the many dimensions of Iraqi disunity -- sociologically and historically between Arabs and Kurds, and within Arabs, between Shi'is and Sunnis. About 20% of the population of Iraq lives in a geographical continuum north of the 36th parallel. That region is mainly inhabited by Kurds, who speak a different language and have a different "national tradition" than the Arabs who live in Baghdad and south of that line. But there is also a curious fracture within Iraqi society between Arab Sunnis and Arab Shi'is. Shi'ism and Sunnism are the two main sects in Islam, historically somewhat similar to Catholics and Protestants in Christianity. And the divide is sociologically very heavy in the history of Iraq. As a result of those fractures, there is no proper accounting of how the society is exactly divided in terms of population and percentages. But it is presumed that the Iraqi population is comprised of approximately 60% Arab Shi'is, 20% Arab Sunnis, and 20% Kurds, mostly Sunnis. One can see how the three elements are additionally intertwined in terms of geography, because the line between the north and the south which marks the socalled 36th parallel operates relatively well to demarcate Arab and Kurdish Iraqis (and even then, there are quite a few Kurds who live in Baghdad, and many Kurds are more conversant in educated Arabic than in Kurdish), the geographical line simply does not work as a demarcation between Sunnis and Shi'is. In a situation like this, and however thorny its application in practice, it is

clear that the only model that can offer some sort of respite, some sort of room for those communities to flourish, is a federalist model. It would allow new spaces to be created, both in terms of autonomy and interaction. But we are fighting one major problem: over the past thousand years, Iraq has been "unified." In more recent times, the mere thought of federalism has always appeared as a secessionist ploy either put forward by the Kurds or put forward by the Shi'is. It is a problem you will still hear now in the Arab world, that any intervention by America in Iraq is bound to blow it up. This should not deter us from trying: since 1992, with colleagues in Europe and the Iraqi opposition, we have been instrumental in putting federalism forward as a leading concept for the constitutional alternative in Iraq. Leading figures of the Iraqi opposition, with whom I worked for a long time, have realized through a slow process of persuasion, that a federal Iraq must be thought through, and thought through in a creative way that takes into account the diversity and complexity of populations in Iraqi society.

Federalism key to preventing Iraqi civil war Dawn Brancati, Center for the Study of Deomcratic Politics, Princeton, The Washington Quarterly, “Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq” 2004 Although there are several different ethnic and religious groups in Iraq and a history of conflict among these groups, it is still possible to construct a stable democracy in Iraq for several reasons. Whatever their primary motivations, these groups have demonstrated support for federalism, and the fact that religious and ethnic cleavages in Iraq are indeed crosscutting could help moderate behavior and even help develop political parties across religious and ethnic lines—that is, as long as it is within the proper federal political structure. Ethnically diverse countries such as Belgium, Canada, India, Spain, and Switzerland have all constructed stable democracies through federalism. Tensions among Iraq’s different ethnic and religious groups are no stronger or more volatile than tensions have been at one time or another in many of those countries. These tensions have even erupted into violence at various times in India, Spain, and Switzerland. Moreover, within the correct political framework, Iraq’s crosscutting cleavages may conspire to make people behave more moderately. They may

provide the basis for parties to mobilize groups across ethnic and religious lines, focusing politics on issues that are not ethnic or religious in nature, and may thereby defuse tensions. They may also promote more moderate policies on ethnic and religious issues. Whether Iraq is able to establish a stable democracy ultimately depends on the design of its system of federalism.

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Iraq federalism good – solvency Federalism Key to Iraqi Stability States News Service, April 28, 2005 lexis Scholars familiar with Iraq's ethnic and sectarian realities say the federalist form of government holds the potential for a stable political future. Federalism divides constitutional powers between national and local units of government. Such a system could provide political buffers to prevent a popular majority controlling the central government from exercising abusive powers over minority groups, scholars say. More than 20 federal republics exist in the world, among them Brazil, Canada and the United States in the Western Hemisphere; Austria, Germany, Spain and Switzerland in Europe; Australia, India and Malaysia in Asia; and the United Arab Emirates in the Middle East. Iraq consists of three main ethnic/sectarian groups: Sunni Arabs, Shi a Arabs and Kurds. The Sunni Arabs dominated the government under Saddam Hussein, and the core of the current insurgency is based in the central part of Iraq where they are a majority. The Shi a, who by many estimates account for more than half of the Iraqi population, were excluded from meaningful political participation after they boycotted elections held during the British mandate in 1922. The Shi a, who live mainly in the center and south of Iraq, are expected to dominate the January 30 balloting. Iraq will need to remain a united country. I'm quite certain that there will be elements of federalism that we here in the United States would recognize. But what has been impressive to me so far is that Iraqis whether Kurds or Shi a or Sunni or the many other ethnic groups in Iraq have demonstrated that they really want to live as one in a unified Iraq," Rice said in a speech to the U.S. Institute of Peace in August 2004, when she was national security advisor. Veteran U.S. diplomat James Dobbins, who has worked to stabilize the situations in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia, says, "The Iraqis must find their own way to a solution, and that may mean elements of local, sub-national government, or federalism, as well as power sharing in the national level. What's vital is to reach a power arrangement

