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EDUCATION IN A COMPETITIVE AND GLOBALIZING WORLD

CRITICAL THINKING

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EDUCATION IN I A COMPET TITIVE AND GLOBALIZING G WORLD

CRITICA R AL THIINKING G

CHR RISTOPH HER P. HORVATH H AND

JAMESS M. FOR RTE EDITORS

Nova Scien nce Publisheers, Inc. N York New

Copyright © 2011 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. For permission to use material from this book please contact us: Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers’ use of, or reliance upon, this material. Any parts of this book based on government reports are so indicated and copyright is claimed for those parts to the extent applicable to compilations of such works. Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. Additional color graphics may be available in the e-book version of this book.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Critical thinking / editors, Christopher P. Horvath and James M. Forte. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 978-1-62081-702-5 (eBook) 1. Critical thinking. I. Horvath, Christopher P. II. Forte, James M. BF441.C735 2011 160--dc22 2011012599

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. © New York

CONTENTS vii 

Preface Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Rules for Reasoning Revisited: Toward a Scientific Conception of Critical Thinking D. Alan Bensley  Critical Thinking and Systems Thinking: Towards a Critical Literacy for Systems Thinking in Practice Martin Reynolds 

Chapter 3

Developing Critical Thinking through Probability Models Einav Aizikovitsh-Udi 

Chapter 4

The Promotion of Critical Thinking Skills through Argument Mapping Christopher Dwyer, Michael Hogan and Ian Stewart 

Chapter 5

Beyond GDP? Towards a New System of Social Accounts Frédéric Lebaron 

Chapter 6

A Four-Component Instructional Model for Teacher Training in Critical-Thinking Instruction: Its Effectiveness and Influential Factors Yu-chu Yeh 

Chapter 7

Chapter 8

Index

Crucial Connections: An Exploration of Critical Thinking and Scholarly Writing Roisin Donnelly and Marian Fitzmaurice  How Can Critical Thinking Be Recognized in the Classroom? Patrícia Albergaria-Almeida, José Joaquim Cristino Teixeira-Dias and Mariana Martinho 

1 

37  69 

97  123 

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159  175 

189 

PREFACE In reflective problem solving and thoughtful decision making using critical thinking one considers evidence, the context of judgment, the relevant criteria for making the judgment well, the applicable methods or techniques for forming the judgment, and the applicable theoretical constructs for understanding the problem and the question at hand. In this book, the authors present topical research in the study of critical thinking. Topics discussed include developing critical thinking through probability models; the promotion of critical thinking skills through argument mapping; an instructional model for teacher training in critical thinking; advanced academic literacy and critical thinking and critical thinking and higher education. Chapter 1 – Critical thinking (CT) has been widely acclaimed as an important educational outcome, yet numerous problems remain concerning how to conceptualize it. A review of the literature in this chapter reveals that many authors agree that CT involves skills and dispositions related to good reasoning, but they often disagree about which specific skills and dispositions are needed and in how these are organized. Closer inspection of other terms commonly associated with CT such as “evaluation,” “analysis,” and “higher order thinking,” reveals that they, too, are poorly specified and add little to the meaning of CT. The lack of clarity and specificity of CT skills, dispositions, and other terms impedes the instruction, assessment, and scientific study of CT and is only beginning to be addressed through empirical research. Although research reviewed in this chapter shows that explicit infusion of CT into subject matter instruction is more effective than less explicit, immersion and traditional approaches, it also reveals the need for greater specificity in identifying the principles and other antecedent conditions that improve CT. To address these deficiencies, a rule-based approach to defining, instructing, and assessing CT is proposed. The approach operationally defines CT skill as the appropriate use of relevant rules and procedures for reasoning in a discourse context. It further assumes that CT is a motivated process involving dispositions and self-regulation in the service of belief formation and revision. Chapter 2 – Rather than exploring one tradition of systems thinking – CST - this chapter explores the notion of contemporary systems thinking as being implicitly critical. An argument will be made that the need for what might be called a ‘systems literacy’ reflects a need for the original critical idea of systems. The basis of such a literacy is a proposed framework of systems thinking in practice based on revised ideas of boundary critique (Ulrich and Reynolds, 2010). After describing what this critical literacy in systems thinking in practice looks like and entails, the question of how the critical kernel emerged amongst contemporary systems thinking in practice approaches is examined. This section traces the

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influence of critical thinking traditions on systems thinking. Finally, some views are offered on why attention to the critical literacy of systems thinking in practice is significant to a contemporary world beset with complex issues of change and uncertainty. Chapter 3 – In light of the importance of developing critical thinking, and given the scarcity of research on critical thinking in mathematics studies in the broader context of higher-order thinking skills, authors have carried out a research that examined how teaching strategies oriented towards developing higher-order thinking skills influenced the students’ critical thinking abilities. The guiding rationale of the work was that such teaching can foster the students’ skills of and dispositions towards critical thinking. In this research, a primary attempt has been made to examine the relations between education for critical thinking and mathematics studies through examining teaching and learning critical thinking according to the infusion approach, which combines critical thinking and mathematical content (“Probability in Daily Life” learning unit).The main contribution of this work and the innovations it is expected to introduce lie in elucidating the connection between critical thinking and the study of mathematics and creating insights into the mechanisms of critical thinking development, and its place and importance in the study of mathematics, in spite of the uncertainty whether critical thinking skills acquired in studying one field will necessarily be applied by students in other fields, referred to as “the transfer problem.” In this way it will be possible to strengthen the status of mathematics studies in imparting higher-order thinking skills in various frameworks, in parallel with and beyond the formal program of studies. The purpose of this research is to examine how and to what extent it is possible to develop critical thinking by means of the learning unit “Probability in Daily Life” using the infusion approach. The research questions that guided it are: (1) To what extent does the study of “Probability in Daily Life” in the infusion approach contribute to the development of critical thinking dispositions? (2) To what extent does the study of “Probability in Daily Life” in the infusion approach contribute to the development of critical thinking abilities? (3) What are the processes of construction of critical thinking skills (e.g., identifying variables, postponing judgment, referring to sources, searching for alternatives) during the study of the “Probability in Daily Life” learning unit in the infusion approach? The present research involved nine groups of gifted and high-achieving mathematics students in eleventh grade from all the social groups and strata of Israeli society. The students studied the learning unit “Probability in Daily Life” modified by the researchers to include critical thinking teaching in the infusion approach. The students were then tested in two critical thinking tests, CCTDI and the Cornell Critical Thinking Test, the results of which were statistically analyzed, and also selectively interviewed, with subsequent qualitative analysis of the interviews and lesson transcripts. Thus the research combines quantitative and qualitative methods. The research findings can be summed up in the following categories: (i) In all three iterations of the experimental teaching, a moderate improvement was detected in the critical thinking dispositions of all experimental groups. (ii) Throughout these iterations, a moderate improvement was also detected in the students' critical thinking abilities. (iii) Teaching critical thinking contributed to the construction and use of these skills in the framework of mathematics. Thus, when teachers consistently emphasize critical thinking skills, the students are more likely to succeed in the subject of mathematics. (iv) This research did not detect a clear-cut distinction between the critical thinking abilities and dispositions of excellent and average mathematics students. That is, no direct correlation has been found between the development of mathematical knowledge and the development of critical thinking. On the

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basis of these findings, the following recommendations for further research can be made: (1) A more comprehensive examination of the processes of critical thinking: to what extent could the students describe, orally and in writing, the processes of thinking, activate them and apply the thinking skills they studied on the procedural and meta-cognitive level? Did they make an informed use of terms and strategies of higher-order thinking, including critical thinking? In other words, it should be examined what use the research participants make of the “language of thinking,” or, in the words of Costa and Marzano, “do they speak thinking?” (Costa & Marzano, in Harpaz, 1997). Developing such a language involves, on the part of the teacher, such skills as using precise vocabulary, presenting critical questions, presenting data rather than answers, aspiring for exactness, giving directions, and developing meta-cognition. (2) Examination of the attitudes and perceptions of education students in colleges for teacher training, practicing teachers and researchers of mathematical education with regard to teaching that develops critical thinking in mathematics; evaluation of these students’ and professionals’ critical thinking functions in teaching, learning, and research. (3) Teaching “Probability in Daily Life” and conducting the same research among all the strata of the students’ population and not only among those who study mathematics at the higher level. It definitely seems that in the last decade, there has been a rapidly growing awareness of the importance of promoting the development of thinking skills in the Israeli educational system, and the system has been making considerable progress towards integrating the curriculum learning materials that contribute to the development of higher-order thinking skills. In 1994, the Ministry of Education recognized thinking skills as a distinct subject of studies. This recognition lead to the establishment of a Subject Committee for Thinking Skills, which is in charge of consolidating appropriate didactic materials, as is the case with the rest of the academic subjects in the school system. The complex and ceaselessly changing contemporary reality, which requires independent decision-making on a daily basis, makes it extremely important to impart to students the ability to think critically. Critical thinking is needed in every field of activity, as it allows the individual to deal with reality in a reasonable, mature and independent way (Lipmann, 1991). The need for developing critical thinking in different disciplines is anchored in the ideals of education for democracy, as our freedom to think about and criticize the reality and society in which authors live is a form of expression of our autonomy as individuals. Today this idea is even more vital, because of the growing need to be capable of engaging in inquiry and evaluation based on rational considerations regarding the various messages authors are exposed to in different areas of life (Feuerstein, 2002, Perkins, 1992, Swartz, 1992). In the field of education, mathematics has traditionally been considered a branch of knowledge particularly suited to the teaching and learning of higher-order thinking skills, such as critical thinking. Mathematics curricula all over the world, including Israel, identify the acquisition of these skills as one of their goals. The idea that mathematics is a discipline suited to teaching critical thinking also appears in the research literature. However, in spite of this assumption, very few empirical studies to date have engaged with the question of whether the study of mathematics indeed develops or even requires this mode of thinking. The answer to this question is far from being clear. The present research tackles precisely this basic question, “Is it possible to develop critical thinking in the framework of mathematics studies?” Chapter 4 – Argument mapping is a method of visually diagramming arguments using a 'box and arrow' format with the aim of simplifying the reading of an argument structure and facilitating the assimilation of core statements and relations. The current chapter presents the

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findings of a controlled trial in which argument mapping training was compared with hierarchical outline training as techniques for teaching critical thinking skills. Eighty-one undergraduate psychology students were allocated to one of three groups: an argument mapping group, an outlining group, or a control group and were tested on critical thinking before and after an 8-week intervention period. Results revealed that students in the argument mapping group scored higher than the control group at post-test on the critical thinking skills of evaluation and inductive reasoning. Students in the outlining group scored significantly higher than those in the control group on tests of analysis and inductive reasoning. There were no significant performance differences at post-test between those in the argument mapping group and those in the hierarchical summary group. Results are discussed in light of research and theory on best practice in the cultivation of critical thinking. Chapter 5 – The limits of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), most of them known for a long time and sources of an already flourishing [6] scientific literature, are the starting point of this observation: centred on production, this indicator describes the incomes and their evolution increasingly poorly, in particular due to the globalisation of economies; "defensive" expenditures such as the reconstruction of pollution-damaged environment or prison expenses are then considered as contributions to wealth; households' production, which is nonmonetary to a vast extent, is not taken into account; the production of the non-merchant sector, assessed by the production costs, is poorly measured; its calculation relies on various by partial "inputations" (a housing expenses is attributed to owner-households); it is based on the notion of average and not of that of variance. Chapter 6 – This study investigated the effectiveness of a training course in criticalthinking instruction with an emphasis on four components that are most likely to bring about teachers’ improvement in personal teaching efficacy and teacher behaviors during the training. Eighty-two preservice teachers participated in a 16-week training session in this study. Based on both qualitative and quantitative analyses, the findings suggest that providing guided practice and generating reflective teaching are crucial to the successfulness of a teacher training program and that a training course in critical-thinking instruction does, in fact, produce more lasting effects if it simultaneously imparts professional knowledge, raises personal teaching efficacy as well as heightens reflective teaching. At the same time, it is found that professional knowledge and field practices are indeed decisive in teachers’ overall improvement in personal teaching efficacy and teacher behaviors during teacher training. Chapter 7 – Academic writing in the context of producing quality research articles is something which all academics engage in and there is evidence of increased attention to supporting the development of the writing and subsequent output of academics and research students. However, while scholarly writing is learnt in complex ways, critical thinking is an intrinsic part of such writing, and is highly valued across all the academic disciplines and indeed is a high priority on both employability and citizenship agendas. However, in practice the teaching of critical thinking is difficult and there is a lack of discussion about what it means within the context of the writing process. This study describes a pedagogic intervention with a group of academic staff to support the participants not only to explore critical thinking in their own writing, but also to consider in depth how they would apply this learning to their work with students in higher education. Within the context of an academic writing module on a postgraduate programme for academic staff in higher education, an action research approach was used with participants to improve their understanding of the role of critical thinking in the academic writing process. The data suggests that the pedagogic

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intervention resulted in greater confidence in terms of participants’ critical writing skills and also supported them to help their own students in the academic writing process. An exploratory model is proposed for critical academic writing encompassing a series of scaffolded in-class activities, virtual peer learning, and tutor feedback – culminating in the publication and dissemination of individual practice-based educational research. Chapter 8 – A crucial goal of Higher Education is to support students in developing their ability to think critically. However, “critical thinking” can be an ambiguous expression. In this chapter authors intend to clarify its meaning, as well as to characterise the most significant indicator of critical thinking: higher-order questioning, as well as the relationship between critical thinking and active learning. Authors also propose to shed light on the teaching approaches which seem to inhibit students’ critical skills and to present teaching and learning strategies to enhance critical thinking. Finally, authors will describe the curriculum of a first year chemistry course at a Portuguese university aimed at fostering students’ critical thinking through the encouragement of quality questioning. Authors will describe in detail the teaching, learning and assessment strategies designed and implemented in this course.

In: Critical Thinking Editors: Ch. P. Horvath and J. M. Forte, pp. 1-36

ISBN: 978-1-61324-419-7 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 1

RULES FOR REASONING REVISITED: TOWARD A SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTION OF CRITICAL THINKING D. Alan Bensley Frostburg State University Frostburg, Maryland, USA

ABSTRACT Critical thinking (CT) has been widely acclaimed as an important educational outcome, yet numerous problems remain concerning how to conceptualize it. A review of the literature in this chapter reveals that many authors agree that CT involves skills and dispositions related to good reasoning, but they often disagree about which specific skills and dispositions are needed and in how these are organized. Closer inspection of other terms commonly associated with CT such as “evaluation,” “analysis,” and “higher order thinking,” reveals that they, too, are poorly specified and add little to the meaning of CT. The lack of clarity and specificity of CT skills, dispositions, and other terms impedes the instruction, assessment, and scientific study of CT and is only beginning to be addressed through empirical research. Although research reviewed in this chapter shows that explicit infusion of CT into subject matter instruction is more effective than less explicit, immersion and traditional approaches, it also reveals the need for greater specificity in identifying the principles and other antecedent conditions that improve CT. To address these deficiencies, a rule-based approach to defining, instructing, and assessing CT is proposed. The approach operationally defines CT skill as the appropriate use of relevant rules and procedures for reasoning in a discourse context. It further assumes that CT is a motivated process involving dispositions and self-regulation in the service of belief formation and revision.

Keywords: critical thinking, disposition, metacognition, rules, skills.

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INTRODUCTION Most educators agree that improvement of critical thinking (CT) is an important educational objective, but they often disagree on exactly what CT is and on how to teach and assess it. In a way, CT is like Little Orphan Annie--people want to adopt her, but they are not sure who she is or where she came from. An attempt to discover the origins of CT reveals that multiple disciplines have contributed to this rich construct, but it has remained poorly defined by many who use the term. The review that follows focuses primarily on the contributions from philosophy, education, and psychology that have arguably made the most important, unique contributions. It is not surprising that various disciplines have used different terminology and approaches in their discussions of CT. What is more surprising is that while many view CT as a legitimate construct, it remains a loose conglomeration of concepts without a clear claim to scientific legitimacy. This has impeded progress in the scientific study of CT, in general, and in the determination of what are the most effective ways to teach and assess it, in particular. Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to examine an approach that could help refine the conceptualization of CT in ways that not only improve its operational definition as a scientific construct but also facilitate its instruction and assessment. To better understand the need for this approach, discussion begins with an examination of disagreements and problems in conceptualizing CT. Then, discussion moves to how different approaches conceptualize CT instruction and assessment, followed by a review of research on what are the most effective approaches to teaching CT. This leads to a discussion of how using both general and discipline-specific CT rules could provide a framework for aligning CT instruction with assessment and promote the scientific study of CT. In particular, the approach can facilitate the explicit instruction of CT principles, methods, and concepts infused into subject matter instruction, an approach that empirical research has already shown is effective.

PROBLEMS IN CONCEPTUALIZING CT Definitions of CT abound (e.g., Beyer, 1995; Ennis, 1987; Facione, 1990a; Fisher & Scriven, 1997; Halpern, 2003, Kurfiss, 1988; Lipman, 1991; Moon, 2008; Paul, 1993). After more than three decades of intense discussions about the nature of CT, disagreements about some of its important attributes continue despite persistent complaints from those working in various disciplines about the need to refine its conceptualization (e.g., Bailin, Case, Coombs, & Daniels, 1999a; Bensley, 2009; Cody, 2006; Halonen, 1995; Johnson, 1992; Morgan, 1995; Petris, 2004; Riddell, 2007; Williams & Worth, 2001; Yanchar, Slife, & Warne, 2008). As the following review suggests, CT remains a construct in transition, in need of further integration of concepts from philosophy, education, psychology, and other disciplines. The early beginnings of CT, before it was CT and before there were disciplines, can be traced to early Greek language and philosophy. According to The New Oxford American Dictionary, the word “critical” derived from the Greek words, kritikos meaning “discerning” originally from krinein meaning “judge, decide”. The modern word “criterion” came from kriterion or “means of judging” (McKean, 2005, p. 451). The connection of these ancient words to modern views is apparent in the idea that CT involves the use of criteria in making

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reasoned judgments (Beyer, 1995; Lipman, 1991) and in the modern emphasis in the CT literature on the use of appropriate methods to reason well and make good judgments (e.g., Bensley, 1998; Halpern, 2007; Paul,1993). Arguably, the first substantial philosophical contribution to CT came from the Greek philosopher Socrates (469-399 B.C.) who developed a special kind of dialogue that used reasoning to examine opinions, beliefs, and authoritative statements. Socrates emphasized reflection on the quality of belief and thinking, an important aspect of CT found in contemporary philosophical views (e.g., Ennis, 1987; Paul, 1993). Plato (428?-347 B.C.) who recorded the work of his teacher Socrates further developed the rational approach, seeking to find the truth behind appearances (Paul, 1993). In some ways, Plato exerted even more influence through his training of Aristotle who played a pivotal role in the development of reasoning and science. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) invented syllogistic reasoning, helped develop the dialectic, began treating scientific observation as evidence, discussed the relationship between knowledge within oneself versus from other sources, and applied his ideas about reasoning to the practical problems of good citizenship and the improvement of reasoning. Of particular relevance to the arguments advanced in this chapter, Aristotle was the first to extract and formulate rules for correct reasoning from discourse and observations of thinking (Ryle, 1949). Like Aristotle, logicians have continued to derive logical rules from analysis of the practice of argumentation and criticism. Over the next several centuries, philosophers and rhetoricians applied many of Aristotle’s ideas to improve public speaking, legal procedures, and reasoning in general. Although skeptics later criticized Aristotle for being unduly optimistic about the use of reason to arrive at truth, Aristotle’s emphasis on the “art of thinking” influenced numerous books on the use and improvement of reasoning beginning with Cicero and Quintilian and extending to the development of logic textbooks. For example, the Port-Royal Logic credited to Antoine Arnauld and published in 1662 both extended and challenged parts of Aristotle’s approach. Arnauld’s textbook incorporated the assessment of probability, a concern about the attitudes related to good reasoning, and an attempt to balance skepticism with gullibility (Kennedy, 2004). His clearly written book used rules of reasoning to support the practice of thinking in the way he believed people naturally think and was widely used in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. In the Nineteenth Century, some instructors and authors of logic textbooks like James McCosh viewed part of their mission to make logic accessible to beginning college students and help them pursue the practical goal of applying logic. Philosophers in Great Britain had revived interest in Aristotle, continuing a tradition that valued rhetoric and the art of thinking (Kennedy, 2004). This approach also continued to assume that teaching students to reason well in a logic course would help them reason well about many different topics, consistent with the doctrine of formal discipline, a view originating with Plato, but developed by Medieval scholars (Smith, Langston, & Nisbett, 1992). The doctrine of formal discipline assumes that learning one challenging subject like Latin will help students improve their reasoning in other subjects, that is, that general rules for reasoning acquired in one challenging subject will readily transfer to learning of another subject. But increasingly, knowledge in the sciences was becoming specialized; and distinct academic disciplines arose. By the early part of the Twentieth Century, research by E. L. Thorndike, one of the founders of educational psychology, had seriously challenged the doctrine of formal discipline and the

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idea that rules for reasoning acquired in one discipline would readily transfer to another (Thorndike, 1906; Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901). Another trend in the Nineteenth Century that influenced the development of CT was an increasing emphasis on the autonomy of individual thinkers. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) questioned the 2,000 year-old distinction between the knowledge one acquires through personal experience and the knowledge acquired through testimony and other sources external to the individual (Kennedy, 2004). He concluded that they did not differ in kind and that both were subjectively experienced. This view tends to move much responsibility for evaluating the quality of experience, testimony, and other sources of information to the individual. The contemporary CT goal of educating students to be autonomous, self-regulated learners and thinkers probably owes much to endorsement of these philosophical ideas in Britain and the US. At the beginning of the Twentieth Century, authors working in different areas helped develop the concept of CT. In his influential 1906 book, Folkways, the sociologist William Graham Sumner discussed the importance of critical habits of thought in education. He decried the orthodoxy that develops when educators promote the codes, standards, and fashions of their group resulting in endorsement of popular opinions that maintain “broad fallacies, half-truths, and glib generalizations” (Sumner, 1940, p. 631). More influential, however, was the work of John Dewey, the student of pragmatist and philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce. Like Peirce, Dewey viewed scientific inquiry as a good model for thinking and its improvement. Dewey (1910) introduced the term “reflective thinking” to emphasize the importance of actively reflecting on the quality of beliefs, knowledge, and other products of thinking. His ideas about thinking resonate in recent conceptions of CT despite the fact that he never used the term “critical thinking,” per se. Dewey made clear that reflective thinking should be integrated into content learning in the schools and emphasized the importance of fostering certain attitudes or what many today call CT dispositions. The influence of Dewey is apparent in one of the most commonly cited definitions of CT in use today offered by philosopher, Robert Ennis, who defines CT as “reasonable, reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do” (Ennis, p. 10, 1987). Dewey may also be the source of the view that the classroom should be a place for a community of inquiry (Lipman, 1991) that has influenced some efforts to reform the classroom along CT lines. His emphasis on the importance of maintaining student interest and encouraging students to reflect on the content they study are still emphasized (Bensley, 2010; Kurfiss, 1988). Educator Edward Glaser followed up Dewey’s early work by beginning efforts to assess CT and demonstrating empirically that instruction could improve CT skill. Like Dewey, Glaser argued that CT involves certain attitudes (Glaser, 1941). The development of the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal marked the beginning of efforts to assess CT with standard instruments, primarily evaluating argument analysis skills applied to everyday questions and situations. In the years that followed, the skills aspect of CT came to dominate efforts to teach and assess it (Bailin et. al., 1999a). Indeed, many experts view CT as a skill or having a skill component (e.g., Beyer, 1995; Ennis, 1987; Facione, 1990a; Fisher & Scriven, 1997; Halpern, 2003, Kurfiss, 1988; Lipman, 1991; McPeck, 1990; Paul, 1993; Seigel, 1988). Given the longstanding influence of philosophy and rhetoric on discourse in both scholarly and professional settings, it is not surprising that the skills most associated with CT are reasoning skills. Many of the same experts who define CT as involving skill also maintain

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that thinking critically involves good reasoning, reasoned judgment, or taking a rational approach (e.g., Beyer, 1995; Ennis, 1987; Facione, 1990a; Fisher & Scriven, 1997; Halpern, 1998, Kurfiss, 1988; Lipman, 1991; McPeck, 1990; Paul, 1993; Seigel, 1988). The development of the informal logic movement in philosophy commonly associated with CT has focused on teaching people to reason well and to identify fallacies in natural language discourse (Eemeren et al., 1996). This admittedly selective review of the definitions of CT authorities suggests that most agree that CT involves certain skills, especially skills for reasoning well. The focus on good reasoning in CT comes from a longstanding tradition in philosophy and rhetoric on the art and practice of good thinking. Many philosophers view rules of logic as normative in the sense that they are rules that should be followed for a person to be rational or reasonable. In this view, thinking is judged in terms of how well it reaches certain standards or criteria for what is considered sound or good reasoning. Reflecting on the quality of thinking in relation to criteria and standards is important to self-correction in CT (Lipman, 1991). The normative view of good reasoning often tends toward a prescriptive emphasis when philosophers and educators recommend students follow certain principles and rules to produce thinking that meets prescribed standards. In contrast, psychologists usually take a descriptive approach when scientifically studying how people think, sometimes investigating how well people can use the rules of reasoning (Galotti, 1989) and documenting their thinking errors in relation to norms. Other psychologists, however, take a more prescriptive approach to rules, studying how teaching of rules might be used to improve CT skills. Clearly, many philosophers, psychologists, and educators agree that acquiring reasoning skills is important to CT, but disagreements multiply when those defining CT seek to identify specific skills that should be part of a critical thinker’s skill set (Bailin et al., 1999a). Taxonomies of CT skills often list many of the same skills, such as argument analysis skills, clarifying/defining the question, and assessing the credibility of sources (e.g., Ennis, 1987; Facione, 1990a; Halpern, 1998; 2007). The same taxonomies also show many disagreements about other skills they specify. For example, besides argument analysis skills, Halpern (1998) has listed skills such as “skills in thinking as hypothesis testing” and skills in thinking about “likelihood and uncertainty” (Halpern, 1998, p. 452). In a more recent, comprehensive taxonomy for a book on critical thinking in psychology, she has listed specific skills such as “how to develop an awareness of biases in memory”, “how to isolate and control variables in order to make strong causal claims”, and “how to use graphs, diagrams, hierarchical trees, matrices, and models as solution aids” to problem solving (Halpern, 2007, pp. 6-7). In contrast, Ennis (1987, pp. 14-15) listed “making value judgments,” “identifying and handling equivocation,” and “employing and reacting to fallacy labels” not listed by Halpern. In contrast to both Ennis and Halpern, a Delphi panel of CT experts assembled by the American Philosophical Association (APA) did not specifically list any of these as skills. To some extent, differences are likely due to the disciplinary focus of the authors, i.e. Halpern is a psychologist and Ennis is a philosopher. In her latest taxonomy, Halpern (2007) has included skills for problem solving, decision making, and creativity, putting these in the generic terminology of cognitive psychology. In contrast, Ennis (1987) listed no skills for creativity although he has acknowledged a connection between CT and creativity, as did the APA Delphi panel (Facione, 1990a). Although the APA panel, composed mostly of philosophers, acknowledged that CT is related to problem solving, decision making, and creative thinking, like Ennis, they focused on argumentation and reasoning skills (Facione,

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1990a). This raises additional questions about the relationships between reasoning, problem solving, decision making, creative thinking, and CT, all of which are generic labels, themselves. At an even more general level, experts use different terms to refer to skill. For example, the APA’s panel of experts referred to evaluation and other skills as cognitive skills (Facione, 1990a). In contrast, Ennis (1987) used the term “ability” to refer to what many, and perhaps even he, would sometimes call skills. The distinction is not necessarily trivial. Skill sometimes refers to an ability acquired through learning and practice, and ability is often associated with a basic intellectual aptitude. Clarification of such terminological differences could help advance the scientific study of CT. Halpern (2007) has observed that a variety of groupings of CT skills can be made depending on the context and reason for the grouping. Although Halpern has constructed her taxonomies with cognitive psychology in mind, no author of a taxonomy has used empirical methods to determine which skills are listed and how they are organized. This is related to the question of how general are CT skills. It further raises the question of whether CT skills might actually be composed of many subskills or a large set of microskills that vary across disciplines, tasks, and other contexts. Moreover, as Hayes (1985) noted, many different thinking strategies may be used to do thinking tasks; and it is not clear how thinking strategy use is related to CT skill acquisition, further complicating efforts to scientifically study CT skills. Another important way CT has lacked clarity and specification has been its persistent association with “higher order thinking” (e.g., Barak & Dori, 2009; Bissell & Lemons, 2006). The cognitive processes or skills that constitute higher order thinking typically go unspecified and often generally refer to problem solving, decision making, reasoning, and creative thinking. Similarly, educators have often associated CT with higher levels of Bloom’s Taxonomy such as evaluation, application, and synthesis. This appeal to Bloom’s Taxonomy is misdirected because Bloom’s taxonomy is a scheme for describing kinds of assessment objectives at different levels, and does not address the problem of specifying CT skill as an antecedent condition. As noted by Ennis (1987), the vague use of higher order thinking and Bloom’s Taxonomy offers too little guidance for how to approach CT and insufficient criteria for judging whether CT has been displayed. Some authors have attempted to elaborate the psychological basis of higher order thinking and the levels of Bloom’s Taxonomy. Halpern (2007) has stated that “higher order cognitive skills are relatively complex, require judgment, analysis, and synthesis; and are not applied in a rote or mechanical manner” (Halpern, 2007, p. 6). More specific correspondences between Bloom’s levels and research on learning and cognition have been developed by Anderson and Krathwohl (2001) and Marzano (2001). These revised taxonomies focus on cognitive categories within the knowledge domain, and are proposed to help teachers develop learning and skill objectives. Neither, however, has been developed according to a cognitive psychological theory or clear line of research. Although they should be lauded for seeking to be consistent with psychological research, both need further corroboration from research studies (Moseley et al., 2005). As with Bloom’s original taxonomy, it would be a mistake to assume that the newer taxonomies have identified kinds of cognitive processes that produce CT. In general, the lack of specificity in the language used to discuss CT is a problem for the scientific study of CT. Scientific progress is made as scientists begin with a phenomenon

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described in natural language terms, such as the term “reasoning,” and then operationally define it in terms of observable behaviors that can be measured, such as the appropriate use of certain rules for reasoning. The use of measurement procedures allows cognitive and educational researchers to refine the meaning and precision of terms. In contrast, some using Bloom’s Taxonomy generalize from vague terms originally used to describe kinds of assessment objectives such as evaluation, analysis, and synthesis to the construct of CT as a kind of thinking. For them, tasks requiring analysis or evaluation are prima facie CT tasks. Assuming that such tasks call forth CT does little to insure the construct validity of CT measures. It is better to begin with a clear conception or theory of the construct and then develop tests and measures designed to assess it. The assumption that evaluation tasks elicit CT runs into trouble when an evaluative judgment is affectively-based and does not require reasoning such as evaluating which of two models of car is better based on a criterion of personal preference. Likewise, an analytical judgment that involves only a simple categorical distinction, such as analyzing American cars into subordinate categories of “Fords” and “Chevrolets” would require little thought and conscious effort for adults. Psychological conceptions of CT often assume it is effortful thinking (e.g., Halpern, 1998); and reasoning likely involves conscious attention (DeWall, Baumeister & Masicampo, 2008). If “evaluation” is to be a scientifically useful CT term, it should be further specified in the context of performance of actual reasoning tasks and then empirically studied. Keeley and Browne (1986) examined an evaluative level task by asking 37 college seniors from different majors to “critically evaluate” a 550-word essay on the value of attending college. Keeley and Browne operationally defined CT at the evaluative level as the ability to detect a number of reasoning problems on the essay task. Although many of the seniors successfully posed questions about sampling and logic, many also missed other reasoning problems and failed to identify ambiguous language and assumptions in the essay. These results may suggest that the students differed from Keeley and Browne in their concept of critical evaluation and what it entails. This may have prevented students from using CT skills they possessed. Alternately, students may not have possessed the requisite skills. While this research has provided a good starting point as a means to add empirical meaning to what skills are involved in critical evaluation in the context of a specific CT task, it also highlights the need for clearer specification of CT skills. Future studies should decouple students’ CT reasoning skills from their knowledge of their skills and when to use them. Unless a vague term like “evaluation” is further defined and studied as a cognitive operation or process that produces CT and is not just defined as a general label for what people are presumed to do during task execution, it adds little to the scientific meaning of CT. This points to a more general kind of conceptual error commonly made in viewing CT as a skill. As Bailin et al., (1999a) have noted, CT skill is often conceived as an outcome indicating the degree to which a person meets standards in performance on a thinking task. While this normative move is useful in anchoring CT performance to standards and criteria, it can lead to a category error when it is assumed that performance reflects an actual cognitive ability or process. Many experts describe CT as a cognitive ability (Facione, 1990a), but few have actually studied it as such; for an exception see the research of Stanovich and his colleagues (e.g., Stanovich & West, 1997; Toplak, & Stanovich, 2002). Nor have educational tests been developed that can isolate and diagnose specific cognitive problems with reasoning (Leighton & Gierl, 2007).

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Many authors would agree that acquiring reasoning skills is important to CT, but some have objected that there has been too great an emphasis on logic and reasoning at the expense of other important aspects (Walters, 1994). In particular, they have argued that knowledge, belief, and dispositions have been neglected. In the tradition of Dewey and Glaser, many now agree that CT involves having certain dispositions that may be conducive to thinking critically (e.g., Bailin et al., 1999a; Beyer, 1995; Ennis, 1987; Facione, 1990a; Halpern, 1998, Kurfiss, 1988; Lipman, 1991; McPeck, 1990; Paul, 1994; Perkins & Salomon, 1993; Seigel, 1992). CT dispositions are broadly viewed as individual differences in attitudes, traits, habits of mind, and cognitive style related to CT. Studies of college students have shown that CT skills and dispositions are distinguishable, and both contribute to CT (Clifford, Boufal, & Kurtz, 2004; Taube, 1997). As with CT skills, despite considerable agreement that dispositions are important to CT, authors disagree more when they try to identify specific dispositions. For example, many endorse open-mindedness (e.g., Ennis, 1987; Halpern, 1998; Paul, 1993) while fewer mention fair-mindedness (e.g., Paul, 1993; Fisher, 1991). Some identify skepticism (e.g., Beyer, 1995; McPeck, 1981) and others flexibility in thinking (Halpern, 1998; Stanovich & West, 1997). Ennis (1987) has identified 14 dispositions in his taxonomy such as “seeking reasons,” using one’s critical thinking abilities” and “being open-minded” (Ennis, 1987, p. 12). In contrast, Halpern (1998) has offered five including “open-mindedness” or “flexibility,” “habitual use of plans…,” “willingness to engage in and persist at a complex task,” willingness to abandon nonproductive strategies in an attempt to self-correct,” and an “awareness of the social realities that need to be overcome…” (Halpern, 1998, p. 452). Based on the work of the APA expert panel and factor analysis of scores on the California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inventory, Facione and Facione identified seven dispositions including “open-mindedness,” “truth-seeking,” “CT self-confidence,” “inquisitiveness,” “maturity,” “analyticity,” and “systematicity” (Facione & Facione, 1992, pp. 2-3). Although factor analysis obtained seven general dispositions, this may not be a complete set of CT dispositions, given that which factors are identified in a factor analysis depends upon which items have been entered into the analysis. It is unclear whether a complete set of general CT dispositions can be identified because of limitations to the psychometric approach and because CT dispositions may be context-specific. In this regard, Siegel (1992) raised the fundamental question of whether CT dispositions are generalizable. As was true almost two decades ago when Siegel (1992) posed this question, little research has been conducted on whether CT dispositions generalize to different tasks and situations. Although Siegel tentatively concluded in favor of generalizability, examination of the lives of some great critical thinkers suggests that the generalizability of CT dispositions is limited (Bensley, 2006). For example, Alfred Russel Wallace, a scientist with prodigious CT skills who discovered natural selection along with Charles Darwin, also believed in the implausible claim of spiritualists that the dead could be contacted through spirit mediums. When presented with clear evidence that mediums were using legerdemain and trickery to produce the appearance of contact with spirits, Wallace continued to believe in spiritualism. He seems to have been disposed to use his CT skills in most of his scientific writings but was not disposed to fair-mindedly evaluate the evidence concerning spiritualism and theistic claims. Although Wallace was willing to apply the idea of natural selection to all non-human species, he was not disposed to entertain the logical implication that humans evolved through natural selection, maintaining to the end that

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humans had undergone some sort of special creation or evolution, consistent with his theistic beliefs. Given that CT dispositions may not generalize to all situations or contexts, it is important to identify the dispositions involved in performing specific reasoning tasks in particular contexts. For example, one might hypothesize that the disposition, fair-mindedness, would be necessary to critically evaluate the evidence on both sides of an argument (Paul, 1993; Fisher, 1991). Fair-mindedness might be especially important when strong beliefs are held. A different disposition, systematicity, or the tendency to be diligent and take a systematic, organized approach to inquiry might be needed more for an extensive and comprehensive analysis of a question. For belief revision, open-mindedness and flexibility in thinking might be especially important (Stanovich & West, 1997). People who are not open-minded may be reluctant to consider a claim contrary to a strongly held belief and if they are not flexible in their thinking will not revise that belief to be consistent with good evidence that refutes their belief. This last example highlights another objection to the traditional emphasis on CT skills, that is, that it neglects the formation and revision of belief, an important function of CT. In this regard, Paul (1993) has distinguished CT in the “strong sense” from CT in the “weak sense.” Weak-sense critical thinkers have adequate skills for reasoning but do not use their skills to revise mistaken, unsupported beliefs or may even use those skills to bolster or promote their entrenched, mistaken beliefs. In contrast, critical thinkers in the strong sense use their CT skills to develop their beliefs and revise them when a fair evaluation of the relevant evidence shows their beliefs are mistaken. Changing one’s belief requires, not only CT skill but also openness to alternative points of view and fair-mindedness in evaluating all the relevant evidence. This distinction between weak-sense and strong-sense critical thinkers is useful because people have often been shown to evaluate evidence biased in the direction of their prior beliefs (e.g., Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Kardash & Scholes, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2008). Lord, et al., (1979) had participants read mixed research evidence on the questions of capital punishment and rate the quality of the evidence. They found that participants often maintained their initial belief on the question, sometimes even increasing the strength of their belief, despite good evidence contradicting it. Belief perseveration in the face of contradictory evidence suggests that people find it very difficult to escape the biasing effects of prior belief. Several studies suggest that CT dispositions are needed to escape the biasing effects of prior belief. In one study, Stanovich and West (1997) had 349 college student participants first rate their endorsement of several propositions. Then, participants completed measures of CT dispositions for flexible thinking, open-mindedness, and other dispositions. Following this, they evaluated several everyday arguments on the same propositions that they had previously rated. Independently, several experts rated the strength of the arguments to determine argument quality and later to infer evaluation ability. To measure cognitive ability, Stanovich and West used scores on the SAT and a vocabulary test that served as a proxy for an intelligence test. Stanovich and West (1997) conducted a series of regression analyses of students’ argument quality scores that took into account their prior belief ratings to predict each individual student’s argument quality with the beta weight used as a measure of their ability to reason independently of their prior belief. They found that these scores were reliably related to cognitive ability and a composite CT disposition measure called actively open-

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minded thinking. After partialing out cognitive ability, actively open-minded thinking was a significant predictor of the ability to evaluate the arguments, suggesting a unique contribution of CT disposition. Recently, Bensley, Spero, Kennedy, Murtagh, and Bernhardt (2010) investigated how individual differences in CT skills and dispositions are related to belief revision. They presented students with a literature review discussing whether people use only 10% of their brains, a question about which students are likely to have a prior belief and interest. Students rated their belief in the 10% myth before and after reading a literature review that presented evidence on both sides of the question but which contained much high quality evidence clearly refuting the 10% myth. To test their critical reading skill, students also took a critical reading test about the review. To assess their CT disposition, participants completed measures of flexible thinking, open-mindedness, and intellectual engagement. Consistent with previous research, students generally did not revise their belief after reading the literature review and completing the test. However, those students who scored better on the critical reading test also tended to rate their belief in the 10% myth significantly lower after reading and taking the CT test. Likewise, students with higher scores on a composite measure of CT disposition tended to revise their belief more. These results suggest that people do not generally revise their their beliefs in response to disconfirming evidence, but are more likely to do so when they have more CT skill and are more disposed to think critically. Taken together, the review of the CT disposition literature suggests that, not only do many CT experts recognize the importance of both CT skills and dispositions but empirical studies have supported the contribution of both. Clearly, more research is needed on the relationship between CT skills and specific dispositions and on how specific CT skills and dispositions contribute to belief revision, an important function of CT. Perhaps the most important implication is that a more complete scientific approach to the study of CT should include assessment of both CT skills and dispositions in the same individuals. It seems doubtful that a person with CT skills, even one disposed to use those skills, would think critically if he or she was not also aware of the need to use a specific skill in a particular situation. From a psychological perspective, CT is a deliberate and purposeful cognitive activity (Halpern, 1998) that involves regulation of one’s own thinking and behavior to meet certain standards. A common theme among psychologists and educators is that a person’s thinking should be self-regulated. Likewise, philosophers who emphasize thinking as a reflective activity assume that such thinking involves active consideration of the quality of one’s knowledge and beliefs with the goal of holding beliefs that are consistent with reasonable evaluation of the relevant evidence (e.g. Dewey, 1910; Ennis, 1987: Paul, 1993). Along these same lines, Paul (1993) has described CT as thinking about thinking. The psychological term that has come closest to capturing all of these ideas is metacognition, originally proposed by Flavell (1976). Metacognition refers to the knowledge a person has of his or her own cognitive processes and products and has become increasingly associated with the ability to self-regulate cognition. A connection between metacognition and critical thinking has been proposed many times (e.g., Halpern, 1998; McGuinness, 1990; Swartz, 1989) but has only occasionally been tested, (e.g., Hanley, 1995; Ku & Ho, 2010). See Mosely et al., (2005) and Tarricone (2011) for reviews of theories connecting metacognition with CT. The two components of metacognition most important to self-regulation in CT are monitoring and control. Metacognitive monitoring involves observations and judgments a

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person makes about his or her own progress toward some cognitive goal. Accurate monitoring is necessary for making appropriate decisions about how to adjust learning, thinking, or other cognitive activities to reach the goal, that is, for the regulation and control of cognitive processing. For example, knowing how well one is thinking on a task can help a person decide if the right thinking strategy is being used or whether changes are needed to improve thinking. Based on this reasoning, it might be expected that people who are unaware of what they do not know on a test will not modify their approach to improve their knowledge and skill. Kruger, Dunning, and their colleagues have extensively studied self-monitoring of test performance on reasoning and a variety of other tests (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003). They have consistently found that those people who performed better on various tests were also more accurate in estimating their performance on those tests. Dividing test takers into quartiles based on their performance, they found that those in the lowest quartile who did the worst on a test tended to greatly overestimate their scores. As test performance improved, people became increasingly accurate in estimating their actual scores. Interestingly, although test takers in the top quartile tended to be much better calibrated and did not overestimate their scores as did poorer performers, they instead tended to slightly underestimate how well they did. To account for these results, Kruger and Dunning (1999) have proposed that poor performers are doubly cursed. Not only do they lack the knowledge and skill of better performers, but their lack of knowledge and skill robs them of the ability to know that they lack knowledge and skill; hence, they are also more deficient in accurately monitoring their test performance. Few studies have directly examined the relationship between CT skill and test monitoring accuracy, but Kruger and Dunning (1999) did examine reasoning test performance and students’ ability to accurately estimate their test performance in two experiments. In one, they examined the monitoring accuracy of 45 college students who took a logical reasoning test they constructed from LSAT test preparation questions. As before, they found that those who did the worst on the test greatly overestimated their performance on the test while the best performers were better calibrated but tended to underestimate how well they did. In a follow-up study of disjunctive reasoning performance on the Wason selection task (Wason, 1966), Kruger and Dunning tested whether improving skill on the selection task would produce better self-monitoring in a group trained to do the selection task as compared to a control group not receiving the special training. In the first phase of their study before training, participants showed the usual pattern of estimation errors. The poorest performers greatly overestimated the number of selection problem questions they answered correctly while those who performed better were better calibrated, and the best performers underestimated their scores. In the second phase, Kruger and Dunning randomly assigned half of the students to a group that received a deductive reasoning training packet adapted from Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Oliver (1986) while the other half did a filler task. After training, they had all participants look at their original tests again and re-estimate how many they had correctly answered. This time, the accuracy scores of the poor performers in the training group rose to nearly the expert levels of the best performers with calibration increasing as performance increased. Monitoring accuracy of the untrained group showed no improvement. Kruger and Dunning (1998) interpreted their results as suggesting that the training improved reasoning skill on the Wason selection task and this also improved self-

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monitoring of that skill. When poorer performers were trained, they acquired knowledge that helped them determine which questions were correctly answered and which were not, resulting in improved calibration. These results suggest that self-monitoring may be involved in the regulation of CT and that researchers seeking to comprehensively study CT should examine it and other metacognitive variables along with CT skills and dispositions. Understanding the contribution of metacognition also has implications for questions related to how best to teach CT so that knowledge and skills acquired through instruction transfer to other contexts, especially realworld applications. It has been suggested that improving metacognitive skill promotes transfer of CT (Billing, 2007; Halpern, 1998). As discussed next in the review of instructional practices that promote CT, practices that call attention to CT principles, rules, skills, and dispositions externalized in the discourse of thinking may help students monitor their thinking.

APPROACHES TO TEACHING CT It should be clear from the previous discussion that CT is not just a kind of thinking that goes on inside the head but is externalized in various kinds of discourse and contexts. CT is good thinking found in formal dialogues and exchanges in scholarly forums, courtrooms, professional discussion of problems, in everyday discussions of political questions, and in textbooks and classrooms. Indeed, those who teach and assess CT in various disciplines look for evidence of it in the use of certain principles, rules, procedures, language, and other externalized products of thinking. Given the complexity of CT and the importance of teaching it well in different disciplines and different kinds of discourse, the task seems daunting. Are there normative rules, principles, standards, and criteria that should be taught to students in all disciplines? How should these be integrated into the discourse of instruction and assessment?

What is the Best Way to Teach Critical Thinking? Ennis (1989) has provided a useful scheme for classifying approaches to teaching CT in terms of whether or not CT skills and dispositions are made explicit and how CT instruction is related to subject matter instruction. Using these two dimensions, Ennis (1989) classified approaches into four different types (general, immersion, infusion, and mixed). The general approach focuses instruction on explicitly teaching principles for thinking, usually separate from regular course content instruction and sometimes in abstract form as in a formal logic course. A second approach called “immersion” does not make rules or principles of thinking explicit but instead relies on intense, thoughtful exposure or immersion to CT in subject matter. Like the general approach, a third approach called “infusion” employs explicit instruction of rules, principles, and knowledge related to thinking skills, but students receive this explicit instruction as they study relevant subject matter and are encouraged to think deeply about it. Finally, the mixed approach combines explicit teaching of CT rules and principles as a separate thread of instruction with either immersion or infusion.

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RESEARCH ON APPROACHES TO TEACHING CRITICAL THINKING Very few studies have empirically compared the different approaches (e.g., Angeli & Valanides, 2009; Valanides & Angeli, 2005). In one study Angeli and Velanides (2009) compared students taught with the general, immersion, and infusion approaches on their ability to write a CT discussion of an ill-defined issue. Before instruction, students took the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (CCTST) of Facione (1990b) to assess individual differences in CT skill. Instruction in the general, infusion, immersion, and control groups involved having all students discuss in dyads an essay on the influence of the media on society. Only students in the general and infusion groups got brief lectures that explicitly discussed five different CT skills. The infusion group received guided instruction in the use of the skills while the immersion group was engaged in Socratic questioning about the essay without any explicit mention of the five skills. The control group received no explicit instruction in skills or relevant guided instruction but instead simply prepared an outline of the essay. After instruction, students received a different essay on whether drugs should be legalized and worked collaboratively in their dyads to develop an outline presenting their joint position on the question. Angeli and Velanides developed a CT rubric to compare the outlines of the four groups. Statistically controlling for students’ initial CCTST performance, they found that the infusion and immersion groups performed significantly better than the control group on the outline task using the rubric to score the outlines. Although both the infusion and immersion groups were significantly better than the control group and had large effect sizes, the infusion group had the largest effect size. More extensive support for the advantage of infusion over immersion came from a large meta-analysis of many CT studies examining the effect sizes of general, immersion, infusion, and mixed approaches (Abrami et al., 2008). Abrami and co-workers found that the effect size for the infusion approach was larger than that of either the immersion or general approaches. However, the mixed approach combining infusion with explicit instruction of CT as a separate thread in the course had the largest effect size of the four (Abrami et al., 2008). The results of this meta-analysis suggest that instructors should design courses in which CT is explicitly taught as a separate thread of instruction and infused into course content instruction. Abrami et al., (2008) obtained findings related to pedagogical grounding that might also be attributed, at least in part, to explicit instruction. Specifically, they compared studies on how much training in CT the instructor received, how extensive were observations made relating course activities to skill development, how detailed was the description of the course curriculum in relation to CT skill objectives, and when CT was simply listed as a course objective with no supporting information. They obtained by far the largest effect size for the studies in which instructors had more CT training followed by those with more extensive observations while those studies that merely mentioned CT among course objectives had the smallest effect size. It seems plausible that those instructors with more CT training and who made more extensive observations related to skill development would be in much better position to make CT skills and principles explicit; however, this interpretation awaits direct testing. It should be noted that the comparison of instructional components in studies is inherently difficult because they often lack precise specification. Moreover, the approaches taken by instructors may not fit neatly into categories such as the four types of CT

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instructional approaches Ennis (1987) proposed. Unfortunately, the meta-analysis of Abrami et al, (2008) did not permit very elaborate characterization of either “explicit” or “infusion”. Consistent with the suggestions of Abrami et al., future studies should seek to clearly identify the instructional elements that promote CT, especially the principles that should be made explicit. Instructors can make CT principles explicit in several other ways not identified by Abrami et al, (2008) or Ennis (1989). In general, explicit instruction is any kind of instructional communication that draws attention to the use of a principle or rule, making it more likely to be accessed, reflected upon, and deliberately used. Besides explicitly stating CT goals and objectives, CT discourse may include special problems and questions that illustrate certain rules, strategies, and procedures. These can be solved problems or writing samples that model and annotate correct use of CT rules for argumentation. Assignments may also require students to find the structure and use of rules in problems (Halpern, 1998). Initially, when students are first learning several new CT rules, instructors can make rules explicit and organize the rules through use of scaffolding structures (Rosenshine & Guenther, 1992) such as the tables described by Bensley (2010) for organizing rules and standards of evidence used in psychological discourse. Likewise, instructors may provide rubrics that highlight important criteria and rules for producing good written products or other performances (Facione & Facione, 2009). Other methods for explicit instruction involve coaching that guides application of and reflection on use of rules. In general, the effects of explicit rule provision should be enhanced when students practice using the rules and then are given feedback about their use in CT assignments and assessments. As described later, these suggestions for making CT rules explicit can be readily adapted to the infusion of CT into course content and work. Yet, effective instruction that explicitly infuses CT rules and principles into course content requires many instructional decisions regarding sequencing, placement, and language use in the infusion of specific CT rules into various forms of classroom discourse. Although detailed discussion of these issues goes beyond the scope of this chapter, the following review of some studies from psychology illustrates how the explicit infusion of CT rules into courses can produce substantial increases in CT skill, replicating and extending this basic finding from Abrami et al., (2008). These include studies in which students received explicit CT rule instruction infused into their courses that improved argument analysis skills (e.g., Bensley et al., 2010; Nieto & Saiz, 2008; Solon, 2007) critical reading skills (Bensley & Haynes, 1995), and skills for analyzing the quality of research (Penningroth, Despain, & Gray, 2007). In two of these studies, explicit infusion produced gains on the Cornell Test of Critical Thinking-Form Z, (CTCT) a general CT test assessing argument analysis skill (Nieto & Saiz, 2008; Solon, 2007). Solon compared two very similar general psychology classes, one receiving explicit infusion of CT into their course work and the other control class treated the same but not receiving the CT instruction. The CT class received explicit instruction of general logical rules like modus tollens, wrote argumentative essays, read from the CT textbook by Halpern (2003), and completed exercises accompanying it. The CT class, not only did significantly better than the control class on the CTCT but also performed as well on a test of general psychology. These results suggest that explicit infusion of rules and other CT materials into course instruction was effective in efficiently improving general CT skills without sacrificing acquisition of regular course content. In another well–controlled study,

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Nieto and Saiz found that the structural training of Halpern (1998) with practice exercises and feedback also produced significant gains on the CTCT and on their own reasoning test. Other studies, focusing less on general CT skills, have used explicit CT instruction infused into psychology course work to demonstrate improvement in CT skills related to psychology (e.g., Bensley et al., 2010; Bensley & Haynes, 1995; Penningroth, Despain, & Gray, 2007). In one of these, Penningroth, Despain, and Gray (2007) examined how rules and principles for thinking critically about the quality of psychological research and information could be infused into a course on problem solving in psychology. Penningroth et al. used CT principles for evaluating psychological information from Smith (2003), explicitly covering each rule with subject matter that illustrated its application as students covered chapters from a CT textbook by Stanovich (2004). Students practiced applying the principles to evaluate psychological studies of varying quality. After instruction, students in the problem solving course performed significantly better than those in a comparable class on a test developed by Lawson (1999) and his colleagues that assessed correct identification of violations of the rules in different psychological examples. Bensley and Haynes (1995) used explicit CT instruction and infusion to teach students to critically evaluate the quality of evidence presented in literature reviews on psychological questions. One introductory psychology class was explicitly taught CT rules for identifying strengths and weaknesses of different kinds of evidence using criteria and standards of evidence found in Bensley (1998). The CT class also wrote a short literature review on a question based on prewriting that organized the kinds of evidence to be presented in their review. A second introductory psychology class, using the same textbook but taught by a different instructor, received no explicit CT instruction. After instruction, the CT-infused class correctly organized and labeled more evidence from a literature review they read than the control class when both were compared to their pre-test scores on the same task. On a second task, all students wrote a generic outline for a hypothetical CT paper. The outlines of students in the CT class used more appropriate CT language as judged by CT experts than the outlines constructed by the control class. A common component of the studies just reviewed was that explicit CT instruction involved the teaching of rules, criteria, and principles for reasoning that were contextualized in the discourse of the subject. Often, instruction in those studies contained components of effective, direct, and guided instruction. This instruction provided students with models demonstrating the use of rules in relevant subject matter, gave them practice in the form of exercises focused on assessing skills, and then gave them feedback. In these respects, it also resembled approaches recommended by Angelo (1995) and Beyer (1997) that contain direct instructional components. Although direct instruction has been shown to be highly effective in teaching subject matter (Walberg, 2006), some have objected that it is ineffective in teaching higher-order cognitive skills, as Doyle (1983) noted. To investigate whether CT rules could be directly taught in a psychology course, Bensley, Crowe, Bernhardt, Buckner, and Allman (2010) used a mixed approach called direct infusion (DI). The DI approach incorporated explicit teaching of CT rules embedded into subject matter instruction as well as other components of effective instruction including guided instruction (Mayer, 2004), direct instruction (Walberg, 2006) and feedback from formative assessments (Black & Wiliam, 1998). Specifically, instruction targeted and made rules for argument analysis explicit, teaching those rules and principles infused into psychology subject matter instruction, guiding instruction through exercises that provide

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practice in using the rules followed by feedback, and then formative assessments for evaluating skill acquisition with additional feedback. To test the effectiveness of DI on acquisition of argument analysis skills, Bensley et al., (2010) compared research methods classes receiving and not receiving DI of argument analysis rules into their classes on an argument analysis test administered before and after instruction. This test called Analyzing Psychological Statements (APS) served as a summative assessment of skill acquisition, measuring the ability to correctly apply argumentation rules in everyday and psychology-related situations. It included items assessing the ability to recognize kinds of evidence, evaluate different kinds of evidence, distinguish arguments from non-arguments, and find assumptions in examples. APS items sampled the same skills taught to the CT group but differed in content from examples used in instruction and earlier formative assessments. Bensley et al. found that the CT-infused research methods class showed significantly greater gains on the APS than students in traditional research methods not receiving explicit CT instruction. Supporting the conclusion that it was DI that led to the CT-infused group’s gains on the APS was the similarity of the groups in overall academic experience, GPA, SAT, and CT disposition; however, differences in instructor and textbook across the research methods classes, weaken this conclusion. Testing under better controlled conditions, Bensley and Spero (2011) assessed the effectiveness of directly infusing CT skills for both argument analysis and critical reading in which the same instructor taught a CT-infused class and two control classes all using the same textbook. Specifically, one class received explicit instruction of CT rules for argument analysis and critical reading directly infused into course work. A second control class received memory improvement instruction, and a third received traditional instruction focused on content knowledge acquisition. Before instruction, all three classes were pretested with the APS and a new critical reading test (CRT) that had them critically analyze a literature review on a psychological question. After each test, students estimated their score, assessing their ability to metacognitively monitor their test performance. After instruction at the end of the semester, all three groups were post-tested with the same measures. Planned comparisons revealed that the CT-infused class showed significantly greater gains than the two control classes on both the APS and the CRT. Also after instruction, the CT–infused class showed significantly greater gains in their metacognitive monitoring accuracy on the APS than the two control classes. These results replicated under better controlled conditions the findings of Bensley et al., (2010) and extended them to show that DI was effective in improving critical reading. DI may also have improved monitoring, suggesting a relationship between acquisition of argument analysis and metacognitive skills. In summary, many studies have shown that explicitly teaching CT, infused into subject matter instruction, is more effective than immersion (Abrami et al, 2008). In particular, one kind of explicit infusion called direct infusion that incorporates components of guided and direct instruction has been shown to be more effective than traditional instruction (e.g., Bensley & Spero, 2011; Bensley et al., 2010; Nieto & Saiz, 2008; Penningroth, Despain, & Gray, 2003; Solon, 2007). Still, questions remain about how best to explicitly infuse CT rules and principles, especially regarding the nature of the rules and principles to be taught. One question with important implications for the effectiveness of instruction is whether CT rules, skills, and dispositions are general or specific to subject or context.

