Crimes-against-fundamental-laws-of-the-state.docx

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PO1 FROILAN L. TRESTIZA Crimes Against the Fundamental Laws of the State – Arbitrary Detention DOCTRINE: If a policeman kidnaps the victim, except when legally authorized as part of police operations, he cannot also be said to be acting in an official capacity, hence he is to be treated as a private individual liable under this article. FACTS:  PO1 Froilan L. Trestiza, P/S Insp. Loriemar L. Manrique, both police officers, and Rodie Pineda, a private individual, were charged with Kidnapping for Ransom  It was alleged that on or about the 7th day of November 2002, Trestiza, Manrique, and Pineda, all armed with firearms, kidnapped Lawrence Yu and Maria Irma Navarro , or otherwise deprive them of their liberty by then and there kidnap without legal grounds for the purpose of extorting money for their safety and immediate release as in fact said accused demanded the amount of P1,000,000.00 as ransom money from them.  Irma and Lawrence, the victims, alleged that they were at the ‘Where Else Disco’ in Makati attending the party. When Irma was about to proceed to Lawrence’s car, she noticed it was blocked by a van and three armed men later on emerged from the van. She recognized Rodie Pineda being her sister’s kumpare. She was handcuffed by Manrique and was ushered to the Honda while Lawrence was already inside the van. She was asked by Pineda to remove her jewelry. Her bag containing P120,000 was likewise taken. They were told they will not be released if they will not produce P1,000,000. Lawrence called his friends and agreed that the money will be brought toe Caltex gas station in Greenhills. Manrique threatened them and told them not to report the incident. They were able to raise P180,000 and thereafter they were brought to Star Mall Edsa. They were warned about the consequences if she will report it to her father, a policeman.  In Defense, the respondents alleged that Irma and Lawrence are known to Pineda as suppliers of prohibited drugs such as ‘Ecstasy’, ‘Blue Anchors and ‘Yeng-yen’ and they merely conducted a buy-bust operation with the help of Manrique of PDEA.

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On February 21, 2003, Public Prosecutor Andres N. Marcos filed a Motion to Withdraw Information of Kidnapping with Ransom and to Admit Information for Robbery with attached Resolution dated 03 January 2008. He pointed out therein that after he conducted a preliminary investigation, he found no probable cause exists to warrant the indictment of the accused for the crime of Kidnapping with Ransom. He added that they should be charged instead for the crimes of Robbery and Grave Threats. The Court set the hearing of this Motion to 06 March 2003. Private complainants appearing through Private Prosecutor Teresita G. Oledan filed an "Urgent Motion to Hold Withdrawal of Information for Kidnapping Charge with Entry of Appearance as Private Prosecutor." They alleged in said Motion that they were not furnished clear and certified true copies of the Resolution dated 03 January 2003 to enable them to file their Opposition/Comment to the Motion to Withdraw. Before the issue could be resolved, another judge took over the Court as Assisting Presiding Judge after Judge Salvador Abad Santos requested to be relieved. Judge Bernabe issued an order directing the City Prosecution Office to conduct reassessment and re-evaluation of the evidence presented and to submit its report within 30 days. The Prosecution maintains that the correct and appropriate charges to be filed against accused should be for robbery and grave threats but for two counts each and not for kidnapping as initially filed. Thus, it prayed for this Court to be allowed to withdraw the present information. To justify, the prosecution said that the case of kidnapping would not prosper against all the accused because the essential elements for the crime of Kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under Article 267 of the RPC is that the offender must be a private individual which does not obtain in the case at bar as respondents are public officers. RTC denied the motion to withdraw and found Trestiza, Manrique, and Pineda guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct participation of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Trestiza is guilty of arbitrary detention HELD: NO. Trestiza is guilty of kidnapping for ransom because he kidnapped the victim as a private individual. Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. 2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority. 3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been in􏰄icted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made. 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer. Under the circumstances, Trestiza claimed he should be held liable only for Arbitrary Detention. Furthermore, the prosecutor argues that the essence of the crime of kidnapping could not be possibly committed by the accused as they are police officers who at the time the complainants were divested of cash and personal belongings were conducting a police operation to enforce the provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Law. This, according to them, runs counter to the provisions of Art. 267 of the RPC which provides that any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner, deprive him of his liberty shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The Court finds this unmeritorious. Even a public officer can commit the said crime within the context of the aforesaid legal provision. This is settled in our jurisprudence in the case of People vs. ALIPIO SANTIANO, JOSE SANDIGAN, et al: "The fact alone that appellant Pillneta is an organic member of the NARCOM and appellant Sandigan a member of the PNP would not exempt them from the criminal liability of kidnapping. It is quite clear that in abducting and taking away the victim, appellants did so neither in furtherance of official functions nor in the pursuit of authority vested in them. It is not, in fine, in relation to their office, but in purely private capacity that they have acted in concert with their co-appellant Santiano and Chanco." Even an eminent jurist, Justice Florenz B. Regalado elucidates on this point clearly: "This article provides that the crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal

detention are committed by private individuals obviously because if the offender is a public officer the crime is arbitrary detention under Art. 124, but passing sub silentio on the matter of kidnapping. It should be understood however, that the public officer who unlawfully detains another and is punishable by Art. 124 is one who has the duty to apprehend a person with a correlative power to detain him. If he is only an employee with clerical or postal functions, although the Code considers him as a public officer, his detention of the victim is illegal detention under this article since he is acting in a private, and not an official, capacity. If a policeman kidnaps the victim, except when legally authorized as part of police operations, he cannot also be said to be acting in an official capacity, hence he is to be treated as a private individual liable under this article. In the same order, the trial court asked for further evidence which support the defense's claim of holding a legitimate police operation. However, the trial court found as unreliable the Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet presented by the defense. The sheet was not authenticated, and the signatories were not presented to attest to its existence and authenticity. Trestiza insists that his participation is limited to being a driver of the Mitsubishi Adventure van. Hence, the Court agrees with the appellate court's assessment that Trestiza's acts were far from just being a mere driver. The series of events that transpired before, during, and after the kidnapping incident more than shows that Trestiza acted in concert with his co-accused in committing the crime. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. H.C. No. 03119 promulgated on 30 June 2009, as well as the Resolution promulgated on 11 June 2010, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Froilan L. Trestiza is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Kidnapping in Criminal Case No. 02-3393 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, as well as the accessory penalties provided by law.

ASTORGA v. PEOPLE Crimes Against the Fundamental Law of the State – Arbitrary Detention DOCTRINE: Must not exceed one short and concise statement. FACTS:  Private offended parties Simon, De La Cruz, Maniscan, Militante and Pelias are members of the Regional Special Operations Group of the DENR Tacloban City. On Sept. 1, 1997 they, together with SPO3 Cinco and SPO1 Capoquian were sent to the Island of Daram to conduct intelligence operations on possible illegal logging activities. They found 2 boats being constructed at Brgy. Locob-Locob.  They met Petitioner Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be the owner of the boats. A heated altercation ensued so Petitioner called for reinforcements and moment later, a boat bearing 10 armed men, some wearing fatigues arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then brought to Petitioner’s house in Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2am.  Petitioner was charged with a convicted of Arbitrary Detention by the Sandiganbayan. o Petitioner filed MR: Denied with finality o Petitioner filed Urgent Motion for Leave to File 2nd MR with attached MR alleging the innocence of Petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner is guilty of arbitrary detention HELD: No, the determinative factor in arbitrary detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear. After carefully reviewing the evidence, the SC found no proof that Petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the private offended party. The following are the elements of arbitrary detention: (1) Offender is a public officer or employee (2) He detains a person (3) Detention is without legal grounds. From the narration of SPO1 Capoquian, what appears is that Petitioner being the municipal mayor, merely extended his hospitality and end entertained the DENR team in his house. The testimonial evidence likewise shows that there was no actual restraint imposed on the private

offended parties. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that they were free to leave the house and roam around the barangay. He also, admitted that it was raining at that time. It is possible that Petitioner prevented the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to travel by boat. Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a reasonable doubt as to whether petitioner detained the DENR Team against their consent. The events that transpired are, to be sure, capable to two interpretations. While it may support the proposition that the private offended parties were taken to petitionerÊs house and prevented from leaving until 2:00 a.m. the next morning, it is equally plausible, if not more so, that petitioner extended his hospitality and served dinner and drinks to the team at his house. He could have advised them to stay on the island inasmuch as sea travel was rendered unsafe by the heavy rains. He ate together with the private offended parties and even laughed with them while conversing over dinner. This scenario is inconsistent with a hostile confrontation between the parties. Moreover, considering that the Mayor also served alcoholic drinks, it is not at all unusual that his guests left the house at 2:00 a.m. the following morning. ASTORGA V PEOPLE Crimes Against Fundamental Laws of the State – Arbitrary Detention Facts:  In 1997, the Regional Special Operations Group of the DENR sent a team to Daram, Western Samar to conduct research in line with govt’s campaign against illegal logging. In transit, the team spotted boats being constructed, prompting them to investigate.  The Team later saw to yacht-like boats which they later found out to be owned by a certain Figueroa. Later, they found 2 more other boats in a different barangay. They met Mayor Astorga, they approached and tried to explain their purpose. Astorga then slapped Simon twice and exclaimed “Puwede ko kamo papaglanguyon pag-uli ha Tacloban. Ano, di ka maaram nga natupa ako? Natupa baya ako. Diri kamo makauli yana kay puwede kame e charge ha misencounter. (I can make you swim back to Tacloban. Dont you know that I can box? I can box. Dont you know that I can declare this a misencounter?)”