that reflects the population, not just voting turnout, and avoids sectarian conflict."

All ethnic parties support federalism as the only way to solve tensions. Dawn Brancati, Center for the Study of Deomcratic Politics, Princeton, The Washington Quarterly, “Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq” 2004 Federalism seems to be the system of choice for more than just the Kurds. In fact, all Iraqi leaders that opposed the regime before it collapsed have expressed their support for federalism in Iraq. The Iraqi opposition first voiced its support for federalism in December 2002 at the London conference of opposition leaders that included Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi‘as. The members of the conference agreed that “[n]o future state of Iraq will be democratic if it is not federal at the same time in structure.”6 Federalism, they claim, is a necessary form

of democracy because federalism protects the will of the minority against the will of the majority.

Federalism empirically solves and will in Iraq. Dawn Brancati, Center for the Study of Deomcratic Politics, Princeton, The Washington Quarterly, “Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq” 2004 Although there are several different ethnic and religious groups in Iraq and a history of conflict among these groups, it is still possible to construct a stable democracy in Iraq for several reasons. Whatever their primary motivations, these groups have demonstrated support for federalism, and the fact that religious and ethnic cleavages in Iraq are indeed crosscutting could help moderate behavior and even help develop political parties across religious and ethnic lines—that is, as long as it is within the proper federal political structure. Ethnically diverse countries such as Belgium, Canada, India, Spain, and Switzerland have all constructed stable democracies through federalism. Tensions among Iraq’s different ethnic and religious groups are no stronger or more volatile than tensions have been at one time or another in many of those countries. These tensions have even erupted into violence at various times in India, Spain, and Switzerland. Moreover, within the correct political framework, Iraq’s crosscutting cleavages may conspire to make people behave more moderately. They may provide the basis for parties to mobilize groups across ethnic and religious lines, focusing politics on issues that are not ethnic or religious in nature, and may thereby defuse tensions. They may also promote more moderate policies on ethnic and religious issues. Whether Iraq is able to establish a stable democracy ultimately depends on the design of its system of federalism.

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Iraq federalism good – solvency Iraq federalism spills over to stabilize the entire Middle East. BBC Monitoring Middle East – Political, “Iraqi Kurdish writer supports Iraqi-US pact” July 2, 2008 lexis In establishing the principles of democracy, this agreement shall become a solid basis for democracy as well as for establishing the constitutional rights, laws and federalism in Iraq; hence eradicating the roots of dictatorship, unilateralism, subjugation and power monopoly. This will not only serve Iraq, but it will be a successful model for both the region and the Middle East.

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Iraq federalism bad – links Iraq not modeling US federalism now. Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Fox News, "Burdensome Weight of Unity Could Force Iraq Break-Up" September 20, 2006 "Federalism is a preliminary step to dividing and separating Iraq," said Adnan al-Dulaimi, head of the Iraqi Accordance Front, the largest Sunni bloc in the parliament. "I call on Iraqis to confront this draft." But Michael Rubin, a Middle East expert at the American Enterprise Institute who served as a consultant for the U.S.-led transitional government after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, said a federalist system with powerful regional forces may be inevitable. "One of the big ironies in Iraq is everyone says they want a strongman," via a strong, centralized government, Rubin said. "But in reality, they want a weak central government as possible, and it's going to be a country of regional strongmen." But how strong, and autonomous, and whether the power will be shared among all groups, is the million dollar question, he said. "We should be encouraging them to define the role of the federalist government," and in the fairest way possible, Rubin said, "and

so far we are dropping the ball."