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THE GENERALITY-SPECIFICITY DEBATE Stephen Norris (1992) has provided useful distinctions for approaching the problem of the generalizability of CT. He has contended that CT is generalizable when it has satisfied four conditions. The first condition concerns whether CT can be shown to be a kind of “thinking-in-general” that can be abstracted from the objects and particulars of thought. The second is the extent to which at least some commonality in CT is found across topics, subjects, and fields. The third concerns whether CT contributes a significant fund of resources for dealing effectively with each of these various fields, subjects, and concerns” (Norris, 1992, p. 1). Finally, the fourth concerns the extent to which CT transfers. Examining the four conditions from the perspective of rules of reasoning can help provide an empirical basis to testing whether conditions have been met for at least the last three conditions. Regarding the first condition, it makes sense to view CT as a kind of thinking-in-general inasmuch as it is a form of applied reasoning that can be found and used in many different kinds of discourse. Philosophers have analytically extracted many rules for reasoning that exist abstractly as sets of normative rules and principles for a kind of thinkingin-general and that can be further applied in different subjects. Regarding the second condition, some of the same general rules and principles of reasoning associated with CT can be found across topics, subjects, and fields suggesting that they are needed in common. The third condition that CT contributes a significant fund of resources to effectively deal with various fields and subjects has been at least partially met. In response to complaints that traditional education has not helped students learn to think effectively, educators have developed many CT instructional, assessment, and other materials for different subject areas. Some of these materials have been general in that students from different subject areas have benefitted from them. Empirical research has often supported the effectiveness of this approach as compared to traditional approaches. Finally, the fourth condition that CT skills transfer has received some empirical support. As will be discussed shortly, learning to apply rules and principles of CT (many of them general) in certain subject areas, discourse types, and contexts has transferred to ones that differ to some extent; but transfer has often been obtained only under very special conditions (Billing, 2007). For purposes of our discussion of rules of reasoning, the positions on the generalityspecificity debate can be contrasted as two extremes. Those holding the generalist view maintain that learning a set of general rules helps a person think in different disciplines regardless of the content or context. In contrast, specifists maintain that CT skills and rules are context-bound or specific to subject matter. Advocating an early specifist position, Toulmin (1958) argued that different disciplines have their own discipline-specific criteria and rules for evaluating evidence. Refining the specifist position, McPeck (1981; 1990) argued that all CT is inextricably associated with specific content and skills in a domain and so learning the rules for one domain helps little to think in another discipline, that is, they do not transfer. Considerable research on subject or domain specificity has supported the specifist position. It is plausible that epistemological differences in disciplines could impair transfer of CT from one to another. Analyzing discourse from different disciplines, Moore (2004) found that the features of argumentative discourse in three disciplines differed in object, content, and referent of evaluation, suggesting subject specificity in disciplinary discourse. Another

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study by Renaud and Murray (2008) found that when psychology students studying with general CT test questions were compared to those studying with subject-specific CT questions, the students showed greater improvement on subject-specific CT test questions than on general CT questions. Consistent with Thorndike’s earlier research, Newell (1980) found little transfer of reasoning skill. Lehman and Nisbett (1990) found that the reasoning skills of college students from different majors were discipline-specific. Also, the reasoning skills of college students showed limited generality across different tasks for measuring CT, even when those tasks might be expected to tap the same kind of reasoning (Toplak & Stanovich, 2002). In general, many studies reviewed by Detterman (1992) and Barnett and Ceci (2002) have found that learning to think and solve problems in one subject often showed little transfer to other subjects and problems, supporting the domain specificity of learning and thinking. Taken together, these findings provide considerable converging support for the specifist position. In general, poor transfer may be due to a failure to access appropriate rules and patterns of thinking needed to think in a different subject area or context from the one in which they were acquired (Lockhart, 1992). Supporting the generalist position, Fong, Krantz, and Nisbett (1986) found that teaching students general statistical rules such as the “law of large numbers” was effective in helping them learn how to think about everyday problems and that the training transferred outside of the classroom. It should be noted, however, that this demonstration was for the use of a single rule, the law of large numbers, which may be more readily acquired than some other rules (Fong & Nisbett, 1991; Lehman,; & Nisbett, 1990). Other recent research has further challenged domain specificity by showing more generality in thinking processes than many cognitive psychologists had previously assumed (Halford & Andrews, 2007). Schunn and Anderson (1999) found that psychologists used more domain-general rules in scientific reasoning tasks than did bright psychology students. Halpern (1998) has documented other cases of transfer of CT consistent with the view that students who are taught CT will apply their skills outside of the classroom. The considerable evidence supporting each side of the generalist-specifist debate suggests that the debate needs to be rethought. In one recent attempt at resolution, Davies (2006) has argued that the dilemma of choosing between the two positions is based on the fallacy of the false alternative. Instead, CT involves the use of both general skills and other disciplinespecific skills and modes of thinking. Davies further argued that an infusion approach could serve to combine the two approaches. In another attempt to resolve the discrepancies in the research on teaching general rules and domain or context-dependent thinking, Perkins and Salomon (1989) proposed that both general rules and the specific context must be taken into account. They explained the difficulty students have with general rules for thinking as due to not knowing how to use the rules in specific contexts. Similarly, Lockhart (1992) argued that CT is like pattern recognition and thinkers must acquire the ability to use cues that signal appropriate thinking strategies. More recently, Billings (2007) concluded from a review of the literature on transfer that CT instruction was more likely to promote transfer when abstract principles were coupled with examples. Finally, a review of research on discovery learning by Mayer (2004) found little evidence that students readily induce thinking rules when learning content and do not efficiently acquire them without guidance. Taken together, these results further support the

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hypothesis that rules should be taught explicitly and infused into course material so that students learn to recognize the patterns of rule use in various contexts.

ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS IN CONCEPTUALIZING CT Difficulties in conceptualizing CT reviewed in this chapter can be classified as presenting two different, but inter-related sets of problems. The first, more fundamental set of problems concerns the lack of definitional clarity and specificity in CT terms. The second set of problems is related to the tendency not to specify the purpose of CT when conceptualizing it. Regarding the definitional problem, the review showed widespread agreement on more general, high-level terms such as “skill,” “disposition,” “reasoning,” “analysis,” and “evaluation,” but less agreement when more specific identification of terms was attempted. Disagreements about specific skills often seemed to be discipline- and task-specific. Except for some psychometric studies, researchers have not conducted much systematic, empirical research to identify either specific skills or dispositions. Further systematic task analysis and empirical study of the steps involved in performance of more precisely defined evaluation and analysis tasks is needed. Principles of CT also lack specification in a variety of ways that could impact CT instruction and assessment. Although many CT authorities recommend teaching CT principles, what constitutes a principle remains unclear. For example, CT principles might be logical rules, normative statements for how to approach questions, recommendations for analyzing and evaluating certain kinds of informal arguments, strategies for responding to persuasive communications, important concepts underlying CT, or some combination of these. Scriven (2003) has noted that principles often take a variety of forms as commonsense prescriptions in informal logic. Although variability in the description of principles is to be expected, a failure to specify the principle appropriate for a particular context could reduce transfer of learning from one subject to another. This would likely pose problems for metacognitive control of strategy use and self-regulation, in general. It may, therefore, be useful to identify the most felicitous expressions of principles likely to promote acquisition and transfer of CT skills in particular situations. More research is needed to examine how to promote the acquisition and transfer of specific CT rules and the role metacognition plays. A related problem in specifying CT rules and principles concerns whether they are general or specific. Although CT instruction has been commonly assumed to be at least somewhat generalizable, little attention has been paid to whether principles and rules are general or specific. Because it is not known how the generality of CT rules affects the acquisition and transfer of CT skills, the generality of rules should be studied in the context of particular tasks. Whenever higher-order hypothetical constructs such as critical thinking or evaluation remain ill-defined, it may be useful to adopt a more bottom-up, atomistic approach to defining them, as has been successfully employed in other sciences. This involves using lower-level components or features to define a higher-level concept. Because, at a fundamental level, CT involves the appropriate use of criteria, standards, and logical rules in a particular context, these common low-level components could be specified and help define the higher-order reasoning skills. Another way to refine an operational definition of a higher-order cognitive

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construct is to make an aspect of its definition more explicit (Williams, 1999). Using CT rules to operationally define CT in thinking tasks could provide the means to make CT terms more explicit in both instructional and assessment research and to refine the CT construct from the bottom up. Another specification problem impeding the scientific study of CT skills is that skills are typically defined as outcomes. As with other mental constructs, this can be a problem when an outcome like performance on a CT test is treated as a proxy for CT as a mental construct and when the conditions that produce the CT outcome are not well understood (De Houwer, 2011). Although defining skills in terms of standards-based outcomes is useful for goalsetting and assessment, cognitive psychological explanations require that CT also be defined in terms of well-defined procedures, strategies, and cognitive processes that produce the skillful performance in observed outcomes. Williams (1999) has clearly discussed how to operationalize CT in terms of observable behaviors and measured outcomes, but much more work needs to be done on how to specify antecedent conditions that produce CT. As mentioned before, the second set of problems in conceptualizing CT occurs when the purpose and goals underlying the use of CT skills and dispositions are not viewed as components of a purposeful, self-regulated process. The goal of any CT episode is, of course, to reason well. This presumes that some outcomes of thinking are better than others. For example, in constructing an argument, reasoning to a conclusion that is well-supported would be a better outcome than reasoning to a poorly-supported conclusion. The purpose, therefore, is to produce well-reasoned conclusions and beliefs that follow from these conclusions. This is captured in the commonly cited definition by Ennis (1987, p. 10) that CT is “reasonable, reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do.” Likewise, the purpose of revising faulty beliefs to be consistent with well-reasoned conclusions is closely related to self-correction in CT (Lipman, 1991) and to CT in the strong sense (Paul, 1993. This suggests that modeling CT as a goal-oriented and self-regulated process would help solve problems in conceptualizing it that do not neglect its function. To revise and correct beliefs, thinkers must, not only have good CT skills and the dispositions to use those skills but also be able to accurately monitor their thinking outcomes to insure that they their beliefs have been revised appropriately. This process requires self-regulation because to reach this goal and follow normative rules thinkers must monitor and strategically adjust the deployment of thinking strategies in ways that change the states and outputs of the system. Therefore, CT research should examine how people monitor the outcomes of their use of CT skills and dispositions as they think about evidence that should lead them to revise their beliefs. In the next section, I propose an approach designed to solve conceptual problems in specifying CT skills that treats CT as a motivated, self-regulated process involving dispositions and metacognitive skills in the service of belief revision.

CONCEPTUALIZING CRITICAL THINKING FOR INSTRUCTION AND ASSESSMENT To help solve the previously mentioned problems, I propose that CT rules be identified and contextualized within discourse to provide a general framework for the instruction, assessment, and scientific study of CT. Embedding CT into natural language discourse for

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instructional purposes has been shown to be an effective approach (Kuhn, 1991; Lipman, Sharp, & Oscanyan, 1980). By constructing instructional and assessment materials in relation to CT rules, rule use can be manipulated as part of instructional discourse while measurements of the ability to apply such rules in various thinking tasks can serve as dependent variables. More technically, this allows better alignment of CT instruction with assessment (Bensley & Murtagh, 2011). Many psychologists have used abstract rules of reasoning as a way to scientifically study the acquisition and use of reasoning skills (Galotti, 1989). Most often, rules and procedures have been used to study deductive and formal reasoning (e.g., Braine, Reiser, & Rumain, 1984; Osherson, 1975; Ripps, 1988) but also in the study of informal and inductive reasoning (Lehman & Nisbett, 1990) in problem solving research (Newell & Simon, 1972) and in research on thinking, in general (Lovett & Anderson, 2005). In many other studies, judgments using heuristics or rules of thumb have been compared to judgments made using normative rules (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002). It should be noted at the outset that the rule-based approach to CT proposed here does not assume the psychological validity of any particular rules unlike many of the cognitive theories just cited (e.g., O’Brien, 2004; Smith, Langston, & Nisbett, 1993). The proposed rules are not part of mental procedures or cognitive representations of arguments or other parts of reasoning. They are external representations found in the discourse of thinking in which arguments are made, analyzed, and evaluated. Their representational status is, therefore, externalized with respect to cognition when cognition is viewed as an internal mental process. An important advantage of external CT rules is that they are the directly observable representations of rules used in argumentative discourse. As such, they can readily be made explicit for purposes of instruction, assessment, and objective/subjective inspection. External rules for reasoning at their most basic level are propositional statements for how to relate symbols together in ways that express elementary, logical relations. They may be rules for expressing formal logical relations, but more often in CT and informal logic they are associated with reasoning under uncertainty and defeasible reasoning (Pollock, 1987). As such, these rules often serve the heuristic function of helping to move the thinker towards a tentative conclusion. They are the kind of rules commonly used in everyday, legal, scientific, and disciplinary thinking. Examples of simple, general rules expressed in English might be “a reason provides support for a claim” or “an anecdote or example provides relatively weak support for arguments.” For scientific thinking, a somewhat general rule might be “true experiments can allow for causal inferences.” In the disciplinary thinking of neuroscience, “data from brain imaging studies provide better evidence about the localization of brain damage than case studies of brain damage.” As seen in these examples, external rules may be general and express how premises are logically related to conclusions or how to value certain kinds of commonly used evidence, or they may be specific rules for making judgments in a discipline. Rules appear to vary in reference, generality, and complexity across kinds of discourse but also in their expression within discourse communities. As Ennis (1992) noted almost two decades ago, more research that analyzes and compares the rules of different kinds of discourse is needed. This is important because criteria, standards, and rules acquire their normative status when a community of experts have studied their use and found them to be reliable and have come to tentatively accept them in their CT discourse. As should become clear from the discussion that follows, rules of reasoning acquire their status as rules, not simply when philosophers have codifed abstract,

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logical relations between symbols but also though an epistemological route. Especially in highly specialized, disciplinary thinking, rules are based on norms derived from what experts in the field have come to acknowledge as the best available knowledge. Further study of the use and derivation of rules is needed to help determine how to best express different rules for instruction and assessment within and across different forms of CT discourse. CT rules are often expressed in linguistic form and share some features with rules of language. The formation of arguments in discourse is largely accomplished through the manipulation of language that follows certain semantic and syntactic rules. Intuitively, we often experience our thoughts as a kind of inner speech, and some like McPeck (1990) have argued that thinking is largely language use. Although showing some overlap, the rules of reasoning are not the same as the rules of language (Smith, Langston, & Nisbett, 1993); and the overt form that language takes cannot be what the mind uses to reason (Gleitman & Papafragou, 2005; Jackendoff, 1996). Still, external rules of reasoning are likely to share more features with natural language than do mental representations of reasoning rules. This makes language a good tool for externalizing, observing, and manipulating thought. Learning the rules for using certain indicator terms such as the rule that “therefore” signals a conclusion should follow can help students improve their CT (Bensley & Haynes, 1995; Paul, 1984); however, doing so is not sufficient for CT to occur (Fawkes, 2003). Rules for using the language of argumentation are just one set of external rules of reasoning, and other non-linguistic ways of representing CT rules as well as more complex rules may be needed for specific applications. Expressed in natural language, simple rules of reasoning can be combined to form more complex argumentation structures. Along these lines, some informal logicians have developed “argumentation schemes” that serve a heuristic function in argumentation tasks (Walton, Reid, & Macagno, 2008). Argument schemes are forms of argument that serve as logical tools for analyzing scientific, legal, and other informal arguments found in natural language discourse. Argumentation schemes have a strong connection with the use of fallacies. For example, “argument from waste” or what is more often called “argument from sunk costs” is an argumentation scheme used to justify continuance of an apparently failing enterprise such as the Viet Nam War in its later years. Formerly, logicians would have considered argument schemes like argument from sunk costs to be fallacies. Now, from the perspective of argumentation schemes, they are considered by many to be a kind of defeasible argumentation strategy. They are still viewed as a weak strategy, but they sometimes lead to a sound conclusion. Importantly, they provide the occasion to pose critical questions. CT rules of reasoning are like argumentation schemes in that both can serve as heuristic strategies in analysis of discourse, but CT rules are more variable in form. Simple ones are elemental, yet they can be combined and elaborated to form more complex argumentation structures like argumentation schemes. Another example of the refinement of the rules of reasoning is the informal logic developed by Stephen Toulmin to deal with certain problems in inductive logic (Toulmin, 1958). To accommodate specific rules required for thinking in the sciences and other disciplines, Toulmin refined and elaborated the specification of premises used in inductive reasoning. He distinguished premises as serving three different functions in argumentation, statements serving as grounds, warrants, or backing (Toulmin, Rieke, & Janek, 1979). Grounds serve as the foundation for support of a claim exemplified in common knowledge, personal testimony, statistical or factual data, and experimental or research findings. Warrants

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are statements that connect the grounds to claims as being reliable and providing genuine, solid support. Warrants essentially authorize the grounds as relevant to the claim and permit the movement from claim to conclusion. Warrants are exemplified in laws, principles, legal rulings, formulas, rules of thumb, theories, and various authoritative statements. Backing provides the reasons and other information that back a warrant, supporting why it should be accepted as reliable. Just as different warrants tend to be specific to different fields, so do the different kinds of backing tend to be specific for different warrants. For example, the backing for a law passed by Congress might be a Supreme Court ruling upholding it while a scientific law would be backed by its replication in many different experiments in many different laboratories. In contrast to Toulmin’s analysis of kinds of premises used in induction, Bensley (1998; 2010) has taken a rule-based approach to evaluate the quality of scientific and non-scientific kinds of evidence used in inductive arguments in psychology. Initially, some common general rules were adopted for inductive and causal reasoning such as the rule that conclusions should be consistent with relevant evidence and the corollary heuristic rule that in complex inductive arguments the side supported by the most, high quality evidence is favored when drawing a tentative conclusion. To evaluate the quality of evidence in psychological inductive arguments, other fairly general rules of CT were based on discussions found in CT books in psychology, (e.g., Stanovich, 2004; Wade & Tavris, 2006; Zechmeister & Johnson, 1992) and various psychology textbooks on research methodology. One such rule, that wellcontrolled research studies provide stronger evidence than poorly controlled ones generally applies to psychological and other scientific arguments but is not relevant to CT in other disciplines such as art. Tables 1 and 2 organize these rules for common kinds of evidence used in psychological discourse and can serve as standards of evidence. Table 1 shows various kinds of nonscientific evidence commonly used in everyday psychological discussions, and Table 2 contains various research methods used as evidence in more formal psychological discussions such as literature reviews. The tables list strengths and weaknesses for each kind of evidence that serve as heuristic rules for judging the quality of evidence typically provided by each kind of evidence when used in support of a psychological claim. In Toulmin’s analytic scheme, the strengths and weaknesses serve as rules for evaluating the quality of backing each kind of evidence provides for hypotheses and theories (the warrants). They can also be applied to help evaluate the individual instances of evidence (the grounds) offered to support particular claims. For example, strong conclusions related to Freud’s psychoanalytic theory are usually not warranted because Freudian theory has been backed almost exclusively by relatively weak case study evidence. Likewise, the grounds provided to support claims invoking Freudian theory are often based on case study data that provide weak support. In contrast, much stronger conclusions related to cognitive behavior theory may be warranted because cognitive behavior theory and treatments of certain disorders have been backed by many well-controlled, randomized trial experiments. As Table 2 shows, well-controlled experiments tend to provide much better support. Consequently, a behavior therapist invoking cognitive behavior theory who has also systematically manipulated treatment conditions and made careful observations of the effects on behavior would have better grounds to warrant a conclusion or diagnosis based on cognitive behavior theory.

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An important fact about disciplinary thinking is that psychology and other fields develop their own specific rules for reasoning in their discourse. The rule that functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data provides better support than PETscan data because of its superior spatial resolution in scanning the brain is a more specific rule for evaluating evidence from arguments in cognitive neuroscience than the rules in Table 2. As disciplines accumulate knowledge, the rules for evaluating arguments and what counts as high quality evidence related to that knowledge become more specific. Because these rules depend on scientific findings, themselves, they tend to remain unsettled until they have been well studied and accepted by experts in the field. For example, although many psychologists now treat findings from (fMRI) studies as high quality evidence that neural activity in specific brain areas causes certain mental events, this view remains controversial given that the theory for how brain states are related to cognitive states is far from settled (Miller, 2010). Table 1. Strengths and Weaknesses of Non-scientific Sources and Kinds of Evidence Approach

Strengths

Weaknesses

Commonsense Belief Informal beliefs and folk theories of mind commonly assumed to be true

-is a view shared by many, not just a few people. -is familiar and appeals to everyday experience.

-is not based on careful, systematic observation. -may be biased by cultural and social influences. -often goes untested.

Anecdote Story or example, often biographical, used to support a claim

-can vividly illustrate an ability, trait, behavior, or situation. -provides a “real-world” example.

-is not based on careful, systematic observation. -may be unique, not repeatable, and cannot be generalized to large groups.

Personal Experience Reports of one’s own experience often in the form of testimonials and introspective self-reports

-tells what a person may be feeling, experiencing, or aware of at the time. -is compelling and easily identified with.

-is often subjective and biased. -may be unreliable because people are often unaware of the real reasons for their behaviors and experiences.

Statement of Authority Statement made by a person or group assumed to have special knowledge or expertise

-may be true and useful when the authority has relevant knowledge or expertise. -is convenient because acquiring one’s own knowledge and expertise takes a lot of time.

-is misleading when presumed authority does not have or pretends to have special knowledge or expertise. -may be biased.

Reprinted from Bensley, D. A. (2010). A brief guide to teaching and assessing critical thinking in psychology, APS Observer, 23, 49-53.

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Table 2. Strengths and Weaknesses of Scientific Research Methods/Designs Used as Sources of Evidence Method/Design

Strengths

Weaknesses

Case Study Detailed description of one or a few subjects

-provides much information about one person. -may inform about a person with special or rare abilities, knowledge, or characteristics.

-may be unique and hard to replicate. -may not generalize to other people. -cannot show cause and effect.

Naturalistic Observation Observations of behavior made in the field or natural environment

-allows observations to be readily generalized to real world. -can be a source of hypotheses.

-allows little control of extraneous variables. -cannot test treatments. -cannot show cause and effect.

Survey research A method like a questionnaire that allows many questions to be asked

-allows economical collection of much data. -allows for study of many different questions at once.

-may have problems of self reports such as dishonesty, forgetting, and misrepresentation of self. -may involve biased sampling.

Correlational Study A method for finding a quantitative relationship between variables

-allows researcher to calculate the strength and direction of relation between variables. -can use it to make predictions.

-does not allow random assignment of participants or much control of subject variables. -cannot test treatments. -cannot show cause and effect.

Quasi-experiment A method for comparing treatment conditions without random assignment

-allows comparison of treatments. -allows some control of extraneous variables.

-does not allow random assignment of participants or much control of subject variables. -Cannot show cause and effect.

True Experiment A method for comparing treatment conditions in which variables can be controlled through random assignment

-allows true manipulation of treatment conditions. -allows random assignment and much control of extraneous variables. -can show cause and effect.

-cannot manipulate and test some variables. -may control variables and conditions so much that they become artificial and unlike “real world” cnditions.

Adapted from Bensley, D. A. (2010). A brief guide to teaching and assessing critical thinking in psychology, APS Observer, 23, 49-53.

In the language of Toulmin, the theoretical underpinnings of fMRI and cognitive neuroscience do not provide sufficient backing to warrant the conclusion that brain activity in a certain brain region as measured by fMRI causes some mental state. In contrast, rules of evidence like those in Table 2 that are based on established scientific methodology and

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practices are more settled and tend to be more general. For example, scientists tend to evaluate evidence provided by true experiments more highly than from correlational and quasi-experimental studies because most scientists agree that true experiments can help show causation while the other two methods cannot. Finally, although a rule-based model shows promise in helping promote understanding of CT skill acquisition, the research reviewed earlier strongly suggests that other psychological variables must be involved in belief revision. A comprehensive psychological model should include motivational and affective variables in addition to cognitive variables. To further explicate the rule-based approach, I describe a tentative proto-model that includes dispositional, affective, and metacognitive variables in addition to cognitive variables. For models that include some of these same variables, see Halpern (1998) and Perkins, Jay, and Tishman, (1993). The proto-model is offered as a part of the rule-based framework to guide research on CT and does not make strong assumptions about how CT skills, dispositions, motives, and metacognitions are related. At the cognitive level, it is expected that people internalize external rules through explicit instruction or through inference in the analysis of discourse. The internal representations of external rules may or may not resemble those found in previous research on use of rules and heuristics. This is a worthy question for future research in the tradition of the heuristics and biases literature that may be aided by clear specification of the external rules people use, but the proposal of external rules does not require this assumption. It is assumed that people have somewhat limited knowledge of their own rule use, skill levels, and dispositions; but they can improve their ability to accurately monitor use of such rules when rules are made explicit and their use is practiced. At the motivational level, CT is a thinking process that can be affected by the goals, dispositions, and effort of the thinker. Rules promulgated by disciplines and thinking cultures can prescriptively direct thinking toward the goal of revising beliefs to be consistent with critical evaluation of relevant evidence. The attitudes and dispositional approaches a person adopts can also affect movement towards CT goals. In terms of approach achievement motivation, Bartels, Mangun-Jackson, and Ryan (2010) found that need for achievement predicted cognitive strategies such as CT and that fear of failure was negatively associated with CT in terms of avoidance motivation. Other research on motivated reasoning suggests that the kind of processing people engage in can affect their tendency to more readily accept the validity of information consistent with their preference than information that is inconsistent (Kunda, 1990). More recently, Ditto (2010) has argued that the amount of processing a thinker engages in can explain much of motivated reasoning by assuming, for example, that people engage in more extensive search for alternative information when information is inconsistent with a conclusion they prefer. It may be that motivation can affect CT in a variety of ways that are not yet well understood. At the affective level, information related to belief is often affectively-toned, and emotions associated with beliefs can dispose a person to approach information and thinking tasks in particular ways, usually in the direction of maintaining personal beliefs. Blanchette and Richards (2004) have found that participants asked to reason with emotional versus neutral statements were more likely to draw invalid inferences with emotional statements. In another study of college students, Oaksford, et al. (1996) induced them to be in either positive, negative, or neutral moods and tested them on Wason’s selection task. Participants in both the positive and negative mood conditions showed a greater confirmatory bias on the

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task than those in a control mood condition. In contrast, interest might be expected to enhance effort and the quality of thinking performance. It seems hard to escape the conclusion that at a fundamental level CT is a psychological construct. In psychological terms, it seems to be a process involving cognitive skills, background knowledge, dispositions, motives, emotions, and metacognitive factors. Although some philosophers, (e.g., Facione, 1990; Paul, 1993) and psychologists (e.g., Halpern, 1998; Stanovich, 2008) have theorized that multiple variables are involved, research to develop comprehensive, empirically-based models of CT is in only its beginning stages. The rulebased proto-model proposed here is an effort to provide a framework to move scientific research on CT in a more productive direction, one that views CT as a multivariate process that is related to the use of normative rules contextualized in the discourse of CT tasks. Until the inter-relationships of these variables are understood in relation to the use of external rules, a complete, functional understanding of how CT occurs will not be possible.

CONCLUSION The literature reviewed in this chapter on the conceptualization of CT revealed problems with the clear specification of CT skills and dispositions and the need to identify the antecedent conditions that produce CT. While many authorities agree that CT involves skills and dispositions related to good reasoning, many disagreements persist about which specific skills and dispositions are involved. The lack of clarity and specificity in CT skills, dispositions, and other terms has impeded the instruction, assessment, and scientific study of CT. Review of other research on CT instruction showed that explicit teaching of CT infused into subject matter instruction was more effective than less explicit traditional and immersion approaches, but it also revealed that greater specificity was needed to identify the principles leading to improvement of CT. To address the need for greater specificity and clarity in conceptualizing CT, a rule-based approach to defining, instructing, and assessing CT was proposed. This approach treats CT skill as the appropriate use of rules and procedures for reasoning that can be infused into relevant discourse and then assessed as an outcome. This conception allows CT to be viewed in the context of individual difference and/or instructional conditions that produce appropriate CT rule use as an outcome. For instruction of skills, the rule-based approach employs the explicit instruction of CT rules, contextualizing them in subject matter instruction. In assessment, instruction is aligned with assessments measuring the appropriate use of relevant rules contextualized in subject matter differing in content from that used in instruction. Improved specification of rules can promote both the experimental manipulation of rules in discourse as instructional components and the construction of tests and measures for assessing the effectiveness of CT instructional strategies and skill acquisition that can be varied to test for transfer. External CT rules explicity operationalized in instruction and assessment allow for a more systematic mapping between input and output conditions and a functional approach to the psychological study of CT that can promote scientific progress in studying it (De Houwer, 2011) One particular implementation of this rule-based approach called direct infusion has further specified the conditions of explicit infusion of CT. It incorporates effective

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instructional practices such as explicit instruction of rules for analyzing psychological arguments and critical reading along with practice exercises, assessments, and feedback to guide skill acquisition. The direct infusion approach and the rule-based framework, in general, also allow the study of CT dispositions and metacognitive skills along with CT rule acquisition. Results of a new study by Bensley and Spero (2011) investigating direct infusion of CT rules into psychology subject matter instruction showed that DI promoted CT skill acquisition and increased metacognitive monitoring skill. This study illustrates how a rulebased approach using Tables 1 and 2 provided a way to systematically align instruction and assessment and track the gains due to direct infusion. The second set of problems in conceptualizing CT concerns the tendency to focus on CT skills as outcomes instead of viewing CT as a goal-oriented process that also involves dispositions and metacognition in the service of belief revision. An advantage of the CT rulebased approach is that besides CT skills assessment, the contribution of CT dispositions and metacognitive skills can be also measured as people use rules to perform a CT task. Viewing CT as a multivariate process with the goal of the self-correction of thinking in accordance with appropriate rule use can allow for a more complete modeling of belief revision and other changes in thinking resulting from instruction and experience. However, the encouraging results of the two new studies reported, although consistent with earlier research, should be considered preliminary and in need of replication. It should not surprise us that some of the new studies reviewed in this chapter would reveal CT to be a complex kind of thinking, multivariate in appearance. Yet, this complexity should not discourage us. Taking a multivariate, process approach to CT should improve our ability to identify antecedent conditions that predict CT as opposed to measuring it as a single outcome presumed to be a proxy for CT skill. Finding relationships among the many variables thought to be related to CT may turn the complexity of CT into its strength, providing it with a unique identity among constructs used to explain thinking. In this way, what has often been described as the art of thinking might increasingly become the science of thinking and its improvement. By viewing CT as involving rule use, research in psychology, philosophy, education, and other disciplines might be better coordinated to promote the scientific study of CT. Ultimately, this might help integrate what has appeared to be a complex set of inter-related terms into a useful model of a legitimate, although complex, scientific construct.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND DEDICATION I dedicate this chapter to the memory of my friend and colleague, Dr. Ronald Reed, who helped me get started in critical thinking and introduced me to the work of Matthew Lipman.

In: Critical Thinking Editors: Ch. P. Horvath and J. M. Forte, pp. 37-67

ISBN: 978-1-61324-419-7 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 2

CRITICAL THINKING AND SYSTEMS THINKING: TOWARDS A CRITICAL LITERACY FOR SYSTEMS THINKING IN PRACTICE Martin Reynolds* Communication and Systems Department, The Open University, Walton Hall Milton Keynes MK7 6AA UK

1. INTRODUCTION “The core aspects of systems thinking are gaining a bigger picture (going up a level of abstraction) and appreciating other people’s perspectives” (Chapman 2004 p. 14)

This simple distinction made by Jake Chapman builds upon a distinction made by Richard Bawden in identifying two transitions implicit in systems thinking; one, towards holism, and another towards pluralism (Bawden 1998). The transitions speak of two worlds. One, the holistic ontological real-world ‘universe’ of interdependent elements, encapsulating complex interrelationships. Two, an epistemological socially constructed world of ‘multiverse’ (cf. Maturana and Poerksen 2004 p.38), encapsulating differing perspectives on reality. The two worlds are of course abstractions – ways of framing. This act of framing itself constitutes a third distinct critical world. This is a world where boundaries inevitably need to be made and questioned on the inevitable limitations on (i) framing reality (limits on being holistically ‘universe’), and (ii) framing engagement with reality (limits on being pluralistically ‘multiverse’). Whilst striving towards aspirations of holism and pluralism, this third critical dimension confers a peculiar sense of grounding, purposefulness and responsibility in systems thinking. As Werner Ulrich shows in his seminal work Critical Heuristics of Social Planning (1983), the systems ‘idea’ as a philosophical tool can be traced back to Immanuel Kant’s *

Contact Details: Tel: +44 (0)1908 654894 (work) Email: [email protected] Website: http://sites.google.com/site/jjntest1/Home/people/martin-reynolds-1

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1784 enlightenment treatise - Critique of Pure Reason. Kant uses the systems idea as an holistic concept: “ - a whole which is prior to the determinate knowledge of the parts and which contains the conditions that determine a priori for every part its position and relation to the other parts. This idea accordingly postulates a complete unity in the knowledge obtained by the understanding, by which this knowledge is to be not a mere contingent aggregate, but a system connected according to necessary laws” (Immanuel Kant, 1784, quoted in Ulrich, 1983 p.223; Ulrich’s italics)

The systems idea as originally formulated by Kant is an abstract holistic principle used as a means for understanding ‘the real world’. The Kantian critical interpretation of the systems idea rests on the principle that it is simply not possible to have comprehensive knowledge. In the subsequent treatise Kant “undertakes the dialectical task of making reason reflect upon its own limitations” (Ulrich, 1983:269). Critique of Pure Reason formulates an original critical interpretation to the systems idea. In course, the critique provides a fundamental and enduring epistemological challenge to classical comprehensive rationalism; a rationalism that assumes the possibility of comprehensive knowledge and understanding. Werner Ulrich’s critical systems heuristics is often regarded as an example of one particular tradition of systems thinking called critical systems thinking (CST). The positivist interpretation of systems science came under critical review during the 1970s most notably through the works of C. West Churchman (1970) and Russell Ackoff (1974) in America and Peter Checkland (1979) in England (original papers reproduced in Flood and Jackson, 1991a). Checkland built on Churchman’s critique, defining an alternative “soft” systems tradition, and naming the former as the “hard” systems tradition. Around the same time Werner Ulrich was also building on Churchman’s work, subsequently contributing to what later came to be referred to as a “critical” systems tradition (cf. Flood & Jackson, 1991a). Contemporary systems approaches can then be classified as ‘hard’, ‘soft’, or ‘critical’, according to the degree to which they maintain Kant’s original critical sense of the systems idea (see Figure 1). Rather than exploring one tradition of systems thinking – CST - this chapter explores the notion of contemporary systems thinking as being implicitly critical. An argument will be made that the need for what might be called a ‘systems literacy’ reflects a need for the original critical idea of systems. The basis of such a literacy is a proposed framework of systems thinking in practice based on revised ideas of boundary critique (Ulrich and Reynolds, 2010). After describing what this critical literacy in systems thinking in practice looks like and entails, the question of how the critical kernel emerged amongst contemporary systems thinking in practice approaches is examined. This section traces the influence of critical thinking traditions on systems thinking. Finally, some views are offered on why attention to the critical literacy of systems thinking in practice is significant to a contemporary world beset with complex issues of change and uncertainty.

Critical Thinking and Systems Thinking Systems ‘Type’ & philosophical origins* Hard Systems Ontology: Epistemology: Intention:

Soft Systems Ontology: Epistemology: Intention:

Selected Systems Approaches

realism positivism control

• general systems theory (Bertalanfy, 1940) • classical ‘mechanistic’ cybernetics (Ashby, 1956) • operations research (Churchman, Ackoff & Arnoff, 1957) • systems engineering (Hall, 1962) • socio-technical systems (Trist et al., 1963) • RAND-systems analysis (Optner, 1965) • system dynamics (Forrester, 1961; 1971; Meadows et al., 1972; 1992; Senge, 1990) • organic cybernetics (Beer, 1979; Varela et al., 1974)

nominalism constructivist interpretivism appreciation

• Inquiring systems design (Churchman, 1971) • soft systems methodology (Checkland, 1981) • strategic assumption surface testing (Mason & Mitroff, 1981) • interactive management (Ackoff, 1981) • cognitive mapping and strategic options development analysis (Eden and Ackermann, 1988)

Critical Systems Ontology: nominalism constructivist/ Epistemology critical idealism emancipation Intention:

• • • • • • •

critical systems heuristics (Ulrich, 1983) system of systems methodologies (Jackson & Keys, 1984) community operational research (Rosenhead, 1984) liberating systems theory (Flood, 1990) interpretive systemology (Fuenmayor, 1991) total systems intervention (Jackson & Flood, 1991) systemic intervention (Midgley, 2000)

* Glossary of Terminology Ontology realism: nominalism:

(assumptions about the nature of ‘things’ or ‘being’). ‘real world’ is made up of systems. systems are means of re-presenting (naming) phenomena of the real world.

Epistemology positivism: constructivism: interpretivism: critical idealism:

(assumptions of knowledge generation). validity based on ‘objective’ scientific method of gathering empirical facts. knowledge is socially constructed validity based upon ‘subjective’ interpretations (multiple realities) of phenomena. phenomena (maps), as distinct from noumena (objects), are imbued with human purpose and must lay open their perspective and purpose for critical reflection

Intention control: appreciation: emancipation:

(primary pledge or human purpose embodied in systems approach). enables technical mastery over natural and social entities. enables furthering communication and understanding between different groups. enables freedom from coercive material and ideological forces.

Adapted from Reynolds and Holwell, 2010 p. 10. Figure 1. An overview of systems approaches and their philosophical origins .

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2. WHAT IS CRITICAL IN SYSTEMS THINKING IN PRACTICE? “Systems literacy is not just about measurement. The learning journey up the ladder of complexity—from quarks, to atoms, to molecules, to organisms, to ecosystems—will be made using judgment as much as instruments. Simulations about key scientific ideas and visualizations of complex knowledge can attract attention—but the best learning takes place when groups of people interact physically and perceptually with scientific knowledge, and with each other, in a critical spirit. The point of systems literacy is to enable collaborative action, to develop a shared vision of where we want to be.” (Thackara, 2005)

“Clear systems thinking is one of the basic literacies of the modern world” commented Geoff Mulgan – a senior government advisor in the UK government’s Cabinet Office during the 1990s… “not least because it offers unexpected insights that are not amenable to common sense” (Mulgan, 1997). Our common sense understanding of situations is continually and inadvertently shaped by our actions or practice. In the same way effective systems thinking is a literacy that is continually being informed, moulded and (re)shaped by ongoing practice. It is this interplay between conceptual tools and practice that resonates with the idea of systems thinking in practice as an important development in critical thinking. The name - systems thinking in practice - suggests an important interplay between understanding and practice; systems thinking continually being informed, moulded and (re)shaped by ongoing practice. Systems thinking in practice deals with what might be considered to be the critical literacy required to be competent practitioners in supporting real world decision-making. The name provides a continual reminder of the important interplay between understanding and practice. Systems thinking in practice involves stepping back from messy situations of complexity, change, and uncertainty, and clarifying key interrelationships and perspectives on the situation. It further requires engaging with multiple often contrasting perspectives amongst stakeholders involved with and affected by the situation so as to best direct responsible joined-up thinking with action to bring about morally justifiable improvements.

The above definition encapsulates three generalized purposeful orientations of systems thinking in practice (Reynolds & Howell, 2010 p.17): 1) Making sense of, or simplifying (in understanding), relationships between different entities associated with a complex situation. The prime intention is not to get some thorough comprehensive knowledge of situations, but rather to acquire a better appreciation of wider dynamics in order to improve the situation. 2) Surfacing and engaging (through practice) contrasting perspectives associated with complex situations. The prime intention here is not to embrace all perspectives on a predetermined problem so as to solve the problem, but rather to allow for possibilities in reshaping a problem-situation for improved possibilities of resolution. 3) Exploring and reconciling (with responsibility) ethical issues and power relations, both expressions of boundary issues associated with inevitable partial understandings of a situation and partiality amongst different stakeholders. The intention here is to gently disrupt, unsettle and thereby provoke new systems thinking.

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An effective systems approach to managing real world complex situations embodies all three aspects of systems thinking in practice. The criticality of systems thinking in practice can be expressed in terms of promoting continual and meaningful conversation. The ‘conversation’ works at two levels. One is an expression of boundary reflection, a conversation between our conceptual constructs of real world realities – constructs called ‘systems’ - and the actual realities being addressed. The other is an expression of boundary discourse, a conversation between people involved with and affected by the systems used to construct and engage with reality (Ulrich and Reynolds, 2010). Whereas boundary reflection is a conversation influenced by conventional critical systems thinking, boundary discourse is influenced also by traditions of social learning. Both conversations constitute what might be referred to as boundary critique, a triadic interplay between judgements of ‘fact’, value judgements, and boundary judgements, underpinning systems thinking in practice. Ulrich describes this interplay as an ‘eternal triangle’: “Thinking through the triangle means to consider each of its corners in the light of the other two. For example, what new facts become relevant if we expand the boundaries of the reference system or modify our value judgments? How do our valuations look if we consider new facts that refer to a modified reference system? In what way may our reference system fail to do justice to the perspective of different stakeholder groups? Any claim that does not reflect on the underpinning ‘triangle’ of boundary judgments, judgments of facts, and value judgments, risks claiming too much, by not disclosing its built-in selectivity” (Ulrich 2003 p.334)

Boundary critique can be described in terms of activities underpinning a framework of systems thinking in practice; constituting what has been referred to as an overall critical systems framework (Reynolds 2008a). The framework is supported by three (sub)frameworks respectively – framework for understanding (fwU), framework for practice (fwP), and a framework for responsibility (fwR) - The activities of boundary critique involve continual revising of boundary judgements (systems thinking) with judgements of ‘fact’ (observing) and value judgements (evaluating) (see Figure 2).

Adapted from Reynolds 2008a p.386. Figure 2. Critical systems framework illustrating systems thinking in practice activities.

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In developing this into a broader heuristic for systems thinking in practice, three complementary entities can be added: firstly, real-world contexts of change and uncertainty associated with a framework for understanding; secondly, people or practitioners involved with making change associated with a framework for practice; and thirdly, the ideas and concepts – including systems - as tools for effecting change associated with a framework for responsibility. What is critical in systems thinking in practice is: (i) an appreciation that complex realities, despite good intentions with complexity sciences, can never be holistically comprehended; (ii) an acknowledgement that any perspective on a situation is laden with values that inhibit any sense of neutral engagement; and (iii) an awareness of the limitations of systems design in the light of (i) and (ii).

3. HOW SYSTEMS THINKING BECAME CRITICAL Systems science emerged in the 1940s and 1950s in response to clear problems of military logistics generated during World War Two. Whilst the problems addressed by variants of systems science (systems engineering, system dynamics, systems analysis and operations research) might be highly complicated in terms of involving many variables, the problem situation could nevertheless be well defined; that is, the methods would serve what Jackson and Keys (1983) would call a clearly defined “unitary purpose”. A war-time consensus is likely to generate broad and common objectives. Systems science relates to the transformation in practice in order to address issues of interrelatedness and pluralism in perspectivs. In the late 1950s, operations research (OR outside of America the term used is ‘operational’ research), previously used as a means of controlling non-human (hardware) variables in weapon, computer, or space systems, was applied to the more challenging task of addressing organisational, community and societal problems. The increasingly pluralistic demands of the post-war/post-colonial era, provided new challenges for systems science techniques. In systems science, the response was soft systems thinking and critical systems thinking (see Figure 1). The emergence of ‘soft’ and ‘critical’ systems approaches since the 1980s can best be understood as an epistemological challenge to the systems idea as described by Ulrich: “The systems idea as we understand it does not presuppose that we can know ‘the whole system’, but only that we can undertake a critical effort to reflect on the inevitable lack of comprehensiveness in our understanding and design for (social) systems. Thus the systems idea, if we do not scientistically misunderstand it, challenges us to make transparent to ourselves and to others the normative implications of our systems concepts and designs” (Ulrich, 1983 p.21).

During the Second World War the ‘systems idea’ acquired currency as an operational tool. Systems engineering and OR transformed the holistic idea into a methodological tool for controlling variables within the context of clearly pre-defined instrumental action. At the same time ‘systems science’ and Bertalanffy’s ‘general systems theory’ translated the epistemologically critical interpretation of Kant’s systems idea into an ontological realist concept of systems as actual comprehensive representations of ‘real world’ phenomena. This

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now pervades everyday language reference to the ‘education system’, ‘health system’ or ‘legal system’ etc. Systems as concepts assumed a social ‘factual’ status. The application of OR to organisational and societal problems further entrenched systems thinking into a positivist epistemological framework associated with the narrow instrumental purposes of gathering empirical ‘facts’. In seeking to identify more clearly just what the critical systems idea is and its relevance to contemporary systems thinking in practice literacy, three dimensions of analysis are used in critiquing each of the hard and soft systems traditions. Each of the three dimensions contexts, practitioners, and systems as conceptual constructs - correspond to the systems thinking in practice framework introduced earlier (Figure 2).

3.1. Critique of the ‘Hard’ Systems Tradition Context Matters From the 1950s, Churchman and Ackoff were amongst the pioneers applying principles of operations research to organisational management and wider societal issues (Churchman et.al., 1957). Ackoff (1981) following the lead of Churchman’s critique of OR, expands on how approaches to problem-solving based upon assumptions of consensual, unitary purpose could not be applied as a tool for most social systems design, characterised more often by complexity and conflict. Complexity is not of the type that arises from some innate but growing complexity factor in institutional dynamics, but is rather derived from taking account of conflicting human perceptions and interests involved in applied systems dynamics (cf. Ellis, 1995). The American Apollo Space Programme provides perhaps the best example of overcoming considerable technical complexity using ‘hard’ systems (operations) research in achieving the goal of putting a man on the moon. In allowing technology to be mobilised for such a unitary purpose, instrumental questions of ‘how’ resources might be deployed to achieve the objective dominated, first, practical questions concerning ‘what’ resources were actually available, and second, ethical questions of ‘why’ resource use needed to be prioritised for this mission. The powerful instrumental techniques of OR and other ‘hard’ system variants were effectively allowed free rein. In contrast, Churchman and Ackoff could document the failures of OR in contexts where the purpose and purposefulness were ill-defined because of conflicting interests amongst different actors. On one level OR developed academically with the pursuit of ‘modelling’ techniques “ - a study of the delights of algorithms; nuances of game theory; fascinating but irrelevant things that can happen in queues” (Churchman in 1979 p. 50). In instances where the instrumental force of techniques assumes an authority of its own, effectively by-passing issues of purpose, the ‘irrelevance’ of approaches might be transformed into a more intrusive form - what has been termed a “cybernetic technocratism” (Flood, 1990), or where, in terms of social planning, there is a propensity for the means to define the ends (Ulrich 1988a). Practitioner Matters Hard systems thinking in social science is characterised by a positivist epistemology wherein the systems being examined assume the status of real world objects - a realist ontology - in much the same way that natural ‘objective’ science based on empiricism treats its subject-matter (Churchman, 1970, in Flood and Jackson 1991a). Checkland (1981),

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Jackson (1985), Flood and Jackson (1991b) and Ellis (1995) draw attention to Burrell and Morgan’s 1974 typology of four social science paradigms - subjectivist “radical humanism” and “interpretivism”, and objectivist “radical structuralism” and “functionalism” - in signalling the correspondence between the “functionalist paradigm” and hard systems thinking. The paradigm claims that sociological ‘models’, represent actual ‘systems’ constituents of the real world which, once conceptually formulated can then be legitimately engineered. There appears to be general agreement that the enduring legacy of perceiving ‘systems’ in terms of a realist ontology - existing outside of human purposefulness - was strongly influenced by Bertalanffy’s ‘general systems theory’ in the 1940s (Checkland, 1991; Jackson, 1990; Flood & Ulrich, 1991). Such theoretical underpinning promotes systems practice as an essentially regulatory function.