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Mayor Astorga then ordered someone to fetch reinforcements, and 45 minutes later, or between 5:00-6:00 p.m., a banca arrived bearing 10 men, some of them dressed in fatigue uniforms. The men were armed with M-16 and M14 rifles, and they promptly surrounded the team, guns pointed at the team members. After negotiations, Simon and the special ops team failed to convince Mayor Astorga of their purpose. Mayor Astorga then were brought to a house where they were told they would be served dinner. They were there until 2am. Mayor Astorga was charged with Arbitrary Detention. SB – Mayor Astorga guilty. Astorga argues that the prosecution failed to establish the required quantum of evidence to prove his guilt especially that the private complainants executed a joint affidavit of desistance. There was no fact of restraint employed by the armed men upon the persons of the team.

Issue: WON Astorga is guilty of AD under Art. 124? Held: YES. Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person. Elements: 1) that the offender is a public officer/employee  Astorga = mayor 2) that he detains a person  jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention tells us that victim’s liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the victim’s person. In this case, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. The complainants were not allowed to go home, and were threatened by the armed men surrounding them. 3) that the detention is without legal grounds  acts were not motivated by legal grounds, instead by his “instinct for self-presevation and the feeling that he was being singled-out” Astorga submits that it is unclear whether the team was in fact prevented from leaving Brgy. LucobLucob or whether they had simply decided to while away the time and take advantage of the purported hospitality of the accused. On the contrary, SPO3 Cinco clearly and categorically denied that they were simply whiling away the time

between their dinner with Mayor Astorga and their departure early the following morning. SPO1 Capoquian gave similar testimony, saying that they did not use the time between their dinner with Mayor Astorga and their departure early the following morning to enjoy the place and that, given a choice, they would have gone home. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

PEOPLE V SANIANO Crimes Against Fundamental Laws of the State – Robbery with Homicide – Conspiracy in the Commission of the Crime Facts:  This is an appeal from the June 14, 1993 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 95), finding accusedappellants Manuel Diaz, Eddie Luto and Arnald Angquilo guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.  That on or about the 30th day of October, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the abovenamed accused, conspiring together, confederating with another person whose true name and identity have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob one FERDINAND FURIGAY y PUA.  Evidence for the prosecution established that on October 30, 1992, at about 6:00 p.m., while Ferdinand Furigay was in his office at 223-E Roosevelt Ave., Brgy. San Antonio, Q.C., and his employees, Melchor Bacani and Conrado Caliguiran, were in front of the establishment,[3] accusedappellants together with two (2) John Does came.[4] Accused Diaz asked Caliguiran where his boss was. After Caliguiran replied that his boss was inside the office, Diaz entered the establishment and went to Furigay's office. Accused Luto, Angquilo and the two (2) John Does posted themselves outside the establishment.

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After a short while, a gunshot was heard from Furigay's office. Caliguiran and Bacani were unable to enter immediately Furigay's office because Diaz poked his gun at them on his way out.[8] They also saw a gun tucked in the waist of Diaz, which gun they recognized as the 9mm automatic pistol of Furigay.[9] Accused-appellants then fled together from the scene of the crime Contrary to the police version, Diaz declared he was arrested at Onyx corner Francisco Streets, San Andres Bukid, Manila, on January 5, 1993. Eddie Luto testified that he was arrested by the police in the early morning of January 6, 1993 while he was at his residence at Sitio Militar. Arnald Angquilo said that he was arrested at his residence at about 5:00 a.m. on January 6, 1993. TC: Convicted

In their brief,[33] accused-appellants assigned the following errors: 1. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNRELIABLE AND UNWORTHY TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES. 2. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT CONSPIRACY WAS PRESENT IN THE INSTANT CASE AND IN FINDING ALL THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 3. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING IMPRIMATUR TO THE SEARCH, SEIZURE AND ARREST CONDUCTED ON THE THREE ACCUSED HEREIN NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THESE WERE MADE IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. The appeal is without merit. Appellants contend that the prosecution has failed to establish their identity and participation in the crime considering that none of the witnesses for the prosecution saw the crime. Allegedly, these witnesses were not able to enter the store upon hearing the gunshot because they were prevented by a man who wore dark eyeglasses and who poked a gun at them. The records will show that Bacani and Caliguiran positively identified Diaz, Luto and Angquilo as the perpetrators of the crime.