The US is telling Iraq not to model our federalism. Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Fox News, "Burdensome Weight of Unity Could Force Iraq Break-Up" September 20, 2006 The Bush administration, however, is not talking about anything but a strong, national government in Iraq. Though the federalist issue was left open in the constitution, any course that leaves Baghdad weak is not supported by the United States, said National Security Council spokesman Frederick Jones. "We don't believe that is the correct course for Iraq," he said of a three-state solution. "The Iraqi people expressed their desire for a unity government, overwhelming numbers of them came out to vote. ... We believe that is the course that (Prime Minister Nouri) al-Maliki is pursuing and

we support [Iraqis] in their efforts."

Iraq is looking to other federalist models. New York Times, David Brooks, " Iraq's Founding Moments" October 7, 2003 Should the Iraqis aim for a centralized presidential system or a loose parliamentary one? Most groups, including the Kurds, who are the best organized, call for decentralized government, but they are open-minded about which federalist model -- the Swiss? the German? -- would fit Iraq best. Federalism:

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Iraq federalism bad – solvency A federalist solution to Iraq is impossible. Stratfor, “Geopolitical Diary: Iraq's Federalist Problem” January 25, 2008 There is great opposition to both federal zones from various Sunni — as well as Shiite — quarters within Iraq, and also from the United States, Turkey and neighboring Sunni Arab states. Aware of this, al-Rubaie proposes a new federalist model of Iraq, consisting of five provinces: A “‘Kurdistan province,’ including the current Kurdistan and surrounding areas; a ‘Western province,’ including Mosul and the upper Tigris and Euphrates valleys; a ‘Kufa province,’ built around the Middle Euphrates governorates; a ‘Basra province,’ including the lower Tigris and Euphrates valleys; and a ‘Baghdad province,’ built around Greater Baghdad, which may include parts of Diyala and Salah ad Din governorates.” The geographic makeup of these proposed regions is an effort to strike a triangular balance between the country’s three key ethno-sectarian groups, as well as to satisfy the concerns of Washington, Ankara and the Arab capitals. The demographic distribution of the Shia, Sunnis

and Kurds and the geographic distribution of energy resources is such that any agreement between the internal and external players on a federal model (no matter how you slice it) is going to be excruciatingly difficult. Even among the Shia, there are competing visions of autonomy. Since a deal remains elusive in the current system and designing a new one from scratch seems impossible, the United States and Iran have a long way to go before they can reach a settlement on Iraq.

Strong federal power in Iraq key to stability. Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Fox News, "Burdensome Weight of Unity Could Force Iraq Break-Up" September 20, 2006 While a partitioning of Iraq along religious and ethnic lines may ease the sectarian strife there, say some U.S. lawmakers like Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del., Alex Vatanka, security editor for Jane's Information Group, warned that such a break-up right now could have grave consequences. "It doesn't necessarily mean the end to the violence," he said, noting that Baghdad, the nation's capital, is home to Sunnis and Shiites and neither group is going to want to leave. "Given the animosity between the Shia and the Sunni, it would be best to hope for a strong leader or a strong central government in Baghdad and let the people decide for themselves for the long term, what model of government is best for them."

US federal model increases instability and resistance in Iraq. Carole A. O'Leary, professor at American University, CQ Congressional Testimony, "Iraq in 2012" April 3, 2008 lexis Establishing stability in a future Iraq is a necessary precondition for the development of good governance and a vibrant civil society. The Iraqi experience of state-directed violence against specific ethnic and sectarian groups, including mass murder and ethnic cleansing, requires a new framework for governance that accommodates the political and cultural significance of communalism in Iraqi society. Federalism as an organizing framework for pluralistic societies is one model that could promote stability in Iraq. In this regard, it has been suggested at various times that partition of Iraq may be the path that leads to political stabilization. Taking an Iraqi point of view, it is clear that the term .partition. is unhelpful - perhaps even detrimental -- to the goal of stabilizing Iraq. It immediately causes Iraqis to become suspicious, to tune us out, and to be reluctant to engage in dialogue on power-sharing, decentralization and federalism. There is a real irony here federalism as a model for governance in Iraq has long been supported by its proponents, including myself, precisely because it is one model that can hold Iraq together as a single state minus a new dictator. Unfortunately, in the current political environment many Iraqis believe that when American officials, scholars and/or the media use the word federalism, we are really using it as a gloss or codeword for partition. We need to be clear in our use of these terms - if we mean partition as in the economic and political break up of Iraq -than we should say so - if we mean federalism as a means to keep Iraq unified than we should be clear about that too. Conflation of the terms partition and federalism on our side is not only erroneous but dangerous, as it contributes to an environment of confusion and mistrust on the part of the Iraqi body politic.