Systems Change Matters The technical bias and positivist theoretical underpinnings of hard systems thinking lends itself to a perspective of systems as homeostatic, ‘closed’, and with an equilibrium to be maintained. The task of systems practice from the ‘hard’ perspective, as Oliga (1990) observes, is to ensure the ‘stability’ of such systems. Control is the management intention which systems practice is seen to serve. In narrowly focusing on goals and instrumental ‘means’ for achieving the goals, rather than allowing for questioning the systems’ built in objectives (purpose) and underlying interests (purposefulness), social consequences of systems design are ignored (Checkland, 1981). The result of this orientation towards control is to maintain or even accentuate existing power relations implicit in the system (Flood & Ulrich 1991). Checkland (1978) points out how the ‘hard’ systems tradition promotes the ‘neutral’ ‘value-free’ image of the systems analyst. Implicitly, therefore, it would appear that institutional conservatism relates as much to stabilising the institutional practice of systems analysis (authority of the experts) as with stabilising institutional practice of client organisations being served by systems analysis. Towards Soft Systems Approaches From the late 1970s the three dimensions of critique were translated into two distinct systems’ approaches; firstly, a soft systems approach that focused primarily on developing an epistemological challenge in the practitioner domain, and secondly, a critical systems approach which focused increasingly more on the political challenge generated in the systems change dimension. The soft systems ‘interpretivist’ approach attempts to; (a) provide the basis for techniques to address pluralist purposes, (b) adopt the principle of ‘multiple realities’ as an anti-positivist (interpretivist) theoretical framework, and (c) promote institutional change (Jackson, 1991a; Flood and Ulrich, 1990). Amongst the soft systems approaches to emerge in the 1980s (see Figure 1), Checkland’s (1981) soft systems methodology (SSM), developed with colleagues at Lancaster University, is one of the best known and most enduring (case studies are particularly well documented in Checkland and Scholes, 1990). The success of SSM might be attributed to the detailed development of methodological procedures for addressing complex human-based problem situations. These are commonly represented as an iterative learning cycle with seven stages of enquiry (Figure 3) although Checkland himself more recently describes it in terms of two parallel streams of enquiry.

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Stage 1 The `problem situation' unstructured The remit of intervention is identified, providing the site sometimes referred to as ‘the mess’ Stage 2 The problem-situation expressed Ordinarily carried out through a rich picture; a tool used for brainstorming ideas of the problem situation usually with the active collaboration of those involved with the system. Designed to generate the main issues (e.g. conflicts) and tasks (e.g. communication links, social or institutional norms and roles) of the system. Stage 3 Root definitions of relevant systems Systems deemed relevant to the problem situation are first conceptually identified through isolation of ‘problem themes’, named and provided with concise root definitions; formulated around fundamental systems questions encapsulated in the mnemonic CATWOE: Customers/clients : beneficiaries of ‘T’ Actors/agents: those who would do ‘T’; ‘experts' Transformation (‘T’): the purpose of the system Weltanschauung (worldview): value-informed view which makes ‘T’ meaningful Owner(s): decision makers who control conditions of the system Environment: ‘constraining’ elements outside the system Stage 4 Conceptual modelling To encapsulate the key activities which the system must undertake in order to fulfil the requirements of the root definition. System models are expressions of ideal forms of organised activities. Derived from the root definition rather than rich picture. Used for pro-active interrogative and analytical work, rather than a contrivance at representing ‘reality’. Stage 5: Comparative analysis Conceptual constructs (models) compared with the ‘realities of the mess’. Carried out both monologically, comparing conceptual models with the ‘rich picture’ formulated in Stage 2, and/or, more preferably, dialogically, in a process of re-presenting models back to those involved with the system in order gain critical feedback. Stage 6: Debate changes The critique emerging from Stage 5 is used as the basis for a debate amongst those involved with the system, concerning the desirability and feasibility of future changes Stage 7: Action to improve the situation Implementing changes agreed upon during the Stage 6 debate or reverting back to Stage 3.

Source: adapted from Checkland, 1981. Figure 3. Stages of Soft Systems Methodology.

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A distinction between a ‘logic-based stream of analysis’ (represented by the 7 stage core method) and a ‘stream of cultural analysis’, articulated later by Checkland and Scholes (1990), precludes any assumption of a linear flow between these seven stages. The ‘cultural analysis’ constituent of the framework, reinforces the essential iterative nature of SSM. It is a particularly important constituent to stages 1 and 2 of the core method, providing a dialogical means towards defining relevant systems in stage 3.

3.2. Critique of ‘Soft’ Systems Context Matters Jackson (1982) questioned the ambitions of soft systems thinking as expressed in the work of Churchman, Ackoff, and Checkland, arguing that the domain of application for soft systems remains, as with hard systems, restricted. Jackson observed that soft systems can only work in conditions which allows for “genuine” debate amongst those involved. Despite many years of documented practical success there would appear also to be circumstances that mitigate against its successful deployment: “SSM continues to be employed uncritically in problem situations where the mobilisation of differentiated power resources by different interest groups makes genuine participation impossible” (Jackson, 1990 p. 362).

Flood and Jackson (1991b) further argue that SSM practitioners often compound this problem by advocating for SSM a status as a ‘meta-methodology’ incorporating hard systems as a constituent part of SSM.

Practitioner Matters Jackson’s critique of soft systems approaches are rooted in the assertion that interpretivist theory offers nothing in relation to theorising about institutional change... “It is surprising to find that at the moment no genuinely interpretive systems theory exists... Such a theory would have to probe the systemic nature of interpretations individuals employ in constructing the social world” (Jackson, 1982 p.18). John Oliga (1988), whilst acknowledging the achievement of soft systems approaches in having made an ontological break with empiricism, rejecting realist assumptions of there being an ‘objective’ world of social facts, suggests that soft systems practitioners continue to assume attaining ‘objective knowledge’ at the level of theory. In pursuing this point, Oliga distinguishes between ‘naturalistic’ and ‘historic’ hermeneutics; suggesting that it is the former which effectively objectifies others’ realities. The validity of SSM is based upon respect for the point of view and aims of all the ‘stakeholders’. However, Oliga argues that because SSM practitioners neglect the influence of social structural factors on the formation, maintenance and (it might be added) articulation of worldviews – a term introduced by Churchman (1971) in translation of the more rich German term, Weltanschauung - they perpetuate ontological realism at the theoretical level despite having made an ontological break with empiricism at the methodological level. The effect, referred to as “epistemological impoverishment” (Flood & Ulrich, 1991 p. 306), is to produce a theoretical stance which is relativistic and without external legitimisation. Similarly, Jackson (1991a) argues, change can only be understood in SSM via

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the processes of communication facilitating mutual understanding between the involved actors. This is epistemologically ‘impoverished’ through not being able to appreciate the ‘effects of material conditions’ and the incidence of ‘false consciousness’ on peoples’ worldviews (Flood & Ulrich, 1991).

Systems Change Matters “What I hear Habermas arguing is that the debate at stages 5 and 6 of the soft systems methodology will be inhibited by society’s structure. I think that it is in the nature of society that this will be so.” (Checkland, 1981 p. 283). “Recommendations of soft systems thinking remain “regulative” because no attempt is made to ensure that the conditions for “genuine” debate are provided” (Jackson, 1991b p.133).

SSM does not discriminate between worldviews. According to Jackson, the methodology is therefore ‘ideologically naive’ since no attempt is made to relate worldviews to social relations of power effecting incidences of false consciousness. Put another way; “...there are no explicit directives in the theory that aim to prevent the approach from being expert driven” (Flood & Ulrich 1991p. 198). An authority is implicitly established by virtue of there being no explicit reference to theory (cf. Sangren, 1988).

Oliga (1990) maps out an architecture of power and ideology in relation to different systems practice, and examines how underlying assumptions inform institutional perspectives of ‘stability’ (social control) and ‘change’ (social transformation). Whilst hard systems thinking (as a function of positivism) typically neglects the subjective domain of ‘worldviews’ and focuses on relations of power as constituents of systems regulation, soft systems typically neglect the relations of power determining ideology. Oliga argues that by focusing upon either one or the other in the ‘power/ideology’ dialectic, both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ traditions implicitly share a conservative view of using systems practice for social control; that is, maintaining social order in the face of actual or potential conflicts. What may appear to be institutional liberalisation, as professed by some soft systems practitioners, turns out to be ideological conservatism (a point made by Flood & Ulrich, 1991); ideology removed from relations of power.

Towards Critical Systems Approaches To summarise the critique so far, contextual concerns have questioned the (in)appropriateness of systems approaches in application to diverse and often conflicting human purposes. Practitioner concerns have generated debate over the principles behind the social construction of knowledge in relation to the ‘systems idea’. Since the 1940s with Bertalanfy’s realist ontological interpretation of ‘systems’, considerable confusion between the ontological and epistemological conceptualisations of systems have beleaguered the systems literature (Flood & Ulrich, 1990:186; Checkland, 1991p. 26). Finally, systems and institutional concerns over social/political stability and change have raised fundamental issues concerning power and ideology in relation to systems practice.

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At the same time that Peter Checkland was establishing soft systems methodology, Werner Ulrich (1983) was formulating critical systems heuristics (CSH). Both addressed problems of applying ‘hard’ systems practice - particularly as manifest in operations research - to social affairs. Both acknowledge significant influence from Churchman (1971) who first introduced the idea, derived from his mentor Edgar A. Singer, that social systems are teleological or, in more common language, purposeful. Whereas in soft system practice the original systems idea (as a human construct) was thought best to be reinvented through new terminology - “wholismic thinking” (Ackoff, 1981) or “holonic thinking” (Checkland, 1991) - abandoning the term ‘systems thinking’ to its realist ontological colonisation (ibid p. 27), Churchman and Ulrich significantly retain the idea of a system bounded by “whole system judgements”; constructs imbued with human intentionality. The use of the term “systemic” thinking and practice encapsulates and retains the meaning of the original epistemological intention of the systems idea. In the following sub-section concepts and ideas derived from Churchman and Ulrich are traced, providing a further understanding of the idea of a critical dimension to systems thinking in practice.

3.3. Emergence of Boundary Critique Context Matters Churchman’s characterisation of purposeful systems dealt initially with only those involved in the systems design. Nine conditions that must be fulfilled for a system (S) to demonstrate purposefulness were identified (derived from the philosophy of Immanuel Kant). The conditions are reproduced in summary below (adapted from Churchman, 1971 p. 43) 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)

S is teleological S has a measure of performance There is a client whose interests are served by S S has teleological components which coproduce the measure of performance of S S has an environment (both social and ecological) S has a decision maker who can produce changes in the measure of performance of S’s components and hence changes in the measure of performance of S 7) S has a designer who influences the decision maker 8) The designer aims to maximise S’s value to the client 9) There is a built in guarantee that the purpose of S defined by the designer’s notion of the measure of performance can be achieved and secured Churchman (1979 p. 79) later reordered these nine conditions into three groups of three categories; each group corresponding with a particular social role - client, decision maker, and planner. Each category is associated with two allied categories which Ulrich later termed role specific concerns and key problems. Reynolds later renamed these three category groups in terms of stakeholders, stakes and stakeholding issues (Reynolds, 2007). Ulrich also identified each category group with a term reflecting the primary source of influence motivation, control, and expertise - for client, decision maker, and planner (“designer”) respectively (Ulrich, 1983 p. 250) (see Table 1).

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Table 1. Categories of ‘Involved’ in a Purposeful System’s Design Churchman’s 1971 nine conditions for a purposeful system

Churchman’s 1979 three groups of three categories for a purposeful system

Ulrich’s 1983 sources of influence informing a purposeful system

Group 1 condition 3. condition 1. condition 2.

social role: client role specific concerns: purpose key problems: measure of performance

sources of motivation: whose purposes are served?

Group 2 condition 6. condition 4. condition 5.

social role: decision maker role specific concerns: components key problems: environment

sources of control: who has the power to decide?

Group 3 condition 7. condition 8. condition 9.

social role: planner/designer role specific concerns: implementation key problems: guarantor

sources of expertise: who has the know-how?

Adapted from Ulrich, 1983 pp. 245-250.

Churchman (1979 p.80) suggests a role for those affected by systems design, and provides a self-reflective description of an additional three categories that centre around the role of systems philosopher; along with the two related categories, the enemies of the systems approach and significance. It is Ulrich (1983) however who systematically distinguishes between those involved in a system’s design and those affected by a systems design so as to define the latter role more concisely for social systems planning. The category of those affected by, but not involved in, systems design are designated by Ulrich as being the witness; those who in practical discourse will argue the case of the affected (ibid p. 252). The role specific concerns of the witness are conceptualised as those of emancipation; liberation from oppressive material conditions and false consciousness. “... it [emancipation] reminds us that social mapping and design is not merely a matter of instrumental orientation toward some purpose (as functionalistic “systems science” seems to assume), but that for socially rational planning it is essential that the planner initiate a process of emancipatory self-reflection on the part of the affected” (Ulrich, 1983 p. 257; original italics).

The final ‘key problem’ category represents the possibilities of a conflict in worldviews “different visions of what social reality and human life in it ought to be” (ibid) - between the involved and the affected. Consequently the “source of influence” for this category group is defined as the source of legitimisation. Table 2 summarises the twelve “critical-heuristic categories.”

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Categories Dimensions of intentionality Client?. Purpose? (role) 1 Sources of (concerns) Measure of 2 The purposeful motivation (problems) improvement? 3 4 Decision maker? (role) System of concern 5 Components? (concerns) Sources of Those involved (or context 6 Environment? (problems) control 7 Planner? (role) sources of of application) 8 Expertise? (concerns) expertise on which depends 9 Guarantor? (problems) the meaning of 10 Witness? (role) sources of Those affected ‘improvement’ 11 Emancipation? (concerns) legitimisation 12 Worldviews? (problems) Adapted from Ulrich, 1983:258; 1993 p.595 and 1996 p.43.

Checkland (1981) similarly uses Churchman’s nine conditions of a purposeful system as a basis for formulating the CATWOE mnemonic (client, actor, transformation, worldview, owner, and environment; see Figure 2). It has been argued that Checkland uses the conditions in a functionalist manner by accepting them as given, though defined differently by different stakeholders. Consequently, Ulrich (1983 p. 247, footnote 11), for example, argues that SSM contributes (albeit unintentionally) to systems maintenance. In contrast, Churchman and Ulrich engage in challenging the conditions by asking for each condition what ‘is’ the actual situation in juxtaposition to what ‘ought’ to be the ideal situation. This engagement with the ethics of conditions - encouraging an ‘is’/’ought’ dialogue - and Ulrich’s subsequent development of the categories associated with the ‘affected’ (Churchman’s “systems’ enemies”) in juxtaposition with the ‘involved’ - is a key distinction between Checkland’s SSM and the critical systems approach. Churchman (1979) in The Systems Approach and Its Enemies describes his purposeful systems inquiry as a process of unfolding, though refrains from providing any precise definition. In examining his own twelve categories of ‘whole systems judgements’ belonging to a purposeful system, Churchman states: “I’ll be more interested in their process of unfolding rather than in their definitions...(and).. in explaining the unfolding of meaning, I’ll use imagery, and specifically the imagery of striving-force and the opposite, passive-helplessness” (Churchman, 1979 p. 80).

Unfolding as a dialectical process comes closest to any form of definition offered. Ulrich also appreciates Churchman’s process of unfolding as a dialectic: “We call this dialectical interplay between planners (“systems rationality”) and witnesses (lived social practice) the process of unfolding. The process of unfolding is intended to represent our critical, and practicable, solution to the problem of practical discourse” (Ulrich, 1983 p. 266, original italics).

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Ulrich is describing here what in later years he would refer to as constituting the last of three steps of unfolding: first, the mapping out of the twelve categories (roles, concerns, problems) in the form of “boundary questions”; second, contrasting “actual with ideal” mapping; and third, promoting “stakeholder participation” (Ulrich, 1988a pp. 423-425). The first step is analogous Singer’s holistic concept of sweeping in (Churchman, 1979 p.78; Ulrich, 1988a p. 423). In CSH terms this exercise is undertaken with precise guidelines associated with what is termed the “social mapping” of the twelve boundary questions (‘roles’, ‘role-concerns’, and ‘key problems’) associated with sources of motivation; control, knowledge, and legitimacy; each source of influence (Table 2).1 Whilst sweeping in conjures up an endless quest for comprehensiveness, the process of unfolding has been described as “the critical counterpart to the sweep-in process” (ibid). The critical idea of the sweep-in concept is to increase the awareness and understanding of systems’ dimensions and concerns from various perspectives. This is undertaken through the subsequent two steps of unfolding: firstly, through subjecting each of the twelve boundary questions to an “is” and an “ought” mode, and secondly, through subjecting the systems design (as created by those involved) to a wider democratic process “in which the affected citizens emancipate themselves from the premises and promises of experts” (Ulrich, 1983 p. 263, my italics). The second and third ‘steps’ of unfolding as described by Ulrich prompt questions regarding the underlying practitioner underpinnings and systems implications of CSH.

Practitioner Matters A feature of Ulrich’s CSH is the attempt to marry the ideas from Habermasian critical social theory with the concerns of systems practice so as to effect an alternative practical approach to enquiry (Ulrich, 1983:106-166). The approach builds upon Churchman’s ideas of systems practice as a dialectical pursuit; though Ulrich more precisely associates the dialectics of systems practice with Habermas’ pragmatistic model of rational discourse and communicative action (ibid pp. 240-243). The model challenges the means/end dichotomy prevalent in positivist approaches manifest in what Habermas refers to as decisionistic and technocratic models of social enquiry. Decisionistic models separate the privilege of choosing between ‘ends’, seen as located in the domain of politics, from the value free ‘means’, located in the domain of expertise. Technocratic models reverse the primacy of the politician over the expert implicit in the decisionistic model, and suggests instead that the political process in decision making is simply a “stopgap in a still imperfect rationalisation of power, in which the initiative has in any case passed to scientific analysis and technical planning” (Habermas, 1971, quoted in Ulrich, 1983 p. 75). Both models assume the separability of means and ends. The pragmatistic model in contrast identifies a dialectic between means or expertise, representing questions of fact, and decision making about ends or politics, representing questions of value:

1

Ulrich distinguishes between social mapping and social design: “If the task is to determine... actual social reality, i.e., the problem situation, we speak of “mapping”; if the task is to determine (“make real”) future social reality, we speak of “design”” (Ulrich, 1983 p. 242). Social design corresponds with the SSM principle of conceptual modelling.

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Martin Reynolds “The dialectical or “pragmatistic” model thus requires a model of rational discourse between experts and political agencies, a model that can guarantee an adequate translation of practical needs into technical questions, and of technical answers into practical decisions. The basic requirement for such a discourse is that it be public; a second necessary requirement is that it be “free from oppression”, that is , not subject to external sources of systematic distortion” (Ulrich, 1983 p. 78; original italics).

The “oppression” and “distortion” referred to by Ulrich can be understood in terms of a second theoretical construct offered by Habermas known as the knowledge-constitutive interest theory (Habermas, 1971). The theory is based upon the anthropological premise of there being two fundamental forms of human activity, work (or ‘labour’) and interaction (‘language’ or ‘communication’). Each activity is associated with a particular interest. Work is associated with a technical interest in the prediction and control of natural and social affairs. Interaction is associated with a practical interest in fostering mutual human understanding. In order to realise the full potential of these two human activities - that is, having labour free from ‘materialistic’ and economic constraints and demands, and communication free from distortion brought about by ‘false consciousness’ - Habermas postulates a third emancipatory interest. This interest ensures freedom from coercion. The three constitutive interests are invariant though complementary, and are underpinned by three equally invariant though complementary ‘rationalities’ which are referred to respectively as instrumental, strategic and communicative (Figure 4). Basis of Human Interest “Work”

Knowledge Constitutive Interests & Associated Rationalities technical interest in prediction and control of natural and social affairs instrumental rationality (labour) success depends upon technical mastery over social and natural processes

“Interaction”

practical interest in fostering mutual understanding strategic rationality (human interaction) success depends upon practical mastery over ensuring mutual understanding

“Power/Authority”

emancipatory interest in being free from coercion communicative rationality (authority relations) success depends upon being free from coercion imposed by power relations

Adapted from Habermas (1971) and Oliga (1988). Figure 4. Habermas’ Taxonomy of Knowledge-Constituent Interests.

Ulrich’s application of Habermas’ pragmatistic model reinforces Churchman’s idea of purposeful systems through making explicit the importance of including a dimension of human intentionality (Ulrich, 1983 p. 237). Returning to Burrell and Morgan’s framework of social theory paradigms it is evident that CSH does not fit readily into any of the four ‘paradigms’. CSH might be seen rather in terms of proposing radical change through operating a dialectic between the structuralism in the objective domain, as depicted by the

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deliberations of the ‘involved’, and humanism in the subjective domain, as depicted by the counter-deliberations offered by the ‘affected’. In defining an emancipatory interest, constitutive theory provides an element of purpose to the pragmatistic model of inquiry through dialogue between those “involved” and those “affected”: “... the idea of the “emancipatory” interest is to combine the “technical” interest in instrumental control with the “practical “ interest in mutual understanding, so as to emancipate the inquirer from the seemingly objective (because unreflected) constraints produced by the former, technical, interest” (Ulrich, 1983:63).

From a theoretical standpoint, systems practice has undergone what Flood (in Flood & Ulrich, 1990) has identified as the two significant epistemological breaks: the first, manifest in particular through Checkland’s SSM, has brought in the interpretivist idea of systems thinking where systems are considered as epistemological conceptual tools rather than ontological real world entities; the second, manifest through Ulrich’s CSH, has highlighted the critical interpretivist divide between the (systems) rationale of the involved in contrast to the (social) rationale of the affected. Both ‘breaks’ are associated with a constructivist epistemology. The challenge remains with reconciling these two “epistemological breaks” with constitutive interest theory. With the first break the challenge is to clearly demarcate the relevance of constitutive interests to the epistemological idea of systems, in the same way - as discussed elsewhere (Reynolds, 1998) - as the ontological relevance of constitutive interests has been made relevant in systems practice; that is, alignments of ‘hard’/technical, ‘soft’/practical, and ‘critical’/emancipatory (cf. Ulrich, 1988b pp. 150-151, Table IV; Oliga, 1988 p. 92; Flood and Jackson, 1991b pp. 324-325) . The second epistemological break bears on the Habermasian ‘emancipatory’ project more directly by challenging systems practice to define more clearly the task of emancipating the ‘affected’ from the “premises and promises of involved experts” (Ulrich, 1983 p. 308). From a political or institutional standpoint, systems inquiry has shifted from an ontological concern regarding the factors necessary to control and maintain an object system, to a more explicit epistemological concern with systemic practice to bring about social transformation.

Systems Change Matters The interaction between the involved and the affected corresponds at an institutional level with Oliga’s interpretation of the interaction between power and ideology (Oliga, 1990). To recap, Oliga contends that the failure of systems practice to engage in the dialectic between power and ideology has effectively reinforced measures of social control and stability rather than facilitating social transformation and change. In hard systems approaches this failure is brought about by a neglect of the ‘ideological’ constituent (dismissing ‘subjective’) whilst in soft systems approaches the failure is due to neglecting issues of ‘power’ (thereby implicitly and uncritically accepting ‘false consciousness’). Oliga argues that forces of change can only take effect when issues of power and ideology are both “doubted” through critical engagement between those involved with and those affected by systems practice. Through its focus on interaction between the involved and the affected, CSH has an implicit radical agenda of institutional transformation. Although the methodology cannot claim to replace efforts to achieve institutional democratisation, it has a core purpose of

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ensuring that systems are not expert driven but are open to social critique and thereby open to radical change (cf. Ulrich, 1988b p. 159). The “polemical employment of boundary judgements” is the term given by Ulrich (1983 p. 313) to the heuristic tool for enabling lay citizens or their representatives (‘witnesses’) to question the ‘premises and promises’ of the planners. According to Kant’s critical ideal of reason “... no standpoint, not even the most comprehensive systems approach, is ever sufficient in itself to validate its own implications” (Ulrich, 1988b p. 157). Those ‘affected’ by a system can theoretically question the premises of experts in a polemical manner without assuming any expertise of their own. As Ulrich points out, polemic... “entails no positive validity claims and hence requires neither theoretical knowledge nor any other kind of special expertise or “competence”. A polemical argument is advanced merely in hypothetical fashion, to show the dogmatic character of the opponent’s (“the expert’s”) pretension of knowledge” (Ulrich, 1983 p. 305).

The practical limitations are centred around achieving meaningful dialogue between the ‘involved’ and the ‘affected’ in circumstances where the former might be an unwilling player and the latter has little effective means of expression. Flood and Ulrich (1990 p. 201) maintain that “... it pays careful and explicit attention not to presuppose that those in control of “decision power” are willing to take account of the views and interests of those affected, but only that they are interested in making their own views and interests appear to be defensible on rational grounds” The question raised by Jackson (1985) as to why CSH should suppose that the powerful should take account of the views and interests of those affected but not involved is addressed by Flood and Ulrich: “As a rule, the powerful ... seek to conceal their specific private interests behind some facade of common interest, of generally acceptable norms or “objective necessities”. A critical approach, although it cannot “force” the powerful to take account of the less powerful, can at least unveil this facade of rationality and objectivity which is so characteristic of the strategic action of powerful vested interests in present-day “interest group liberalism” ...[Polemical employment of boundary judgements] pays careful and explicit attention not to presuppose that those in control of “decision power” are willing to take account of the views and interests of those affected, but only that they are interested in making their own views and interests appear to be defensible on rational grounds” (Flood and Ulrich, 1990 p. 201).

Those in power have an interest in justifying the status quo through recourse to objectifying their authority (with the implicit intention of rendering harmless their position). Ulrich (1988b p. 158) argues that through such strategies the powerful leave themselves open to possible exposure and challenge given the application of appropriate social critique enabled by “democratically secured institutional arrangements”. Ulrich later suggested possible areas for innovation: “...a critically heuristic training for citizens... I believe that the systems idea...might become important as a “countervailing power” to face the steadily growing influence of expertise in our society, namely, by something like a generally available “expertise of laypeople in dealing critically with expertise”. ... I think of new arenas of participatory

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conflict resolution such as “planning cells” and “citizen reports on technological projects”, i.e. , institutional arrangements within which citizens, together with experts and designers, can train themselves in critically heuristic debate.” (Ulrich, 1993:608, original italics).

The suggestions here were later developed into what Ulrich (2003) described as critical reflective practice, as against another parallel tradition of CST referred to as critical pluralism (cf. Mingers, 1997; Jackson, 1999).

3.4. Critical Reflective Practice and Critical Pluralism In the same way that Checkland’s SSM gained prominence within the tradition of soft systems approaches, Ulrich’s CSH emerged and developed prominence during the same period within a critical systems thinking tradition. CST was named in the mid-1980s, and was later given expression with two significant publications: the journal Systems Practice, first published in 1988 and renamed in 1998 as Systemic Practice and Action Research; and secondly, a compilation text in 1991 entitled Critical Systems Thinking: Directed Readings (Flood and Jackson, 1991a). The Centre for Systems Studies at Hull University has played a leading role in promoting CST through encouraging research and publications. A particular variant of CST promoted at Hull is one based on promoting methodological and theoretical pluralism. The dominant expression of this is total systems intervention (TSI) – a methodology for drawing different methods together through a three-fold process of (i) creatively exploring problematic situations, (ii) choosing an appropriate systems approach, and (iii) implementing it (Flood and Jackson, 1991b). The emphasis on pluralism has been championed in particular by Mike Jackson. TSI builds on an earlier categorisation of systems methodologies (Jackson and Keys, 1984) called system of systems methodologies (SOSM). SOSM provides a matrix for classifying systems methods on two dimensions: one, the level of complexity of the problem situation (simple or complex), and the other, the degree of shared purpose amongst participant stakeholders (unitary, pluralist, or coercive relationships). It is this latter dimension that draws on the hard, soft, critical typology using metaphors as guiding principles – mechanic for the ‘hard’, living organism for the ‘soft’ and the metaphor of prison for the ‘critical’ situations. The classification yields a six celled matrix as illustrated in Table 3. Each cell defines a problem situation which then invites particular suitable systems methods (some examples are given). The two dimensions of situations are helpful in delineating the two aspects of systems thinking described above. The simple/ complex dimension relates to levels of interrelatedness and interdependencies, and the unitary/ pluralist/ coercive dimension relates to levels of engagement with multiple perspectives. Again such a model has been helpful in prompting systems practitioners to think more clearly about the nature of the problem situation – the ‘mess’ – in a simplified manner. It has helped with the appreciation that different systems methods might complement each other and indeed complement other approaches used for similar problem situations.

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Martin Reynolds Table 3. System of systems methodologies

‘Systems’ i.e., problem situations

Simple

Complex

Unitary ‘hard’ systems based on mechanistic metaphor Simple unitary: e.g. systems engineering Complex unitary: e.g., system dynamics, viable systems model

Participants Pluralist ‘soft’ systems based on organic metaphor Simple pluralist: e.g. Strategic assumption surfacing and testing Complex pluralist: e.g. soft systems methodology

Coercive ‘critical’ systems based on prison metaphor Simple coercive: e.g., critical systems heuristics Complex coercive: (non available!)

Adapted from Jackson, 2000 p.359.

There are two difficulties with TSI. First, that a problem situation can somehow be easily identified as constituting one of the six ‘problem situation’ types by an expert practitioner seems to deny possibilities of there being underlying contrasting perspectives on the situation amongst different stakeholders. What may appear to be simple or unitary from one ‘expert’ perspective can often actually be quite coercive from the perspective of other stakeholders associated with the situation. Second, there is an underpinning difficulty in the pigeon-holing of particular systems approaches as being only suitable for specific types of situation. Firstly, there may be different opinions on where different systems approaches ‘fit’ based upon actual experiences of using the approach. A study of 30 key systems thinkers as practitioners (rather than focusing on methods associated with them) reveals the rich and diverse experiential background of using different systems approaches (Ramage and Shipp, 2009). Secondly, such pigeon-holing takes away the potential for systems approaches to themselves adapt and develop through different contexts of use amongst different users. A revised account of five systems approaches – system dynamics, viable systems model, strategic options development and analysis, soft systems methodology, and critical systems heuristics – drawn from various philosophical traditions suggests that their respective robustness over 30 years of use derives from their adaptability by different users in different contexts of use (Reynolds and Howell, 2010). Whilst systems approaches may well have derived from particular paradigmatic traditions of either functionalism, interpretivism or critical social theory, this does not imply that they remain fixed in this tradition (ibid p.296). So whilst sociological paradigms may be helpful in understanding the origins of particular systems approaches, they are less helpful in theorizing and steering practice for developing methodologies based on mixed methods (Zhu, 2011). Ulrich contrasts TSI, which he views as constituting a ‘shallow’ form of complementarism, with what he calls a ‘deeper complementarism’ offered by boundary critique underpinning critical reflective practice (Ulrich, 2003). This deeper sense of methodological complementarism does not privilege multiple methods per se but neither does it alienate or devalue any particular method. Rather than suggesting that there are appropriate methods for different predefined contexts, there is an acknowledgement of value given to any professional practice but that any such practice can benefit from a reflection on how it deals

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with judgments of ‘fact’, value judgements and boundary judgements. Boundary critique can therefore complement any methodology as a reflective tool. This deeper sense of complementarism using boundary critique at the level of methodology resonates with the theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984) and the deeper sense in using Habermas’ three knowledge constitutive interests at the level of theory in a more integral fashion for critical systems thinking (Reynolds, 2002). Traditions of American pragmatism with the writings of Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, also provide more helpful theorizing frameworks for systems practice (Ulrich, 2006; Zhu, 2011). Ulrich and Reynolds (2010) have further delineated two forms of boundary critique – boundary reflection and boundary discourse. Boundary reflection corresponds to a framework for understanding. Boundary discourse corresponds to a framework for practice. Together they contribute towards the framework for systems thinking in practice introduced earlier (Figure 2). The next section examines the implications of this critical systems framework for contemporary critical thinking.

4. IMPLICATIONS OF A ‘CRITICAL’ SYSTEMS THINKING IN PRACTICE The previous section provides a framework for understanding the emergence of contemporary systems thinking in practice. But how might this inform a framework for practice for engaging with different perspectives and a framework for responsibility in enacting systems thinking in practice from a critical perspective? From a contemporary ‘soft’ and ‘critical’ systems perspective, systems are regarded as conceptual constructs enabling an interdisciplinary space for purposeful conversation across disciplines and for exploring possibilities for creative change. In the context of international development discourse I have called this a ‘creative space’ (Reynolds, 2008b). If systems thinking in practice provides such a potentially powerful agent of change, what is that may inhibit such change? In the practical domain of engaging with different perspectives, the fear for change is manifest in the traps of uncritical thinking that pervade our everyday practices. Aligned with these traps is an unclear use of language around systems thinking. What precisely is meant by the terms systemic, systematic and system and how might such terms be more meaningfully incorporated in to a critical systems literacy?

4.1 Three traps of thinking in practice Three particular traps of thinking in practice can be highlighted (Reynolds and Holwell, 2010, pp. 5-6; pp. 301-303). Each trap is associated with an uncritical focus on each of the three pillars of a framework for systems thinking in practice introduced earlier (Figure 2) – (i) silo problem-solving (fixing situations) representing the trap of reductionism, (ii) people management in (fixing people) representing the trap of dogmatism, and (iii) systems obsession (with fixed ideas) representing the trap of fetishism (with expressions of uncritical holism and pluralism). Each of these traps can then be aligned with relevant systems ideas associated with managing change.

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Trap 1: Silo Problem-Solving: Towards Anticipating Systemic Change “We are most comfortable working in silos – our own, independent function or department, our own industry or agency, our own sector (business, government, civil)… Our structures hardwire us into silos, reinforcing independent rather than interdependent habits – even matrix organizations are still fixed within topic-specific domains, and the fact that nongovernmental or non-profit agencies are segregated by function (education, healthcare, housing, etc.) creates the same silo mindsets” (Huston 2007 p.46).

The conventional functionalist systems idea of organisation – a whole consisting of related parts contributing to a particular function - has contributed considerably to a reification of this type of silo thinking. Organisations are typically organised with departmental terms of reference carrying clearly defined remits for employees. The idea is neat, easy to work with in terms of providing some assurance of certainty, or at least lack of ambiguity, and most importantly, as suggested above, comfortable. Comfort is conventionally drawn from some basic (mis)understanding about organisations working as self-contained functional systems, the output of which is unquestionably some ‘good’ for the wider community. It pervades many impressions of organisations whether small and simple or large and complex. The UK National Health Service (NHS) for example was likened to a supertanker by a British Government Minister in the 1980s. The analogy conjures up not just slowness and difficulty in being re-directed, but that there are discrete parts with particular functions all contributing towards an ultimate destination. The image is very much in contrast to many complexity theorists such as the Noble laureate, Ilya Prigogine (1997), who claims that no static system can exist. Organisations like the health service are inherently unpredictable because they continually change from within due to the changing dynamics of interrelated parts. This is what is meant by systemic change. A systemic issue comprises complexity, uncertainty, interdependencies and controversy involving a wide range of variables requiring resolution. A technical problem on the other hand bounded by a fixed bounded silo occupies the more comfortable domain, amenable to a solution, usually provided by a traditional ‘expert’. Characteristics of issues are troublesome! They can sometimes distract from getting things done. But can they be ignored? The trap of silo thinking is based upon the idea that such issues can be ignored. It is associated with reductionism. A critical perspective on systems acknowledges that, to use a famous systems adage, a system is merely a map of a situation or territory, not to be confused with the actual territory. Real world complexities represent something that exists outside of any one conceptualisation of context. The real world complexity provides the site for systemic change. In terms of a systems literacy, the tension between system and situation might be appreciated in terms of a conversation. The distinction between thinking about systems and systems thinking is helpful in clearing ground between systems thinking and related disciplines associated with systems sciences (e.g., complexity and chaos theory). It respects rather than struggles against two different perceptions of ‘systems’: one, as with systems thinking, an epistemological construct; the other, as with systems sciences, more an ontological entity. A key underplayed intent of systems thinking associated with systemic change is to make simple the complex web of interrelationships and interdependencies in a transparent (and thereby questionable) manner. In short, systems thinking about systemic change involves a

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continual conversation between ‘systems’ and ‘situations’; a tension expressed through the act of making simple the complex – a tension that invites more an artistic rather than scientific literacy. This is not to deny the importance of a scientific literacy promoting more detailed understanding in terms of, say, evolutionary science, chaos theory and complexity sciences, but the craft of systems thinking is primarily geared towards making manageable the complex. The task involves using a language that is accessible to all stakeholders.

Trap 2: Fixing People: Towards Purposeful Systematic Change Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep. Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man; but will they come when you do call for them? From William Shakespeare (Henry IV Pt.1 Act III Scene 1) "A systems approach begins when first you see the world through the eyes of another" (Churchman 1968 p.231).

The Shakespeare quotation was used as an introduction to the British House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (March, 2003) report: The Water Framework Directive (WFD): Fourth Report of Session 2002-03 Volume 1 p.5. HC130-1. Its purpose was to highlight the problem and inadequacy of conventional approaches towards environmental management through control-orientated fiscal and regulatory measures. The trap of ‘fixing people’ into pre-designed purposes – ‘purposive management’ – is based upon the misguided behaviourist idea that different purposes from different perspectives can be moulded into a consensual purpose. The story of failure in organizational change projects, and the argument for WFD, in contrast, suggests alternative strategies based upon working with people/ stakeholders rather than working on them. The trap here is related to the trap of dogmatism. Systemic failure in many situations can often be associated with the dogmatic disregard of other perspectives that inform the situation. The literacy called for requires not just simplifying realities for individual comprehension but making sense of realities for mutual understanding amongst stakeholders involved in a situation in order to foster shared practice. This second aspect of a systems literacy speaks to the human dimension of intervention. As such it speaks of systematic change; change directed by human agents. The term ‘systematic’ relates to an inevitable requirement of orderliness. Our means of communication through language and discourse requires levels of systematisation to a greater or lesser extent so as to generate some sense of mutual understanding. The systems literacy relates to two significant intervention theories. In 1960 Douglas McGregor published The Human Side of Management, in which he introduced the concept of Theory X and Theory Y styles of management. Theory X is the conventional mechanistic style of top-down management treating people as having no responsibility, preferring to be told what to do and to have decisions made for them. Theory Y conversely assumes a more constructive role:

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Martin Reynolds “It was quite an article of faith, this Theory Y. Everything about the structure of corporations went against it: the perks and power structure of the hierarchy, the labour relations tradition, the curricula at most business school…, and all those devices like performance appraisals, that measured one person against another. Adopting Theory Y would mean giving up both the stick (threatening to fire people) and the carrot (bribing them or being paternalistic). Without those two weapons, what leverage did a manager have? Only the ability to spark other people’s involvement and commitment, by giving them the opportunities to do good work—hardly a strong incentive by conventional standards” (Kleiner 1996 p. 46).

The second idea of social learning is situated in planning theory. John Friedman (1987) describes social learning as the third of four traditions informing planning - the other three being ‘social reform’, ‘policy analysis’ and ‘social mobilization’. He contrasts social learning with the more control-oriented tradition of policy analysis which, he claims: "is a form of anticipatory decision-making, a cognitive process that uses technical reason to explore and evaluate possible courses of action.... Social learning, on the other hand, begins and ends with action, that is, with purposeful activity… It is the essential wisdom of the social learning tradition that practice and learning are construed as correlative processes, so that one process necessarily implies the other." (Friedman 1987 p. 181).

Social learning, like Theory Y, invokes a proactive engagement amongst stakeholders in systematically managing change. The idea moves away from implementation modelled on hierarchical notions of working on people – restructuring, reconfiguring, re-engineering – and then dealing with inevitable subsequent resistance amongst stakeholders, towards a more collective notion of working with people – stakeholding development. The notion of social learning builds on the importance of nurturing the tension between changing practice and understanding between stakeholders (Blackmore et al. 2007; Reynolds 2008b). The learning here is collaborative (hence ‘social’) involving multiple stakeholders including professional experts, and the action is concerted, again involving multiple stakeholders. The notion of concerted action is captured in the metaphor of an orchestra, with multiple individual players doing different things, though all contributing towards some hopefully harmonious output. Conventional systematic change is purposive. This involves a linear application of tools to serve a prescribed purpose. In contrast, purposeful systematic change involves use of language, amongst other tools, for iterating on better revised goals based on improved understanding and better practice.

Trap 3: Maintaining Systems or ‘Systems’ Obsession: Toward Meaningful Systems Change “To a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail” (Mark Twain).

This familiar mantra provides a reminder that our tools and models, including systems frameworks as systems tools, can often be sub-consciously overpowering in determining how we approach issues. But what about its counterpart? Continually adopting ‘new’ systems runs the risk of elevating the notion of ‘system’ to a fetish status; celebrating the very notion of system as being the panacea for crises. Systems are often referred to in association with new developments – miraculous ways of doing things.

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The trap of systems maintenance, or being obsessive with the tools we construct, lies in reifying and privileging the ‘system’ - whether it’s old or new – as though it has some existence and worth outside of the user and some status beyond its context of use in enabling change. McGregor’s Theory X depicting a conventional model of management hierarchically imposed and indiscriminately applied across all parts of an organisation, regarding stakeholders as objects rather than subjects, is perhaps the most pervasive example of an implicit system - a conceptual model - resilient to change. It is a pervasive way of thinking that continues to hold a widespread grip on management practice. There are many other ‘systems’ that similarly entrap our understanding and practice. A generic term for these is ‘business as usual’ (BAU). Examples include the annual cycles of organisational planning, target setting, budgeting, the development of performance indicators and performance related pay incentives etc. BAU models maintain existing ‘systems’ principally because of a fear for change. But the fear is not evenly distributed amongst all stakeholders. Some fear change more than others simply because the system works in a partial manner. The system works for some and not for others. All systems are partial. They are necessarily partial – or selective – in the dual sense of (i) representing only a section rather than the whole of the total universe of considerations, and (ii) serving some parties - or interests - better than others (Ulrich 2002 p. 41). In other words, no proposal, no decision, no action, no methodology, no approach, no system can get a total grip on the situation (as a framework for understanding) nor get it right for everyone (as a framework for practice) (Reynolds, 2008a). Drawing on the quotation from Chapman at the beginning of this chapter, the two dimensions of partiality respond to the two transitions implicit in systems thinking about systems change; one, towards holism, and another towards pluralism. Given the partiality of systems a third critical dimension is required where systems boundaries inevitably need to be made and questioned on the inevitable limitations of being holistic and pluralistic. Frameworks are used widely as a means of providing some overriding shape and guidance towards recommended action. Different systems approaches can be considered as frameworks. Systems are more detailed expositions of a framework. The relationship between a framework and systems is analogous to that between policy and plans. Whereas policy provides an overall guidance structure, individual plans around projects and programmes might be considered as expressions of policy. Indeed the term policy framework is often used to describe the wider setting of planning initiatives on projects and programmes. As the name implies, framework has two interrelated parts; one, a cognitive or conceptual device – a frame of reference which, two, enables work through systems (plans, projects, programmes etc.) The trap of fetishism signals responsibility in systems thinking in two dimensions – one towards understanding and another towards practice. First, with respect to understanding, there is an imperative to continually ask questions of ‘systems’; to appreciate them as judgements of fact rather than matters of fact. For example, when confronted with arguments of an iniquitous ‘economic system’ generating continual social and ecological impoverishment, or an ‘education system’ that systematically continues to marginalise particular sectors of our community, systems practitioners have a responsibility to create space for, and help support the framing of, better systems, rather than perpetuating the myth that these are some God-given realities that we need to simply live with. Second, with respect to practice, the sense of responsibility here lies with our humility in systems design; in avoiding inclinations to fetishise systems. Geoffrey Vickers cautioned

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against over-enthusiasm in the models (that is, systems) that we generate (Vickers 1987). We can often live by the dictate of models rather than, as should be, the changing realities in which the models are applied and which ought to further shape or indeed make redundant such models.

4.2 Towards a critical systems literacy The risk of systems obsession is akin to moralism. Humberto Maturana makes a relevant point distinguishing between being moralistic and ethical. Moralists, he suggests, “lack awareness of their own responsibility. People acting as moralists do not see their fellow human beings because they are completely occupied by the upholding of rules and imperatives; that is a particular systems design. They know with certainty what to be done and how everybody else has to behave” (Maturana & Poerksen 2004 p.207). Being ethical, in contrast requires giving legitimacy to people, and particularly those who may disagree with the rules. Using our own form of systems literacy, systems boundaries (the domain of systems change) are subject to systematic changes invoked by the designers and users of systems, and systemic changes invoked by those subject to the use of systems. There is here a triadic interplay between three perpetual factors – systems with their boundaries, people and their values, and real world entities and events in the factual domain. The relationship between them can be expressed in terms of either an entrapped vicious circle or a liberating virtuous cycle. For example, in terms of vicious circles, the Mark Twain quote might be seen in terms of a hammer (a system’s tool), the hammerer (systematic people), and the hammered (systemic events). The analogy of the UK National Health Service to a super tanker ship might be interpreted in terms of a steer (the system or definitive plan of direction), a steerer (systematic pilots or experts), and the steered (passive passengers). Table 4. Features of a critical systems literacy Type of change Systemic

Location of change Complex realities or situation

Systematic

Stakeholders

Systems

Conceptual worlds

Primary intent Make simple & manageable the complex web of realities for improving situations Developing mutual understanding and shared practice

Risks or traps Seeing a mess as simple problem-solving i.e., reductionist thinking rather than as improvement resolution. Fixing people as objects for purposive endeavours rather than as purposeful subjects.

Some key vocabulary Complexity Feedback Emergence Uncertainty Autonomy Perspectives Praxis Learning Stakeholding

Improvement of situations and emancipation through reflective practice

Complacency and obsession with ‘systems’ e.g., as holistic devices, rather than as temporary pragmatic constructs

Judgements Boundaries Reframing Critique

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The three types of trap noted above represent responses to particular types of wellfounded anxiety and fear with managing complex issues. There is the continual fear of systemic uncertainty in unforeseen events and unintended consequences, the fear of losing or even reinforcing excessive systematic control, and the fear of change in systems; an undue ultimate optimism in old or new systems. Table 4 summarises these traps in terms of contributing towards a critical literacy of systems thinking in practice. A key intent of systems thinking associated with systems change is to continually question boundaries of our conceptual constructs with a primary focus on improving the situation. That is, with a focus on steering good systemic change.

5. SUMMARY In an online analysis contrasting the source of scholarly publications in which the terms ‘critical thinking’ and ‘systems thinking’ were mentioned, 88% of the papers in which the term critical thinking appeared were in social sciences, arts and humanities, whereas for systems thinking 48% were found in literature from those fields with the remainder being dispersed across a range of other disciplines including business, engineering, maths, and different biophysical sciences (Cabrera, 2006). As noted by Cabrera, this would suggest that systems thinking appears to have significant currency over and above critical thinking in fostering a greater engagement of interdisciplinarity. The argument put forward in this chapter though is that systems thinking is indeed interdisciplinary, but coupled with more explicit attention to critical thinking, systems thinking provides for a transdisciplinary engagement; one that transcends conventional disciplinary silos. The critical literacy embodied in such transciplinarity is manifest in a framework of systems thinking in practice. The notion of systems thinking in practice derives from a critical systems perspective constituting three activities associated with three entities – (i) a framework for understanding complex interrelationships in the real world context of change and uncertainty, (ii) a framework for practice when engaging with different perspectives amongst people involved and affected in the contexts of interest, and (iii) a composite framework for responsibility acknowledging the limiting and integral features of framing understanding and framing practice in the conceptual world of ideas and tools. The framework appreciates (multi)disciplinary efforts towards framing an understanding of interrelationships and interdependencies of complex realities in the real world. The framework practically engages with multiple perspectives in endeavours of interdisciplinarity towards framing some sense of mutual understanding across different disciplines and perspectives. And most importantly the framework transcends disciplines through both (i) boundary reflection – checking on the partiality of understanding judgements of ‘fact’ through any one disciplinary framework – and (ii) boundary discourse – checking against the partiality of value judgments that inevitably inform any inquiry from any disciplinary or indeed interdisciplinary perspective. The transdisciplinary framework acts as a framework for responsibility. Together the three frameworks working together constitute a framework of systems thinking in practice. Whereas a systems literacy involving systemic and systematic change provides a language to mediate between the mess of real world situations, and the systems (including

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methods, methodologies, approaches) used to deal with them, a critical systems literacy involving in addition, systems change, provides a language to mediate between systems ideas developed amongst systems practitioners and established thinking and practice associated with different professional traditions. The critical literacy refers to all approaches, whether traditionally systems based or belonging to other traditions of professional practices. It is in the practice of using them whilst being aware of the inevitable traps – reductionism (silo problem-fixing), dogmatism (fixing people), and systems fetishism associated with holism and pluralism (fixed systems) – that enables a critical systems literacy.

REFERENCES Ackoff, R. (1974). Redesigning the Future: a systems approach to societal problems. New York, John Wiley. Ackoff, R. (1981). Creating the Corporate Future: plan or be planned for. New York, John Wiley. Ashby, W. R. (1956). An Introduction to Cybernetics. London, Chapman & Hall. Bawden, R. J. (1998). "The Community Challenge: The Learning Response " New Horizons (Journal of the World Education Foundation Australia), 99 (October): 40-59. Beer, S (1979), The Heart of Enterprise, John Wiley, London and New York. Beer, S (1985), Diagnosing the System for Organizations, John Wiley London and New York. Bertalanfy, L. V. (1956). "General Systems Theory." General Systems Yearbook, 1: 1-10. Blackmore, C. et al. (2007). "Social Learning: an alternative policy instrument for managing in the context of Europe's water " Environmental Science and Policy (Special Issue) 10(6). Cabrera, D. (2006) Systems Thinking Thesis. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY Chapman, J. (2004). System Failure: why governments must learn to think differently. London, Demos. Checkland, P. (1978). "The Origins and Nature of 'Hard' Systems Thinking." Journal of Applied Systems Analysis, 5: 99-110. Checkland, P. (1981). Systems Thinking Systems Practice. Chichester, John Wiley. Checkland, P. (2000). "Peter Checkland at 70: A Review of Soft Systems Thinking." Systems Research and Behavioural Science, 17(1): 11-58. Checkland, P. and J. Scholes (1990). Soft Systems Methodology in Action. Chichester, John Wiley. Checkland, P. and S. Holwell (1997). Information, Systems and Information Systems Chichester, John Wiley. Churchman, C. W. (1968). The Systems Approach. New York, Dell. Churchman, C. W. (1970). "Operations Research as a Profession." Management Science 17: B37-53. Churchman, C. W. (1971). The Design of Inquiring Systems: basic concepts of systems and organizations. New York, Basic Books. Churchman, C. W. (1979). The Systems Approach and its Enemies. New York, Basic Books.

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Churchman, C. W., and R. Ackoff, et al. (1957). Introduction to Operations Research. New York, John Wiley. Eden, C. and F. Ackermann (1988). Making Strategy: the journey of strategic management. London, Sage Ellis, K. (1995). Critical Considerations in the Development of Systems Thinking and Practice. Systems Practice, 8(2), 199-214. Flood, R. L. (1990). Liberating Systems Theory: towards critical systems thinking. Human Relations, 43. Flood, R. L., & Jackson, M. C. (Eds.). (1991a). Critical Systems Thinking: Directed Readings. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Flood, R. L., & Jackson, M. C. (1991b). Total Systems Intervention: A Practical Face to Critical Systems Thinking. In R. L. Flood & M. C. Jackson (Eds.), Critical Systems Thinking. Chichester: John Wiley. Flood, R. L., & Ulrich, W. (1990). Conversations on Critical Systems Thinking. In R. L. Flodd & M. C. Jackson (Eds.), Critical Systems Thinking: Directed Readings. Chichester: Wiley. Forrester, J. W. (1961). Industrial Dynamics. Cambridge MA, Wright-Allen Press. Forrester, J. W. (1971). World Dynamics. Cambridge Mass., Wright & Allen. Friedman, J. 1987. Planning in the Public Domain: from Knowledge to Action. New York: Picnceton University Press. Fuenmayor, R. (1991). Between Systems Thinking and Systems Practise. Critical Systems Thinking: Directed Readings. R. L. Flood and M. C. Jackson. Chichester, Wiley. Habermas, J. (1971). Knowledge and Human Interests. London, Heinemann. Habermas, J. (1984). The Theory of Communicative Action Volumes 1 and 2. Cambridge, Polity Press. Hall, A. D. (1962). A Methodology for Systems Engineering. New York, Van Nostrand. Huston, T. (2007). Inside Out: Stories and Methods for Generating Collective Will to Create the Future We Want. Cambridge, MA, Society for Organizational Learning. Jackson, M. (1982). "The Nature of Soft Systems Thinking: the work of Churchman, Ackoff and Checkland." Journal of Applied Systems Analysis, 9: 17-28. Jackson, M. (1985). The Itinerary of a Critical Approach. Review of Ulrich's 'Critical Heuristics of Social Planning'. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 36, 878-881. Jackson, M. C. (1990). The Critical Kernal in Modern Systems Thinking. Systems Practice, 3(4), 357-364. Jackson, M. C.(1991a). Modernism, post-modernism and contemporary systems thinking. In R. L. Flood & M. C. Jackson (Eds.), Critical Systems Thinking: Directed Readings (pp. 287-302). Chichester: John Wiley. Jackson, M. C. (1991b). The Origins and Nature of Critical Systems Thinking. Systems Practice, 4(2), 131-148. Jackson, M. C. 1999. "Towards Coherent Pluralism in Management Science." Journal of the Operational Research Society 50:12-22. Jackson, M. C. 2000. Systems Approaches to Management. London: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. Jackson, M. and P. Keys (1984). “Towards a System of Systems Methodologies”. Critical Systems Thinking: Directed Readings. R. L. Flood and M. C. Jackson. Chichester, John Wiley.