Issue: WON there was conspiracy? YES Held: It is settled that to hold an accused liable as coprincipal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. That avert act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime or moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the time of the commission of the crime. One who participates in the material execution of the crime by standing guard or lending moral support to the actual perpetrator is criminally responsible to the same extent as the latter.

Luto and Angquillo were not innocent latter bystanders when the crime at bar was committed. They were there on purpose. They stood as guards while Diaz robbed and shot the victim. Finally, accused-appellants assert that the trial court gravely erred when it admitted in evidence the gun (Exh. E), five bullets (Exhs. F-F-4) and magazine (Exh. G) taken from them by the police at the time of their arrest. Allegedly, they were obtained during a warrantless arrest. Their objection is too late. The records show that they failed to object to the admissibility of said evidence during their formal offer. Thus, waived their right against their admissibility. Amidst a waiver, the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellants. SO ORDERED.

Fernando CAYAO v. Judge Justiniano DEL MUNDO Crimes Against Fundamental Laws of the State DOCTRINE: The idea of confinement is not synonymous only with incarceration inside a jail cell. It is enough to qualify as confinement that a man be restrained, either morally or physically of his personal liberty. FACTS:  Petitioner Cayao is a bus driver of Donny’s Transit. While traversing the stretch of Mataas na Lupa, Indang, Cavite, he overtook a Sto. Niño Liner and as a consequence, he almost collided head-on with an oncoming ownertype jeepney. It turned out later that the jeepney was registered in the name of respondent Judge Del Mundo.  At 3:30PM of the same day, a policeman picked up Cayao and immediately brought him before the sala of Judge Del Mundo. Judge Del Mundo confronted Cayao and accused him of nearly causing an accident that morning. Without giving Cayao an opportunity to explain, Judge Del Mundo insisted that Cayao must be punished for the incident. Cayao was compelled to choose from the following punishments: (1) to face a charge of multiple attempted homicide, (2) revocation of his driver’s license, or (3) to be put in jail for three days.  Cayao chose the confinement for three days. As a consequence, he was forced to sign a “waiver of detention” by Judge Del Mundo. Though not actually incarcerated, Cayao remained in the premises of the municipal jail for three days (Oct. 22-25, 1992) by way of serving his “sentence.” On the 3rd day, he was released by SPO1 Manolo Dilig. The fact of detention was confirmed by the testimony of the jail warden. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Del Mundo was guilty of arbitrary detention when Cayao was not even put behind bars. HELD: Yes, Judge Del Mundo is guilty. Complainant was actually confined. Cayao was not allowed to leave the premises of the jail house. The idea of confinement is not synonymous only with incarceration inside a jail cell. It is enough to qualify as confinement that a man be restrained, either morally or physically of his personal liberty. Judge Del Mundo was in fact guilty of arbitrary detention when he, as a public officer, ordered the arrest and detention of Cayao without legal grounds. In overtaking another vehicle, Cayao was not committing or had not actually committed a

crime in the presence of Judge Del Mundo. Such being the case, the warrantless arrest and subsequent detention of complainant were illegal. It would be well to emphasize at this point that the gravity of the misconduct of respondent is not alone centered on his order for the detention of complainant. Rather, it is ingrained in the fact that complainant was so detained without affording him his constitutional rights. When respondent insisted on punishing him without a chance to air his side, complainant was deprived of the presumption of innocence, the right to be heard by himself and counsel, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him as well as the right to an impartial and public trial. Moreover, complainant was made to execute a waiver of detention without the assistance of counsel. Worse, the aforesaid waiver was even subscribed by complainant before the very same judge who was his accuser. Certainly, such intentional and blatant violations of one’s constitutional rights committed by respondent cannot be tolerated by this Court. Furthermore, the reprehensible conduct exhibited by respondent judge in the case at bar exposed his total disregard of, or indifference to, or even ignorance of, the procedure prescribed by law. His act of intentionally violating the law and disregarding well-known legal procedures can be characterized as gross misconduct, nay a criminal misconduct on his part. He used and abused his position of authority in intimidating the complainant as well as the members of the Indang police force into submitting to his excesses. Likewise, he closed his eyes to the mandates of the Code of Judicial Conduct to always conduct himself as to be beyond reproach and suspicion not only in the performance of his duties but also outside his sala and as a private individual. Clearly, there is not an iota of doubt that respondent, through his oppressive and vindictive actuations, has committed a disservice to the cause of justice. He has unequivocably demonstrated his unfitness to continue as a member of the judiciary and should accordingly be removed from the service. WHEREFORE, respondent judge Justiniano A. Del Mundo of the Municipal Trial Court of Indang, Cavite is hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits with prejudice to reinstatement or reappointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled corporations.