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Iraq federalism bad – solvency US prescence prevents Iraqi federalism. BBC Monitoring Middle East – Political, “Iraqi cleric Al-Sadr interviewed on "armed resistance", political process, Iran's role” March 31, 2008 lexis In fact, if federalism does not lead to the partitioning of Iraq, then it is an honourable step, but the problem is that the presence of the occupation is an obstacle on the way to establishing federalism, which cannot be established as long as the occupation remains in place, and as long as the occupation remains in place, federalism and even centralized federalism will partition Iraq. If there had not been occupation, we would have had a different argument. Federalism is a big title and may be of an Islamic nature, but in the presence of the occupation, federalism cannot be implemented and Iraq will be partitioned.

Federalism will cause division, ethnic conflict and civil war. Dawn Brancati, Center for the Study of Deomcratic Politics, Princeton, The Washington Quarterly, “Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq” 2004 Iraqi minority groups in the northern part of the country also have reservations about establishing federalism in Iraq out of fear that the Kurds will discriminate against them in any Kurdish-dominated region that is created. Although the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which was established under the protection of the no-fly zone created by the United States following the Persian Gulf War and is comprised of the two main Kurdish parties and a coalition of Christians and Assyrians, has promised to respect all people’s rights, some minorities such as the Turkomans and Assyrians fear that a Kurdish regional government would harm their minority rights by protecting Kurdish identities and passing laws prohibiting non-Kurds from using their own language, practicing their own religion, or gaining rightful employment. The president of the Iraqi Turkoman Front, San’an Ahmad Agha, has warned, “If one group tries to favor itself over another … it will lead to civil war. If there is a division, there will be an ethnic war.”

Federalism won’t solve for ethnic conflict in Iraq Mideast Mirror, “Secular constitutional democracy is best for Iraq” June 16, 2003 lexis Federalism might be the best available solution for distributing Iraq's wealth equally among the country's citizens; it might provide Iraq's minorities with more equitable political representation. Yet it cannot guarantee that these minorities would not someday in the future be subjected to ethnic cleansing and genocide. The former Yugoslavia is a case in point, and so is the former Soviet Union. Federalism did not protect the minorities in either country from oppression.

Iraq will not solve Middle East democracy, terrorism, or the peace process. David L. Mack, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, Arabia Link, 2004 Some of the cheerleaders of last year’s war, a war that in a very real sense is not over, badly oversold what we were going to accomplish. The success which I believe is still possible in Iraq will make that country a much better place for Iraqis and a much safer place for Iraq’s neighbors, but it is unlikely to lead to a wave of democracy throughout the region. It will not by itself bring us much closer to an ArabIsraeli settlement, it will not end terrorism and it will only help reduce global energy dependence on other Arab suppliers. We need to start looking for a good exit strategy based on achievable goals within a relatively short time frame.

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Iraq federalism bad – solvency Making Iraq democratic won’t spread democracy to the Middle East. Marina Ottaway, “Democratic Mirage in the Middle East, Democracy and Rule of Law Project” October 2002 http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Policybrief20.pdf The increasingly popular idea in Washington that the United States, by toppling Saddam Hussein, can rapidly democratize Iraq and unleash a democratic tsunami in the Middle East is a dangerous fantasy. The U.S. record of building democracy after invading other countries is mixed at best and the Bush administration’s commitment to a massive reconstruction effort in Iraq is doubtful. The repercussions of an intervention in Iraq will be as likely to complicate the spread of democracy in the Middle East as promote it. The formation of a new, more moderate regime in Iraq would unlikely have the inspirational effect some predict. Many Arabs, rather than looking to Iraq as a model, would focus on the fact that Iraq was “liberated” through western intervention, not by a popular Iraqi movement. One powerful current in today’s regional discourse emphasizes liberation from excessive western interference in Arab affairs more than liberation from undemocratic leaders. The Middle East today lacks the domestic conditions that set the stage for democratic change elsewhere. It does not have the previous experience with democracy that facilitated transitions in Central Europe. Moreover, countries of the Middle East do not benefit from a positive “neighborhood effect,” the regional, locally grown pressure to conform that helped democratize Latin America. On the contrary, neighborhood norms in the Middle East encourage repressive, authoritarian regimes.