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Kleiner, A. (1996). The Age of Heretics: Heroes, Outlaws, and the Forerunners of Corporate Change. New York, Currency (Doubleday). Mason, R. O. and I. I. Mitroff (1981). Challenging Strategic Planning Assumptions: Theory, Cases and Techniques. New York, John Wiley. Maturana, H. and Poerksen (2004). From Being to Doing: The Origins of the Biology of Cognition. Heidelberg, Germany, Carl-Auer Verlag. Meadows, D. H., D. L. Meadows, et al. (1972). The Limits to Growth: a Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind. London, Earthscan. Meadows, D. H., D. L. Meadows, et al. (1992). Beyond the Limits of Growth. Post Mills, Chelsea Green. Midgley, G. 1992. "Pluralism and the Legitimation of Systems Science." Systems Practice 5:147-172. Midgley, G. (2000). Systemic Intervention: Philosophy, Methodology and Practice. New York, Kluwer/Plenum. Midgley, G. (Ed.) (2003), Systems Thinking (4 vols.). London: Sage. Mingers, J. 1997. "Towards Critical Pluralism." Pp. 407-440 in Multimethodology: The Theory and Practice of Combining Management Science Methodologies, edited by J. Mingers and A. Gill. Chichester: John Wiley. Mulgan, G (1997) Life After Politics: New Thinking for the Twenty First Century Fontana Press, London. Oliga, J. C. (1988). Methodological Foundations of Systems Methodologies. Systems Practice, 1(1), 87-109. Oliga, J. C. (1990). Power - ideology matrix in social systems control. In R. L. Flood & M. C. Jackson (Eds.), Critical Systems Thinking: Directed Readings (pp. 269-286). Chichester: John Wiley. Optner, S. L. (1965). Systems Analysis for Business & Industrial Problem Solving. New York, Prentice-Hall. Prigogine, Ilya. 1997. End of Certainty. New York: The Free Press. Ramage, M. and K. Shipp (2009). Systems Thinkers. London, Springer. Reynolds, M. (1998). "Unfolding" Natural Resource Information Systems: fieldwork in Botswana. Systems Practice and Action Research, 11(2), 127-152. Reynolds, M. (2002). "In defence of knowledge constitutive interests. A comment on 'What is this thing called CST?' (Midgley, 1996)." Journal of the Operational Research Society, 53(10): 1162-1164. Reynolds, M. (2004). "Churchman and Maturana: Enriching the Notion of Self-Organization for Social Design." Systemic Practice and Action Research, 17(6): 539-556. Reynolds, M. 2007. "Evaluation based on critical systems heuristics." Pp. 101-122 in Systems Concepts in Evaluation: An Expert Anthology, edited by Bob Williams and Iraj Imam. Point Reyes CA, USA EdgePress. Reynolds, M. (2008a). "Getting a grip: A Critical Systems Framework for Corporate Responsibility." Systems Research and Behavioural Science, 25(3): 383-395. Reynolds, M. (2008b). "Reframing expert support for development management." Journal of International Development, 20: 768-782. Reynolds, M, and S Holwell (Eds.). (2010). Systems Approaches to Managing Change: a practical guide. London, Springer

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Rosenhead, J. (1989). Rational Analysis for a Problematic World: Problem Structuring Methods for Complexity, Uncertainty and Conflict. Chichester, John Wiley. Sangren, P. S. (1988). Rhetoric and the authority of ethnography: "postmodernism" and the social reproduction of texts. Current Anthropology, 29(3), 405-435. Senge, P. (1990). The Fifth Discipline. New York, Currency Doubleday. Thackara, J. (2005) In the Bubble: Designing for a Complex World. MIT Press ISBN 0-26220157-7 (extract from chapter 8 found on http://www.thackara.com/inthebubble/toc.html) Trist, E.L., Higgin, G.W., Murray, H., and Pollock, A.B. (1963) Organisational Choice, Tavistock, London. Ulrich, W. (1983). Critical Heuristics of Social Planning: a new approach to practical philosophy. Stuttgart (Chichester), Haupt (John Wiley - paperback version). Ulrich, W. (1988a). Churchman's "Process of Unfolding" - Its Significance for Policy Analysis and Evaluation. Systems Practice, 1(4), 415-428. Ulrich, W. (1988b). Systems Thinking, Systems Practice, and Practical Philosophy: a programme of research. Systems Practice, 1(2), 137-163. Ulrich, W. (1993). Some Difficulties With Holistic Thinking. Systems Practice, 6(6), 583608. Ulrich, W. (1996). A Primer to Critical Systems Heuristics for Action Researchers. Hull: University of Hull. Ulrich, W. (2003). "Beyond Methodology Choice: critical systems thinking as critically systemic discourse." Journal of the Operational Research Society, 54(4): 325-342. Ulrich, W. (2006). Critical pragmatism: a new approach to professional and business ethics Interdisciplinary Yearbook of Business Ethics. L. Zsolnai. Oxford, UK, and Bern, Switzerland, Peter Lang Academic Publishers. 1: 53-85. Ulrich, W., and M. Reynolds. 2010. "Critical Systems Heuristics." Pp. 243-292 in Systems Approaches to Managing Change, edited by Martin Reynolds and Sue Holwell. London: Springer. Vickers, G. (1965). The Art of Judgement, Chapman and Hall, London Vickers, G. (1987). Essays of Sir Geoffrey Vickers. Policymaking, Communication and Social Learning. G. B. Adams, J. Forester and B. L. Catron. New Brunswick, NJ., Transaction Books. Zhu, Z. (2011). "After Paradigm: why mixing-methodology theorising fails and how to make it work again." Journal of the Operational Research Society 62 (4): 784-798.

In: Critical Thinking Editors: Ch. P. Horvath and J. M. Forte, pp. 69-95

ISBN: 978-1-61324-419-7 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 3

DEVELOPING CRITICAL THINKING THROUGH PROBABILITY MODELS Einav Aizikovitsh-Udi Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts, USA

“Learning without thinking is a wasted blessing" Confucius

ABSTRACT In light of the importance of developing critical thinking, and given the scarcity of research on critical thinking in mathematics studies in the broader context of higher-order thinking skills, we have carried out a research that examined how teaching strategies oriented towards developing higher-order thinking skills influenced the students’ critical thinking abilities. The guiding rationale of the work was that such teaching can foster the students’ skills of and dispositions towards critical thinking. In this research, a primary attempt has been made to examine the relations between education for critical thinking and mathematics studies through examining teaching and learning critical thinking according to the infusion approach, which combines critical thinking and mathematical content (“Probability in Daily Life” learning unit).The main contribution of this work and the innovations it is expected to introduce lie in elucidating the connection between critical thinking and the study of mathematics and creating insights into the mechanisms of critical thinking development, and its place and importance in the study of mathematics, in spite of the uncertainty whether critical thinking skills acquired in studying one field will necessarily be applied by students in other fields, referred to as “the transfer problem.” In this way it will be possible to strengthen the status of mathematics studies in imparting higher-order thinking skills in various frameworks, in parallel with and beyond the formal program of studies. The purpose of this research is to examine how and to what extent it is possible to develop critical thinking by means of the learning unit “Probability in Daily Life” using the infusion approach. The research questions that guided it are: (1) To what extent does the study of “Probability in Daily Life” in the infusion approach contribute to the development of critical thinking dispositions? (2) To what extent does the study of “Probability in Daily Life” in the

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Einav Aizikovitsh-Udi infusion approach contribute to the development of critical thinking abilities? (3) What are the processes of construction of critical thinking skills (e.g., identifying variables, postponing judgment, referring to sources, searching for alternatives) during the study of the “Probability in Daily Life” learning unit in the infusion approach? The present research involved nine groups of gifted and high-achieving mathematics students in eleventh grade from all the social groups and strata of Israeli society. The students studied the learning unit “Probability in Daily Life” modified by the researchers to include critical thinking teaching in the infusion approach. The students were then tested in two critical thinking tests, CCTDI and the Cornell Critical Thinking Test, the results of which were statistically analyzed, and also selectively interviewed, with subsequent qualitative analysis of the interviews and lesson transcripts. Thus the research combines quantitative and qualitative methods. The research findings can be summed up in the following categories: (i) In all three iterations of the experimental teaching, a moderate improvement was detected in the critical thinking dispositions of all experimental groups. (ii) Throughout these iterations, a moderate improvement was also detected in the students' critical thinking abilities. (iii) Teaching critical thinking contributed to the construction and use of these skills in the framework of mathematics. Thus, when teachers consistently emphasize critical thinking skills, the students are more likely to succeed in the subject of mathematics. (iv) This research did not detect a clear-cut distinction between the critical thinking abilities and dispositions of excellent and average mathematics students. That is, no direct correlation has been found between the development of mathematical knowledge and the development of critical thinking. On the basis of these findings, the following recommendations for further research can be made: (1) A more comprehensive examination of the processes of critical thinking: to what extent could the students describe, orally and in writing, the processes of thinking, activate them and apply the thinking skills they studied on the procedural and meta-cognitive level? Did they make an informed use of terms and strategies of higher-order thinking, including critical thinking? In other words, it should be examined what use the research participants make of the “language of thinking,” or, in the words of Costa and Marzano, “do they speak thinking?” (Costa & Marzano, in Harpaz, 1997). Developing such a language involves, on the part of the teacher, such skills as using precise vocabulary, presenting critical questions, presenting data rather than answers, aspiring for exactness, giving directions, and developing meta-cognition. (2) Examination of the attitudes and perceptions of education students in colleges for teacher training, practicing teachers and researchers of mathematical education with regard to teaching that develops critical thinking in mathematics; evaluation of these students’ and professionals’ critical thinking functions in teaching, learning, and research. (3) Teaching “Probability in Daily Life” and conducting the same research among all the strata of the students’ population and not only among those who study mathematics at the higher level. It definitely seems that in the last decade, there has been a rapidly growing awareness of the importance of promoting the development of thinking skills in the Israeli educational system, and the system has been making considerable progress towards integrating the curriculum learning materials that contribute to the development of higher-order thinking skills1. In 1994, the Ministry of Education recognized thinking skills as a distinct subject of studies. This recognition lead to the establishment of a Subject Committee for Thinking Skills, which is in charge of consolidating appropriate didactic materials, as is the case with the rest of the academic subjects in the school system. The complex and ceaselessly changing contemporary reality, which requires independent decision-making on a daily basis, makes it extremely important to impart to

1

Critical, deductive, creative, inventive and other types of thinking: on the interconnections between different types of thinking, see Appendix 10.1

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students the ability to think critically. Critical thinking is needed in every field of activity, as it allows the individual to deal with reality in a reasonable, mature and independent way (Lipmann, 1991). The need for developing critical thinking in different disciplines is anchored in the ideals of education for democracy, as our freedom to think about and criticize the reality and society in which we live is a form of expression of our autonomy as individuals. Today this idea is even more vital, because of the growing need to be capable of engaging in inquiry and evaluation based on rational considerations regarding the various messages we are exposed to in different areas of life (Feuerstein, 2002, Perkins, 1992, Swartz, 1992). In the field of education, mathematics has traditionally been considered a branch of knowledge particularly suited to the teaching and learning of higher-order thinking skills, such as critical thinking. Mathematics curricula all over the world, including Israel, identify the acquisition of these skills as one of their goals. The idea that mathematics is a discipline suited to teaching critical thinking also appears in the research literature2. However, in spite of this assumption, very few empirical studies to date have engaged with the question of whether the study of mathematics indeed develops or even requires this mode of thinking. The answer to this question is far from being clear. The present research tackles precisely this basic question, “Is it possible to develop critical thinking in the framework of mathematics studies?”

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY The following research questions guided the study: •

•

To what extent does the infusion-approach study of “Probability in Daily Life” learning unit contribute to students’ development of critical thinking dispositions? To what extent does the infusion-approach study of “Probability in Daily Life” contribute to students’ development of critical thinking abilities? What are the instructional processes (e.g. putting a statement into question, delaying judgment, referring to sources) by which critical thinking skills are constructed during the infusion-approach study of the “Probability in Daily Life” unit?

Research population: 180 tenth-grade students, studying in two educational frameworks: the Kidumatica mathematics program for gifted youth at Ben-Gurion University and the formal high school framework. About 50 students studied this unit with the researcher in a general high school in central Israel, and about 40 students studied the same program as part of the formal high-school curriculum with another teacher. The two groups represent the multi-cultural composition of the Israeli society: city residents, kibbutz members, the religious sector and the Arab sector. “Probability in Daily Life, the special learning unit developed for the purposes of this research, contained 15-16 double lessons (30-32 academic hours). Research tools: questionnaires3, personal interviews, observation, class records and analysis of lesson plans. 2

A number of articles on critical thinking in mathematics use the term in other contexts and deal with imparting technical tools such as making an estimation, comparison or inference, verifying a result, evaluating an exercise, application and interpretation, solution strategies etc. 3 The following questionnaires were used: the Cornell critical thinking test, version Z (Ennis et al., 1985), checking the dispositions and abilities for critical thinking (answering research questions 1,2); a content-based critical

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UNIQUENESS AND CONTRIBUTION Educators in Israel, who wonder, like their colleagues worldwide, about the goals of the education system that could guide the different educational frameworks, may find in this research an idea that can unify different topics and study programs, in order to prepare learners for life in a changing society, and develop their ability to think in a systematic and independent way. More generally, this research is expected to contribute to the public discourse of the mathematical education community on this issue. It raises the public awareness of the need to develop critical thinking in the framework of mathematical education, which may enable future examination and promotion of the development of critical thinking through mathematics teaching in a fuller and more informed way. Drawing on infusion-approach study of "Probability in Daily Life," the present research establishes points of reference to critical thinking dispositions and abilities among students learning mathematics in different environments (high school and the Kidumatica mathematics club). This combination has not been examined so far by the literature in the field. This research has identified and measured differences between dispositions, abilities, and construction of skills characteristic of critical thinking in mathematics, and completes other researchers conducted in other environments. The combination of the Cornell test and the CCTDI test in the evaluation of critical thinking abilities and dispositions is unique to this research; it has not been performed in previous studies. To conclude, the main contribution of this research lies in revealing the connection between critical thinking and the teaching of mathematics. Despite the problem of transfer discussed earlier, the scientific contribution of this research lies in the new insights it provides into critical thinking, its place and importance in teaching mathematics. Thus it will be possible to strengthen the status of the study of mathematics in imparting higher-order thinking skills, both in parallel with and beyond the formal education program.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FORMAL SCHOOL CURRICULUM Current approaches in the teaching of mathematics according to the new mathematics curriculum adhere to a conceptual understanding of mathematics and emphasize investigation, problem solution, mathematical literacy4 and use of mathematical discourse. The students are supposed to actively construct their knowledge and understanding, while the teacher functions as a ‘mediator’ by asking questions, posing challenges and assigning investigation tasks, and helps the students to think in deeper ways about various concepts, ideas and mathematical contexts. Studying and teaching mathematics in such a way is a very difficult task, because the ways of teaching and learning are very demanding and creative, requiring, among the rest, deep knowledge and understanding of mathematics on the teacher’s part, coping with the unknown on the student’s part, and much intellectual effort on both thinking questionnaire on “Probability in Daily Life” (answering research question 3); mathematical knowledge questionnaire (answering research question 4). 4 Mathematical literacy is defined as “an individual’s capacity to identify and understand the role that mathematics plays in the world, to make well-founded judgements and to use and engage with mathematics in ways that meet the needs of that individual’s life as a constructive, concerned and reflective citizen." (PISA 2003: Assessment Framework -Mathematics, Reading, Science and Problem Solving Knowledge and Skills).

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sides. This research was designed while taking into account the implications of earlier researches’ findings (Feuerstein, 2002; Zohar & Tamir, 1993; Weinberger, 1998) and of the pilot study conducted in preparation for this research. these findings point at the importance of learning experiences that develop critical thinking by means of various specially designed curricula. The findings of the present research are likely to be useful in composing new study programs and methods that can be based on the connection between critical thinking and the study of mathematics, which this research brings to light.

CRITICAL THINKING: AN OVERVIEW Critical thinking is a topic that has interested humans since ancient times. Development of critical thinking has been defined as one of the most important goals of education since the Middle Ages until today. The ancient ‘fathers’ of the idea of critical thinking are considered to be the sophists5 (740-399 BC) and Socrates (5th c. BC). Socrates, who was and still remains an extremely influential philosophical figure, dealt mainly with the theory of ethics and the issues of governing society and the state. Walking the streets of Athens, he approached people with questions about the nature of the world. In order to understand their opinion on a certain issue, he first had to clarify their definition of that issue and whether that definition was true. He was a person who thought independently, and taught others to think for themselves. Therefore, if one wanted to be a disciple of Socrates, one would have to think independently, and if necessary, to be able to detach oneself from previously known and generally accepted ideas and definitions (Bryan, 1987). Socrates is known to have resisted the greatest cultural innovation of his time – the writing of books. He claimed that writing on parchment does not allow open argument and contestation, which are crucial for thinking (Regev, 1997). Socrates used a technique called elenchus (ελενχος), a mixture of questions somewhat like a crossexamination, which later became known as the “Socratic method” or “Socratic debate,” and in which Socrates refrained from openly introducing his own opinions. Socrates makes all his conclusions from the answers of his opponent, which served him later in the debate to defeat the latter’s opinions; thus in his constant striving for the absolute knowledge he created a method of critical thinking, and posed an ideal model of critical thinking for his successors. What made him such a model was that he investigated questions, was the first to raise the problem of definition, sought after the meaning of things, sought to find self-evident arguments and proofs, used inductive arguments and did not grant axiomatic validity to definitions (Bryan, 1987). Socrates was sentenced to death on the charge of treason and “corruption of youth.” Only later did Plato’s writings, “the Socratic dialogues,” defend the good name of Socrates and prove that he was wrongfully convicted (Bryan, 1987). The pedagogy of questioning and thinking, according to Aristotle, begins with wondering, with the primary question. The ability to ask questions is crucial for a human being, and in Jean Paul Sartre’s terms, it is essential to be able “to see what is lacking – about facts, reasons, explanations that we lack – to explain what is present and is experienced as lacking” (Harpaz & Adam, 2000).

5

The sophists developed the theory of rhetoric, the basis of non-formal logic, which later became an important component in education for critical thinking.

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The Educational and Social Importance of Critical Thinking As in the distant past, the need for developing critical thinking today is anchored in the ideals of education for democracy, which postulate our freedom to think about and criticize reality and society in which we live, as an expression of our being autonomous individuals. Today this idea becomes even more vital, because of the increasing need to be able to investigate and evaluate various messages presented to us in different fields, on the basis of rational considerations. In this sense, to develop a critical approach and attitude towards various issues means to “be aware” (Feuerstein, 2002). Matthew Lipman in his article “A Functional Definition of Critical Thinking” points at the traditional distinction between ‘knowledge’ and ‘wisdom’. ‘Knowledge’ refers to the sum of information and ‘truths’ passed from generation to generation, while ‘wisdom’ refers to the person’s ability to make sensible decisions in complicated and unclear situations. Wisdom is highly prized, because previous knowledge is not sufficient in order to know what the best way to act is. According to Lipman, in periods of transition and change, when the reservoir of traditional knowledge becomes insufficient to deal with reality, wisdom, which is characterized by intellectual flexibility and originality, is highly esteemed. In our days, according to Lipman, the term ‘wisdom’ came to be replaced with the term ‘critical thinking’. The principles of critical thinking, according to Lipman, are the ability to exercise judgment (judgment is activated when we use our knowledge to arrive at practical decisions), use of criteria in decisionmaking (when we have several options that we critically compare to each other in order to choose the one that appears best), sensitivity to context (when we take into account the specific conditions of context and choose a suitable way to act, instead of acting as we are accustomed to, without regard for the specific situation), and finally, self-correcting thinking (when we encounter a problem that springs from our course of action, we are prepared to make a re-evaluation and to correct that course). The contemporary reality is complex and ceaselessly changing. It constantly demands arriving at independent decisions, therefore it is extremely important to instill in the students at school the ability to think critically, according to the above principles. Critical thinking is necessary in any field of occupation, since it allows the individual to deal with reality in a reasonable and independent way. The Critical Thinking Movement: At the time of unprecedented confusion regarding the appropriate goals of education, the educational Critical Thinking Movement, with headquarters in the United States, proposes a profound discussion of one educational goal rooted far back in the antiquity. This movement has a considerable influence in the U.S. and is increasingly influential also in other countries, including Israel. The movement’s thinkers – philosophers, psychologists and educators – claim that critical thinking is a worthy educational goal that suits the spirit of the present time and answers its challenges. The movement is a sub-current of a larger and older, internationally renowned movement called “Education for Thinking,” which began 30 years ago in the United States in response to the failure of school education to realize its goals. “Education for Thinking” set out to propose an educational ideal that should guide all the educational institutions. In the framework of the “Critical Thinking” movement, its title concept was given different and even contradictory theoretical and didactic definitions. Many educators from different disciplines are trying to define the field of critical thinking and create a common concept. Yet, in spite of the variety of definitions and the disagreements on the meaning of the movement’s central idea, the purpose of the movement is to educate young people for critical thinking and personality,

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prepared and able to examine the accepted beliefs. David Perkins, one of the movement’s most notable thinkers, emphasizes the need for fostering critical thinking as a tool for understanding knowledge, and not as a goal for its own sake (Harpaz, 1996,1997). The Critical Thinking Movement seeks to encourage students to cast intelligent doubt about what the authorities – teachers, specialists, textbooks, books, newspapers, television – tell them. It seeks to bring up critical pupils who ask questions such as, on what grounds does a certain text or person claim what they claim? From what point of view are they claiming this? Why prefer their claim over other, contradicting or different claims? The idea of educating for critical thinking, as well as the idea of educating for creative thinking, has far-reaching consequences for school education. At present, it is mostly an idea, rather than action, but one can already see practical attempts to realize this idea in the educational field. One of the ways to realize the idea of educating for critical thinking is to “translate” it into a range of skills. Thus, for instance, the devoted promoters of this idea developed a new field called “informal logic,” which helps to locate, criticize and construct propositions in natural language. Other supporters of education for critical thinking developed a classification of skills, such as the skill of examining reliability of information sources, the skill of uncovering basic assumptions, the skill of identifying biases, etc. Other supporters developed study programs based on conflicts between different worldviews, standpoints and versions. Still others composed programs of critical reading, critical watching and critical “consumption” of media (Harpaz & Adam, 2000).

THEORY OF CRITICAL THINKING "Critical thinking is that mode of thinking - about any subject, content or problem - in which the thinker improves the quality of his or her thinking by skillfully taking charge of the structures inherent in thinking and imposing intellectual standards upon them" NCECT

Definitions of Critical Thinking A historical survey over several decades shows that the existing plethora of definitions of ‘critical thinking’, vagueness and lack of true understanding surrounding the term have led to a structural disagreement about the nature of this phenomenon among researchers, psychologists, informal logicians, philosophers, educators and theorists (Ennis, 1985,1987; Lipman, 1991; McPeck, 1981; Passmore,1980; Paul, 1993; Siegel, 1998; Johnson & Blair, 1994). The situation of this term is similar to that of the term ‘environment protection’. Everyone agrees about the importance of the activity and its goals, but the lack of clarity about the exact nature of the goals and the means of achieving them prevents necessary action in many cases. Some see critical thinking simply as “everyday, informal reasoning” (Galotti 1989), whereas others feel differently. Shafersman (1991) proposes that a critical thinker is one who asks questions, offers alternative answers and questions traditional beliefs. He believes that such people, who seem to be challenging society, are not welcome, and for this reason critical thinking is not encouraged. Lipman considers it to be different from ordinary

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thinking because it is both more precise and more rigorous, and furthermore, it is also selfcorrecting (1991). It has also been described by Halpern (1998) as being “purposeful, reasoned, and goal-directed. “Since there exist in literature dozens of widely varying definitions of ‘critical thinking’6, I have no way of posing one definition, as is conventionally done in dissertations. I will try to dispel this vagueness by presenting different definitions and the disagreements between different specialists concerning these definitions. On the basis of extensive reading in the field, it seems that critical thinking is a thinking that establishes criteria for examining beliefs, opinions and truths, in order to give a rationally based preference to certain beliefs, opinions and truths over others – and to be prepared to doubt even these7. Thus, critical thinking is a thinking that criticizes phenomena, ideas and products on the basis of rational and emotional criteria. Ennis (1987) defines critical thinking as “reasonable and reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do.” This definition replaced a narrower definition Ennis proposed in 1962, as “correct evaluation of statements,” which encountered much criticism and opposition, because it was based on logical skills alone. Ennis, who is known as one of the most important writers on critical thinking, presents in his article “A Taxonomy of Critical Thinking Dispositions and Abilities” (1987) the taxonomy of critical thinking, which includes fourteen dispositions and twelve abilities, subdivided into sub-abilities. Some of the dispositions and abilities essential for a critical thinker will be described below: dispositions such as searching for a question, making an argument, taking care to be well-informed, using reliable sources, searching for alternatives, taking a stand, and abilities such as clarity, grounding of claims, inference, and interconnection. Siegel (1988) discusses Ennis’ taxonomy very favorably and refers to the inclusive set of dispositions, characteristics and abilities proposed by Ennis as a “regulative ideal”8. He claims that critical thinking guides our judgments and provides us with criteria of excellence on which evaluation of educational activities can be based – therefore it is called a regulative ideal. Siegel in his article deals with the question, “Who is a critical thinker?” He claims that a critical thinker has to be an individual with a certain type of personality, dispositions, traits of character and thinking habits. The critical thinker has to know how to evaluate statements, and to be prepared to match judgment and action to a principle, to demand justification and to question ungrounded claims. McPeck (1981) defines critical thinking as correct use of reflexive skepticism in a given field, and sees the essence of critical thinking in the behavioral aspect of doubting, or “postponement of judgment.” McPeck’s behavioral approach differs from Ennis’ definition (according to Ennis, the essence of critical thinking is the logical-analytic activity of analyzing statements). In order to deeper understand both McPeck’s and Ennis’ definitions, I will review and compare the various approaches again. McPeck sees the essence of critical thinking in its behavioral aspect, while Ennis completely ignores this aspect. McPeck opposes those who see critical thinking as primarily evaluation of statements, because evaluation of 6 7

8

In fact, each definition relates to a certain area in the field of education and includes several important aspects. The concept of ‘critical thinking’ raises a wealth of associations. Some will imagine critical thinking as doubting whatever is said, others as a kind of protest, provocation or an inclination to argue. With regard to the term ‘doubt’ I will adhere to the positive meaning of the word: not discarding an old idea and seeking to replace it with a new idea, but recognizing the value of the old idea while creating and posing a new one alongside with the old. Without doubting and testing ideas, it would be impossible to develop new and better ideas. Doubt is, without a doubt, a crucial force in learning and development. Siegel defines regulative criteria for excellence, the ability to choose between methods, kinds of policy, and educational acts.

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statements concentrates on questions of validity and not on checking the reliability of information sources. According to McPeck, we do not routinely analyze conclusions, but rather evaluate data, information and facts. In order to do this, one needs to be well acquainted with the field that the evaluated information belongs to. Therefore, according to McPeck, “acquisition of specific skills is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for critical thinking”; a more detailed definition can be found on the official website of NCECT9: Critical thinking is that mode of thinking – about any subject, content, or problem – in which the thinker improves the quality of his or her thinking by skillfully analyzing, assessing, and reconstructing it. Critical thinking is a self-directed, self-disciplined, self-monitored, and selfcorrective thinking. It presupposes assent to rigorous standards of excellence and mindful command of their use. It entails effective communication and problem-solving abilities, as well as a commitment to overcome our native egocentrism and sociocentrism. Watson and Watson & Glaser (1980) claim that critical thinking is: (1) an investigative approach that involves an ability to recognize and accept the general need of proving whatever is assumed to be true; (2) knowledge of the nature of valid conclusions, and of abstractions and generalizations in which the measure of validity of different kinds of evidence is established in a logical way; (3) skills of applying the above knowledge and approaches. Critical thinking is also defined as result-based, rational, logical and reflective evaluative thinking in terms of what to reject or accept and what to believe, following which thinking a decision is made what to do (or not to do), and then to act accordingly, taking responsibility for the decisions that were made and for their implications. Elsewhere, critical thinking is defined as the ability and readiness to evaluate claims in an objective manner, based on solid arguments (Wade & Tavris, 1993). From all of the above definitions it can be concluded that critical thinking is characterized both by behavioral components, such as doubting, postponement of judgment and inquisitiveness, and by cognitive components, such as the process of investigation and drawing conclusions. We would like to focus on three specific definitions that deal with both abilities and dispositions. McPeck defines critical thinking as “skills and dispositions to appropriately use reflective skepticism” (McPeck, 1981). Lipman claims that critical thinking is “thinking which enables judgment, is based on criteria, corrects itself, and is contextsensitive” (Lipman, 1991). The third definition is the one we have based our research. Ennis (1962) defines critical thinking as “a correct evaluation of statements". Over twenty years later, Ennis broadened his definition to include a mental element, defining it as “reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do” (Ennis, 1985). The abilities related to critical thinking are divided into two categories: skills, which include the ability to analyze, evaluate, and draw conclusions, and dispositions, such as the motivation, inclination and urge of the student to apply critical thinking to discussing issues, making decisions, and/or solving problems. In addition to critical thinking skills, it is also important to evaluate the students’ dispositions towards critical thinking, since they may point at the learner’s inclination to practically apply critical thinking in various contexts.

9

The National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking, http://www.criticalthinking.org/about/nationalCouncil

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Critical Thinking Abilities According to Ennis’ Taxonomy10 Critical thinking depends on a number of skills, such as identifying the source of information, assessing the source’s reliability, evaluating the extent of the new information’s consistency with previous knowledge, and making a conclusion on the basis of all these mental acts. In the literature, critical thinking skills are considered necessary for encouraging meta-cognitive understanding. According to Ennis (1963,1987,1991,2002) critical thinking is a reflective activity (in which the person examines his/her own thinking activity) and at the same time a practical activity, the goal of which is a rational belief or action. There are five key concepts here: practical, reflective, rational, belief, and action. In light of these, Ennis upgraded his taxonomy of critical thinking11 and divided it into a system of dispositions and abilities presented below. The principal areas of the critical thinking ability are clarity, grounding, inference, and interrelatedness. The critical thinking abilities are: focusing on the question; analyzing statements; asking questions; evaluating the reliability of the source; deduction; value-judging; defining terms; identifying assumptions; making decisions about action; interrelatedness with others. It is important to note that the principal areas presented in Fig. 2.1.3 have an intuitive dimension: we want to be clear about what is happening; we want to have an acceptable grounding for our judgments; we want our inferences to be logical; we want our interrelations with others to be sensitive, and we want that the dispositions and abilities for critical thinking should be active (Harpaz, 2002).

Critical Thinking Dispositions according to Facione Critical thinking has been investigated largely in terms of thinking skills that involve the cognitive domain. For decades, the promotion of students’ thinking has been the focus of educational studies and programs (Boddy, Watson, & Aubusson, 2003; De Bono, 1976; Ennis, 1985; Kuhn, 1999). Each of these programs has its own definition of thinking and/or of skills. Some use the phrase ‘cognitive skills’ (Leou et al., 2006; Zoller et al., 2000) and others refer to ‘thinking skills’ (Aizikovitsh & Amit 2008, 2009, 2010; Boix-Mansilla & Gardner, 1998; De Bono, 1990; Egan, 1997; Resnick, 1987; Zohar & Dori, 2003; Zohar, 2004), but they all distinguish between higher- and lower-order skills. Resnick (1987) maintained that thinking skills resist precise forms of definition; yet, higher order thinking skills can be recognized when they occur. Our ever-changing and challenging world requires students, our future citizens, to go beyond the building of their knowledge; they need to develop their higher-order thinking skills, such as system critical thinking, decision making, and problem solving (Zohar, 1999; 2000, Zoller, 2002; 2007). There have been significant changes in the past decades in the field of education. Whereas earlier the teacher was at the 10

. Ennis emphasizes that the dispositions and abilities in his taxonomy relate to general critical thinking. In order to infuse them into the general curriculum, it will be necessary to teach them several times, at different levels of difficulty and in the framework of different study subjects (see Fig. 2) 11 In his first article from 1962, Ennis defined critical thinking as “correct evaluation of statements. In 1987, he replaced this definition with a new one: “Critical thinking is a reflexive rational thinking focusing on the decision what to believe or to do”. Ennis upgraded his taxonomy, which he published 25 years earlier, according to his new definition. The first taxonomy only included abilities and skills, while the present one, a “taxonomy of dispositions and abilities for critical thinking,” also includes dispositions (14 dispositions and 12 abilities).

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center and the emphasis was put on what to teach, today’s education involves teaching how to think, and in particular, how to be a critical thinker. Critical thinking is necessary in every profession, and it allows one to deal with reality in a reasonable and independent manner (Lipman, 1991; McPeck, 1994; Paul, 1993). There seems to be no clear consensus as to what exactly critical thinking is. Some see it as simply being “everyday, informal reasoning” (Johnson & Blair, 1994), whereas others feel differently. Yet, it seems evident at this point that the ability to think critically is not something that we are born with, and it is widely accepted that it is in fact a learned ability that we need to teach. There are taxonomies that set out a list of reasoning skills involved in critical thinking (12 skills according to Ennis’ taxonomy of 1962 or 15, according to Dick, 1991). Many of these approaches assume that when these skills are taught and used properly, the students will become better thinkers. Other approaches see dispositions as playing a vital part in the process of critical thinking. Beyer (1987) describes dispositions for critical thinking as involving "an alertness to the need to evaluate information, a willingness to test opinions, and a desire to consider all viewpoints." Halpern (1996) emphasizes the importance of the students’ dispositions, since skills are useless unless put into practice. In addition to successfully using the appropriate skill in a given context, critical thinking implies also the disposition to recognize the need for using a particular skill in a certain situation, and the willingness to make the effort of applying it. Facione and Facione (1994, 2000) describe dispositions towards critical thinking as containing elements of intellectual maturity, searching for truth, open-mindedness, systematicity, self-confidence in critical thinking, analyticity, and inquisitiveness. They developed the California Critical Thinking Disposition Inventory (CCTDI), which was originally meant to be used to assess critical thinking dispositions in college students, but has been successfully adapted also for use in high school. There are seven scales on the CCTDI. Each describes an aspect of the overall disposition toward using one's critical thinking to form judgments about what to believe or what to do. People may be positively, ambivalently, or negatively disposed on each of seven aspects of the overall disposition toward critical thinking. The CCTDI also provides a total score which gives equal weight to each of the seven: Truthseeking, Open-mindedness, Analyticity, Systematicity, Critical Thinking, Self-Confidence, Inquisitiveness, Maturity of Judgment. Truth seeking is the habit of always desiring the best possible understanding of any given situation; it is following reasons and evidence where ever they may lead, even if they lead one to question cherished beliefs. Truth-seekers ask hard, sometimes even frightening questions; they do not ignore relevant details; they strive not to let bias or preconception color their search for knowledge and truth. The opposite of Truthseeking is bias which ignores good reasons and relevant evidence in order not to have to face difficult ideas. Open-mindedness is the tendency to allow others to voice views with which one may not agree. Open-minded people act with tolerance toward the opinions of others, knowing that often we all hold beliefs which make sense only from our own perspectives. Open-mindedness, as used here, is important for harmony in a pluralistic and complex society where people approach issues from different religious, political, social, family, cultural, and personal backgrounds. The opposite of openmindedness is closed-mindedness and intolerance for the ideas of others. Analyticity is the tendency to be alert to what happens next. This is the habit of striving to anticipate both the good and the bad potential consequences or outcomes of situations, choices, proposals, and plans. The opposite of analyticity is being heedless of consequences, not attending to what happens next when one makes choices or accepts ideas uncritically. Systematicity is the

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tendency or habit of striving to approach problems in a disciplined, orderly, and systematic way. The habit of being disorganized is the opposite characteristic to systematicity. The person who is strong in systematicity may or may not actually know or use a given strategy or any particular pattern in problem solving, but they have the mental desire and tendency to approach questions and issues in such an organized way. Critical Thinking Self-Confidence: the tendency to trust the use of reason and reflective thinking to solve problems is reasoning self-confidence. This habit can apply to individuals or to groups; as can the other dispositional characteristics measured by the CCTDI. We as a family, team, office, community, or society can have the habit of being trustful of reasoned judgment as the means of solving our problems and reaching our goals. The opposite is the tendency to be mistrustful of reason, to consistently devalue or be hostile to the use of careful reason and reflection as a means to solving problems or discovering what to do or what to believe. Inquisitiveness is intellectual curiosity. It is the tendency to want to know things, even if they are not immediately or obviously useful at the moment. It is being curious and eager to acquire new knowledge and to learn the explanations for things even when the applications of that new learning is not immediately apparent. The opposite of inquisitiveness is indifference. Maturity of Judgment: Cognitive maturity is the tendency to see problems as complex, rather than black and white. It is the habit of making a judgment in a timely way, not prematurely, and not with undue delay. It is the tendency of standing firm in one's judgment when there is reason to do so, but changing one's mind when that is the appropriate thing to do. It is prudence in making, suspending, or revising judgment. It is being aware that multiple solutions may be acceptable while appreciating the need to reach closure in certain circumstances even in the absence of complete knowledge. The opposite, cognitive immaturity, is characterized by being imprudent, black-and-white thinking, failing to come to a closure in a timely way, stubbornly refusing to change one's mind when reasons and evidence indicate one is mistaken, or revising one's opinions without a substantial reason for doing so. Ennis (1985, 1987, 1989) presents 14 dispositions, the first 13 of which are defined as necessary for critical thinking, while the last one, “being sensitive,” is not exactly a basic disposition yet nevertheless has to be present in the totality of dispositions. The dispositions are: seeking for clarification of a thesis or question; searching for arguments; trying to be well-informed; using reliable sources; taking into account the general situation; trying to stay relevant to the central issue; consistently remembering what the original or basic issue is; searching for alternatives; seriously considering different points of view; postponing judgment; taking a stand; seeking a high degree of precision; dealing with the components of the whole in an organized way; sensitivity.

Development and Learning of Critical Thinking There is an ongoing discussion in the field of education regarding the ways in which critical thinking skills can be developed. Some researchers believe that there is a need to plan specific critical thinking courses. Others claim that developing these skills can be accomplished in the framework of regular courses (Ennis, 1989; McPeck, 1981; Resnick, 1987; Weinberger,1992). There is a debate as to whether these skills are completely general or specific to subject matter and concepts. Most agree that critical thinking has both general and specific attributes. Feuerstein's study (2002) showed that after teachers were provided

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with theoretical and pedagogical knowledge, they were able to foster critical thinking in their students. Zohar and Tamir (1993) found that critical thinking does not develop on its own. Based upon this conclusion and upon the small amount of existing research in the field of critical thinking in mathematics, this study examines the affinity between education for critical thinking and mathematical studies. Many researchers, beginning with the philosopher Passmore (1980), hesitate regarding many questions related to critical thinking, such as, what does ‘being critical’ mean? Is it possible to educate for critical thinking, and what does this mean? How can we know that we have succeeded in this task? In his article “Teaching to Be Critical,” Passmore discusses the meaning of education for critical thinking and raises the question, “Is being critical a matter of habitual behavior acquired through experience, that is, a habit?”In addition, Passmore relates to the confusion between mere grumbling and critical thinking. According to Passmore, it should be clear that a critical person is a person who has imagination. In the same way as imagination should be distinguished from delusion, being critical has to be distinguished from a grumbling expression of discontent, or from mere slander. They are as easy to confuse as imagination and delusion. According to Schafersman (1991), critical thinking is a learned ability that should not be left to develop of its own accord, nor should it be taught by an untrained teacher. Both training and knowledge are necessary to promote critical thinking abilities in students. Moreover, Schafersman suggests that because society does not welcome people who challenge authority, critical thinking is not often encouraged. Thus, in his opinion, "most people do not think critically." Resnick (1987) corroborates Schafersman’s point of view, arguing that despite the fact that developing critical thinking has been one of the most important goals of education for centuries, problems that demand critical thinking are often dealt with ineffectively. Expertise in any field can only be achieved with critical thinking (Wagner 1997), and it is therefore necessary to help students understand how valuable it is and how they can achieve it. In Zohar and Tamir's (1993) study as well, the researchers concluded that critical thinking does not develop on its own and efforts are required in order to develop it. As Barak, Ben-Chaim and Zoller (2002, 2007) summarize, previous research has shown a need for improving critical thinking skills among students, since most students do not use sophisticated thinking even at the higher education level. In general, there is a consensus that the ability to think critically is becoming increasingly important for being successful in contemporary life, because of the everincreasing pace of changes and the complexity and interconnectedness of various phenomena we encounter. People today are not expected to ‘know their place’, but rather to establish and reinvent their position in the world. As the world is advancing, more and more people are required to make rational decisions based on evaluative/critical thinking, instead of accepting others’ authority. Thus, students need to be ready to examine truth values, to raise doubts, to investigate situations and to search for alternatives in the context of school and everyday life. In accordance with the above, De Bono (1976) had proposed a long time ago that it is hard to teach thinking skills by means of a formal logical process, using principles and axioms. He developed a number of approaches to teaching thinking, and showed that students who received lessons in thinking produced a greater number of solutions for problems, compared to students who did not receive such lessons. Our research is based on three key elements: a critical thinking taxonomy that includes skills and dispositions (Ennis, 1987); the learning unit "Probability in Daily Life" (Lieberman & Tversky, 1996,2001); and the infusion approach of integrating subject matter with thinking skills (Swartz, 1992). Ennis claims that critical thinking is a reflective and practical activity aiming for a moderate action or belief.

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There are five key concepts and characteristics defining critical thinking: practical, reflective, moderate, belief and action. In accordance with the categories this definition employs, Ennis developed a taxonomy of critical thinking skills that include an intellectual as well as a behavioral aspect. In addition to skills, Ennis’ taxonomy also includes dispositions and abilities. In this study, we focus on students’ abilities rather than their dispositions. We have chosen to use Ennis’ definition and taxonomy of critical thinking because it distinguishes between abilities and disposition, and because teaching thinking skills according to a taxonomy suits the hierarchical structure of our learning unit in probability studies.

The Learning Unit "Probability in Daily Life" (Lieberman & Tversky, 2001) This unit in probability studies is part of the formal high school curriculum of the Israeli Ministry of Education. It was chosen because its rationale is to make the students to "study issues relevant to everyday life, which include elements of critical thinking” (Lieberman & Tversky 2001, Introduction p.3). In this unit, students must analyze problems using statistical instruments, as well as raising questions and thinking critically about the data, its collection, and its results. Students learn to examine data qualitatively as well as quantitatively. They must also use their intuitions to estimate probabilities and examine the logical premises of these intuitions, along with misjudgments of their application. The unit is unique because it explores probability in relation to everyday problems. This involves critical thinking elements such as tangible examples from everyday life, confronting credible information, accepting and dismissing generalizations, rechecking data, doubting, comparing new knowledge with the existing knowledge. This unit is characterized by questions such as “Define the term ‘critical thinking’,” “Give examples of a problem while using a controlled experiment,” “Give examples of failures and misleading commercials,” and “Give examples of a scientific truth that was dismissed.” While studying the subject, the connection is checked between statistical judgment and intuitive judgment, and intuitive mechanisms that produce wrong judgments are explored. While studying the subject, students are expected to acquire the tools for critical thinking. In the beginning, students learn the mathematical tools necessary for performing calculations, and later on they use the probability part: causal connection, and mechanisms of intuitive judgment, which are considered more of a psychological projection (Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman et. al, 1996).

The Infusion Approach (Swartz, 1992) In light of the evidence that has accumulated in the field of teaching thinking, the question arises whether thinking skills are general or content-dependent (Perkins & Salomon, 1988,1989; Perkins, 1992). Out of this question there developed four major approaches: the general approach, the infusion approach, the immersion approach, and the mixed approach. The general approach teaches thinking skills as a range of general skills detached from other study subjects, as a separate course in the curriculum. In the infusion approach the skills are taught in the framework of a specific study subject, and thinking turns into an integral part of teaching specific materials, while general principles and terminology of thinking are explicitly emphasized. In the immersion approach, the study material is taught in a thought-

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provoking way and the students are “immersed” in the topic of study, without explicit reference to the principles of thinking. The mixed approach combines the general and the infusion approach. The present research employs the infusion approach, where thinking is taught and learned in the context of the learning unit “Probability in Daily Life.” It is important to elaborate here on the distinctions between the general and the infusion approach. The field of education has recognized for decades the need to concentrate on the promotion of critical thinking skills. The question is how this can be best accomplished. Some educators feel that the best path is to design specific courses aimed at teaching critical thinking, which is called the general skills approach. Integrating the teaching of these skills in regular courses in the curriculum is a different approach known as the infusion approach. The question at the heart of the argument is, whether critical thinking skills are general or depend on content and on the system of concepts specific to that particular content. According to Swartz and Parks (1994), the infusion approach aims at teaching specific critical thinking skills along with different study subjects, and instilling critical thinking skills through teaching the set learning material. According to this approach, such lessons are expected to improve the students’ thinking and help them to learn the contents in different study subjects. Swartz also emphasizes that the students should not only employ critical thinking skills in class, but also be able to activate them in real-life situations and to recognize situations when these skills should be used. For this, an appropriate motivation should be fostered; otherwise these skills will remain passive. In this study, conducted according to the latter approach, we have combined the mathematical content of the "Probability in Daily Life” learning unit with critical thinking skills according to Ennis' taxonomy, restructured the curriculum, tested different learning units and evaluated the participants’ critical thinking skills, to examine whether the learning unit “Probability in Daily Life,” by using the infusion approach, does indeed develop critical thinking.

Studies Dealing with Critical Thinking in Mathematics An extensive literature review conducted in this research has shown that a number of works have been published on the topic of “critical thinking in mathematics,” yet very few of them proceed from the same context or ‘spirit’ as the present study, namely, that of seeking for a general definition of “critical thinking” and giving this definition a scientific grounding (Akbari-Zarin & Gray,1990; Avital & Barbeau, 1991; Battista et al., 1989; Becker, 1984; Boucher, 1998; Cherkas, 1992; Coon & Birken, 1988; Dion, 1990; Dubinsky, 1989, 1986; Fridlander, 1997; Garofalo, 1986, 1987; Gray & St. Ours, 1992; Innabi & Sheikh, 2007; Johnson, 1994; Kaplan, 1992; Kaur & Oon, 1992; Kloosterman & Stage, 1992; LeGere, 1991; McCoy, 1990; Movshovitz-Hadar, 1993; Olson .& Olson, 1997; Lawrenz & Orton, 1989). As pointed out before in the “Theoretical Background” section, critical thinking has been defined in many different ways, on the basis of various theories. In science, and in particular in mathematics, none of the classical definitions cited in the “Theoretical Background” section have been presented. Researchers who do relate to critical thinking in the field of mathematics use this term in other contexts, and in fact deal with imparting technical tools such as performing an assessment, checking the correctness of results, evaluating a certain exercise, comparison, inference, application and interpretation, solution strategies, etc. Reviewing these articles, we have searched for the term “critical thinking”

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used in the sense relevant to the present study. Strategies for critical thinking in learning: define your purpose, what it is you want to study; clarify questions and answers with your teachers or other specialists in the subject. The purposes of study can be formulated in simple phrases: “Plumbing regulations in suburban neighborhoods,” “Structure and terms in the human skeleton.” Think about what is already known to you on the subject: what do you already know that may help you in your study? What are your preconceptions on the subject? What means do you have for carrying out the study, and what is your timetable? Gather information; keep your thinking open so as not to exclude opportunities, Ask questions; what are the preconceptions of the sources’ authors? Organize the information you have collected into structures that make sense to you and ask questions again and again. Within the framework of mathematics studies, critical thinking does not develop spontaneously but requires an effort. Critical thinking skills rely on self-regulation of the thinking processes, construction of meaning, and detection of patterns in supposedly disorganized structures. A considerable mental work is involved in the processes and judgments it requires. Critical thinking is not algorithmic, i.e. its patterns of thinking and action are not clear or predefined. Critical thinking tends to be complex. It often terminates in multiple solutions that have advantages and disadvantages, rather than a single clear solution. It requires the use of multiple, sometimes mutually contradictory criteria, and frequently concludes with uncertainty. The latter conclusion corresponds with Zohar's research (1996, p.21). (i) Conventional teaching is not appropriate for the changing and challenging world we live in, which demands critical/evaluative thinking based on rational decisions and dispositions. In this research we find that combining different instruction strategies (such as asking questions, independent investigation of phenomena, or experimenting in the framework of open discussion and drawing conclusions considerably improves the students' critical thinking abilities and dispositions. These findings correspond with those of earlier researches (Facione, 2002) showing that critical thinking relies on cognitive activity directed at focused, inquisitive interpretation of relevant information, and constant reference to the student's dispositions. (ii) (Partial) transfer between disciplines is possible. One of the main goals of teaching higher-order thinking skills, such as critical thinking, is the transfer of these skills to all disciplines and fields. However, transfer within and between disciplines is difficult to put into practice (Bransford et al., 1999). In this research the instruction of higher-order thinking skills was used within the framework of mathematics studies, but the students' success in critical thinking tests indicates their ability to transfer their critical thinking skills to other fields, since these tests are based on generic questions that are not confined to specific disciplines. I will elaborate on this conclusion further in the “Research Limitations” section.

RECOMMENDATIONS We live in a period of non-stop dynamic changes in all the areas of life. The amount of knowledge accumulated by the different research disciplines is immense and ever-growing, which makes it impossible to endow students with all the information they may need in the future. Thus, the education system needs to adapt itself to the world of tomorrow. Along with imparting basic knowledge, education needs to impart skills needed for independent confrontation with new information and with the challenges of the 21st century.We believe

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that a graduate of the education system should be capable of critical thinking (which is a central empowering mental tool necessary to the citizen of the modern democratic society as a learner, consumer, professional, and more) and adopt critical thinking as a way of life. The term "critical thinking" refers to the individual's ability to adequately evaluate claims by means of logical-analytic skills, to use reflective thinking that raises question questions regarding inclinations, beliefs, perceptions and ways of action (Facion, 2002; Ennis, 1989). These research findings have major educational implications concerning the training of teachers for taking part in programs designed to promote critical thinking. The empirical results convincingly show that conscious, consistent instruction of critical thinking in mathematics increases the students' chances of success. This conclusion is extremely important for the process of changing teachers' beliefs and instruction strategies in the discipline. We propose that the programs of professional development be designed in such a way as to help teachers better understand what is higher-order thinking and have a more coherent sense of what is critical thinking. We also propose to encourage teachers to employ a wider range of teaching strategies, as presented in this and other researches, in order to help their students fulfill tasks that require higher-order thinking in general and critical thinking in particular.

RESEARCH UNIQUENESS AND CONTRIBUTION This research was designed as a continuation of a large-scale pilot study, conducted by the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev and a general high school (located at the center of Israel) in 2007. The purpose of the pilot study was to examine the students' critical thinking abilities in different environments drawing on infusion-approach study of "Probability in Daily Life". (i)The present research establishes points of reference to critical thinking dispositions among students learning mathematics in different environments (high school and a mathematics club). This element has not been examined so far by the literature in the field (ii) This research has identified and measured differences between dispositions, abilities, and construction of skills characteristic of critical thinking in mathematics, and completes other researchers conducted in other environments (iii)The combination of the Cornell test and the CCTDI test in the evaluation of critical thinking abilities and dispositions is unique to this research; it has not been performed in previous studies. Educators in Israel, who wonder, like their colleagues in the West, about the goals of the education system that could guide the different educational frameworks, may find in this research an idea that can unify different topics and study programs, in order to prepare the learners for life in a changing society, and develop their ability to think in a systematic and independent way. In much of the literature, critical thinking development is referred to as an important goal of the educational system. This research may contribute to the public discourse of the mathematical education community on this issue. It also raises the public awareness of the need to develop critical thinking in the framework of mathematical education, which may enable future examination and promotion of critical thinking development through mathematics teaching in a fuller and more informed way. To conclude, the main contribution of this research lies in revealing the connection between critical thinking and the teaching of mathematics. Despite the problem of transfer discussed earlier, the scientific contribution of this research lies in the new insights it

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provides into critical thinking, its place and importance in teaching mathematics. In this manner, it will be possible to strengthen the status of the study of mathematics in imparting higher-order thinking skills, both in parallel with and beyond the formal education program.

Implications for the Formal School Curriculum Current mathematics teaching approaches espouse the conceptual understanding of mathematics and stress the significance of problem solution, mathematical literacy and mathematical discourse. According to this approach, teachers function as mediators between the students and the information they need to acquire by asking questions, posing challenges, and research. Thus teachers help students better comprehend mathematical terminology, ideas and associations. This method of teaching is extremely challenging for both students and teachers: it necessitates the teacher's profound understanding of mathematics, intellectual effort and creativity, and the student's confrontation with unfamiliar situations and contents. The implications of this research for the education curriculum were designed on the basis of previous studies12. Feuerstein (2002), Zohar and Tamir (1993), as well as Weinberger (1998) point out the importance for the students to experience learning that develops critical thinking by means of diverse study programs with special characteristics. The findings of the present research may assist in developing curricula and instruction methods for different ages and learning levels in mathematics, on the basis of the connection between critical thinking and the study of mathematics through the learning unit "Probability in Daily Life." In light of the above, the implications of this research for the formal school curriculum is in the opportunity it provides to expand the implementation of programs for critical thinking development and their infusion into mathematics curricula, according to the requirements specified by the formal education program 13.

CONCLUDING REMARKS From this research’s findings and discussion, there arise the following research recommendations: A more comprehensive examination of the processes of critical thinking: to what extent could the students describe, orally and in writing, the processes of thinking, activate them and apply the thinking skills they studied on the procedural and meta-cognitive level? Did they make an informed use of terms and strategies of higher-order thinking, including critical thinking? On the basis of the former, it should be examined what use the research participants make of the “language of thinking,” or, in the words of Costa and Marzano, “do they speak thought?” (Costa & Marzano, in Harpaz, 1997; Costa, 1991). Developing such a language involves, on the part of the teacher, such skills as using precise vocabulary, presenting critical questions, presenting data rather than answers, aspiring for exactness, giving directions, and developing meta-cognition. Examination of the attitudes and 12 13

See appendix for the studies on which this research implications are based I.e., "the student knows how to draw conclusions from mathematical models," "the student will develop logical mathematical thinking skills, such as drawing conclusions, making generalizations, analysis, making and supporting assumptions, self-criticism.”