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Indonesia federalism now Indonesia is moving to federalism now. Paul Smoke, Associate Professor of Public Finance and Planning @ NYU Wagner. 2005. The World Bank Report: East Asia Decentralizes. “Making Local Government Work.” http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPDECEN/Resources/dc-full-report.pdf Decentralization reforms in Indonesia include both devolution of authority and, to a lesser extent, deconcentration of functions. Deconcentration to provincial authorities was the dominant form of decentralization before 1999, when the emphasis shifted to devolution to city and district governments. Local governments have broad functions and receive substantial intergovernmental transfers, but have limited revenue authority. The country has increasingly developed the legal framework (most recently through Laws 32 and 33 of 2004), but functional responsibilities and subnational revenues require further elaboration and regulation.

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Indonesia federalism good - terrorism Indonesia looking to US model to check terrorism. John D. Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence, US Department of State, Annual Threat Assessment to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Threats, Challenges, and Opportunities for the United States” February 28, 2006 Southeast Asia includes vibrant, diverse, and emerging democracies looking to the United States as a source of stability, wealth, and leadership. But it is also home to terrorism, separatist aspirations, crushing poverty, ethnic violence, and religious divisions. Burma remains a dictatorship, and Cambodia is retreating from progress on democracy and human rights made in the 1990s. The region is particularly at risk from avian flu, which I will address later at greater length. Al-Qa'ida-affiliated and other extremist groups are present in many countries, although effective government policies have limited their growth and impact. The prospects for democratic consolidation are relatively bright in Indonesia, the country with the world's largest Muslim population. President Yudhoyono is moving forward to crack down on corruption, professionalize the military, bring peace to the long-troubled province of Aceh, and implement economic reforms. On the counterterrorism side, Indonesian authorities have detained or killed significant elements of Jemaah Islamiya (JI), the al Qa'ida-linked terrorist group, but JI remains a tough foe.

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Indonesia federalism good - hegemony A. Federalism prevents the dissolution of Indonesia. Dana Dillon, writer for the Heritage Foundation. “Indonesia and Separatism: Finding a Federalist Solution” April 19, 2000, http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/EM670.cfm, No. 670 The lack of revenue is also an increasing source of tension. The provincial governments have limited power to tax or raise revenue. The central government's principal source of revenue--which funds 75 percent of the national budget--is oil, primarily from the outer islands. Yet very little of that revenue is given back to them. Money that does return to the provinces usually benefits Jakarta-appointed bureaucrats or government-owned businesses. Indigenous populations find it difficult to get jobs in the local government, and the military controls most of the state-owned enterprises. Most Indonesians feel that members of the military are more interested in protecting their business interests and institutional political rights than in national security. The repression of civilians by the~i’my and the national police has made them the country’s most hated and distrusted institutions. However, none of the insurgent groups that arose to battle the injustices has met with much success. In some cases, insurgents have practiced indiscriminate killing, kidnapping, and intimidation of innocent civilians and destruction of foreign-owned property and businesses. Rather than build support for their causes, this behavior strengthens the hand of Jakarta. Separatist grievances focus on access to revenue and the inability of the provinces to pass and enforce local civil and criminal laws. Relieving the causes of the endemic insurrections will be difficult, but not an insurmountable task. The adoption of a system based on federalism could resolve the grievances and weaken the insurrection movements.

B. Indonesian collapse destroys the signal of US leadership. Rajan Menon, Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University. Fall, 2001. The National Interest. “Another Year of Living Dangerously?” The consequences of Indonesia's breakup would affect American interests, as well. American energy and raw materials companies (Exxon-Mobil, Texaco, Chevron, Newmont Mining, Conoco and FreeportMcMoRan, among others) operate in Indonesia, particularly in Aceh, Riau, and West Papua, and many of the ships that traverse the Strait of Malacca are American-owned. The United States is also a major trader and investor in East Asia and is to some degree hostage to its fate, especially now that the American economy is slowing. Moreover, if Indonesia fractures, worst-case thinking and preemptive action among its neighbors could upset regional equilibrium and undermine the American strategic canopy in East Asia. The United States has a network of bases and alliances and 100,000 military personnel in the region, and is considered the guarantor of stability by most states-a status it will forfeit if it stands aside as Indonesia falls apart. America's competitors will scrutinize its actions to gauge its resolve and acumen. So will its friends and allies-Australia, Japan, Singapore, Thailand and South Korea-each of whom would be hurt by Indonesia's collapse.

C. Leadership is essential to prevent global nuclear exchange Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995 Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership

would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

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Indonesia federalism bad Federalism will drive Indonesia to secession Hasjim Djalal, former ambassador and now a senior advisor on maritime affairs to the Indonesian government, “An Indonesian Perspective on Terrorism” 2003 In contrast, Indonesian decolonisation and ‘nation building’ was based on the concept of ‘inheriting’ Dutch authority over an otherwise diverse group of ethnic communities, cultures and polities. Despite promises to the outlying islands, federalism was strangled at birth because it was, and largely still is, seen as driving ‘Indonesians’ apart rather

than drawing them together. Many Indonesians in the outlying islands also consider that national resources are being plundered by the majority Javanese rather than shared equitably. Three generations of Indonesians have also grown up deliberately immersed in the questionable belief that any successful secession would mean the end of multi-ethnic Indonesia as a whole. Particularly when general Indonesian federalism is perpetually postponed, the danger is that such a myth can needlessly become selffulfilling when a secession becomes inevitable anyway. These effects can be seen in the manner in which many Indonesians have superficially reconciled themselves to the loss of East Timor. Many, perhaps most, regret its loss rather than truly face up to why Indonesia ‘lost’ the territory.

A stable Indonesia is key to the economy Samantha F. Ravich, fellow in the Asian Studies Program at CSIS. “Eyeing Indonesia Through the Lens of Aceh” 2000 If Indonesia does succeed in reforming itself, its natural resources and population could once again make the country an engine of growth for the region and a significant market for U.S. goods and services. Indonesia’s gross domestic product fell by 13.7 percent in 1998. Yet, it should not be forgotten that during the period from 1966 to 1993, the economy grew by such an astronomical amount that many analysts in the early 1990s predicted that if the

country’s growth could be sustained for three more decades, Indonesia could become one of the world’s largest economies by 2025.1 Although having basically closed in upon itself during the last three years, a reformed Indonesia could also reclaim its position as a leader in Southeast Asia. Geographically, Indonesia straddles the entire region. The country provides key shipping lanes throughout the immediate region and to the industrial economies of northeast Asia. Strategically, the country creates a natural deterrent to any hegemonic intentions of China, Russia, Japan, or India.

Federalism leads to Indonesian fragmentation Asia Week, “Asian Wars” August 4, 2000 One problem is that federalism is seen as a panacea for all woes, regardless of the idiosyncrasies of each state. It has not been particularly effective, for example, in subduing separatist movements in Canada or Nigeria. In Asia, Indonesia, the Phil_ippines and Sri Lanka are all discussing federal possibilities. But it is wrong to simply assume that anything that worked in the West will work in Asia. Here's why: Indonesia: Although the country was established as a federation of 15 autonomous states in November 1949, this structure was abandoned less than a year later in favor of a highly

centralized system. The fear was that a federal organization would facilitate disintegration and weaken the identity of the people as Indonesians. The Regional Autonomy Bill, which could take effect at the beginning of 2001, promises more power and government funds to the provinces. But will mere autonomy satisfy the Acehnese, who have demanded freedom for years? Maluku declared independence in 1950, only to be taken back forcibly by the military. A form of federalism may be enough for the Malukus, where bloodshed is recent, but it may not be possible. Opponents claim it is against the Constitution. Philippines: To deal with war and development problems in Mindanao, the Senate is examining federalism as a means to resolve provincial disparities. The proposal by policial scientist Jose Abueva envisages a two-stage transformation from the decentralized unitary system to a federal system by 2010. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front, however, wants a separate nation, not autonomy. Compromise is needed. Sri Lanka: Previous attempts at devolution, notably in the 1980s, failed mainly because there was no clear delineation of powers to be devolved. Unanimous agreement from Tamil parties also was absent. Last month the Tamil Tigers refused to address a government devolution plan unless Tamil self-determination was examined first. Secession, it seems, is nonnegotiable. Present models of federalism presuppose a transparent democratic framework, a strong and independent judiciary to resolve jurisdiction disputes, and parties willing to bargain without resorting to violence. The fear in such countries as Indonesia is that federalism will simply foster increased regionalism, causing more enmity. If it is to work, a purely Asian solution must be devised — one not based on experiences in North America and Europe, but on the more complex and violent conflicts of former colonies.

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