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perceptions of education students in colleges for teacher training, practicing teachers and researchers of mathematical education with regard to teaching that develops critical thinking in mathematics; evaluation of these students’ and professionals’ critical thinking functions in teaching, learning, and research. Teaching “Probability in Daily Life” and conducting the same research among all the strata of the students’ population and not only among those who study mathematics at the higher level. Examining the gender, age, and ethnicity aspects of critical thinking development. There is neither consensus nor coherence in contemporary approaches to education for critical thinking. The research reported in this thesis has demonstrated the viability of integrating the purposeful promotion of critical thinking with the teaching of conventional mathematics content. It is hoped that the findings of this study will contribute to our understanding of the nature of critical thinking and to the further development of instructional approaches relevant to its promotion.

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Zoller, U. (1993). Are lecture and learning compatible? Maybe for LOCS: Unlikely for HOCS. Journal of Chemical Education, 70, 195–197. doi: 10.1021/ed070p195 Zoller, U. (1999). Teaching tomorrow’s college science courses: Are we getting it right? Journal of College Science Teaching, 29, 409–414. Zoller, U. (2001). Alternative assessment as (critical) means of facilitating HOCS-promoting teaching and learning in chemistry education. Chemical Education: Research and Practice in Europe, 2(1), 9–17. Retrieved from http://www.uoi.gr/cerp/2001_February/pdf/04Zoller.pdf Zoller, U., Ben-Chaim, D., Ron, S., Pentimalli, R., & Borsese, A. (2000). The disposition toward critical thinking of high school and university science students: An interintra Israeli-Italian study. International Journal of Science Education, 22, 571–582. doi: 10.1080/095006900289679 Zoller, U., Dori, Y. J., & Lubezky, A. (2002). Algorithmic, LOCS and HOCS (chemistry) exam questions: Performance and attitudes of college students. International Journal of Science Education, 24, 185–203. doi: 10.1080/09500690110049060

In: Critical Thinking Editors: Ch. P. Horvath and J. M. Forte, pp. 97-121

ISBN: 978-1-61324-419-7 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 4

THE PROMOTION OF CRITICAL THINKING SKILLS THROUGH ARGUMENT MAPPING Christopher Dwyer, Michael Hogan and Ian Stewart School of Psychology, National University of Ireland, Galway, Ireland

ABSTRACT Argument mapping is a method of visually diagramming arguments using a 'box and arrow' format with the aim of simplifying the reading of an argument structure and facilitating the assimilation of core statements and relations. The current chapter presents the findings of a controlled trial in which argument mapping training was compared with hierarchical outline training as techniques for teaching critical thinking skills. Eighty-one undergraduate psychology students were allocated to one of three groups: an argument mapping group, an outlining group, or a control group and were tested on critical thinking before and after an 8-week intervention period. Results revealed that students in the argument mapping group scored higher than the control group at post-test on the critical thinking skills of evaluation and inductive reasoning. Students in the outlining group scored significantly higher than those in the control group on tests of analysis and inductive reasoning. There were no significant performance differences at post-test between those in the argument mapping group and those in the hierarchical summary group. Results are discussed in light of research and theory on best practice in the cultivation of critical thinking.

INTRODUCTION Critical thinking is a metacognitive process which is made up of a collection of sub-skills (i.e. analysis, evaluation, and inference) that, when used appropriately, increases the chances of producing a logical solution to a problem or a valid conclusion to an argument. In education reports around the world, the teaching of critical thinking skills has been identified as an area of education to be developed and examined, specifically, in higher education (Association of American Colleges & Universities, 2005; Australian Council for Educational

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Research, 2002; Higher Education Quality Control, 1996), because it endows students with the capability to reason not only academically, but also in social and interpersonal contexts where adequate problem-solving and decision making are necessary on a daily basis (Ku, 2009). Though the benefits of critical thinking are not always obvious to many students in thirdlevel education, it is well established that good critical thinking ability predicts both academic and everyday functioning (Quitadamo & Kurtz, 2007). Good critical thinkers are more likely to get better grades; are better equipped and more likely to use the skills of critical thinking on an everyday basis (U.S. Department of Education, 1990); and are often more employable as well (Holmes and Clizbe, 1997; National Academy of Sciences, 2005). The ability to think critically allows those in the workforce to think independently, analyse data in order to make inferences, communicate well and make sound decisions. In addition, critical thinking skills are highly desired by employers for their workforce (El Hassan & Madhum, 2007) and are also essential for good management (MacPherson, 1999). However, teaching critical thinking (CT) skills to University students is a major educational challenge (Kuhn, 1991; Willingham, 2007). There are many reasons for this, including the broad challenges of embedding CT into an often crowded curriculum, and designing an effective teaching strategy that targets specific CT skills and offers sufficient practice so these skills develop in an orderly and cumulative way. Two related problems discussed in more detail below include: difficulties in defining critical thinking and constructing thinking frameworks and theories that inform the practice of teachers in the area; and difficulties associated with the assimilation of text-based argument and the challenge of teaching students transferable analysis, evaluation, and inference skills using text-based teaching materials. We will consider both of these issues below and then describe how theory-driven argument mapping training might serve to resolve these problems.

WHAT IS CRITICAL THINKING? There are many definitions and measures of critical thinking. This variety can make it difficult for researchers and teachers to understand or agree on the key components of good critical thinking and these difficulties may impede their ability to construct an integrated theoretical account of how best to train critical thinking skills. In the absence of greater clarity in relation to the components of critical thinking skill and the way these components work together in the context of solving critical thinking problems, it can be difficult to design critical thinking training programs. In the past century, there has been little agreement on how to conceptualise critical thinking. John Dewey (1933) provided one of the first multi-level models of thinking in his classic book, How We Think. Each level of thinking in Dewey’s system differs in terms of its adequacy for the purpose of achieving “active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey, 1933, p. 8). In the first level of Dewey’s system is the stream of consciousness (e.g. day dreaming), an “uncontrolled coursing of ideas through our heads” (p. 6). At the next level, Dewey describes imagination as a more orderly and controlled type of thinking, specifically, where

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“successions of imaginative incidents and episodes that have a certain coherence, hang together on a continuous thread, and thus lie between kaleidoscope flights of fancy and considerations deliberately employed to establish a conclusion” (p. 6). The third level of thinking in Dewey’s system “is practically synonymous with belief” - belief that is accepted or rejected as a set of conclusions, but “not conclusions reached as the result of personal mental activity, such as observing, collecting, and examining evidence” (p. 7). Dewey draws a contrast between this form of thinking and reflective thinking, the highest level of thinking in his cognitive system: “…Columbus did not accept unhesitatingly the current traditional theory…Skeptical of what, from long habit, seemed most certain, and credulous of what seemed impossible, he went on thinking until he could produce evidence for both his confidence and his disbelief. Even if his conclusion had finally turned out wrong, it would have been a different sort of belief from those it antagonized, because it was reached by a different method. Active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends constitutes reflective thought. Any one of the first three kinds of thought may elicit this type; but once begun, it includes a conscious and voluntary effort to establish belief upon a firm basis of evidence and rationality” (Dewey, 1933, p. 8, italics added).

Dewey’s conceptualization of reflective thinking helped to inform more recent conceptualizations of critical thinking. Similarly, recognition of the importance of critical thinking in education followed the growth of interest in informal logic, which was initiated in part by the work of Stephen Toulmin in the late 1950’s (Allen, Feezel & Kauffeld, 1967). Informal logic is a type of logic that emphasises the justificatory function of argumentation, namely that a good argument requires sufficient support (e.g. reliable and valid empirical evidence). Toulmin’s focus on informal reasoning helped to transform argumentation training initiatives in university, which traditionally had focused on training in formal logic (i.e., reasoning using syllogisms). Deliberations in relation to critical thinking skills grew in part from the notion of informal logic, where the central focus is on the analysis and evaluation of claims - claims could only be made (and justified) after a sufficient amount of analysis and evaluation had been conducted on propositions and their logical interdependencies within the arguments used to support these claims. Since then, dozens of definitions for critical thinking have been offered (see Table 1). Though there have been dozens of attempts at defining critical thinking, many of the definitions are quite vague. Many of the authors present a number of skills necessary for good critical thinking rather than providing an operational definition that informs measurement and analysis of the skills listed. The one thing that all the authors seem to agree on is that critical thinking is in fact a collection of cognitive and metacognitive skills centred on the analysis and evaluation of beliefs and the ability to draw sound inferences. Though it is reasonable to suggest that a straightforward, singular description and operational definition of critical thinking is not possible due to the variety of perspectives on critical thinking, there is a need for some reasonable group consensus in an educational context; as an agreed upon operational definition is necessary to conduct educational research in this area and, more importantly, to compare findings across different groups and intervention studies.

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Christopher Dwyer, Michael Hogan and Ian Stewart Table 1. Definitions and Descriptions of Critical Thinking

Author Glaser (1941)

Ennis (1987)

Paul (1993)

Allegretti & Frederick (1995)

Wilkinson (1996)

Bensley (1998)

Halpern (2003)

Definition/Description Critical thinking is: an attitude of being disposed to consider, in a thoughtful way, problems and subjects that come within the range of one’s experience; knowledge of the methods of logical enquiry and reasoning; and some skills in applying those methods. Critical Thinking calls for a persistent effort to examine any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the evidence that supports it and the further conclusions to which it tends. Critical thinking is reasonable, reflective thinking, focused on deciding what to believe or do. A unique kind of purposeful thinking, in which the thinker systematically and habitually imposes criteria and intellectual standards upon the thinking, taking charge of the construction of thinking, guiding the construction of the thinking according to the standards, assessing the effectiveness of the thinking according to the purpose, the criteria, and the standards. Critical thinking is evaluating the arguments of others, evaluating one’s own arguments, resolving conflicts and understanding the source of conflicts in argumentation; thus coming to a resolution in complex problems and gaining confidence in one’s own thinking processes Critical thinking is goal-oriented, purposeful thinking that involves a number of mental skills, such as determining what data is relevant, evaluating the credibility of sources and making inferences. Critical thinking is reflective thinking in which a person evaluates relevant evidence and works to draw a sound or good conclusion. Critical thinking is purposeful, reasoned and goal-directed thinking – the kind of thinking involved in solving problems, formulating inferences, calculating likelihoods and making decisions.

Though debate is ongoing over the definition of critical thinking and the core skills necessary to think critically, to date, there has been only one definition and list of skills that stands out as a reasonable consensus conceptualisation of critical thinking. In 1988, a committee of 46 experts in the field of critical thinking, known as the Delphi Committee, gathered to discuss a definition of critical thinking. The committee also discussed the skills

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necessary to think critically. The findings taken from this meeting, known as The Delphi Report, written by Peter Facione (1990), defined critical thinking as: “…purposeful, self-regulatory judgment which results in interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and inference, as well as explanation of the evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations upon which that judgment is based.” (p. 3).

Furthermore, the Delphi panel overwhelmingly agreed (i.e. 95% agreement) that analysis, evaluation and inference were the core skills necessary for critical thinking (Facione, 1990). These skills (as described by the Delphi Report) are presented in Table 2. The definition of critical thinking provided by the Delphi Report was adopted by the American Philosophical Association (APA) and as a result, has become a widely accepted definition for good critical thinking (Beckie, Lowry & Barnett, 2001). The same definition of critical thinking was also used by the U.S. Department of Education as a framework for setting its educational goals (Facione, Facione, Blohm & Giancarlo, 2002). The Delphi definition of critical thinking also inspired the creation of the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (CCTST; Facione, 1990), a test that is commonly used as part of the evaluation of critical thinking intervention studies. At the same time, the challenges of teaching critical thinking skills remain, and a question remains as to how best to teach critical thinking skills.

Can Critical Thinking Skills Be Taught? A Look at the Previous Research Critical thinking (CT) courses have been taught at University in varying academic domains including law, philosophy, psychology, sociology and nursing. Importantly, it is often argued that critical thinking is a domain-general skill that can be taught alongside any academic content (Gabbenesch, 2006). At the same time, whether or not CT can be improved via explicit instruction and how it is best improved are issues that continue to be debated in the literature. This debate is fuelled in part by difficulties interpreting and comparing research studies in the area. CT courses are taught in a variety of different academic domains and are informed by varying conceptualisations of CT. Different intervention studies also use different measures of CT performance that are not directly comparable - the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione, 1990), the Cornell Critical Thinking Test (Ennis, Millman & Tomko, 1985) and the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Assessment (Watson & Glaser, 1980). The reported reliability and validity of different measures also varies, which has led Abrami and colleagues to ask: “How will we know if one intervention is more beneficial than another if we are uncertain about the validity and reliability of the outcome measures?” (Abrami et al., 2008, p. 1104). Abrami and colleagues add that, even when researchers declare that they are assessing CT using reliable and valid assessment tools, there still remains the major challenge of ensuring that measured outcomes are related in some meaningful way to the conceptualisation and operational definition of CT that informs their teaching practice. Often, the relationship between the concepts of CT that are taught and those that are assessed is unclear and a large number of studies in this area specify no theory to help elucidate these relationships.

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Christopher Dwyer, Michael Hogan and Ian Stewart Table 2. The Core Critical Thinking Skills According to the Delphi Report

Skill

Description

Analysis

To identify the intended and actual inferential relationships among statements, questions, concepts, descriptions or other forms of representation intended to express beliefs, judgments, experiences, reasons, information, or opinions. Examining ideas: to determine the role various expressions play or are intended to play in the context of argument, reasoning or persuasion; to compare or contrast ideas, concepts, or statements; to identify issues or problems and determine their component parts, and also to identify the conceptual relationships of those parts to each other and to the whole. Detecting arguments given a set of statements, descriptions, questions or graphic representations, to determine whether or not the set expresses, or is intended to express, a reason or reasons in support of or contesting some claim, opinion or point of view. Analysing arguments: given the expression of a reason or reasons intended to support or contest some claim, opinion or point of view, to identify and differentiate: (a) the intended main conclusion, (b) the premises and reasons advanced in support of the main conclusion, (c) further premises and reasons advanced as backup or support for those premises and reasons intended as supporting the main conclusion, (d) additional unexpressed elements of that reasoning, such as intermediary conclusions, non-stated assumptions or presuppositions, (e) the overall structure of the argument or intended chain of reasoning, and (f) any items contained in the body of expressions being examined which are not intended to be taken as part of the reasoning being expressed or its intended background.

Evaluation

To assess the credibility of statements or other representations which are accounts or descriptions of a person's perception, experience, situation, judgment, belief, or opinion; and to assess the logical strength of the actual or intend inferential relationships among statements, descriptions, questions or other forms of representation. Assessing claims: to recognize the factors relevant to assessing the degree of credibility to ascribe to a source of information or opinion; to assess the contextual relevance of questions, information, principles, rules or procedural directions; to assess the acceptability, the level of confidence to place in the probability or truth of any given representation of an experience, situation, judgment, belief or opinion. Assessing arguments: to judge whether the assumed acceptability of the premises of a given argument justify one's accepting as true (deductively certain), or very probably true (inductively justified), the expressed

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Table 2. (continued) Skill

Description conclusion of that argument; to anticipate or to raise questions or objections, and to assess whether these point to significant weakness in the argument being evaluated; to determine whether an argument relies on false or doubtful assumptions or presuppositions and then to determine how crucially these affect its strength; to judge between reasonable and fallacious inferences; to judge the probative strength of an argument's premises and assumptions with a view toward determining the acceptability of the argument; to determine and judge the probative strength of an argument's intended or unintended consequences with a view toward judging the acceptability of the argument; to determine the extent to which possible additional information might strengthen or weaken an argument.

Inference

To identify and secure elements needed to draw reasonable conclusions; to form conjectures and hypotheses; to consider relevant information and to educe the consequences flowing from data, statements, principles, evidence, judgments, beliefs, opinions, concepts, descriptions, questions, or other forms of representation. Querying evidence: in particular, to recognize premises which require support and to formulate a strategy for seeking and gathering information which might supply that support; in general, to judge that information relevant to deciding the acceptability, plausibility or relative merits of a given alternative, question, issue, theory, hypothesis, or statement is required, and to determine plausible investigatory strategies for acquiring that information. Conjecturing alternatives: to formulate multiple alternatives for resolving a problem, to postulate a series of suppositions regarding a question, to project alternative hypotheses regarding an event, to develop a variety of different plans to achieve some goal; to draw out presuppositions and project the range of possible consequences of decisions, positions, policies, theories, or beliefs. Drawing conclusions: to apply appropriate modes of inference in determining what position, opinion or point of view one should take on a given matter or issue; given a set of statements, descriptions, questions or other forms of representation, to educe, with the proper level of logical strength, their inferential relationships and the consequences or the presuppositions which they support, warrant, imply or entail; to employ successfully various sub-species of reasoning, as for example to reason analogically, arithmetically, dialectically, scientifically, etc; to determine which of several possible conclusions is most strongly warranted or supported by the evidence at hand, or which should be rejected or regarded as less plausible by the information given.

Adapted from Facione, 1990.

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Nevertheless, researchers have attempted to group intervention studies in an effort to examine whether or not critical thinking can be improved via explicit instruction. For example, a recent meta-analysis by Alvarez-Ortiz (2007) examined 52 studies which investigated a wide range of teaching strategies designed to improve CT. The meta-analysis was specifically conducted in order to answer the questions as to whether or not participation in philosophy courses improved CT ability. Results of the meta-analysis revealed that participation in a philosophy course yielded a mean effect size of .26 SD, CI [.12 - .39], with little evidence to suggest that participation in a philosophy course had any greater effect on CT performance than any other academic course (mean effect size = .12 SD, CI [.11, .21]). However, this meta-analysis also suggested that all courses (regardless of academic content) that directly taught CT (effect size of .40, CI [.08, .71]) or had CT infused into the curriculum (effect size of .26, CI [.09, .43]) yielded better CT performance than courses that did not teach CT in some form (effect size of .12 SD, CI [.08, .17]). These findings lend some support to Gabbenesch’s (2006) claim that CT is domain-general, as the course content was not the key factor in improving CT, whereas involvement of some form of explicit CT instruction was fundamental. Another meta-analysis, conducted by Abrami and colleagues (2008) included 161 CT intervention studies and examined the efficacy of different types of CT training course. They used Ennis’ (1989) typology of four CT course types (i.e. general, infusion, immersion and mixed) to differentiate CT intervention methods. In the general approach to CT training, CT skills, dispositions and processes “are learning objectives, without specific subject matter content” (Abrami et al., 2008, p. 1105). Conversely, the infusion method requires specific course content upon which CT skills are practiced. In the infusion approach, the objective of teaching CT alongside course content is made explicit. In the immersion method, like the infusion method, specific course content is required; however, while CT skills are practiced, CT objectives are not made explicit in the immersion approach. Finally, in the mixed approach, critical thinking is taught independently of the specific subject matter content of the course. Abrami and colleagues (2008) reported a significant effect on CT performance (g+ = .34) of all CT courses included in the meta-analysis. However, only 91 of the studies assessed critical thinking ability using standardised tests (i.e. as opposed to using an assessment devised by a teacher or researcher), and these 91 studies yielded an average effect size of (g+) .24. Comparing the four CT course types, results of the meta-analysis revealed that courses using the mixed approach had the largest effect on CT performance (g+ = .94), followed by the infusion approach (g+ = .54), the general approach (g+ = .38) and the immersion approach (g+ = .09), respectively. It is important to note that the immersion typology (which had the smallest effect) is the only approach that does not make CT objectives explicit to students. Thus, making CT objectives clear to students may be an important part of any course design aimed at increasing CT ability (Abrami et al., 2008). More generally, the authors concluded that the enhancement of CT ability is greatly dependent upon how CT is taught and that the mixed approach to teaching CT worked best as students were required to learn CT skills separate from other course material and then apply them to the material later on in the course. Abrami and colleagues’ (2008) meta-analysis was conducted in light of some very broad distinctions between different types of CT training courses. However, less is known about how different instructional methods impact overall training benefits. In this chapter, we propose that teaching strategies that facilitate the assimilation of argument structures (i.e.

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analysis of argument structures), and an assessment of the quality of evidence and the logical relationships between propositions in moderately complex arguments (i.e. evaluation of argument structures) may in turn facilitate significant growth in analysis and evaluation skills. With a guiding theory and suitable experimental controls it is possible to compare different teaching strategies in this context.

Beyond Text-Based Learning: The Use of Thought Structuring Tools in CT Education Central to our theory of CT enhancement is a focus on the problem of working memory demands associated with the assimilation and simultaneous analysis and evaluation of arguments. According to various frameworks for thinking (e.g. Dewey, 1933; Bloom, 1956; Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001; Moseley et al., 2005), there are a number of cognitive and metacognitive skills that are necessary for good thinking. For example, researcher and theorists often point to the ability to build understanding through the organisation of ideas (Moseley at el., 2005); and the ability to recognise, appraise and analyse both a chain of arguments and the justification of claims through reasoning (Allen, Feezel & Kauffeld, 1967). While these kinds of organizational, analytical, and evaluative skills may be fundamental components of good CT, Harrell (2005) notes that students often fail to understand the ‘gist’ (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978) of text-based information presented to them; and more often, students cannot adequately ‘follow’ the argument of a text (i.e. the chain of reasoning and the justification of claims in the chain), as most students do not even acknowledge that information within a text presents an argument and instead read it as if it were a story. Conversely, authors who do understand the nature of argumentation often construct verbose ‘maze-like’ arguments that consist of massive amounts of text (Monk, 2001). Students who are presented with these texts may thus find it very difficult to capture anything more than the ‘gist’ of the argument. For example, because text-based arguments contain many more sentences than just the propositions that are part of the argument, these sentences may obscure the intention of the piece and the inferential structure of the argument (Harrell, 2004). More specifically, as arguments are not sequential in nature, the linear nature of text sometimes makes it difficult to assimilate the information within a text-based argument (van Gelder, 2003). For example, when reading text, a person may read a statement on page three and not read any relevant support (or objection) to this claim until they reach page 16. Between pages 3 and 16, it could be that a variety of other propositions are presented, which places cognitive load on the reader. Cognitive load is the burden put upon an individual in using and distributing working memory resources during cognitive activities such as learning and problem-solving (Sweller, 1988, 1999). This additional load comes from the need to, for example, switch attention from one page to another and back and forth, in order to create some structure for a ‘non-user friendly’ text. While reading text-based materials, students must figure out the relationship between propositions for themselves, using whatever cues they can, regardless of the ambiguity of the text. Thus, in attempting to mentally structure arguments when reading text, the reader faces cognitive load. Tindall-Ford, Chandler and Sweller (1997) found that learning is impeded when instructional materials require a high degree of attention switching. They concluded that encoding environments that increase the cognitive load placed on the reader tend not only to

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slow the learning process, but also reduce overall levels of learning. Presenting information in a way that reduces the level of attention switching may minimize the cognitive load and improve learning. Having available the structure of an argument is crucial for many reasons: it facilitates logical reasoning, the answering of specific questions about the relation between one proposition and others, and the ready construction of a ‘mental image’ of the whole argument. Argument mapping is a learning aid which may facilitate thinking in this regard. For example, in the argument map, both the propositions and the relationships among them are explicitly stated and the information is presented in an integrated, organised fashion. Notably, it is generally the case that integrated, organised representations facilitate learning (Sweller, 1999). In previous research, argument mapping has been identified as a technique that might circumvent the many obstacles related to reading text and visualizing the argument simultaneously; and may also enhance overall levels of learning and CT (van Gelder, 2001). Thus, argument mapping is hypothesised as a tool that may support the cultivation of CT skills by helping to resolve the problem of working memory demands associated with the assimilation and simultaneous analysis and evaluation of arguments.

Argument Mapping as a Tool for Critical Thinking Instruction In an argument map, a text-based argument is visually represented using a ‘box-andarrow’ style flow-chart that makes the structure of the argument explicit to the reader by organising the propositions within the argument and by displaying all the connections amongst propositions within the argument (van Gelder, 2001). For an example of an argument map, see Figure 1. Though computer-based argument mapping is a relatively new technique (van Gelder, 2000), some research has examined the efficacy of teaching CT skills using argument mapping as a tool of instruction. For instance, in her meta-analysis, Alvarez-Ortiz (2007) found that students who participated in critical thinking courses that used at least some argument mapping within the course achieved gains in CT ability with an effect size of .68 SD, CI [.51, .86]. In courses where there was “lots of argument mapping practice” there was also a significant gain in students’ CT performance, with an effect size of .78 SD, CI [.67, .89]. These findings compare favourably to the effect sizes observed for participation in philosophy courses (average effect size = .26 SD, CI [.12 - .39]), any other academic course (effect size = .12 SD, CI [.11, .21]), and courses that directly taught CT or had CT infused into the curriculum (average effect size = .49 SD, CI [.39, .59]. Thus, there are a number of studies that have previously used argument mapping as a tool of CT instruction. For example, Tim van Gelder (2001) and van Gelder and Rizzo (2001) provided undergraduate philosophy students with a semester-long CT course, in which students were trained in CT through the use of argument mapping (AM). Students’ CT ability was tested both before and after one college semester using alternate forms of the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (CCTST; Facione, 1990). Results revealed an improvement with an effect size of .84, which implied an impressive gain of almost one standard deviation in CT ability over the course of the semester. It is important to note that, though the authors credit much of this gain to AM training, they also admit that this gain could also be due to other

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aspects of the course, such as the practice regime. Notably, this study did not include a control group or an alternative CT training regime with which to compare AM training. Similarly, van Gelder, Bissett and Cumming (2004) provided undergraduate philosophy students with a 12-week CT course taught through the use of AM. Students were pre-tested using the CCTST. During the course, students were provided with homework exercises and were free to complete as many practice exercises as they wished. Students also attended one tutorial per week in which they had access to both argument mapping software and to direct personal guidance from their tutors. After completion of the course, students were post-tested using the CCTST. Results revealed that CT scores increased significantly from pre- to posttesting with a large effect size of .8 SD, CI [.66, .94]. There was also a significant correlation between performance and AM practice hours (r = .31). Butchart et al. (2009) compared two groups of students who attended AM-infused CT modules (i.e. a module with online automated feedback for AM exercises and a module that contained AM exercises only, with no automated feedback). These modules were compared in turn with a ‘standard’ CT module (i.e. no AM). CT training was heavily concentrated on two CT skills: analysis and evaluation, described by the Delphi Report as core critical thinking skills. Prior to commencement of the course, students completed the CCTST Form A as a pre-test. During the course, students were provided with eight homework assignments and 10 sets of exercises. Automated feedback was provided to students in the automated feedback AM group. After completion of the course, students were post-tested using Form B of the CCTST. Butchart and colleagues found that those who received automated feedback for their AM exercises showed a significant gain in CT ability with a medium effect size of .45. Students who completed the AM exercises without automated feedback showed a gain with an effect size .22. Those who participated in a standard CT module showed a gain with an effect size of .19. Unfortunately, statistical differences among the three groups in this study were not reported. Furthermore, as admitted by the authors, participants in the automated feedback group could have been provided with more informative feedback, as opposed to simply receiving automated notice of a ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ response for placement of a proposition. One could argue that this automatic ‘correction’ of argument mapping exercises is not an ideal form of feedback, in the sense that an explanation as to why a response is incorrect would likely have been more informative to the student. Thus, although students who received automated feedback for their AM exercises showed the largest gain in CT ability, it is unclear how feedback worked to improve performance in this context. Therefore, while research suggests that CT courses taught through the use of AM improve CT ability, there have been a number of problems with the research conducted to date. For example, two of the three studies described above (i.e. van Gelder & Rizzo, 2001; van Gelder, Bissett and Cumming, 2004) did not compare AM-infused CT training with a nointervention control group or a comparable active intervention control group. In addition, although Alvarez-Ortiz’s (2007) meta-analysis suggests that semester-long training courses in AM produce greater gains in CT skills (when compared with standard semester-long courses in introductory philosophy), AM training has not been directly compared with other methods of teaching CT skills, apart from one study where a standard CT course was used for comparison purposes (Butchart et al., 2009).

Figure 1. An example of an Argument Map created through Rationale™.

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Butchart and colleagues reported using the same course structure and teaching the same content “as far as possible” (Butchart et al., 2009, p. 278), but it is unclear how this worked in practice. Furthermore, though Butchart and colleagues compared three groups in their study, these groups were not adequately matched or randomly assigned to experimental conditions. Participants were assigned to experimental conditions based on the semester in which they registered for the CT course. Those in the automated feedback AM group participated in the first semester of the study; those in the standard CT training condition participated in the second semester; and those in the AM exercises only group participated in the third semester of the study. Also, the pre-and-post-test scores (and the resultant gains) of the three groups were not statistically compared, so it difficult to assess whether or not the groups possessed similar or different CT abilities prior to their participation in the course, and whether or not gains across conditions are statistically different from one another. In summary, though evidence suggests that critical thinking can be taught and enhanced, research studies in this area are difficult to compare because of differences across studies in the conceptualisations of critical thinking that inform teaching practices and the selection of measures used to assess performance. Some research studies have examined the efficacy of AM-infused CT training; however, this research is also difficult to interpret due to the absence in some studies of a control condition for comparison purposes and the failure to randomly assign groups to experimental conditions in other studies. Therefore, further research is needed to provide more conclusive evidence in favour of the claim that argument mapping is a tool that facilitates critical thinking ability.

Rationale for the Current Research Argument maps and argument mapping may be a useful pedagogical aid, particularly in situations where students are working to analyse and evaluate complex arguments. The current research is part of a larger set of studies designed to examine the effects of argument mapping on memory for arguments (Dwyer, Hogan, & Stewart, 2010) and growth in critical thinking skill and reflective judgment. The following study examined the effect of AM training on CT skill. Critical thinking performance of those who attended an AM-infused CT seminar series was compared with the performance of those who attended a CT seminar series using identical content but taught using more traditional, hierarchical outlines (HO; see below). The performance of students in both of these active critical thinking training courses was compared to the performance of students who received no explicit CT training. A further aim of the study was to examine the effect of both AM and HO training on students’ disposition towards thinking. Based on previous research (Butchart et al., 2009; van Gelder, Bissett and Cumming, 2004; van Gelder & Rizzo, 2001), we hypothesised that AM training would result in larger gains in CT ability over the course of the semester when compared with both HO training and the control condition. More specifically, though HO organises information for the reader, the structure of an argument is represented as a linear flow of text and it does not make use of a box-and-arrow format, colour cues to represent reasons, objections, and rebuttals, or relational cues (i.e. but, because and however) that link propositions. However, because information within an HO is hierarchically organised, we hypothesise that training in HO

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(like AM training) would result in larger gains in CT ability over the course of the semester when compared with the control condition.

METHOD Design A series of six one-way ANCOVAs were used to assess the effect of the three experimental conditions (AM, HO, & Control) on six ability outcomes: overall CT, analysis, evaluation, inference, deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning, while controlling for baseline CT skill ability. Similarly, a series of seven ANOVAs were also used to assess the effects of the experimental conditions on students’ disposition towards thinking.

Participants Participants were first year psychology students (N = 81; 57 females, 24 males), aged between 18 and 25 years, from the National University of Ireland, Galway. In return for their participation, students were awarded academic course credits. To ensure confidentiality, participants were identified by ID number only.

Materials and Measures The CT intervention materials used in this study were the exercise handouts and CT recordings, and a laptop, a projector and DVDs which were used to present the pre-recorded seminar series. These materials are available upon request. The California Critical Thinking Skills Test (CCTST; Forms B) was administered as a baseline measure at the pre-test session. The CCTST was developed by Peter Facione and colleagues (1990; 2002). The CCTST consists of 34 multiple choice questions, which examine overall CT ability as well as five sub-skills: analysis, evaluation, inference, inductive reasoning, and deductive reasoning. Results are presented as raw scores and are additionally presented as U.S. national percentile equivalents of approximately 2,000 university students. Test reliability ranges from 0.78– 0.84 (Facione, 1991). The CCTST (Form 2000) was administered at the post-testing session. Gain was not measured from pre- to post-testing (i.e. from Form B to Form 2000). Rather, in accordance with Jacobs (1995), the CCTST (Form B) was administered as a baseline measure and analysed as a covariate, whereas the CCTST (Form 2000) was administered as an outcome measure and analysed as the dependent variable. The California Critical Thinking Disposition Inventory (CCTDI; Facione & Facione, 1992) was administered at post-testing. Seven subscales of the CCTDI include: truth seeking, open mindedness, analyticity, systematicity, confidence, inquisitiveness and maturity.

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Finally, a questionnaire was administered at the end of the course which asked students to rate various facets of the course, such as their ability to understand the course, the quality of the materials, and the quality of the instruction.

Procedure The study took place over eight weeks. The two experimental groups attended a 16 hour CT seminar series over the course of eight weeks, differing only in method of presentation (i.e. AM-infused or HO -infused CT training). The seminar series was designed to teach CT according to the framework provided by the Delphi Report and the American Philosophical Association. The control group did not attend any CT seminars. In Week 1, the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Form B) was administered. The seminar series began in Week 2. Seminars were given to four different groups per week: two of which were AM groups and two of which were HO groups. Both AM and HO lectures were identical in content and pre-recorded voice-over, which was dubbed over a PowerPoint™ slideshow using the Echo360™ system recording. Only the slideshows and inclass handouts varied (for purposes of presenting either AM or HO strategies for organizing arguments). The voice-over was performed by the same person (male: research supervisor) and this person did not facilitate the delivery of these recordings to students in the seminar. Independent evaluators rated the quality of the voice-over and judged whether or not there were any substantial differences in the quality of AM and HO delivery. Quality of voiceovers were rated highly and no differences in quality between AM and HO conditions were noted. In the seminars, students were taught skills and then shown how to use them via worked examples. During the seminars, the recordings were often paused and restarted in order to allow time for the completion of exercises. Students were given enough time so that they could actively learn by applying the skills they had just learned. On average, approximately 75% of the time allotted to each class was dedicated to this active learning. The course outline and what was taught in each class is presented in Table 3. In Week 8, after completion of the seminar series, the CT ability of all three groups was again measured using CCTST Form 2000. In Week 8, the CCTDI was administered to all groups in order to examine students’ disposition toward thinking. Students also completed a questionnaire which asked them to rate various facets of the course and make suggestions for improving the course. Students who did not complete the course (e.g. those who simply dropped out), were also given the questionnaire and were asked for reasons why they did not complete the course.

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Christopher Dwyer, Michael Hogan and Ian Stewart Table 3. Critical Thinking Course Outline

Class No. 1 2

Title

What Was Taught

Pre-Testing Session 1: “Introduction to Critical Thinking”

• 1.

3

Session 2: “Unpacking (analysing and evaluating) a persons’ belief”

4

Session 3: “Analysis & Evaluation”

5

Session 4: “Evaluation”

6

Session 5: “Inference”

7

Session 6: “Making Another’s Argument Your Own”

8

Post-Testing

Students completed the CCTST (Form B) pre-test. We think in order to decide what to do and what to believe. 2. We ultimately decide what to believe by adding supports or rebuttals to our own arguments (i.e. questioning our own beliefs). 3. Arguments are hierarchical structures. We can continue to add more levels if we like. 1. In order to analyse an argument, we must extract the structure of the argument from dialogue or prose. 2. Identifying types (sources) of arguments and considering the strength of each type is another form of analysis. 3. The evaluation of the overall strengths and weaknesses of an argument can be completed after adequate analysis. 1. Evaluation includes the recognition of imbalances, omissions and bias within an argument. 2. Evaluative techniques can aid recall. 3. Examining whether or not the arguments used are relevant or logically connected to the central claim is also an important factor in evaluation. We must evaluate: 1. Types (sources) of arguments based on credibility 2. The relevance of propositions to the central claim or intermediate conclusions within the argument 3. The logical strength of an argument structure 4. The balance of evidence within an argument structure 1. Evaluation and inference are intimately related. 2. Inference differs from evaluation in that the process of inference involves generating a conclusion from previously evaluated propositions. 3. In larger informal argument structures, intermediate conclusions must be inferred prior to the inference of a central claim. • Review of all the previous 5 sessions

•

Students completed the CCTST (Form 2000) post-test and the CCTDI

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RESULTS Means and standard deviations for the three groups are presented in Table 6. A series of between-subjects ANCOVAs were conducted to examine the effects of experimental conditions on CT outcomes, while also controlling for baseline CT ability. A preliminary analysis evaluating the homogeneity-of-slopes assumption revealed that there was no significant difference amongst groups on pre-test CT or sub-skill performance. There was a main effect of group on analysis performance, F (2, 77) = 4.74, MSE = .04, p = .011, partial η² = .11, with those in the HO group scoring significantly higher on the analysis post- test than those in the control group (p < .05). Post-hoc analysis revealed borderline difference between the AM and control group, F (1, 77) = 3.59, MSE = .04, p = .06, with the AM group scoring higher than the control group. Though there was no main effect of group on evaluation performance, F (2, 77) = 2.35, p = .103, there were some interesting trends in the data. Specifically, post hoc analyses revealed that the AM group scored significantly higher than the control group on post testing, F (1, 77) = 4.29, MSE = .02, p = .042. There was a borderline main effect of group on inductive reasoning, F (2, 77) = 3.08, p = .052. Post-hoc analyses revealed that the AM group scored significantly higher than those in the control group, F (1, 77) = 4.44, MSE = .02, p = .038; and that the HO group also scored significantly higher than those in the control group, F (1,77) = 4.52, MSE = .02, p = .037. No other effects were observed. A further series of eight ANOVAs were conducted in order to examine the effects of group on disposition and the sub-scales of the CCTDI. There were no main effects of group on overall disposition score, or on the sub-scale scores of truth seeking, open mindedness, analyticity, systematicity, confidence, inquisitiveness or maturity. However, overall disposition score was significantly correlated with post-test CT performance (r = .45, p = .001), but not with pre-test CT performance (r = .16, p = .244).

DISCUSSION We examined the effects of AM-infused and HO-infused CT training on students’ CT performance. Performance on various sub-skills of CT (i.e. analysis, evaluation, inference, inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning) was measured both before and after the intervention, as was students’ disposition towards thinking on post-testing. Results revealed that students in the HO condition performed better than students in the control group on analysis and inductive reasoning at post-testing. Students in the AM condition performed better at post-test than students in the control condition on evaluation and inductive reasoning. Unlike van Gelder and colleagues (2001, 2003, 2004), we did not find a significant effect of AM training on overall CT performance. Although we must evaluate the results of the current study with caution, findings suggest that certain critical thinking skills (i.e. evaluation and inductive reasoning) can potentially be enhanced by argument mapping training. These results also suggest that certain critical thinking skills (i.e. analysis and inductive reasoning) are enhanced by training in hierarchical outlining.

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Table 6. Means and standard deviations (%) and sample size (N) for the three groups at both pre-test and post-test Pre-Test

Post-Test

N

M

SD

M

SD

23 28 30

.48 .44 .41

.15 .16 .15

.51 .50 .43

.14 .13 .13

23 28 30

.55 .49 .45

.15 .18 .19

.67 .72 .58

.17 .16 .22

23 28 30

.46 .41 .36

.17 .14 .14

.45 .41 .34

.17 .17 .13

23 28 30

.44 .40 .41

.16 .15 .16

.47 .46 .43

.16 .15 .16

23 28 30

.49 .42 .40

.16 .16 .13

.59 .58 .50

.13 .15 .14

23 28 30

.46 .45 .40

.15 .16 .13

.42 .42 .36

.16 .16 .16

Overall CT AM HO Control Analysis AM HO Control Evaluation AM HO Control Inference AM HO Control Inductive Reasoning AM HO Control Deductive Reasoning AM HO Control

Results also revealed that a positive disposition toward critical thinking was related to better critical thinking performance at post-testing (Ennis, 1987; Facione, 1990, 1992; Facione, Facione, Blohm & Giancarlo, 2000; Halpern, 2003, 2004). Notably, the correlation between pre-test CT performance and dispositions was not significant. This suggests that

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dispositions such as truth seeking, open mindedness, analyticity, systematicity, confidence, inquisitiveness or maturity may emerge as significant correlates of CT performance only after students have been exposed to some training in CT skills. However, we must interpret these findings with caution because we only measured dispositions at one point in time, that is, at post-test. Furthermore, researchers have identified problems with the measurement of dispositions, including the problematic nature of measuring CT dispositions using self-reports (Ku, 2009). There were a number of limitations in this study. One limitation was the small sample size, which impacted on the power of our statistical analysis. It was difficult to persuade students to register for this extra-curricular CT training course, and although we managed to recruit a relatively large number of students, there was significant attrition from pre-test to post-test. Reasons for attrition included students having conflicting schedules, being too busy with other subjects, and other personal reasons. From the 129 students who initially completed the CCTST pre-test, only 81 completed the post-test. This reduced the power of our statistical analysis. Some borderline effects may well have been significant if our sample size was larger. Another limitation of the current study was the randomization of participants to the control condition. From a pool of approximately 1,000 eligible students, it was hoped that roughly 300 would register for the course. Those who did sign up were to be randomly allocated to the AM group, the HO group, or the control condition. Initially, only 101 students signed up for the course. As a result, to ensure adequate statistical power in the comparison of the AM and HO conditions, those 101 students were randomly allocated to one of two conditions. Therefore, it was necessary to recruit an additional group of students for the control condition. Those who were assigned to the control condition were students who had expressed an interest in attending the CT course but who could not attend due to conflicting schedules. Thus, it may be that those who were recruited for the control condition may have been ultimately less motivated to take part and perform well on the CT tests, as many students in the experimental conditions actually rearranged their schedules in order to attend the CT course. Notably, participants in the control condition performed less well than participants in the AM and HO groups on certain post-test CT skills and it is possible that these differences between the experimental groups and the control group may have been a result of differences in motivation. Although we measured disposition toward critical thinking and found a correlation between CCTST and CCTDI performance on post-test, the CCTDI does not provide us with a direct measure of student motivation to perform well on the CCTST. A measure of students’ motivation would have been useful in the current study, and it could have been included as a second covariate in the analysis of experimental condition of CT outcomes. Another potential limitation of the study is the lack of feedback provided to students during the course. In a meta-analysis by Marzano (1998), it was found that by providing feedback to students on the type of strategy they used and how well they were using it to improve a specific type of cognitive process, students showed a significant gain in achievement, with an effect size of 1.13. Provision of feedback could potentially have also motivated students and curbed attrition in our study. Another challenge in the current study was the selection of a critical thinking test that allowed for adequate measurement of gains associated with CT training. Though the CCTST measures CT and the CT sub-skills according to the Delphi definition and framework, the test itself is not necessarily ideal for

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evaluating gain in intervention studies. For example, according to research by Jacobs (1995), the CCTST Forms A and B are dissimilar in that they possess different levels of difficulty. As a result, Jacobs has recommended that these tests are not used for purposes of measuring individual differences or gains from pre- to post-testing; and instead, one form should be used a covariate measure. In accordance with Jacobs’ research findings, we used Form B as a covariate and baseline measure of CT and the Form 2000 of the CCTST as the outcome measure. Further limitations of the CCTST are apparent when one examines the format of the test. Though there are 34 items which measure analysis, evaluation, inference, inductive and deductive reasoning skills, performance is assessed via multiple choice questions (MCQs). More specifically, the CCTST and many other MCQ tests of critical thinking have been criticised for being basically tests of verbal and quantitative knowledge (Halpern, 2003), since the test-takers are not free to determine their own evaluative criteria nor generate their own solutions to the problem (Ku, 2009). The measurement of critical thinking through MCQs is also problematic given the potential incompatibility between conceptualisations of critical thinking and its assessment using MCQs. MCQ tests assess cognitive capacities associated with identifying single right- and- wrong answers in relation to CT problems, and this approach to testing is unable to provide a direct measure of test-takers use of metacognitive processes such as reflective judgment (Halpern, 2003; Ku, 2009). One solution to this problem would be to use a critical thinking assessment that asks open-ended style questions, which allow for test-takers to demonstrate whether or not they spontaneously use a specific critical thinking skill. However, the only commonly used critical thinking assessment that uses an open-ended format is the Ennis-Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test (Ennis & Weir, 1985), which has been criticised for its domain-specific nature (Taube, 1997), the subjective nature in which the tests are scored and potential biases in favour of test-takers who are more proficient in writing (Adams, Whitlow, Stover & Johnson, 1996). In short, both MCQ and open-ended test formats for assessing critical thinking have their respective limitations. The current trend is to combine the two response formats into one test (Ku, 2009). One final issue to consider in relation to this study is what amounts to a sufficient amount of argument mapping training. One possible reason why AM did not emerge as a better training method than HO is that, because AM is a relatively novel method that students must first master before it becomes useful in promoting CT, more AM training is needed relative to other CT training methods. Based on van Gelder, Bissett and Cumming’s (2004) finding that ‘deliberate practice’ in argument mapping facilitates growth of CT skills, we have to question whether or not sufficient practice in AM was provided in the current study. Van Gelder and colleagues recommend a semester long course in AM-infused CT training. Although the course in this study was only eight weeks, our study suggests that those who attended CT training scored higher on some CT skills at post-testing when compared with those in the control condition. The problem is that these effects were not very large or significant, and we have to question whether or not this is due to the small sample size or the intensity of the training provided. One improvement on the current design would be to include more argument map practice outside the classroom. We initially sought to control for the level of practice in both AM and HO conditions by restricting work to class-time only. While this was done with the good intention of controlling for potential confounds in the comparison between AM and HO training, it may have had a negative impact on the overall efficacy of

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the course. Therefore, extended training in argument mapping through CT, both inside and outside the classroom, is recommended in future studies. Further research is needed in order to discover the conditions that most positively affect CT skill development, including research into the effects of extended training in argument mapping. Further research should also measure and control for students’ motivation level, as the lack of motivation of students is one possible cause of the high attrition rate in this study. In addition, future research should also use measures of CT ability that allow for an assessment of the meta-cognitive abilities of students. For example, open-ended short answer questions that allow for both quantitatively and qualitatively scoring rubrics would be ideal, as they require test-taker to truly consider and evaluate all possible solutions and alternatives and construct an argument in response to a probe question, rather than simply choosing the correct answer on an MCQ. Furthermore, according to the survey taken by students who participated in our study, it was recommended that future research should also aim to assess student ability throughout the course and provide students with feedback throughout. Students also suggested that identification of the student’s initial critical thinking strengths and weaknesses, and how they are improving over time, may act as an incentive to continued participation and engagement throughout the course. Though incentives were provided to students (i.e. research participation credit and two laptops to be awarded to those who showed best effort), it was also suggested by a handful of students that perhaps too many material incentives and rewards may not be a good thing, as any sort of performance-based feedback could potentially be rewarding enough. It was further suggested that making the course available online would be an ideal method of increasing participation as it avoids the issue of timetable clashes with other classes, as students would be able to take the course whenever it suited them. It was also suggested that argument mapping software be provided to students outside the class setting (also suggested by van Gelder, Bissett & Cumming [2004]). In the current study, we did not train students in the use of argument mapping software per se, but rather in the method of argument mapping using paper and pencil materials and exercises provided in class. In summary, thinking is an important aspect of the human experience and consciously thinking about thinking is necessary in academic settings so that students may assess what they have to learn and what they already know. Students often encounter arguments in academic text-books that are difficult to analyse and evaluate due to the way in which the arguments are presented in text format. In order to promote good CT, educators must help students to lessen the cognitive load associated with reading and assimilating text. Argument mapping is a learning tool which may help students in this context. Results from this study suggest that AM training may increase specific CT sub-skills, such as evaluation and inductive reasoning. However, the observed effects were weak and methodological problems in the current study prevent us from drawing any strong conclusions in relation to the value of AM training.

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In: Critical Thinking Editors: Ch. P. Horvath and J. M. Forte, pp. 123-140

ISBN: 978-1-61324-419-7 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 5

BEYOND GDP? TOWARDS A NEW SYSTEM OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTS Frédéric Lebaron* Université de Picardie-Jules Verne, France

By asking in February 2008 Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, Jean-Paul Fitoussi and a group of economists and of social scientists to reflect on new measures of "economic performances and social progress" to make up for the inadequacies of the GDP, the President of the Republic has contributed to legitimise an already established undertaking whose aim is to build "alternative" well-being indicators, whose visibility had increased thanks to the Human Development Indicator (HDI) of the United Nations Development Programme, at the beginning of the 1990s and accelerated during the recent period with the work conducted in the OECD, the European Commission, in think tanks and in the academic world, especially around what is now called "the economics of happiness". The strong echo of the Stiglitz Commission, whose published report gave rise to an official and quite mediatic launch campaign, has heightened certain tensions around the project of new "well-being", "economic performances" or still "sustainability" indicators: is the purpose for example to extend the principle of "monetisation" to the non-merchant sphere to integrate the "damages of progress" or to relativise the monetary measures of wealth to the benefit of other counting units? This contribution questions some of the issues of the Stiglitz Commission and, more widely speaking, addresses the various facets of the current movement aiming to promote "new wealth Indicators". We shall focus more particularly on the divergences running through that space and on the possible resistances raised by such a movement in various sectors (public statistics, the social movements, the world of professional economists, etc.). *

Frédéric Lebaron is professor of sociology at the Université de Picardie-Jules Verne, the director of the Centre universitaire de recherches sur l’action publique et le politique – épistémologie et sciences sociales and a former member of the Institut universitaire de France (IUF). He has recently published La crise de la croyance economics (the Crisis of economic creed) (coll. « Dynamiques socio-économiques » at the Editions du Croquant), and is preparing a book on social indicators (coll. « Topos plus », Dunod). He supervises the "Alterindicateurs" column in the Savoir / Agir review, whose publication director he is.

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The report of the "Commission on measuring economic performances and social progress", so-called "Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi commission" or more often "Stiglitz commission", appointed by President Nicolas Sarkozy in February 2008 [1],underlines the belated consecration of the quest for better wealth and performance measures which had come to light as soon as in the 1970s, in France with the "social indicators" promoted by Jacques Delors [2], and had gained in visibility at the beginning of the 1990s with the launch of the human development indicator by the PNUD [3]. When the report was published in September 2009 [4], then in the form of two books published by Odile Jacob Pub. in November 2009 [5], high French and foreign political, administrative officials as well as worldly recognised famous scientists concluded that in-depth transformation of the statistical recording method in the socio-economic and environmental fields was necessary. The idea is to overcome the limits of the current measuring systems, by modifying "performance" measuring modalities which are considered as basically faulty, legitimately disputed and unsuitable for the contemporary stakes. The limits of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), most of them known for a long time and sources of an already flourishing [6] scientific literature, are the starting point of this observation: centred on production, this indicator describes the incomes and their evolution increasingly poorly, in particular due to the globalisation of economies; "defensive" expenditures such as the reconstruction of pollution-damaged environment or prison expenses are then considered as contributions to wealth; households' production, which is nonmonetary to a vast extent, is not taken into account; the production of the non-merchant sector, assessed by the production costs, is poorly measured; its calculation relies on various by partial "inputations" (a housing expenses is attributed to owner-households); it is based on the notion of average and not of that of variance. According to the Commission, all the national accounting systems set up after the second world war must hence be revamped thoroughly. The public statistical institutions are bound to implement, relatively in the short-term, noticeable changes in the intellectual architecture on which they have been built: their investigation devices, their measuring instruments and other indicators must thoroughly evolve to correct the just aforementioned defects. In terms of public policies, this change must enable better assessment of the economic and social performances at different levels and thus promote the implementation of more appropriate strategies, on a par with the citizens' expectations. The public "decision makers" themselves must grab hold of innovations and apply them in their ordinary concrete activity: they form the explicit target audience of the report. The particularly ambitious and grandiloquent speech by the President of the Republic on the launch day contributes to granting an official character to said change: "A formidable revolution lies ahead of us. Each of us is now fully aware of it. This revolution will only take place if nurtured in our minds. (...) Statistics, accounting, reflect our aspirations, the value we ascribe to things. They are indissociable from a Weltanschauung, from economics, from society, from an idea of man, from his/her relation to others. To consider them as objective data, external to ourselves, which are unquestionable and indisputable is undoubtedly reassuring, comfortable, but surely dangerous. (...) For many years, people whose life was becoming increasingly difficult were told that their standard of living was increasing. How should they not feel led astray? (...) For a number of years, the statistics have pointed out an increasingly high economic growth as a victory over shortage, until said growth appeared to destroy more than it created, by jeopardising the future of the

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planet. (...) Behind the religion of numbers, behind the whole edifice of our statistical and accounting representations, also lies the religion of market which is always right (...) If the market had the right answer for everything, it would be common knowledge. If the market were never wrong, everyone could see it. (...) The market is not meaningful. It does not equate with responsibility. It does not equate with project. It does not equate with vision. The financial markets even less. » [7].

Box: A Multifaceted and Long-Term Movement The movement of the "alternative indicators" (according to one of the labels currently used) both corresponds to a work completed in certain public bodies, NGOs and by researchers regrouped in independent centres. It has grown in successive "waves" in scattered sectors, without coordination nor global coherence, without common denomination and with a rather small degree of institutionalisation. The notion of "social indicators" crystallised in the 1960-70s in the United States, primarily within the academic world, with the publication of several books and then as of 1974, of a journal entitled Social Indicators Research. Jacques Delors and a group of Ecole nationale d’administration (ENA) students imported this scientific movement to France in 1967-1968, by endeavouring to suggest "social indicators" within the framework of the French plan, within which Jacques Delors was a civil servant. This politico-administrative guarantee confers mediatic visibility to the movement, even if the latter retracts from public space with the 19731974 crisis. The movement is then again mainly discussed in academic reviews. The human development indicator no sooner appeared within the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) than in the beginning of the 1990s, after years of internal discussions about the choice of the best development indicators and of a necessary synthetic measure, to which partake economists such as Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen. At the end of the 1990s, independent companies emerged at the intersection of universities and certain NGOs. In France, the BIP40 is one of the most known, and also of the most criticised (especially by the official public statistics). In Canada, the Centre for the Study of Living Standards (CSLS) enjoys great success with the Index of Economic Well-Being (Andrew Sharpe and Lars Osberg), often presented as quite "innovating", in particular because it emphasises the notion of "economic insecurity" among other dimensions. Researchers and associative actors get together. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), to a lesser extent the World Bank, join the UNDP in a movement which henceforth impregnates certain of the main international organisations, within which the neo-liberal discourse has got the upper hand. The OECD published its first social indicators in 2001, but in the form of a dashboard and not of a synthetic indicator. The national public statistics organisations are now being concerned as well. Parallel to this movement limited to the most "critical" fringes of international organisations, the "economics of happiness" develops in the world of academic economists, in the wake of the work of Easterlin. They are mainly centred on the study of the relations between wealth (GDP) and well-being or "happiness". The turning point towards the economics of happiness of the academic research became more obvious in the second half of the 2000 and has further somehow marginalised the most prominent research work in social sciences in the 1990, such as the attempts originating from NGOs (in France, the BIP), or independent centres such as the Institute for innovation in social policy (Miringoff, United States) or the Centre for the Study of Living Standards (CSLS, Canada) [15].

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For the President of the French Republic, the report is hence the opportunity of a true "cultural revolution", leading to break away from exclusively merchant measures that the crisis would have ruled out definitely. He also states that "France will open everywhere the debate on the conclusions of this report (...) It will include the study of this report in the syllabus of all the application schools of its public service [8]."

The decision to mandate Joseph Stiglitz [9], alongside with Amartya Sen [10] and JeanPaul Fitoussi [11], to make a collection of proposals in this area, can be considered as the somehow paradoxical victory of a multifaceted movement, which some years ago still seemed to be doomed to remain neglected by institutions, before asserting themselves successively, to a limited extent, in different international organisations (United Nations Organisation, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, World Bank...). The crisis has contributed to strengthen the promoters of this statistical "renovation" even more: the ° introduction to the report [12] explicitly indicates that "certain members of the Commission believe that the latter makes [their recommendations] all the more urgent [13]". It is in particular what the President of the Republic expresses in his preface, who states that the crisis reveals the inadequacy of current statistical tools. The text published by the three economists to outline the philosophy of the report (entitled "Essay on measuring") goes even further along those lines, considering that the crisis is even partially the product of deficient measuring instruments, a thematic which falls into a vaster movement of criticism of the . accounting [14] and financial Indicators

THE OUTLINES OF THE REPORT: AMBITION AND TECHNICITY The text of the report combines two features which may seem contradictory at first view: ambition and technicity. In more than one way, it comes across as a "manifesto" and contains a strong programmatic dimension. The recommendations and numerous formulations here and there vigorously claim for new practices: "a major effort should also be conducted..."; "... should be taken into account"; "... must be taken into account"; "allocate statistical means to the fields wherein the available Indicators remain insufficient", etc. If the demands addressed to the statistical devices remain relatively vague, they are nevertheless numerous, involve significant public investment and are presented as major inflections which should allow for noticeable social and political changes. On the other hand, the report is both long (the French version entailed 324 pages of a very dense text [16]) and often technical, let alone esoteric, juxtaposing concepts and indicators borrowed from sometimes contradictory or still quite distinct theoretical frameworks. Numerous developments, in particular in the first part dedicated to the GDP, pertain to improving national accounting [17]. As a bureaucratic-scientific project developed after the war, confronted with many issues (or "anomalies"), national accounting was hence supposed to go from strength to strength and grow steadily so as to integrate the response to said issues, but sadly lacking simplicity and coherence. Without giving up totally on using the GDP, the report recommends for example increased usage of actual household incomes and consumption, as many items already present in national accounting, but still poorly measured.

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Its purpose is hence to focus the representation of economy on actual consumption and incomes, including on their unequal distribution (which however comes second, after the "central tendency" measure), aspects that a representation focused on sole global production should smooth out. This first point partially challenges a "productivist" vision, which has hitherto innervated the different streams of political economy and of economic thinking, but to the benefit of a conception which remains monetary and partially "consumerist" or "utilitarian". Insisting repeatedly on the principle of equivalence (an identical service for a household for example should not be accounted for differently according to the public or private legal status of its provider), the report appeals for better measure of non merchant services (in particular healthcare or education) thanks to which households enjoy a well-being which is for the time being vastly ignored by official statistics. Along the same line of thought, the aim is to develop patrimony accounts at all levels and to submit the balance sheets thus prepared to "resistance tests" based upon various exploitation hypotheses, "where there are no market prices or when said prices are subjected to erratic fluctuations or speculative bubbles [18]." The difficulties associated with the monetary measure of patrimony, in an extended meaning, hence open up immense perspectives for national accountants. The vision developed in the report confers greater significance to non merchant public services and to the wealth they generate, to the domestic activity and to all the stock variations that affect the activity in the long run. It hence offers more integrated representation of the whole social activity, less strictly "economic" or "economicist", a vision which corresponds more to that long-developed vision in social sciences (sociology, anthropology, political science, etc.). As regards the "quality of life", which is the subject matter of the second part, the developments bearing upon the three conceptual frameworks presented as the most "useful" for analysing this issue (measures of the subjective well-being [19],"capabilities" and "fair allowances" theories) refer to the corresponding theories or economic work, which are represented within the Commission by their main promoters. The report attempts to convince the reader of their "operational" usefulness. The methodological difficulties and the lack of reliable data are, and the report readily admits it, the main obstacles to scientific knowledge in the field: quarterly or a fortiori monthly homogenous data bearing upon work conditions or subjective well-being are not or hardly available. The report thus recommends the multiplication of investigations for measuring realities hitherto remained little objectivated: a concern prevailing since the beginning of the movement of social indicators is a similar instance. Another element to be noted is the report focusing on citizens' subjective perception of the ordinary activity, as measured by surveys on the timetable which integrate attitude issues, along the lines of the work of Kahneman on the "U index" ("unpleasant"), a dissatisfaction indicator constructed on the basis of a detailed subjective assessment of daily activities. The indicators presented in the third part dedicated to "sustainability" are abstract intellectual constructions akin to sophisticated national accounting methods, as is the case of net adjusted savings (NAS), derived from the work of the World Bank, especially from research conducted by "Nobel" Kenneth Arrow, a member of the Commission. In a 2004 report, the Bank evaluates the "net internal savings" for the quasi-totality of countries in the world [20]. The starting point is gross savings measured by national accounting, from which the capital consumption of generated assets can be deduced, which allows to obtain net savings. Said value is added the educational expenses, measures of human capital investment.

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The depletion of various natural resources can be assessed, on the basis of the profit derived from said resources, and the damages resulting from global carbon dioxide pollution can be estimated. The data obtained from the NAS are, little intuitively at first glance, quite favourable to China, where gross savings are very high. The variations in NAS do not provide radically different estimates from gross savings. Especially, the aim of this indicator is to monetise the notion of sustainability, which proved to be one of the most problematic and controversial items of the work of the Commission and of its reception. Between the draft and the final version, the wording has been smoothed out and attenuated, due to quite critical public reactions from certain members, influenced by “decrease” theories and the ecology stream.

Box 1. The Recommendations of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Report Recommendation 1: When assessing material well-being, one should refer to incomes and consumption rather than production. Recommendation 2: emphasise the household perspective Recommendation 3: consider income and consumption jointly with wealth Recommendation 4: give more prominence to the distribution of income, consumption and wealth Recommendation 5: broaden incomes indicators to non-merchant activities Recommendation 6: the quality of life depends on the objective conditions of people and on their "capabilities" (dynamic capacities). Steps should be taken to improve measures of people's health, education, personal activities and environmental conditions. In particular, substantial effort should be devoted to developing and implementing robust, reliable measures of social connections, political voice and insecurity that can be shown to predict life satisfaction. Recommendation 7: quality-of-life indicators in the dimensions covered should assess inequalities in a comprehensive way. Recommendation 8: surveys should be designed to assess the links between various quality-of-life domains for each person, and this information should be used when designing policies in various fields. Recommendation 9: statistical offices should provide the information needed to aggregate across quality-of-life dimensions, allowing the construction of different indexes. Recommendation 10: measures of objective and subjective well-being provide key information about people's quality of life. Statistical offices should incorporate questions to capture people's life evaluation, hedonic experiences and priorities in their own surveys. Recommendation 11: sustainability assessment requires a well-identified dashboard of indicators. The distinctive feature of the components of this dashboard should be that they are interpretable as variations of some underlying "stock". A monetary index of sustainability has its place in such a dashboard; still, under the current state of the art, it should remain essentially focused on economic aspects of sustainability. Recommendation 12: The environmental aspects of sustainability deserve a separate follow-up based on a well-chosen set of physical indicators. In particular, there is a need for a clear indicator of our proximity to dangerous levels of environmental damage (such as associated with climate change or the depletion of fishing stocks).

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Many critical diagnoses are contained in the report: for example, the inability of the GDP, focused on merchant assessment, to measure not only well-being, but even economic performance, which net domestic product, or even better, actual household incomes, can approximate with greater accuracy. The American counterexample used by Stiglitz (an increasing GDP whereas households cannot see their incomes rise) is the most striking, and it is also highly symbolical: the "American model" has thus lost its dominating status explicitly. Similarly, the depiction of the blatant limits of public statistics in terms of objectivation of the quality of life: lack of surveys, of comparable data, of measure of the positive or negative time perception as experienced by individuals, etc. Finally, the little satisfactory, contradictory and poorly unified character of the set of current sustainability indicators, which cannot only be monetary, but must also be "physical" and which should measure variations in stocks so as to come closer to the idea of sustainability: the current consumption should not affect the future consumption possibilities. The report, on this score, leads to a moderate and pragmatic vision, by advocating limited usage of physical and monetary indicators.

THE LEGITIMACY OF THE COMMISSION OR THE BOUNDARIES OF "EXPERT" KNOWLEDGE Announced at the beginning of 2008, the composition of the Commission proved to be a major stake, expressed publicly on several occasions by most critical commentators. The Stiglitz commission indeed includes economists who are admittedly rather "critical" against mainstream thought and especially neoliberalism in its more radical version, but consecrated by international academic institutions [21] ; internationally recognised neoclassical economists who have enriched the well-being theory or to national accounting, and officials in charge of national and international statistical organisations; finally a few economists, closer to other social sciences, who have contributed to original empirical work in the field. It has mobilised members of national (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, INSEE, Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques, OFCE) and international (OECD) bodies, involved in the reforming movement, as "drafters". The Commission also illustrates, as this has been far less emphasised, the outstanding American domination in economics (of happiness), which has become overwhelming in the contemporary French context. Out of the 24 members of the Commission, 12 hold a position in an American university, among whom 3 in Princeton, 2 in Chicago and 2 in Columbia. 5 are economics "Nobel" prize winners. The Commission has hence mobilised strong academic symbolical capital associated with the United States, representatives of statistical organisations and with recognised expertise: it is in the heart of "international" economic science that the signal of statistical revolution originates, although prone to multiple internal tensions can be seen between the lines in the report [22]. The first implicit exclusion relates to human and social sciences. Psychology (apart from punctual mentions), sociology, demography, political science, let alone history [23], geography or anthropology, are left aside to the benefit of the national accounting / economic theory combination, supposedly at the core of the stakes and issues of well-being and socioeconomic performance, which means implicit bias in favour of an utilitarian vision, regardless

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how moderate, of well-being and especially of accounting monetisation, especially in terms of environment. This contributes to giving more technician and anhistoric vision of the issue, centred on the way that national accounting and theoretical economics could develop in the future in new directions [24] and thus fuel the work in this field. It is one of the aspects of the symbolic "captation" and "closing" due to the creation of the Commission: it restricts a set of intrinsically pluridisciplinary research issues to the domain of economic science, which causes favourable bias to both utilitarian and monetary representation of well-being and sustainability. Constantly reasserted, the measure and the explanation of (economic, social, environmental) inequalities are thus pushed in the background de facto. The second exclusion concerns actors of the "civil society" some of whom, quite variably, have still racked their brains for some years around the issue of alternative indicators, in particular by constructing indicators [25], databases [26] or by making radical propositions in this respect, sometimes with strong mediatic and political echo. Still, the "participative" dimension of the project of "new wealth indicators" has often been put forward in the numerous social debates on the subject [27]: it is a democratic mobilisation project as well as a scientific project. The French BIP40, for instance, is not mentioned when the synthetic poverty and inequality indicators are evoked, in the part dedicated to "quality of life". The FAIR forum has formed, precisely, around Jean Gadrey, to offer a democratic approach to the preparation and the choice of indicators. More generally, the constructions of synthetic indicators are contested for the sake of resorting pragmatically to "dashboards", which in fine translate in "sets of indicators" (which corresponds to the leadership within official, national and international statistical organisations [28]). Some authors wish that the "non-merchant", especially associative, world were more emphasised in the Stiglitz report, contrary to what authors such as Patrick Viveret or Bernard Perret, associated with the "second left" (in particular in the Esprit journal) and with the promotion of the "third sector", used to do a few years ago. Other authors insist, in the wake of Dominique Méda, on the feminine underrepresentation also conspicuous within the Commission, which is the third objective exclusion, characteristic thereof. Patrick Viveret, answering a question on the www.terraeco.net site, clearly asserts such a posture: "it is important that a commission with economists of this calibre should recognise the well-foundedness of the criticisms addressed to the GDP for several years; but which remained associated with alternative sectors by public opinion. It tells us that indicators have made us blind and underlines the need to measure ecological and social sustainability. The point is that this commission has worked exclusively between economists and statisticians, with few ladies, whereas feminine sensitivity is needed on the activity-inactivity theme [29]." Finally, the discussion on sustainability indicators is a far cry from the dominant environmental specialists, linked with natural sciences, biologists in particular. Still, the former have already embarked on intense scientific struggle around the construction of durability Indicators and are involved in quite numerous researches on damage to natural environment. The commission finally appears as a relatively confined space, centred on the dominant academic economic science and on the official statistical devices [30]. This explains that a portion of the criticisms made thereto precisely pertains to its composition and its intrinsic limits. such is the case for instance of the criticism made by Dominique Méda, a graduate

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from Normal Sup, a philosophy professor, a member of the Inspection générale des affaires sociales and senior scientist in the Centre d’études de l’emploi, who explains: "The commission only included two ladies and a vast majority of economists who worked behind closed doors, without ever meeting with the civil society. It refused to query the way citizens might decide together what is really important to them. Furthermore, it left significant room for very individualistic approaches. I refer to the quality of life measured by individual satisfaction or to indicators which are vulnerable to criticism, such as net adjusted savings. On the other hand, the commission has firmly opposed the idea of GDP-alternative or complementary synthetic indicators. It is a pity. Finally, its recommendations have not been implemented for the time being, or in homeopathic doses, and apparently they are not on the agenda any longer today" (an interview to L'Hebdo, by Philippe Le Bé, put on line on 16 June 2010). This social confinement, with its consequences on the generated and diffused "contents", may however be seen as a condition of the political and social efficiency of the commission, inasmuch as the political leaders have obviously attempted to mobilise a maximum of scientific capital, a particular form of symbolic capital.

IN THE MIDST OF RADICAL REJECTION, SCEPTICISM, QUALIFIED CRITICISM, PRAGMATIC ACCEPTANCE AND PROSELYTISTIC ENTHUSIASM: A MIXED RECEPTION If the quite mediatised publication of the report has given rise to numerous comments, they originate in the first place from the usual actors of the political game, party speakers, journalists and other "generalists" news analysts. The main newspapers, just like the political parties, nevertheless cover the event rather obligingly, with limited effort to politicise the contents (see text box 2 on the communiqué of the PS.) Libération even invites Joseph Stiglitz, whose democrat orientations and criticisms of neoliberal policies are well-known, to comment upon current affairs in its pages on 15 September 2009. The range of attitudes, as can be described sketchily for want of a (underway) quantitative study, reveals vast interpretive amplitude, from radical rejection to proselytistic enthusiasm via all nuances and "viewpoints", all possible tones, on the report: as in numerous cases, the announcement also functions like a "projective test" which sometimes tells as much about commentators as about the study object. Certain analysts thus interlace their presentation of the report with their own ideological conceptions: Le Figaro, who was privy to reading the report, outlined on 11 September a legitimisation of "individualistic" approaches, which triggered a harsh reaction from Jean Gadrey, who embodies the "critical" wing of the commission [31]. Christine Boutin, on the right of the political spectrum, seizes the issue of the criticism of the GDP. In an official commentary, "Christine Boutin, the president of the Christian-Democrat Party (PCD), in the wake of the Copenhagen climate summit, considers the reformation of the GDP as a "matter of urgency" so as to incorporate "the environmental and human capital", as suggested by the Stiglitz report. "Among the various causes of failure" in Copenhagen she notes, in a communiqué, the "unfounded fear of the signatory countries to have to curb their growth and hence to become poorer" (...), "the blatant inability of the people in power" to measure their increasing wealth "other than through the GDP" which is but a "productive activity indicator". If France adopts a "double

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measure of its growth", one in compliance with international classifications, the other taking into account the social and environmental dimensions of the economic activity, it will be "at the forefront of the struggle to protect the planet and to eradicate poverty", Ms Boutin concluded". Some appeal for the use of happiness indicators, after the "model" practiced by the State of Bhutan since the 1970s with "gross national happiness", incidentally mentioned quite often in magazine commentaries as illustrating these "alternative indicators": this rather "conservative", possibly "traditionalist" monarchy, defends a hostile position to the development of tourist industry and uncontrolled globalisation. On the whole, the reactions nevertheless seem to be more numerous and more favourable on the left than on the right of the politico-mediatic spectrum. Box 2. The Socialist Party And The Stiglitz Report Committed to an undertaking of doctrinal renovation around the notion of "care", the Socialist Party harshly reacts to the publication of the Stiglitz report, by supporting its goals while condemning current public policies and by mobilising an indicator, the "gross domestic happiness", calculated by the Centre for the study of living standards, which is clearly favourable to the "plural left" government policy. "The conclusions of the Stiglitz report reflect the rather wide consensus today on the necessity to have economic indicators which are not limited to measuring the production of goods and services. For enlightened citizens' information, democratic debate, experts work, political choices, items such quality of life, environment, health, culture, quality of public services or still inequalities in plain and simple synthetic indicators must be considered. The Socialist Party demands their implementation and eagerly anticipates their revelations. Indeed since 2002, the right-wing policy has accumulated regressions, which is clearly shown by existing well-being indicators. The "gross domestic happiness" index calculated by the Centre for the study of living standards (Canada) reached its peak in France in 2002, after an exceptional growth period between 1997 and 2002, and has decreased continuously since then. Is it any wonder? (...). as usual, the words of Nicolas Sarkozy totally contradict his actions. His whole policy defeats the logic associated with wellbeing indicators in place. And it is particularly shocking to hear him suggest to put an end to "the religion of numbers", whereas he was the one to impose that "religion", in particular for the security policy, with many perverse effects. Considering well-being in all its dimensions and the necessity to be done with outrageous consumer society lies at the heart of the socialists project and of the civilisation offensive launched at the Summer University in La Rochelle. ". Communiqué of the Socialist Party, September 2009.

Reactions, in particular, accumulate on newspapers Websites and on "blogs": 54 "reactions" for instance on the Figaro site, where, alongside with asserted supports, more than one internaut is extremely critical against the report, against Joseph Stiglitz, sometimes against Nicolas Sarkozy, and in some cases point out a contradiction between the critical tone of the report and the orientations of the government in power, also emphasised on left-wing newspapers websites. Some scepticism can be felt as regards the spirit of the report. For Fanch12, "the temperature is either too high to too low, who cares, change thermometer! As feelings today have superseded reality, we shall feel less warm or less cold all of a sudden. Fantastic, is it not? (Figaro site, 11/09/2009). For Sacripant, "able to transcend his ideological

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preferences and to call upon Stiglitz who makes no bones about his political preferences(at the antipodes of Nicolas Sarkozy's) and then capable of ignoring the recommendations he might have advocated (see Attali), and finally to carry on with sudden insights unseating his own camp. Nicolas Sarkozy, a potential great reformer, but constantly held on a tight lead by the daemons of demagoguery, electoralism and communication. What a pity!" (Figaro site, 11/09/2009).

The 94 reactions to the article announcing the Stiglitz report on the Libération site are also often negative, since they often first and foremost address the President of the Republic and "the right", again accused of "breaking the thermometer", of pursuing an "ideological scrambling" strategy", etc. Scepticism about the spirit of the report is just as assertive: "Well, one may wonder how they're going to measure such a relative value as well-being! A firstclass hoax! We shall rise by 10 degrees at least on the Sucker scale" (professeurMaboul NuttyProfessor, Libération site, 14/09/2009). The spontaneous politicised way in which the report was received outlines the ambiguity of its significance: it is perceived, and often denounced, as a political "feat" pulled off by the President of the Republic, a simple communicational "soliciting" operation. "I would like to add to my previous comment that Mr Sarkozy has a gift for misinterpreting the reality of things. On the brink of the biggest economic and financial crisis of the century, Mr Sarkozy was preaching for full employment, full blast economics, etc. etc. (al of us were full blast economics). Not once could he forecast that crisis. This time again, with an oxygen mask on his nose, he offers a "gross national happiness" and ideas worthy of an exalted. We're going to relapse, Mr President, and you still don't catch the tide of the way history is going. Once again, you will of course save the world and the whole universe. But you might be wellinspired to take the appropriate measures before the situation really stinks. "We the people do beg you" ("onvouslavaitdit - wehadtoldyouso", Libération site, 14/09/2009).

The propositions of the Commission sometimes tie in with alterglobalist criticism. "It would pay to listen to alterglobalists. They have been saying for a long time that GDPbased calculation of wealth is an aberration. GDP measures partly false things. For example, a storm destroys and conditions reconstructions which raise the GDP, whereas everything was destroyed. It does not take the weight of education into account, since knowledge-induced wealth is difficult to assess, because it takes a while to realise. It is contrary to neoliberal short-term conception. » (Robert, Libération site, Monday 14 September).

The press, sites and blogs [32] offer numerous supporting attitudes, which may be unconditional, marked or more nuanced [33]. The "movement" is launched officially, which strengthens the actors mobilised. At the same time, the national and international statistical offices will play a decisive role for the future of the propositions put forward by the commission. The level of consensus on the stakes and the significance of the report appears rather low, which confirms the assumption of notable and generalised cognitive disturbance, as well in political actors (diagrammatically, the left supports the "spirit" of the report by blaming the government, whereas the right is divided between those that follow the government and the most critical, who abruptly reject what appears to them as a "severe ideological blow") as in journalists and internauts, as many unconstrained interpreters who deliver a portion of actual political and symbolical usages which can be derived therefrom.

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Box 3: "Eco is Facts" or Head on Clash Against Profane Neoliberalism On the Figaro site, the reactions to the slightly early announcement of the publication of the report are numerous and sometimes hefty. The reaction of that Internaut expresses a "neoliberal" ideological posture which can be found on numerous occasions and which crystallises a number of discursive features, as invoking economic discipline as a source of scientific truths omitted in the report, or still the "concrete" character of monetary measure. "[HDI] is not an economic performance measuring instrument. To what extent is life expectancy characteristic of eco-performances? Still, it is included in the HDI... HDI represents a subjective vision of what Good looks like for a nation whose main objective it to have well-fed citizens regardless of what they do. (...). Economics is not poppycock, it's not simplistic, it's not so complicated either. Eco is FACTS. When you're loaded with it, there are two possibilities. Either you've stolen it or you've got someone who found it judicious to give you money in exchange for something he deemed worthy of that price. That's it. Anything else is crap. Either you earn money without any constraints or you extort it. This is concrete. The rest is Byzantine considerations on "right, but what shall we do with this money is not ours (yet)?" Enough of governments' mass extortion led insidiously by "higher aspirations" which are always Trojan horses for the cupidity of the men in power who capitalise on poor people's jealousy. (...) Who creates wealth in France? The CAC 40 or Healthcare? Small and mid-sized companies or the ministry of economy? Growth IS an imperfect indicator, but it is the best we have because it is concrete: How much dough have we generated? Obviously, currency does not represent all the value, but it still may represent the whole merchant value. And merchant value is what we are willing to exchange voluntarily. The rest, taxes, etc. is akin to foreclosures (with or without cooperation). It is wealth too, but wealth acquired by force, whereas capitalists' wealth you have in mind is a created wealth. (…). As Stiglitz is knowingly a NEW KEYNESIAN, he is diametrically opposed to neoliberal theses".

THE SPACE OF "EXPERT" POSITIONS In the world of economists, the legitimacy of the Commission, with its five "Nobel" prize winners, imposes relative silence on the French academic elite. The Paris School of Economics however organised in March 2010 (within the framework of the Master of the Public Policies and Development Ecole Normale Supérieure) a conference around the results of the commission, with François Bourguignon, Marc Fleurbaey (members of the commission), Denis Cogneau. No economist in the Toulouse School of Economics, traditionally with predominantly neoliberal orientation, has weighed in visibly in the debate. Most "moderate" neoliberal economists hardly step in, but the council of economic analysis, predominantly neoliberal for several years, was referred to in 2010 by the President of the Republic and German Chancellor Angela Merkel about the request for creating a set of 20 well-being and sustainability indicators. Christian de Boissieu, president of the Council of economic analysis (official advisers of the prime minister), defends this project publicly, which is in line with the Stiglitz report. The ultraliberals are fairly isolated in view of an apparently overwhelming position, since it encompasses a spectrum of "streams" ranging from critical sociologists to official economists.

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It is among heterodoxical economists and socio-economists that stances, which can be characterised generally as a support embellished with criticisms, are the most visible. Jean Gadrey, quoted enormously and repeated on a multitude of websites of associations, political parties, newspapers (in the first place of course the monthly newspaper Alternatives économiques which hosts him) expresses this critical support. He is significant of a current stance in the promoters of synthetic well-being indicators, among whom Dominique Méda, who participates with him in the FAIR forum, Florence Jany-Catrice (senior lecturer at the university of Lille) or still Patrick Viveret can be mentioned, followed by many other authors and organisations abroad. This "internal criticism" has materialised rather rapidly during the work of the commission, after a fit of temper against its composition, which led Dominique Méda to contest it publicly. An Emeritus economics professor in Lille 1, Jean Gadrey has been since the beginning of the 2000s one of the main promoters in France of the new wealth indicators movement. He has recently developed his critical and radical analyses, increasingly inspired by the thematic of "decrease", via the FAIR forum (and in Alternatives économiques). In a text published on the FAIR forum with Dominique Méda, Jean Gadrey developed in June 2009 [34] a nuanced criticism of the Stiglitz report, which will operate as a reference stance in a "non-official" sphere of influence: he maintains that fair diagnoses can be found therein, as well as interesting but timid propositions, and at the same time the expression of the stranglehold of economists and of a dangerous "monetisation" volition of indicators, especially in terms of environmental sustainability [35]. His criticisms focus around this third aspect incidentally, which reflects the growing intensity of the stakes around public policies in terms of environment and their economic consequences. These stances are widely shared by the organisations and increasingly numerous initiatives around these stakes. As regards sociologists, reference, although significant, to social inequalities (including inequalities between socio-professional categories) does not raise overflowing enthusiasm, since it is again "captured" by economists and relegated to a secondary and corrective role. The report admittedly remains mostly "economic", whether in the first or third part, with a focus on "performance" measures, and the "social indicators" issue as that of economic performances or sustainability, has not mainly been treated through the prism of social inequalities, as often put in the foreground by social sciences. In the same manner, the authors' blind faith in "subjective" indicators, as measured quite roughly by answering "satisfaction" questions can only raise cautious reactions in specialists of questionnaire-based investigation methods, who know that answers to questions not always have a single meaning. Finally, monetisation of environmental damage measuring comes across as a dangerous technical sophistication since it may strengthen the "artificial" market construction processes. Rejection stances nevertheless are voiced among economists, including those called "heterodoxical". Such is the case first of all of the Marxist and Keynesian economists most bent on "value-added sharing" (hence GDP sharing). Christophe Ramaux, a Keynesian economist, a senior lecturer in Paris and a member of the Left Party, defends the GDP as a productive activity measuring instrument in an article in Politis published in July 2009, entitled "Long live the GDP! But not on its own": although ascribing an "anti-capitalist" character to the GDP(by officially integrating non-merchant services) and reminding that we are dealing here with a convention based on an irreplaceable monetary measure for macroeconomic analysis, Christophe Ramaux still acknowledges the relevance of other indicators. He criticises nevertheless the limits of the "ecological footprint" as an

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environmental indicator which is advocated in the report and more widely speaking in the public space. Michel Husson, a former economist of the Revolutionist Communist League (LCR in French) and close to the "critical left" (he is a chronicle writer in the Regards review supervised by Clémentine Autain), an administrator of the INSEE and an economics professor shows, in an ironic note published on his personal web site, that the subjective happiness indicators advocated vigorously by the Commission are highly correlated with the logarithm of the GDP, which leads him to relativise the scope of the "alternative" developed by the commission and to repeat a "productivist" stance often encountered in the field of economics of happiness. Many criticisms address the environmental indicators suggested. As noted by Yannick Rumpala, they have multiplied impressively over the last years, in connection with the recompositions of the public action [36], within the framework of a new mode of governance, analysed incidentally as one of the aspects of "new public management [37]." Their signification and their usages may appear ambiguous and ambivalent. On the economists' and ultra-liberal thinkers' front finally, quite violently hostile stances at times target Joseph Stiglitz primarily, who is coined as one of the main enemies of the "true liberals". But they have little access to the mediatic space, apart from the blogs and of "reactions" on the sites. Slightly isolated in his fiercely reactionary stances in Le Figaro, Alain-Gérard Slama frontally contests the usage of indicators such as the HDI: "The adoption of these new [HDI] criteria has seen the emergence of another configuration of the planet (...) We're surely much the better for it: history-laden tumultuous nations, bursting with invention, noise and fury, cynically overestimated by the GDP index have been superseded by the fabulous destiny of the Northern countries with their civilising ideal, whose unfathomable boredom and stifling conformism has been depicted by Bergman's unforgiving look [38]".

On his blog [39], the ultraliberal essayist Guy Sorman goes even further: "Jean-Philippe Cotis has presented the Stiglitz report to his UNO colleagues where it is suggested to replace the conventional measure of national wealth (GDP) with a qualitative evaluation of the Gross national happiness (sic). The communication has raised the interest of the poorest countries (Morocco in particular) who thus hope to realise that they are no so poor after all! The Americans have looked askance at that project(Stiglitz is rather gibed at in the United States) and have reminded that the already existing qualitative measures (as adopted by the UNO) surprisingly reveal that the richest nations are also those where people live the best and longest lives".

The financier Georges Ugeux, whose blog is often quoted, tends to agree and well illustrates the discrepancy between the narrow-minded world of economic elites and the problematics raised by the Commission: "I was in a restaurant in New-York and one of my table neighbours asked me what President Sarkozy had in mind when suggesting to incorporate life enjoyment in the Gross National Product. I had not paid much heed to these presidential words which had apparently interested the my American interlocutors, who wondered whether France had a monopoly on life enjoyment. And they went on to mention the attempt to include French gastronomy in Unesco's cultural heritage of humanity. The conversation evolved into various directions: I felt ill at ease at

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first. I was rather upset by such a superficial statement in the midst of widespread unemployment. This reminds of the "brioches" (little buns) that Marie-Antoinette wanted to distribute to the people who had no more bread in 1789. How can a recently jobless man's or woman's life enjoyment be measured? Is this statement sarcastic or thoughtless? (...) The French Commission on this subject confirms the flimsiness of its proposer, Nobel prizewinner John Stiglitz who, when he was the Chief Economist of the World Bank, raised many eyebrows."

THE "SEQUELS" TO THE REPORT: THE REVOLUTION UNDERWAY? Several critical comments insist on the cumbersome changes implied by the implementation of the report's propositions. The GDP remains quite dominant in the ordinary economic and social analysis, inspite of the increasing and dormant questioning of this indicator, which can only be exacerbated by the publication of the report. The most radical propositions concerning general patrimony accounts have met with scepticism, expressed for instance by French economist André Babeau in the Commentaire review [40]. In a press conference on 17 November 2009, followed by articles (especially in the daily newspaper Le Monde), Jean-Philippe Cotis, the director general of the INSEE, announces that the INSEE will take into account the impulse given by the Stiglitz report and puts forward a far-reaching work programme, as well as a bundle of early results in its extension, in particular in terms of international comparison. Nevertheless, he maintains the idea of "completing" the GDP with other indicators and insists on the multidimensionality of the real world. In the light of this omnipresent GDP and of the still limited legitimacy of "alternative" indicators, changes in perspective stand little chance of translating in short-term turmoils in the official representation of economic and social performances. The director of the INSEE besides insisted on a continuity rather than a break: "this report, which marks a milestone, still does not break away from current statisticians' work. It rather calls for accelerating engaged mutations; the better to meet with social demand. Innovate the better to meet with social demand, such is the mandate anyway we have been given by the highest authorities of the State. As the Anglo-Saxons like to say, "mainstreaming" work remains to be done: i.e. to switch from emerging work in prototype stage to regular production, accessible to a very wide audience (...) At international level, the INSEE will work in close cooperation with the OECD and Eurostat to implement the orientations of the Stiglitz report".

Jean Gadrey, commenting the recent evolutions of the INSEE, expresses moderate optimism, symmetrical to the scepticism with which he had welcome the launch of the Stiglitz operation. The controversies around the Stiglitz report hence refer to a very specific configuration: a Commission formed fairly closely around dominant economists, which proposes multifaceted renovation of the statistical device with the explicit support of official institutes, but which both "delineates" and limits the magnitude and the possible practical consequences thereof, while leaving the main operational choices "open" (and to the responsibility of the statistical administrations); a Head of state quite involved in the promotion of a discourse which seems to question some of his previous ideological stances and triggers significant cognitive disorder in his electoral "clientele"; "profanes" torn between "politicking" interpretations,

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radical rejection, enthusiasm and all possible attitude nuances concerning a projected turmoil of the official representations of economics; political actors who endeavour to integrate the "new discourse" while politicising their analysis of the content of the report; critical experts who are pleased about the legitimisation of their investments while deploring that a few dominant economists have closed the case on a problematic they have kept close to their chests, which economists have set a monopoly on the thematic of alternative indicators, while undermining a number of potential effects: the report may thus paradoxically close the space of the debate around academic economists and simultaneously render the most prominent promoters of alternative indicators less visible and less legitimate to some extent.

REFERENCES [1]

A first version of this abstract of our text has been published in Savoir / Agir, in the "Alterindicateurs" column. F.Lebaron, "The Stiglitz report: towards a statistical revolution", Savoir / Agir, 10 December 2009. [2] J.Gadrey, F.Jany-Catrice, Les nouveaux indicateurs de richesse (The new wealth indicators), Paris, La Découverte, 2nd ed., 2008. [3] On the birth of the HDI, E.Stanton, « The Human Development Indicator : A History », Working Paper Series, 127, PERI, University of Massachussets, February 2007. [4] See the official web site of the Commission: http://www.stiglitz-senfitoussi.fr/fr/index.htm [5] J.Stiglitz, A.Sen, J.-P.Fitoussi, Performances économiques et progrès social. Richesse des nations et bien-être des individus, (economic performances and social progress. nations' wealth and individuals' well-being), Paris, Odile Jacob, 2009 and J.Stiglitz, A.Sen, J.-P.Fitoussi, Performances économiques et progrès social.Vers de nouveaux systèmes de mesure (Economic performances and social progress. Towards new measuring systems), Paris, Odile Jacob, 2009. [6] See for example D.Méda, Au-delà du PIB. Pour une autre mesure de la richesse (Beyond the GDP. For another wealth measure), Paris, Flammarion, 2008. [7] Nicolas Sarkozy, Great amphitheater of the Sorbonne, Monday 14 September 2009, repeated in J. Stiglitz, A.Sen, J.-P.Fitoussi, op. cit. [8] The contrast between the communication offensive around the Stiglitz report and the small echo of the reports of the Economic, social and environmental council, as that dedicated to sustainable development Indicators (Philippe Le Clézio, June 2009), is significant. [9] Joseph Stiglitz was Chief economist at the World Bank up to 2000, before he was awarded the prize of economic sciences in memory of Alfred Nobel in 2001 (alongside with M. Spence and G.Akerlof). He now teaches in the Graduate School of Business of Columbia. He came to world fame by his critical stances on the management of the Asian crisis by the IMF and by his neo-keynesian orientations, in particular during the subprime crisis. He has thus come closer to the "alterglobalists". [10] Amartya Sen, "Nobel prize-winner" in 1998, teaches currently in Harvard. A theorician of development, well-being and of economics as a "moral science", he is an honorary president of Oxfam, an international NGO and a founder of the International ethical,

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[11]

[12] [13] [14]

[15]

[16]

[17] [18]

[19] [20]

[21]

[22]

[23] [24]

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scientific and political collegium, an association based in France, founded in 2002 by Milan Kucan, president of Slovenia, Michel Rocard, a forme French Prime Minister, co-presidents, Stéphane Hessel, vice-president, and Sacha Goldman, general secretary. Jean-Paul Fitoussi is the prime mover of the Stiglitz commission and undoubtedly the author or at least the partial inspirer of some of the most committed texts derived therefrom (including that of the President of the Republic). A professor in Sciences Po Paris, where he is a member of the scientific council, Jean-Paul Fitoussi was Chairman of the French monitoring centre for economic conjunctures. He is a member of the Economic analysis council. Known for his neo-keynesian orientations, Jean-Paul Fitoussi is bent on the independence of economic experts. It is entitled Synthesis and recommendations. p.9. For a presentation of the issues of environmental (private) accounting: Jacques Richard, « Pour une révolution comptable environnementale » (For an environmental accounting revolution), Le Monde de l'économie, 5 February 2008. The publication by Odile Jacob pub. consists of two books, whereof the first, prepared by the three supervisors of the Commission, includes an essay on measurement which goes beyond collective, more moderate conclusions. For want of direct testimonies, it is difficult to known far more on the nature of disagreements and resistances raised by the analyses of the three supervisors. About the history of the national accounting in France, see F. Fourquet, Les comptes de la puissance. Aux origines de la comptabilité nationale et du plan (The accounts of power. At the origins of national accounting and of the plan), Paris, Encres, 1980. p. 15. Here appears a recent breakthrough of the problematics for measuring the "subjective" happiness, derived in particular from the New Economics Foundation, at the origin of the "Happy Planet Indicator" and which have set the trend in the wake of international conferences on the issue of "happiness" measure. See Vers de nouveaux systèmes de mesure, (Towards new measuring systems) op. cit., p. 325 et sq. After the model of the three people responsible, who can be classed diagrammatically in the category of "consecrated heretics", as coined by Pierre Bourdieu: P.Bourdieu, Homo academicus, Paris, Minuit, 1984. By mobilising reputed academic economists known for work in some concurring cases, the people responsible have run the risk of adopting ecumenical compromise positions, which is indeed the case on numerous occasions, where conceptual frameworks or partially contradictory indicator are juxtaposed, without the report leaning in favour of a particular item. Cf. the remarks by J.Gadrey and D.Méda on this score, art. cit. Any reflexive perspective on the social usages of quantification and of "indicators" is for instance largely and strangely missing from the report. See A.Desrosières, Pour une sociologie de la quantification et Gouverner par les nombres (for a sociology of quantification and governing through numbers), Paris, Ecole des Mines, 2008. The next step of the international consecration of the economists working on new wellbeing measures will undoubtedly be the attribution of a "Nobel" prize. One of the most quoted and discussed is the « Happy Planet Index » of the New Economics Foundation : http://www.happyplanetindex.org/. The Institute for

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[25] [26] [27]

[28] [29]

[30] [31] [32]

[33]

[34] [35]

[36] [37] [38] [39]

Frédéric Lebaron Innovation in Social Policy has developed the Social Health Indicator in the United States, with a strong impact. In France, the BIP40 has initiated a construction movement of local Indicators: www.bip40.org In particular that of Ruut Veenhoven of the University of Rotterdam : http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/ See for example: http://nopib.fr/ The main cleavage in the debates on indicators indeed concerns the opposition between synthetic indicators, defended by the most radical, in particular in associations and think tanks, in the wake of the UNDP and the "dashboards" defenders http://www.terra-economica.info/Sortir-de-la-demesure-et-accepter,7598.html This is the case here of a device for quasi-undermining the controversy, avoiding confrontation of adverse stances - whereas the heterodoxical and not institutional voices are relegated to the edge or outside the device thus set up. http://alternatives-economiques.fr/blogs/gadrey/2009/09/13/le-figaro-et-le-%C2%ABrapport-stiglitz-%C2%BB/ A systematic corpus of stances has been constructed. See a few appended illustrations. Such as for instance on the site of "feminist" orientation, the news which consecrate its first column to wealth indicators: http://www.lesnouvellesnews.fr/index.php/ component/content/article/39-editorial/55-editorial As soon as in the report draft put on line in June 2009, they put forward a first analysis: J.Gadrey, D.Méda, « Commission Stiglitz : un diagnostic juste, des propositions (encore) timides » (Stiglitz commission: a fair diagnosis, (still) timid propositions), IDIES, 9 June 2009. We have repeated this stance in the Alterindicateurs column of the Savoir / Agir review: F.Lebaron, art. cit. Yannick Rumpala, « Mesurer le « développement durable » pour aider à le réaliser ? » (Measuring "sustainable development' for assisting its realisation?), Histoire & mesure, vol. XXIV – n 1, 2009, p. 211-246. See also the research of Jean-Pierre Le Bourhis in the CURAPP. A.-G.Slama, « Le bonheur devient un droit » (Happiness becomes a right), Le Figaro, 16/09/2009. Blog http://gsorman.typepad.com/guy_sorman/2010/02/keynes-combien-de-divisions.html A.Babeau, « Mesurer le bien-être : retour sur le rapport Stiglitz » (Measuring wellbeing: a look back on the Stiglitz report), Commentaire, Hiver 2009-2010, Vol. 32, 128, p.1054 et sq.

In: Critical Thinking Editors: Ch. P. Horvath and J. M. Forte, pp. 141-157

ISBN 978-1-61324-419-7 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 6

A FOUR-COMPONENT INSTRUCTIONAL MODEL FOR TEACHER TRAINING IN CRITICAL-THINKING INSTRUCTION: ITS EFFECTIVENESS AND INFLUENTIAL FACTORS Yu-chu Yeh Institute of Teacher Education Research Center for Mind, Brain & Learning Center for Creativity and Innovation Studies National Chengchi University 64, Chih-nan Rd, Sec. 2, Taipei 116, Taiwan

ABSTRACT This study investigated the effectiveness of a training course in critical-thinking instruction with an emphasis on four components that are most likely to bring about teachers’ improvement in personal teaching efficacy and teacher behaviors during the training. Eighty-two preservice teachers participated in a 16-week training session in this study. Based on both qualitative and quantitative analyses, the findings suggest that providing guided practice and generating reflective teaching are crucial to the successfulness of a teacher training program and that a training course in critical-thinking instruction does, in fact, produce more lasting effects if it simultaneously imparts professional knowledge, raises personal teaching efficacy as well as heightens reflective teaching. At the same time, it is found that professional knowledge and field practices are indeed decisive in teachers’ overall improvement in personal teaching efficacy and teacher behaviors during teacher training.

Keywords: critical thinking, instructional model, personal teaching efficacy, teacher behavior, teacher training, professional knowledge.

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It has long been recognized that critical thinking is an effective learning strategy (Halpern, 1998; Jawarneh, Iyadat, Al-Shudaifat, & Khasawneh, 2008; Klein, Olson, & Stanovich, 1997; Lawson, 1999; Roberts-Cady, 2008), the key to emotional intelligence (Elder, 1997) and a prerequisite for leaders in business (Harris & Eleser, 1997; Dilenschneider, 2000). Since students’ critical-thinking ability can be significantly improved through effective teaching (e.g. Alshraideh, 2008; Browne & Meuti, 1999; Carmen & Kurubacak, 2002; Ellis, 2001; Hittner, 1999; Jawarneh et al., , 2008; Mackinnon, 2006; McCarthy-Tucker, 2000; Nelson & Oliver, 2004; Semerci, 2006; ; Yanchar, Slife, &Warne, 2009; Yeh, 2008a, 2008b; Yang & Chung, 2009), teacher educators should be held accountable for turning out effective cultivators of critical-thinking skills. Previous studies have suggested that, aside from dispositions, teachers’ professional knowledge, personal teaching efficacy, and teacher behaviors are fundamental to the effective instruction of critical thinking (Yeh, 1997, 2007, 2008b). With this in mind, a course which emphasized four components was designed in this study to help teachers to become confident cultivators of critical-thinking skills. Apart from this, this study was conducted to identify the relationships among the fundamental components of effective critical-thinking instruction and to determine the most crucial factors vis-à-vis teachers’ professional growth in this area.

FUNDAMENTALS OF EFFECTIVE CRITICAL-THINKING INSTRUCTION The first of the four fundamental components of effective critical-thinking instruction on the part of a teacher is having a sufficient body of professional knowledge about critical thinking. Shulman (1987) identified three distinct types of professional knowledge: content knowledge, pedagogical knowledge, and pedagogical content knowledge. Content knowledge and pedagogical content knowledge are especially important for teaching such complexthinking skills as critical thinking, creative thinking and problem-solving. By integrating the concepts of professional knowledge (Grossman & Richert, 1988) and critical thinking (Alshraideh, 2008; Bailin, Coombs, Browne & Meuti, 1999; Facione, Sanchez, Facione, & Gainen, 1995; Gadzella & Masten, 1998; Giancarlo & Facione, 2001; Halpern, 1998, 2003; Harris & Eleser, 1997; McCarthy-Tucker, 2000; Paul & Elder, 2001; Yeh, 1997, 2008b, 2009), this study redefined content knowledge and pedagogical content knowledge so that “content knowledge” includes a teacher’s understanding of critical thinking and related concepts while “pedagogical content knowledge” takes into account a teacher’s knowledge as to how best to employ appropriate teaching strategies to accommodate students’ needs during the teaching of critical thinking. As for the second fundamental component of critical-thinking instruction—teacher efficacy, it has been reported that teacher efficacy is closely related to teachers’ adoption of innovation strategies, their commitment to teaching, and their employment of effective classroom strategies (Aguirre & Speer, 2000; Albion, 2001; Guesky & Passaro, 1994; Kulinna & Silverman, 2000). Teacher efficacy is commonly broken down into two factors: teaching efficacy and personal teaching efficacy (Gibson & Dembo, 1984). Since research findings have demonstrated that personal teaching efficacy is a stronger predictor of teacher effectiveness and is more conducive to effective teaching than teaching efficacy (Dembo & Gibson, 1985; Gusky, 1988), this study focuses exclusively on personal teaching efficacy.

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Accordingly, in teaching critical thinking, a teacher’s personal teaching efficacy refers to his or her confidence with respect to building upon students’ prior knowledge, dispositions and skills related to critical thinking (Yeh, 2006). Besides professional knowledge and personal teaching efficacy, teacher behaviors, the third fundamental component in effective critical-thinking instruction, play an important role in the teaching of critical thinking. Teacher behaviors that contribute to students’ capacity to learn critical thinking skills can be divided into four categories: behaviors that relate to improving students’ prior knowledge; critical-thinking dispositions; critical-thinking skills; and overall critical-thinking ability. Such teacher behaviors include: increasing students’ prerequisite knowledge; teaching critical-thinking skills, schema-driven strategies, and ways to build a frame of mind which is conducive to thinking; offering a healthy mix of facilitating methodologies by employing an infused-instruction approach as well as anchored instruction; keeping students focused on undertaking tasks; building a constructive learning environment; giving students cues, prompts and positive feedback; supplying examples and practice opportunities; asking higher-order questions and extended questions; allowing a variety of answers; providing successful learning experiences; rewarding student interactions; encouraging students’ engagement in group discussions along with cooperative learning; and monitoring the entire learning process (Alshraideh, 2008; Browne & Meuti, 1999; Chen, 2001; Larson, 2000; Halpern, 1998, 2003; Paul & Elder, 2001; Yeh, 1997; 2007; 2008b). The fourth and final fundamental component in effective critical-thinking instruction is teachers’ own critical-thinking dispositions because they may influence teaching outcomes in a subtle way. In the course of teaching critical thinking, teachers must be self-confident, open-minded, creative in following curricula, sensitive to students’ feelings, analytical about students’ learning problems and systematic in problem-solving. It need not be explained that such personal teaching traits characterize teachers’ critical-thinking dispositions (Giancarlo & Facione, 2001; Halpern, 2003, 2008; Paul & Elder, 2001; Yanchar et al., 2009). As for the relationships among the four fundamental components discussed above, namely a full body of professional knowledge, a high degree of teacher efficacy, positive teacher behaviors and teachers’ own wealth of critical-thinking dispositions, Robinson (1995) noted that teachers’ existing knowledge and experience had a strong impact on both their development and use of effective teaching strategies. In a computer simulation, Yeh (1997) found that personal teaching efficacy functioned as a mediator between knowledge and teacher behaviors and that, at the same time, the relationship between personal teaching efficacy and teacher behaviors was bi-directional. Hence, in terms of critical thinking, the improvement of teachers’ professional knowledge should increase both their personal teaching efficacy and teacher behaviors. Another point is that critical-thinking dispositions are significantly related to individuals’ ego-resiliency, which refers to a person’s ability to change his or her model of perceptual and behavioral functioning in order to adapt to situational constraints (Facione et al., 1995); such dispositions can be influential on a teacher’s learning of professional knowledge and formation of personal teaching efficacy, not to mention his or her adaptation of positive teacher behaviors.

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INTERVENTIONS FOR TEACHER TRAINING IN CRITICAL-THINKING INSTRUCTION For a training course in critical-thinking instruction to be effective, it must be able to improve teachers’ professional knowledge, personal teaching efficacy, and teacher behaviors. Providing sufficient guided practice and stimulating reflective teaching are two effective interventions to achieve this. Guided practice sessions based on an analytical understanding of teaching events are often more constructive than those in natural settings (Yeh, 2006); furthermore, belief change often comes about as a result of the interaction of practice and reflection in teaching (Tillema, 2000). Guided practice can also lead to mastery with regard to experiences, which has been put forth as a powerful way to enhance teacher efficacy (Bandura, 1995). In support of this, Yeh (2006) concluded that guided practices contribute to preservice teachers’ improvements in personal teaching efficacy as it pertains to their teaching of critical thinking. Also relevant in this regard, Tillema (2000) determines that a change in beliefs can be attributed to the interactive effects of practice and reflection in teaching. The other intervention—reflective teaching—results in instructors’ reconstruction of professional knowledge and teacher beliefs as well as improvements in teaching practice (Rodriguez & Sjostrom, 1998; Tillema, 2000; Yeh, 2004). Two mechanisms have been found essential for nurturing reflective teaching: self-awareness and mindfulness. Collier (1998) has recently pointed out that building a high level of self-awareness before the student teaching experience is critical to pre-service teachers’ learning of reflective teaching and their becoming thoughtful practitioners. Titone, Sherman, and Palmer (1998) also attest to the theory that giving feedback to increase self-awareness and that encouraging “mindfulness” in the teacher-learner setting are effective ways to foster reflective teaching. Accordingly, while self-awareness and mindful learning contribute to reflective teaching and then encourage the improvements in professional knowledge, personal teaching efficacy, and teacher behaviors, guided practices may carry effects on the employment of reflective teaching as well as the reconstruction of professional knowledge, personal teaching efficacy, and teacher behaviors. It is apparent that four components are crucial to bringing about the improvement of personal teaching efficacy and teacher behaviors in critical-thinking instruction; these components are: (a) increasing self-awareness and mindful learning, (b) reconstructing knowledge and personal teaching efficacy, (c) employing reflective teaching, and (d) conducting guided practices. This study therefore incorporates these four components into the training course in critical-thinking instruction.

HYPOTHESES This study examined two hypotheses. The first supposition is that a four-component instructional design which especially emphasizes guided practice and reflective teaching should have a positive impact on a teacher’s improvement in the areas of professional knowledge, personal teaching efficacy, and teacher behaviors vis-à-vis critical thinking. The second presupposes that a teacher’s critical-thinking dispositions, professional knowledge and field practices correlate with his or her personal teaching efficacy and teacher behaviors

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during the teaching of critical thinking. The integrated model of the proposed hypotheses in this study is displayed in Figure 1. More details about the four-component instructional design are described in the section of experimental design.

•

• •

• •

Giving test results of critical-thinking, professional knowledge, and personal teaching efficacy Requesting self-evaluations of teacher behaviors Giving lectures and conducting class discussions

Increasing selfawareness and mindful learning

Reconstructing professional knowledge and personal teaching efficacy

Employing guided practices

Provoking reflective teaching

• • •

A strong sense of criticalthinking dispositions Abundant Professional knowledge Frequently use of teacher behaviors

Improvements in • personal teaching efficacy • teacher behaviors

Improvements in • professional knowledge

Developing critical-thinking tests followed by class discussions Field practices of positive teacher behaviors

Figure 1. The integrated model of tested hypotheses.

METHOD Participants Eighty-two preservice teachers enrolled in a post-bachelor teacher education program participated in this study. They had an average age of 29.79 years (SD = 3.41) and an average teaching experience of 2.81 years (SD = 1.42). Among the participants, 38 were males, 44 were females, and of these, 49 were teaching in junior high schools, and 33 in senior high schools.

Instruments All instruments employed in this study were The Questionnaire of Dispositions toward Critical Thinking (QDCT), The Questionnaire of Professional Knowledge for Criticalthinking Instruction (QPK-CTI), The Questionnaire of Personal Teaching Efficacy in

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Teaching Thinking (QPTE-TT) and The Checklist for Teacher Behaviors in Critical-thinking Instruction (CTB-CTI). The first three of these instruments are 6-point Likert-type questionnaires while the final one is a checklist. QDCT scores indicate the degree of dispositions toward critical thinking. The QDCT, with a Cronbach’s α coefficient of .88 (20 items), comprises four factors: systematicity and analyticity, open-mindedness, intellectual curiosity, and reflective thinking. The item response options are “never” to “always,” scored from 1 to 6 points (Yeh, 1999). QPK-CTI scores reveal participants’ self-evaluation of their own professional knowledge in teaching critical thinking. With a Cronbach’s α coefficient of .95 (9 items), the QPK-CTI measures two factors: content knowledge about critical thinking and pedagogical content knowledge about critical thinking. The item response options are “totally disagree” to “totally agree,” scored from 1 to 6 points (Yeh, 1999). QPTE-TT scores reflect the trainees’ level of confidence in their ability to teach learners to think critically. The QPTE-TT, with a Cronbach’s α coefficient of .86 (12 items), assesses three factors: improvement in thinking dispositions, sharpening of overall thinking ability, and broadening of prior knowledge and thinking skills (Chen, 2001). The scoring system of the QPTE-TT is the same as that of the QPK-CTI. Finally, CTB-CTI scores evaluate the frequency of using positive behaviors in teaching critical thinking. The CTB-CTI has a Cronbach’s α coefficient of .95 (21 items), and it covers four factors: expanding students’ prior knowledge, upgrading their critical-thinking dispositions, cultivating their critical-thinking skills, and ameliorating their overall criticalthinking ability (Yeh, 1999). Besides these four tests, five reflection items related to instructional design were included to evaluate the participants’ attitudes toward the training course. The scoring system for these items is the same as that of the QPK-CTI. The statements which participants evaluated are: (1) The self-evaluation of my personal teacher behaviors enhanced my self-awareness in employing favorable teacher behaviors and, therefore, increased my use of positive teaching behavior for critical thinking; (2) Developing critical-thinking tests contributed to improving my understanding of critical thinking; (3) Developing critical-thinking tests contributed to improving my own critical-thinking ability; (4) Class discussions of critical-thinking test items contributed to improving my critical-thinking ability; and (5) I have often tried to employ positive teacher behaviors for critical thinking this semester.

Experimental Design This study employed a pretest-posttest design. Besides completing the pretests and posttests which were identical, participants attended a weekly two-hour experimental instruction session, the aim of which was to improve the participants’ professional knowledge, personal teaching efficacy, and teacher behaviors pertaining to critical-thinking. The instruction lasted for sixteen weeks. The course design emphasized the following four components: (a) increasing self-awareness and mindful learning, (b) reconstructing knowledge and personal teaching efficacy, (c) employing reflective teaching, and (d) conducting guided practices.

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More specifically, the course design was based on three basic assumptions. First, returning the graded pretest results of all tests to the participants and also telling them the mean averages within the group would increase self-awareness about professional knowledge, personal teaching efficacy and teacher behaviors, which would, in turn, provoke mindful learning during the classes which followed. Secondly, it was assumed that developing criticalthinking tests as out-of-class assignments followed by in-class discussions would improve the participants’ understanding of critical-thinking, and this would then further enhance their professional knowledge and personal teaching efficacy. The third assumption was that the employment of guided practice and reflective teaching would result in a more frequent use of positive teacher behaviors; it follows that this would lead to improvements in professional knowledge, personal teaching efficacy, and teacher behaviors.

Procedures The step-by-step timing and procedures of the teaching activities are depicted in Figure 2. Two types of test were administered during the semester: Type A tests included three questionnaires for measuring critical-thinking dispositions, professional knowledge, and personal teaching efficacy (QDCT, QPK-CTI, and QPTE-TT). Type B test refers to the checklist for teacher behaviors (CTB-CTI). All participants were administered pretests A in the first class and were subsequently asked to do pretest B based on two periods of classroom teaching (90 minutes in total) which they recorded between the end of the latter part of the first and the early part of the second weeks. Do Pretest B (Record class teaching)

Lecture and discuss related topics of criticalthinking instruction

Week 1

Administer Pretest A: QDCT, QPK-CTI, and QPTE-TT

Week 2

Give results of Pretest A

Week 3

Assign groups and request the development of test items

Week 5

Take turns presenting test items and participate in class discussions

Develop and revise test items

Week 6 Week 7

Analyze Pretest B based on CTB-CTI Give results of Pretest B

Week 14 Week 15

What the teacher does What the students do

Lecture on teacher behaviors

Week 16

Figure 2. Flowchart of instructional procedures.

Do Posttest B and analyze Posttest B Give Posttest B results; administer Posttest A and reflection items

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The participants were shown their results of Type A pretests in the second week and were given pretest B results in the seventh week. Pretest B results were not immediately returned because, as a self-evaluation checklist, it was believed that a full understanding of each checking item was required to enable participants to analyze the self-evaluation items. A thorough lecture and a discussion of the self-evaluation checking items had been held in the sixth week. Toward the end of the semester, the participants were required to do posttest B (again by recording their teaching and doing follow-up self-evaluations). The posttest B results were given in the sixteenth week before posttests A were administered. The five reflection items were added to posttests A. As for teaching activities, all participants were randomly assigned to groups of four or five people during the third week. Each participant was asked to develop one multiple-choice test item geared toward other teachers for each of the following critical-thinking skills: assumption identification, induction, deduction, explanation, and the evaluation of arguments. These concepts had been explained in the preceding week. From the fifth week on, the groups took turns presenting their test items to the class; 40- to 50- minute discussions on the test items followed each week. Meanwhile, lectures and discussions on topics related to criticalthinking instruction continued from the second week to the fifteenth week. The main topics for the lectures included: a) b) c) d) e) f) g) h)

definitions and components of critical thinking, factors that influence the learning of critical thinking; teaching approaches; instructional models; curriculum design; effective teacher behaviors, effective student behaviors, and teaching strategies.

RESULTS Effectiveness of the Training Course Three repeated measures analyses of variance were employed to examine the changes among the participants in terms of the three indices for effective critical-thinking instruction: professional knowledge, personal teaching efficacy, and teacher behaviors. It should be noted that the employed data of teacher behaviors in this study, as determined by Test B, were analyzed by the researcher. The correlation coefficient of the CTB-CTI scores between the researcher and the participants was .93. The means and standard deviations of the QPK-CTI, QPTE-TT and the CTB-CTI are displayed in Table 1. The first and the third analyses yielded significant effects (Wilks’ Λs = .18 and .70, respectively, ps < .001), whereas the second analysis did not (Wilks’ Λ = .99), thus demonstrating that the training course significantly improved the teachers’ perceived professional knowledge and their use of positive teacher behaviors but not their personal teaching efficacy. Subsequent paired t-tests and comparisons of the means revealed that the teachers’ perceived knowledge in both content knowledge and

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pedagogical content knowledge pertaining to teaching critical thinking had significantly increased in the posttest than in the pretest, ts(62) = 14.88 and 19.53, ps < .001. Moreover, the teachers reported that they were employing more favorable teacher behaviors to improve students’ prior knowledge, critical-thinking dispositions, critical-thinking skills, and overall critical-thinking ability at the time of the posttest than they were at the time of the pretest, ts(71) = 4.45, 4.34, 5.01, and 5.78, ps < .01, respectively. Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of the QPK-CTI, QPTE-TT, and CTB-CTI

Inventory QPK-CTI (n = 65) Content knowledge Pedagogical content knowledge QPTE-TT (n = 71) Enhancing thinking dispositions Improving overall thinking ability Increasing prior knowledge and thinking skills CTB-CTI (n = 74) Increasing prior knowledge Enhancing critical-thinking dispositions Improving critical-thinking skills Improving critical-thinking ability

Pretest M SD

Posttest M SD

2.30 1.99

.93 .84

4.26 4.20

.72 .82

4.12 4.31 4.43

.62 .58 .54

4.23 4.39 4.42

.68 .68 .56

2.38 14.95 8.69 3.07

1.37 9.25 8.76 3.08

3.42 24.05 16.95 6.69

1.84 16.67 14.02 5.69

To further confirm the effectiveness of the employed interventions, the relationships between the three indices for effective critical-thinking instruction and the five reflection items related to the interventions were analyzed. On a six-point scale, the mean scores for the five items were 5.08 (SD = .89), 5.03 (SD = .90), 4.95 (SD = .92), 5.15 (SD= .90), and 4.69 (SD = .93), respectively. The results of Pearson correlation analyses clearly showed that each of the five items and the three indices of effective critical-thinking instruction had a positive correlation (see Table 2). Of particular interest is that all five items had the highest degree of correlation with professional knowledge, rs(76) = .58 to .78, ps < .001. Table 2. Correlations among the Scores of Professional Knowledge, Personal Teaching Efficacy, and Teacher Behaviors in the Posttest and Five Reflection Questions

Posttest professional knowledge Posttest personal teaching efficacy Posttest teacher behaviors

Q1 .58*** .54*** .21*

Q2 .78*** .57*** .32**

Q3 .70*** .51*** .35***

Q4 .75*** .56*** .22*

Q5 .67*** .61*** .32**

* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.

Noteworthy too is that the second highest correlation was with personal teaching efficacy, rs(76) = .51 to 61, ps < .001. Comparatively, each of the five items had a significantly lower degree of correlation with teacher behaviors, rs(76) = .21 to .35, ps < .05. As a result of the

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findings, it can reasonably be stated that the teachers had a positive attitude toward the training course. Furthermore, the correlation coefficients suggest that there was a certain degree of training effect as shown in the teachers’ improvement in terms of personal teaching efficacy though the effect was not significant in the repeated measures analyses of variance.

The Relationships Among the Four Fundamentals of Effective CriticalThinking Instruction Two canonical correlation analyses were used to investigate the relationships among the four fundamental components of effective critical-thinking instruction. Both analyses involved two independent variables (IV, critical-thinking dispositions and professional knowledge for teaching critical thinking) and two dependent variables (DV, personal teaching efficacy for critical thinking and teacher behaviors for critical thinking). However, the first analysis employed the pretest scores, whereas the second one used the posttest scores.The first analysis yielded a significant canonical correlation (Wilks’ Λ = .73, p < .001). The canonical correlation was .51, representing 26% overlapping variance for the pair of canonical variates. The pair of canonical variates had a high factor loading on criticalthinking dispositions (.85) on the IV side and a high factor loading on personal teaching efficacy (.94) on the DV side, which indicates that critical-thinking dispositions and personal teaching efficacy seem to have had a strong positive correlation in the pretest (see Table 3). Table 3. Canonical Correlation Analysis of Pretest IVs and Pretest DVs Canonical variate Correlation Coefficient Pretest IV set Critical-thinking dispositions

Professional knowledge Percent of variance Redundancy Pretest DV set Personal teaching efficacy

Teacher behaviors Percent of variance Redundancy Canonical correlation (ρ) Squared canonical correlation (ρ2) Wilks’ Λ

.85 .42

.92 .54 Total = .45 Total = .11

.94 .61

.83 .36 Total = .63 Total = .16

.51 .26 .73 ***

*** p < .001.

The second analysis also yielded a significant canonical correlation (Wilks’ Λ = .46, p < .001). The canonical correlation was .73, representing 54% overlapping variance for the pair of canonical variates. The pair of canonical variates had a high factor loading on professional knowledge (.99) on the IV side and a high factor loading on personal teaching efficacy (.99)

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on the DV side. Therefore, as shown in the posttests, abundant professional knowledge is most assuredly related to a strong sense of personal teaching efficacy (see Table 4). Table 4. Canonical Correlation Analysis of Posttest IVs and Posttest DVs Canonical variate Correlation Coefficient Posttest IV set Critical-thinking dispositions Professional knowledge Percent of variance Redundancy Posttest DV set Personal teaching efficacy Teacher behaviors Percent of variance Redundancy Canonical correlation (ρ) Squared canonical correlation (ρ2) Wilks’ Λ

.30 .99

.12 .97 Total = .54 Total = .29

.99 .40

.96 .12 Total = .57 Total = .31

.73 .54 .46 ***

*** p < .001.

The Most Crucial Factors for Improving Personal Teaching Efficacy and Teacher Behaviors To further understand the most crucial factors related to teachers’ improvements in personal teaching efficacy and teacher behaviors, a third independent variable, “frequency of practicing teacher behaviors,” was added to the foundation of the second canonical correlation and then reanalyzed. Table 5. Canonical Correlation Analysis between CT-Dispositions, Professional Knowledge, Practicing Frequencies and Posttest DVs Canonical variate Correlation Coefficient Posttest IV set Critical-thinking dispositions Professional knowledge Frequency of practicing teaching behavior Percent of variance Redundancy Posttest DV set Personal teaching efficacy Teacher behaviors Percent of variance Redundancy Canonical correlation (ρ) Squared canonical correlation (ρ2) Wilks’ Λ

*** p < .001.

.28 .96 .84

.14 .68 .37 Total = .56 Total = .33

.99 .39

.96 .11 Total = .57 Total = .33

.76 .58 .42 ***

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The analysis yielded a significant canonical correlation (Wilks’ Λ = .42, p < .001) of .76, representing 58% overlapping variance for the pair of canonical variates. The pair of canonical variates had a factor loading on professional knowledge (.96) and frequency of practicing teacher behaviors (.86) on the IV side and a high factor loading on personal teaching efficacy (.99) on the DV side. Thus, on the basis of the results of the posttests, there is strong evidence to support the theory that abundant professional knowledge and frequent practice of teacher behaviors are related to having a strong sense of personal teaching efficacy (see Table 5).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS Effectiveness of theTraining Course This study employed a four-component design to improve teacher effectiveness in teaching critical-thinking by: (a) increasing self-awareness in terms of professional knowledge, personal teaching efficacy and teacher behaviors when participants were given their test results; (b) helping to reconstruct professional knowledge and personal teaching efficacy by means of lectures and class discussions; (c) encouraging reflective teaching by increasing self-awareness and mindful learning, and (d) improving professional knowledge, personal teaching efficacy and teacher behaviors through guided practices. By and large, the participants’ positive attitudes towards the instructional design and the significant results from the related analyses suggest that the instructional design that was developed here was effective in achieving the presumed instructional goals although its effects on personal teaching efficacy were not as strong as the impacts on professional knowledge and teacher behaviors. Nevertheless, the findings in this study not only support the notion that teacher effectiveness in teaching critical thinking can be significantly improved by means of a welldesigned course (Yeh, 1997, 2008a, 2009) but also demonstrate that guided practice and reflective teaching are powerful tools for teachers’ professional growth (Carter, 1990; Collier, 1998; Tillema, 2000, Yeh, 2004). Evidence that led to these conclusions is observed, first, in the teachers’ significant improvements in professional knowledge and teacher behaviors and, secondly, in the strong correlations between the first and the fifth reflection items and the posttest scores of professional knowledge, personal teaching efficacy, and teacher behaviors. Moreover, this study confirms that those with a greater wealth of professional knowledge at the completion of the training tended to highly value and benefit from opportunities to evaluate their own teacher behaviors, which agrees with the claim by Rodriguez and Sjostrom (1998) that reflective teaching is related to professional knowledge. As a result, it can be said with confidence that guided practice and self reflection in teaching are crucial to teachers’ acquisition of professional knowledge, development of personal teaching efficacy, and employment of effective teacher behaviors during the teaching of critical thinking. Another important intervention found in this study is the inclusion of class discussions. It had been earlier hypothesized that devising critical-thinking tests followed by class discussions would contribute to teachers’ improvements in both professional knowledge and personal teaching efficacy. The following findings support this: (a) there was a significant change in knowledge at the completion of the training course; and (b) there was a high

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correlation between the second, third, and fourth reflection items and the posttest scores of professional knowledge along with personal teaching efficacy. These findings help validate the idea that discussions generally contribute to learners’ understanding of a topic and the development of critical thinking ( Yeh, 2008b, 2009). In brief, class discussions are most probably one of the most effective ways to increase professional knowledge and personal teaching efficacy in a specific domain.

Crucial FactorsfFor Improving Personal Teaching Efficacy and Teacher Behaviors This study investigated the predictive powers of professional knowledge and criticalthinking dispositions on teachers’ personal teaching efficacy and teacher behaviors in both the pretests and the posttests. Though there were significant canonical correlations for both analyses, the correlation patterns were different. In the pretests, critical-thinking dispositions were a better predictor of personal teaching efficacy and teacher behaviors than was professional knowledge. By contrast, in the posttests, professional knowledge became a better predictor than critical-thinking dispositions. The low predictive power of professional knowledge in the pretests may have been due to the low variance—almost all of the teachers had very limited professional knowledge about teaching critical thinking (The mean for content knowledge was 2.30 and for pedagogical content knowledge 1.99). However, upon completion of the training course, the teachers’ professional knowledge had significantly improved (The mean for content knowledge was 4.26 and for pedagogical content knowledge 4.20). These results strongly imply that professional knowledge is a more influential factor in teachers’ enhancement of personal teaching efficacy and their use of teacher behaviors than critical-thinking dispositions. It is therefore important to help teachers-in-training build up professional knowledge, especially that of pedagogical content knowledge. On the basis of the results of this study, it appears that in addition to professional knowledge, a large number of practice sessions is a crucial factor in teachers’ improvement in personal teaching efficacy and teacher behaviors vis-à-vis critical thinking. According to Tillema (2000), reflection after practice is a more fruitful way of affecting student teachers’ belief change than preparing them to be reflective before they enter their practice teaching. This study, however, encouraged reflection both before and after practice by means of giving test results and requesting self-evaluations of teacher behaviors twice during the training. The results here suggest that such a reflection approach may be a more effective way than a pure reflection-after-practice approach in terms of raising the motivational force of teaching practice sessions in improving teacher effectiveness.

CONCLUSION Preparing confident cultivators of critical thinking and nurturing reflective teachers can not be over emphasized in teacher education. To achieve this educational ideal, as a teacher educator, I designed a training course which featured a four-component process with a special focus on guided practice and reflective teaching. The findings in this study indicate that the

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instructional design and interventions incorporated in the training course were effective. In essence, the study findings show that teacher effectiveness in teaching critical thinking can be improved as long as the training course is meticulously designed. Worthy of special note, however, is that a training course in critical-thinking instruction can indeed produce more lasting effects if it imparts professional knowledge, raises personal teaching efficacy as well as enhances reflective teaching all at the same time. This study has also developed instruments in the form of questionnaires for measuring four fundamental components of a successful critical-thinking instruction; these tools will be valuable in further research. Finally, the teacher training in this study was focused more on the use of the “direct approach” for teaching critical thinking, in which critical-thinking skills are regarded as general skills. Further studies may apply this instructional design with the “infusion approach”, thus focusing more on how to teach critical-thinking skills in a specific domain.

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Elder, L. (1997). Critical thinking: The key to emotional intelligence. Journal of Developmental Education, 21(1), 40-41. Ellis, T. J. (2001). Multimedia enhanced educational products as a tool to promote critical thinking in adult students. Journal of Educational Multimedia and Hypermedia, 10(2), 107-124. Facione, P. A., Sanchez, C. A., Facione, N. C., & Gainen, J. (1995). The dispositions toward critical thinking. The Journal of General Education, 44(1), 1-25. Gadzella, B. M., & Masten, W. G. (1998). Critical thinking and learning processes for students in two major Fields. Journal of Instructional Psychology, 25(4), 256-261. Giancarlo, C. A., & Facione, P. A (2001). A look across four years at the disposition Journal of General Education, 50(1), 29-55. Gibson, S., & Dembo, M. H. (1984). Teacher efficacy: A construct validation. Journal of Educational Psychology, 76, 569-582. Grossman, P. L., & Richert, A. E. (1988). Unacknowledged knowledge growth: A reexamination of the effects of teacher education. Teaching and Teacher Education, 4(1), 53-62. Guesky, T. R., & Passaro, P. D. (1994). Teacher efficacy: A study of construct dimensions. American Educational Research Journal, 31(3), 627-643. Guesky, T. R. (1988) Teacher efficacy, self-concept, and attitude toward the implementation of instructional innovation. Teaching and Teacher Education, 4(1), 63-69. Halpern, D. F. (1998). Teaching critical thinking for transfer across domains. American Psychologist, 53(4), 449-455. Halpern, D. F. (2003). Knowledge and thought: An introduction to critical thinking (4th ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Harris, J. C., & Eleser, C. (1997). Developmental Critical Thinking: Melding Two Imperatives. Journal of Developmental Education, 21(1), 12-19. Hittner, James B. (1999). Fostering critical thinking in personality psychology: The trait paper assignment. Journal of Instructional Psychology, 26(2), 92-97 Jawarneh, M., Iyadat, W., Al-Shudaifat, S., & Khasawneh, L. (2008). Developing critical thinking skills of secondary students in jordan utilizing monro and slater strategy, and mcfarland strategy. International Journal of Applied Educational Studies, 4(1), 58-69. Klein, P., Olson, D. R., & Stanovich, K. (1997). Structuring reflection: Teaching argument concepts and strategies enhances critical thinking. Canadian Journal of School Psychology, 13(1), 38-47. Kulinna, P. H., & Silverman, S. (2000). Relationship between teachers’ belief systems and actions toward teaching physical activity and fitness. Journal of Teaching in Physical Education, 19, 206-221. Larson, B. E. (2000). Classroom discussion: a method of instruction and a curriculum outcome. Teaching and Teacher Education, 16(5-6), 661-677. Lawson, T. J. (1999). Assessing psychological critical thinking as a learning outcome for psychology majors. Teaching of Psychology, 26(3), 207-209. Mackinnon, G. R. (2006). Contentious issues in science education: Building critical-thinking patterns through two-dimensional concept mapping. Journal of Educational Multimedia and Hypermedia, 15(4), 433-445.

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McCarthy-Tucker, S. N. (2000). Teaching style, philosophical orientation and the transmission of critical thinking skills in the U.S. public schools. Korean Journal of Thinking & Problem Solving, 10(1), 69-77. Nelson, T., & Oliver, W. (2004). Maximizing critical thinking skills with technology. In P. Kommers and G. Richards (Eds.), Proceedings of World Conference on Educational Multimedia, Hypermedia and Telecommunications, 2004, 3982-3986. Paul, R., & Elder, L. (2001). Critical thinking: Tools for taking charge of your learning and your life. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Roberts-Cady, S. (2008).The role of critical thinking in academic dishonesty policies. International Journal for Educational Integrity, 4, 2, 60-66. Rodriguez, Y. E., Sjostrom, B. R. (1998). Critical reflection for professional development: A comparative study of nontraditional adult and traditional student teachers. Journal of Teacher Education, 49(3), 177-187. Robinson, B. (1995). Teaching teachers to change: The place of change theory in the technology education of teachers. Journal of Technology and Teacher Education, 3(2/3), 107-117. Semerci, N. (2006). The effect of problem-based learning on the critical thinking of students in the intellectual and ethical development unit. Social Behavior and Personality, 34, 1127-1136.Shulman, L. S. (1987). Knowledge and teaching: Foundations of the new reform. Harvard Educational Review, 57(1), 1-21. Titone, C., Sherman, S., & Palmer, R. (1998). Cultivating student teachers’ dispositions and ability to construct knowledge. Action in Teacher Education, 19 (4), 76-87. Tillema, H. H. (2000). Belief change towards self-directed learning in student teachers: Immersion in practice or reflection on action. Teaching and Teacher Education, 16(5-6), 575-591. Yanchar, S. C., Slife, B. D., &Warne, R. (2009). Advancing disciplinary practice through critical thinking: A rejoinder to bensley. Review of General Psychology, 2009, 13(3), 278–280. Yang, S. C., & Chun, T. (2009). Experimental study of teaching critical thinking in civic education in Taiwanese junior high school. British Journal of Educational Psychology , 79, 29–55. Yeh, Y. (1997). Teacher training for critical-thinking instruction via a computer simulation. Unpublished dissertation, University of Virginia, VA, US. Yeh, Y. (1999). A study of substitute teachers’ professional knowledge, personal teaching efficacy, and teaching behavior in critical-thinking instruction. Journal of Chengchi University, 78, 55-84 Yeh, Y. (2004). Nurturing reflective teaching during critical-thinking instruction in a computer simulation program. Computers & Education, 42(2), 181-194.Yeh, Y. (2006). The interactive effects of personal traits and guided practices on preservice teachers’ changes in personal teaching efficacy. British Journal of Educational Technology, 37(4), 513-526. Yeh, Y. (2007). Aptitude-treatment interactions in preservice teachers’ behavior change during computer-simulated teaching. Computers & Education, 48(3), 495-507. Yeh, Y. (2008a). Collaborative PBL meets e-learning: How does it improve the professional development of critical-thinking instruction? In T. B. Scott and J. I. Livingston (Eds.),

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Leading-edge educational technology (pp. 133-158). Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc. Yeh, Y. (2008b). Integrating collaborative PBL with blended learning to improve preservice teachers’ critical-thinking skills. In A.R. Lipshitz and S. P. Parsons (Eds.), E-learning: 21st century issues and challenges (pp. 155-175). Nova Science Publishers, Inc. Yeh, Y. (2009). Integrating e-learning into the direct-instruction model to enhance the effectiveness of critical-thinking instruction, Instructional Science, 37, 185–203.

In: Critical Thinking Editors: Ch. P. Horvath and J. M. Forte, pp. 159-173

ISBN 978-1-61324-419-7 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 7

CRUCIAL CONNECTIONS: AN EXPLORATION OF CRITICAL THINKING AND SCHOLARLY WRITING Roisin Donnelly and Marian Fitzmaurice Learning, Teaching and Technology Centre Dublin Institute of Technology, Ireland

ABSTRACT Academic writing in the context of producing quality research articles is something which all academics engage in and there is evidence of increased attention to supporting the development of the writing and subsequent output of academics and research students. However, while scholarly writing is learnt in complex ways, critical thinking is an intrinsic part of such writing, and is highly valued across all the academic disciplines and indeed is a high priority on both employability and citizenship agendas. However, in practice the teaching of critical thinking is difficult and there is a lack of discussion about what it means within the context of the writing process. This study describes a pedagogic intervention with a group of academic staff to support the participants not only to explore critical thinking in their own writing, but also to consider in depth how they would apply this learning to their work with students in higher education. Within the context of an academic writing module on a postgraduate programme for academic staff in higher education, an action research approach was used with participants to improve their understanding of the role of critical thinking in the academic writing process. The data suggests that the pedagogic intervention resulted in greater confidence in terms of participants’ critical writing skills and also supported them to help their own students in the academic writing process. An exploratory model is proposed for critical academic writing encompassing a series of scaffolded in-class activities, virtual peer learning, and tutor feedback – culminating in the publication and dissemination of individual practicebased educational research.

Keywords: Advanced academic literacy; Academic writing; Collaborative dialogue; Critical thinking; Peer review.

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INTRODUCTION Over the last few decades, critical thinking has been defined in a number of different ways. Elder & Paul (1994) suggest that critical thinking is best understood as the ability of thinkers to take charge of their own thinking. More recently, Duron, Limbach, & Waugh (2006) define critical thinking as the ability to analyse and evaluate information and conclude that “critical thinkers are considered to be able to raise vital questions and problems, formulate them clearly and gather and assess relevant information, use abstract ideas, think open-mindedly, and communicate effectively with others” (p. 160). Teachers in all disciplines agree that critical thinking is an important educational outcome for their students, and indeed there is general consensus that ccritical thinking concepts and tools are the essential core of all well-conceived instruction. However, although teachers are able to articulate the critical thinking skills that they would like their students to exhibit, the cognitive steps between actual student performance and desirable student performance often remain unarticulated and vague. Taken further, there is an implicit assumption that academics have an agreed understanding of the concept of critical thinking but this tacit understanding is seldom articulated or discussed. As academics working with postgraduate students we were interested in ways of supporting students to be critical in their academic writing. Academic writing can be seen as a continuum of increasing complexity developing from undergraduate to postgraduate writing and beyond (Stacey & Granville, 2009). The term advanced academic literacy (AAL) has been used to refer to the writing expected of participants in higher levels of a discipline and this is a cumulative process of which enculturation into the disciplinary norms is central. Badley (2009) reminds us that good academic writing should always be a problematic and tentative exercise in critical reflective thinking. Clearly, there are key elements of academic writing of which critical thinking is paramount that need to be developed and the pedagogic challenge is to devise relevant supports for postgraduate students so that they can develop as academic writers. While the social and ideological underpinnings of academic writing have been investigated (Canagarajah, 2002; Casanave, 2002; Johns, 1997), the relationship between critical thinking and academic writing is an under researched area.

CONTEXT There is increasing pressure on academics to undertake research and to publish in higher education and indeed their practice offers rich and interesting fields for investigation but there are few opportunities provided within an increasingly busy and pressurised academic environment for developing their academic writing. In recognition of this, a 10 ECTS module entitled ‘Writing and Disseminating Research’ was developed and had shared delivery as part of two masters programme in Applied eLearning and Higher Education, which are accredited professional development programmes for academic staff. Ultimately there was dual purpose to the module, to enhance academics own writing as well as supporting their own students in the same endeavour. Each year, participants are drawn from a variety of Higher Education Institutions in Ireland and from a range of disciplines and course participants range from newly appointed

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staff to their institutions, to those that have been teaching for anywhere between 5-25 years. Our experience of working with the participants is that this multi disciplinary setting provides for interesting and critical discourse about academic writing. In terms of their subject disciplines, there is an eclectic mix, with many subject disciplines being represented ranging across apprentice education, undergraduate and postgraduate education. The study had a number of objectives: 1) To focus on how critical thinking informs the practice of academic writing; this involved exploring the definitional debates surrounding critical thinking and arriving at a definition that could be adapted within different disciplines. 2) To support academics in improving their own writing through an increased awareness of the concept and practice of critical thinking.

SETTING THE DISCUSSION IN THE LITERATURE For many years, academic writing has been a distinct teaching and research subject in US higher education and is strongly emerging as a subject in UK higher education, but in Ireland there are few initiatives in this area. Findings from research carried out in the UK with academic and support staff shows that 90% of respondents believe it is necessary to support students in their writing (Ganobscik, 2004). Initially, there were two models in the UK for teaching academic writing. The first is a skills approach, which seeks to teach writing as a set of discrete techniques without relation to a discipline and the second is an academic socialization model, which views academic writing proficiency as something that students absorb through immersion in disciplinary practices. However, Lea & Street (1998) argue for an academic literacies approach, which challenges the assumption implicit in the skills and academic socialization approach that it is the students who are in deficit and need to learn to adapt to the university. Academic literacies theorists make the case that ‘writing is not a student problem only, but a challenge for all members of the university as they attempt to adjust to new forms and technologies of writing and studying, as well as a variety of student backgrounds and experiences’ (Ganobscik-Williams, 2006, p. 4). In working with academic staff we became aware of a real challenge because as subject specialists they often do not feel that they can work effectively with students on their writing. The authors began to consider how this new theoretical framework might inform the practice of academic staff and decided to put into practice an initiative to support lectures in terms of their writing skills, whilst examining the role of critical thinking in this process and supporting the academic staff to work more effectively with their students on their writing. The work seeks to contribute to the discussion about the role of writing in the university and draw lessons for readers from our experience of implementing an initiative with academic staff drawn from a variety of higher education institutions in Ireland and from a diverse range of disciplines.

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TEACHING CRITICAL ACADEMIC WRITING The recognition that academic writing needs to be taught is growing and the call for teaching writing has come from outside and from inside the university (Bergstrom, 2004; Ganobcsik-Williams, 2006). Prior to the 1990’s, there was very limited provision of writing support in the UK tertiary education sector and this can be contrasted with the situation in US universities, where dedicated writing support has been a feature of first year programmes since the late nineteenth century (Ivanic & Lea, 2006). However in the UK there is now an emerging body of work on student writing and three models are evident, study skill, academic socialization and academic literacies. Indeed, there is a now a growing body of research in the field of academic literacies and despite the variety of contexts, the findings in regard to students’ struggle with writing and the gaps between tutors’ and students’ expectations and understanding are remarkably consistent (Ivanic & Lea, 2006). Research findings from very different institutional contexts and student groups all indicate ‘a complex relationship between the acquisition and development of subject-based knowledge and writing in higher education’ (Lea, 2004. p. 740). She argues that as subject specialists, academics often overlook the ways in which writing and textual practices are central to the process of learning (Lea, 2004). It is very frequent in higher education for the teaching or support for writing to be separated from mainstream study but a successful programme developed in the USA ‘Writing in the Disciplines’ approaches the development of academic writing through the disciplines. However, it does not take account of the increasing number of interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary contexts where students are undertaking courses, which are becoming more common at undergraduate and postgraduate level. Jacobs (2005) reports on an initiative at a tertiary institution in South Africa on integrating academic literacies into the disciplines of study and argues for the importance of creating discursive spaces for the collaboration of academic literacies practitioners and disciplinary specialists. Attention to student writing must be integrated in mainstream contexts and it seemed to us that working with academic staff on their writing could offer the potential for opening up such discursive spaces. Stierer (1997) writes about removing some of the guesswork from the process of meeting the writing requirements of courses and calls for a more systematic and explicit approach for helping students to identify and critique the kinds of expectations they are expected to fulfill in relation to written assignments. Students are always expected to be critical in their writing but while lecturers are able to articulate the critical thinking skills that they would like their students to exhibit in terms of their writing, the cognitive steps between actual student performance and desirable student performance often remain unarticulated and vague. In the module there was an attempt to implement strategies to support students to develop their critical thinking skills in order to bring a criticality to their writing. Some of these students are expert writers in their own disciplines, while others may not have considerable experience and find academic writing really difficult. However, each member of the group is encountering a new area of study with its own particular discourse and supporting the writing process gave them the opportunity to develop new skills.

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RESEARCH DESIGN Cohen, Manion & Morrison (2000) argue that action research is a powerful tool for change and improvement at the local level and this approach was used in this study because it offered the potential to bridge the gap between research and practice by potentially delivering useable solutions to real-world problems. Different action researchers have described the process in different ways, some as cycles of reflective action, some as flow diagrams, some as spirals of action (Mc Niff et al., 1996). Also, in action research there are different types of studies ranging from small-scale evaluative case studies which have a defined start and end point to studies which are cyclical in nature and more long term (Tight, 2003). This research study had a defined start and end point and an approach outlined by Coughlan & Brannick (2001), comprising of a series of steps, diagnosing, planning action, taking action and evaluating was followed, as it was the most suited to the context. Figure 1 illustrates the data collection cycle undertaken in the study.

Figure 1. Action Research Cycle for Critical Academic Writing.

The action research cycle began with a review of the situation, drawing on informal conversations with participants, colleagues, a review of the literature and a process of values clarification for ourselves with regards to the relationship between critical thinking and academic writing. Following on from this, the ‘Critical Academic Writing Module’ was

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designed to develop academic writing through the application of critical thinking skills. It is arguable that using the traditional lecture format may not adequately foster active learning or critical thinking skills in these participants, as it is based on a teacher-centred approach. As a result, it was important to adjust the structure of class delivery to promote such skills. Not only would this make the module work more enjoyable for both participants and tutors, it could equip participants with the skills necessary in their future practice. During a class session, the tutor needed to consider the kinds of active learning that could encourage critical thinking. To enhance the overall learning experience, it was necessary have a broad understanding of what active learning constituted for these participants. In-class strategies included requesting participants to be involved in the learning experience by, for example, giving information and ideas, sharing experiences, and offering opinions. Table 1 shows a variety of the short activities used to help progress the participants through the process of critical academic writing. Table 1. List of In-class activities Students asked first to read an article and: Individually In pairs/small groups Produce a drawing/visual summary of the text One group highlights key points, another ‘blacks out’ everything that is NOT necessary Everyone selects one sentence from the text In pairs, analyse a passage in the article for that they have found meaningful (a main ‘voice’ point or an idea with which to argue) Produce one question that you would ask the In groups, discuss the textual features of the author discipline that are evident Produce a ‘bare bones’ summary (25 words) In pairs, examine the main argument/s that the author/s are making Write a Critical Synopsis of the Text (See In groups of 4, discuss how convincing the Appendix 1) arguments made by the author/s are and present to entire group

Towards the end of the first semester, once the participants had experienced the range of in-class activities, a virtual peer learning set entitled ‘online journal club’ was established in the virtual learning environment, webcourses. This was envisaged as a way to share insights and conversation themes with the participants. In the first instance, articles on the process of critical academic writing were distributed by the tutors to the group, but thereafter, they were encouraged to select relevant articles themselves. In the asynchronous discussion board in the VLE, directed commentary on each article was posted by participants who were divided into small groups of four; contribution is regular and periodic (weekly). Discussion questions posed by the tutors are used to stimulate reflection and conversation. In particular, these questions are designed to help the online journal club participants: • • •

identify key points addressed by the article, and put them in context; discuss the validity of the findings, and; consider how the findings apply to practice with regard to critical thinking and academic writing.

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Participants are encouraged to take a RADICAL approach to evaluating these articles online: Read, Ask, Discuss, Inquire, Collaborate, Act and Learn. To support the participants further in this, a set of guidelines are used, shown in Table 2: Table 2. RADICAL Approach to Critical Academic Writing Read Ask Discuss Inquire Collaborate Act Learn

the article critically the key questions for yourself the meaning and shared interpretation into other sources of knowledge and insight with others who know or care about the issues by sharing their postings and working to change practice from what others share online and from your actions and collaborations and re-start the cycle

Finally, the tutors highlight commonalities or uniquely important ideas from the online collaborative dialogue. The peer learning sets have the potential to improve communication and mutual support between participants and also to encourage them to make links between taught sessions on critical acadmic writing and foster and advance their understanding of classroom writing practices. This also leads into a crucial aspect of the module – the role of formative feedback to students by tutors. By providing formative feedback that seeks to discover and clarify intended meanings, the tutors tap into the developing writers' basic desire to communicate their ideas. The process-oriented writing instructional approach favoured by the module tutors ensured that deep-level revision was most productive in terms of writing skills development. The tutor formative feedback underpinned with an inquiring stance engaged the participants in negotiation over the emerging meaning of their texts. Sample draft compositions were used to explore the assumptions and implications of this instructional stance to the participant writing. At the mid way point and at the end of the module, participants were invited to complete questionnaires with eight open-ended questions designed to evaluate the module, but with a specific focus on the experience of the critical writing process; the data from these questionnaires were then analyzed. In looking for patterns and trends in the responses, the following steps were undertaken: reading through the responses and developing categories for the different themes emerging; as we read through the comments, we assigned at least one category to each response. Once the data had been studied and categories determined, the next step was to pinpoint categories that were related and identify the main themes. Four themes emerged from the data: becoming critical; perception of the peer review process; and challenges of critical academic writing; perceived impact of critical academic writing on practice.

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS Becoming Critical To engage critically with a written text, the reader ideally needs to have an understanding of what the authors are doing and reasonable knowledge of the field of enquiry and this can only be achieved by critical reading of relevant texts.

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Attention is drawn here to the importance of approaching a text as something that demands a response from you as a reader and to see your reading as an active process that requires you to be critical. The critical reading of a text is mostly about assessing the quality of the case that has been made and so the critical reader is interested in whether there is sufficient evidence to support a claim and whether other possible interpretations have been considered. Thus, the participants recognized the importance of working with students to develop the skill of critical reading as an important step to becoming critical in writing. Most of the participants reported that the strategies used in class and outlined in Table 1 were useful in terms of the development of their own academic writing and would be used by them with their own students. Teaching my students how to construct an argument and focus their work is the most challenging but I have now some strategies that I can employ with them. Business Lecturer One of the most important things I will be sharing with my students is the importance of developing a logical line of reasoning Social Work Lecturer

Allied to this, the importance of being able to critically select the texts that are most central and relevant to your study purposes was also seen as important. Engaging my students with the process of researching the literature in my discipline and accessing relevant journals is key. Architecture Lecturer

There is a clear need to select what to read and what not to read and it could be argues that making critical choices about what to read is in fact the first step and so the importance of focusing with students on techniques for deciding what to read. In terms of the writing process, the issue of attention to planning also emerged as important. I will be emphasizing to them the need for planning to ensure steady progress. Ecology Lecturer

In addition, it was felt by a number of the lecturers that there was a real need to support students in terms of the development of their academic writing through facilitated sessions focusing on the key elements of academic writing, and the module had been enabling for them in that regard. I will now be facilitating sessions on academic writing with my own students and enabling structured peer feedback to occur in these. I would also like to have optional ‘dip-in’ sessions for those with different levels of experience. Law Lecturer

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It has become clear to me that supported, dedicated academic writing sessions must be included at least at MA level. The process should be considered a journey towards excellence. Business Lecturer

Clearly, the importance of structured sessions on academic writing and the confidence to support students in terms of becoming critical in the academic writing process grew through participation in the module and through the range of different activities that were developed and the peer review process emerged as of particular significance.

PERCEPTION OF THE PEER REVIEW PROCESS In the module, peer review was the process of making judgments about the quality of critical academic writing which involved a peer reading and examining the draft journal papers in various stages of completion and providing feedback. This feedback led to reflection and discussion, with the ultimate aim of improving participant learning. The greatest value of peer review here was the influence that different disciplinary peers had on improving individual’s critical academic writing practice: I got the most interesting and constructive comments back from the peers who were from various different backgrounds and disciplines to myself. I now realize the benefits of a critical friend. Law Lecturer

A study by Mürau (1993) considered the effects of the peer review process on writing anxiety. By working together, although perhaps having an initial sense of apprehension about the process and what it entails, participants come to realize the similar problems and difficulties that their peers share and feel less isolated. There can be a fear of exposure of one’s work to peers and also a sense of unease at having to give criticism: It is lonely at times writing for publication whether in my own discipline or more broadly in education, so it was a positive thing to see how someone else feels about my writing. Business Lecturer I was a bit intimidated by this as I am now to it; however it was a good learning experience. Social Work Lecturer Initially I had a fear of being wrong in offering my opinion but once I was honest about comments it felt good to have a judgment to offer. Instrumentation Lecturer

By providing the participants with experience in writing collaboratively and critiquing one another's writing, it is argued here that collaborative writing promotes active learning and provides them with experience working as part of a team. Peer review gave the participants experience in critical thinking and promoted their editorial skills. These classroom techniques raised participants’ comfort level at having their work evaluated by others in a professional setting. The module evaluation feedback confirmed that participants who completed the module were more likely to write collaboratively in future, and participants reported that they would seek collaborative writing opportunities in their workplace:

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Roisin Donnelly and Marian Fitzmaurice As well as the face-to-face reviews we conducted, I got sent texts and emails throughout that kept me going when I was going to give up. The group peer review sessions were very useful also and are something that I intend to use in my own practice. Social Care Lecturer

The collaborative peer review sessions facilitated the participants in learning how to read carefully, with attention to the details of a piece of writing (whether their own or another writer's). Academic writers have very little opportunity and few spaces to share their writingin-progress (Antoniou & Moriarty, 2008) but the module provided a space for this and all agreed that their writing was strengthened by taking into account the responses of both the actual and anticipated readers. As a result, they were making the transition from writing primarily for themselves or for the tutors, to writing for a broader audience, which was a key transition for the participants as they developed their post-graduate work and learnt to write papers of publishable quality. Wrapped around these benefits were the development of participant skills in formulating and communicating constructive feedback on a peer's work, as well as knowing how to gather and respond to feedback on their own work. However, it is worth highlighting that there can be a downside to collaborative peer review, particularly if one of the peers is a stronger writer than the other in the first instance, as one participant noted: This has the potential to place a burden on the more experienced writers in the process. Law Lecturer

CHALLENGES OF CRITICAL ACADEMIC WRITING The two key challenges identified by the participants revolved around time management of the writing process and grappling with scholarship, particularly knowing when to stop reading and start writing; this symbiotic relationship between reading and writing is important to acknowledge: It was difficult to transfer the chaos of my concepts and all the reading I was doing into a structured piece of work. Getting to grips with a new type of literature was the biggest issue for me. Law Lecturer The editing of my paper took much, much longer than I had allocated time for. Architecture Lecturer The synthesis of literature is complex and requires time and space to think. Law Lecturer

Whilst the complexity of writing is not to be underestimated, discovering efficient writing skills does take time; it consists of lengthy procedures of conducting thorough research and the ability to write skillfully. Improving the efficiency of one’s academic output is a valuable skill to acquire. The participants had to grapple with challenging disciplinespecific subject matter and exacting logic; all whilst contending with the educational research field’s rhetoric, accepted language and writing style, required format, and of course, critical thinking. There is a very clear sense form the data that building a repertoire of critical thinking and writing skills that enable the participants to enter the academic debates in their

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subject, and even to challenge accepted thinking, is worth the time investment as it can result in can result in changes to practice.

Perceived Impact of Critical Academic Writing on Practice From the 20 participants on the module, only five had previously published in disciplinary journals, and none in educational research outlets. However, participation in the module had some important results and all lecturers reported that there had been real learning in terms of writing in an academic context and more specifically, writing for a journal. One of the most useful aspects is that this was an opportunity to spend time learning and improving my writing abilities in an academic context. Social Work Lecturer I have a much better sense of how to approach the whole area of writing for a journal. Business Lecturer

They had also become more confident about their writing: I now appreciate that no research idea, no matter how small could be of real interest to someone out there. This module has given me the confidence to pursue publishing my own work Apprentice Lecturer

The module required each participant to target a specific journal and write an article and as outlined earlier a framework was provided for individuals to engage in the writing process. The support, guidance and practice led to improvements in their writing over the timescale of the module and this resulted in an increase in confidence and an improvement in their writing process.

Towards a Model of Critical Academic Writing The academic writing process demands that the participants are thinking critically and over the course of the module a model emerged which can/has provided for our participants an approach to the teaching academic writing in the context of their own disciplinary field. Figure 2 shows the six components of the model and how they interrelate: in-class activities, virtual peer learning sets, the support of tutors’ feedback, the role of cross programme dissemination which took the form of a participant-led conference and an educational research forum, the online and in-class resources distributed and the impact on participants’ practice of critical thinking skills and critical academic writing.

Figure 2. Model of Critical Academic Writing.

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CONCLUSION This work contributes to the discussion about the role of writing in the university and draws lessons for readers from our experience of implementing an initiative with academic staff drawn from a variety of higher education institutions in Ireland and from a diverse range of disciplines. Antoniou and Moriarty (2008, p. 164) contend that ‘successful academic writing does not depend on innate talent and ability but, like all writing, develops with dedication and practice’. There is much to be gained by adopting the practice of explicitly teaching academic writing skills with a particular focus on developing the skill of being critical. During the module, the lecturers through structured exercises and activities had ongoing practice and gained confidence in academic writing in an educational discipline and also gained confidence in articulating what it means to be critical as a writer. Academic writing is a developmental process as is critical thinking and the pedagogic intervention with academic staff on two postgraduate programmes detailed in this chapter has highlighted the value of focusing on the role of critical thinking in the writing process. Since writing and publishing are increasingly important in a successful academic career it is imperative that there is support for lecturers to develop their writing. Morss & Murray (2001) argue that despite the emphasis on publishing to enhance individual and institutional profiles there is not sufficient research or support for academics aiming to improve quality and productivity in writing. Moore (2003) suggests that to help academics write, we need to initiate discussions and undertake research and in this chapter we have sought to contribute by sharing the work we undertook with a group of lecturers. The comments of the lecturers indicate that the project has been successful and many have presented their work at conferences and some have published for the first time in peer review higher education journals. Also, a model has been developed which we hope can be used by lecturers to support their students in their academic writing endeavors so that the tacit understanding which lecturers have of the concept of critical thinking in the writing process will be articulated, discussed and become a focus of their educational practices.

REFERENCES Antoniou, M., & Moriarty, J. (2008). What can academic writers learn from creative writers? Developing guidance and support for lecturers in Higher Education. Teaching in Higher Education, 13(2), 157-167. Badley, G. (2009). Academic Writing as shaping and re-shaping. Teaching in Higher Education, 14(2), 209-219. Canagarajah, A.S. (2002). Critical academic writing and multilingual students. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Casanave, C.P. (2002). Writing games: multicultural case studies of academic literacy practices in higher education. Mahwah: NJ: Laurence Erlbaum. Duron, R., Limbach, B., & Waugh, W. (2006). Critical Thinking Framework For any Discipline. International Journal of Teaching and Learning in Higher Education, 17(2), 160-166.

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Elder, L., & Paul, R. (1994). Critical thinking: Why we must transform our teaching. Journal of Developmental Education, 18(1), 34-35. Ivanic, R., & Lea, M.R. (2006). New Contexts, New Challenges: the Teaching of Writing in UK Higher Education. In Teaching Academic Writing in U K Higher Education (pp.715). Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Jacobs, C. (2005). On being an insider on the outside: new spaces for integrating academic literacies. Teaching in Higher Education, 10(4), 475-487. Johns, A.M. (1997). Text, role and context: Developing academic literacies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lea, M.R. (2004). Academic literacies: a pedagogy for course design. Studies in Higher Education, 29(6), 739-756. Leki, L. (1998). Academic Writing: Exploring Processes and Strategies. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press. Ganobcsik-Williams, L. (ed.) (2006). Introduction: Starting Point Theory and Pedagogy in Teaching Academic Writing in U K Higher Education (pp.3-6). Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Moore, S. (2003). Writer’s retreat for academics: Exploring and increasing the motivation to write. Journal of Further and Higher Education 27(3), 333-342. Morss, K., & Murray, R. (2001). Researching Academic Writing within a Structured Programme: insights and outcomes. Studies in Higher Education, 26(1), 35-52. Mürau, A.M. (1993). Shared writing: Students’ perceptions and attitudes of peer review. Working Papers in Educational Linguistics, 9(2), 71-79. Schatzman, L. & Strauss, A. (1973). Field Research: Strategies for a Natural Sociology. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. Stacey, J.D., & Granville, S. (2009). Entering the conversation: reaction papers in advanced academic literacy. Teaching in Higher Education, 14(3), 327-339. Srierer, B. (2006). Schoolteachers as Students of Academic Literacy and the Construction of Professional Knowledge within Master’s Courses in Education. In Teaching Academic Writing in U K Higher Education. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Sword, H. (2007). The Writer’s Diet. New Zealand: Pearson Education.

APPENDIX 1: A CRITICAL SYNOPSIS OF A TEXT Notes on Questions Critical reading is part of academic study and requires you not just to passively read a text but also to assess the texts of other scholars. In order to do this well, a structured approach can be helpful. The 5 questions outlined below provide a framework for a critical reading of a text.

Question 1: Sketch a Simple Outline of the Key Arguments or Ideas This requires you to read the entire article and summarise the main arguments and ideas.

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Question 2: What Are the Authors Seeking to Do in Writing this Article? The abstract, introduction or conclusion should make clear what the purpose of the authors is. Authors may be seeking to do any of the following: • • • • • •

Contribute to theory Report their own research Criticise what is currently being done Review the work of others Express opinions Give advice on future policy directions.

Question 3: What Are the Authors Saying that Has Relevance to My Work? This question requires you to consider the links if any to your own project or research.

Question 4: How Convincing is What the Authors Are Saying? This question requires you to evaluate the arguments put forward by the authors. • • • • • •

Are the arguments supported with strong evidence? What claims are made? Are there unsubstantiated claims? What data set is drawn on and are the claims clearly related to this? Are the claims consistent with other articles you have read? Do the claims resonate in terms of your own research or professional experience?

Question 5: What Use Can I Make of This? This question requires you to think about the following: • •

Do you agree or disagree with the claims made by the author? In your own writing, is this a key text that you will use and discuss in depth or will you only refer to it briefly?

(Adapted from Wallace & Wray, 2006)

In: Critical Thinking Editors: Ch. P. Horvath and J. M. Forte, pp. 175-188

ISBN: 978-1-61324-419-7 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 8

HOW CAN CRITICAL THINKING BE RECOGNIZED IN THE CLASSROOM? Patrícia Albergaria-Almeida1, José Joaquim Cristino Teixeira-Dias2 and Mariana Martinho3 1

Research Center for Didactics and Technology in Teacher Education Department of Education University of Aveiro, Portugal 2 Department of Chemistry University of Aveiro, Portugal 3 Department of Education University of Aveiro, Portugal

ABSTRACT A crucial goal of Higher Education is to support students in developing their ability to think critically. However, “critical thinking” can be an ambiguous expression. In this chapter, we intend to clarify its meaning, as well as to characterize the most significant indicator of critical thinking: higher-order questioning, as well as the relationship between critical thinking and active learning. We also propose to shed light on the teaching approaches which seem to inhibit students’ critical skills and to present teaching and learning strategies to enhance critical thinking. Finally, we will describe the curriculum of a first year chemistry course at a Portuguese university aimed at fostering students’ critical thinking through the encouragement of quality questioning. We will describe, in detail, the teaching, learning and assessment strategies designed and implemented in this course.

1. QUESTIONING AS THE MAIN INDICATOR OF CRITICAL THINKING The Commission of European Communities (2006) considers critical thinking as a key competence for lifelong learning in terms of an “attitude of critical appreciation and curiosity, an interest in ethical issues and respect for both safety and sustainability - in

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particular, as regards scientific and technological progress in relation to oneself, family, community and global issues” (p. 15). The Boyer Commission Report (1998) reinforces that courses should be “structured in such a way as to create student-centered learning environments where inquiry is the norm, problem solving becomes the focus, and thinking critically is part of the process” (p. 4). Therefore, critical skills are identified as important generic competences to be developed by students. However, it is well-known that frequent university classes do not promote students’ criticality (Braxton & Nordvall, 1985). According to Sternberg (1987) and to Browne & Freeman (2000), critical thinking is a participant activity that implies a partnership between the teachers and their students. Even if critical thinking can be accelerated through the implementation of specific teaching, learning and assessment strategies, these will only be effective if the students are willing to become fully engaged in effective learning. Actually, critical thinkers are those who are predisposed to think critically (Halpern, 1999). Critical thinkers evaluate the outcomes of though processes (Halpern, 1998). Thus, critical thinking can be taught as: decision making (Dawes, 1988), cognitive process (Rabinowitz, 1993), problem solving (Mayer, 1992), or argument analysis (Kahane, 1997). Several authors (Almeida, Pedrosa de Jesus & Watts, 2011; Browne & Freeman, 2000; Cuccio-Shirripa & Steiner, 2000; Meyer, 1994; Shaw, 1996) also conceptualize critical thinking as directly related to higher-level questioning. According to Cuccio-Shirripa and Steiner (2000, p. 21): “questioning is one of the thinking processing skills which is structurally embedded in the thinking operations of critical thinking, creative thinking and problem solving. It consists of the smaller micro-thinking skills of recall, comprehension, application analysis, synthesis and evaluation (…) Questions guide knowledge construction in the formation and changing of the cognitive networks or schemata”.

Facione, Facione & Giancarlo (1996, p. 71) also see a straight link between critical thinking and questioning: “Critical questioners, critical learners, are curious, challenge authority, internalize, practice scientific and critical thinking and questioning. Critical questioners have the motivation, inclination to drive and involve themselves in meaningful critical thinking, while making decisions and/or solving problems.”

Actually, Browne & Freeman (2000, p. 302) consider questioning as “the primary behavioral characteristic of critical thinking classrooms”. Almeida, Pedrosa de Jesus and Watts (2011) also conceptualize student questioning as the most important indicator of critical thinking. In 1966, Raths, Wasserman, Jonas and Rothstein considered the interaction between the students and the teacher as a privileged site to enhance criticality. More recently, Meyer (1994) saw each declarative statement made by the teacher, or by the students, as potential stimuli to ask questions. Furthermore, this author, as many others (e.g., Braxton & Nordvall, 1985; Browne & Freeman, 2000; Browne & Keeley, 1998; Ruggerio, 1996), consider a separate category of critical questions. These questions are seen as especially significant for the critical thinking classroom. Shaw (1996) underlines that, in a first moment, critical

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thinking requires comprehension. Thus, questions that disclose information are important starting points for activating critical thinking. Browne and Freeman (2000, p. 302) suggest a list of questions to promote critical thinking: • • • • • • • •

What words or phrases are being used in an ambiguous fashion? What descriptive and value assumptions provide the foundation for the reasoning? What evidence was provided for the claims in the reasoning? What is the quality of the proffered evidence? Are the analogical components of the argument persuasive? What important omitted information is omitted from the reasoning? What rival causes might explain the conclusion? What alternative inferences can reasonably be drawn from the evidence?”

On the other hand, Almeida, Pedrosa de Jesus and Watts (2011) do not defend the existence of a distinct category of critical questions. Instead, these authors suggest that encouraging “critical questioners” is more important than promoting critical questions (Almeida, Pedrosa de Jesus and Watts, 2011, p. 117). According to Almeida, Pedrosa de Jesus & Watts (2011), being critical depends on three key aspects: context, competency and disposition. Mayer (1986) emphasizes the role of context, stating that is mainly the learning context that promotes or shrinks students’ criticality. As stated by Mayer (1986, p. 253): “The key to developing critical thinking lies in creating conditions for participation rather than passivity, and in providing opportunities for emotional engagement with the materials.”

2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTIVE LEARNING AND CRITICAL THINKING Several studies (Almeida, Pedrosa de Jesus & Watts, 2008; Almeida, Teixeira-Dias & Medina, 2010; Pedrosa de Jesus, Teixeira-Dias & Watts, 2003; Teixeira-Dias, Pedrosa de Jesus, Neri de Souza & Watts, 2005) found that encouraging student questioning is a key strategy to promote active learning. Browne and Freeman (2000) also point out the encouragement of active learning as a fertilizer of classroom criticality. The strong point of active learning is that it eases personal interest within the subject matter, this means provoking students into discussion, questioning and evaluation. Critical thinking arises from a state of doubt that can only be accomplished through cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), cognitive disequilibrium (Graesser & Olde, 2003) or controversy (Browne & Freeman, 2000). So, in order to enhance critical thinking, teachers must stimulate controversy intentionally (Brod, 1986). However, as stated by Browne and Freeman (2000, p. 302): “the special nature of critical thinking as an educational objective results in the necessity to design classrooms to match the demands of a mental activity that is less than welcome for many students.”

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Frequently, both teachers and students feel uncomfortable with controversy. However, it is controversy that promotes discussion and reflection, and these are both essential when fostering critical thinking. But it is not solely discomfort that inhibits critical thinking. In 1987, Sternberg presented several myths inhibiting the teaching and learning of critical thinking: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)

the teacher has nothing to learn from students critical thinking is exclusively the teacher’s job there is a correct way to teach critical thinking the more important is the “right” answer discussion is a means to an end the role of a course in critical thinking is to teach critical thinking

When the students and the teacher step out of their comfort zone and take risks by experiencing controversy, “cognitive magic is possible” (Browne & Freeman, 2000, p. 308). Pithers and Soden (2000, p. 244) underline that the teacher should aim at challenging student ideas: “For example, by facilitating the generation of hypotheses, the interpretation of information or data, specification of criteria, or helping students to understand the judgmental processes for applying principles to new situations or for making predictions”.

In the next section, we will describe the curriculum of a first year chemistry course, aiming to promote students’ critical thinking through fostering students’ high-level questioning.

3. HOW TO DESIGN A CHEMISTRY UNIVERSITY COURSE AIMED AT PROMOTING STUDENTS’ CRITICAL THINKING Having in mind the encouragement of students’ critical thinking, the curriculum of a 1st year chemistry course, at the University of Aveiro in Portugal, aims at promoting active learning, fostering student higher-level questioning, and consequently enhance student criticality and promote deep approaches to learning. Johnston (2010) suggests some activities to develop first year students’ intellectual competences. It is important to emphasize that questioning is linked to several intellectual skills, as shown in Table 1. Following the suggestions of Johnston (2010) and Mbajiorgu and Reid (2006), the teaching, learning and assessment strategies at this chemistry course for 1st year students were conceived, designed and implemented in order to foster deep learning (Entwistle, McCune, & Walker 2001). Almeida, Pedrosa de Jesus and Watts (2011) found that university students adopting deep approaches to learning are frequently critical questioners. The strategies implemented are described in the following sections.

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Table 1. Student development in practice Intellectual competences Curiosity, openness to new ideas and willingness to listen to other views

Scepticism and critical awareness of the need to gather data, information and present evidence Communication which is concise, accurate and persuasive

Examples of student activity from practice Brainstorming, formulating questions, investigating relevant information, carrying out sustained inquiry work, discussing ideas with peers and lecturers. Acknowledging diversity and including all points of view Asking focused questions, checking sources, keeping detailed notes of practical work. Identifying mistakes and improving performance Devising models, making analogies and comparisons, categorizing information, focusing on key questions, recognizing audience needs and academic conventions. Utilizing a variety of communication technologies. Resisting the temptation to plagiarize

Adapted from Johnston 2010, 54; bold added by the authors of this chapter.

A) The Basic Structure of the General Chemistry Course: Lectures, Laboratory Classes and Tutorials The General Chemistry course comprises three kinds of classes: lectures, laboratory classes and tutorials. Students should attend a two-hour lecture per week (not compulsory). Lectures should provide the students with the understanding of the contents approached. These classes are of crucial importance to students’ academic success in chemistry. Lectures should be seen as hours of active study. Before each class, students are expected (i) to read the material provided by the teacher; (ii) to identify topics that could represent obstacles to learning; and (iii) to identify topics that could raise doubts or questions. During lectures students are stimulated to ask questions either orally or in a written format, as we will explain later. The main aim of the laboratory classes is to initiate the student in the research process in chemistry. Simultaneously, it is expected that students will learn to appreciate chemistry as an experimental science. To accomplish this aim, all laboratory tasks are planned and performed individually. During laboratory classes, the teacher acts as a facilitator, assisting students to overcome their difficulties. Each student must attend a two-hour laboratory class per week. Practical classes are compulsory. Practical laboratory sessions were conceived in order to promote the development of concepts and understanding and not merely as a handmaid of lectures. In laboratory classes, the students have opportunities to: (a) identify the main objectives of the work; (b) identify and overcome any conceptual and practical difficulties encountered; (c) plan and execute the work; (d) record and discuss the results and observations in their lab book; (e) answer the questions raised in their laboratory manual

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Tutorials provide the student with guidance about learning methods. Students should use these classes to clarify their doubts and/or ask questions about the contents taught in lectures and also about the practical tasks. Each student is expected to attend a two-hour tutorial per week, but these are not compulsory classes.

B) Innovative Teaching and Learning Strategies Besides the formal classes described earlier, the following strategies were also implemented: 1) small pauses during lectures to encourage students’ oral questions. In the middle of the lesson, the teacher stopped lecturing for two or three minutes, and invited the students to think about or to discuss the class topics with their colleagues. At the end of the break, students had the opportunity to raise oral questions. If the students felt more comfortable, they could write their questions instead, and the teacher would answer orally at the beginning of the next lesson. Some instances of students’ questions asked after these pauses are: Teacher, could you explain better what is anthropomorphism? Are all dry cell batteries not rechargeable?

2) teacher’s written questions during lectures to facilitate the organization of teaching and learning and to serve as a role model to students. For instance, throughout the ‘Water and aqueous solutions’ topic, the teacher presented seventeen written questions. These had diverse degrees of difficulty and served different functions. Some instances of the written questions drawn from our project are: How can you describe the polarity of a water molecule? Why are there substances that are gaseous, others are liquids and others are solids? In the absence of gravity, why are water drops exactly spherical?

3) ‘Questions and answers in Chemistry’ online forum to encourage and facilitate students’ questioning. Students could use this tool to ask written questions related to the topics taught during lectures and/or practical laboratory sessions. Questions related to everyday phenomena with a chemical background were also welcomed. The teacher answered all questions within two days, also on the online forum. All questions and answers are available online to all chemistry students. An instance of a written question asked through the online forum is: I think the teacher said that in the reaction NH3(g) + HCl(g) -> NH4+Cl-(s), the reagents have a lower energy than the products. However, it was also said that the energy of the Cl- and NH4+ pair is higher than the energy of the pair Cl-H and NH3. Could you confirm this information and explain why this happens?

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4) ‘Probllem-based casses’ online foorum to encouurage studentts to ask queestions and suggesst possible expplanations for the phenomenna proposed by b the teacherr. This kind of actiivity also aim med to enhannce the discuussion betweeen students. All A of the problem m-based cases proposed too students werre based on reeal-life situatiions with a social, ecological or o technologiccal impact onn society. Sttudents were invited to t eyes of a scientifically s i informed citizzen. One of analyze these situatiions through the oblem-based cases c proposedd to the studennts is shown inn Figure 1. the pro Problem-b based case “Acid rain” Having in mind your knnowledge aboutt acids and bassis, ask questioons or proposee possible e explanations fo or the followingg phenomenonn: nd limestone are a the most used u materials in the construuction of builddings and Marble an monuments. Bo m oth marble andd limestone aree composed of calcium carboonate (CaCO3), differing o only in the crysstalline structuure. Even if booth are known by b their high durability, d builddings and m monuments bu uilt with marblle and limestonne are graduallly eroded throough the action of acid r rain. How can we explain thiss phenomenon? More inforrmation about acid rain availlable in: Atkinss, P. and Loretta, J. (2005). Chemical Principles – Thee Quest for Insiight (3rd ed.). New York: W. H. P H Freeman and Company. p. 3996. Fiigure 1. Problem m-based case abbout acid rain.

Fiigure 2. Example of an interacttion moment beetween studentss, in one of the online o forums (in Poortuguese).

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P. Albergariaa-Almeida, J. J. J C. Teixeira--Dias and M. Martinho M Figure 2 presents an a example of o an interactiion moment between b studeents in the online forum aboutt acid rain. It I was interessting to find that besides proposing nations for thee situation prooposed, studennts also raisedd questions rellated to the explan acid raain topic. For instance: We talk about accid rain, but is i there basic rain? The situatio ons proposed in these forrums aimed at a triggering perplexity orr cognitive disequilibrium (Graeesser & Olde, 2003), leadingg to the discusssion among students. s 5) chemisstry mini-projects where thhe students aree given the oppportunity to creatively develo op a small-group project on a chemistry topic. t Besidess scientific knoowledge, it is also expected thatt students develop other kinnds of compettences, such ass the social compeetence. Accordding to Daviees (2009), grooup work is a learning strrategy that compriises a social dilemma, d in which w learnerss face contradictory demandds between self-intterest and alttruism. Mini-pprojects compprise nine phhases, as summ marized in Figure 3.

Phase 1 – Tea P am Organisati tion and Regiistration The organization and registration r off the teams was w facilitatedd through thee use of a sooftware speciffically conceivved for this puurpose. P Phase 2 – Top pics Randomly ly Assigned within w Teams

1

• Team orrganization and registration

2

• Topics raandomly aassigned w within teaams

3

• Readingg the papeer and asking questiions

4

• Meetingg with thee teacher

5

• Proposing up to two researrch questiions

6

• Writing,, producin ng and delivering th he poster

7

• Oral preesentation n of the po osters

8

• Evaluation of the mini‐reseearch projects

9

• Exhibitio on of the posters

Fiigure 3. Processs of developmennt of the mini reesearch projectss.

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Phase 3 – Reading The Paper and Asking Questions Each team should read the paper related to their topic. All of the papers were chosen from ‘Scientific American’, as shown in Table 2. Moreover, after reading the paper, the students should ask questions about scientific contents and post them in the online forum created to support the development of mini-projects. This forum was only accessible to the students that subscribed to the chemistry mini-projects. Some instances of questions posted in the online forum are: •

•

•

According to the Scientific American paper “The secrets of stardust”, the particles of dust originated in comets contain organic materials and also contain structures that can promote chemical evolution if these structures are underwater. What exactly are these “structures”? And how do these structures promote chemical evolution when underwater? The temperature needed to transform liquid hydrogen into solid hydrogen is about 14 Kelvin. However, if the pressure rises, then the temperature will also rise. Thus, to perform this transformation, an extremely low temperature is needed as well as a high pressure. Thus, at which temperature does liquid hydrogen becomes solid hydrogen? This paper explains the importance of rocks in the origin of life on our planet. However, we are curious to know why carbon was the most important atom in the origin of life. Was it possible to substitute carbon by a different element? Would it be possible for another element to promote the same kind of bonds between atoms? Table 2. Mini-projects topics and corresponding Scientific American paper

Topic - Title of the Scientific American Paper Melting below zero The secrets of stardust Intelligent gels The evolution of the periodic system Combinatorial chemistry and new drugs New chemical tools to create plastics Catalysis on surfaces Metal clusters and magic numbers Nanotechnology and the double helix Little green molecules Zinc fingers Simulating water and the molecules of life Making new elements How should chemists think? The ice of life Drugs by design Making metallic hydrogen The complexity of coffee Life’s rocky start Creating nanophase materials

Year 2000 2000 1993 1998 1997 1997 1993 1997 2004 2006 1993 1998 1998 1993 2001 1993 2000 2002 2001 1996

Month February December May September April May April December June March February November September February August December May June April December

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Phase 4 – Meeting with the Teacher At this stage, students should have the initiative to schedule a meeting with the teacher. The teacher met with each group separately. Each meeting lasted 30 minutes. In these meetings, the students must raise questions about their topic and the teacher will only provide appropriate feedback, orientation and guidance for students and answer their questions. Phase 5 – Proposing Up to Two Research Questions Students were asked to raise up to two research questions that should guide their research projects and their posters. Some instances of these questions are: • • • •

Is it useful to spend millions of Euros in the research and discovery of new compounds that currently do not have any utility? To what extent is the study of the stardust important for the humankind? What is the environmental impact of the superficial fusion? How can melting below zero be explained?

Phase 6 – Writing, Producing and Delivering the Posters During this phase, each group selected and organized the information according to their research questions and produced the poster. Figure 4 shows a poster produced by the team researching “Drugs by design.”

Figure 4. Poster about the topic “Drugs by design.”

Phase 7 – Oral Presentation of the Posters Each ‘project team’ presents its project to the other students and to teachers. Each presentation is subjected to questions from both peers and teachers. Some instances of these questions are:

How Can Critical Thinking Be Recognized in the Classroom? •

•

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Why are there some medicines (such as the H1N1 vaccine) that take a short time for being produced while other drugs take so many years for being discovered and produced? Why is there this difference? You said the flavor of the coffee had its origins in the amino acids. How does this happens? Are the amino acids bonded to the caffeine?

Phase 8 – Evaluation of the Mini-Research Projects After the presentation of the posters, the students were evaluated based on: (i) the performance in each of the following tasks: asking questions about the Scientific American paper, meeting with the teacher, asking the guiding questions; (ii) the scientific quality of the poster; (iii) the aesthetic quality of the poster; (iv) the presentation of the poster; (v) the answers to the questions raised by both peers and teachers; (vi) the questions asked during the presentation session. The score for each student’s participation in the mini-research projects was added to the final grade of the student.

Phase 9 – Exhibition of the Posters After the presentation session, the posters were exhibited for a month in the building dedicated to the teaching of first-year students of Science and Technology.

C) Assessment Strategies In order to promote the alignment between teaching, learning and assessment (Biggs & Tang 2007; Pedrosa de Jesus & Moreira, 2009), the following assessment strategies were considered: 1) a multiple-choice test due to the large number of students in the chemistry course. This test also included two open questions: a question-posing case (students should raise questions) and a problem-based case (students should propose explanations) as shown in Figure 5. 2) participation in the two online forums considering both the number and the quality of the participation; 3) performance in practical laboratory work considering both students’ performance in practical classes and the content of the lab book; 4) participation in the mini-projects considering the development of the project, the quality of the poster, the quality of the poster presentation, and the questions asked during the mini-projects presentation session.

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In the lastt decades, as thhe harmful connsequences of the acidic atm mospheric polluutants has bbecome more evident e in the 1960s, the Norrth American and a the Europeean Union govvernments s started regulatiing the emissioons of the acid atmospheric pollutants p (mainnly sulphur diooxide and n nitrogen oxidess).

in forests

in lakees

in ecosystemss

in public mon numents

However, - in some parts of Euroope and North America, the rain was stilll acidic, in spiite of the ssevere control of pollution; e – mainly m forests – the negativee impacts of acid rain were suuperior to - in some ecosystems t those foreseen by the governm ments. Discusss, explain, com mment on these observations in i detail. Fiigure 5. Problem m-based case abbout acid rain.

CONCLUSION N ulum of this first year chemistry coursee shows that it i is possible to create a The curricu quuestion-based learning envvironment com mbining tradiitional classess, such as leectures and laaboratory pracctical classes, and innovativve strategies such s as mini-rresearch projeects, online foorums and problem-based cases. Actuallly, even the strategies typpically teacheer-centered, suuch as lectures, included soome innovative features in order o to prom mote students’ motivation annd, consequen ntly, engage thhem in criticall learning. It is the teacher’s responsibilitty to create a learning atm mosphere that fosters studennts’ active leaarning. But it is the studennts’ role to acctively engagee in this learning environmeent, developingg their criticality. As stated by b Halpern (19999, p. 70), “criticaal thinking skillls can be taughht and learned, and when studdents learn thesse skills and apply th hem appropriateely, they becom me better thinkerrs.”

REFFERENCESS Almeida, P., Peedrosa de Jesuus, H., & Wattts, M. (2008).. Developing a mini-projectt: students’ A questions and a learning sttyles. The Psychology of Edducation Revieew, 32(1), 6-177. A Almeida, P., Pedrosa P de Jesus, J H. & Watts, M. (2011). ( Kolb’’s Learning Styles and Approachees to Learning through the Use U of Studennts’ Critical Quuestions. In S. Rayner &

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E. Cools (Eds.), International Perspectives On Style Differences In Human Performance: Leading Edge Research, Theory And Practice (pp.115-128). New York: Routledge. Almeida, P., Teixeira-Dias, J. J., & Medina, J. (2010). Enhancing the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning: the interplay between teaching and research. International Journal of Teaching and Case Studies, 2(3/4), 262-275. Biggs, J., & Tang, C. (2007). Teaching for Quality Learning at University (3rd Ed). England & NY: Society for Research into Higher Education & Open University Press. Boyer Commission on Educating Undergraduates in the Research University (1998). Reinventing Undergraduate Education: A Blueprint for America’s Research Universities. Retrieved October 2010 from http://naples.cc.sunysb.edu/Pres/boyer.nsf Braxton, J. M. & Nordvall, R. C. (1985). Selective liberal arts colleges: higher quality as well as higher prestige? Journal of Higher Education, 56, 538-553. Brod, H. (1986). Philosophy teaching as intellectual affirmative action. Teaching Philosophy, 9, 1-10. Browne, M., & Freeman, K. (2000). Distinguish Features of Critical Thinking Classrooms. Teaching in Higher Education, 5(3), 301-309. Browne, M. & Keekey, S. M: (1998). Asking the right questions: a guide to critical thinking. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Chin, C., & Osborne, J. (2008) Students’ Questions: a potential resource for teaching and learning science. Studies in Science Education, 44 (1), 1-39. Commission of the European Communities (2006). Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council on key competences for lifelong learning. Official Journal of the European Union, 10-18. Cuccio-Schirripa, S., & Steiner, H. E. (2000). Enhancement and analysis of science question level for middle school students. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 37, 210-224. Davies, W. M. (2009). Groupwork as a form of assessment: common problems and recommended solutions. Higher Education, 58, 563-584. Dawes, R. M. (1988). Rational Choice in an Uncertain World. Fla.: Harcourt Brace. Entwistle, N. J., McCune, V., & Walker, P. (2001). Conceptions, styles and approaches within higher education: analytic abstractions and everyday experience. In R. J. Sternberg, & L. F. Zhang (Eds.), Perspectives on Cognitive, Learning and Thinking styles (pp. 103-136). New Jersey: Erlbaum. Faccione, P., Facione, N. & Giancarlo, C. (1996). The motivation to think in working and learning. In E. Jones (ED.), Preparing Competent College Students: Setting New and Higher Expectations for Student Learning (pp. 67-79). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Graesser, A. C. & Olde, B. A. (2003) How does one know whether a person understands a device? The quality of the questions the person asks when the device breaks down. Journal of Educational Psychology, 95 (3), 524-536. Halpern, D. F. (1999). Teaching for Critical Thinking: helping college students develop the skills and dispositions of a critical thinker. New Directions for Teaching and Learning, 80, 69-74. Halpern, D. F. (1998). Teaching Critical Thinking for Transfer Across Domains: disposition, skills, structure training, and metacognitive monitoring. American Psychologist, 53, 449455.

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Johnston, B. (2010). The First Year at University: Teaching Students in Transition. Berkshire: The Society for Research into Higher Education and Open University Press. Kahane, H. (1997). Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric. Belmont: Wadsworth. Mayer, J. (1986). Teaching critical awareness in an introductory course. Teaching Sociology, 14, 249-256. Mayer, R. E. (1992). Thinking, Problem Solving, Cognition. New York: Freeman. Mbajiorgu, N., & Reid, N. (2006). Factors Influencing Curriculum Development in Chemistry. Hull: Higher Education Academy Physical Sciences Center. Meyer, M. (1994). Rhetoric, Language, and Reason. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press. Pedrosa de Jesus, H., & Moreira, A. (2009). The role of students' questions in aligning teaching, learning and assessment: a case study from undergraduate sciences. Assessment and Evaluation in Higher Education, 34(2), 193-208. Pedrosa de Jesus, H., Teixeira-Dias, J. J. C., & Watts, M. (2003) Questions of Chemistry. International Journal of Science Education, 25 (8), 1015-1034. Pithers, R. T. & Soden, R. (2000). Critical thinking in education: a review. Educational Research, 42(3), 237-249. Rabinowitz, M. (1993). Cognitive Science Foundations of Instruction. Hillsdale, N. J.: Erlbaum. Raths, L. E., Wasserman, S., Jonas, A. & Rothstein, A. (1966). Teaching for Critical Thinking: Theory and Application. Columbus, Ohio: Charles-Merrill. Ruggerio, V. R. (1996). Becoming a Critical Thinker. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Shaw, V. F. (1996). The cognitive processes in informal reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning, 2, 51-80. Sternberg, R. J. (1987). Teaching critical thinking: eight ways to fail before you begin. Phi Delta Kappan, 68, 456-459. Teixeira-Dias; J. J. C., Pedrosa de Jesus, H., Neri de Souza, F., & Watts, M. (2005). Teaching for quality learning in chemistry. International Journal of Science Education, 27(9), 1123-1137.

INDEX # 21st century, 84, 119, 157

A abstraction, 37 academic settings, 117 academic success, 179 access, 18, 32, 107, 136 accounting, 124, 126, 127, 129, 139 acid, 181, 182 action research, x, 90, 159, 163 adaptability, 56 adaptation, 143 adults, 7, 33 age, 87 agencies, 52, 58 alertness, 79 allocated time, 168 amplitude, 131 anchoring, 7 anthropology, 127, 129 anxiety, 63, 167 APA, 5, 6, 8, 101 aptitude, 6 aqueous solutions, 180 argument mapping, ix, 97, 106, 117 Aristotle, 3, 73, 87 articulation, 46 Asian crisis, 138 assessment, vii, xi, 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 12, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 29, 31, 35, 83, 89, 93, 95, 101, 104, 105, 116, 117, 118, 124, 127, 128, 129, 175, 176, 178 assessment tools, 101 assets, 127 assimilation, ix, 32, 97, 98, 104, 105, 106 atoms, 40

attribution, 139 authorities, 5, 19, 27, 75, 137 authority, 24, 32, 43, 44, 47, 52, 54, 67, 81, 176 autonomy, ix, 4, 71 aversion, 91 avoidance, 26 awareness, ix, 5, 8, 42, 51, 62, 70, 144, 152, 161, 179

B balance sheet, 127 base, 88 batteries, 180 behaviors, x, 24, 141, 142, 143, 144, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153 belief systems, 155 benchmarking, 93 benefits, 98, 104, 167, 168 Bhutan, 132 bias, 26, 44, 79, 91, 112, 129 blogs, 132, 133, 136, 140 bones, 133, 164 boredom, 136 Botswana, 66 brain, 21, 24, 25, 33 brain activity, 25 brain damage, 21 Britain, 4 buns, 137 business ethics, 67

C cabinet, 40 calcium, 181 calcium carbonate, 181 calibration, 11 capital consumption, 127 capital punishment, 9

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Index

carbon, 128 carbon dioxide, 128 case studies, 21, 44, 163, 171 case study, 23, 94 causal inference, 21 causal reasoning, 23 causation, 26 CCTDI, viii, 31, 70, 72, 79, 85, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115 central executive, 33 challenges, 42, 51, 72, 74, 84, 86, 98, 101, 127, 157, 161, 165, 168 chaos, 58, 59, 168 chemical, 180 Chicago, 88, 89, 91, 129 children, 33, 88, 90, 91 China, 128 citizens, 51, 54, 131, 134 citizenship, x, 3, 94, 159 civil society, 130, 131 clarity, vii, 1, 6, 19, 27, 75, 76, 78, 98 classes, 14, 16, 117, 176, 179, 180 classification, 55, 75, 118 classroom, 4, 14, 18, 30, 32, 88, 92, 94, 116, 119, 142, 165, 167, 176, 177 cleavage, 140 climate, 128, 131 climate change, 128 closure, 80 coercion, 52 cognition, ix, 6, 10, 21, 29, 30, 31, 32, 70, 86 cognitive abilities, 117, 119 cognitive ability, 7, 9, 34 cognitive activity, 10, 84 cognitive capacities, 116 cognitive dissonance, 177 cognitive level, ix, 26, 70, 86 cognitive load, 105, 117 cognitive map, 39 cognitive process, 6, 10, 11, 20, 60, 115, 176 cognitive psychology, 5, 6 cognitive representations, 21 cognitive skills, 6, 15, 27, 33, 78, 92 cognitive style, 8 cognitive system, 99 cognitive tool, 89 cognitive variables, 26 coherence, 87, 99, 125, 126 collaboration, 162 college students, 3, 8, 11, 18, 26, 30, 79, 95 colleges, ix, 70, 87 colonisation, 48 color, 79

commercials, 82 common sense, 40 communication, 14, 39, 47, 52, 59, 77, 133, 136, 138, 165, 179 communication technologies, 179 communities, 21, 88, 91 community, 4, 21, 39, 42, 58, 61, 72, 80, 85, 176 compilation, 55 complement, 55, 57 complexity, 12, 21, 28, 40, 42, 43, 55, 58, 59, 81, 160, 168 compliance, 132 composition, 71, 129, 130, 135 comprehension, 59, 118, 119, 176, 177 computer, 42, 106, 120, 143, 154, 156 computer use, 154 concept map, 155 conception, 7, 27, 89, 127, 133 conceptual model, 51, 61 conceptualization, 2, 27, 99 conference, 93, 134, 137, 169 confidentiality, 110 configuration, 136, 137 confinement, 131 conflict, 43, 49, 55 conflict resolution, 55 confrontation, 84, 86, 140 Confucius, 69 congress, 23, 87 consciousness, 47, 49, 52, 53 consensus, 30, 42, 79, 81, 87, 99, 100, 132, 133, 160 constituents, 44, 47 construct validity, 7 construction, viii, 27, 70, 72, 84, 85, 100, 106, 128, 130, 135, 140, 176, 181 constructivism, 39, 94 consumption, 75, 126, 128, 129 contradiction, 132 control condition, 109, 113, 115, 116 control group, x, 11, 13, 97, 107, 111, 113, 115 controlled research, 23 controversial, 24, 32, 128 controversies, 137 convention, 135 conversations, 41, 163 cooperation, 134, 137 cooperative learning, 143 coordination, 125 Cornell Critical Thinking Test, viii, 70, 101, 119 correlation, viii, 70, 107, 114, 115, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153 correlation coefficient, 148, 150 correlations, 152, 153

Index corruption, 73 course content, 12, 13, 14, 34, 104 course work, 14, 15, 16 covering, 15 creative thinking, 5, 6, 75, 94, 142, 176 creativity, 5, 86, 89 crises, 60 critical academic writing, xi, 159, 164, 165, 167, 169 criticism, 3, 76, 86, 126, 130, 131, 133, 135, 167 crystalline, 181 CST, vii, 38, 55, 66 cues, 18, 105, 109, 143 cultivation, x, 97, 106 cultural heritage, 136 culture, 132 currency, 42, 63, 134 curricula, ix, 60, 71, 73, 86, 143 curriculum, ix, xi, 13, 70, 71, 72, 78, 82, 86, 88, 89, 93, 94, 98, 104, 106, 120, 155, 175, 178 cycles, 61, 163

D damages, 123, 128 data collection, 163 data set, 173 decision makers, 124 deduction, 78 deductive reasoning, 11, 30, 110, 113, 116 deep learning, 178 defects, 124 defence, 66 deficiencies, vii, 1 deficit, 161 Delta, 29 delusion, 81 democracy, ix, 71, 74 Democrat, 131 democratisation, 53 demography, 129 Department of Education, 98, 101, 120, 175 dependent variable, 21, 110, 150 depth, x, 124, 159, 173 designers, 55, 62 destiny, 136 detection, 84 development of thinking skills, ix, 70 developmental process, 171 dialogues, 12, 73 dichotomy, 51 direct measure, 115, 116 directives, 47 discomfort, 178

191

disequilibrium, 177, 182 disorder, 137 disposition, 1, 9, 10, 16, 19, 34, 79, 82, 88, 90, 95, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 115, 120, 155, 177 dissatisfaction, 127 distribution, 127, 128 distribution of income, 128 diversity, 179 dough, 134 draft, 128, 140, 165, 167 drawing, 23, 55, 77, 84, 85, 86, 117, 163, 164 dreaming, 98 drugs, 13 durability, 130, 181

E ecology, 128 economic activity, 132 economic consequences, 135 economic growth, 124 economic indicator, 132 economic performance, 123, 124, 129, 134, 135, 138 economic theory, 129 economics, 123, 124, 125, 129, 130, 133, 135, 136, 138 education, viii, ix, x, 2, 4, 17, 28, 32, 33, 34, 43, 58, 61, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 118, 120, 127, 128, 133, 153, 154, 155, 156, 159, 161, 167 educational assessment, 30 educational institutions, 74 educational objective, 2, 28, 32, 118, 177 educational practices, 171 educational psychology, 3 educational research, xi, 7, 99, 159, 168, 169 educational system, ix, 70, 85 educators, 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 17, 74, 75, 83, 117, 142 egocentrism, 77 e-learning, 156, 157 elementary teachers, 88 emotion, 30 emotional intelligence, 142, 155 emotional state, 26 empirical methods, 6 empirical studies, ix, 10, 71 employability, x, 159 employees, 58 employers, 98 employment, 54, 142, 144, 152, 154 encoding, 105 encouragement, xi, 175, 177, 178

192

Index

enculturation, 160 enemies, 49, 50, 136 energy, 180 engineering, 39, 42, 56, 60, 63 England, 38 environment, x, 25, 48, 49, 50, 75, 92, 124, 130, 132, 135, 160 environmental aspects, 128 environmental conditions, 128 environmental management, 59 environmental sustainability, 135 epistemology, 34, 43, 53 equilibrium, 44 ethical issues, 40, 118, 175 ethics, 50, 73 ethnicity, 87 Europe, 64, 95 European Commission, 123 everyday life, 81, 82 evidence, vii, x, 3, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 32, 77, 79, 82, 99, 100, 103, 104, 105, 109, 112, 152, 159, 166, 173, 177, 179 evolution, x, 9, 124 exclusion, 129, 130 execution, 7 exercise, 51, 71, 74, 83, 110, 160 expenditures, x, 124 experimental condition, 109, 110, 113, 115 experimental design, 145 expertise, 24, 34, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 88, 120, 129 exploitation, 127 exploratory model, xi, 159 exposure, 12, 54, 167 extraneous variable, 25

F factor analysis, 8 faith, 60, 135 fear, 26, 57, 61, 63, 131, 167 feelings, 132, 143 financial, 125, 126, 133 financial crisis, 133 financial markets, 125 fishing, 128 fitness, 155 flexibility, 8, 9 flights, 99 fluctuations, 127 force, 43, 50, 54, 76, 134, 153 Ford, 105, 120 formal education, 72, 86 formal reasoning, 21, 88

formation, vii, 1, 9, 22, 46, 143, 176 foundations, 34 fragility, 92 framing, 37, 61, 63 France, 87, 123, 124, 125, 126, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 139, 140 freedom, ix, 39, 52, 71, 74 Freud, 23 full employment, 133 functional approach, 27, 30, 35 functionalism, 44, 56

G game theory, 43 gender equality, 154 general education, 120 generalizability, 8, 17, 30, 32, 33, 34 geography, 129 Germany, 66, 87 gifted, viii, 70, 71 goal-setting, 20 God, 61 goods and services, 132 google, 37 governance, 136 government policy, 132 governments, 64, 134 grades, 92, 98 gravity, 180 Great Britain, 3 Greece, 87 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), v, x, 123, 124, 125, 126, 129, 130, 131, 133, 135, 136, 137, 138 grounding, 13, 37, 76, 78, 83 grouping, 6 growth, 99, 105, 109, 116, 124, 131, 132, 155 guidance, 6, 18, 61, 107, 169, 171, 180 guidelines, 51, 165 guiding principles, 55

H happiness, 123, 125, 129, 132, 133, 136, 139 harmony, 79 health, 43, 58, 128, 132 helplessness, 50 hermeneutics, 46 high school, 71, 72, 79, 82, 85, 94, 95 higher education, vii, x, 29, 81, 97, 159, 160, 161, 162, 171

Index higher-order thinking, viii, ix, 69, 70, 72, 78, 84, 85, 86, 94 history, 32, 129, 133, 136, 139 holism, 37, 57, 61, 64 homework, 107 homogeneity, 113 horses, 134 house, 59 household income, 126, 129 housing, x, 58, 124 human, 8, 34, 39, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 52, 59, 62, 73, 84, 117, 124, 125, 127, 129, 131 human activity, 52 human capital, 127, 131 human development, 124, 125 human experience, 117 human intentionality, 48, 52 human perception, 43 humanism, 44, 53 hypothesis, 5, 19, 103, 106, 109 hypothesis test, 5

I ideal, 30, 32, 33, 34, 50, 51, 54, 73, 74, 76, 107, 115, 117, 136, 153 idealism, 39 ideals, ix, 71, 74 identification, 15, 19, 117 identity, 28 ideology, 47, 53, 66 image, 44, 58 imagery, 50 imagination, 81, 98 imbalances, 112 IMF, 138 Immanuel Kant, 4, 37, 38, 48 immersion, vii, 1, 12, 13, 16, 27, 82, 104, 161 improvements, 40, 144, 151, 152, 169 in transition, 2 incidence, 47 income, 128 incompatibility, 116 independence, 139 independent variable, 150, 151 individual differences, 8, 10, 13, 34, 116 individuals, ix, 10, 46, 71, 74, 80, 129, 138, 143, 169 induction, 23, 31, 92 industry, 58, 132 inequality, 130 inferences, 26, 32, 78, 98, 99, 100, 103, 177 infusion approach, viii, 13, 18, 28, 29, 69, 81, 82, 87, 104, 154

193

insecurity, 125, 128 institutional change, 44, 46 institutionalisation, 125 institutions, 124, 126, 129, 161, 171 instructional design, 144, 152, 154 instructional materials, 105 instructional methods, 104 instructional practice, 12, 28 integration, 2, 92 intellectual flexibility, 74 intelligence, 9, 31, 93 intentionality, 50, 52 interest groups, 46 International Labour Organisation, 125 interrelatedness, 42, 55, 78 interrelations, 78 intervention, x, 39, 55, 59, 97, 99, 101, 104, 107, 110, 113, 116, 144, 152, 159, 171 investment, 127, 169 investments, 138 Ireland, 97, 110, 160, 161, 171 Israel, ix, 71, 72, 74, 85, 94 Israeli educational system, ix, 70 issues, viii, 14, 29, 32, 38, 40, 42, 43, 47, 48, 53, 58, 60, 63, 73, 74, 77, 79, 82, 98, 101, 102, 123, 126, 127, 129, 139, 154, 155, 157, 165, 176

J jobless, 137 Jordan, 91 journalists, 131, 133 junior high school, 156 justification, 30, 76, 105

K Keynes, 37 Keynesian, 135 kill, 35, 109 knowledge acquisition, 16

L laptop, 110 laws, 23, 38 lead, ix, 7, 20, 22, 32, 43, 70, 79, 133, 144 leadership, 130 learners, 4, 72, 85, 153, 176 learning environment, 143, 164, 176 learning process, 106, 143, 155 lesson plan, 71, 92

194

Index

liberalisation, 47 liberalism, 54 liberation, 49 life expectancy, 134 life satisfaction, 128 lifelong learning, 175 light, viii, x, xi, 41, 42, 69, 73, 78, 82, 86, 97, 98, 99, 100, 104, 124, 137, 175 limestone, 181 liquids, 180 literacy, vii, 38, 40, 43, 57, 58, 59, 62, 63, 72, 86, 90, 92, 159, 160, 171, 172 localization, 21 logical reasoning, 11, 30, 106 logistics, 42 longitudinal study, 32, 118 love, 94

M magnetic resonance, 24 magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), 24 magnitude, 137 majority, 131 man, 43, 59, 60, 124, 137 management, 39, 43, 44, 57, 59, 61, 66, 98, 119, 136, 138, 168 manipulation, 22, 25, 27 mapping, vii, ix, 27, 49, 51, 97, 98, 106, 107, 109, 113, 116, 117, 118, 120 Maryland, 1 mass, 134 materials, ix, 14, 17, 21, 30, 70, 82, 98, 105, 110, 111, 117, 177, 181 mathematical knowledge, viii, 70, 72 mathematics, viii, ix, 69, 70, 71, 72, 81, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93 mathematics education, 87, 93 mathematics studies, viii, ix, 69, 71, 84 matrix, 55, 58, 66 matter, vii, 1, 2, 12, 15, 16, 17, 27, 28, 43, 49, 80, 103, 104, 127, 131, 168, 169, 177 measurement, 7, 32, 40, 90, 99, 115, 116, 118, 139 measurements, 21, 119 media, 13, 75 mediation, 29 memory, 5, 16, 35, 109, 138 mental activity, 99, 177 mental image, 106 mental representation, 22 mental state, 25 mentor, 48 messages, ix, 71, 74

meta-analysis, 13, 14, 28, 104, 106, 107, 115, 118, 119 metacognition, 1, 10, 12, 19, 28, 32, 34 metacognitive skills, 16, 20, 28, 31, 99, 105 metaphor, 55, 56, 60 methodological procedures, 44 methodology, 23, 39, 44, 46, 47, 48, 53, 55, 56, 57, 61, 67, 90 military, 42 Ministry of Education, ix, 70, 82, 91 misconceptions, 29, 154 mission, 3, 43 mixing, 67 modelling, 43 models, vii, 5, 7, 15, 26, 27, 32, 33, 44, 51, 60, 61, 62, 86, 98, 161, 162, 179 modernism, 65 modules, 107 molecules, 40 monopoly, 136, 138 Moon, 2, 33 Morocco, 136 motivation, 26, 29, 30, 48, 49, 50, 51, 77, 83, 88, 115, 117, 172, 176 multiplication, 127 mutations, 137

N naming, 38, 39 National Health Service, 58, 62 National Research Council, 92 natural resources, 128 natural science, 130 natural selection, 8 negative mood, 26 neglect, 20, 46, 47, 53 neoliberalism, 129 Netherlands, 88 neuroscience, 21, 24, 25 neutral, 26, 30, 42, 44 New Zealand, 172 NGOs, 125 nursing, 101, 118

O objectivity, 54 observable behavior, 7, 20 obstacles, 106, 127, 179 officials, 124, 129 open-mindedness, 8, 9, 10, 79

Index openness, 9, 179 operations, 39, 42, 43, 48, 176 operations research, 39, 42, 43, 48 opportunities, 60, 84, 143, 152, 160, 167, 177, 179 oppression, 52 optimism, 63, 137 organism, 55 organize, 14, 23 originality, 74 overlap, 22 oxygen, 133

P Pacific, 29, 35, 90, 94, 118, 119 parallel, viii, 44, 55, 69, 72, 86 participants, ix, x, 9, 10, 11, 25, 26, 70, 83, 86, 107, 110, 115, 148, 152, 159, 160, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169 pattern recognition, 18 pedagogy, 73, 172 peer assessment, 119 peer review, 165, 167, 168, 171, 172 percentile, 110 performance appraisal, 60 performance indicator, 61 performance related pay, 61 performers, 11 permit, 14, 23 personality, 74, 76, 155 persuasion, 102 Philadelphia, 32 physical activity, 155 physics, 90, 91 pilot study, 73, 85 PISA, 72 Plato, 3, 73 plausibility, 103 playing, 79 pluralism, 37, 42, 55, 57, 61, 64 polarity, 180 polarization, 32 policy, 60, 61, 64, 76, 132, 173 political leaders, 131 political parties, 131, 135 politics, 51 pollution, x, 124, 128 population, ix, 70, 71, 87 Portugal, 175, 178 Portuguese university, xi, 175 positive attitudes, 152 positive correlation, 149, 150 positive feedback, 143

195

positivism, 39, 47 postmodernism, 67 poverty, 130, 132 power relations, 40, 44, 52 practical activity, 78, 81 pragmatism, 57, 67 preparation, 11, 73, 94, 130 preservice teachers, x, 141, 144, 156, 157 president, 123, 124, 126, 131, 133, 134, 136, 138, 139 prima facie, 7 primacy, 51 principles, vii, 1, 2, 5, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 27, 43, 47, 74, 81, 82, 102, 103, 178 prior knowledge, 143, 149 probability, vii, 3, 82, 87, 102 probe, 46, 117 problem solving, vii, 5, 6, 15, 21, 31, 33, 43, 57, 62, 77, 78, 80, 88, 90, 91, 92, 94, 98, 105, 120, 142, 143, 176 problem-based learning, 156 problem-solving strategies, 88 production costs, x, 124 professional development, 85, 156, 160 professional growth, 142, 152 professionals, ix, 70, 87 profit, 30, 58, 128 project, 53, 88, 103, 123, 125, 126, 130, 132, 134, 136, 171, 173, 180 projective test, 131 proposition, 106, 107 protection, 75 prototype, 137 psychological variables, 26 psychologist, 5 psychology, x, 2, 5, 14, 15, 16, 18, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 90, 93, 97, 101, 110, 118, 155 psychometric approach, 8 public awareness, 72, 85 public investment, 126 public opinion, 130 public schools, 156 public service, 126, 127, 132 publishing, 169, 171

Q quality of life, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132 quantification, 139 quarks, 40 quartile, 11 query, 131

196

Index

questioning, xi, 13, 44, 73, 112, 137, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180 questionnaire, 25, 72, 111, 135

R random assignment, 25 rationalisation, 51 rationality, 35, 50, 52, 54, 99 reactions, 128, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136 reading, ix, 10, 14, 16, 28, 75, 76, 97, 105, 106, 117, 118, 131, 165, 166, 167, 168, 172 reading skills, 14 reagents, 180 realism, 39, 46 reality, ix, 37, 41, 49, 51, 70, 74, 79, 132, 133 reasoning, vii, x, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 75, 79, 80, 88, 92, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 105, 110, 113, 117, 120, 166, 177 reasoning skills, 4, 5, 7, 8, 18, 19, 21, 79, 88 recall, 112, 118, 176 reception, 128 recognition, ix, 70, 99, 112, 160, 162 recommendations, ix, 19, 30, 70, 86, 126, 131, 133, 139 reconstruction, x, 124, 144 reductionism, 57, 58, 64 reference system, 41 reflective practice, 55, 56, 62 reform, 4, 60, 88, 91, 93, 156 regression, 9 regulations, 84 rejection, 131, 138 relevance, 3, 43, 53, 102, 112, 135 reliability, 75, 77, 78, 101, 110 religion, 125, 132 remodelling, 92 replication, 23, 28 reproduction, 67 requirements, 86, 162 researchers, viii, ix, 12, 19, 70, 72, 75, 80, 85, 87, 98, 101, 104, 115, 125, 163 resistance, 60, 127 resolution, 18, 24, 40, 58, 62, 88, 100 resources, 17, 43, 46, 105, 128, 169 response, 10, 17, 42, 74, 107, 116, 117, 119, 126, 165, 166 response format, 116, 119 restructuring, 60 rewards, 117 rhetoric, 3, 4, 5, 73, 168 risk, 60, 62, 139

risks, 41, 178 rubrics, 14, 117 rule-based approach, vii, 1, 21, 23, 26, 27, 28 rules, vii, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 34, 62, 102

S safety, 175 savings, 127, 131 scaffolded in-class activities, xi, 159 scarcity, viii, 69 scarcity of research, viii, 69 schema, 31, 143 schemata, 176 scholarship, 168 school, ix, 4, 60, 70, 71, 74, 81, 85, 86, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 126, 154 school improvement, 154 science, 3, 28, 29, 38, 42, 43, 49, 59, 83, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 127, 129, 130, 138, 155, 179 scientific knowledge, 40, 127 scientific method, 25, 39 scientific observation, 3 scientific progress, 27 scientific study of CT, vii, 1, 2, 6, 20, 27, 28 scope, 14, 136 Second World, 42 secondary students, 155 security, 132 selectivity, 41 self-assessment, 32 self-awareness, 144, 152 self-concept, 155 self-confidence, 8, 79, 80 self-discipline, 77 self-efficacy, 154 self-evaluations, 153 self-monitoring, 11, 12 self-reflection, 49 self-regulation, vii, 1, 10, 19, 20, 84, 93 self-reports, 24, 115 seminars, 111 sensitivity, 74, 80, 130 sequencing, 14 services, 127, 135 sex, 119 sex differences, 119 shape, 61, 62, 89 shortage, 124 showing, 18, 22, 84 signalling, 44 signals, 22, 61

Index simulation, 143, 154, 156 skeleton, 84 skill acquisition, 6, 16, 26, 27, 28 social consequences, 44 social construct, 47 social control, 47, 53 social group, viii, 70 social indicator, 123, 124, 125, 127, 135 social inequalities, 135 social influence, 24 social learning, 41, 60 social movements, 123 social order, 47 social policy, 125 social relations, 47 social sciences, 63, 125, 127, 129, 135 social theory, 51, 52, 56 socialization, 161, 162 society, viii, ix, 13, 33, 47, 54, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 79, 81, 85, 124, 132, 181 sociology, 101, 123, 127, 129, 139 Socrates, 3, 73, 93 software, 107, 117, 119 solution, 5, 50, 58, 71, 72, 83, 86, 89, 97, 116 South Africa, 162 special creation, 9 specialists, 75, 76, 84, 130, 135, 161, 162 species, 8, 103 speech, 22, 124 stability, 44, 47, 53 stakeholder groups, 41 stakeholders, 40, 46, 48, 50, 55, 56, 59, 60, 61 standard deviation, 106, 113, 114, 148 standard of living, 124 state, 73, 128, 137, 177 states, 20, 24, 50, 126 statistics, 123, 124, 125, 127, 129 strategic management, 65 strategy use, 6, 19 stream of consciousness, 98 stress, 86 structuralism, 44, 52 structure, ix, 14, 31, 47, 60, 61, 82, 97, 102, 105, 106, 109, 112, 164, 181 student achievement, 118 student motivation, 115 student teacher, 153, 156 style, 59, 106, 116, 156, 168 subjective well-being, 127, 128 subskills, 6 suburban neighborhoods, 84 Sun, 154 supervisor, 111

197

supervisors, 139 support staff, 161 Supreme Court, 23 sustainability, 123, 127, 128, 129, 130, 134, 135, 175 sustainable development, 138, 140 Switzerland, 67, 88 syllogisms, 99 synthesis, 6, 7, 168, 176 systemic change, 58, 62, 63

T Taiwan, 141, 154 talent, 171 tanks, 123, 140 target, 61, 124, 136, 169 taxes, 134 taxonomy, 5, 6, 8, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, 76, 78, 79, 81, 83, 89, 118, 119 teacher effectiveness, 142, 152, 153, 154 teacher training, vii, ix, x, 70, 87, 141, 154 teachers, viii, x, 6, 29, 70, 75, 80, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 92, 93, 94, 98, 141, 142, 143, 144, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 160, 176, 177, 178 teaching experience, 144, 154 teaching strategies, viii, 69, 85, 104, 142, 143, 154 technician, 130 techniques, vii, x, 42, 43, 44, 97, 112, 161, 166, 167 technological progress, 176 technologies, 161 technology, 43, 91, 93, 120, 156, 157 temperature, 132 tension, 58, 59, 60 tensions, 123, 129 territory, 58 tertiary education, 162 test data, 91 test scores, 15, 109 testing, 13, 17, 39, 56, 76, 107, 110, 113, 114, 116 textbook, 3, 14, 15, 16, 89 textbooks, 3, 12, 23, 75 therapist, 23 think critically, ix, xi, 10, 29, 71, 74, 79, 81, 93, 98, 100, 101, 175, 176 thoughts, 22, 30 tones, 131 traditions, viii, 38, 41, 43, 47, 56, 60, 64 training, x, 3, 11, 13, 15, 18, 30, 31, 32, 54, 81, 85, 93, 97, 98, 99, 104, 106, 107, 109, 111, 113, 115, 116, 117, 141, 144, 148, 150, 152, 153, 154, 156 training programs, 98 traits, 8, 30, 76, 143, 156 transcripts, viii, 70

198

Index

transformation, 42, 47, 50, 53, 124 translation, 46, 52 transmission, 156 treatment, 23, 25, 156 trial, x, 23, 30, 88, 97 triangulation, 94 triggers, 137 tutor feedback, xi, 159

U united, 74, 123, 125, 126, 129, 136, 140 United Nations, 123, 125, 126 United Nations Development Programme, 123 United States, 74, 125, 129, 136, 140 universe, 37, 61, 133 universities, 125, 162 urban, 94 USA, 1, 66, 69, 162

V validation, 155 variables, viii, 5, 12, 25, 26, 27, 28, 42, 58, 70 variations, 127, 128, 129 vested interests, 54 virtual peer learning, xi, 159, 164, 169 vision, 40, 125, 127, 129, 134 visions, 49 visualization, 88 visually diagramming arguments, ix, 97 vocabulary, ix, 9, 62, 70, 86 voice-overs, 111

vulcanization, 35

W Wales, 120 war, 42, 94, 124, 126 Washington, 29, 32, 88, 92, 93, 118, 119, 120 waste, 22 water, 64, 180 weakness, 103 wealth, x, 76, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 140, 143, 152 weapons, 60 web, 58, 62, 118, 136, 138 websites, 132, 135 well-being, 123, 125, 127, 128, 129, 132, 133, 134, 135, 138, 139, 140 William James, 57 Wisconsin, 118 witnesses, 50, 54 workers, 13 workforce, 98 working memory, 105, 106 workplace, 167 World Bank, 125, 126, 127, 137, 138 worldview, 50 worldwide, 72 writing process, x, 159, 162, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171

Y young people, 74